Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related
Employee Corruption (Testimony, 04/21/99, GAO/T-GGD-99-86).

The corruption of Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and U.S.
Customs Service employees along the Southwest border by drug traffickers
is a serious and continuing threat. Some of these employees have waved
drug loads through ports of entry, coordinated the movement of drugs
across the border, transported drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints,
sold drugs, and revealed drug intelligence information. Both INS and
Customs have policies and procedures to help ensure the integrity of
their employees. However, neither agency is taking full advantage of its
policies, procedures, and the lessons to be learned from closed
corruption cases to address the rising threat of employee corruption on
the Southwest border. For example, although the agencies generally
completed background investigations for new hires by the end of their
first year on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some
cases by as much as three years. The Justice Department's Office of the
Inspector General and Customs' Office of Internal Affairs, which deal
with allegations of drug-related misconduct by INS and Customs
employees, are required to formally report internal control weaknesses
identified from closed corruption cases. However, GAO's review of 28
cases involving INS and Customs employees along the Southwest border who
had been convicted of drug-related crimes between 1992 and 1997 found
internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported or
corrected. These weaknesses included instances where (1) drug smugglers
chose the inspection lane at a port of entry, (2) INS and Customs
employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting persons with whom
they had close personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel
were allowed to cross the Southwest border or pass Border Control
checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs have not formally
evaluated their integrity procedures to determine their effectiveness.
For example, GAO found that financial information required for
background investigations and reinvestigations was either limited or not
fully reviewed. This testimony summarizes the April 1999 report,
GAO/GGD-99-31.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD-99-86
     TITLE:  Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
	     Drug-Related Employee Corruption
      DATE:  04/21/99
   SUBJECT:  Drug trafficking
	     Smuggling
	     Internal controls
	     Bribery
	     Ethical conduct
	     Federal employees
	     Personnel management
	     Customs administration
	     Crimes or offenses
IDENTIFIER:  Texas
	     California

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DRUG CONTROL INS and Customs Can DoMore To Prevent DrugRelated
EmployeeCorruption

Statement of Richard M. Stana, Associate DirectorAdministration of
Justice Issues General Government Division

United States General Accounting OfficeGAO Testimony Before the
Senate Caucus on International NarcoticsControl

For Release on DeliveryExpected at 2:00 p.m., EDTon Wednesday
April 21, 1999

GAO/T-GGD-99-86

SummaryDrug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 1 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Some Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and U.S. CustomsService employees on the Southwest Border
have engaged in a variety of illegal drug-related activities,
including waving drug loads through ports ofentry, coordinating
the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border, transporting
drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints, selling drugs, anddisclosing
drug intelligence information.

Both INS and Customs have policies and procedures designed to
helpensure the integrity of their employees. However, neither
agency is taking full advantage of its policies, procedures, and
the lessons to be learnedfrom closed corruption cases to fully
address the increased threat of employee corruption on the
Southwest Border. These policies andprocedures consist mainly of
mandatory background investigations for new staff and 5-year
reinvestigations of employees, as well as basicintegrity training.
While the agencies generally completed required background
investigations for new hires by the end of their first year onthe
job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some instances,
by as many as 3 years. Both INS and Customs provided integrity
training to newemployees during basic training, but advanced
integrity training was not required. The Departments of Justice
and the Treasury have different organizationalstructures but
similar policies and procedures for handling allegations of drug-
related misconduct by INS and Customs employees. At Justice,
theOffice of the Inspector General (OIG) is generally responsible
for investigating criminal allegations against INS employees. GAO
found thatthe Justice OIG generally complied with its policies and
procedures for handling allegations of drug-related misconduct. At
the Treasury, Customs'Office of Internal Affairs is generally
responsible for investigating both criminal and noncriminal
allegations against Customs employees.Customs' automated case
management system and its investigative case files did not provide
the necessary information to assess compliance withinvestigative
procedures.

