Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and
Program Challenges (Testimony, 07/29/1999, GAO/T-GGD-99-148).

The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) mission is twofold.
First, the agency seeks to prevent aliens from entering the United
States illegally and remove those who succeed in doing so. Second, INS
provides services to facilitate the entry, residency, employment, and
naturalization of legal immigrants. This testimony summarizes GAO's work
on management and program challenges at INS. These challenges involve
INS' strategic planning process, organizational structure,
communications and coordination, financial management, and program
implementation.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD-99-148
     TITLE:  Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of
	     Management and Program Challenges
      DATE:  07/29/1999
   SUBJECT:  Immigration or emigration
	     Internal controls
	     Law enforcement
	     Strategic planning
	     Federal agency reorganization
	     Public administration
	     Financial management
	     General management reviews
IDENTIFIER:  INS Institutional Hearing Program

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO
    Testimony Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
    Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims House of Representatives
    Not to be Released Before 9:30 a.m. EDT Thursday
    IMMIGRATION AND July 29, 1999           NATURALIZATION SERVICE
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges Statement of Richard
    M. Stana Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues
    General Government Division GAO/T-GGD-99-148 Summary Immigration
    and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges GAO and others have identified management and program
    challenges that have troubled the Immigration and Naturalization
    Service (INS) for years. GAO's management reports in 1991 and 1997
    and related reviews have indicated that urgent attention should be
    given to INS' management challenges. GAO pointed out significant
    issues related to INS' (1) strategic planning process; (2)
    organizational structure; (3) communications and coordination; and
    (4) financial management processes. More specifically, GAO said
    that: *  INS' strategic planning required sustained management
    attention and commitment; *  INS' reorganization had created some
    uncertainty about organizational roles and responsibilities; *
    INS' internal communications and coordination were problematic, as
    evidenced by its outdated policies and procedures on how to
    implement immigration laws; and *  INS' financial management
    processes were weak, including outdated accounting systems, weak
    internal controls, and a lack of management emphasis on financial
    management. In addition to these management challenges, program
    implementation issues at INS have been the focus of much of GAO's
    work. GAO's reports on these issues have been related to INS'
    efforts to: *  stem the flow of illegal aliens across the
    Southwest Border; *  identify and remove criminal aliens from the
    country; *  process applications for naturalization; *  enforce
    workplace immigration laws; and *  process aliens for expedited
    removal. GAO recognizes that addressing these management and
    program challenges can be difficult. In carrying out its mission,
    INS has to contend with issues of foreign policy (e.g., U.S.
    readiness to provide asylum to political refugees); domestic
    policy (e.g., the tension between the need for cheap labor that
    immigrants have historically met and the protection of employment
    and working standards for U.S. citizens); and intergovernmental
    relations (e.g., between the federal government, which sets policy
    on immigration, and state and local governments, which largely
    bear its costs and consequences). Sustained top-level management
    commitment and monitoring are necessary to ensure that these
    challenges are addressed appropriately. Page 1        GAO/T-GGD-
    99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program Challenges
    Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of
    Management and Program Challenges Mr. Chairman and Members of the
    Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss work we
    have done addressing management and program challenges at the
    Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).  These challenges
    have been related to INS' strategic planning process,
    organizational structure, communications and coordination,
    financial management, and program implementation. For the most
    part, our testimony is based on products that we have issued on
    these matters since 1991. Attached to my statement is a
    bibliography of this work. INS' mission involves carrying out two
    primary functions. One is an enforcement function that involves
    preventing aliens from entering the United States illegally and
    removing aliens who succeed in doing so. The other is a service
    function that involves providing services or benefits to
    facilitate entry, residence, employment, and naturalization of
    legal immigrants. To enable INS to better implement and enforce
    immigration laws, Congress significantly increased its resources
    during the past several years. For example, between fiscal years
    1993 and 1998, the number of onboard staff at INS increased from
    about 19,000 to nearly 31,000. During the same period, INS' budget
    more than doubled from $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1993 to about
    $3.8 billion in fiscal year 1998.  Funding increases have
    continued in fiscal year 1999 with Congress providing over $3.9
    billion. Earlier this year, we reported on management challenges
    and program risks in the Justice Department.1  Most of the
    challenges and risks that we identified were in INS. However, we
    noted that, in carrying out its responsibilities, INS has to
    contend with issues of foreign policy (e.g., U.S. readiness to
    provide asylum to political refugees); domestic policy (e.g., the
    tension between the need for cheap labor that immigrants have
    historically met and the protection of employment and working
    standards for U.S. citizens); and intergovernmental relations
    (e.g., between the federal government, which sets policy on
    immigration, and state and local governments, which largely bear
    its costs and consequences). Several of our past reports have
    identified significant management Management     challenges that
