Customs Service: Inspectional Personnel and Workloads (Testimony,
08/14/98, GAO/T-GGD-98-195).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed certain aspects of
the Customs Service's inspectional personnel and its commercial cargo
and passenger workloads, focusing on: (1) the implications of any
differences between the cargo and passenger inspectional personnel
levels at selected airports and seaports around the United States and
those determined by Customs to be appropriate for these ports (assessed
levels); and (2) any differences among the cargo and passenger
processing workload-to-inspector ratios at the selected ports and the
rationales for any significant differences in these ratios.

GAO noted that: (1) it was not able to perform the requested analyses to
identify the implications of differences between assessed and actual
inspectional personnel levels because Customs does not have a
systematic, agencywide process for assessing the need for inspectional
personnel or allocating them to its commercial cargo ports; (2) Customs
does not have these processes for its sea or land ports; (3) while
Customs uses a quantitative model to determine the need for additional
inspectional personnel to process air passenger, the model is not
intended to establish the level at which airports should be staffed,
according to Customs officials; (4) Customs has awarded a contract for
the development of a resource allocation model; (5) upon delivery of the
model, they will customize a process for using it to meet changing
personnel needs and new initiatives; (6) Customs officials at the ports
GAO visited told it that the current personnel levels, coupled with the
use of overtime, have enabled these ports to meet Customs' performance
standards for trade and passenger processing; (7) Customs also had
performance standards for cargo examination--in fiscal year (FY) 1997,
Customs expected its ports to examine 3.1 percent of all arriving cargo;
(8) Customs reported that it inspected only 2.6 percent of arriving
cargo in FY 1997; (9) GAO was also not able to perform the analyses to
identify workload-to-inspector ratios and rationales for any differences
in these ratios because it did not have a sufficient level of confidence
in the quality of the workload data; (10) GAO identified significant
discrepancies in the workload data it obtained from Customs
headquarters, two Customs Management Centers, and three ports; (11) GAO
could not obtain specific explanations for these discrepancies without
Customs having to conduct extensive additional work; (12) GAO also did
not identify any systematic controls over the quality of the data; (13)
however, workload was only one of the several factors considered by
Customs in the few assessments--which focused on its drug smuggling
initiatives--completed since 1995 to determine its needs for additional
inspectional personnel and allocate such personnel to ports; and (14)
Customs also considered factors such as the threat of drug smuggling,
budgetary constraints, and legislative limitations.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD-98-195
     TITLE:  Customs Service: Inspectional Personnel and Workloads
      DATE:  08/14/98
   SUBJECT:  Customs administration
             Agency evaluation
             Strategic planning
             Personnel management
             Smuggling
             Drug trafficking
             Data integrity
             Human resources utilization
             Federal employees
             Inspection
IDENTIFIER:  Los Angeles International Airport (CA)
             Long Beach (CA)
             John F. Kennedy International Airport (NY)
             Newark International Airport (NJ)
             Detroit (MI)
             Houston (TX)
             Los Angeles (CA)
             New York (NY)
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and
Technology, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m.  EST Friday, August
14, 1998

CUSTOMS SERVICE - INSPECTIONAL
PERSONNEL AND WORKLOADS

Statement of Norman J.  Rabkin Director, Administration of Justice
Issues, General Government Division

GAO/T-GGD-98-195

GAO/GGD-98-195T


(264448)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV


CUSTOMS SERVICE:  INSPECTIONAL
PERSONNEL AND WORKLOADS
====================================================== Chapter Summary

The U.S.  Customs Service is responsible for collecting revenue from
imports and enforcing customs and related laws.  Customs also
processes persons, carriers, cargo, and mail into and out of the
United States.  In fiscal year 1997, Customs collected about $19
billion in revenues and processed, among other things, about 18
million import entries and 442 million air, land, and sea passengers
entering the country.  At the end of fiscal year 1997, Customs had
deployed 7,207 inspectors at ports of entry around the country. 

The Chairmen of the Subcommittee on Government Management,
Information, and Technology, House Committee on Government Reform and
Oversight and the Subcommittee on Trade, House Committee on Ways and
Means, respectively, requested that we analyze the (1) relationships
between actual cargo and passenger inspectional personnel levels at
selected airports and seaports and those determined by Customs to be
appropriate for these ports (assessed levels) and (2) cargo and
passenger processing workload-to-inspector ratios at the selected
ports.  We focused our work at Los Angeles International Airport, New
York City's John F.  Kennedy International Airport, the seaport in
Long Beach, CA, the air and sea ports in Newark, NJ, and the air and
sea ports each in Houston, TX and Detroit, MI. 

