Asset Forfeiture: Historical Perspective on Asset Forfeiture Issues
(Testimony, 03/19/96, GAO/T-GGD-96-40).

GAO discussed the Departments of Justice's and Treasury's asset
forfeiture programs. GAO noted that: (1) the asset forfeiture programs
present a high risk for abuse and fraud because of program mismanagement
and internal control weaknesses; (2) Marshals Service mismanagement,
ineffective oversight, slow disposition, and poor recordkeeping of
seized property has resulted in excessive costs and millions of dollars
in lost revenue; (3) the Justice asset forfeiture program lacks closing
procedures to ensure the proper recording of all seized property in its
property management system; (4) the Customs asset forfeiture program
lacks adequate safeguards over seized property and has incomplete and
inaccurate accounting and reporting of seized property; (5) the agencies
have made many improvements to their asset forfeiture programs, agencies
need to additionally enhance their tracking systems and to develop and
implement policies and procedures to ensure proper accountability for
and stewardship over seized property; and (6) although consolidating the
management and disposition of seized assets could reduce administrative
costs and duplicative efforts, the agencies cite legislative acts and
federal reporting requirements as barriers to developing a joint plan
for consolidation.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD-96-40
     TITLE:  Asset Forfeiture: Historical Perspective on Asset 
             Forfeiture Issues
      DATE:  03/19/96
   SUBJECT:  Search and seizure
             Interagency relations
             Property disposal
             Law enforcement
             Inventory control systems
             Federal property management
             Assets
             Federal agency accounting systems
             Funds management
IDENTIFIER:  Customs Service Seized Asset Program
             DOJ Seized Asset Management System
             Seized Asset Deposit Fund
             DOJ National Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Program
             DOJ/Treasury Consolidated Asset Tracking System
             Customs Forfeiture Fund
             DOJ Assets Forfeiture Fund
             Treasury Asset Forfeiture Fund
             Treasury Seized Asset and Case Tracking System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
Committee on Governmental Affairs
U.S.  Senate

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
10:00 a.m., EDT
on Tuesday
March 19, 1996

ASSET FORFEITURE - HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON ASSET FORFEITURE
ISSUES

Statement of Laurie E.  Ekstrand
Associate Director, Administration of Justice Issues
General Government Division

GAO/T-GGD-96-40

GAO/GGD-96-40T


(182017)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  OIG - x
  IRS - x
  ONDCP - x
  CATS - x
  SEACATS - x

ASSET FORFEITURE:  HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE ON ASSET FORFEITURE
ISSUES
============================================================ Chapter 0


   SUMMARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Enforcement actions resulted in the value of the Departments of
Justice's and the Treasury's seized property inventories growing from
a reported $33 million in 1979 to almost $2 billion in 1994.  In
January 1990, the Comptroller General identified seized and forfeited
assets as a high-risk area because it had been characterized by
mismanagement and internal control weaknesses. 

In June 1991, GAO recommended consolidating the management and
disposition of all noncash seized properties.  It reported that
estimated program administration costs could be reduced 11 percent
annually if Justice and the U.S.  Customs Service consolidated the
postseizure management and disposition of such items and that
consolidation would likely result in lower contractor costs due to
economies of scale.  According to Justice and Treasury, the 1992
legislation that established a separate Treasury fund complicated the
potential for consolidation.  There are no plans for consolidation of
asset management disposition functions.  GAO still sees areas of
possible duplication between the two funds and programs and
accordingly believes that consolidation makes sense. 

In March 1993, the Justice Office of Inspector General (OIG) reported
mismanagement by contractors hired by the Marshals Service to
maintain and dispose of property, resulting in excessive costs and
lost revenues of almost $2.8 million in six districts reviewed by the
OIG.  The OIG reported that $2.5 million of the excessive costs and
lost revenue resulted from a lack of effective Marshals Service
oversight of real property management contracts.  In March 1994, OIG
reported that the Marshals Service was not disposing of forfeited
property expeditiously, allowing property to deteriorate, thus
resulting in lost revenue when it was sold.  The Marshals Service has
initiated various actions to address these problems. 

