Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and
Program Challenges (Testimony, 07/29/1999, GAO/T-GGD-99-148).
The Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS) mission is twofold.
First, the agency seeks to prevent aliens from entering the United
States illegally and remove those who succeed in doing so. Second, INS
provides services to facilitate the entry, residency, employment, and
naturalization of legal immigrants. This testimony summarizes GAO's work
on management and program challenges at INS. These challenges involve
INS' strategic planning process, organizational structure,
communications and coordination, financial management, and program
implementation.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-GGD-99-148
TITLE: Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of
Management and Program Challenges
DATE: 07/29/1999
SUBJECT: Immigration or emigration
Internal controls
Law enforcement
Strategic planning
Federal agency reorganization
Public administration
Financial management
General management reviews
IDENTIFIER: INS Institutional Hearing Program
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United States General Accounting Office GAO
Testimony Before the House Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on Immigration and Claims House of Representatives
Not to be Released Before 9:30 a.m. EDT Thursday
IMMIGRATION AND July 29, 1999 NATURALIZATION SERVICE
Overview of Management and Program Challenges Statement of Richard
M. Stana Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues
General Government Division GAO/T-GGD-99-148 Summary Immigration
and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges GAO and others have identified management and program
challenges that have troubled the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) for years. GAO's management reports in 1991 and 1997
and related reviews have indicated that urgent attention should be
given to INS' management challenges. GAO pointed out significant
issues related to INS' (1) strategic planning process; (2)
organizational structure; (3) communications and coordination; and
(4) financial management processes. More specifically, GAO said
that: * INS' strategic planning required sustained management
attention and commitment; * INS' reorganization had created some
uncertainty about organizational roles and responsibilities; *
INS' internal communications and coordination were problematic, as
evidenced by its outdated policies and procedures on how to
implement immigration laws; and * INS' financial management
processes were weak, including outdated accounting systems, weak
internal controls, and a lack of management emphasis on financial
management. In addition to these management challenges, program
implementation issues at INS have been the focus of much of GAO's
work. GAO's reports on these issues have been related to INS'
efforts to: * stem the flow of illegal aliens across the
Southwest Border; * identify and remove criminal aliens from the
country; * process applications for naturalization; * enforce
workplace immigration laws; and * process aliens for expedited
removal. GAO recognizes that addressing these management and
program challenges can be difficult. In carrying out its mission,
INS has to contend with issues of foreign policy (e.g., U.S.
readiness to provide asylum to political refugees); domestic
policy (e.g., the tension between the need for cheap labor that
immigrants have historically met and the protection of employment
and working standards for U.S. citizens); and intergovernmental
relations (e.g., between the federal government, which sets policy
on immigration, and state and local governments, which largely
bear its costs and consequences). Sustained top-level management
commitment and monitoring are necessary to ensure that these
challenges are addressed appropriately. Page 1 GAO/T-GGD-
99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program Challenges
Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of
Management and Program Challenges Mr. Chairman and Members of the
Subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss work we
have done addressing management and program challenges at the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). These challenges
have been related to INS' strategic planning process,
organizational structure, communications and coordination,
financial management, and program implementation. For the most
part, our testimony is based on products that we have issued on
these matters since 1991. Attached to my statement is a
bibliography of this work. INS' mission involves carrying out two
primary functions. One is an enforcement function that involves
preventing aliens from entering the United States illegally and
removing aliens who succeed in doing so. The other is a service
function that involves providing services or benefits to
facilitate entry, residence, employment, and naturalization of
legal immigrants. To enable INS to better implement and enforce
immigration laws, Congress significantly increased its resources
during the past several years. For example, between fiscal years
1993 and 1998, the number of onboard staff at INS increased from
about 19,000 to nearly 31,000. During the same period, INS' budget
more than doubled from $1.5 billion in fiscal year 1993 to about
$3.8 billion in fiscal year 1998. Funding increases have
continued in fiscal year 1999 with Congress providing over $3.9
billion. Earlier this year, we reported on management challenges
and program risks in the Justice Department.1 Most of the
challenges and risks that we identified were in INS. However, we
noted that, in carrying out its responsibilities, INS has to
contend with issues of foreign policy (e.g., U.S. readiness to
provide asylum to political refugees); domestic policy (e.g., the
tension between the need for cheap labor that immigrants have
historically met and the protection of employment and working
standards for U.S. citizens); and intergovernmental relations
(e.g., between the federal government, which sets policy on
immigration, and state and local governments, which largely bear
its costs and consequences). Several of our past reports have
identified significant management Management challenges that