Over the past 3 years, Customs has assessed the need for additional
inspectors to combat drug smuggling through ports along the Southwest
border.  Customs also uses a quantitative model to estimate the need
for inspectional personnel at airports, but not to establish the
appropriate personnel levels, according to Customs officials. 
However, Customs does not have a systematic, agencywide process for
assessing the need for inspectional personnel and allocating such
personnel to process commercial cargo or land and sea passengers at
all of its 301 ports.  Therefore, we were not able to identify the
implications of differences between assessed and actual inspectional
personnel levels. 

We were also not able to perform the workload-to-inspector ratio
analyses because we did not have a sufficient level of confidence in
the quality of the workload data.  We identified a few significant
discrepancies in the workload data we obtained from Customs
headquarters and the ports we contacted, and we did not identify any
systematic controls over the quality of the data.  In addition,
workload is only one of several factors Customs has considered in the
few assessments completed since 1995; Customs also considers factors
such as the smuggling threat at each port and legislative constraints
on the movement of certain inspectional positions. 


CUSTOMS SERVICE:  INSPECTIONAL
PERSONNEL AND WORKLOADS
==================================================== Chapter STATEMENT

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Today we are releasing a report that you and the Chairman of the
Subcommittee on Trade, House Committee on Ways and Means requested on
certain aspects of the U.S.  Customs Service's inspectional personnel
and its commercial cargo and passenger workloads.\1 I am pleased to
be here to summarize the information we presented in that report. 

You asked us to analyze (1) the implications of any differences
between the cargo and passenger inspectional personnel levels at
selected airports and seaports around the United States and those
determined by Customs to be appropriate for these ports (assessed
levels) and (2) any differences among the cargo and passenger
processing workload-to-inspector ratios at the selected ports and the
rationales for any significant differences in these ratios.  We were
unable to complete those analyses basically because Customs does not
have a systematic method for determining the number of inspectors it
needs at its ports, and we did not have confidence in the workload
data Customs had reported. 

To try to answer your questions, we obtained and reviewed relevant
staffing, budget, and workload documents at headquarters and nine
ports; interviewed cognizant Customs officials at those locations;
and visited four ports--the international airports in Los Angeles and
New York and the seaports in Long Beach and Newark--where we observed
cargo and passenger processing operations.  Although we did not
perform a complete quality assessment of Customs' inspectional
personnel data, we compared workload data we obtained for each port
from various sources and attempted to reconcile any differences.  Our
objectives, scope, and methodology are discussed in more detail in
appendix I of the report.  We shared our findings and conclusions
with Customs officials; they generally agreed with the information we
developed. 


--------------------
\1 See Customs Service:  Inspectional Personnel and Workloads
(GAO/GGD-98-170, Aug.  14, 1998). 


   BACKGROUND
-------------------------------------------------- Chapter STATEMENT:1

Created in 1789, Customs is one of the federal government's oldest
agencies.  Customs is responsible for collecting revenue from imports
and enforcing customs and related laws.  Customs also processes
persons, carriers, cargo, and mail into and out of the United States. 
In fiscal year 1997, Customs collected about $19 billion in revenues
and processed about 18 million import entries; about 128 million
vehicles and trucks; about 706,000 commercial aircraft; about 214,000
vessels; and about 442 million air, land, and sea passengers entering
the country. 

Customs performs its mission with a workforce of about 19,500
personnel at its headquarters in Washington, D.C., and at 20 Customs
Management Centers (CMC),\2

20 Special Agent-in-Charge offices, and 301 ports of entry around the
country.  At the end of fiscal year 1997, Customs had deployed 7,207
inspectors at these ports.  This represented an increase of 17
percent over the level deployed in fiscal year 1992, the earliest
year for which complete data were available. 