INS and Customs have missed opportunities to learn lessons and
changetheir policies and procedures for preventing the drug-
related corruption of their employees. The Justice OIG and
Customs' Office of Internal Affairsare required to formally report
internal control weaknesses identified from closed corruption
cases, but have not done so. GAO's review of 28 casesinvolving INS
and Customs employees assigned to the Southwest Border, who were
convicted of drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through1997,
revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally
reported and/or corrected. These weaknesses included instances
where (1) drug

Summary Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related Employee Corruption

Page 2 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 smugglers chose the inspection lane at a
port of entry, (2) INS andCustoms employees did not recuse
themselves from inspecting individuals with whom they had close
personal relationships, and (3) law enforcementpersonnel were
allowed to cross the Southwest Border or pass Border Patrol
checkpoints without inspection. Also, INS and Customs had
notformally evaluated their integrity procedures to determine
their effectiveness. GAO made recommendations in response to
theseweaknesses.

StatementDrug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 3 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Mr. Chairman and Members of the Caucus: I
am pleased to be here today to discuss the serious and continuing
threatof corruption to Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and U.S. Customs Service employees along the Southwest
Border by personsinvolved in the illegal drug trade. The enormous
sums of money being generated by drug trafficking have increased
the threat for bribery. It is achallenge that INS, Customs, and
other law enforcement agencies must overcome at the border. My
testimony focuses on (1) the extent to which INS and Customs
haveand comply with policies and procedures for ensuring employee
integrity; (2) an identification and comparison of the Departments
of Justice's andthe Treasury's organizational structures,
policies, and procedures for handling allegations of drug-related
employee misconduct and whether thepolicies and procedures are
followed; (3) an identification of the types of illegal drug-
related activities in which INS and Customs employees on
theSouthwest Border have been convicted;

1 and (4) the extent to which

lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992
through1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for
preventing the

drug-related corruption of INS and Customs employees. This
statement is based on our March 30, 1999, report2 on drug-
relatedemployee corruption. Our statement makes the following
points:

*  INS' and Customs' compliance with their integrity procedures
varied.*

Justice's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and INS generally
compliedwith investigative procedures, but Customs' compliance was
uncertain.

*  Opportunities to learn lessons from closed corruption cases
have beenmissed.

Stretching 1,962 miles from Brownsville, TX, to Imperial Beach,
CA, theSouthwest Border has been a long-standing transit area for
illegal drugs entering the United States. According to the
Department of State, theSouthwest Border is the principal transit
route for cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the
United States. INS and Customs areprincipally responsible for
stopping and seizing illegal drug shipments
1 In this report, if employees entered guilty pleas, we considered
them to have been convicted of the

crime. 2 Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related Employee Corruption (GAO/GGD-99-31, Mar. 30, 1999).

Background

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 4 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 across the Southwest Border. At the ports
of entry, about 1,300 INS and2,000 Customs inspectors are to check
incoming traffic to identify both persons and contraband that are
not allowed to enter the country.Between the ports of entry and
along thoroughfares in border areas, about 6,300 INS Border Patrol
agents are to detect and prevent the illegal entry ofpersons and
contraband.

The corruption of INS or Customs employees is not a new
phenomenon,and the 1990s have seen congressional emphasis on
ensuring employee integrity and preventing corruption. A corrupt
INS or Customs employee ator between the ports of entry can help
facilitate the safe passage of illegal drug shipments. The
integrity policies and procedures adopted by INS andCustoms are
designed to ensure that their employees, especially those in
positions that could affect the smuggling of illegal drugs into
the UnitedStates, are of acceptable integrity and, failing that,
to detect any corruption as quickly as possible. INS and Customs
follow Office of Personnel Management (OPM)regulations, which
require background investigations to be completed for new hires by
the end of their first year on the job. Generally, thebackground
investigations included a credit check, criminal record check,
contact with prior employers and personal references, and an
interviewwith the employee. Our review found that background
investigations for over 99 percent of the immigration inspectors,
Border Patrol agents, andCustoms inspectors hired during the first
half of fiscal year 1997 were completed by the end of their first
year on the job.3 OPM also requires immigration inspectors, Border
Patrol agents, andCustoms inspectors to be reinvestigated at 5-
year intervals from the date they enter on duty. The objective of
these reinvestigations is to ensurethese employees' continuing
suitability for their positions. As with background
investigations, contractors did the reinvestigations and INSand
Customs were responsible for making the final determinations on
suitability. However, INS and Customs did not complete
reinvestigationswithin the required 5-year time frame for over
three-fourths of the selected Southwest Border personnel scheduled
for reinvestigations in fiscal years