    have troubled INS for years. Those challenges have been Challenges
    related to INS' (1) strategic planning process; (2) organizational
    structure; 1 Performance and Accountability Series:  Major
    Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice
    (GAO/OCG-99-10, Jan. 1999). Page 2                       GAO/T-
    GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program Challenges
    Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:  Overview of
    Management and Program Challenges (3) communications and
    coordination; and (4) financial management processes. In 1991, we
    reported that INS lacked a strategic plan and that past priority
    INS' Strategic Planning    management processes were not
    successful.2 We also stated that past Process
    efforts to implement agencywide planning systems lacked sustained
    top management support, managers were not held accountable for
    achieving goals and objectives, and priorities were not used in
    planning for decisionmaking. Three years later, INS developed and
    issued a strategic plan to better focus its attention on key
    mission and operational priorities. The plan identified eight
    major strategic priorities, including such challenges as
    facilitating compliance with immigration laws, deterring unlawful
    migration, and reengineering INS work processes. In fiscal year
    1995, INS implemented a priorities management process intended to
    facilitate the achievement of the strategic priorities identified
    in the plan. Specific annual goals related to strategic priorities
    were identified for special management attention, including the
    establishment of objectives, time frames, and performance
    measures. In fiscal year 1996, to further focus management
    attention on the most important goals, INS ranked the annual goals
    according to their priority. By assigning senior INS managers
    specific responsibility for achieving the annual priority goals,
    INS intended to establish better organizational and individual
    accountability. In 1997, we said that these efforts appeared to be
    consistent with the intent of the Government Performance and
    Results Act. However, we also concluded that, while INS' initial
    steps in developing a strategic plan and management priorities had
    been positive, our past work at INS had indicated that, to be
    successful, such initiatives would require sustained management
    attention and commitment.3 In 1991, we reported that,
    historically, INS leadership had allowed INS' INS' Organizational
    organizational structure to become decentralized without adequate
    Structure                  controls.4 Specifically, its regional
    structure had created geographical separation among INS programs
    and hampered resource allocation and consistent program
    implementation. The field structure to carry out INS' enforcement
    functions was bifurcated between districts and Border Patrol
    sectors, resulting in uncoordinated, overlapping programs. In
    addition, 2Immigration Management: Strong Leadership and
    Management Reforms Needed to Address Serious Problems (GAO/GGD-91-
    28, Jan. 23, 1991). 3INS Management: Follow-up on Selected
    Problems (GAO/GGD-97-132, July 22, 1997). 4 GAO/GGD-91-28, January
    23, 1991. Page 3                       GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges Statement
    Immigration and Naturalization Service:  Overview of Management
    and Program Challenges INS' 33 district directors and 21 Border
    Patrol chiefs were supervised by a single senior INS headquarters
    manager. In 1994, with the appointment of a new Commissioner, INS
    implemented an organizational structure intended to remedy at
    least two problems with the 1991 structure. First, the
    Commissioner thought the agency's field performance was uneven and
    poorly coordinated. In particular, the headquarters operations
    office had an unrealistically large span of control because of its
    responsibility for overseeing the operations of 33 district
    offices and 21 Border Patrol sectors. Second, the Commissioner
    believed that program planning, review, and integration had
    suffered because the operations office was preoccupied with
    matters that should have been handled by field managers and
    therefore could not focus on program planning. To address these
    and other problems, the reorganization established Executive
    Associate Commissioner (EAC) positions for (1) policy and
    planning, (2) programs, (3) management, and (4) field operations.
    The EAC for Field Operations had overall responsibility for
    managing INS' operational field activities through three regional
    directors, who were delegated budget and personnel authority over
    INS' district directors and Border Patrol chiefs in their
    respective areas. In 1997, we reported that the reorganization had
    succeeded in shifting some management authority to officials
    closer to the field activities, and many INS managers that we
    interviewed perceived the reorganization as a positive step in
    providing oversight to the field units.5 However, the
    implementation of the headquarters reorganization also appeared to
    have created some uncertainty among INS managers and field staff
    about the relative roles and responsibilities of some of the EACs.
    This uncertainty had been amplified by internal questions about
    possible staffing imbalances among the offices. For example, we
    found that no analysis had been done to determine the appropriate
    number of staff needed for the office of programs, given the
    reassignment of some its new responsibilities to other offices.
    INS' Commissioner stated that the 1994 reorganization would build
    Internal Communications    communication capabilities. However,
    communication continued to be a and Coordination           problem
    at INS. We reported in 1997, as we did in 1991,6 that INS'
    headquarters and field managers generally viewed headquarters as
    not being in touch with events, problems, and concerns in the
    field. Part of the 5GAO/GGD-97-132, July 22, 1997. 6 GAO/GGD-97-
    132, July 22, 1997; and GAO/GGD-91-28, January 23, 1991. Page 4
    GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges communications
    challenge involved uncertainty among INS managers about the roles
    and responsibilities of headquarters executives, which in turn
    caused uncertainty about proper channels of communication for
    obtaining policy guidance or implementing program initiatives.
