Budget Process: Comments on H.R. 853 (Testimony, 05/12/99,
GAO/T-AIMD-99-188).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO discussed the implications of
H.R. 853 on the congressional budget process, focusing on: (1) the
importance of the long-term perspective; (2) the long-term and insurance
commitments in the budget; and (3) how this relates to the need for
control, accountability, and transparency.

GAO noted that: (1) in the past GAO suggested four broad goals for a
budget process; (2) the process should: (a) provide information about
the long-term impact of decisions while recognizing the differences
between short-term forecasts, medium-term projections, and longer-term
simulations; (b) provide information and be structured to focus on
important macro trade-offs; (c) provide information necessary to make
informed trade-offs between missions and between the different tools of
government; and (d) be enforceable, provide for control and
accountability, and be transparent; (3) the approach taken in H.R. 853
has much to recommend it; (4) requiring reports on 75-year budgetary
trends for the budget as a whole can help provide the necessary
long-term context; (5) the inclusion in the budget of the Office of
Management and Budget's (OMB) reports and comparisons between the
President's policy proposals and current law will focus more attention
on the long term and on how the President would seek to address looming
problems; (6) having a Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report as well
will permit Congress and other observers to make comparisons with the
OMB law report, providing an independent view; (7) although for many
programs the Budget Enforcement Act's multiyear timeframe has
represented great progress, there are programs and activities where a
longer time horizon is necessary to understand the spending implications
of the government's commitment and how this commitment affects future
budgetary flexibility; (8) programs with an apparently shorter time
horizon than pension and health commitments could also benefit from a
longer term perspective; (9) federal insurance provided to individuals
and businesses against a wide variety of risks is a prime example of the
type of program that may carry long-term cost implications; (10) H.R.
853 requires estimates of the risk assumed by the government in these
programs be disclosed in the budget; (11) it sets fiscal year 2006 as a
date certain for moving to the comprehensive approach; (12) H.R. 853
also calls for OMB, CBO, and GAO to report on the advisability and
appropriate implementation of budgeting for the risk-assumed costs; (13)
if a joint resolution is enacted into law, it would specify subtotals of
new budget authority and outlays for nondefense and defense
discretionary spending, direct spending, emergencies, and other subsets
of spending deemed necessary; and (14) H.R. 853 contains fall-back
procedures for expediting a concurrent resolution if the President
vetoes the joint resolution.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-AIMD-99-188
     TITLE:  Budget Process: Comments on H.R. 853
      DATE:  05/12/99
   SUBJECT:  Budget administration
	     Proposed legislation
	     Presidential budgets
	     Future budget projections
	     Budgeting
	     Comparative analysis
	     Fiscal policies
	     Economic analysis

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AI99188t.book GAO United States General Accounting Office

Testimony Before the Committee on Rules, House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery Expected at 9: 30 a. m. Wednesday, May 12,
1999

BUDGET PROCESS Comments on H. R. 853 Statement of Susan J. Irving
Associate Director, Budget Issues Accounting and Information
Management Division

GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

  GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

Page 1 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: It is a pleasure to
return to talk with you again about the congressional budget
process-- and especially whether and how it should be changed to
meet the fiscal situation presented today. Attached to my
testimony today is a list of testimony statements we have issued
on the budget process over the past 5 years. In addition, I was
fortunate to participate in your September 1997 briefing on budget
enforcement procedures in the House of Representatives. 1

As we have discussed before, everyone involved in the budget
process shares some frustration with it. The public finds it
confusing. Executive branch agencies say it is burdensome and
time- consuming. Members of the Congress say it seems too lengthy
with too many votes on authorizations, budget resolutions,
reconciliation, appropriations, emergency supplementals, and the
debt limit.

In one sense, of course, nothing could be more important than
debates about the budget. Budgeting is the process by which we as
a nation resolve the large number of often conflicting objectives
that citizens seek to achieve through government action. The
budget determines the fiscal policy stance of the government--
that is, the relationship between spending and revenues. And it is
through the budget process that the Congress and the President
reach agreement about the areas in which the federal

government will be involved and in what way. Because the decisions
are so important, we expect a great deal from our budget and
budget process. We want the budget to be clear and understandable.
We want a process that presents the Congress and the American
people with a framework in which to understand the significant
choices and the information necessary to make the best informed
decisions about federal tax and spending policy. In addition to
these broad goals, the budget process has also been expected to
respond to the budget challenges of a particular time. The 1974
Budget

and Impoundment Control Act was designed to reassert the Congress'
role in setting overall federal fiscal policy and in establishing
spending 1 The Congressional Budget Process committee print,
September 26, 1997.