3 We restricted our analysis of immigration inspectors and Border
Patrol agents hired in fiscal year

1997 to those hired by March 8, 1997, and of Customs inspectors
hired in fiscal year 1997 to those hiredby March 25, 1997. This is
because we received personnel data current as of March 1998, the
1-year

anniversaries of those dates, and because OPM allows agencies to
employ individuals in a "subject toinvestigation" status for up to
1 year. A background investigation should be completed during that
time.

INS and CustomsGenerally Completed BackgroundInvestigations, but
Not Reinvestigations, WhenDue

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 5 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 1995 through 1997. In some instances,
reinvestigations were as many as 3years overdue.  To the extent
that a reinvestigation constitutes an important periodiccheck on
an employee's continuing suitability for employment in a position
where he or she may be exposed to bribery or other types of
corruption,the continuing reinvestigation backlogs at both
agencies leave them more vulnerable to potential employee
corruption.  As of March 1998, INS hadnot yet completed 513
overdue reinvestigations of immigration inspectors and Border
Patrol agents. Customs had a backlog of 421
overduereinvestigations.

Newly hired immigration inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and
Customsinspectors are required to attend basic training. As part
of their basic training, new employees are to receive training
courses on integrityconcepts and expected behavior, including
ethical concepts and values, ethical dilemmas and decisionmaking,
and employee conductexpectations. This integrity training provides
the only required integrity training for all immigration
inspectors, Border Patrol agents, and Customsinspectors. For
Border Patrol agents, 7 of 744 basic training hours are to be
devoted to integrity training. For Customs inspectors, 8 of 440
basictraining hours are to be devoted to integrity training. INS
immigration inspectors are to receive integrity training as part
of their basic training,but it is interspersed with other training
rather than provided as a separate course. Therefore, we could not
determine how many hours are to bedevoted specifically to
integrity training.

We selected random samples of 100 immigration inspectors, 101
BorderPatrol agents, and 100 Customs inspectors to determine
whether they received integrity training as part of their basic
training. Agency recordswe reviewed showed that 95 of 100
immigration inspectors, all 101 Border Patrol agents, and 88 of
100 Customs inspectors had received basictraining. According to
INS and Customs officials, the remaining employees likely received
basic training, but it was not documented in their records.
Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials advocated advanced
integritytraining for their employees to reinforce the integrity
concepts presented during basic training.4  The Justice OIG, INS'
Office of Internal Audit, andCustoms provide advanced integrity
training for INS and Customs employees.
4 Advanced integrity training is any nonmanagerial integrity
training provided to employees following

completion of basic training.

Basic Integrity TrainingWas Required and Advanced Training WasNot

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 6 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 While this advanced training has been
available to immigration inspectors,Border Patrol agents, and
Customs inspectors, they were not required to take it or any
additional integrity training beyond what they received inbasic
training. Consequently, some immigration inspectors, Border Patrol
agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to the Southwest Border
had notreceived any advanced integrity training in over 2 years.

Based on a survey of random samples of immigration inspectors,
BorderPatrol agents, and Customs inspectors assigned to the
Southwest Border, we found that during fiscal years 1995 through
1997, 60 of 100 immigrationinspectors agents received no advanced
integrity training.  In addition, 60 of 76 Border Patrol agents
received no advanced integrity training duringthe almost 2 1/2 -
year period we examined.

5  The Customs survey indicated

that 24 of 100 Customs inspectors received no advanced integrity
trainingduring this period.

The Departments of Justice and the Treasury have established
proceduresfor handling allegations of employee misconduct.
Misconduct allegations arise from numerous sources, including
confidential informants,cooperating witnesses, anonymous tipsters,
and whistle-blowers. For example, whistle-blowers can report
alleged misconduct through theagencies' procedures for reporting
any suspected wrongdoing. INS and Customs have policies that
require employees to report suspectedwrongdoing.