    Headquarters' efforts to resolve concerns about roles,
    responsibilities, and communication processes were not successful.
    For example, there was still confusion among field managers
    regarding roles and responsibilities, and inconsistent versions of
    guidance on naturalization procedures were distributed to field
    offices. INS did not intend to issue written guidance on
    appropriate communication channels and coordination methods
    between offices until it obtained a decision on how the agency
    would be restructured. Lack of up-to-date policies and procedures
    had also contributed to INS' communications challenges. For
    example, at the time of our 1991 report, field manuals containing
    policies and procedures on how to implement immigration laws were
    out-of-date and had not been updated by the time of our 1997
    report. As a result, INS employees were burdened with having to
    search for information on immigration laws or regulations in
    multiple sources, which sometimes resulted in their obtaining
    conflicting information. The lack of current manuals also led some
    field officers to create policy locally, thus compounding
    coordination difficulties. However, during the past 2 years, INS
    has published an administrative manual and established a timetable
    through January 2001 for issuing five field manuals. The financial
    statement audit of INS' fiscal year 1998 Statement of Financial
    Management    Financial Position and the related Statements of
    Operations and Changes in Net Position resulted in a disclaimer of
    opinion. The auditor reported that INS had not maintained
    appropriate accounting records and relevant documentation to
    support certain balances in the financial statements. In addition,
    INS' internal control structure was not adequate to ensure that
    its assets were properly safeguarded from loss, damage, or
    misappropriation, and that transactions were accurately and
    completely recorded. Accordingly, the auditor could not perform
    sufficient audit procedures to determine whether the financial
    statements were affected by these conditions. The auditor
    identified five material weaknesses7 with respect to (1) the fund
    balance with the Treasury reconciliation process, (2) fixed
    assets, (3) accounts payable, (4) deferred revenue, and (5) INS'
    financial 7 A material weakness is a condition in which the design
    or operation of one or more of the internal control components
    does not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that errors or
    irregularities in amounts that would be material to the financial
    statements may occur and not be detected promptly by employees in
    the normal course of performing their duties. Page 5
    GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges management systems.
    INS has taken action to address some of its financial management
    problems, including engaging a contractor to reconcile the fund
    balance differences with Treasury. With respect to INS' financial
    management systems, the auditor reported that the systems (1) were
    not integrated, resulting in significant delays and burdensome
    reconciliation efforts; (2) had significant internal control
    weaknesses-including computer control problems-affecting the
    accuracy and reliability of financial information; and (3)
    limited, rather than enhanced, effective decisionmaking. In 1991,
    we reported that INS' budget development process, which had
    evolved with weak controls over expenditures and revenues,
    significantly impeded INS management's ability to address program
    weaknesses. In addition, we said that INS did not have fiscal
    accountability over its resources. Its outdated accounting
    systems, weak internal controls, and lack of management emphasis
    on financial management had contributed to this situation. As we
    reported again in 1993 and more recently in 1997,8 INS' financial
    management systems' weaknesses made it difficult for the agency to
    monitor the status of its budget and to make sound budgetary
    decisions. For example, in March 1995, INS' budget office
    projected that the field offices would have about $115 million in
    surplus funds through the rest of the year. Upon subsequent input
    from INS' field offices, it turned out that the field offices
    would experience a $5 million shortfall for the remainder of the
    year. Earlier this year, concerned that INS would incur a budget
    shortfall, the House Appropriations Committee asked that we
    examine INS' fiscal condition for fiscal year 1999. Based on
    discussions with officials from INS, the Justice Department, and
    the Office of Management and Budget, and based on our analysis of
    INS budget documents, we concluded that INS was not experiencing
    an overall budget shortfall for fiscal year 1999.9 However, we
    noted that the hiring policy that INS followed in fiscal year
    1998, and the reduced revenues from INS' Examinations Fee
    revenues, contributed to reduced discretionary funding in fiscal
    year 1999. In 1997, INS selected a new financial management system
    but did not first analyze its financial management processes, as
    required by the Clinger- 8 Immigration Issues: Making Needed
    Policy and Management Decisions on Immigration Issues (GAO/T-GGD-
    93-18, Mar. 30, 1993); and GAO/GGD-97-132, July 22, 1997. 9 INS
    Budget: Overhiring and Decline in Revenues Have Created Fiscal
    Stress (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-99- 129, Mar. 24, 1999). Page 6
    GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges Cohen Act of 1996,10
    to ensure that the new system did not automate outmoded,
