Federal Employee Redress: An Opportunity for Reform (Testimony, 11/29/95,
GAO/T-GGD-96-42).

The redress system for federal workers seeks to protect these employees
against arbitrary agency actions and prohibited personnel practices,
such as discrimination or retaliation for whistleblowing. But how well
is the redress system working and does it add to or detract from the
fair and efficient operation of the federal government? This testimony
makes three main points. First, because of the system's complexity and
the variety of redress mechanisms available, it is inefficient,
expensive, and time-consuming.  Second, because the system strongly
protects individual workers' redress rights, it is vulnerable to
employees who would take undue advantage of these protections. Its
protracted processes and requirements divert managers from more
productive activities and inhibit some of them from addressing
legitimate performance and conduct problems. Moreover, the demands of
the system put pressure on employees and agencies alike to settle
cases--regardless of their merits--to avoid potential costs. Third,
alternatives to the current system do exist and may be worth further
study as Congress considers modifying the federal system. Leading
private sector employers told GAO that their managers are held
accountable for treating people fairly but are also given the
flexibility and discretion to make the tough decision that are an
inevitable part of sound management. To the extent that the federal
redress system is titled toward employee protections at the expense of
the effective management of the nation's business, it deserves
congressional attention.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD-96-42
     TITLE:  Federal Employee Redress: An Opportunity for Reform
      DATE:  11/29/95
   SUBJECT:  Collective bargaining
             Federal employees
             Personnel management
             Labor-management relations
             Civil rights law enforcement
             Administrative remedies
             Labor negotiations
             Employment discrimination
             Administrative hearings
IDENTIFIER:  Canada
             New Zealand
             Australia
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Civil Service, Committee on Government
Reform and Oversight
House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
9:00 a.m.  EST
Wednesday
November 29, 1995

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE REDRESS:  AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM

Statement of Timothy P.  Bowling
Director Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division

GAO/T-GGD-96-42

GAO/GGD-96-42T


(966669)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV


FEDERAL EMPLOYEE REDRESS:  AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR REFORM
============================================================ Chapter 0

Statement by
Timothy P.  Bowling, Associate Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division

The purpose of the redress system for federal employees is to uphold
the merit system principles by ensuring that federal employees are
protected against arbitrary agency actions and prohibited personnel
practices, such as discrimination or retaliation for whistleblowing. 
But how well is the redress system working, and does it add to or
detract from the fair and efficient operation of the federal
government?  In response to these questions, GAO makes three points: 

  First, because of the complexity of the system and the variety of
     redress mechanisms it affords federal employees, it is
     inefficient, expensive, and time-consuming. 

  Second, because the system is so strongly protective of the redress
     rights of individual workers, it is vulnerable to employees who
     would take undue advantage of these protections.  Its protracted
     processes and requirements divert managers from more productive
     activities and inhibit some of them from taking legitimate
     actions in response to performance or conduct problems. 
     Further, the demands of the system put pressure on employees and
     agencies alike to settle cases--regardless of their merits--to
     avoid potential costs. 

  Third, alternatives to the current redress system do exist.  These
     alternatives, in the private sector and elsewhere, may be worth
     further study as Congress considers modifying the federal
     system. 

Leading private sector and nonfederal employers have told GAO that
managers in their organizations are held accountable for treating
people fairly but are also given the flexibility and discretion to
make the tough decisions that are an inevitable part of managing
well.  These organizations recognize that a balance must be struck
between individual employee protections and the authority of managers
to operate in a responsible fashion.  To the extent that the federal
government's administrative redress system is tilted toward employee
protections at the expense of the effective management of the
nation's business, it deserves congressional attention. 


============================================================ Chapter 1

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the administrative redress
system for federal employees.  The current redress system grew out of
the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) and related legal and
regulatory decisions that have occurred over the past 15 years.  The
purpose of the redress system is to uphold the merit system
principles by ensuring that federal employees are protected against
arbitrary agency actions and prohibited personnel practices, such as
discrimination or retaliation for whistleblowing.  Today, as more
voices are heard calling for streamlining or consolidating the
redress system, I would like to address the question of how well the
redress system is working and whether, in its present form, it
contributes to or detracts from the fair and efficient operation of
the federal government. 