We selected five Justice OIG procedures to evaluate compliance
with theprocessing of employee misconduct allegations. In a
majority of the cases we reviewed, the Justice OIG complied with
its procedures for receiving,investigating, and resolving drug-
related employee misconduct allegations. For example, monthly
interim reports were prepared as required in 28 of39 opened cases
we reviewed. In the remaining 11 cases, either some information
was missing in interim reports or there were no interimreports in
the case file.

INS' Office of Internal Audit complied with its procedures for
receivingand resolving employee misconduct allegations in all of
its cases.

5 INS did not provide us with requested training data for 25 of
the 101 Border Patrol agents in our

sample.

Justice OIG and INSGenerally Complied with
InvestigativeProcedures, but Customs' ComplianceWas Uncertain

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 7 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Because Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs' automated case managementsystem did not track adherence
to Customs' processing requirements, we could not readily
determine if the Office of Internal Affairs staff compliedwith
their investigative procedures.

Customs' automated system is the official investigative record. It
tracksand categorizes misconduct allegations and resulting
investigations and disciplinary action. The investigative case
files are to support theautomated system in tracking criminal
investigative activity and contain such information as printed
records from the automated system, copies ofsubpoenas and arrest
warrants, and a chronology of investigative events. Based on these
content criteria and our file reviews, the investigative casefiles
are not intended to and generally do not document the adherence to
processing procedures. Our analysis of the 28 closed cases
revealed that drug-related corruption inthese cases was not
restricted to any one type, location, agency, or job. Corruption
occurred in many locations and under various circumstancesand
times, underscoring the need for comprehensive integrity
procedures that are effective. The cases also represented an
opportunity to identifyinternal control weaknesses.

The 28 INS and Customs employees engaged in one or more drug-
relatedcriminal activities, including

*  waving drug-laden vehicles through ports of entry,

*  coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border,

*  transporting drugs past Border Patrol checkpoints,

*  selling drugs, and

*  disclosing drug intelligence information.

The 28 convicted employees (19 INS employees and 9 Customs
employees)were stationed at various locations on the Southwest
Border. Six each were stationed in El Paso, TX, and Calexico, CA;
four were stationed inDouglas, AZ; three were stationed in San
Ysidro, CA; two each were stationed in Hidalgo, TX, and Los
Fresnos, TX; and one each was stationedin Naco, AZ, Chula Vista,
CA, Bayview, TX, Harlingen, TX, and Falfurrias, TX.

Opportunities to LearnLessons from Closed Corruption Cases
HaveBeen Missed

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 8 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 The 28 INS and Customs employees who were
convicted for drug-relatedcrimes included 10 immigration
inspectors, 7 Customs inspectors, 6 Border Patrol agents, 3 INS
Detention Enforcement Officers (DEO), 1 Customscanine enforcement
officer, and 1 Customs operational analysis specialist. All but
the three had anti-drug smuggling responsibilities. Twenty-six
ofthe convicted employees were men; 2 were women. The employment
histories of the convicted employees varied substantially. In 19
cases, the employees acted alone, that is, no other INS or
Customsemployees were involved in the drug-related criminal
activity. In the remaining nine cases, two or more INS and/or
Customs employees actedtogether. Of the 28 cases, 23 originated
from information provided by confidential informants or
cooperating witnesses, and 5 cases originatedfrom information
provided by agency whistle-blowers. Prison sentences for the
convicted employees ranged from 30 days, for disclosure
ofconfidential information, to life imprisonment for drug
conspiracy, money laundering, and bribery. The average sentence
was about 10 years.6 Both the Justice OIG and Customs procedures
require them to formallyreport internal control weaknesses
identified during investigations, including drug-related
corruption investigations involving INS andCustoms employees.
Generally, the Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs, respectively, have lead responsibility for
investigatingcriminal allegations involving INS and Customs
employees. Reports of internal control weaknesses are to identify
any lessons to be learned thatcan be used to prevent further
employee corruption. The reports are to be forwarded to agency
officials who are responsible for taking correctiveaction. Reports
are not required if no internal control weaknesses are identified.
In the 28 cases involving INS or Customs employees who were
convictedfor drug-related crimes in fiscal years 1992 through
1997, no reports were prepared. We concluded from this that either
(1) there were no internalcontrol weaknesses revealed by, or
lessons to be learned from, these corruption cases or (2)
opportunities to identify and correct internalcontrol weaknesses
have been missed, and thus INS' and Customs' vulnerability to
employee corruption has not been reduced.