have troubled INS for years. Those challenges have been Challenges
related to INS' (1) strategic planning process; (2) organizational
structure; 1 Performance and Accountability Series: Major
Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice
(GAO/OCG-99-10, Jan. 1999). Page 2 GAO/T-
GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program Challenges
Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of
Management and Program Challenges (3) communications and
coordination; and (4) financial management processes. In 1991, we
reported that INS lacked a strategic plan and that past priority
INS' Strategic Planning management processes were not
successful.2 We also stated that past Process
efforts to implement agencywide planning systems lacked sustained
top management support, managers were not held accountable for
achieving goals and objectives, and priorities were not used in
planning for decisionmaking. Three years later, INS developed and
issued a strategic plan to better focus its attention on key
mission and operational priorities. The plan identified eight
major strategic priorities, including such challenges as
facilitating compliance with immigration laws, deterring unlawful
migration, and reengineering INS work processes. In fiscal year
1995, INS implemented a priorities management process intended to
facilitate the achievement of the strategic priorities identified
in the plan. Specific annual goals related to strategic priorities
were identified for special management attention, including the
establishment of objectives, time frames, and performance
measures. In fiscal year 1996, to further focus management
attention on the most important goals, INS ranked the annual goals
according to their priority. By assigning senior INS managers
specific responsibility for achieving the annual priority goals,
INS intended to establish better organizational and individual
accountability. In 1997, we said that these efforts appeared to be
consistent with the intent of the Government Performance and
Results Act. However, we also concluded that, while INS' initial
steps in developing a strategic plan and management priorities had
been positive, our past work at INS had indicated that, to be
successful, such initiatives would require sustained management
attention and commitment.3 In 1991, we reported that,
historically, INS leadership had allowed INS' INS' Organizational
organizational structure to become decentralized without adequate
Structure controls.4 Specifically, its regional
structure had created geographical separation among INS programs
and hampered resource allocation and consistent program
implementation. The field structure to carry out INS' enforcement
functions was bifurcated between districts and Border Patrol
sectors, resulting in uncoordinated, overlapping programs. In
addition, 2Immigration Management: Strong Leadership and
Management Reforms Needed to Address Serious Problems (GAO/GGD-91-
28, Jan. 23, 1991). 3INS Management: Follow-up on Selected
Problems (GAO/GGD-97-132, July 22, 1997). 4 GAO/GGD-91-28, January
23, 1991. Page 3 GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges Statement
Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management
and Program Challenges INS' 33 district directors and 21 Border
Patrol chiefs were supervised by a single senior INS headquarters
manager. In 1994, with the appointment of a new Commissioner, INS
implemented an organizational structure intended to remedy at
least two problems with the 1991 structure. First, the
Commissioner thought the agency's field performance was uneven and
poorly coordinated. In particular, the headquarters operations
office had an unrealistically large span of control because of its
responsibility for overseeing the operations of 33 district
offices and 21 Border Patrol sectors. Second, the Commissioner
believed that program planning, review, and integration had
suffered because the operations office was preoccupied with
matters that should have been handled by field managers and
therefore could not focus on program planning. To address these
and other problems, the reorganization established Executive
Associate Commissioner (EAC) positions for (1) policy and
planning, (2) programs, (3) management, and (4) field operations.
The EAC for Field Operations had overall responsibility for
managing INS' operational field activities through three regional
directors, who were delegated budget and personnel authority over
INS' district directors and Border Patrol chiefs in their
respective areas. In 1997, we reported that the reorganization had
succeeded in shifting some management authority to officials
closer to the field activities, and many INS managers that we
interviewed perceived the reorganization as a positive step in
providing oversight to the field units.5 However, the
implementation of the headquarters reorganization also appeared to
have created some uncertainty among INS managers and field staff
about the relative roles and responsibilities of some of the EACs.
This uncertainty had been amplified by internal questions about
possible staffing imbalances among the offices. For example, we
found that no analysis had been done to determine the appropriate
number of staff needed for the office of programs, given the
reassignment of some its new responsibilities to other offices.
INS' Commissioner stated that the 1994 reorganization would build
Internal Communications communication capabilities. However,
communication continued to be a and Coordination problem
at INS. We reported in 1997, as we did in 1991,6 that INS'
headquarters and field managers generally viewed headquarters as
not being in touch with events, problems, and concerns in the
field. Part of the 5GAO/GGD-97-132, July 22, 1997. 6 GAO/GGD-97-
132, July 22, 1997; and GAO/GGD-91-28, January 23, 1991. Page 4
GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges communications
challenge involved uncertainty among INS managers about the roles
and responsibilities of headquarters executives, which in turn
caused uncertainty about proper channels of communication for
obtaining policy guidance or implementing program initiatives.
Headquarters' efforts to resolve concerns about roles,
responsibilities, and communication processes were not successful.