I have three points to make: 

  First, because of the complexity of the system and the variety of
     redress mechanisms it affords federal employees, it is
     inefficient, expensive, and time-consuming. 

  Second, because the system is so strongly protective of the redress
     rights of individual workers, it is vulnerable to employees who
     would take undue advantage of these protections.  Its protracted
     processes and requirements divert managers from more productive
     activities and inhibit some of them from taking legitimate
     actions in response to performance or conduct problems. 
     Further, the demands of the system put pressure on employees and
     agencies alike to settle cases--regardless of their merits--to
     avoid potential costs. 

  Third, alternatives to the current redress system do exist.  These
     alternatives, in the private sector and elsewhere, may be worth
     further study as Congress considers modifying the federal
     system. 

I would like to make one additional observation:  Leading private
sector and nonfederal employers have told us that managers in their
organizations are held accountable for treating people fairly but are
also given the flexibility and discretion to make the tough decisions
that are an inevitable part of managing well.  These organizations
recognize that a balance must be struck between individual employee
protections and the authority of managers to operate in a responsible
fashion.  To the extent that the federal government's administrative
redress system is tilted toward employee protection at the expense of
the effective management of the nation's business, it deserves
congressional attention. 

My observations today are based on interviews with officials at the
adjudicatory agencies, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM), and
the now defunct Administrative Conference of the United States;
analysis of data on case processing provided by the adjudicatory
agencies; and a review of the redress system's underlying legislation
and other pertinent literature.\1 In addition, my remarks draw upon a
symposium GAO held in April of this year at the request of Senator
William V.  Roth, Jr., then Chairman of the Senate Governmental
Affairs Committee, with participants from the governments of Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia, as well as private sector employers such
as Xerox, Federal Express, and IBM.\2 The proceedings added to our
awareness and understanding of current employment practices outside
the federal government. 


--------------------
\1 My comments focus on the redress processes available to individual
employees, both within and outside of collective bargaining units,
but not on the collective bargaining processes under which unions can
appeal agency actions affecting the groups they represent. 

\2 We will be issuing a full report on the symposium in the near
future. 


   A COMPLEX AND DUPLICATIVE
   SYSTEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

Today, executive branch civil servants are afforded opportunities for
redress at three levels:  first, within their employing agencies;
next, at one or more of the central adjudicatory agencies; and
finally, in the federal courts.  Although one of the purposes of CSRA
was to streamline the previous redress system, the scheme that has
emerged is far from simple.  Today, no fewer than four independent
agencies hear employee complaints or appeals.  The Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) hears employee appeals of firings or
suspensions of more than 14 days, as well as other significant
personnel actions.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) hears employee discrimination complaints\3 and reviews
agencies' final decisions on complaints.\4 The Office of Special
Counsel (OSC) investigates employee complaints of prohibited
personnel actions--in particular, retaliation for whistleblowing. 
For employees who belong to collective bargaining units and have
their individual grievances arbitrated, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA) reviews the arbitrators' decisions.\5

While the boundaries of the appellate agencies may appear to be
neatly drawn, in practice these agencies form a tangled scheme.  One
reason is that a given case may be brought before more than one of
the agencies--a circumstance that adds time-consuming steps to the
redress process and may result in the adjudicatory agencies reviewing
each other's decisions.  Matters are further complicated by the fact
that each of the adjudicatory agencies has its own procedures and its
own body of case law.  All but OSC offer federal employees the
opportunity for hearings, but all vary in the degree to which they
can require the participation of witnesses or the production of
evidence.  They also vary in their authority to order corrective
actions and enforce their decisions. 

What's more, the law provides for further review of these agencies'
decisions--or, in the case of discrimination claims, even de novo\6
trials--in the federal courts.  Beginning in the employing agency,
proceeding through one or more of the adjudicatory bodies, and then
carried to conclusion in court, a single case can take years. 


--------------------
\3 Complaints may be filed for unlawful employment discrimination on
the bases of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
handicap. 

\4 In addition, EEOC receives and investigates employment
discrimination charges against private employers and state and local
governments. 

\5 In addition, employees can appeal position classifications to OPM. 

\6 In a de novo trial, a matter is tried anew as if it had not been
heard before. 


