Federal Employee Redress: A System in Need of Reform (Testimony,
04/23/96, GAO/T-GGD-96-110).

GAO discussed the administrative redress system for federal employees.
GAO noted that: (1) the federal employee redress system is a complex and
duplicative system that affords employees redress at three different
levels; (2) the system is inefficient, expensive, and time-consuming
because of its complexity and the variety of redress mechanisms
available; (3) the system contains significant overlap, especially in
mixed cases where two or more agencies review an appellant's decision;
(4) redress system costs are difficult to determine because many direct
costs are not reported and indirect costs are not measurable; (5) the
most time-consuming cases involve discrimination complaints, which take
an average of 800 days to reconcile; (6) the federal redress system
provides its employees with far greater opportunities than do
private-sector redress systems; (7) the federal system allows federal
workers numerous appeals, evidentiary hearings, and district court
trials; (8) federal workers file workplace discrimination complaints
five times more often than do private-sector employees; (9) the current
system is vulnerable to abuse and diverts managers attention from more
productive activities, inhibits managers from taking legitimate actions
against poor performers, and pressures employees and agencies to settle
cases to contain costs; and (10) alternative dispute resolution offers
some promising approaches to handling workers complaints, but these
methods are underused and in the early stages of development.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-GGD-96-110
     TITLE:  Federal Employee Redress: A System in Need of Reform
      DATE:  04/23/96
   SUBJECT:  Federal employees
             Employment discrimination
             Litigation
             Administrative remedies
             Administrative hearings
             Civil rights law enforcement
             Personnel management
             Jurisdictional authority
             Labor-management relations
IDENTIFIER:  Walter Reed Army Medical Center Early Dispute Resolution 
             Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Treasury,
Postal Service, and General Government
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Not to be Released Before
2:00 p.m.  EDT
Tuesday
April 23, 1996

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE REDRESS - A
SYSTEM IN NEED OF REFORM

Statement for the Record of
Timothy P.  Bowling, Associate Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division

GAO/T-GGD-96-110

GAO/GGD-96-110t


(410037)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ADR -
  CSRA -
  FLRA -
  EEOC -
  FBI -
  MSPB -
  NSOB -
  OPM -
  OSC -

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE REDRESS:  A
SYSTEM IN NEED OF REFORM
============================================================ Chapter 0


   SUMMARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The purpose of the redress system for federal employees is to uphold
the merit system principles by ensuring that federal employees are
protected against arbitrary agency actions and prohibited personnel
practices, such as discrimination or retaliation for whistleblowing. 
But how well is the redress system working, and does it add to or
detract from the fair and efficient operation of the federal
government?  In response to these questions, GAO makes three points: 

  -- First, because of the complexity of the system and the variety
     of redress mechanisms it affords federal employees, it is
     inefficient, expensive, and time-consuming. 

  -- Second, because the system is so strongly protective of the
     redress rights of individual workers, it is vulnerable to
     employees who would take undue advantage of these protections. 
     Its protracted processes and requirements divert managers from
     more productive activities and inhibit some of them from taking
     legitimate actions in response to performance or conduct
     problems.  Further, the demands of the system put pressure on
     employees and agencies alike to settle cases--regardless of
     their merits--to avoid potential costs. 

  -- Third, alternatives to the current redress system do exist--in
     the private sector and in some parts of the federal government. 
     These alternatives, including a variety of less formal
     approaches collectively known as alternative dispute resolution,
     may be worth further study as Congress considers modifying the
     federal employee redress system. 

Leading private sector and nonfederal employers have told GAO that
managers in their organizations are held accountable for treating
people fairly but are also given the flexibility and discretion to
make the tough decisions that are an inevitable part of managing
well.  These organizations recognize that a balance must be struck
between individual employee protections and the authority of managers
to operate in a responsible fashion.  To the extent that the federal
government's administrative redress system is tilted toward employee
protections at the expense of the effective management of the
nation's business, it deserves congressional attention. 


   STATEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to discuss the administrative
redress system for federal employees.  The current redress system
grew out of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 (CSRA) and related
legal and regulatory decisions that have occurred over the past 16
years.  The purpose of the redress system is to uphold the merit
system principles by ensuring that federal employees are protected
against arbitrary agency actions and prohibited personnel practices,
such as discrimination or retaliation for whistleblowing.  Today, as
more voices are heard calling for streamlining or consolidating the
redress system, I would like to address the question of how well the
redress system is working and whether, in its present form, it
contributes to or detracts from the fair and efficient operation of
the federal government.  My comments reiterate views first expressed
in testimony in November 1995, with some updating based on work GAO
has done since then.\1

I have three points to make: 

  -- First, because of the complexity of the system and the variety
     of redress mechanisms it affords federal employees, it is
     inefficient, expensive, and time-consuming. 