6 The average prison sentence calculation does not include two
former employees sentenced to life

imprisonment, and one former employee who fled the country prior
to sentencing. Information isprovided only on the imprisonment
portion of the sentences.

Drug-Related CorruptionCases Were Not Used to Learn Lessons

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 9 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Justice's OIG investigated 13 of the 28
cases. The investigative files did notdocument whether procedures
were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses. Further,
there were no reports identifying internal controlweaknesses.
According to a Justice OIG official, no reports are required if no
weaknesses are identified, and he could not determine why
reportswere not prepared in these cases.

Customs' Office of Internal Affairs' Internal Affairs Handbook
provides forthe preparation of a procedural deficiency report in
those internal investigations where there was a significant
failure that resulted from (1)failure to follow an established
procedure, (2) lack of an established procedure, or (3)
conflicting or obsolete procedures. The report is to detailthe
causal factors and scope of the deficiency.

We identified eight cases involving Customs employees investigated
byCustoms' Office of Internal Affairs. No procedural deficiency
reports were prepared in these cases. Further, the investigative
files did not documentwhether internal control weaknesses were
identified. A Customs official said the reports are generally not
prepared. Although the Justice OIG and Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs have leadresponsibility for investigating allegations
involving INS and Customs employees, the FBI is authorized to
investigate INS or Customs employees.Of the 28 cases, the FBI
investigated 7, involving 6 INS employees and 1 Customs employee.
Under current procedures, the FBI is not required toprovide the
Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs with case
information that would allow them to identify internal control
weaknesses,where the FBI investigation involves an INS or Customs
employee. In addition, while Attorney General memorandums require
the FBI to identifyand report any internal control weaknesses
identified during white-collar or health care fraud
investigations, a Justice Department official told usthat these
reporting requirements do not apply to drug-related corruption
cases. According to FBI officials, no reports were prepared in the
sevencases because they were not required.

The Justice OIG and Customs did not identify and report any
internalcontrol weaknesses involving the procedures that were
followed at the ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints
along the SouthwestBorder. Our review of the same cases identified
several weaknesses.

We identified 14 cases in which INS or Customs inspectors
knowinglypassed drug-laden vehicles through ports of entry.
Traditionally, INS and Customs have relied on internal controls to
minimize this type of

Our Review of ClosedCorruption Cases Revealed Internal
ControlWeaknesses on the Southwest Border

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 10 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 corruption. These have included the random
assignment and shifting ofinspectors from one lane to another and
the unannounced inspection of a group of vehicles. However, in the
cases we reviewed, these internalcontrols did not prevent corrupt
INS and Customs personnel from allowing drug-laden vehicles to
enter the United States. In some cases, theinspectors communicated
their lane assignment and the time they would be on duty to the
drug smuggler, and in other cases, they did not. In onecase, for
example, an inspector used a cellular telephone to send a
prearranged code to a drug smuggler's beeper to tell him which
lane to useand what time to use it. In contrast, another inspector
did not notify the drug smuggler concerning his lane assignment or
the times he would be onduty. In that case, the drug smuggler used
an individual, referred to as a spotter, to conduct surveillance
of the port of entry. The spotter used acellular telephone to
contact the driver of the drug-laden vehicle to tell him which
lane to drive through. The drug smugglers' schemes succeeded in
these cases because the driversof the drug-laden vehicles could
choose the lane they wanted to use for inspection purposes. These
cases support the implementation of one ormore methods to deprive
drivers of their choice of inspection lanes at ports of entry. At
the time of our review, Customs was testing a method toassign
drivers to inspection lanes at ports of entry.