      AN INEFFICIENT SYSTEM:  THE
      MIXED CASE EXAMPLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

The most frequently cited example of jurisdictional overlap in the
redress system is the so-called "mixed case." A tenured federal
employee who has been fired (or who has experienced any of several
other major adverse actions such as a demotion) can appeal the
agency's decision to MSPB.  Likewise, a federal employee who feels
that he or she has been discriminated against can appeal to EEOC. 
But an employee who has been fired, and who feels that the firing was
based on discrimination, can essentially appeal to both MSPB and
EEOC.  The employee first appeals to MSPB, with hearing results
further appealable to MSPB's three-member Board.  If the appellant is
still unsatisfied, he or she can then appeal MSPB's decision to EEOC. 
If EEOC finds discrimination where MSPB did not, the two agencies try
to reach an accommodation.  If they cannot do so--an event that has
occurred only three times in 15 years--a three-member Special Panel
is convened to reach a determination.  At this point, the employee
who is still unsatisfied with the outcome can file a civil action in
U.S.  district court, where the case can begin again with a de novo
trial. 

A mixed case can become even more complicated and duplicative if it
is adjudicated under the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement, which may lead to a hearing before an arbitrator.  If the
employee goes through arbitration (which his or her union must
approve and for which it generally pays part of the cost) and is left
unsatisfied by the arbitrator's ruling, he or she can appeal the
arbitrator's ruling to MSPB, starting the adjudication process almost
from scratch. 

The complexity of mixed cases has attracted a lot of attention.  But
two facts about mixed cases are particularly worth noting.  First,
few mixed cases coming before MSPB result in a finding of
discrimination.  Second, when EEOC reviews MSPB's decisions in mixed
cases, it almost always agrees with them.  In fiscal year 1994, for
example, MSPB decided roughly 2,000 mixed case appeals.  It found
that discrimination had occurred in just eight.  During the same
year, EEOC ruled on appellants' appeals of MSPB's findings of
nondiscrimination in 200 cases.  EEOC disagreed with MSPB's findings
in just three.  In each instance, MSPB adopted EEOC's determination. 

One result of this sort of jurisdictional overlap and duplication is
simple inefficiency.  A mixed case appellant can--at no additional
risk--have two agencies review his or her appeal.  These agencies
rarely differ in their determinations, but an employee has little to
lose in asking both agencies to review his or her case. 


      A COSTLY SYSTEM, WITH MANY
      COSTS UNKNOWN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

Just how much this multilevel, multiagency redress system costs is
hard to ascertain.  We know that in fiscal year 1994, the share of
the budgets of the four agencies that was devoted to individual
federal employees' appeals and complaints totaled $54.2 million (see
table 1).  We also know that in fiscal year 1994, employing agencies
reported spending almost $34 million investigating discrimination
complaints.  In addition, over $7 million was awarded for
complainants' legal fees and costs in discrimination cases alone.\7
But many of the other costs cannot be pinned down, such as the direct
costs accrued by employing agencies while participating in the
appeals process, arbitration costs, the various costs tied to lost
productivity in the workplace, employees' unreimbursed legal fees,
and court costs.  All these costs either go unreported or are
impossible to clearly define and measure. 



                    Table 1. Portion of Budgets for
                    Adjudicatory Agencies Devoted to
                Individual Federal Employee Appeals and
                Complaints, Along with Cases Received in
                                FY 1994

                                  Budget (millions
Agency                                          $)      Cases received
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
MSPB                                          24.7            10,341\a
EEOC                                          19.4            16,637\b
OSC                                            8.0             1,837\c
FLRA                                           2.1                97\d
======================================================================
Total                                         54.2              28,912
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Total of initial appeals and petitions for review of initial
appeals. 

\b Total of requests for hearings before an administrative judge and
appeals to the Commission of agency final decisions. 

\c These complaints contained 3,471 separate allegations of
prohibited personnel practices. 

\d Number of appeals of arbitration awards decided in FY 1994. 

Source:  OMB data, agency data, and agency estimates. 


--------------------
\7 Consists of legal fees and costs (1) paid by agencies in
discrimination complaints resolved by administrative procedures and
(2) paid from the Judgment Fund for settlements and judgments arising
out of lawsuits. 