Page 2 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

priorities. The act sought not to achieve a particular outcome but
to impose a structure and a timetable on the budget debate. It was
neutral as to fiscal policy. It was not until the enactment of the
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (also known as
Gramm- Rudman- Hollings or GRH) in 1985 that the budget process
was designed to achieve a particular goal. Both GRH and the 1987
amendments to it sought to achieve a specific outcome: a balanced
budget by a time certain. However, GRH sought to

use a change in process to force agreement on substance-- and
measured against its stated objective of a balanced budget, it did
not succeed. The 1990 Budget Enforcement Act (BEA) took a
different tack toward the same end. While it also sought to
achieve a balanced budget, it used process to enforce a previously
reached agreement. It was designed to limit congressional actions
that would increase the deficit. On its own

terms BEA succeeded, but its ambition was limited. It did not seek
to control economic or demographic- driven growth in existing
entitlement programs-- and that is the area of greatest growth
today. Nevertheless, the combination of fiscal discipline and
economic growth led to the first balanced budget in nearly 30
years. Today, therefore, a different fiscal situation has emerged.
After nearly 30 years of unified budget deficits, current
projections are for surpluses as far as the eye can see. At

the same time, the country faces a demographic tidal wave that
will-- absent a change in policy-- overwhelm the budget.

This is a new set of challenges for the budget process: almost 30
years of projected surpluses followed by-- absent changes in
Social Security and Medicare-- a reappearance of large and growing
deficits. These circumstances present an opportune time to
reexamine the budget process.

Such an examination should be guided by a number of key
principles. General Criteria for a Budget Process

In the past we have suggested four broad goals or criteria for a
budget process. 2 The process should 2 Budget Process: Evolution
and Challenges (GAO/T-AIMD-96-129, July 11, 1996) and Budget
Process: History and Future Directions (GAO/T-AIMD-95-214, July
13, 1995).

Page 3 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

 provide information about the long- term impact of decisions
while recognizing the differences between short- term forecasts,
medium- term projections, and longer- term simulations;  provide
information and be structured to focus on important macro

trade- offs;  provide information necessary to make informed
trade- offs between

missions and between the different tools of government; and  be
enforceable, provide for control and accountability, and be

transparent. Each of these is important, and they are related--
but they cannot all be maximized in a single process. Trade- offs
are necessary. Today, in the context of H. R. 853, your staff
asked me to focus especially on the importance of the long- term
perspective, on increasing the understanding

and recognition of long- term commitments and insurance
commitments in the budget, and on how this relates to the need for
control, accountability, and transparency.

Long- Term Perspective and Commitment Recognition

A long- term perspective is important in the budget debate in both
a macro and a micro sense. By macro I mean the nation's economic
health. The nation's economic future depends in large part upon
today's budget and investment decisions. 3 Therefore, we believe
that at the macroeconomic level, the budget should provide a long-
term framework and should be

grounded on a linkage of fiscal policy with the long- term
economic outlook.

The micro aspect of this longer- term perspective relates to those
programs and activities where a longer time horizon is necessary
to understand the fiscal and spending implications of commitments
for specific purposes. Examples include retirement programs,
Medicare, and pension insurance- and even some discretionary
programs whose design implies continued funding. Although BEA's
multiyear focus represented significant progress in this regard,
planning for longer- range economic goals and looking at the costs
of some commitments requires looking much further ahead. For these
programs, even very rough projections may be better than ignoring
the long term.

3 Budget Issues: Long- Term Fiscal Outlook (GAO/ T- AIMD/ OCE- 98-
83, February 25, 1998).

Page 4 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

Since the bill before you deals with both of these aspects of the
long term, let me discuss each.

Long- Term Macro Perspective

Beginning in 1992, congressional leaders have requested that we
provide a long- term macro perspective by modeling the
implications of different fiscal policy paths for the nation's
economy over a long- term period, which has ranged from 50 to 75
years. We have periodically updated these simulations to account
for changes in the fiscal and economic environment. For the last 4
years the Congressional Budget Office (CBO)

has also produced long- term simulations and the President's
budget has included long- term simulations by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The CBO and GAO results have been
quite similar.

Looking at the simulations since 1992 tells the dual story of
today's fiscal challenge: (1) the outlook has improved greatly
from earlier simulations and (2) looking out over the longer term,
the current situation is not sustainable. In 1992, modeling a
continuation of the then- current fiscal and

budget policy resulted in a deficit exceeding 20 percent of gross
domestic product (GDP) by the year 2020. In contrast, today's
update shows the benefits of the difficult policy choices made by
the Congress and the President and of a healthy economy: in 2020,
the model indicates a surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP and does not
show a deficit reemerging until 2028. However, this improved
outlook does not mean that the fiscal challenges facing the
country have been met. In fact, the current situation is still not
sustainable over the long term. Our most recent model results
indicate that if current policy were continued, by 2063 federal
revenue will cover only

health care, Social Security, and interest spending. To continue
all other spending at current policy levels would require federal
borrowing and/ or revenue increases. As the Comptroller General
pointed out earlier this year, 4 absent any policy changes,
budgetary flexibility declines drastically over time and there is
increasingly less room for programs for national

defense, the youth, infrastructure, and law enforcement. This is
true even if we assume that the entire unified budget surplus is
saved and used to reduce debt (and thus interest) from current
levels.

We believe these simulations provide a useful perspective that is
often lacking in budget debates. They tell us that the surplus is
temporary. 4 See, for example, Social Security and Surpluses:
GAO's Perspective on the President's Proposals (GAO/ T- AIMD/
HEHS- 99- 95, February 23, 1999).