  -- Second, because the system is so strongly protective of the
     redress rights of individual workers, it is vulnerable to
     employees who would take undue advantage of these protections. 
     Its protracted processes and requirements divert managers from
     more productive activities and inhibit some of them from taking
     legitimate actions in response to performance or conduct
     problems.  Further, the demands of the system put pressure on
     employees and agencies alike to settle cases--regardless of
     their merits--to avoid potential costs. 

  -- Third, alternatives to the current redress system do exist--in
     the private sector and in some parts of the federal government. 
     These alternatives, including a variety of less formal
     approaches collectively known as alternative dispute resolution,
     may be worth further study as Congress considers modifying the
     federal employee redress system. 

I would like to make one additional observation:  Leading private
sector and nonfederal employers have told us that managers in their
organizations are held accountable for treating people fairly but are
also given the flexibility and discretion to make the tough decisions
that are an inevitable part of managing well.  These organizations
recognize that a balance must be struck between individual employee
protections and the authority of managers to operate in a responsible
fashion.  To the extent that the federal government's administrative
redress system is tilted toward employee protection at the expense of
the effective management of the nation's business, it deserves
congressional attention. 

My observations today are based on a body of work examining how the
redress system operates and how agencies deal with workplace
disputes.  We interviewed officials at the adjudicatory agencies, the
Office of Personnel Management (OPM), the now defunct Administrative
Conference of the United States, and a number of executive branch and
legislative agencies; analyzed data on case processing provided by
the adjudicatory and other agencies; and reviewed the redress
system's underlying legislation and other pertinent literature.\2 In
addition, my observations draw upon a symposium GAO held in April
1995 at the request of Senator William V.  Roth, Jr., then Chairman
of the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, with participants from
the governments of Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, as well as
private sector employers such as Xerox, Federal Express, and IBM.\3
The proceedings added to our awareness and understanding of current
employment practices inside and outside the federal government. 


--------------------
\1 Federal Employee Redress:  An Opportunity for Reform
(GAO/T-GGD-96-42, November 29, 1995). 

\2 My comments focus on the redress processes available to individual
employees, both within and outside of collective bargaining units,
but not on the collective bargaining processes under which unions can
appeal agency actions affecting the groups they represent. 

\3 Transforming the Civil Service:  Building the Workforce of the
Future--Results of a GAO-Sponsored Symposium (GAO/GGD-96-35, Dec. 
26, 1995). 


   A COMPLEX AND DUPLICATIVE
   SYSTEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Today, executive branch civil servants are afforded opportunities for
redress at three levels:  first, within their employing agencies;
next, at one or more of the central adjudicatory agencies; and
finally, in the federal courts.  Although one of the purposes of CSRA
was to streamline the previous redress system, the scheme that has
emerged is far from simple.  Today, no fewer than four independent
agencies hear employee complaints or appeals.  The Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) hears employee appeals of firings or
suspensions of more than 14 days, as well as other significant
personnel actions.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) hears employee discrimination complaints\4 and reviews
agencies' final decisions on complaints.\5 The Office of Special
Counsel (OSC) investigates employee complaints of prohibited
personnel actions--in particular, retaliation for whistleblowing. 
For employees who belong to collective bargaining units and have
their individual grievances arbitrated, the Federal Labor Relations
Authority (FLRA) reviews the arbitrators' decisions.\6

While the boundaries of the appellate agencies may appear to be
neatly drawn, in practice these agencies form a tangled scheme.  One
reason is that a given case may be brought before more than one of
the agencies--a circumstance that adds time-consuming steps to the
redress process and may result in the adjudicatory agencies reviewing
each other's decisions.  Matters are further complicated by the fact
that each of the adjudicatory agencies has its own procedures and its
own body of case law.  All but OSC offer federal employees the
opportunity for hearings, but all vary in the degree to which they
can require the participation of witnesses or the production of
evidence.  They also vary in their authority to order corrective
actions and enforce their decisions. 

What's more, the law provides for further review of these agencies'
decisions--or, in the case of discrimination claims, even de novo\7
trials--in the federal courts.  Beginning in the employing agency,
proceeding through one or more of the adjudicatory bodies, and then
carried to conclusion in court, a single case can take years. 