For example, there was still confusion among field managers
regarding roles and responsibilities, and inconsistent versions of
guidance on naturalization procedures were distributed to field
offices. INS did not intend to issue written guidance on
appropriate communication channels and coordination methods
between offices until it obtained a decision on how the agency
would be restructured. Lack of up-to-date policies and procedures
had also contributed to INS' communications challenges. For
example, at the time of our 1991 report, field manuals containing
policies and procedures on how to implement immigration laws were
out-of-date and had not been updated by the time of our 1997
report. As a result, INS employees were burdened with having to
search for information on immigration laws or regulations in
multiple sources, which sometimes resulted in their obtaining
conflicting information. The lack of current manuals also led some
field officers to create policy locally, thus compounding
coordination difficulties. However, during the past 2 years, INS
has published an administrative manual and established a timetable
through January 2001 for issuing five field manuals. The financial
statement audit of INS' fiscal year 1998 Statement of Financial
Management Financial Position and the related Statements of
Operations and Changes in Net Position resulted in a disclaimer of
opinion. The auditor reported that INS had not maintained
appropriate accounting records and relevant documentation to
support certain balances in the financial statements. In addition,
INS' internal control structure was not adequate to ensure that
its assets were properly safeguarded from loss, damage, or
misappropriation, and that transactions were accurately and
completely recorded. Accordingly, the auditor could not perform
sufficient audit procedures to determine whether the financial
statements were affected by these conditions. The auditor
identified five material weaknesses7 with respect to (1) the fund
balance with the Treasury reconciliation process, (2) fixed
assets, (3) accounts payable, (4) deferred revenue, and (5) INS'
financial 7 A material weakness is a condition in which the design
or operation of one or more of the internal control components
does not reduce to a relatively low level the risk that errors or
irregularities in amounts that would be material to the financial
statements may occur and not be detected promptly by employees in
the normal course of performing their duties. Page 5
GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges management systems.
INS has taken action to address some of its financial management
problems, including engaging a contractor to reconcile the fund
balance differences with Treasury. With respect to INS' financial
management systems, the auditor reported that the systems (1) were
not integrated, resulting in significant delays and burdensome
reconciliation efforts; (2) had significant internal control
weaknesses-including computer control problems-affecting the
accuracy and reliability of financial information; and (3)
limited, rather than enhanced, effective decisionmaking. In 1991,
we reported that INS' budget development process, which had
evolved with weak controls over expenditures and revenues,
significantly impeded INS management's ability to address program
weaknesses. In addition, we said that INS did not have fiscal
accountability over its resources. Its outdated accounting
systems, weak internal controls, and lack of management emphasis
on financial management had contributed to this situation. As we
reported again in 1993 and more recently in 1997,8 INS' financial
management systems' weaknesses made it difficult for the agency to
monitor the status of its budget and to make sound budgetary
decisions. For example, in March 1995, INS' budget office
projected that the field offices would have about $115 million in
surplus funds through the rest of the year. Upon subsequent input
from INS' field offices, it turned out that the field offices
would experience a $5 million shortfall for the remainder of the
year. Earlier this year, concerned that INS would incur a budget
shortfall, the House Appropriations Committee asked that we
examine INS' fiscal condition for fiscal year 1999. Based on
discussions with officials from INS, the Justice Department, and
the Office of Management and Budget, and based on our analysis of
INS budget documents, we concluded that INS was not experiencing
an overall budget shortfall for fiscal year 1999.9 However, we
noted that the hiring policy that INS followed in fiscal year
1998, and the reduced revenues from INS' Examinations Fee
revenues, contributed to reduced discretionary funding in fiscal
year 1999. In 1997, INS selected a new financial management system
but did not first analyze its financial management processes, as
required by the Clinger- 8 Immigration Issues: Making Needed
Policy and Management Decisions on Immigration Issues (GAO/T-GGD-
93-18, Mar. 30, 1993); and GAO/GGD-97-132, July 22, 1997. 9 INS
Budget: Overhiring and Decline in Revenues Have Created Fiscal
Stress (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-99- 129, Mar. 24, 1999). Page 6
GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges Cohen Act of 1996,10
to ensure that the new system did not automate outmoded,
inefficient business processes. Instead of developing and
