National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Weather Service
Modernization and NOAA Corps Issues (Testimony, 03/13/97,
GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-97-63).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed: (1) preliminary
findings of its ongoing audit work relating to the National Weather
Service's (NWS) Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS),
the linchpin of NWS' $4.5-billion modernization program; (2) its report
concerning the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association's (NOAA)
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) system, which
plays a vital role in weather forecasting; and (3) findings from its
report on the NOAA Commissioned Corps, relating to issues involving
Corps officers' receiving military pay, allowances, and benefits.

GAO noted that: (1) the NWS modernization has entailed acquiring and
putting into operation new and vastly more capable weather observing
systems; (2) through AWIPS, the NWS expects to tap a reservoir of data
from its new observing systems, data that its current, aging processing
and communications system cannot handle; (3) after early successes in
demonstrating the technical feasibility of system functions, design
problems and disagreements between NOAA and the development contractor
stymied progress; (4) on the recommendation of an independent review
team, some development responsibility was brought in-house, to NWS/NOAA
labs, in 1995; (5) the AWIPS strategy was changed again in 1996, when
even more development responsibility, for AWIPS data acceptance,
processing, and display capabilities, was brought in-house, primarily to
NOAA's Forecast Systems Laboratory (FSL); (6) at that time, NWS decided
to use FSL's prototype system, called Weather Forecast Office-Advanced
which was being developed parallel to AWIPS as a risk-reduction tactic;
(7) with these changes, NWS expects AWIPS to be fully deployed in 1999
at a total cost of $550 million; (8) GOES satellites in the current
series will begin to reach the end of their useful lives about 2002; (9)
NOAA is now in the process of planning the procurement of replacements
for these satellites, which need to be procured quickly to prevent a gap
in coverage as the current series runs out; (10) GAO found NOAA's near
term approach reasonable, competitively procuring two to four GOES
spacecraft that will carry the same meteorological instruments as the
current series, with modest improvements; (11) a new GOES design might
better meet the evolving needs of forecasters and improve performance as
well as reduce costs; (12) GAO's greatest concern in this area is with
NOAA's delay in conducting an analysis of the technological options and
developing specific plans for the follow-up series; (13) generally, the
NOAA Corps does not meet criteria for receiving military compensation;
(14) if a decision to convert Corps officers to civilian status were
made, a transition plan would need to consider, along with the time
period to accomplish the change: (a) retirement benefits/credits to be
allotted to officers who are converted to civilian capacity; (b)
resources needed for potential recruitment, training, and retention of
civilian employees who might replace Corps members choosing to leave fe*

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-AIMD/GGD-97-63
     TITLE:  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration: Weather 
             Service Modernization and NOAA Corps Issues
      DATE:  03/13/97
   SUBJECT:  Weather forecasting
             Earth resources satellites
             Systems conversions
             Systems design
             Requirements definition
             Computer software verification and validation
             Federal procurement
             Military compensation
             Military personnel
             Civilian employees
IDENTIFIER:  NOAA Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
             NWS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
             NWS Next Generation Weather Radar
             NWS Automated Surface Observing System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, Committee on
Science, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
1 p.m.
Thursday,
March 13, 1997

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC
ADMINISTRATION - WEATHER SERVICE
MODERNIZATION AND NOAA CORPS
ISSUES

Statement of Joel C.  Willemssen
Director, Information Resources Management
Accounting and Information Management Division

GAO/T-AIMD/GGD-97-63

GAO/AIMD-97-63t


(511418)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ASOS - Automated Surface Observing System
  AWIPS - Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
  EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
  FSL - Forecast Systems Laboratory
  GOES - Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
  NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
  NESDIS - National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information
     Service
  NEXRAD - Next Generation Weather Radars
  NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
  NWS - National Weather Service
  WFO - Weather Forecast Office

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

We are pleased to be here today to discuss our work in three areas
under the responsibility of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), a component of the Department of Commerce.  At
your request, we will, first, share preliminary findings of our
ongoing audit work relating to the National Weather Service's (NWS)
Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System (AWIPS), the linchpin
of NWS' $4.5-billion modernization program; second, discuss our
report being released today concerning NOAA's Geostationary
Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) system, which plays a
vital role in weather forecasting; and third, summarize findings from
our report issued last year on the NOAA Commissioned Corps, relating
to issues involving Corps officers' receiving military pay,
allowances, and benefits.  Attached to my statement today is a
listing of prior reports and testimony dealing with these issues. 