In 10 of 28 cases, drug smugglers relied on friendships,
personalrelationships, or symbols of law enforcement authority to
move drug loads through a port of entry or past a Border Patrol
checkpoint. In these 10cases, drug smugglers believed that
coworkers, relatives, and friends of Customs or immigration
inspectors, or law enforcement officials, wouldnot be inspected or
would be given preferential treatment in the inspection process.
For example, a Border Patrol agent relied on his friendships
withhis coworkers to avoid inspection at a Border Patrol
checkpoint where he was stationed. In another case, an inspector
agreed to allow her boyfriendto smuggle drugs through a port of
entry. The boyfriend used his personal and intimate relationship
with the inspector to solicit drug shipments fromdrug dealers. Two
DEOs working together used INS detention buses and vans to
transport drugs past a Border Patrol checkpoint. In two
separatecases, former INS employees relied on friendships they had
developed during their tenure with the agency to smuggle drugs
through ports ofentry and past Border Patrol checkpoints.

INS and Customs do not have written recusal policies concerning
theperformance of inspections where the relationship of
immigration or Customs inspectors and Border Patrol agents to the
person being

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 11 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 inspected is such that they may not
objectively perform the inspection.Nor do they have a written
inspection policy for law enforcement officers or their vehicles.
For example, our review of the cases determined that, onnumerous
occasions, INS DEOs drove INS vehicles with drug loads past Border
Patrol checkpoints without being inspected. INS and Customs have
not evaluated the effectiveness of their integrityassurance
procedures to identify areas that could be improved. According to
Justice OIG, INS, and Customs officials, agency integrity
procedureshave not been evaluated to determine if they are
effective. The Acting Deputy Commissioner of Customs said that
there were no evaluations ofthe effectiveness of Customs integrity
procedures. Similarly, officials in INS' Offices of Internal Audit
and Personnel Security said that there wereno evaluations of the
effectiveness of INS' integrity procedures. According to the
Justice Inspector General, virtually no work had been done
toreview closed corruption cases or interview convicted employees
to identify areas of vulnerability. Based on our review, one way
to evaluate the effectiveness of agencyintegrity procedures would
be to use drug-related investigative case information. For
example, the objective of background investigations
orreinvestigations is to determine an individual's suitability for
employment, including whether he or she has the required
integrity. All 28 of the INSand Customs employees who were
convicted for drug-related crimes received background
investigations or reinvestigations that determinedthey were
suitable. According to INS and Customs security officials,
financial information, required to be provided by employees as
part oftheir background investigations or reinvestigations, is to
be used to determine whether they appear to be living beyond their
means, or haveunsatisfied debts. If either of these issues arises,
it must be satisfactorily resolved before INS or Customs can
determine that the employee issuitable. In addition, Justice
policy provides for the temporary removal of immigration
inspectors and Border Patrol agents if they are unable
and/orunwilling to satisfy their debts.

7

Our review of background investigation and reinvestigation files
forconvicted INS employees showed that immigration inspectors and
Border Patrol agents were required to provide limited financial
information onliabilities, including bankruptcies, wage
garnishment, property repossession, and liens for taxes or other
debts or judgements that have
7 Justice Department policy defines debt as "lawful financial
obligations that are just debts that are past

due."