--------------------
\4 Complaints may be filed for unlawful employment discrimination on
the bases of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, or
handicap. 

\5 In addition, EEOC receives and investigates employment
discrimination charges against private employers and state and local
governments. 

\6 In addition, employees can appeal position classifications to OPM. 

\7 In a de novo trial, a matter is tried anew as if it had not been
heard before. 


      AN INEFFICIENT SYSTEM:  THE
      MIXED CASE EXAMPLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

The most frequently cited example of jurisdictional overlap in the
redress system is the so-called "mixed case." A career federal
employee who has been fired (or who has experienced any of several
other major adverse actions such as a demotion) can appeal the
agency's decision to MSPB.  Likewise, a federal employee who feels
that he or she has been discriminated against can appeal to EEOC. 
But a career employee who has been fired, and who feels that the
firing was based on discrimination, can essentially appeal to both
MSPB and EEOC.  The employee first appeals to MSPB, with hearing
results further appealable to MSPB's three-member Board.  If the
appellant is still unsatisfied, he or she can then appeal MSPB's
decision to EEOC.  If EEOC finds discrimination where MSPB did not,
the two agencies try to reach an accommodation.  If they cannot do
so--an event that has occurred only three times in 16 years--a
three-member Special Panel is convened to reach a determination.  At
this point, the employee who is still unsatisfied with the outcome
can file a civil action in U.S.  district court, where the case can
begin again with a de novo trial. 

The complexity of mixed cases has attracted a lot of attention.  But
two facts about mixed cases are particularly worth noting.  First,
few mixed cases coming before MSPB result in a finding of
discrimination.  Second, when EEOC reviews MSPB's decisions in mixed
cases, it almost always agrees with MSPB.  In fiscal year 1994, for
example, MSPB decided roughly 2,000 mixed case appeals.  It found
that discrimination had occurred in just eight.  During the same
year, EEOC ruled on appellants' appeals of MSPB's findings of
nondiscrimination in 200 cases.  EEOC disagreed with MSPB's findings
in just three.  In each instance, MSPB adopted EEOC's determination. 

One result of this sort of jurisdictional overlap and duplication is
simple inefficiency.  A mixed case appellant can--at no additional
risk--have two agencies review his or her appeal.  These agencies
rarely differ in their determinations, but an employee has little to
lose in asking both agencies to review his or her case. 


      A COSTLY SYSTEM, WITH MANY
      COSTS UNKNOWN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.2

Just how much this multilevel, multiagency redress system costs is
hard to ascertain.  We know that in fiscal year 1994--the last year
for which data on all four agencies are available--the share of the
budgets of the four agencies that was devoted to individual federal
employees' appeals and complaints totaled $54.2 million (see table
1).  We also know that in fiscal year 1994, employing agencies
reported spending almost $34 million investigating discrimination
complaints.  In addition, over $7 million was awarded for
complainants' legal fees and costs in discrimination cases alone.\8
But many of the other costs cannot be pinned down, such as the direct
costs accrued by employing agencies while participating in the
appeals process, arbitration costs, the various costs tied to lost
productivity in the workplace, employees' unreimbursed legal fees,
and court costs.  All these costs either go unreported or are
impossible to clearly define and measure. 



                                Table 1
                
                  Portion of Budgets for Adjudicatory
                 Agencies Devoted to Individual Federal
                 Employee Appeals and Complaints, Along
                     with Cases Received in FY 1994

                                  Budget (millions
Agency                                          $)      Cases received
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
MSPB                                          24.7            10,341\a
EEOC                                          19.4            16,637\b
OSC                                            8.0             1,837\c
FLRA                                           2.1                97\d
======================================================================
Total                                         54.2              28,912
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Total of initial appeals and petitions for review of initial
appeals. 

\b Total of requests for hearings before an administrative judge and
appeals to the Commission of agency final decisions. 

\c These complaints contained 3,471 separate allegations of
prohibited personnel practices. 

\d Number of appeals of arbitration awards decided in FY 1994. 

Source:  OMB data, agency data, and agency estimates. 


--------------------
\8 Consists of legal fees and costs (1) paid by agencies in
discrimination complaints resolved by administrative procedures and
(2) paid from the Judgment Fund, which provides a permanent
indefinite appropriation to pay certain settlements and judgments
against the government arising out of lawsuits. 