    inefficient business processes. Instead of developing and
    implementing a risk management plan, as we had recommended, INS
    tasked its contractor with helping to ensure that risks associated
    with implementation of the new system would be identified and
    necessary steps taken to mitigate them. According to INS, it had
    an urgent need to replace its financial management system, which
    was over 19 years old and did not have the functionality needed
    for INS to efficiently manage and account for its resources, and
    INS believed that this was a prudent way to proceed. In addition
    to the long-standing management challenges that we identified,
    Program Challenges    program implementation issues at INS have
    been of continuing concern. These issues have been related to INS'
    efforts to (1) stem the flow of illegal aliens across the border,
    (2) identify and remove criminal aliens, (3) process applications
    for naturalization, (4) enforce immigration laws that pertain to
    the workplace, and (5) process aliens for expedited removal from
    the country. In 1993, we testified that INS was confronted with
    the challenge of Border Control        preventing millions of
    aliens from entering the country illegally.11 Our prior work in
    this area had shown that INS had difficulty in removing illegal
    aliens once they entered the country and had limited space to
    detain aliens it apprehended. We concluded, therefore, that the
    key to controlling the illegal alien population was to prevent
    their initial entry. Consistent with the Attorney General's
    strategy, in 1994, INS issued a national Border Patrol strategy
    intended to deter illegal entry between the ports of entry along
    the Southwest Border. In the strategy's initial phase, the focus
    was on two sectors-San Diego and El Paso-that in 1993 accounted
    for the majority of apprehensions nationwide. In the second phase
    of the strategy, INS increased the resources it allocated to
    sectors in Tucson, Arizona, and south Texas. In 1997, we reported
    that INS had made progress in implementing some, but not all, of
    its strategy.12 For example, INS had allocated Border Patrol
    agents in general accordance with the strategy, focusing resources
    in the areas of highest known illegal activity. However, the
    proportion of time the 10 P.L. 104-106.  The act requires
    executive agencies to conduct analyses of work processes before
    making significant investments in information technology. 11
    Immigration Enforcement: Problems in Controlling the Flow of
    Illegal Aliens (GAO/T-GGD-93-39, June 30, 1993). 12Illegal
    Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More
    Evaluation Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11, 1997). Page 7
    GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges agents at the
    Southwest Border collectively spent on border enforcement
    activities did not increase between 1994 and 1997 as planned.
    Further, the Border Patrol had not determined the most appropriate
    mix of staffing and other resources needed for its sectors, as
    called for in the strategy. We also stated in our 1997 report that
    INS lacked data on several outcomes that the strategy was expected
    to achieve. For example, there were no data to indicate whether
    (1) illegal aliens were deterred from entering the United States,
    (2) there had been a decrease in attempted reentries by those who
    had been previously apprehended, and (3) the strategy had reduced
    border violence. We said that, despite the investment of billions
    of dollars in the strategy, INS had amassed only a partial picture
    of the effects of increased border control and did not know
    whether the investment was producing the intended results.
    Further, INS lacked a systematic and comprehensive evaluation plan
    to assess the strategy's overall effectiveness. We noted also that
    developing such a plan would be in keeping with the principles
    embodied in the Results Act. In September 1998, INS contracted
    with independent research firms for an evaluation. In an update to
    our 1997 report,13 we noted that available data suggested that
    several anticipated interim effects of the strategy had occurred.
    For example, apprehensions of illegal aliens continued to shift
    from traditionally high entry points like San Diego and El Paso to
    other locations along the border, as resources were deployed.
    Also, southwest border ports of entry inspectors apprehended an
    increased number of persons attempting fraudulent entry, and there
    were reports of higher fees being charged by smugglers, which INS
    said indicated an increased difficulty in illegal border crossing.
    However, data were still not available on the overall impact of
    the strategy and how effective it has been in preventing and
    deterring illegal entry. As far back as 1989, we reported that INS
    had not been effective in Criminal Alien Removal    removing
    illegal aliens from the country.14 Five years later, the
    Commissioner stated that over half of the illegal alien population
    initially entered the United States legally but then overstayed
    their period of admission. She added that no effective means
    existed to locate and arrest those aliens. With respect to
    criminal aliens, INS did not know how many prisoners in state and
    local prisons were deportable criminal aliens. Our 13 Illegal
    Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation
    (GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19, 1999). 14Immigration Control: Deporting
    and Excluding Aliens From the United States (GAO/GGD-90-18, Oct.