implementing a risk management plan, as we had recommended, INS
tasked its contractor with helping to ensure that risks associated
with implementation of the new system would be identified and
necessary steps taken to mitigate them. According to INS, it had
an urgent need to replace its financial management system, which
was over 19 years old and did not have the functionality needed
for INS to efficiently manage and account for its resources, and
INS believed that this was a prudent way to proceed. In addition
to the long-standing management challenges that we identified,
Program Challenges program implementation issues at INS have
been of continuing concern. These issues have been related to INS'
efforts to (1) stem the flow of illegal aliens across the border,
(2) identify and remove criminal aliens, (3) process applications
for naturalization, (4) enforce immigration laws that pertain to
the workplace, and (5) process aliens for expedited removal from
the country. In 1993, we testified that INS was confronted with
the challenge of Border Control preventing millions of
aliens from entering the country illegally.11 Our prior work in
this area had shown that INS had difficulty in removing illegal
aliens once they entered the country and had limited space to
detain aliens it apprehended. We concluded, therefore, that the
key to controlling the illegal alien population was to prevent
their initial entry. Consistent with the Attorney General's
strategy, in 1994, INS issued a national Border Patrol strategy
intended to deter illegal entry between the ports of entry along
the Southwest Border. In the strategy's initial phase, the focus
was on two sectors-San Diego and El Paso-that in 1993 accounted
for the majority of apprehensions nationwide. In the second phase
of the strategy, INS increased the resources it allocated to
sectors in Tucson, Arizona, and south Texas. In 1997, we reported
that INS had made progress in implementing some, but not all, of
its strategy.12 For example, INS had allocated Border Patrol
agents in general accordance with the strategy, focusing resources
in the areas of highest known illegal activity. However, the
proportion of time the 10 P.L. 104-106. The act requires
executive agencies to conduct analyses of work processes before
making significant investments in information technology. 11
Immigration Enforcement: Problems in Controlling the Flow of
Illegal Aliens (GAO/T-GGD-93-39, June 30, 1993). 12Illegal
Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive; More
Evaluation Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec. 11, 1997). Page 7
GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges agents at the
Southwest Border collectively spent on border enforcement
activities did not increase between 1994 and 1997 as planned.
Further, the Border Patrol had not determined the most appropriate
mix of staffing and other resources needed for its sectors, as
called for in the strategy. We also stated in our 1997 report that
INS lacked data on several outcomes that the strategy was expected
to achieve. For example, there were no data to indicate whether
(1) illegal aliens were deterred from entering the United States,
(2) there had been a decrease in attempted reentries by those who
had been previously apprehended, and (3) the strategy had reduced
border violence. We said that, despite the investment of billions
of dollars in the strategy, INS had amassed only a partial picture
of the effects of increased border control and did not know
whether the investment was producing the intended results.
Further, INS lacked a systematic and comprehensive evaluation plan
to assess the strategy's overall effectiveness. We noted also that
developing such a plan would be in keeping with the principles
embodied in the Results Act. In September 1998, INS contracted
with independent research firms for an evaluation. In an update to
our 1997 report,13 we noted that available data suggested that
several anticipated interim effects of the strategy had occurred.
For example, apprehensions of illegal aliens continued to shift
from traditionally high entry points like San Diego and El Paso to
other locations along the border, as resources were deployed.
Also, southwest border ports of entry inspectors apprehended an
increased number of persons attempting fraudulent entry, and there
were reports of higher fees being charged by smugglers, which INS
said indicated an increased difficulty in illegal border crossing.
However, data were still not available on the overall impact of
the strategy and how effective it has been in preventing and
deterring illegal entry. As far back as 1989, we reported that INS
had not been effective in Criminal Alien Removal removing
illegal aliens from the country.14 Five years later, the
Commissioner stated that over half of the illegal alien population
initially entered the United States legally but then overstayed
their period of admission. She added that no effective means
existed to locate and arrest those aliens. With respect to
criminal aliens, INS did not know how many prisoners in state and
local prisons were deportable criminal aliens. Our 13 Illegal
Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation
(GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19, 1999). 14Immigration Control: Deporting
and Excluding Aliens From the United States (GAO/GGD-90-18, Oct.