   NWS' ADVANCED WEATHER
   INTERACTIVE PROCESSING SYSTEM
   (AWIPS)
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Mr.  Chairman, the National Weather Service has a mission of utmost
importance to all Americans--helping to protect life and property
through early forecasting and warnings of potentially dangerous
weather.  Almost 15 years ago, NWS decided to modernize its automated
systems to improve forecasting while downsizing operations.  The NWS
modernization has entailed acquiring and putting into operation new
and vastly more capable weather observing systems; these include the
Next Generation Weather Radars (NEXRAD), GOES satellites, and the
Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS). 

While NWS acknowledges that unresolved operational issues concerning
some of these observational systems remain, it has found that,
overall, the new radars and satellites have greatly improved
forecasts and warnings.  An example of how important such
improvements are was seen barely 2 weeks ago, with the severe weather
endured by thousands in the south-central United States.  Without the
capabilities provided by satellites and radar, the speed with which
forecasts and warnings of this dangerous weather were communicated to
the public would have been reduced, possibly with more deadly
consequences. 

AWIPS--the system that integrates and interprets these data--is the
centerpiece of the NWS modernization, designed to serve as both a
decision-support and communications system.  Its network of
sophisticated workstations is intended to support forecasters by
processing and analyzing large volumes of data coming in from a
multitude of observing systems, satellites, and radars.  In concert
with NWS computer models of weather patterns, AWIPS will use these
data to aid local forecasters in making specific weather predictions
and issuing timely warnings of threatening meteorological events.  In
addition, AWIPS is to provide the conduit for national
communications, the structure through which NWS field offices,
national centers, and customers will communicate.  Through AWIPS, the
Weather Service expects to tap a reservoir of data from its new
observing systems--data that its current, aging processing and
communications system cannot handle. 

However, as we have reported several times over the past few years,
full utilization of the data from these observing systems has been
prevented by delays and continuing problems with AWIPS.\1 We have
made several recommendations that we feel will strengthen NWS'
ability to acquire AWIPS.  Progress to date has, however, been
uneven, and we continue to be concerned about risks in the
development of AWIPS--risks that threaten the system's ability to be
completed on time, within budget, and perform with the functional
capability that AWIPS must be able to provide.  Until AWIPS is
deployed and functioning properly, NWS will not be able to take full
advantage of the nearly $4 billion investment it has made in these
new observing systems.  Because of these concerns, the NWS
modernization was placed on our list of high-risk government programs
in 1995, where it remains today.\2

After early successes in demonstrating the technical feasibility of
system functions, design problems and disagreements between NOAA and
the development contractor in 1993-1994 stymied progress.  On the
recommendation of an independent review team, some development
responsibility was brought in-house--to NWS/NOAA labs--in 1995.  The
AWIPS program strategy was changed again in 1996, when even more
development responsibility--for AWIPS data acceptance, processing,
and display capabilities--was brought in-house, primarily to NOAA's
Forecast Systems Laboratory (FSL).  At that time, NWS decided to use
FSL's prototype system, called Weather Forecast Office
(WFO)-Advanced, which was being developed parallel to AWIPS as a
risk-reduction tactic.  NWS officials chose WFO-Advanced because of
its demonstrated superior data acceptance, processing, and display
capability over the contractor's version, hoping that using it would
enable the agency to deploy these AWIPS capabilities to field
operations as quickly as possible.  The contractor did, however,
retain responsibility for communications, system monitoring and
control, and other capabilities.  With these changes, NWS expects
AWIPS to be fully deployed in 1999, at a total cost of $550 million. 