INS and Customs Have NotEvaluated Their Integrity Procedures

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 12 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 not been paid.8 They were not required to
provide information on theirassets. In comparison, Customs
inspectors and canine enforcement officers were required to
provide information on both their assets andliabilities, including
financial information for themselves and their immediate families
on their bank accounts, automobiles, real estate,securities, safe
deposit boxes, business investments, art, boats, antiques,
inheritance, mortgage, and debts and obligations exceeding $200.9
Our review of the 28 cases involving convicted INS and
Customsemployees disclosed that 26 of 28 employees were offered or
received financial remuneration for their illegal acts. At least
two were substantiallyindebted, and at least four were shown to be
living beyond their means. For example, one of the closed cases we
reviewed involved an immigrationinspector who said he became
involved with a drug smuggler because he had substantial credit
card debt and was on the verge of bankruptcy. Giventhe limited
financial information immigration inspectors are required to
provide, this inspector might not have been identified as a
potential risk. Inanother case, a mid-level Border Patrol agent
owned a house valued at approximately $200,000, an Olympic-sized
swimming pool in its ownseparate building, a 5-car garage, 5
automobiles, 1 van, 2 boats, approximately 100 weapons, $45,000 in
treasury bills, 40 acres of land, andhad no debt. Given the
current background investigation or reinvestigation financial
reporting requirements for Border Patrol agents, this agent
wouldnot have had anything to report, since he was not required to
report his assets, and he had no debts to report. Our review of
Customs files for eight of the nine convicted Customsemployees
showed that the Customs inspectors and canine enforcement officers
had completed financial disclosure statements that included
theirassets and liabilities as part of their employee background
investigations and reinvestigations. However, based on our case
file review, Customsdoes not fully use all of the financial
information. For example, according to a Customs official,
reported liabilities are to be compared with debtslisted on a
credit report to determine if all debts were reported. Thus, their
current use of the reported financial information would not have
helped toidentify an employee who was living well beyond his means
or whose debts were excessive.
8 Immigration inspectors and Border Patrol agents are to complete
a Questionnaire for National

Security Positions as part of their background investigation and
reinvestigation. 9 Customs inspectors and canine enforcement
officers are to complete a Questionnaire for Public Trust
Positions and a Financial Statement on Customs Form 257 as part of
their background investigationand reinvestigation.

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 13 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 Another source of evaluative information
for INS and Customs could bethe experiences of other federal
agencies with integrity prevention and detection policies and
procedures. For example, while INS' and Customs'procedures were
similar to those used by other federal law enforcement agencies,
several differences exist. According to agency officials, INS
andCustoms did not require advanced integrity training, polygraph
examinations, or panel interviews before hiring, while the FBI,
DEA, andSecret Service did have these requirements. Among the five
agencies, only DEA required new employees to be assigned to a
mentor to reinforceagency values and procedures. Since these
policies and procedures are used by other agencies, they may be
applicable to INS and Customs. During our review, the Justice OIG,
INS, the Treasury OIG, and Customsbegan to review their
anticorruption efforts. These efforts have not been completed, and
it is too early to determine what their outcomes will be. Given
the enormous sums of money being generated by drug traffickingand
the corruption of some INS and Customs employees along the
Southwest Border, both INS and Customs are vulnerable to the
threat ofcorruption. Accordingly, we recommended that the Attorney
General

*  direct the Commissioner of INS to evaluate the effectiveness of
integrityassurance efforts, such as training, background
investigations, and

reinvestigations;

*  require the Commissioner of INS to comply with policies that
requireemployment reinvestigations to be completed when they are
due;

*  direct the Commissioner of INS to strengthen internal controls
atSouthwest Border ports of entry and at Border Patrol checkpoints
by

establishing (1) one or more methods to deprive drivers of their
choice ofinspection lanes at ports of entry; (2) a policy for the
inspection of law enforcement officers or their vehicles at ports
of entry and Border Patrolcheckpoints; and (3) a recusal policy
concerning the performance of inspections by immigration
inspectors and Border Patrol agents wheretheir objectivity may be
in question;

*  direct the Commissioner of INS to require Border Patrol agents
andimmigration inspectors to file financial disclosure statements,
including a

listing of their assets and liabilities, as part of the background
investigationor reinvestigation process, as well as fully review
this information to identify financial issues, such as employees
who appear to be livingbeyond their means;

Recommendations

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 14 GAO/T-GGD-99-86

*  require the Justice OIG to document that policies and
procedures werereviewed to identify internal control weaknesses in
cases where an INS

employee is determined to have engaged in drug-related criminal
activities;and

*  require the Director of the FBI to develop a procedure to
provideinformation from closed FBI cases, involving INS or Customs
employees,

to the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal Affairs so they
canidentify and report internal control weaknesses to the
responsible agency official.  The procedure should apply in those
cases where (1) the JusticeOIG or Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs was not involved in the investigation, (2) the subject of
the investigation was an INS or Customsemployee, and (3) the
employee was convicted of a drug-related crime.