      A TIME-CONSUMING SYSTEM,
      ESPECIALLY IN DISCRIMINATION
      CASES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.3

Individual cases can take a long time to resolve--especially if they
involve claims of discrimination.  Among discrimination cases closed
during fiscal year 1994 for which there was a hearing before an EEOC
administrative judge and an appeal of an agency final decision to the
Commission itself, the average time from the filing of the complaint
with the employing agency to the Commission's decision on the appeal
was over 800 days.\9

One reason it takes so long to adjudicate a discrimination case is
that the number of discrimination complaints has been climbing
rapidly.  As shown in table 2, from fiscal years 1991 to 1994, the
number of discrimination complaints filed increased by 39 percent;
the number of requests for a hearing before an EEOC administrative
judge increased by about 86 percent; and the number of appeals to
EEOC of agency final decisions increased by 42 percent.  Meanwhile,
the backlog of requests for EEOC hearings increased by 65 percent,
and the inventory of appeals to EEOC of agency final decisions
tripled.\10



                                Table 2
                
                 Increase in Discrimination Complaints,
                            FYs 1991 to 1994

                                                               Percent
                                         FY 1991   FY 1994    increase
--------------------------------------  --------  --------  ----------
Complaints filed with employing           17,696    24,592        39.0
 agencies
Requests for EEOC hearing\a                5,773    10,712        85.6
Appeals to EEOC\ of agency final           4,167     5,925        42.2
 decisions
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a These caseload data do not include mixed case appeals to MSPB. 

Source:  EEOC. 


--------------------
\9 EEOC processed requests for hearings before an administrative
judge in an average of 154 days.  The Commission processed appeals of
agency final decisions in an average of 185 days.  Cases before MSPB
are processed more quickly but still take a long time.  In fiscal
year 1994, MSPB processed initial appeals in an average of 81 days
and processed appeals of initial decisions to the three-member Board
in an average of 162 days. 

\10 EEOC officials told us that they had undertaken an assessment of
discrimination complaint processing for federal employees and had
expected to complete the study in early 1996.  As of mid-April 1996,
the study was still under way. 


   IMPLICATIONS OF THE FOCUS ON
   EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

One reason Congress placed employee redress responsibilities in
several independent agencies was to ensure that each federal
employee's appeal, depending on the specifics of the case, would be
heard by officials with the broadest experience and expertise in the
area.  In its emphasis on fairness to all employees, however, the
redress system may be allowing some employees to abuse its processes
and may be creating an atmosphere in which managing the federal
workforce is unnecessarily difficult. 

As things stand today, federal workers have substantially greater
employment protections than do private sector employees.  While most
large or medium-size companies have multistep administrative
procedures through which their employees can appeal adverse actions,
these workers cannot, in general, appeal the outcome to an
independent agency.  Compared with federal employees, their rights to
take their employer to court are also limited.  And even when private
sector workers complain of discrimination to EEOC, they receive less
comprehensive treatment than do executive branch federal workers,
who, unlike their private sector counterparts, are entitled to
evidentiary hearings before an EEOC administrative judge, as well as
a trial in U.S.  district court. 

Another characteristic of the redress system for federal employees is
that certain kinds of complaints receive more prominence or attention
than others.  OSC, for instance, was established primarily to
investigate cases in which federal employees complain of retaliation
against them for whistleblowing.  If OSC findings support the
employee and the employing agency fails to take corrective action,
OSC's findings become part of the employee's appeal before MSPB. 
OSC's investigation is done at no cost to the employee.  If OSC's
findings do not support the employee, he or she may proceed with an
appeal to MSPB as if no investigation had ever been made.\11

The OSC investigation, therefore, is not just cost-free to the
employee, but risk-free as well. 

Discrimination is another kind of complaint to which the redress
system gives fuller or more extensive protection than other
complaints or appeals.  Clearly, more administrative redress is
available to employees who claim they have been discriminated against
than to those who appeal personnel actions to MSPB.  For example,
workers who claim discrimination before EEOC--unlike those appealing
a firing, lengthy suspension, or downgrade to MSPB--can file a claim
even though no particular administrative action has been taken
against them.  Further, those who claim discrimination are entitled,
at no cost, to an investigation of the matter by their agencies, the
results of which are made part of the record.  Further still, if they
are unsatisfied after EEOC has heard their cases and any subsequent
appeals, they can then go to U.S.  district court for a de novo
trial, which means that the outcome of the entire administrative
redress process is set aside, and the case is tried all over again. 