GAO's fiscal year 1992 and 1993 and Treasury OIG's fiscal year 1994
financial statement audits of Customs revealed inadequate safeguards
over, and incomplete and inaccurate accounting and reporting of,
seized property.  Customs is taking steps to address these problems;
however, these efforts are in various stages of development.  As GAO
reported, while Customs' efforts are commendable, it must establish
and implement additional policies and procedures, such as
periodically summarizing and assessing the results of its seizure
efforts, and make significant enhancements to its seized property
tracking system.  In addition, a significant and sustained effort by
Customs management would help to ensure that established policies and
procedures and planned improvements are properly implemented. 


============================================================ Chapter 1


   STATEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the asset forfeiture
programs of the Departments of Justice and the Treasury.  I will
provide a historical perspective on the programs, including why we
identified the programs as "high-risk;" problems that were
identified; and efforts to fix the problems, including unresolved
issues. 

As asset forfeiture programs grew in the 1980s, we found that
property was not being properly cared for after it was seized, which
resulted in lost revenue to the government when the property was
sold.  Much has been accomplished in this area since the 1980s. 
However, some significant problems remain with seized property
management.  Also, Justice and Treasury continue to operate two
similar but separate seized asset management and disposal programs
despite legislation requiring them to develop and maintain a joint
plan to coordinate and consolidate postseizure administration of
certain properties.\1 Further, Treasury is in the process of
establishing a separate asset tracking system but plans to continue
to share information with Justice's system. 

My testimony updates our high-risk report on asset forfeiture
programs through discussions with agency officials.\2 We discussed
this statement with Justice and Treasury officials and incorporated
their views where appropriate. 


--------------------
\1 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law No.  100-690, Section
6078(a), 21 U.S.C.  887 (1988). 

\2 High-Risk Series:  Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/HR-95-7, Feb. 
1995). 


      BACKGROUND
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

Asset forfeiture programs were intended to (1) punish and deter
criminal activity by depriving criminals of property used or acquired
through illegal activities and (2) make seized property available as
assets to strengthen law enforcement.  Seized and forfeited property
include businesses, cash, bank accounts, automobiles, boats,
airplanes, jewelry, art objects, and real estate.  Justice and
Treasury also seized thousands of tons of illegal drugs and
counterfeit items that have no resale value to the federal
government.  These latter items are typically held by the agencies
until they are approved for destruction or, in the case of some
counterfeit items that Treasury seized, for donation to charity.  The
Marshals Service and the U.S.  Customs Service are responsible for
holding and maintaining real and tangible personal property seized by
participating agencies within Justice and Treasury, respectively, for
disposition. 

An example of a business that the Marshals Service seized and
continues to operate is the Bicycle Club, a card casino in Bell
Gardens, California.  The Marshals Service seized the Club in April
1990 and continues to hold it today.  According to the Marshals
Service, in August 1994, it accepted an offer to buy the Club: 
however, the prospective buyer was not able to secure financing.  The
Club's net income has declined from $23.1 million in 1993, to $19.3
million in 1994, to $14.0 million in 1995.\3

It uses a trustee to manage its interest in the Club.  The current
trustee was appointed in 1993 and was paid about $322,500 ($210,000
in salary and $112,500 in bonus) last year.  His compensation is
higher than any federal employee. 

Although the government has had forfeiture authority for over 200
years, it was rarely utilized as a law enforcement tool until the
1980s.  The Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 expanded
forfeiture authority and established asset forfeiture funds within
Justice and Customs to hold the proceeds of forfeitures and to
finance program-related expenses (for example, property management
expenses) and certain law enforcement activities, such as the payment
of rewards for information related to asset seizure and training
directly related to the asset forfeiture programs. 

Until recently, Treasury law enforcement agencies other than
Customs--i.e., the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the
Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS); and the U.S.  Secret Service--participated in the Justice
Asset Forfeiture Fund.  In October 1992, Congress created the
Treasury Forfeiture Fund to supersede the Customs Forfeiture Fund.\4
Treasury agencies that previously participated in the Justice Fund
began making deposits into the Treasury Fund in October 1993.  Figure
1 shows the two funds' receipts through fiscal year 1994. 

