Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related Employee
Corruption (Statement/Record, 05/25/99, GAO/T-GGD-99-106).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the Customs Service's
efforts to combat drug-related corruption, focusing on: (1) the extent
to which Customs has complied with policies and procedures for ensuring
employee integrity; (2) an identification of the types of illegal
drug-related activities of which Customs employees on the Southwest
Border have been convicted; (3) an identification of the Department of
the Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for
handling allegations of drug-related employee misconduct and whether the
policies and procedures were followed; and (4) the extent to which
lessons learned from corruption cases closed in fiscal years 1992
through 1997 have led to changes in policies and procedures for
preventing the drug-related corruption of Customs employees.
GAO noted that: (1) Customs has policies and procedures designed to help
ensure the integrity of its employees; (2) however, Customs' compliance
with these policies and procedures has varied; (3) the policies and
procedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations for new
staff and 5-year reinvestigations of employees, as well as basic
integrity training; (4) while Customs generally completed required
background investigations for new hires by the end of their first year
on the job, reinvestigations were typically overdue, in some instances
by as many as 3 years; (5) Customs provided integrity training to new
employees during basic training, but advanced integrity training was not
required; (6) Customs had not formally evaluated its integrity
procedures to determine their effectiveness; (7) one way to evaluate the
effectiveness of integrity procedures would be to use drug-related
investigative case information; (8) Treasury has established procedures
for handling allegations of employee misconduct; (9) within Treasury,
Customs' Office of Internal Affairs is generally responsible for
investigating both criminal and noncriminal allegations against Customs
employees; (10) GAO could not readily determine if the Office of
Internal Affairs complied with the investigative procedures because
Customs' automated case management system and its investigative case
files did not provide the necessary information to assess compliance
with these procedures; (11) Customs has missed opportunities to: (a)
learn lessons from drug-related corruption cases; and (b) change its
policies and procedures for preventing drug-related employee corruption;
(12) GAO's review of the closed cases of nine convicted employees
revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally reported by
the Office of Internal Affairs, even though Customs procedures require
them to formally report internal control weaknesses identified during
investigations; and (13) these weaknesses included instances where: (a)
drug smugglers chose the inspection lane at a port of entry; (b) Customs
employees did not recuse themselves from inspecting individuals with
whom they had close personal relationships; and (c) law enforcement
personnel were allowed to cross the Southwest Border without inspection.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-GGD-99-106
TITLE: Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-Related
Employee Corruption
DATE: 05/25/99
SUBJECT: Drug trafficking
Bribery
Ethical conduct
Customs administration
Personnel management
Federal employees
Internal controls
Smuggling
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DRUG CONTROL: Customs Can Do More|To Prevent Drug-Related Employee
Corruption (GAO/T-GGD-99-106) DRUG CONTROL Customs Can Do More To
Prevent Drug- Related Employee Corruption
Statement for the Record by Richard M. Stana Associate Director,
Administration of Justice Issues General Government Division
United States General Accounting Office
GAO Testimony Before the Finance Committee
U. S. Senate
Not to be Released Before 10: 00 a. m. EDT Tuesday May 25, 1999
GAO/T-GGD-99-106
GAO/T-GGD-99-106
Statement Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related Employee Corruption
Page 1 GAO/T-GGD-99-106
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: I am pleased to submit
this statement to assist in your oversight of the U. S. Customs
Service. You asked us to discuss work we have done on the U. S.
Customs Service's efforts to combat drug- related corruption.
Corruption of Customs employees along the Southwest Border by
persons involved in the illegal drug trade is a serious and
continuing threat. The enormous sums of money being generated by
drug trafficking have increased the threat of bribery. It is a
challenge that Customs and other law enforcement agencies must
overcome at the border.
My statement today is based on a report 1 we issued on March 30,
1999, and follow- up testimony 2 we delivered on April 21, 1999,
before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control. It
focuses on (1) the extent to which Customs has complied with
policies and procedures for ensuring employee integrity; (2) an
identification of the types of illegal drug- related activities of
which Customs employees on the Southwest Border have been
convicted; 3 (3) an identification of the Department of the
Treasury's organizational structures, policies, and procedures for
handling allegations of drug- related employee misconduct and
whether the policies and procedures were followed; and (4) the
extent to which lessons learned from corruption cases closed in
fiscal years 1992 through 1997 have led to changes in policies and
procedures for preventing the drug- related corruption of Customs
employees.
We make the following points in this statement:
Customs' compliance with its integrity procedures varied.
Customs' compliance with its investigative procedures was
uncertain.
Customs missed opportunities to learn lessons from closed
corruption cases.
In our report, we made recommendations to address these points. 4
1 Drug Control: INS and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related Employee Corruption (GAO/GGD-99-31). 2 Drug Control: INS
and Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug- Related Employee
Corruption (GAO/T-GGD-99-86). 3 If employees entered guilty pleas,
we considered them to have been convicted of the crime.