We also recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury

*  direct the Commissioner of Customs to evaluate the
effectiveness ofintegrity assurance efforts, including training,
background investigations,

and reinvestigations;

*  require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with policies
that requireemployment reinvestigations to be completed when they
are due;

*  require the Commissioner of Customs to document that policies
andprocedures were reviewed to identify internal control
weaknesses, in

cases where a Customs employee is determined to have engaged drug-
related criminal activities;

*  require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with the policies
thatrequire employment reinvestigations to be completed when they
are due;

*  require the Commissioner of Customs to document that policies
andprocedures were reviewed to identify internal control
weaknesses in cases

where a Customs employee is determined to have engaged in drug-
relatedcriminal activities;

*  direct the Commissioner of Customs to strengthen internal
controls atSouthwest Border ports of entry by establishing (1) one
or more methods

to deprive drivers of their choice of inspection lanes; (2) a
policy forinspection of law enforcement officers and their
vehicles; and (3) a recusal policy concerning the performance of
inspections by Customs inspectorswhere their objectivity may be in
question; and

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 15 GAO/T-GGD-99-86

*  require that Customs fully review financial disclosure
statements, whichemployees are required to provide as part of the
background investigation

or reinvestigation process, to identify financial issues, such as
employeeswho appear to be living beyond their means.

The Department of Justice generally agreed with the substance of
thereport and recognized the importance of taking all possible
actions to reduce the potential for corruption. However, Justice
expressedreservations about implementing two of the six
recommendations addressed to the Attorney General. First, Justice
expressed reservations about implementing ourrecommendation that
Border Patrol agents and immigration inspectors file financial
disclosure statements as part of their background investigationsor
reinvestigations. Specifically, it noted that implementing
financial disclosure "has obstacles to be met and at present the
DOJ has limited datato suggest that they would provide better data
or greater assurance of a person's integrity." We recognized that
implementation of this recommendation will requiresome
administrative actions by INS. However, these actions are
consistent with the routine management practices associated with
making policychanges within the agency. Therefore, the obstacles
do not appear to be inordinate or insurmountable. Concerning the
limited data about thebenefits of financial reporting, according
to OPM officials and the adjudication manual for background
investigations and reinvestigations,financial information can have
a direct bearing and impact on determining an individual's
integrity. The circumstances described in our case studiessuggest
that financial reporting could have raised issues for follow-up
during a background investigation or reinvestigation. We recognize
thatthere may be questions on the effectiveness of this procedure;
therefore, this report contains a recommendation for an overall
evaluation of INS'integrity assurance efforts.

Secondly, Justice expressed reservations about implementing
ourrecommendation that the FBI develop a procedure to provide
information to the Justice OIG or Customs' Office of Internal
Affairs on internal controlweaknesses. Therefore, we clarified our
recommendation to indicate that the procedure should only apply in
those cases where (1) the Justice OIGor Customs' Office of
Internal Affairs was not involved in the investigation, (2) the
subject of the investigation was an INS or Customs employee,
and(3) the employee was convicted of a drug-related crime. If
internal control weaknesses in INS or Customs are known to the FBI
and not disclosed to

Agencies' Commentson Our Report

Statement Drug Control:  INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent
Drug-Related EmployeeCorruption

Page 16 GAO/T-GGD-99-86 those agencies, then the agencies are not
in the best position to correct theabuses. The Department of the
Treasury provided comments from Customs thatgenerally concurred
with our recommendations and indicated that it is taking steps to
implement them. However, Customs requested that wereconsider our
recommendation that Customs fully review financial disclosure
statements that are provided as part of the background
andreinvestigation process. Our recommendation expected Customs to
make a more thorough examination of the financial information it
collects todetermine if employees appear to be living beyond their
means. We leave it to Customs' discretion to determine the type of
examination to beperformed.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be
pleasedto answer any questions that you or other Members of the
Caucus may have.

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