   Figure 1:  Forfeiture Fund
   Receipts, Fiscal Years 1985
   Through 1994

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Department of Justice, Department of the Treasury, and U.S. 
Customs Service. 

These funds have always collected more than the allowable expenses
that could be charged against them.\5 However, some seized property
may result in a negative cash flow (i.e., associated costs exceed
associated revenue).  Year-end surpluses in the Justice Fund
historically have been used for law enforcement purposes, such as
building prisons or funding special activities through the Office of
National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP).  Year-end surpluses in the
Customs Fund were transferred to the general fund of the Treasury. 
Beginning with fiscal year 1994 and through fiscal year 1997, a
portion of the year-end surpluses in the Treasury Fund are to be
transferred to ONDCP.  Surpluses remaining in the fund after transfer
are available to the Secretary of the Treasury for any law
enforcement activity of a federal agency. 

Asset forfeiture legislation authorizes Justice and Treasury to share
forfeiture proceeds with state and local law enforcement agencies and
foreign governments that participate in law enforcement efforts
leading to seizure and forfeiture of property and cash.  From fiscal
years 1986 through 1994, Justice and Treasury shared over $1.4
billion and $394 million, respectively, in forfeited property and
cash with over 3,000 state and local law enforcement agencies. 

While improvements have been made in the areas of seized property
management and management information systems, Justice and Treasury
Offices of the Inspector General (OIG) and we reported that problems
remain (see related GAO products).  Therefore, we continue to
classify the programs as high-risk. 


--------------------
\3 We have not audited the Bicycle Club. 

\4 Treasury Forfeiture Fund Act of 1992, Public Law No.  102-393, 31
U.S.C.  9703 (1992). 

\5 Allowable expenses exclude certain costs, such as salaries and
benefits of seizing agents, which are borne by the seizing agency. 


         ASSET FORFEITURE PROGRAMS
         IDENTIFIED AS HIGH-RISK
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.1.1

In January 1990, the Comptroller General identified seized and
forfeited assets as a high-risk area because it had been
characterized by mismanagement and internal control weaknesses.  More
specifically, the programs

  had experienced enormous growth in seized assets inventories as
     reported by Justice and Customs (from $33 million in 1979 to
     $1.4 billion in 1989 and was almost $2 billion in 1994);

  had a history of debilitating internal control problems leading to
     mismanagement of seized cash; inaccurate reporting on financial
     results of program operations; and an inability to maximize
     revenues on hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of seized
     cars, boats, airplanes, and real estate; and

  had a lack of U.S.  Attorneys and Marshals Service staffs who were
     sufficiently knowledgeable and experienced in real property law
     and management to adequately deal with the many complex issues
     that routinely arise in the transfer of title for forfeited
     properties. 


      STATUS AND CONTINUING
      CONCERNS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

In February 1995, we reported on the status of the asset forfeiture
programs and progress made.  The following sections describe the key
continuing concerns. 


         SEIZED PROPERTY
         MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS
         REMAIN
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.2.1

Problems persisted with the Marshals Service's maintenance and
disposal of seized and forfeited property, according to Justice OIG
reports.  In March 1993, OIG reported (93-10) mismanagement by the
Marshals Service in maintaining and disposing of property, resulting
in excessive costs and lost revenues of almost $2.8 million in six
districts reviewed by OIG.\6 The OIG also said that $2.5 million of
the excessive costs and lost revenue resulted from a lack of
effective Marshals Service oversight of real property management.  In
one district, the Marshals Service sold seized property for $5.3
million, of which it received $1.3 million as a down payment and an
interest bearing note of $4 million.  The prospective buyer of the
seized real property later defaulted.  When the district resold the
property for $2.5 million, it applied the proceeds to the note which
left $1.75 million balance due.  Since the original buyer was in
bankruptcy, the balance may or may not be received.  In addition, the
OIG also reported that the Marshals Service failed to detect improper
payments for property taxes, attorney fees, and title insurance.  The
OIG said that these deficiencies occurred primarily because oversight
by the Marshals Service was lacking and its guidance was fragmented
in several documents. 