    26, 1989). Page 8                       GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges Statement
    Immigration and Naturalization Service:  Overview of Management
    and Program Challenges work has shown that removing deportable
    criminal aliens from this country has been one of INS' long-
    standing challenges. INS' Institutional Hearing Program (IHP)15 is
    the Department of Justice's main vehicle for placing aliens who
    are incarcerated in state and federal prisons into deportation
    proceedings so that they can be expeditiously deported upon
    release. In 1997, we reported on the 1995 performance results of
    the IHP, and more recently, in 1998, we reported on 1997 IHP
    results.16 In each year, for a 6-month period, we found that INS
    failed to identify nearly 2,000 potentially deportable criminal
    aliens before they completed their prison sentences. Hundreds of
    those criminal aliens were aggravated felons who, by law, should
    have been placed in removal proceedings while in prison and taken
    into INS custody upon release. Some of those aliens were
    subsequently rearrested for new crimes, including felonies. Even
    when INS determined that an alien was potentially deportable and
    should be placed in removal proceedings, INS did not complete the
    IHP for at least half of such cases in both 1995 and 1997. As a
    result, INS took many of the released criminal aliens into custody
    and completed the removal process for them after their prison
    release. As a result of its failure to complete the IHP before
    prison release, INS incurred about $37 million in avoidable
    detention costs in 1995 and about $40 million in 1997. INS took
    action on some, but not all of our 1997 recommendations to improve
    the IHP. For example, responding to our recommendation that INS
    give priority to aliens serving time for aggravated felonies, INS
    indicated that it should be screening all foreign-born inmates as
    they enter the prison systems. Therefore, INS took the position
    that it did not need to single out aggravated felons as a unique
    group. However, it remains unclear whether INS has the resources
    needed to screen everyone as they enter the prison system. INS has
    acknowledged and started to address the need for eliminating the
    backlog of cases that were not screened in previous years because
    aggravated felons could be part of the backlog. 15 The IHP was
    subsumed under a broader program in June 1998 called the
    Institutional Removal Program (IRP). The objectives of the
    programs are the same. The IRP, however, counts certain removal
    orders not included in the IHP-specifically, reinstatement of
    prior removal orders and administrative removal orders-in
    measuring program outcomes. 16 Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to
    Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need To Be Improved (GAO/T-
    GGD-97-154, July 15, 1997); and Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to
    Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement (GAO/GGD-99-
    3, Oct. 16, 1998). Page 9                       GAO/T-GGD-99-148
    INS:  Overview of Management and Program Challenges Statement
    Immigration and Naturalization Service:  Overview of Management
    and Program Challenges INS is authorized to charge user fees to
    recipients of certain INS services, Processes for Granting    such
    as the processing of an alien's application. In 1991, we said that
    INS Citizenship               had a chronic problem with not
    processing applications for naturalization within its 4-month time
    frame. In our 1994 report on INS user fees,17 our analysis of INS'
    workload in its four largest districts showed that it did not
    allocate its staff in proportion to its estimated workload. We
    said that about 80 percent of applicants could expect to wait 4
    months or less for their applications to be processed. However,
    the expected waiting times for two of the four districts in our
    review exceeded 4 months; in New York and San Francisco, the
    waiting times for naturalization applications took 7 and 10
    months, respectively. More recently, we reported that the number
    of applications was continuing to grow and that differences in
    production rates and processing times existed among field units in
    application processing.18 For example, our analyses of INS data
    for the 25-month period of June 1994 through June 1996 showed
    significant differences in the production rates for the five
    predominant types of applications processed by INS' district
    offices and three predominant types of applications processed by
    its service centers. We also reported large differences in the
    projected processing times for the types of applications for which
    these data were readily available. While we did not directly
    determine the cause of the differences, we noted that differences
    in processing times mean that aliens in different INS districts
    have had to wait disparate amounts of time for their applications
    to be processed. We pointed out that the need to treat applicants
    fairly and use government resources efficiently makes both
    determining the causes of the production and timing differences
    and, if feasible, improving production and timeliness, important
    goals for INS. As part of the process of applying for
    naturalization, aliens are required to submit completed
    fingerprint cards with their applications so that a criminal's
    record can be obtained. A criminal conviction can result in denial
    of the application. In 1994, we issued a report related to INS'
    processing of aliens' applications for permanent residency and
    naturalization.19 Specifically, we reported that INS did not
    obtain the 17 INS User Fees: INS Working to Improve Management of
    User Fee Accounts (GAO/GGD-94-101, Apr. 12, 1994). Our review was
    of INS' two major fee accounts-the Immigration Examinations Fee
    Account and the Immigration User Fee Account. Those two accounts
    represented about 99 percent of INS' total user fee account
    revenue. 18Alien Applications: Processing Differences Exist Among
    INS Field Units (GAO/GGD-97-47, May 20, 1997). 19INS
    Fingerprinting of Aliens: Efforts to Ensure Authenticity of
    Aliens' Fingerprints (GAO/GGD-95-40, Dec. 22, 1994). Page 10
    GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges results of all
    requested fingerprint checks from the FBI, and the results were,
    therefore, not always available to examiners before the alien's
    hearings. As a result, INS improperly naturalized citizens with
    felony convictions. In 1997, we testified that INS could still not
    assure itself and Congress that it was granting citizenship only
    to deserving applicants.20 In addition, a report to the Department
    of Justice by a consulting firm indicated that INS had not ensured
    that its field units were implementing internal control procedures
    issued by the INS Commissioner. INS has begun restructuring its
    naturalization process to address these problems. The Immigration
    Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)21 made it illegal Worksite
    Enforcement    for employers knowingly to hire or continue to
    employ or recruit or refer for a fee unauthorized aliens. The act
    further required employers to comply with an employment
    verification process intended to provide employers with a means to
    avoid hiring unauthorized aliens.22 In 1994, we testified that
    INS' worksite enforcement effort had declined from fiscal year
    1989 through 1993.23 Our more recent work in this area has shown
    that, while INS has undertaken several initiatives to improve the
    employment verification process to make it less susceptible to
    fraud, significant obstacles remained.24 First, as mandated in the
    Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
    1996,25 INS is testing pilot programs in which employers must
    electronically verify an employee's eligibility to work. However,
    INS has had difficulty in meeting its goal for enrolling employers
    in the pilot programs. Although originally expected to enroll
    16,000 employers by the end of fiscal year 1999, only 2,500 were
    participating as of November 1998. Second, INS has made little
    progress in reducing the number of documents that employers can
    accept to determine employment eligibility. We pointed out that
    having a smaller number of acceptable documents would make the
    process more secure and reduce employer confusion. Lastly, INS had
    begun issuing new 20 Naturalization of Aliens: INS Internal
    Controls (GAO/T-GGD-97-98, May 1, 1997). 21 P.L. 99-603, 8 U.S.C.
