Department of Commerce: National Weather Service Modernization and NOAA
Fleet Issues (Testimony, 02/24/99, GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the: (1) status of
the National Weather Service (NWS) systems modernization; and (2) most
cost-effective alternatives for acquiring the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) marine data.

GAO noted that: (1) although NWS is nearing completion of its systems
modernization effort, two significant challenges face it this year: (a)
deploying the final system of modernization; and (b) ensuring that all
of its mission-critical systems are year 2000 compliant; (2) NWS has
made progress on both fronts; (3) in the NOAA fleet area, NOAA now
outsources for more of its research and data needs but plans to spend
$185 million over the next five years to acquire four new replacement
NOAA fisheries research ships; and (4) thus, GAO believes that continued
congressional oversight of this area, as well as NOAA's budget requests
for replacement or upgraded ships, is needed to ensure that NOAA is
pursuing the most cost-effective alternatives for acquiring marine data.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-AIMD/GGD-99-97
     TITLE:  Department of Commerce: National Weather Service
	     Modernization and NOAA Fleet Issues
      DATE:  02/24/99
   SUBJECT:  Weather forecasting
	     Systems conversions
	     Privatization
	     Strategic information systems planning
	     Cost control
	     Cost effectiveness analysis
	     Earth resources satellites
	     Radar equipment
	     Ships
	     Warning systems
IDENTIFIER:  NWS Next Generation Weather Radar
	     NWS Next Generation Geostationary Operational
	     Environmental Satellite
	     NWS Automated Surface Observing System
	     NWS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
	     Y2K

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GAO

United States General Accounting OfficeTestimony

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on
Science, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery  Expected at  2 p.m. Wednesday,  February
24, 1999 DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

National Weather Service Modernization and NOAA  Fleet Issues
Statement of Joel C. Willemssen Director, Civil Agencies
Information Systems Accounting and Information Management Division
and L. Nye StevensDirector, Federal Management and Workforce
Issues  General Government Division

GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97 

Page 1 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: We appreciate the
opportunity to join in today's hearing to discuss our work in two
areas under the responsibility of the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), a component of the Department
of Commerce.  At your request, we will first discuss the status of
the National  Weather Service (NWS) systems modernization and then
address the most cost-effective alternatives for acquiring NOAA's
marine data.  Last month,  we continued to designate the NWS
systems modernization effort as a high-risk information technology
area and the NOAA fleet as an additional major  management
challenge confronting the Department of Commerce.1 In brief,
although NWS is nearing completion of its systems modernization
effort, two significant challenges face it this year--deploying
the final  system of the modernization and ensuring that all of
its mission-critical systems are Year 2000 compliant.  NWS has
made progress on both fronts.   In the NOAA fleet area, NOAA now
outsources for more of its research and data needs but plans to
spend $185 million over the next 5 years to acquire  four new
replacement NOAA fisheries research ships.  Thus, we believe that
continued congressional oversight of NOAA's budget requests for
replacement or upgraded ships is needed to ensure that NOAA is
pursuing the most cost-effective alternatives for acquiring marine
data.

National Weather Service Modernization In the 1980s NWS began a
nationwide modernization program to upgrade observing systems such
as satellites and radars, and design and develop

advanced computer workstations for forecasters.  The goals of the
modernization are to achieve more uniform weather services across
the

nation, improve forecasting, provide better detection and
prediction of severe weather and flooding, permit more cost-
effective operations  through staff and office reductions, and
achieve higher productivity.  For example, NWS plans to reorganize
its field office structure from 256 offices  (52 Weather Service
Forecast Offices and 204 Weather Service Offices), to 121.  As of
February 1999, NWS officials told us that 132 offices have been
closed.

1High-Risk Series: An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999) and Major
Management Challenges and  Program Risks:  Department of Commerce
(GAO/OCG-99-3, January 1999).

Page 2 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

NWS' system modernization includes four major systems development
programs, which are expected to collectively cost about $4.5
billion.  I  would like to briefly describe each. Next Generation
Weather Radar (NEXRAD).  This is a program to acquire 166 Doppler
radars.2  Largely deployed, these radars have helped NWS  increase
the accuracy and timeliness of warnings for severe thunderstorms,
tornadoes, and other hazardous weather events.  The  reported cost
of this program is just under $1.5 billion. Next Generation
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES-Next).
This is a program to acquire, launch, and control five
geostationary satellites, GOES-I through GOES-M, which assist in
the mission of identifying and tracking severe weather events,
such as  hurricanes.  The first satellite in the current series
was launched in 1994 and the fifth is scheduled for launch in
2002.  The total cost for these five  satellites, including launch
services and ground systems, is estimated to be just under $2
billion.

Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS).  This is a program to
automate and enhance methods for collecting, processing,
displaying, and  transmitting surface weather conditions, such as
temperature and precipitation.  The system is planned for
installation at 314 NWS locations.   Estimated costs for the ASOS
Program are about $350 million, which includes the NWS units and
another 679 units for the Federal Aviation  Administration and the
Department of Defense. Advanced Weather Interactive Processing
System (AWIPS).  This program integrates, for the first time,
satellite, radar, and other data to support  weather forecaster
decision-making and communications; it is the linchpin of the NWS
modernization.  AWIPS, which was originally scheduled to be
developed incrementally in a series of six modules, or builds, is
currently set to be deployed to 152 locations after the fourth
build by the end of June  1999. In 1995 we designated the NWS
modernization a high-risk area for the federal government because
of its estimated $4.5 billion cost, its  complexity, its
criticality to NWS' mission of helping to protect life and
property through early forecasting and warnings of potentially
dangerous

2This includes radars for NWS, the Air Force, and the Federal
Aviation Administration.

Page 3 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

weather, and its past problems--documented in several of our
reports.3  Our 1997 high-risk series reported that although the
development and  deployment of the observing systems associated
with the modernization were nearing completion, unresolved issues
remained.4  These concerned  the systems' operational
effectiveness and efficient maintenance.  For example, new radars
were not always up and running when severe weather  threatened,
and ground-based sensors fell short of user expectations,
particularly during active weather.  We recommended that NWS
correct  shortfalls in radar performance, and define and
prioritize all ground-based sensor corrections according to user
needs.

Some of our radar and ground-based sensor performance concerns
were addressed, while others remain.  We recently reported that a
NEXRAD unit  in southern California failed to consistently meet
NWS' own NEXRAD availability requirement, and recommended that the
Weather Service  correct the problem such that the radar meets
availability requirements.5 NWS agreed, and has several activities
planned to bring about such  improvement. While there have been
specific performance problems, NWS reports that the new radars and
satellites overall have enabled it to generate better data  and
greatly improved forecasts and warnings.  We continue to view the
NWS modernization as a high-risk area, however, for two primary
reasons:   (1) NWS lacks an overall architecture to guide systems
development and (2) the final piece of the modernization--AWIPS
(the forecaster  workstations that will integrate weather data
from NEXRAD, GOES-Next, and ASOS)--has not yet been deployed.6  At
this point I would like to  discuss these issues in more detail.

NWS Modernization Lacks Overall Systems  Architecture

A systems architecture is an essential tool for guiding effective
and efficient systems development and evolution.  We initially
reported in 1994

3High-Risk Series:  An Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, February 1995).
4High-Risk Series:  Information Management and Technology (GAO/HR-
97-9, February 1997). 5National Weather Service:  Sulphur Mountain
Radar Performance (GAO/AIMD-99-7,October 16, 1998). 6High-Risk
Series:  An Update (GAO/HR-99-1, January 1999).

Page 4 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

that the NWS modernization needed such an overall technical
blueprint;7 NWS agrees--and is currently working on one.  Until
such an architecture is  developed and enforced, the modernization
will continue to be subject to higher costs and reduced
performance.  This is an important point as  component systems
continue to evolve to meet additional demands and take advantage
of improved technology.  The Assistant Administrator for  Weather
Services shares this view, and said recently that NWS plans to
intensify its efforts to develop a systems architecture.

Delivery of AWIPS Remains a Concern Until AWIPS is fully deployed
and functioning properly, NWS will not be able to take full
advantage of the $4.5 billion total investment it has made in

the modernization.  Over the past several years, we have reported
that AWIPS has encountered delays and cost increases due to design
problems  and management shortcomings and have made several
recommendations to improve management of this critical component
of the modernization.  NWS has acted on most of our
recommendations.  I would like to now update you on AWIPS' cost,
schedule, software development, and  maintenance. The cost to
develop AWIPS was estimated at $350 million in 1985; a decade
later, that figure had risen to $525 million.  However, in
testimony and a  report issued in 1996, we pointed out the
inaccuracy of this $525 million estimate due to the omission of
several cost factors, including known  contract increases.8  The
Department of Commerce later committed to a $550 million funding
cap.  Yet as we testified in April 1997, it would prove  extremely
difficult for NOAA to develop and deploy AWIPS within the $550
million cap if any problems were encountered.9   Given the size
and  complexity of the development--and recognizing that even
managed risks can turn into real problems--we testified that such
problems were likely to  occur and that costs would likely exceed
$550 million.