In March 1994, the OIG reported (94-14) that the Marshals Service was
not disposing of forfeited property expeditiously, allowing property
to deteriorate, thus resulting in lost revenue when it was sold.  The
Marshals Service has initiated various actions to address these
problems, such as revising procurement policies, conducting contract
management reviews at certain districts, and providing additional
training to seized assets management staff, according to the
Inspector General. 

The Justice OIG in its fiscal year 1994 audit of the Justice asset
forfeiture program (95-24A, July 1995) reported that there were no
closing procedures in place at fiscal year-end designed to ensure
that all forfeited property was recorded in the property management
system for the Justice Fund.  Further, the estimated value of
forfeited property may not include all possible liens and claims of
innocent third parties. 

Our fiscal year 1992 and 1993 and Treasury's fiscal year 1994
financial statement audits of Customs revealed inadequate safeguards
over, and incomplete and inaccurate accounting and reporting of,
seized property.  Customs is taking steps to address these problems;
however, these efforts are in various stages of development. 

Customs conducted its first nationwide physical inventory of seized
property--including drugs, currency, and counterfeit items--in
February 1994.  As a result of this inventory, Customs was able to
identify and correct many significant errors in the recorded
quantities and values of seized property.  This effort was also
intended to establish an accurate baseline for monitoring and
reporting activity that results from Customs' enforcement efforts. 
However, as we previously reported, some Customs locations did not
effectively perform all of the inventory procedures.  Subsequently,
the Treasury OIG reported in its Management Letter for the Audit of
Customs' Fiscal Year 1994 Financial Statements (OIG-95-130, Sept. 
29, 1995) that Customs performed another inventory in September 1994. 
While less severe than the problems found in the February 1994
inventory, this second inventory also identified significant errors
in recorded quantities and values of seized property. 

Customs also had undertaken significant efforts to strengthen
safeguards at its storage locations.  Specifically, it had performed
a study and evaluation of the adequacy of its physical safeguards
over seized property and currency at 21 medium- to high-volume
storage facilities.  In addition, Customs constructed new facilities
in two districts and had plans for renovation at other facilities. 
However, OIG reported in its audit of Customs' fiscal year 1994
financial statements that controls in place for ensuring the
integrity and safety of stored narcotics were not consistently
followed or were not effective.  Also, narcotics and other property
used in undercover operations were not adequately safeguarded. 

In our February 1995 report, we stated that while its efforts are
commendable, Customs must establish and implement additional policies
and procedures, such as periodically summarizing and assessing the
results of its seizure efforts and making significant enhancements to
its seized property tracking system to ensure proper accountability
for and stewardship over seized property.  In addition, a significant
and sustained effort by Customs management would help to ensure that
established policies and procedures and planned improvements are
properly implemented.  Otherwise, Customs' ability to report reliable
financial information and effectively carry out its seizure program
will continue to be diminished.  Also, tons of illegal drugs and
millions of dollars in currency and other property will remain
vulnerable to theft and misappropriation. 


--------------------
\6 The Marshals Service has 94 districts. 


         PROPERTY MANAGEMENT
         CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS
         UNSUCCESSFUL
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.2.2

In addressing the issue of duplication of effort, one of the
provisions of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 required the Attorney
General and the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and maintain a
joint plan to coordinate and consolidate postseizure administration
of property seized for drug-related offenses.  In June 1991, we
recommended consolidating the management and disposition of all
noncash seized properties, designating the Marshals Service as the
custodian.  We estimated program administration costs could be
reduced 11 percent annually if Justice and Customs consolidated the
postseizure management and disposition of such items.  We estimated
the savings on the basis of fewer positions being needed if both
programs were combined into one.  We also reported that consolidation
would likely result in lower contractor costs due to economies of
scale.  Independently operating in the same areas may result in
higher prices paid for services than under a consolidated program,
which may be able to obtain lower vendor prices because of a higher
volume of activity.  We found this to be true in six locations.\7