    1324a et seq. 22 Generally, the act requires employers to verify
    the identity and eligibility of all new employees hired after
    November 6, 1986. 23 Employer Sanctions: Comments on H.R. 3362-
    Employer Sanctions Improvement Act (GAO/T-GGD- 94-189, Sept. 21,
    1994). 24 Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing
    Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist (GAO/GGD- 99-33, Apr. 2,
    1999); and (GAO/T-GGD-99-105, July 1, 1999). 25 P.L. 104-208. Page
    11                      GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of
    Management and Program Challenges Statement Immigration and
    Naturalization Service:  Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges documents with increased security features, which it
    hoped would make it easier for employers to verify the documents'
    authenticity. However, in addition to those INS documents, aliens
    can show employers various other less secure documents that
    authorize them to work. Therefore, unauthorized aliens seeking
    employment can circumvent the improved security features of INS
    documents by simply presenting fraudulent non- INS documents-such
    as counterfeit Social Security cards-to employers. Further, we
    reported that, since no verification system is foolproof,
    enforcing IRCA's employer sanctions provisions would continue to
    be important. Since 1994, INS had devoted about 2 percent of its
    enforcement work years to its worksite enforcement program, which
    is designed to detect noncompliance with the law. INS completed
    about 6,500 investigations of employers in 1998-about 3 percent of
    the U.S. employers believed to have unauthorized workers on their
    payrolls. INS' worksite enforcement program has infrequently
    imposed sanctions on employers. INS is in the process of changing
    its approach to worksite enforcement, but it is too soon to know
    how these changes will be implemented or to assess their impact on
    the hiring of unauthorized workers. The Illegal Immigration Reform
    and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Expedited Removal
    included provisions establishing a new process for dealing with
    aliens who attempt to enter the United States by engaging in fraud
    or misrepresentation (e.g., falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen
    or misrepresenting a material fact) or who arrive with fraudulent,
    improper, or no documents (e.g., visa or passport). Known as
    expedited removal, the new process gives INS officers, rather than
    immigration judges, the authority to formally order these aliens
    removed from the country. The process also limits the rights of
    aliens to appeal a removal order. Aliens who fear being persecuted
    or tortured if they are returned to their home country are to be
    granted a "credible fear" interview to determine if their claims
    of asylum have a significant possibility of succeeding. In our
    1998 report,26 we addressed several aspects of INS' implementation
    of the expedited removal process, including the implementation and
    results of the process for making credible fear determinations and
    the mechanisms that INS had established to monitor expedited
    removals and credible fear determinations and to improve these
    processes. In our report, we pointed out that our review of case
    file documentation indicated a range of compliance with certain
    aspects of the required expedited 26 Illegal Aliens: Changes in
    the Process of Denying Aliens Entry Into the United States
    (GAO/GGD-98- 81, Mar. 31, 1998). Page 12
    GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges removal processes at
    five selected locations.27 For example, case file documentation
    indicated that supervisors reviewed the expedited removal orders
    in an estimated 80 to 100 percent of the cases at the five
    locations. Further, our report noted that INS had or was in the
    process of developing mechanisms to monitor the expedited removal
    procedures, including the credible fear determinations. Those
    mechanisms included creating an Expedited Removal Working Group to
    visit locations and address problems, creating a quality assurance
    team at headquarters to review selected credible fear files, and
    meeting with nongovernmental organizations to discuss issues and
    concerns. INS has made changes to its processes on the basis of
    concerns raised by these internal reviewers and outside
    organizations. Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I would
    be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of
    the Subcommittee may have. Contact and Acknowledgement For further
    information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard M.