As we reported in December 1994, NOAA/NWS labs are research and
development labs that primarily develop prototype systems, and as
such did not employ software development processes characteristic of
a production environment.  Specifically, the labs did not have the
software quality assurance and configuration management processes,
among others, sufficient to ensure production of stable, reliable
software code.\3

Developing software code for use in one or two prototype
installations requires a far less rigorous approach than what is
needed when nationwide deployment is planned.  However, some of the
software the NOAA/NWS labs were developing was intended for
operational use in AWIPS and was essentially being handed off
directly from the labs to the contractor.  We therefore recommended
in 1994 that NWS and NOAA strengthen their processes for developing
production-quality software code. 

Now, with the 1995 and 1996 AWIPS development changes, significantly
more design and development responsibility has been transferred to
the government, in particular to NOAA's FSL.  In visiting FSL in
Boulder, Colorado, just last week, we found that--with the exception
of one subsystem that we specifically discussed in 1994--the question
of capability remained:  Lab quality assurance and configuration
management processes for production-level software were still
lacking.  However, NWS and NOAA officials said that they have heeded
our 1994 recommendations and are improving their processes in other
ways.  They said that, in order to preserve the labs' research and
development missions, they do not wish to impose any unnecessarily
rigorous software development procedures on the labs.  Instead, NOAA
management now plans to play a more active role in preparing the
government-furnished software for the contractor. 

According to NWS officials, they plan to improve the software
development processes for WFO-Advanced and other government-developed
software using NWS headquarters, NOAA Systems Acquisitions, and
contractor staff.  Specifically, NWS plans to (1) more fully document
the lab's design and software code, (2) design the integration of
government-furnished software and contractor-developed software, (3)
fully test all government software before it is turned over to the
contractor, and (4) strengthen quality assurance and configuration
management.  To help accomplish this, NWS has established several
specific contract task orders. 

NWS officials acknowledge that getting WFO-Advanced ready for the
contractor is a large task because it constitutes such a significant
portion of the AWIPS software.  In addition, officials said that
there is no room for schedule delays due to unforeseen problems. 
They feel confident, however, that they can meet this challenge
because of the steps I have just described, and because they have
experience in turning government software over to the contractor. 
For example, NWS' Office of Hydrology provided hydrometeorological
software to the contractor for the AWIPS "build 1," which was
successfully tested last summer.  In addition, NWS officials said
that they are applying to AWIPS lessons learned from their
configuration management experiences in the radar and observing
systems development projects. 

According to NWS and NOAA officials, one of the critical success
factors for the AWIPS development is preserving the knowledge
investment made in contractor staff; internally, however, such
resources have been dwindling, a problem exacerbated by downsizing. 
These officials noted that one result of this is that functions that
should be performed by government personnel have had to be contracted
outside the agency, such as configuration management. 

Mr.  Chairman, I have been discussing risks that we see in the
development process, primarily in ensuring that government-developed
software code is stable and reliable.  Right now they are just
that--risks.  But they are significant risks, ones that must be
managed lest they become actual problems.  NWS has put into place
appropriate plans and procedures to mitigate these risks.  This is an
important step.  Even more critical, however, is implementation.  For
this reason, these issues are more managerial than technical.  Risks
are inherent in every large systems development effort;
unfortunately, all too frequently they become reality.  Whether or
not this happens is often related to the quality of program
management.  Only by ensuring, through continual monitoring, that
risk-mitigation plans are effectively implemented can management hope
to prevent these risks from becoming real problems.  Development
plans usually include cost and schedule padding to help absorb the
effects of problems that arise.  AWIPS has not been safe from
development setbacks over the years; its cost has increased and its
schedule has lengthened.  Further, according to the program manager,
while the current $550 million estimated cost at completion is a
conservative one, there is no more cost or schedule padding
available. 