The Marshals Service and Customs entered into a memorandum of
understanding in October 1992 for a 1-year small scale pilot
consolidation project whereby the Marshals Service managed and
disposed of Customs' real property and Customs managed and disposed
of vessels for the Marshals Service at four districts.  A total of 52
properties were involved in the pilot project, which dissolved at the
end of the 1-year period.  In a November 28, 1994, letter, the
Marshals Service reported the costs and proceeds associated with the
assets in the pilot project.  However, the report did not contain a
comparison of what costs would have been had the assets not been
consolidated.  Hence, there was no way to determine the effectiveness
of the pilot project from the information provided. 

According to Justice and Treasury, the 1988 Act indicated Congress'
policy choice that the executive branch conduct its asset
forfeited-related management and disposition operations in a unified
manner.  However, no changes in existing statutory authorities were
enacted to facilitate compliance with the policy.  According to
Justice, three Treasury bureaus joined the Justice asset forfeiture
program, which consolidated federal management and disposal of most
assets seized for judicial forfeiture.  Justice believes that,
because of extensive communication between itself and Treasury, a
formal joint plan to achieve consolidation was not necessary.\8
Justice added that complete consolidation had been impractical due to
the continuance of a separate Customs Fund and a separate method of
accomplishing asset management and disposal. 

According to both departments, the 1992 Act, which established the
Treasury Fund, complicated the potential for consolidation.  Treasury
said its fund would provide parallel leadership, policy, and
management structures for its forfeiture activities.  Since the
creation of the Treasury Fund, all Treasury bureaus have joined
Customs in establishing a separate, but consolidated, Treasury
property management and disposal program, while continuing with each
agency's separate and unique seizure and forfeiture authorities.  On
the basis of the 1992 Act and the differences in the two methods of
accomplishing property management and disposal, Justice does not
believe the development of a formal plan is necessary or practical. 
Accordingly, there are no plans for consolidation of asset management
and disposition functions. 

We still believe that consolidation of asset management and
disposition functions makes sense and is still required even with the
passage of the 1992 Act.  Both agencies seize similar types of
property that is generally located in the same geographic areas. 
However, under the current operating structure, each agency maintains
a separate and distinct program for managing and disposing of its
property.  Justice, through the Marshals Service, contracts directly
with multiple vendors for management services.  Treasury, through the
Customs Service, has a single nationwide contractor that provides
custodial services either directly or through subcontracts with other
vendors.  Further, our June 1991 report stated that costs could be
reduced through consolidation.  Neither Justice nor Treasury has
developed cost data to show whether benefits could or could not be
realized.  In addition, the 1988 statute clearly requires the
Attorney General and the Secretary of the Treasury to develop and
maintain a joint plan.  The statute permits the parties to determine
what action should be taken to carry out the statutory mandate.  More
recently, the House Appropriations Committee stated in its July 19,
1995, report that "the consolidation of asset management and
disposition functions of Justice and Treasury could address
duplication and provide cost savings to the management and disposal
process." The report added that the Committee expects Justice to
review the feasibility of consolidating contract vendors for both the
Marshals Service and Treasury agencies.\9


--------------------
\7 San Diego and Calexico/El Centro, California; Yuma, Arizona; and
McAllen, Laredo, and El Paso, Texas. 

\8 21 U.S.C.  887 provides that:  "The Attorney General and the
Secretary of the Treasury shall take such action as may be necessary
to develop and maintain a joint plan to coordinate and consolidate
post-seizure administration of property seized under this subchapter,
subchapter II of this chapter, or provisions of the customs laws
relating to controlled substances."

\9 Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, The Judiciary, and
Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, Fiscal Year 1996, H.R.  Rep. 
No.  104-196, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.  20 (1995). 


         DUPLICATE ASSET
         FORFEITURE FUNDS AND
         PROGRAMS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.2.3

We see areas of possible duplication between the two funds and
programs that extend beyond property management and disposition
activities, to include forfeiture fund administration and management. 
The Treasury Fund structure essentially mirrors that of the Justice
Fund.  Both funds have their own management, operations staff,
custodial agencies (Customs and Marshals Service), and contractors to
maintain and dispose of property.  Although, the funds worked closely
together to develop policies that minimize variations in forfeiture
procedures and operations, the existence of two separate funds has
the potential for unnecessary duplication.  For example, each
department recently issued its own set of very similar program
guidance. 