26, 1989). Page 8 GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges Statement
Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management
and Program Challenges work has shown that removing deportable
criminal aliens from this country has been one of INS' long-
standing challenges. INS' Institutional Hearing Program (IHP)15 is
the Department of Justice's main vehicle for placing aliens who
are incarcerated in state and federal prisons into deportation
proceedings so that they can be expeditiously deported upon
release. In 1997, we reported on the 1995 performance results of
the IHP, and more recently, in 1998, we reported on 1997 IHP
results.16 In each year, for a 6-month period, we found that INS
failed to identify nearly 2,000 potentially deportable criminal
aliens before they completed their prison sentences. Hundreds of
those criminal aliens were aggravated felons who, by law, should
have been placed in removal proceedings while in prison and taken
into INS custody upon release. Some of those aliens were
subsequently rearrested for new crimes, including felonies. Even
when INS determined that an alien was potentially deportable and
should be placed in removal proceedings, INS did not complete the
IHP for at least half of such cases in both 1995 and 1997. As a
result, INS took many of the released criminal aliens into custody
and completed the removal process for them after their prison
release. As a result of its failure to complete the IHP before
prison release, INS incurred about $37 million in avoidable
detention costs in 1995 and about $40 million in 1997. INS took
action on some, but not all of our 1997 recommendations to improve
the IHP. For example, responding to our recommendation that INS
give priority to aliens serving time for aggravated felonies, INS
indicated that it should be screening all foreign-born inmates as
they enter the prison systems. Therefore, INS took the position
that it did not need to single out aggravated felons as a unique
group. However, it remains unclear whether INS has the resources
needed to screen everyone as they enter the prison system. INS has
acknowledged and started to address the need for eliminating the
backlog of cases that were not screened in previous years because
aggravated felons could be part of the backlog. 15 The IHP was
subsumed under a broader program in June 1998 called the
Institutional Removal Program (IRP). The objectives of the
programs are the same. The IRP, however, counts certain removal
orders not included in the IHP-specifically, reinstatement of
prior removal orders and administrative removal orders-in
measuring program outcomes. 16 Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to
Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need To Be Improved (GAO/T-
GGD-97-154, July 15, 1997); and Criminal Aliens: INS' Efforts to
Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement (GAO/GGD-99-
3, Oct. 16, 1998). Page 9 GAO/T-GGD-99-148
INS: Overview of Management and Program Challenges Statement
Immigration and Naturalization Service: Overview of Management
and Program Challenges INS is authorized to charge user fees to
recipients of certain INS services, Processes for Granting such
as the processing of an alien's application. In 1991, we said that
INS Citizenship had a chronic problem with not
processing applications for naturalization within its 4-month time
frame. In our 1994 report on INS user fees,17 our analysis of INS'
workload in its four largest districts showed that it did not
allocate its staff in proportion to its estimated workload. We
said that about 80 percent of applicants could expect to wait 4
months or less for their applications to be processed. However,
the expected waiting times for two of the four districts in our
review exceeded 4 months; in New York and San Francisco, the
waiting times for naturalization applications took 7 and 10
months, respectively. More recently, we reported that the number
of applications was continuing to grow and that differences in
production rates and processing times existed among field units in
application processing.18 For example, our analyses of INS data
for the 25-month period of June 1994 through June 1996 showed
significant differences in the production rates for the five
predominant types of applications processed by INS' district
offices and three predominant types of applications processed by
its service centers. We also reported large differences in the
projected processing times for the types of applications for which
these data were readily available. While we did not directly
determine the cause of the differences, we noted that differences
in processing times mean that aliens in different INS districts
have had to wait disparate amounts of time for their applications
to be processed. We pointed out that the need to treat applicants
fairly and use government resources efficiently makes both
determining the causes of the production and timing differences
and, if feasible, improving production and timeliness, important
goals for INS. As part of the process of applying for
naturalization, aliens are required to submit completed
fingerprint cards with their applications so that a criminal's
record can be obtained. A criminal conviction can result in denial
of the application. In 1994, we issued a report related to INS'
processing of aliens' applications for permanent residency and
naturalization.19 Specifically, we reported that INS did not
obtain the 17 INS User Fees: INS Working to Improve Management of
User Fee Accounts (GAO/GGD-94-101, Apr. 12, 1994). Our review was
of INS' two major fee accounts-the Immigration Examinations Fee
Account and the Immigration User Fee Account. Those two accounts
represented about 99 percent of INS' total user fee account
revenue. 18Alien Applications: Processing Differences Exist Among
INS Field Units (GAO/GGD-97-47, May 20, 1997). 19INS
Fingerprinting of Aliens: Efforts to Ensure Authenticity of
Aliens' Fingerprints (GAO/GGD-95-40, Dec. 22, 1994). Page 10
GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges results of all
requested fingerprint checks from the FBI, and the results were,
therefore, not always available to examiners before the alien's
hearings. As a result, INS improperly naturalized citizens with
felony convictions. In 1997, we testified that INS could still not
assure itself and Congress that it was granting citizenship only
to deserving applicants.20 In addition, a report to the Department
of Justice by a consulting firm indicated that INS had not ensured
that its field units were implementing internal control procedures
issued by the INS Commissioner. INS has begun restructuring its
naturalization process to address these problems. The Immigration
Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA)21 made it illegal Worksite
Enforcement for employers knowingly to hire or continue to
employ or recruit or refer for a fee unauthorized aliens. The act
further required employers to comply with an employment
verification process intended to provide employers with a means to
avoid hiring unauthorized aliens.22 In 1994, we testified that
INS' worksite enforcement effort had declined from fiscal year
1989 through 1993.23 Our more recent work in this area has shown
that, while INS has undertaken several initiatives to improve the
employment verification process to make it less susceptible to
fraud, significant obstacles remained.24 First, as mandated in the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996,25 INS is testing pilot programs in which employers must
electronically verify an employee's eligibility to work. However,
INS has had difficulty in meeting its goal for enrolling employers
in the pilot programs. Although originally expected to enroll
16,000 employers by the end of fiscal year 1999, only 2,500 were
participating as of November 1998. Second, INS has made little
progress in reducing the number of documents that employers can
accept to determine employment eligibility. We pointed out that
having a smaller number of acceptable documents would make the
process more secure and reduce employer confusion. Lastly, INS had
begun issuing new 20 Naturalization of Aliens: INS Internal
Controls (GAO/T-GGD-97-98, May 1, 1997). 21 P.L. 99-603, 8 U.S.C.