Given the magnitude of the task at hand--integrating software from
several separate entities into a complex meteorological system that
will enable forecasters to capitalize on the $4 billion worth of
improvements already made by NWS--and that the Department of Commerce
has committed to a $550-million funding cap, we believe it is
essential that top managers both at NOAA and Commerce understand and
acknowledge the importance of fully implementing their
risk-mitigation plans, and that should these risks turn into real
problems, more time and money will inevitably be required.  Managers
will need to deal with unexpected problems in an efficient, timely,
and cost-effective manner, while at the same time ensuring that NWS
operations--providing forecasts to the public and supporting the
systems in place for use by forecasters--are not adversely affected. 


--------------------
\1 Weather Forecasting:  Recommendations to Address New Weather
Processing Systems Development Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-74, May 13, 1996);
Weather Forecasting:  NWS Has Not Demonstrated that New Processing
System Will Improve Mission Effectiveness (GAO/AIMD-96-29, Feb.  29,
1996); Weather Forecasting:  New Processing System Faces
Uncertainties and Risks (GAO/T-AIMD-96-47, Feb.  29, 1996); Weather
Service Modernization:  Despite Progress, Significant Problems and
Risks Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-95-87, Feb.  21, 1995); and Weather
Forecasting:  Improvements Needed in Laboratory Software Development
Processes (GAO/AIMD-95-24, Dec.  14, 1994). 

\2 High-Risk Series:  Information Management and Technology
(GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997). 

\3 Software quality assurance refers to a program that independently
(1) monitors whether the software and the processes used to develop
it fully satisfy established standards and procedures, and (2)
ensures that any deficiencies in the software product, process, or
their associated standards are swiftly brought to management's
attention.  Software configuration management refers to a process by
which changes to software products are controlled.  It includes
identification of products to be controlled, accounting for changes
to these products, and reporting on the products' status. 


   GEOSTATIONARY OPERATIONAL
   ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE (GOES)
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Mr.  Chairman, you also asked that we discuss NOAA's acquisition
strategy for its Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite
(GOES) system.  This system is an integral part of weather
forecasting, as GOES satellites are uniquely positioned to observe
the development of severe weather--such as hurricanes and
thunderstorms--and provide information allowing forecasters to issue
accurate and timely warnings.  GOES satellites in the current series
will begin to reach the end of their useful lives about 2002;
consequently, NOAA is now in the process of planning the procurement
of replacements for these satellites, which will need to be procured
quickly to prevent a gap in coverage as the current series runs out. 
These satellites will be very similar to the current series. 

However, decisions concerning what type of satellite system to build
for the longer term are not simple.  Given that NOAA's budget is
expected to be constrained in the coming years, it is important that
plans for the next generation of satellites ensure that they will be
economical as well as effective.  As requested by this Subcommittee,
we recently completed a review assessing NOAA's planning for the GOES
system; our report is being released today, and copies are available
at this hearing.\4

In brief, we found NOAA's approach for the near term
reasonable--competitively procuring two to four spacecraft that will
carry the same meteorological instruments as the current series, with
modest technical improvements.  During our review, however, we noted
the difficulty NOAA has in predicting exactly when replacement
satellites will be needed, and how many should be bought.  To help
improve its planning process, we are recommending that NOAA clarify
its policies for replacing partially failed satellites and backing up
planned launches. 

As part of our review of the GOES program, we were asked to look at
whether opportunities exist for improving the system and reducing
long-term costs.  We believe that changing the GOES system design
offers a number of potential benefits.  A new design might better
meet the evolving needs of forecasters and improve performance as
well as reduce costs.  A number of new approaches and technologies
for geostationary meteorology have been suggested in recent years, by
government, academic, and industry experts; many include
technological options unavailable when the present generation of
satellites was designed. 