What are the implications of the extensive opportunities for redress
provided federal workers?  Federal employees file workplace
discrimination complaints at more than 5 times the per capita rate of
private sector workers.  And while some 47 percent of discrimination
complaints in the private sector involve the most serious adverse
action--termination--only 18 percent of discrimination complaints
among federal workers are related to firings. 

Another phenomenon may be worth noting.  Officials at EEOC and
elsewhere have said that the growth since 1991 in the number of
discrimination complaints by federal employees is probably an
outgrowth of passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which raised
the stakes in discrimination cases by allowing complainants to
receive compensatory damages of up to $300,000 and a jury trial in
District Court.\12


--------------------
\11 In addition, the employee who complains of retaliation for
whistleblowing can appeal matters to MSPB that ordinarily would not
be appealable to that agency. 

\12 Figures on compensatory damage awards are not available.  These
amounts are not reported separately but are, instead, lumped together
with figures for back pay awards.  Back pay awards increased nearly
threefold from $8.2 million in fiscal year 1991 to $24.1 million in
fiscal year 1994. 


      VULNERABILITY TO MISUSE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

Officials from EEOC and other agencies have said they are burdened by
cases that are not legitimate discrimination complaints.  We were
told that some employees file complaints as a way of getting a third
party's assistance in resolving a workplace dispute.  We were also
told that some file frivolous complaints to harass supervisors or to
game the system. 

All sorts of matters become the subject of discrimination complaints,
and they are accorded due process.  Here are two examples, drawn from
the newsletter Federal Human Resources Week:  A male employee filed a
formal complaint when a female co-worker with whom he had formerly
had a romantic relationship "harassed him by pointedly ignoring him
and moving away from him when they had occasion to come in contact."
Another claimed that he was fired in part on the basis of his
national origin:  "American-Kentuckian."

We are not in a position to judge the legitimacy of these complaints. 
We note, however, that EEOC's rulings on the complainants' appeals
affirmed the agency's position that there was no discrimination.  We
would also make the point that federal officials spent their
time--and the taxpayers' money--on these cases. 


      INHIBITING MANAGERS AND
      ENCOURAGING SETTLEMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

At the employing agency level, the prospect of having to deal with
lengthy and complex procedures can affect the willingness of managers
to deal with conduct and performance issues.  In 1991, we reported
that over 40 percent of personnel officials, managers, and
supervisors interviewed said that the potential for an employee using
the appeal or arbitration process would affect a manager's or
supervisor's willingness to pursue a performance action.\13

At the adjudicatory agency level, one effect of complex and
time-consuming redress procedures has been to spur the trend toward
settlements.  About two-thirds of the adverse action and poor
performance cases at MSPB were settled in 1994 instead of being
decided on their merits.  Similarly, during the same period, about
one-third of the discrimination complaints brought before EEOC were
settled without a hearing.  Employing agencies settle many more
complaints before they ever get that far. 

While the trend toward settling cases has helped avoid a lot of
adjudication, there is some concern about the larger implications of
the practice.  In a given employee's case, the possibility of
avoiding the potential costs of seeing the process through to the
bitter end--costs that include not just time and money but human
endurance--may be driving the inclination to settle.  Federal
officials, in deciding whether or not to settle, must weigh the cost
of settling against the potential loss of more taxpayer dollars and
the time and energy that would be diverted from the business of
government. 

There is some concern that policies encouraging the contending
parties to compromise on the issues may conflict with the mission of
the adjudicatory agencies to support the merit principles and may set
troublesome precedents or create ethical dilemmas for managers.\14
Further, there is concern that settlements may be fundamentally
counterproductive, especially in discrimination complaints, where
settlement policies may in fact encourage the filing of frivolous
complaints. 


--------------------
\13 Performance Management:  How Well Is the Government Dealing With
Poor Performers?  (GAO/GGD-91-7, Oct.  2, 1990). 

\14 An example is the occasional settlement agreement not to give the
separated employee a bad employment reference.  The supervisor who
argued for the employee's dismissal may not be allowed to give
good-faith answers to a prospective employer who calls for a
reference. 


   IN SEARCH OF ALTERNATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

At a time when Congress and the administration are considering
opportunities for civil service reform, looking in particular to the
private sector and elsewhere for alternatives to current civil
service practices, organizations outside the executive branch of the
federal government may be useful sources for ideas on reforming the
administrative redress system. 