1324a et seq. 22 Generally, the act requires employers to verify
the identity and eligibility of all new employees hired after
November 6, 1986. 23 Employer Sanctions: Comments on H.R. 3362-
Employer Sanctions Improvement Act (GAO/T-GGD- 94-189, Sept. 21,
1994). 24 Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing
Unauthorized Alien Employment Exist (GAO/GGD- 99-33, Apr. 2,
1999); and (GAO/T-GGD-99-105, July 1, 1999). 25 P.L. 104-208. Page
11 GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of
Management and Program Challenges Statement Immigration and
Naturalization Service: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges documents with increased security features, which it
hoped would make it easier for employers to verify the documents'
authenticity. However, in addition to those INS documents, aliens
can show employers various other less secure documents that
authorize them to work. Therefore, unauthorized aliens seeking
employment can circumvent the improved security features of INS
documents by simply presenting fraudulent non- INS documents-such
as counterfeit Social Security cards-to employers. Further, we
reported that, since no verification system is foolproof,
enforcing IRCA's employer sanctions provisions would continue to
be important. Since 1994, INS had devoted about 2 percent of its
enforcement work years to its worksite enforcement program, which
is designed to detect noncompliance with the law. INS completed
about 6,500 investigations of employers in 1998-about 3 percent of
the U.S. employers believed to have unauthorized workers on their
payrolls. INS' worksite enforcement program has infrequently
imposed sanctions on employers. INS is in the process of changing
its approach to worksite enforcement, but it is too soon to know
how these changes will be implemented or to assess their impact on
the hiring of unauthorized workers. The Illegal Immigration Reform
and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 Expedited Removal
included provisions establishing a new process for dealing with
aliens who attempt to enter the United States by engaging in fraud
or misrepresentation (e.g., falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen
or misrepresenting a material fact) or who arrive with fraudulent,
improper, or no documents (e.g., visa or passport). Known as
expedited removal, the new process gives INS officers, rather than
immigration judges, the authority to formally order these aliens
removed from the country. The process also limits the rights of
aliens to appeal a removal order. Aliens who fear being persecuted
or tortured if they are returned to their home country are to be
granted a "credible fear" interview to determine if their claims
of asylum have a significant possibility of succeeding. In our
1998 report,26 we addressed several aspects of INS' implementation
of the expedited removal process, including the implementation and
results of the process for making credible fear determinations and
the mechanisms that INS had established to monitor expedited
removals and credible fear determinations and to improve these
processes. In our report, we pointed out that our review of case
file documentation indicated a range of compliance with certain
aspects of the required expedited 26 Illegal Aliens: Changes in
the Process of Denying Aliens Entry Into the United States
(GAO/GGD-98- 81, Mar. 31, 1998). Page 12
GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges Statement Immigration and Naturalization Service:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges removal processes at
five selected locations.27 For example, case file documentation
indicated that supervisors reviewed the expedited removal orders
in an estimated 80 to 100 percent of the cases at the five
locations. Further, our report noted that INS had or was in the
process of developing mechanisms to monitor the expedited removal
procedures, including the credible fear determinations. Those
mechanisms included creating an Expedited Removal Working Group to
visit locations and address problems, creating a quality assurance
team at headquarters to review selected credible fear files, and
meeting with nongovernmental organizations to discuss issues and
concerns. INS has made changes to its processes on the basis of
concerns raised by these internal reviewers and outside
organizations. Mr. Chairman, this completes my statement. I would
be pleased to answer any questions that you or other members of
the Subcommittee may have. Contact and Acknowledgement For further
information regarding this testimony, please contact Richard M.
Stana at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to
this testimony included Evi Rezmovic and Brenda Rabinowitz. 27 The
locations, which we judgmentally selected, included San Ysidro,
California; Buffalo, New York; and Miami International, Los
Angeles International, and John Fitzgerald Kennedy (JFK) Airports.