      A TIME-CONSUMING SYSTEM,
      ESPECIALLY IN DISCRIMINATION
      CASES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3

Individual cases can take a long time to resolve--especially if they
involve claims of discrimination.  Among discrimination cases closed
during fiscal year 1994 for which there was a hearing before an EEOC
administrative judge and an appeal of an agency final decision to the
Commission itself, the average time from the filing of the complaint
with the employing agency to the Commission's decision on the appeal
was over 800 days.\8

One reason it takes so long to adjudicate a discrimination case is
that the number of discrimination complaints has been climbing
rapidly.  As shown in table 2, from fiscal years 1991 to 1994, the
number of discrimination complaints filed increased by 39 percent;
the number of requests for a hearing before an EEOC administrative
judge increased by about 86 percent; and the number of appeals to
EEOC of agency final decisions increased by 42 percent.  Meanwhile,
the backlog of requests for EEOC hearings increased by 65 percent,
and the inventory of appeals to EEOC of agency final decisions
tripled.\9



                                Table 2
                
                 Increase in Discrimination Complaints,
                            FYs 1991 to 1994

                                                               Percent
                                           FY 1991   FY 1994  increase
----------------------------------------  --------  --------  --------
Complaints filed with employing agencies    17,696    24,592      39.0
Requests for EEOC hearing\a                  5,773    10,712      85.6
Appeals to EEOC of agency final              4,167     5,925      42.2
 decisions
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a These caseload data do not include mixed case appeals to MSPB. 

Source:  EEOC. 


--------------------
\8 EEOC processed requests for hearings before an administrative
judge in an average of 154 days.  The Commission processed appeals of
agency final decisions in an average of 185 days.  Cases before MSPB
are processed more quickly but still take a long time.  In fiscal
year 1994, MSPB processed initial appeals in an average of 81 days
and processed appeals of initial decisions to the three-member Board
in an average of 162 days. 

\9 EEOC officials told us that they have undertaken an assessment of
discrimination complaint processing for federal employees and expect
to complete the study in early 1996. 


   IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOCUS ON
   EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

One reason Congress placed employee redress responsibilities in
several independent agencies was to ensure that each federal
employee's appeal, depending on the specifics of the case, would be
heard by officials with the broadest experience and expertise in the
area.  In its emphasis on fairness to all employees, however, the
redress system may be allowing some employees to abuse its processes
and may be creating an atmosphere in which managing the federal
workforce is unnecessarily difficult. 

As things stand today, federal workers have substantially greater
employment protections than do private sector employees.  While most
large or medium-size companies have multistep administrative
procedures through which their employees can appeal adverse actions,
these workers cannot, in general, appeal the outcome to an
independent agency.  Compared with federal employees, their rights to
take their employer to court are also limited.  And even when private
sector workers complain of discrimination to EEOC, they receive less
comprehensive treatment than do executive branch federal workers,
who, unlike their private sector counterparts, are entitled to
evidentiary hearings before an EEOC administrative judge, as well as
a trial in U.S.  district court. 

Another characteristic of the redress system for federal employees is
that certain kinds of complaints receive more prominence or attention
than others.  OSC, for instance, was established primarily to
investigate cases in which federal employees complain of retaliation
against them for whistleblowing.  If OSC findings support the
employee and the employing agency fails to take corrective action,
OSC's findings become part of the employee's appeal before MSPB. 
OSC's investigation is at no cost to the employee.  If OSC's findings
do not support the employee, he or she may proceed with an appeal to
MSPB as if no investigation had ever been made.\10 The OSC
investigation, therefore, is not just cost-free to the employee, but
risk-free as well. 

Discrimination is another kind of complaint to which the redress
system gives fuller or more extensive protection than other
complaints or appeals.  Clearly, more administrative redress is
available to employees who claim they have been discriminated against
than to those who appeal actions to MSPB.  For example, workers who
claim discrimination before EEOC--unlike those appealing a firing,
lengthy suspension, or downgrade to MSPB--can file a claim even
though no particular administrative action has been taken against
them.  Further, those who claim discrimination are entitled, at no
cost, to an investigation of the matter by their agencies, the
results of which are made part of the record.  Further still, if they
are unsatisfied after EEOC has heard their case and any subsequent
appeals, they can then go to U.S.  district court for a de novo
trial, which means that the outcome of the entire administrative
redress process is set aside, and the case is tried all over again. 