Justice and Treasury were pursuing consolidation of asset tracking
systems.  Both departments had agreed to develop, implement, manage,
operate, enhance, and support a Consolidated Asset Tracking System
(CATS).  CATS was intended to be the primary automated system for
asset tracking and management used by all agencies participating in
both the Justice and Treasury asset forfeiture programs.  However,
Treasury now believes a separate system is needed in order for it to
meet federal government financial reporting requirements.  CATS was
developed prior to the issuance of the Federal Accounting Standards
Advisory Board's Statement of Federal Financial Accounting Standards
No.  3 (FASAB No.  3) which requires the reporting of certain seized
property information.  For example, the statement requires federal
agencies' financial statements to include an analysis of change in
seized property during the year, such as the dollar value and number
of seized properties that are (1) on hand at the beginning of the
year, (2) seized during the year, (3) disposed of during the year,
and (4) on hand at the end of the year. 

Customs pointed out that both the Treasury OIG and we reported that
Customs did not have a sufficient system to account for seized
property from seizure until final disposition.  Accordingly, Treasury
authorized Customs to develop a system for all Treasury
agencies--Seized Asset and Case Tracking System (SEACATS).  While
Treasury recognized that CATS could be modified to meet the financial
reporting requirements, it believes that developing a new system to
meet the requirements would be preferable.  For example, on July 5,
1995, IRS informed Justice that CATS does not address its needs and
requirements and any future participation will depend on whether or
not an electronic bridge can be established between IRS' tracking
system and CATS. 


         IMPROVED GUIDANCE FOR THE
         USE OF SHARED ASSETS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.2.4

Continuing the consolidation theme, in July 1992, we concluded that
because state and local law enforcement agencies often see the
Justice and Customs asset sharing programs as one, the programs
should have the same guidelines, with the same interpretations of
appropriate asset use.\10 Officials in some state and local agencies
found the guidance vague and confusing, with Justice and Customs
allowing different uses of shared proceeds despite having similar
program policies.  We recommended that Justice and Customs issue
joint guidelines for asset sharing with clear, specific definitions
for concepts such as "law enforcement purposes" and "supplanting of
resources."

To date, joint guidelines have not been issued.  However, Treasury
and Justice issued separate sets of revised and mutually agreeable
asset-sharing guidance in October 1993 and March 1994, respectively. 
The clarified guidance is intended to significantly reduce state and
local law enforcement agency confusion about appropriate uses of
shared assets and should lead to fewer improper uses of assets. 


--------------------
\10 Asset Forfeiture:  Improved Guidance Needed for Use of Shared
Assets (GAO/GGD-92-115, July 16, 1992). 


      FURTHER ACTION NEEDED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3

As we have reported, Justice and Treasury have made many improvements
to their asset forfeiture programs over the years.  However,
enhancements to seized property tracking systems and development and
implementation of additional policies and procedures are needed to
help ensure adequate accountability and stewardship over seized
property.  In addition, continued oversight will be required to
ensure that existing policies and procedures and planned improvement
efforts are properly implemented.  The Subcommittee's hearing today
demonstrates the need for active oversight in the area of asset
forfeiture.  We will continue to monitor seized property management
activities. 

Possible duplication of resources within the two forfeiture funds and
programs is of particular interest in light of budget constraints. 
Therefore, we continue to believe that Justice and Treasury should
aggressively pursue options for efficiency gains through
consolidation. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.4

Mr.  Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement.  My colleagues
and I would be pleased to answer any questions. 

RELATED GAO PRODUCTS

High-Risk Series:  Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/HR-95-7, Feb. 
1995). 

Financial Audits:  CFO Implementation at IRS and Customs
(GAO/T-AIMD-94-164, July 28, 1994). 