7Weather Forecasting: Systems Architecture Needed for National
Weather Service Modernization  (GAO/AIMD-94-28, March 11, 1994).

8Weather Forecasting: Recommendations to Address New Weather
Processing System Development  Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-74, May 13,
1996), and Weather Forecasting: New Processing System Faces
Uncertainties and Risks (GAO/T-AIMD-96-47, February 29, 1996).

9Weather Service Modernization:  Risks Remain That Full Systems
Potential Will Not Be Achieved  (GAO/T-AIMD-97-85, April 24,
1997).

Page 5 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

In accordance with a recommendation we made in 1996, the
department contracted for an independent cost estimate of AWIPS
because of the  uncertainty about whether it could be delivered
within the $550 million cap given the increased software
development expenses.10 According to the  assessment dated
February 2, 1998, the likely cost to complete AWIPS through its
final build--build 6--was $618 million.

In March 1998, we reported that although AWIPS was planned for
full deployment through build 6 in 1999--at 152 locations
nationwide--that  schedule is now in doubt.  The latest schedule
calls only for build 4--actually build 4.2--to be completed in
June, within the $550 million cap.   Also as we testified last
year, completion dates for builds 5 and 6 were uncertain because
NWS wanted to ensure that requirements for those  modules were not
extraneous to mission needs, in order to minimize future cost
increases.11  This reflects a recommendation we made in 1996 for
all  AWIPS builds.12  In August 1998, an independent review team
reported that build 5 requirements are essential to NWS' core
mission and that the cost to  complete should range from an
additional $20 to $25 million above the $550 million cap.  The
team concluded that build 6 requirements should not  be pursued,
however, because they "resemble capabilities desired, rather than
requirements."

According to the AWIPS program manager, deployment of build 4.2
will result in improved forecasts and warnings, a reduction of 106
staff, and the  decommissioning of the current Automation of Field
Operations and Services (AFOS) system.  The program manager added
that build 5 will be  pursued in order to realize expected further
improvements in weather forecasts and warnings, a reduction of an
additional 69 staff, and the  decommissioning of the NEXRAD
workstations.  Schedules for build 5 have not yet been developed.
To help ensure that build 4.2 will be delivered  within the cap,
the Assistant Administrator for Weather Services has contracted
with an independent accounting firm to verify program
expenditures. The most critical risk factors underlying questions
about AWIPS' future relate to software development.  We have
frequently reported on this and

10GAO/AIMD-96-74, May 13, 1996. 11GAO/T-AIMD-98-97, March 4, 1998.
12GAO/AIMD-96-74, May 13, 1996.

Page 6 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

made several recommendations to improve AWIPS' software
development processes.13  Software quality is governed largely by
the quality of the  processes used to develop it; however, NWS'
efforts to develop AWIPS software have lacked defined development
processes.  Such processes are  all the more essential because of
NWS' increased use of software code developed internally at NOAA's
Forecast Systems Laboratory (FSL) in  Boulder, Colorado--a
research and development facility that primarily develops
prototype systems.  This software code has not been developed
according to the rigorous processes commonly used to develop
production-quality code.  Failure to adhere to these processes may
result in unstable  software that will continue to cause cost
increases and schedule delays.   The cost assessment delivered in
February 1998 also found risk inherent in the development of
builds 4 through 6 because of the transitioning of FSLdeveloped
software to AWIPS and the uncertainty surrounding requirements for
these builds.  NWS officials have acknowledged these  software
development process weaknesses, and have told us that they
continue to strengthen these processes.  For example, NWS reports
that all  AWIPS software, both that developed by the government
and the contractor, is being controlled under a common
configuration management  process.  Another risk area concerns the
network control facility, which provides the ability to monitor
and maintain AWIPS sites across the country from a  single
location.  As we testified last year,14 through build 3, AWIPS was
still experiencing difficulty with the central location's ability
to detect and  respond to problems.  We further testified that
since these problems concerned only a limited number of sites that
as more sites come on line,  problems can be expected to increase.
NWS officials have acknowledged that the poor performance of the
network control facility continues to be a  prime concern, have
sought the advice of external consultants, and have initiated a
number of actions to improve performance of this facility.