For example, new designs for the meteorological instruments that fly
on GOES could take advantage of advanced sensor technology, which
would allow them to collect data much more efficiently than do
current instruments.  Further, instead of using two large
multipurpose satellites, the GOES system could be made up of smaller
satellites focused on specific tasks.  While potential drawbacks to
this approach would need careful engineering assessment, the basic
concept could lead to a more robust and flexible satellite system
that better meets user needs at a lower cost. 

These and other options need careful engineering analysis before an
informed decision can be made about the future of the GOES program. 
Our greatest concern in this area is with NOAA's delay in conducting
this analysis and developing specific plans for the follow-up series. 
During our review, the agency was planning to begin its GOES
follow-up program in fiscal year 2000, and we questioned the decision
not to begin planning earlier.  Now, with the release of the
President's budget request for fiscal year 1998, the start date has
been delayed even further--the agency does not anticipate beginning a
follow-up program until 2003 at the earliest.  Given that it
generally takes 10 years to develop a new satellite design, deferring
the start of the program until 2003 likely means that NOAA will have
to continue to rely on the current, early-1980s design well into the
second decade of the next century. 

GOES program officials within NOAA have anticipated this problem and,
for several years, proposed funding to begin a planning process. 
However, NOAA and Commerce officials have repeatedly denied this
request in favor of other programs.  The danger NOAA faces--that a
gap in coverage could develop beginning in 2002--has arisen because
planning for the next-generation satellite series has been repeatedly
deferred since 1989. 

Mr.  Chairman, given that options may exist for NOAA to develop a
significantly improved follow-up GOES system, the Congress may wish
to closely examine the costs and benefits of different approaches for
the timing, funding, and scope of the follow-up program.  Further,
the Congress may also wish to examine the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's (NASA) potential role in working with NOAA to
support the needs of geostationary weather satellites within NASA's
advanced spacecraft technology programs. 

We recommend that the NOAA Administrator ensure that the National
Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS)
clarify certain of its GOES planning policies.  Further, we recommend
that the Administrator prepare a formal analysis of the costs and
benefits of several alternatives for the timing, funding, and scope
of the follow-up program.  This analysis should be provided to the
Congress for its use in considering options for the future of the
GOES program. 


--------------------
\4 Weather Satellites:  Planning for the Geostationary Satellite
Program Needs More Attention (GAO/AIMD-97-37, March 13, 1997). 


   NOAA COMMISSIONED CORPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

In a report issued last year, we addressed issues involving the NOAA
Commissioned Corps, focusing on the extent to which it meets
Department of Defense criteria for performing military functions and
receiving military pay and allowances.\5 In that report, we also
estimated potential government savings if Corps officers were
converted to civilian employment. 

The NOAA Corps is made up of officers who operate and manage NOAA's
research and survey ships.  These vessels collect data needed to
support fishery management plans, oceanographic and climate research,
and hydrographic surveys, which chart bodies of water.  Officers also
fly and manage aircraft used by NOAA to penetrate hurricanes for
research purposes and to carry out surveys for forecasting floods and
mapping changing U.S.  shorelines. 

We reported that generally, the NOAA Corps does not meet criteria for
receiving military compensation cited in a Defense report.\6 Further,
NOAA Corps officers are not subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which governs how military personnel are managed.  We
estimated that if Corps members were converted to civilian status,
the government would realize an annual net savings of some $660,000. 
This figure would decrease if the Corps were to become smaller than
it was during our review.  We understand that reductions may have in
fact occurred.  The actual savings also depends on a variety of
factors concerning how the transition would be made and the period of
time over which it would take place. 

Corps officers' entitlement to military rank and military-like
compensation--including retirement eligibility at any age after 20
years of service--was an outgrowth of their temporary assignments to
the armed forces during the first and second world wars.  The Corps
has not been incorporated into the armed services since World War II
and, according to Defense officials, war-mobilization plans envision
no role for them in the future. 