Restitution, Fines, and Forfeiture:  Issues for Further Review and
Oversight (GAO/T-GGD-94-178, June 28, 1994). 

Financial Audit:  Examination of Customs' Fiscal Year 1993 Financial
Statements (GAO/AIMD-94-119, June 15, 1994). 

Financial Management:  Customs' Accountability for Seized Property
and Special Operation Advances Was Weak (GAO/AIMD-94-6, Nov.  22,
1993). 

Financial Management:  First Financial Audits of IRS and Customs
Revealed Serious Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-93-3, Aug.  4, 1993). 

Financial Audit:  Examination of Customs' Fiscal Year 1992 Financial
Statements (GAO/AIMD-93-3, June 30, 1993). 

High-Risk Series:  Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/HR-93-17, Dec.  6,
1992). 

Tax Administration:  IRS's Management of Seized Assets
(GAO/T-GGD-92-65, Sept.  24, 1992). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Improved Guidance Needed for Use of Shared Assets
(GAO/GGD-92-115, July 16, 1992). 

Asset Forfeiture:  U.S.  Marshals Service Internal Control Weaknesses
Over Cash Distributions (GAO/GGD-92-59, May 8, 1992). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Customs Reports Improved Controls Over Sales of
Forfeited Property (GAO/GGD-91-127, Sept.  25, 1991). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Noncash Property Should Be Consolidated Under the
Marshals Service (GAO/GGD-91-97, June 28, 1991). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Need for Stronger Marshals Service Oversight of
Commercial Real Property (GAO/GGD-91-82, May 31, 1991). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Opportunities for Savings Through Program
Consolidation (GAO/T-GGD-91-22, Apr.  25, 1991). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Opportunities to Improve Program Administration
(GAO/T-GGD-91-16, Mar.  13, 1991). 

Oversight Hearings on Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/T-GGD-90-56,
July 24, 1990). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Legislation Needed to Improve Cash Processing and
Financial Reporting (GAO/GGD-90-94, June 19, 1990).  Asset
Forfeiture:  Helping Finance the War on Drugs (GAO/GGD-90-01VR, Oct. 
1989). 

Profitability of Customs Forfeiture Program Can Be Enhanced
(GAO/T-GGD-90-1, Oct.  10, 1989). 

Asset Forfeiture:  An Update (GAO/T-GGD-89-17, Apr.  24, 1989). 

Asset Forfeiture Programs:  Progress and Problems (GAO/T-GGD-88-41,
June 23, 1988). 

Asset Forfeiture Programs:  Corrective Actions Underway But
Additional Improvements Needed (GAO/T-GGD-88-16, Mar.  4, 1988). 

Seized Conveyances:  Justice and Customs Correction of Previous
Conveyance Management Problems (GAO/GGD-88-30, Feb.  3, 1988). 

Real Property Seizure and Disposal Program Improvements Needed
(GAO/T-GGD-87-28, Sept.  25, 1987). 

Asset Forfeiture Funds:  Changes Needed to Enhance Congressional
Oversight (GAO/T-GGD-87-27, Sept.  25, 1987). 

Millions of Dollars in Seized Cash Can Be Deposited Faster
(GAO/T-GGD-87-7, Mar.  13, 1987). 

Drug Enforcement Administration's Use of Forfeited Personal Property
(GAO/GGD-87-20, Dec.  10, 1986). 

Customs' Management of Seized and Forfeited Cars, Boats, and Planes
(Testimony, Apr.  3, 1986). 

Improved Management Processes Would Enhance Justice's Operations
(GAO/GGD-86-12, Mar.  14, 1986). 

Better Care and Disposal of Seized Cars, Boats, and Planes Should
Save Money and Benefit Law Enforcement (GAO/PLRD-83-94, July 15,
1983). 

Asset Forfeiture:  A Seldom Used Tool in Combatting Drug Trafficking
(GAO/GGD-81-51, Apr.  10, 1981). 

Drugs, Firearms, Currency, and Other Property Seized by Law
Enforcement Agencies:  Too Much Held Too Long (GAO/GGD-76-105, May
31, 1977). 


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