13Weather Forecasting: Improvements Needed in Laboratory Software
Development Processes (GAO/ AIMD-95-24, December 14, 1994) and
GAO/T-AIMD-97-85, April 24, 1997; GAO/T-AIMD-98-97, March 4, 1998.

14GAO/T-AIMD-98-97, March 4, 1998.

Page 7 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

Progress Made on Year 2000, But Critical Testing and  Contingency
Planning Efforts Remain

Finally, a critical risk area is whether the AWIPS builds--and,
indeed, all modernization components--will be Year 2000
compliant.15  AWIPS to date  is not Year 2000 compliant.  Build
4.2--set for completion this June--is intended to make all AWIPS
applications Year 2000 compliant.  In the event  it is late, NWS
has renovated its current system, Automation of Field Operations
and Services, to be ready as a potential backup.

Yet even if Year 2000 compliance ceases to be an issue with build
4.2, NWS' companion modernization systems will need to be
compliant because of  the amount of data they exchange.  NWS
reports that five of the six mission-critical systems that
interface with AWIPS are already Year 2000  compliant, on the
basis of individual systems tests.  The remaining system is
scheduled to be compliant by March 31, 1999, according to the
Department of Commerce's February 1999 Quarterly Year 2000
Progress Report to the Office of Management and Budget.

To ensure that these mission-critical systems can reliably
exchange data with other systems and that they are protected from
errors that can be  introduced by external systems, NWS has begun
to perform end-to-end testing.16  These tests include multiple
Weather Service systems working  together and critical interfaces
with the Department of Defense and the Federal Aviation
Administration.  NWS plans to continue to conduct this  end-to-end
testing through March of this year.  The final report on the
results of these tests is scheduled to be issued this May.

We suggest that NWS consider conducting additional end-to-end
testing after the final version of AWIPS is delivered, which is
currently scheduled  for this June. Currently, NWS is using a
prior version of AWIPS in its end-to-end testing--a version that
continues to be modified as AWIPS' systemlevel testing progresses.
Testing with the final version of AWIPS will help to ensure that
the production system that will be running in the year 2000  will
work with its interrelated systems.

15Computer systems have long used two digits to represent the
year, such as simply "99" for 1999, to  conserve electronic data
storage and reduce operating costs.  In this format, however, 2000
is indistinguishable from 1900 because both are represented as
"00."  As a result, if not modified, systems

or applications that use dates or perform date- or time- sensitive
calculations may generate incorrect results beyond 1999.

16Our Year 2000 testing guide--Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  A
Testing Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.21,  November 1998)--sets forth a
structured approach to testing, including end-to-end testing.

Page 8 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

To reduce the risk and potential impact of Year 2000-induced
information systems failures on the Weather Service's core
business processes, it is  critical that NWS have contingency
plans in place that will help ensure continuity of operations
through the turn of the century. Without such  plans, NWS will not
have well-defined processes to follow in the event of failures.
NWS depends on data provided by other federal agencies as well  as
on services provided by the public infrastructure (e.g., power,
water, voice and data telecommunications).  One weak link anywhere
in this chain  of critical dependencies could cause major
disruption to NWS operations.  Given these interdependencies, it
is imperative that contingency plans be  developed for all
critical core business processes.  According to NWS' Year 2000
program manager, the Weather Service has begun drafting
contingency plans for three core business processes:  those that
(1) observe weather data, (2) produce forecasts and warnings, and
(3) disseminate data.  It is essential that NWS develop these
business continuity and contingency plans expeditiously, and test
these plans to  ensure that they are capable of providing the
level of support needed to allow continued functioning of NWS'
core business processes in the event  of failure. As noted in our
business continuity and contingency guide,17 another key element
of such a plan is the development of a zero day or day one risk
reduction strategy and, more generally, procedures for the period
between December 1999 and early January 2000.  Key aspects of this
strategy can  include the implementation of (1) an integrated
control center, whose purposes include the internal dissemination
of critical data and problem  management and (2) a timeline that
details the hours in which certain events will occur (such as when
backup generators will be started) during  the late December and
early January rollover period.  To date, NWS has no such strategy.
We suggest that the development of such a risk reduction  strategy
be undertaken. In conclusion, NWS has made progress on the
development and operational testing of the forecaster workstations
and its Year 2000 testing  and contingency planning.  However,
cost, schedule, and technical risks associated with the
workstations continue to be concerns.  Further, the  results of
NWS' Year 2000 end-to-end testing and business continuity and
contingency plans are expected to be delivered soon.

17Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Business Continuity and Contingency
Planning (GAO/AIMD-10.1.19,  August 1998).

Page 9 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

Pursuing the Most Cost-Effective  Alternatives for Acquiring
NOAA's  Marine Data

NOAA has an aging in-house fleet of 15 ships that are used to
support its programs in fisheries research, oceanographic
research, and hydrographic  charting and mapping.  Most of NOAA's
ships are past their 30-year life expectancies and many of them
are costly and inefficient to operate and  maintain and lack the
latest state-of-the-art technology.  NOAA's ships are managed and
operated by a NOAA Corps of about 240 uniformed service
commissioned officers who, like the Public Health Service Corps,
perform civilian rather than military functions but are covered by
a military-like pay  and benefits system. For more than a decade,
congressional committees, public and private sector advisory
groups, the National Performance Review, the Commerce  Office of
Inspector General (OIG), and our office have urged NOAA to
aggressively pursue cost-effective alternatives to its in-house
fleet of ships.  We have also reported and testified on issues
relating to NOAA's Commissioned Corps that manages and operates
the in-house fleet of  ships.18 We reported on NOAA's fleet
operations and fleet modernization needs in 1986 and again in 1994
and summarized our earlier work, the Commerce  OIG's work, and the
Department of Commerce's corrective actions in summary reports in
January 199819 and January 1999.  As part of our recent  special
performance and accountability series of reports, we identified
the NOAA fleet as one of four major performance and management
issues  confronting the Department of Commerce.20  As early as
1986 we reported that NOAA needed to develop more definitive
information on private ships'  availability, capability, and costs
before taking any action to deactivate NOAA's ships.21  In 1994,
we reported that NOAA (1) lacked the financial  and operational
data it needed to adequately assess whether chartered and
contracted ships could cost effectively meet the needs of its
programs and

18See Issues on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's Commissioned Corps (GAO/ GGD-98-35R, December 2,
1997); National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:  Issues on
the Civilianization of the Commissioned Corps (GAO/T-GGD-98-22,
October 29, 1997); and Federal

Personnel:  Issues on the Need for NOAA's Commissioned Corps
(GAO/GGD-97-10, October 31, 1996).  19Federal Management:  Major
Management Issues (GAO/OCG-98-1R, January 9, 1998).

20Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Commerce (GAO/OCG-99-3,  January 1999).

21Deactivating Research Vessels:  National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration's Use of Private  Ships (GAO/RCED-86-133, June 11,
1986).

Page 10 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

(2) had no assurance that its fleet modernization plan represented
the most cost effective means of meeting future program
requirements.22   Consequently, we recommended that NOAA take
several actions to ensure that all viable and cost-effective
options for accomplishing its program  missions are considered in
making decisions on future fleet modernization. The Commerce OIG
has also reported and testified several times on the NOAA fleet
modernization issue, identified the fleet as one of the top 10
management problems facing the Department of Commerce in April
1997, January 1998, and again in December 1998, and continues to
believe that  NOAA could and should be doing more to pursue cost-
effective alternatives to its in-house fleet of ships for
acquiring marine data.  Following reports  by us, the Commerce
OIG, and others, the Department of Commerce initially identified
the NOAA fleet as a material weakness in its annual  Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) report for fiscal year
1990.  It remains a material weakness today.

Since 1990, NOAA has developed several fleet replacement and
modernization plans that call for investments of hundreds of
millions of  dollars to upgrade or replace these ships, and each
has been criticized by the Commerce OIG for not pursuing
alternative approaches strongly  enough.  For example, in a 1996
program evaluation report on NOAA's $1 billion 1995 fleet
modernization plan, the OIG recommended that NOAA  terminate its
fleet modernization efforts; cease investing in its ships;
immediately begin to decommission, sell, or transfer them; and
contract for  the required data or ship services. In response to
these criticisms, NOAA now says that it has taken steps to improve
the cost efficiency of its fleet and significantly increased its
outsourcing for these services from about 15 percent in 1990 to
over40 percent today.  According to NOAA, for example, it has
removed seven  ships from service and brought one new and two
converted Navy ships into service since 1990, now outsources for
about 46 percent of its research and  survey needs, and expects to
further increase its use of outsourcing to about 50 percent over
the next 10 years.