    Stana at (202) 512-8777.  Individuals making key contributions to
    this testimony included Evi Rezmovic and Brenda Rabinowitz. 27 The
    locations, which we judgmentally selected, included San Ysidro,
    California; Buffalo, New York; and Miami International, Los
    Angeles International, and John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK) Airports.
    Page 13                      GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of
    Management and Program Challenges Attachment Related GAO Products
    Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized
    Alien Employment Exist (GAO/T-GGD-99-105, July 1, 1999). Illegal
    Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation
    (GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19, 1999). Immigration Benefits: Applications
    for Adjustment of Status Under the Haitian Refugee Immigration
    Fairness Act of 1998 (GAO/GGD-99-92R, April 21, 1999). Illegal
    Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien
    Employment Exist (GAO/GGD-99-33, April 2, 1999). Drug Control: INS
    and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee
    Corruption (GAO/GGD-99-31, March 30, 1999). Visa Issuance: Issues
    Concerning the Religious Worker Visa Program (GAO/NSIAD-99-67,
    March 26, 1999). INS Budget: Overhiring and Decline in Revenues
    Have Created Fiscal Stress (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-99-129, March 24,
    1999). Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department
    of Justice (GAO/OCG-99-10, January 1, 1999). Criminal Aliens: INS'
    Efforts to Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement
    (GAO/GGD-99-3, October 16, 1998). INS User Fee Revisions: INS
    Complied With Guidance but Could Make Improvements (GAO/GGD-98-
    197, September 28, 1998). H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program:
    Experiences of Individual Vidalia Onion Growers (GAO/HEHS-98-236R,
    September 10, 1998). Immigration Statistics: Information Gaps,
    Quality Issues Limit Utility of Federal Data to Policymakers
    (GAO/GGD-98-164, July 31, 1998). Immigration Statistics: Guidance
    on Producing Information on the U.S. Resident Foreign-Born
    (GAO/GGD-98-155, July 22, 1998). Immigration Statistics: Status of
    the Implementation of National Academy of Sciences'
    Recommendations (GAO/GGD-98-119, June 9, 1998). Page 14
    GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program
    Challenges Attachment Related GAO Products Assessment of
    Contractor's Review of INS' Analysis of a Random Sample of
    Recently Naturalized Aliens (GAO/GGD-98-131R, May 28, 1998).
    Illegal Aliens: Changes in the Process of Denying Aliens Entry
    Into the United States (GAO/GGD-98-81, March 31, 1998).
    Naturalized Aliens: Efforts to Determine if INS Improperly
    Naturalized Some Aliens (GAO/GGD-98-62, March 23, 1998).
    Retirement Eligibility of Customs and INS Employees on the
    Southwest Border (GAO/GGD-98-70R, March 13, 1998). Community
    Development: Changes in Nebraska's and Iowa's Counties With Large
    Meatpacking Plant Workforces (GAO/RCED-98-62, February 27, 1998).
    H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve
    Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers (GAO/HEHS-98-20,
    December 31, 1997). Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy
    Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21,
    December 11, 1997). Customs and Border Patrol: Resources Needed
    for Reopening Rail Line From Mexico-U.S. Border Into the United
    States (GAO/GGD-98-20R, November 5, 1997). Combating Terrorism:
    Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and
    Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, September 26, 1997). Illegal
    Immigration: Information on Illegal Immigrants and Automobile
    Insurance in California (GAO/GGD-97-172R, September 5, 1997).