What are the implications of the extensive opportunities for redress
provided federal workers?  Federal employees file workplace
discrimination complaints at roughly 10 times the per capita rate of
private sector workers.  And while some 47 percent of discrimination
complaints in the private sector involve the most serious adverse
action--termination--only 18 percent of discrimination complaints
among federal workers are related to firings. 

Another phenomenon may be worth noting.  Officials at EEOC and
elsewhere have said that the growth since 1991 in the number of
discrimination complaints by federal employees is probably an
outgrowth of passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which raised
the stakes in discrimination cases by allowing complainants to
receive compensatory damages of up to $300,000 and a jury trial in
District Court.\11


--------------------
\10 In addition, the employee who complains of retaliation for
whistleblowing can appeal matters to MSPB that ordinarily would not
be appealable to that agency. 

\11 Figures on compensatory damage awards are not available.  These
amounts are not reported separately, but are, instead, lumped
together with figures for back pay awards.  Back pay awards increased
nearly threefold from $8.2 million in fiscal year 1991 to $24.1
million in fiscal year 1994. 


      VULNERABILITY TO MISUSE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.1

Officials from EEOC and other agencies have said they are burdened by
cases that are not legitimate discrimination complaints.  We were
told that some employees file complaints as a way of getting a third
party's assistance in resolving a workplace dispute.  We were also
told that some file frivolous complaints to harass supervisors or to
game the system. 

All sorts of matters become the subject of discrimination complaints,
and they are accorded due process.  Here are two examples, drawn from
recent issues of the newsletter Federal Human Resources Week:  A male
employee filed a formal complaint when a female co-worker with whom
he had formerly had a romantic relationship "harassed him by
pointedly ignoring him and moving away from him when they had
occasion to come in contact." Another claimed that he was fired in
part on the basis of his national origin:  "American-Kentuckian."

We are not in a position to judge the legitimacy of these complaints. 
We note, however, that EEOC's rulings on the complainants' appeals
affirmed the agency's position that there was no discrimination.  We
would also make the point that federal officials spent their
time--and the taxpayers' money--on these cases. 


      INHIBITING MANAGERS AND
      ENCOURAGING SETTLEMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.2

At the employing agency level, the prospect of having to deal with
lengthy and complex procedures can affect the willingness of managers
to deal with conduct and performance issues.  In 1991, we reported
that over 40 percent of personnel officials, managers, and
supervisors interviewed said that the potential for an employee using
the appeal or arbitration process would affect a manager's or
supervisor's willingness to pursue a performance action.\12

At the adjudicatory agency level, one effect of complex and
time-consuming redress procedures has been to spur the trend toward
settlements.  About two-thirds of the adverse action and poor
performance cases at MSPB were settled in 1994 instead of being
decided on their merits.  Similarly, during the same period, about
one-third of the discrimination complaints brought before EEOC were
settled without a hearing.  Employing agencies settle many more
complaints before they ever get that far. 

While the trend toward settling cases has helped avoid a lot of
adjudication, there is some concern about the larger implications of
the practice.  In a given employee's case, the possibility of
avoiding the potential costs of seeing the process through to the
bitter end--costs that include not just time and money but human
endurance--may be driving the inclination to settle.  Federal
officials, in deciding whether or not to settle, must weigh the cost
of settling against the potential loss of more taxpayer dollars and
the time and energy that would be diverted from the business of
government. 

There is some concern that policies encouraging the contending
parties to compromise on the issues may conflict with the mission of
the adjudicatory agencies to support the merit principles and may set
troublesome precedents or create ethical dilemmas for managers.\13
Further, there is concern that settlements may be fundamentally
counterproductive, especially in discrimination complaints, where
settlement policies may in fact encourage the filing of frivolous
complaints. 


--------------------
\12 Performance Management:  How Well Is the Government Dealing With
Poor Performers?  (GAO/GGD-91-7, October 1990). 