Although NOAA apparently has made progress in reducing the costs
of its fleet and outsourcing for more of its research and data
needs, NOAA

22Research Fleet Modernization:  NOAA Needs to Consider
Alternatives to the Acquisition of New  Vessels (GAO/RCED-94-170,
August 3, 1994).

Page 11 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

continues to rely heavily on its in-house fleet and still plans to
replace or upgrade some of these ships.  In this regard, the
President's budget for  fiscal year 2000 proposes $52 million for
construction of a new fisheries research ship and indicates that
NOAA plans to spend a total of $185  million for four new
replacement ships over the 5-year period ending in fiscal year
2004--$52 million in 2000, $51 million in 2001, $40 million in
2002,  $40 million in 2003, and $2 million in 2004.  We have not
had an opportunity to review the latest studies of NOAA's fleet
modernization efforts or NOAA's  acquisition plan for its
fisheries research mission.  Thus, we do not know whether or not
NOAA's proposed replacement ships are the most costeffective
alternative currently available for meeting these fisheries
research needs.

In addition to its proposed acquisitions, NOAA also continues to
repair and upgrade its aging fleet of existing ships.  Since 1990,
it has repaired and  upgraded seven of its existing ships and
plans to repair and upgrade two more in 1999.  According to the
President's recent budget requests, NOAA  spent $12 million in
1996 and $13 million in 1997 to modernize, convert, and replace
its existing ships.  Also, it spent $21 million on fleet
maintenance  and planning in 1998 and expects to spend $13 million
in 1999 and $9 million in 2000.

The question of the viability of the NOAA fleet is entwined with
the issue of the NOAA Corps, which operates the fleet.  In 1995,
the National  Performance Review, noting that the NOAA Corps was
the smallest uniformed service and that the fleet it commanded was
obsolete,  recommended that the NOAA Corps be gradually reduced in
numbers and eventually eliminated.  We reported in October 1996
that the NOAA Corps  generally does not meet the criteria and
principles cited by the Department of Defense for a military
compensation system.23  We also noted that other  agencies, such
as the Navy, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), use federal  civilian
employees or contractors to carry out duties similar to the
functions that NOAA assigns to the Corps.  Commerce developed a
plan  and legislative proposal to "disestablish" or civilianize
the NOAA Corps in 1997, but the Congress did not adopt this
proposal.

23Federal Personnel:  Issues on the Need for NOAA's Commissioned
Corps (GAO/GGD-97-10, Oct. 31,  1996).

Page 12 GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-99-97

According to NOAA and to the Department of Commerce's annual
performance plans for fiscal years 1999 and 2000 under the Results
Act, the  NOAA Corps has been downsized from over 400 officers in
fiscal year 1994 to about 240 at the beginning of fiscal year
1999, achieving gross annual  cost savings of at least $6 million.
In June 1998, NOAA announced a new restructuring plan for the NOAA
Corps.  NOAA's plan focused on the need  for a NOAA Commissioned
Corps of about 240 officers.  NOAA's June 1998 restructuring plan
also called for a new civilian director of the NOAA Corps  and a
new recruiting program. However, the Congress had other ideas.
The Omnibus Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1999 set the number
of NOAA Corps officers at 250.   Subsequently, the Governing
International Fishery Agreement Act (Public Law 105-384, approved
November 13, 1998) made other changes in NOAA's  proposed
restructuring plan.  This act authorized a NOAA Corps of at least
264 but not more than 299 commissioned officers for fiscal years
1999  through 2003, requires that a uniformed flag officer be the
NOAA Corps' operational chief, and directed the Secretary of
Commerce to lift the thenexisting recruiting freeze on NOAA Corps
officers.  According to the NOAA Corps, it expects to have about
250 commissioned officers by the end of  fiscal year 1999. In
summary, NWS faces significant challenges this year--both in
deploying the initial version of AWIPS and in addressing the Year
2000 problem.   Longer term, NWS still needs to develop an overall
systems architecture and to develop AWIPS' build 5 requirements
since they are essential to  NWS' core mission.  In the NOAA fleet
area, continuing congressional oversight of NOAA's budget requests
for replacement or upgraded ships is  needed to ensure that NOAA
is pursuing the most cost-effective alternatives for acquiring
marine data.

This concludes our statement.  We would be happy to respond to any
questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have
at this  time.

(511732, 410427) Letter

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