4 GAO/GGD-99-31.
Statement Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related Employee Corruption
Page 2 GAO/T-GGD-99-106
Stretching 1,962 miles from Brownsville, TX, to Imperial Beach,
CA, the Southwest Border has been a long- standing transit area
for illegal drugs entering the United States. According to the
Department of State, the Southwest Border is the principal transit
route for cocaine, marijuana, and methamphetamine entering the
United States. Customs is one of the principal agencies
responsible for stopping and seizing illegal drug shipments across
the Southwest Border. At the ports of entry, about 2,000 Customs
inspectors are to check incoming traffic to identify both persons
and contraband, including illegal drugs, that are not allowed to
enter the country.
The threat of corruption of Customs employees is not a new
phenomenon, and the 1990s have seen congressional emphasis on
ensuring employee integrity and preventing corruption. A corrupt
Customs employee at a port of entry can facilitate the safe
passage of illegal drug shipments. The integrity policies and
procedures adopted by Customs are designed to help ensure that its
employees, especially those in positions that could affect the
smuggling of illegal drugs into the United States, are of
acceptable integrity and, failing that, to detect any corruption
as quickly as possible.
Customs has policies and procedures designed to help ensure the
integrity of its employees. However, Customs' compliance with
these policies and procedures has varied. The policies and
procedures consist mainly of mandatory background investigations
for new staff and 5- year reinvestigations of employees, as well
as basic integrity training. While Customs generally completed
required background investigations for new hires by the end of
their first year on the job, reinvestigations were typically
overdue, in some instances by as many as 3 years. Customs provided
integrity training to new employees during basic training, but
advanced integrity training was not required.
Customs had not formally evaluated its integrity procedures to
determine their effectiveness. One way to evaluate the
effectiveness of integrity procedures would be to use drug-
related investigative case information. For example, among
employees assigned to the Southwest Border, nine were convicted of
drug- related crimes during fiscal years 1992 through 1997. These
nine employees engaged in one or more illegal drug- related
activities, including
waving drug- laden vehicles through ports of entry,
coordinating the movement of drugs across the Southwest Border,
selling drugs, and
disclosing drug intelligence information. Background
Summary of Findings
Statement Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related Employee Corruption
Page 3 GAO/T-GGD-99-106
The nine convicted employees received background investigations or
reinvestigations that determined they were suitable for employment
and had the required integrity. However, based on our review of
the case files, the financial information that these employees
provided during their background investigations and
reinvestigations was not fully used by Customs. According to a
Customs official, reported liabilities are to be compared with
debts listed on a credit report to determine if all debts were
reported. This use of the financial information would not have
helped to identify employees who were living well beyond their
means or whose debts were excessive.
The Treasury has established procedures for handling allegations
of employee misconduct. Within the Treasury, Customs' Office of
Internal Affairs is generally responsible for investigating both
criminal and noncriminal allegations against Customs employees. We
could not readily determine if the Office of Internal Affairs
complied with the investigative procedures because Customs'
automated case management system and its investigative case files
did not provide the necessary information to assess compliance
with these procedures.
Customs has missed opportunities to (1) learn lessons from drug-
related corruption cases and (2) change its policies and
procedures for preventing drug- related employee corruption. Our
review of the closed cases of the nine convicted employees
revealed internal control weaknesses that were not formally
reported by the Office of Internal Affairs, even though Customs
procedures require them to formally report internal control
weaknesses identified during investigations. These weaknesses
included instances where (1) drug smugglers chose the inspection
lane at a port of entry, (2) Customs employees did not recuse
themselves from inspecting individuals with whom they had close
personal relationships, and (3) law enforcement personnel were
allowed to cross the Southwest Border without inspection. At the
time of our review, we found that Customs had not corrected these
internal control weaknesses, and we therefore made recommendations
in our report to address them. 5
Because of the enormous sums of money being generated by drug
trafficking and the corruption of some Customs employees, Customs
is vulnerable to the threat of corruption. Therefore, we
recommended that the Secretary of the Treasury
5 GAO/GGD-99-31. Recommendations
Statement Drug Control: Customs Can Do More To Prevent Drug-
Related Employee Corruption
Page 4 GAO/T-GGD-99-106
direct the Commissioner of Customs to evaluate the effectiveness
of integrity assurance efforts, including training, background
investigations, and reinvestigations;
require the Commissioner of Customs to comply with policies that
require employment reinvestigations to be completed when they are
due;
require that Customs fully review financial disclosure
statements, which employees are required to provide as part of the
background investigation or reinvestigation process, to identify
possible financial irregularities, such as employees who appear to
be living beyond their means;
require the Commissioner of Customs to document that policies and
procedures were reviewed to identify internal control weaknesses
in cases where a Customs employee was determined to have engaged
in drugrelated criminal activities; and
direct the Commissioner of Customs to strengthen internal
controls at Southwest Border ports of entry by establishing (1)
one or more methods to deprive drivers of their choice of
inspection lanes; (2) a recusal policy concerning the performance
of inspections by Customs inspectors where their objectivity may
be in question; and (3) a policy for inspection of law enforcement
officers and their vehicles.
The Department of the Treasury provided comments from Customs that
generally concurred with our recommendations and indicated that it
is taking steps to implement them.
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