In most private sector organizations, final authority for decisions
involving disciplinary actions rests with the president or chief
executive officer.  Some firms give that authority to the personnel
or employee relations manager.  But others have turned to some form
of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), especially in discrimination
complaints.\15 Many firms use mediators to resolve these matters. 
Some firms use outside arbitrators or company ombudsmen.  Still
others employ committees or boards made up of employee
representatives and/or supervisors to review or decide such actions. 
We have not studied the effectiveness of these private sector
practices, but they may provide insight for dealing with redress
issues in a fair but less rigidly legalistic fashion than that of the
federal redress system. 

In the same regard, some federal agencies are exploring alternatives
to rigid, formal grievance processes.  The particular approaches vary
but include the use of mediation, dispute resolution boards, and
ombudsmen.  The use of ADR methods was called for under CSRA and
underscored by the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990, the
Civil Rights Act of 1991, and regulatory changes made at EEOC.  Based
not only on the fact that Congress has endorsed ADR in the past, but
also that individual agencies have taken ADR initiatives and that
MSPB and EEOC have explored their own initiatives, it is clear that
the need for finding effective ADR methods is widely recognized in
government. 

Our preliminary study of government ADR efforts, however, indicates
that ADR is not widely practiced and that the ADR programs that are
in place are, by and large, in their early stages.  Most of these
involve mediation, particularly to resolve allegations of
discrimination before formal complaints are filed.  Because ADR
programs generally have not been around very long, the results of
these efforts are sketchy, but some agencies claim that these
programs have saved time and reduced costs.  One example is the
Walter Reed Army Medical Center's Early Dispute Resolution Program,
which provides mediation services.  From fiscal year 1993 to fiscal
year 1995, the number of discrimination complaints at the medical
center dropped from 50 to 27--a decrease that Walter Reed officials
attribute to the Early Dispute Resolution Program.  Moreover, data
from the medical center show that since the program began in October
1994, 63 percent of the cases submitted for mediation have been
resolved.  Walter Reed officials said that the costs of investigating
and adjudicating complaints have been lessened, as has the amount of
productive time lost on the part of complainants and others involved
in the cases. 

Other areas that may be worth studying are those segments of the
civil service left partially or entirely uncovered by the current
redress system.  For example, while almost all federal employees can
bring discrimination complaints to EEOC, employees in their
probationary periods, temporary employees, unionized postal workers,
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) employees, and certain other
employees generally cannot appeal adverse actions to MSPB.  In
addition, FBI employees, as well as certain other employees, are not
covered by federal service labor relations legislation and therefore
cannot form bargaining units or engage in collective bargaining. 
What are the implications of the varying levels of protection on the
fairness with which these employees are treated?  Are there lessons
here that might be applied elsewhere in the civil service? 

Finally, it should be noted that legislative branch employees are
treated differently from those in the executive branch.  For example,
under the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995, since January
1996 congressional employees with discrimination complaints have been
required to choose between two redress alternatives, one
administrative and one judicial.  The administrative alternative
allows employees to appeal to the Office of Compliance, with hearing
results appealable to a five-member board.  The board's decisions may
then be appealed to the U.S.  Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, which has a limited right of review.  The other alternative
is to bypass the administrative process and file suit in U.S. 
district court, with the opportunity to appeal the court's decision
to the appropriate U.S.  court of appeals.  The intent of this
arrangement is to avoid the opportunity for the "two bites of the
apple"--one administrative, one judicial--currently offered executive
branch employees.  It is too early to tell if the act will accomplish
its purpose in this area, but Congress may find that once in
operation, the new system may be instructive for considering how best
to provide employee redress. 


--------------------
\15 For a discussion of ADR methods private sector employers use, see
our report Employment Discrimination:  Most Private-Sector Employers
Use Alternative Dispute Resolution (GAO/HEHS-95-150, July 1995). 


   AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE THE
   WAY GOVERNMENT OPERATES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

Today, in the face of tight budgets and a rapidly changing work
environment, the civil service is undergoing renewed scrutiny by the
administration and Congress.  In the broadest sense, the goal of such
scrutiny is to identify ways of making the civil service more
effective and less costly in its service to the American people. 
With so many facets of the civil service under review--including
compensation and benefits, performance management, and the retirement
system--no area should be overlooked that offers the opportunity for
improving the way the government operates.  To the extent that the
federal government's administrative redress system is tilted toward
employee protections at the expense of the effective management of
the nation's business, it deserves congressional attention. 


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