\13 An example is the occasional settlement agreement not to give the
separated employee a bad employment reference.  The supervisor who
argued for the employee's dismissal may not be allowed to give
good-faith answers to a prospective employer who calls for a
reference. 


   IN SEARCH OF ALTERNATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

At a time when Congress and the administration are considering
opportunities for civil service reform, looking in particular to the
private sector and elsewhere for alternatives to current civil
service practices, organizations outside the executive branch of the
federal government may be useful sources for ideas on reforming the
administrative redress system. 

In most private sector organizations, final authority for decisions
involving disciplinary actions rests with the president or chief
executive officer.  Some firms give that authority to the personnel
or employee relations manager.  But others have turned to some form
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), especially in discrimination
complaints.\14 Some firms use outside arbitrators or company
ombudsmen.  Still others employ committees or boards made up of
employee representatives and/or supervisors to review or decide such
actions.  We have not studied the effectiveness of these private
sector practices, but they may provide insight for dealing with
redress issues in a fair but less rigidly legalistic fashion than
that of the federal redress system. 

In the same regard, federal agencies are exploring alternatives to
rigid, formal grievance processes.  The use of ADR methods was, in
fact, called for under CSRA and underscored by the Administrative
Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and
regulatory changes made at EEOC.  Based not only on the fact that
Congress has endorsed ADR in the past, but also that individual
agencies have taken ADR initiatives and that MSPB and EEOC have
explored their own initiatives, it is clear that the need for finding
effective ADR methods is widely recognized in government.  However,
our preliminary study of government ADR efforts last year indicated
that agency efforts are, by and large, in their early stages.  Right
now, results are too sketchy to be of use, but eventually it would be
helpful to know if agencies pursuing ADR approaches have achieved
savings in time and money and whether their employees have found ADR
methods fair and equitable. 

Other areas that may be worth studying are those segments of the
civil service left partially or entirely uncovered by the current
redress system.  For example, while almost all federal employees can
bring discrimination complaints to EEOC, employees in their
probationary periods, temporary employees, unionized postal workers,
intelligence agency and FBI employees, and certain other employees
generally cannot appeal adverse actions to MSPB.  In addition,
intelligence agency and FBI employees, as well as certain other
employees, are not covered by federal service labor relations
legislation and therefore cannot form bargaining units or engage in
collective bargaining.  What are the implications of the varying
levels of protection on the fairness with which these employees are
treated?  Are there lessons here that might be applied elsewhere in
the civil service? 

Finally, it should be noted that legislative branch employees are
treated differently from those in the executive branch.  For example,
under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, beginning in
January 1996 congressional employees with discrimination complaints
will be required to choose between two redress alternatives, one
administrative and one judicial.  The administrative alternative will
allow employees to appeal to the Office of Compliance, with hearing
results appealable to a five-member board.  The board's decisions may
then be appealed to the U.S.  Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which has a limited right of review.  The other alternative
will be to bypass the administrative process and file suit in U.S. 
District Court, with the opportunity to appeal the court's decision
to the appropriate U.S.  Court of Appeals.  The effect of this
arrangement is to avoid the opportunity for the "two bites of the
apple"--one administrative, one judicial--currently offered executive
branch employees.  Congress may find that experience with the new
system in operation may be instructive for considering how best to
provide employees redress. 


--------------------
\14 For a discussion of ADR methods private sector employers use, see
our report Employment Discrimination:  Most Private-Sector Employers
Use Alternative Dispute Resolution (GAO/HEHS-95-150, July 1995). 


   AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE THE
   WAY GOVERNMENT OPERATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

Today, in the face of tight budgets and a rapidly changing work
environment, the civil service is undergoing renewed scrutiny by the
administration and Congress.  In the broadest sense, the goal of such
scrutiny is to identify ways of making the civil service more
effective and less costly in its service to the American people. 
With so many facets of the civil service under review-- including
compensation and benefits, performance management, and the retirement
system--no area should be overlooked that offers the opportunity for
improving the way the government operates.  To the extent that the
federal government's administrative redress system is tilted toward
employee protections at the expense of the effective management of
the nation's business, it deserves congressional attention. 

This concludes my prepared statement, Mr.  Chairman.  I would be
pleased to take any questions that you or other Members of the
Subcommittee may have. 

*** End of document. ***