    Higher Education: Verification Helps Prevent Student Aid Payments
    to Ineligible Noncitizens (GAO/HEHS-97-153, August 6, 1997). INS
    Management: Follow-up on Selected Problems (GAO/GGD-97-132, July
    22, 1997). Immigration and Naturalization Service: Employment
    Verification Pilot Project (GAO/GGD-97-136R, July 17, 1997). Page
    15        GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and
    Program Challenges Attachment Related GAO Products Criminal
    Aliens: INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need
    To Be Improved (GAO/T-GGD-97-154, July 15, 1997). INS Criminal
    Record Verification: Information on Process for Citizenship
    Applicants (GAO/GGD-97-118R, June 4, 1997). Alien Applications:
    Processing Differences Exist Among INS Field Units (GAO/GGD-97-47,
    May 20, 1997). State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud
    (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May 20, 1997). Naturalization of Aliens:  INS
    Internal Controls (GAO/T-GGD-97-98, May 1, 1997). Naturalization
    of Aliens: Assessment of the Extent to Which Aliens Were
    Improperly Naturalized (GAO/T-GGD-97-51, March 5, 1997). Federal
    Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13
    Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, September 30, 1996). Border Patrol:
    Staffing and Enforcement Activities (GAO/GGD-96-65, March 11,
    1996). INS Investment Strategy (GAO/AIMD-96-26R, December 11,
    1995). INS Border Crossing Cards (GAO/GGD-96-25R, November 29,
    1995). Federal Law Enforcement: Information on Certain Agencies'
    Criminal Investigative Personnel and Salary Costs (GAO/T-GGD-96-
    38, November 15, 1995). Law Enforcement Support Center: Name-Based
    Systems Limit Ability to Identify Arrested Aliens (GAO/AIMD-95-
    147, August 21, 1995). Illegal Aliens: National Net Cost Estimates
    Vary Widely (GAO/HEHS-95- 133, July 25, 1995). INS: Information on
    Aliens Applying for Permanent Resident Status (GAO/ GGD-95-162FS,
    June 8, 1995). Information Integrity: Using Technology to
    Determine Eligibility to Work and Receive Benefits (GAO/T-AIMD-95-
    99, March 7, 1995). Page 16        GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview
    of Management and Program Challenges Attachment Related GAO
    Products Border Control: Revised Strategy Is Showing Some Positive
    Results (GAO/GGD-95-30, December 29, 1994). INS Fingerprinting of
    Aliens: Efforts to Ensure Authenticity of Aliens' Fingerprints
    (GAO/GGD-95-40, December 22, 1994). INS: Management Problems and
    Program Issues (GAO/T-GGD-95-11, October 5, 1994). Employer
    Sanctions:  Comments on H.R. 3362 - - Employer Sanctions
    Improvement Act (GAO/T-GGD-94-189, September 21, 1994). INS Drug
    Task Force Activities: Federal Agencies Supportive of INS Efforts
    (GAO/GGD-94-143, July 7, 1994). INS User Fees: INS Working to
    Improve Management of User Fee Accounts (GAO/GGD-94-101, April 12,
    1994). INS' EEO Progress in DC/LA (GAO/GGD-94-10R, October 5,
    1993). Illegal Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods
    Provide Better Population Estimates (GAO/PEMD-93-25, August 5,
    1993). Assessing EEO Progress at INS (GAO/GGD-93-54R, July 15,
    1993). Customs Service and INS: Dual Management Structure for
    Border Inspections Should Be Ended (GAO/GGD-93-111, June 30,
    1993). INS Corrective Action (GAO/GGD-93-46R, June 16, 1993).
    Information on Black Employment at INS (GAO/GGD-93-44R, May 17,
    1993). Border Patrol:  Southwest Border Enforcement Affected by
    Mission Expansion and Budget (GAO/T-GGD-92-66, August 5, 1992).
    Immigration Control: Immigration Policies Affect INS Detention
    Efforts (GAO/GGD-92-85, June 25, 1992). Immigration and the Labor
    Market: Nonimmigrant Alien Workers in the United States (GAO/PEMD-
    92-17, April 28, 1992). Page 17        GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:
    Overview of Management and Program Challenges Attachment Related
    GAO Products Immigrants in Indiana: Northwest Indiana Compared to
    Other Parts of the State (GAO/GGD-92-32FS, January 10, 1992).
    U.S.-Mexico Trade: Concerns About the Adequacy of Border
    Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD-91-228, May 16, 1991). Employee Drug
    Testing: Status of Federal Agencies' Programs (GAO/GGD- 91-70, May
    6, 1991). Border Patrol: Southwest Border Enforcement Affected by
    Mission Expansion and Budget (GAO/GGD-91-72BR, March 28, 1991).
    International Trade: Easing Foreign Visitors' Arrivals at U.S.
    Airports (GAO/NSIAD-91-6, March 8, 1991). Financial Management:
    INS Lacks Accountability and Controls Over Its Resources
    (GAO/AFMD-91-20, January 24, 1991). Immigration Management: Strong
    Leadership and Management Reforms Needed to Address Serious
    Problems (GAO/GGD-91-28, January 23, 1991). Information
    Management: Immigration and Naturalization Service Lacks Ready
    Access to Essential Data (GAO/IMTEC-90-75, September 27, 1990).
    Immigration Services: INS Resources and Services in the Miami
    District (GAO/GGD-90-98, August 6, 1990). Criminal Aliens: Prison
    Deportation Hearings Include Opportunities to Contest Deportation
    (GAO/GGD-90-79, May 25, 1990). Immigration Reform: Employer
    Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination (GAO/GGD-90-62, March
    29, 1990). Immigration Reform: Major Changes Likely Under S. 358
    (GAO/PEMD-90-5, November 9, 1989). Immigration Control: Deporting
    and Excluding Aliens From the United States (GAO/GGD-90-18,
    October 26, 1989). Page 18        GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview
    of Management and Program Challenges Page 19    GAO/T-GGD-99-148
    INS:  Overview of Management and Program Challenges Page 20
    GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:  Overview of Management and Program
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