Corps officials cited the fact that their officers can be assigned
with little notice to any location and function where their services
are needed, often in hazardous conditions.  Yet some civilian
employees are often similarly called upon to respond quickly to
disasters and other emergencies, including those of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), National Transportation Safety Board, and
Federal Emergency Management Agency.  Further, both EPA and the Navy
use ships operated by civilians to conduct oceanic research.  NOAA
ships themselves have, on occasion, been operated by civilians --an
approach NOAA officials called successful. 

If a decision to convert Corps officers to civilian status were made,
a transition plan would need to consider, along with the time period
to accomplish the change, (1) retirement benefits/credits to be
allotted to officers who are converted to civilian capacity; (2)
resources needed for potential recruitment, training, and retention
of civilian employees who might replace Corps members choosing to
leave federal service; (3) what additional resources, if any, NOAA
would require to administer the civilian workforce; and other
specific operational elements. 


--------------------
\5 Federal Personnel:  Issues on the Need for NOAA's Commissioned
Corps (GAO/GGD-97-10, Oct.  31, 1996). 

\6 The Fifth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation, Department
of Defense, January 1984. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3.1

This concludes my statement, Mr.  Chairman.  I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other members of the Committee might
have at this time. 


============================================================ Chapter 1


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 2

Weather Satellites:  Planning for the Geostationary Satellite Program
Needs More Attention (GAO/AIMD-97-37, March 13, 1997). 

High-Risk Series:  Information Management and Technology
(GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997). 

Federal Personnel:  Issues on the Need for NOAA's Commissioned Corps
(GAO/GGD-97-10, Oct.  31, 1996). 

NOAA Satellites (GAO/AIMD-96-141R, Sept.  13, 1996). 

Weather Forecasting:  Recommendations to Address New Weather
Processing Systems Development Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-74, May 13, 1996). 

Weather Forecasting:  NWS Has Not Demonstrated that New Processing
System Will Improve Mission Effectiveness (GAO/AIMD-96-29, Feb.  29,
1996). 

Weather Forecasting:  New Processing System Faces Uncertainties and
Risks (GAO/T-AIMD-96-47, Feb.  29, 1996). 

Weather Forecasting:  Radars Far Superior to Predecessors, but
Location and Availability Questions Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-96-2, Oct. 
17, 1995). 

Weather Service Modernization Staffing (GAO/AIMD-95-239R, Sept.  26,
1995). 

Weather Forecasting:  Radar Availability Requirements Not Being Met
(GAO/AIMD-95-132, May 31, 1995). 

Weather Forecasting:  Unmet Needs and Unknown Costs Warrant
Reassessment of Observing System Plans (GAO/AIMD-95-81, April 21,
1995). 

Weather Service Modernization Questions (GAO/AIMD-95-106R, March 10,
1995). 

Weather Service Modernization:  Despite Progress, Significant
Problems and Risks Remain (GAO/T-AIMD-95-87, Feb.  21, 1995). 

Meteorological Satellites (GAO/NSIAD-95-87R, Feb.  6, 1995). 

Weather Forecasting:  Improvements Needed in Laboratory Software
Development Processes (GAO/AIMD-95-24, Dec.  14, 1994). 

Weather Forecasting:  Systems Architecture Needed for National
Weather Service Modernization (GAO/AIMD-94-28, March 11, 1994). 

Weather Forecasting:  Important Issues on Automated Weather
Processing System Need Resolution (GAO/IMTEC-93-12BR, Jan.  6, 1993). 

Weather Satellites:  Action Needed To Resolve Status of the U.S. 
Geostationary Satellite Program (GAO/NSIAD-91-252, July 24, 1991). 

Weather Satellites:  Cost Growth and Development Delays Jeopardize
U.S.  Forecasting Ability (GAO/NSIAD-89-169, June 30, 1989). 

*** End of document. ***