Page 13 GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of
Management and Program Challenges Attachment Related GAO Products
Illegal Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized
Alien Employment Exist (GAO/T-GGD-99-105, July 1, 1999). Illegal
Immigration: Status of Southwest Border Strategy Implementation
(GAO/GGD-99-44, May 19, 1999). Immigration Benefits: Applications
for Adjustment of Status Under the Haitian Refugee Immigration
Fairness Act of 1998 (GAO/GGD-99-92R, April 21, 1999). Illegal
Aliens: Significant Obstacles to Reducing Unauthorized Alien
Employment Exist (GAO/GGD-99-33, April 2, 1999). Drug Control: INS
and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee
Corruption (GAO/GGD-99-31, March 30, 1999). Visa Issuance: Issues
Concerning the Religious Worker Visa Program (GAO/NSIAD-99-67,
March 26, 1999). INS Budget: Overhiring and Decline in Revenues
Have Created Fiscal Stress (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-99-129, March 24,
1999). Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department
of Justice (GAO/OCG-99-10, January 1, 1999). Criminal Aliens: INS'
Efforts to Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue to Need Improvement
(GAO/GGD-99-3, October 16, 1998). INS User Fee Revisions: INS
Complied With Guidance but Could Make Improvements (GAO/GGD-98-
197, September 28, 1998). H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program:
Experiences of Individual Vidalia Onion Growers (GAO/HEHS-98-236R,
September 10, 1998). Immigration Statistics: Information Gaps,
Quality Issues Limit Utility of Federal Data to Policymakers
(GAO/GGD-98-164, July 31, 1998). Immigration Statistics: Guidance
on Producing Information on the U.S. Resident Foreign-Born
(GAO/GGD-98-155, July 22, 1998). Immigration Statistics: Status of
the Implementation of National Academy of Sciences'
Recommendations (GAO/GGD-98-119, June 9, 1998). Page 14
GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program
Challenges Attachment Related GAO Products Assessment of
Contractor's Review of INS' Analysis of a Random Sample of
Recently Naturalized Aliens (GAO/GGD-98-131R, May 28, 1998).
Illegal Aliens: Changes in the Process of Denying Aliens Entry
Into the United States (GAO/GGD-98-81, March 31, 1998).
Naturalized Aliens: Efforts to Determine if INS Improperly
Naturalized Some Aliens (GAO/GGD-98-62, March 23, 1998).
Retirement Eligibility of Customs and INS Employees on the
Southwest Border (GAO/GGD-98-70R, March 13, 1998). Community
Development: Changes in Nebraska's and Iowa's Counties With Large
Meatpacking Plant Workforces (GAO/RCED-98-62, February 27, 1998).
H-2A Agricultural Guestworker Program: Changes Could Improve
Services to Employers and Better Protect Workers (GAO/HEHS-98-20,
December 31, 1997). Illegal Immigration: Southwest Border Strategy
Results Inconclusive; More Evaluation Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21,
December 11, 1997). Customs and Border Patrol: Resources Needed
for Reopening Rail Line From Mexico-U.S. Border Into the United
States (GAO/GGD-98-20R, November 5, 1997). Combating Terrorism:
Federal Agencies' Efforts to Implement National Policy and
Strategy (GAO/NSIAD-97-254, September 26, 1997). Illegal
Immigration: Information on Illegal Immigrants and Automobile
Insurance in California (GAO/GGD-97-172R, September 5, 1997).
Higher Education: Verification Helps Prevent Student Aid Payments
to Ineligible Noncitizens (GAO/HEHS-97-153, August 6, 1997). INS
Management: Follow-up on Selected Problems (GAO/GGD-97-132, July
22, 1997). Immigration and Naturalization Service: Employment
Verification Pilot Project (GAO/GGD-97-136R, July 17, 1997). Page
15 GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and
Program Challenges Attachment Related GAO Products Criminal
Aliens: INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned Aliens Need
To Be Improved (GAO/T-GGD-97-154, July 15, 1997). INS Criminal
Record Verification: Information on Process for Citizenship
Applicants (GAO/GGD-97-118R, June 4, 1997). Alien Applications:
Processing Differences Exist Among INS Field Units (GAO/GGD-97-47,
May 20, 1997). State Department: Efforts to Reduce Visa Fraud
(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-167, May 20, 1997). Naturalization of Aliens: INS
Internal Controls (GAO/T-GGD-97-98, May 1, 1997). Naturalization
of Aliens: Assessment of the Extent to Which Aliens Were
Improperly Naturalized (GAO/T-GGD-97-51, March 5, 1997). Federal