The nine ports we visited or contacted--Los Angeles International
Airport (LAX); Los Angeles/Long Beach Seaport; New York City's John
F.  Kennedy International Airport (JFK); New York/Newark Seaport;
Newark International Airport; and the Houston and Detroit air and sea
ports--were among the busiest of their kind in the United States in
fiscal year 1997.  According to Customs workload data, these ports
accounted for about 31 percent of all air and sea passengers and
about 19 percent of all cargo entries processed by Customs in fiscal
year 1997.  The ports also accounted for about 21 percent of all
inspectors deployed by Customs at the end of fiscal year 1997. 


--------------------
\2 On October 1, 1995, Customs closed its 7 regional and 42 district
offices and replaced them with 20 CMCs.  The CMCs have oversight
responsibilities over Customs' ports of entry. 


   IMPLICATIONS OF DIFFERENCES
   BETWEEN ASSESSED AND ACTUAL
   INSPECTIONAL PERSONNEL LEVELS
   COULD NOT BE DETERMINED
-------------------------------------------------- Chapter STATEMENT:2

We were not able to perform the requested analyses to identify the
implications of differences between assessed and actual inspectional
personnel levels because, as we reported in April 1998,\3 Customs
does not have a systematic, agencywide process for assessing the need
for inspectional personnel or allocating them to its commercial cargo
ports.  We have since learned that Customs does not have these
processes for its sea or land ports.  While Customs uses a
quantitative model to determine the need for additional inspectional
personnel to process air passengers, the model is not intended to
establish the level at which airports should be staffed, according to
Customs officials. 

Customs is in the early stages of responding to our April 1998
recommendation that it establish an inspectional personnel needs
assessment and allocation process.  Customs has awarded a contract
for the development of a resource allocation model.  Customs
officials have told us that, upon delivery of the model, they will
customize a process for using it to meet changing personnel needs and
new initiatives. 

Customs officials at the ports we visited told us that the current
personnel levels, coupled with the use of overtime, have enabled
these ports to meet Customs' performance standards for trade and
passenger processing, such as completing the inspection of passengers
within 5 minutes of their retrieving checked baggage.  Customs also
had performance standards for cargo examination--in fiscal year 1997,
Customs expected its ports to examine 3.1 percent of all arriving
cargo.  Customs reported that, overall, it inspected only 2.6 percent
of arriving cargo in fiscal year 1997; the ports we visited or
contacted reported that they examined an average of 2.2 percent of
incoming cargo in fiscal year 1997.  Customs has dropped this
indicator from its current performance plan for fiscal year 1999 as
part of its ongoing effort to refine performance measures. 


--------------------
\3 See Customs Service:  Process for Estimating and Allocating
Inspectional Personnel (GAO/GGD-98-107, Apr.  30, 1998). 


   WORKLOAD-TO-INSPECTOR RATIOS
   AND RATIONALES FOR DIFFERENCES
   COULD NOT BE DETERMINED
-------------------------------------------------- Chapter STATEMENT:3

We were also not able to perform the analyses to identify
workload-to-inspector ratios and rationales for any differences in
these ratios because we did not have a sufficient level of confidence
in the quality of the workload data.  We identified significant
discrepancies in the workload data we obtained from Customs
headquarters, two CMCs, and three ports.  For example, for fiscal
year 1997, data from Customs headquarters indicated that the JFK and
Newark airports processed a total of about 1.4 million cargo entries
(shipments) of all types, including those with a value of less than
$1,250 (informal entries) and those with a value of over $1,250
(formal entries).  However, data from the New York CMC indicated that
these airports processed about 1.5 million formal entries alone,
almost 100,000 entries more than headquarters' number for all entries
at these airports.  We could not obtain specific explanations for
these discrepancies without Customs having to conduct extensive
additional work.  We also did not identify any systematic controls
over the quality of the data.\4

However, workload was only one of several factors considered by
Customs in the few assessments--which focused on its drug
smuggling-initiatives--completed since 1995 to determine its needs
for additional inspectional personnel and allocate such personnel to
ports.  Customs also considered factors such as the threat of drug
smuggling, budgetary constraints, and legislative limitations. 


--------------------
\4 In conjunction with the development of the resource allocation
model discussed earlier, Customs indicated that it was undertaking an
initiative to assess and improve the quality of the data to be used
in the model.  Details of this initiative are discussed in our
report. 


------------------------------------------------ Chapter STATEMENT:3.1

Mr.  Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement.  In closing, I
would like to acknowledge the cooperation of Customs personnel during
the course of our review.  I will be pleased to answer any questions. 

*** End of document. ***