Law Enforcement: Investigative Authority and Personnel at 13
Agencies (GAO/GGD-96-154, September 30, 1996). Border Patrol:
Staffing and Enforcement Activities (GAO/GGD-96-65, March 11,
1996). INS Investment Strategy (GAO/AIMD-96-26R, December 11,
1995). INS Border Crossing Cards (GAO/GGD-96-25R, November 29,
1995). Federal Law Enforcement: Information on Certain Agencies'
Criminal Investigative Personnel and Salary Costs (GAO/T-GGD-96-
38, November 15, 1995). Law Enforcement Support Center: Name-Based
Systems Limit Ability to Identify Arrested Aliens (GAO/AIMD-95-
147, August 21, 1995). Illegal Aliens: National Net Cost Estimates
Vary Widely (GAO/HEHS-95- 133, July 25, 1995). INS: Information on
Aliens Applying for Permanent Resident Status (GAO/ GGD-95-162FS,
June 8, 1995). Information Integrity: Using Technology to
Determine Eligibility to Work and Receive Benefits (GAO/T-AIMD-95-
99, March 7, 1995). Page 16 GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview
of Management and Program Challenges Attachment Related GAO
Products Border Control: Revised Strategy Is Showing Some Positive
Results (GAO/GGD-95-30, December 29, 1994). INS Fingerprinting of
Aliens: Efforts to Ensure Authenticity of Aliens' Fingerprints
(GAO/GGD-95-40, December 22, 1994). INS: Management Problems and
Program Issues (GAO/T-GGD-95-11, October 5, 1994). Employer
Sanctions: Comments on H.R. 3362 - - Employer Sanctions
Improvement Act (GAO/T-GGD-94-189, September 21, 1994). INS Drug
Task Force Activities: Federal Agencies Supportive of INS Efforts
(GAO/GGD-94-143, July 7, 1994). INS User Fees: INS Working to
Improve Management of User Fee Accounts (GAO/GGD-94-101, April 12,
1994). INS' EEO Progress in DC/LA (GAO/GGD-94-10R, October 5,
1993). Illegal Aliens: Despite Data Limitations, Current Methods
Provide Better Population Estimates (GAO/PEMD-93-25, August 5,
1993). Assessing EEO Progress at INS (GAO/GGD-93-54R, July 15,
1993). Customs Service and INS: Dual Management Structure for
Border Inspections Should Be Ended (GAO/GGD-93-111, June 30,
1993). INS Corrective Action (GAO/GGD-93-46R, June 16, 1993).
Information on Black Employment at INS (GAO/GGD-93-44R, May 17,
1993). Border Patrol: Southwest Border Enforcement Affected by
Mission Expansion and Budget (GAO/T-GGD-92-66, August 5, 1992).
Immigration Control: Immigration Policies Affect INS Detention
Efforts (GAO/GGD-92-85, June 25, 1992). Immigration and the Labor
Market: Nonimmigrant Alien Workers in the United States (GAO/PEMD-
92-17, April 28, 1992). Page 17 GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS:
Overview of Management and Program Challenges Attachment Related
GAO Products Immigrants in Indiana: Northwest Indiana Compared to
Other Parts of the State (GAO/GGD-92-32FS, January 10, 1992).
U.S.-Mexico Trade: Concerns About the Adequacy of Border
Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD-91-228, May 16, 1991). Employee Drug
Testing: Status of Federal Agencies' Programs (GAO/GGD- 91-70, May
6, 1991). Border Patrol: Southwest Border Enforcement Affected by
Mission Expansion and Budget (GAO/GGD-91-72BR, March 28, 1991).
International Trade: Easing Foreign Visitors' Arrivals at U.S.
Airports (GAO/NSIAD-91-6, March 8, 1991). Financial Management:
INS Lacks Accountability and Controls Over Its Resources
(GAO/AFMD-91-20, January 24, 1991). Immigration Management: Strong
Leadership and Management Reforms Needed to Address Serious
Problems (GAO/GGD-91-28, January 23, 1991). Information
Management: Immigration and Naturalization Service Lacks Ready
Access to Essential Data (GAO/IMTEC-90-75, September 27, 1990).
Immigration Services: INS Resources and Services in the Miami
District (GAO/GGD-90-98, August 6, 1990). Criminal Aliens: Prison
Deportation Hearings Include Opportunities to Contest Deportation
(GAO/GGD-90-79, May 25, 1990). Immigration Reform: Employer
Sanctions and the Question of Discrimination (GAO/GGD-90-62, March
29, 1990). Immigration Reform: Major Changes Likely Under S. 358
(GAO/PEMD-90-5, November 9, 1989). Immigration Control: Deporting
and Excluding Aliens From the United States (GAO/GGD-90-18,
October 26, 1989). Page 18 GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview
of Management and Program Challenges Page 19 GAO/T-GGD-99-148
INS: Overview of Management and Program Challenges Page 20
GAO/T-GGD-99-148 INS: Overview of Management and Program
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