Page 5 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

Perhaps more important, they alert us to the fact that even if the
surplus is saved, we face an unsustainable outlook. These
simulations also provide a context within which to look at longer-
term projections for individual programs such as Social Security
and Medicare. Both of these programs use trust fund financing and
accounting. As a result, we get a picture of their financial
outlook by looking at the trust funds-- for example, we know that
under the current tax and benefit structure, Social Security's
annual cash receipts will fall short of annual cash outlays in
2014 and that the Social Security Trust Fund will be insolvent in
2034. The Trustees' report does look 75 years out. However, in
analyzing Social Security and considering alternative program
changes, it is a mistake to look only at the trust fund; it is
important to also recognize how Social Security fits into the
budget and the economy and to understand how it grows as a share
of both.

Although we consider these simulations-- and other long- term
projections -- to provide critically important context for budget
deliberations, we would also stress that they must be interpreted
carefully. Given the range of uncertainty about economic changes
and the response to these changes, these simulations cannot be
viewed as forecasts of budgetary or economic outcomes 50 years in
the future. Indeed, the dramatic improvement in the outlook over
the last 7 years shows how sensitive these results are to
unanticipated shifts in economic growth or to policy actions. The

simulations, therefore, should be seen as illustrative of
direction and magnitude given current information about
demographic and budgetary trends and the functioning of the
economy. In this spirit, the approach taken in H. R. 853 has much
to recommend it. Requiring reports on 75- year budgetary trends
for the budget as a whole can help provide the necessary long-
term context. Few of the

government's commitments are truly transient. For example,
embedded in numerous programs and policy decisions are long- term
relationships with states and in the international community that
have fundamental implications for the cost of government over
time. The inclusion in the

budget of OMB's reports and comparisons between the President's
policy proposals and current law will focus more attention on the
long term and on how the President would seek to address looming
problems. Having a CBO report as well will permit the Congress and
other observers to make comparisons with the OMB current law
report, providing an independent view. Although we do not make
budget projections or estimates, as long as

it is useful to the Congress we will continue our work on the long
term as well. Given the level of uncertainty involved in long-
term modeling-- and the need to be aware of how sensitive results
are to different assumptions

Page 6 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

about how the economy works-- it has proven useful to have several
different entities develop and maintain the ability to simulate
the long term. In the past, the few players in this arena have
collaborated and shared techniques, data, and analyses. This has
increased the confidence that can be placed in the direction and
magnitude of the results. I am sure this will continue, especially
if the requirements in H. R. 853 are enacted to ensure the
continued efforts of OMB and CBO.

Long- Term Focus at Micro Level Needed in Budget

The budget was not designed to and does not provide complete
information on long- term cost implications stemming from some of
the government's commitments when they are made. We have long
advocated that policymakers need information on the long- term
cost consequences of today's commitments. For programs as large as
Social Security and Medicare this is important both for macro
policy and for resource

allocation. However, it is also important to understand the long-
term implications of the commitments for those programs too small
to drive the long- term outlook. A budget is about the allocation
of scarce resources. Such decisions reflect a number of factors
including beliefs about the appropriate role of government in
various areas, judgment about the likely success of a program in
achieving certain goals, and the cost of a program. It is
important that Members of the Congress and the President-- and

citizens-- be able to compare program costs on a consistent basis.
A budget should be structured to permit informed programmatic
decisionmaking across a wide range of approaches-- for example,
insurance, credit, asset sales, capital, grants, and direct
service. This is less difficult if policymakers know what the cost
of a given decision will be. Although for

many programs BEA's multiyear time frame has represented great
progress, there are programs and activities where a longer time
horizon is necessary to understand the spending implications of
the government's commitment- and

this commitment affects future budgetary flexibility. H. R. 853's
requirement for reports on long- term budgetary trends should also
be helpful in this area. While long- term information on Social
Security and Medicare has been available in Trustees' reports--
and is often cited in the debate-- these are not the only programs
in which the government has made long- term commitments. Civilian,
military, and veterans' retirement benefits constitute another
large category of the federal government's commitments. While some
have been recognized in the budget, none of the

costs of civilian or military retiree health benefits are
recognized in the budget as they are earned. The same is true for
veterans' pensions and

Page 7 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

benefits. As the result of new accounting standards that require
its reporting, information on the long- term liabilities of these
other retirement and benefit programs is now being made available
in annual financial

statements. This information can supplement the information
included in the budget as decisionmakers consider the costs of
these programs. Programs with an apparently shorter time horizon
than pension and health commitments could also benefit from a
longer- term perspective. As I noted above, many government
programs and policies imply costs over a relatively long period of
time. For some of these-- e. g., pensions-- long- term

costs may be easy to calculate. For others, such as decisions
about the nation's role in the world or some intergovernmental
commitments, costs are more difficult the estimate. Unfortunately
for analysts, ease of calculation does not always correlate with
importance. Federal insurance provided to individuals and
businesses against a wide

variety of risks is a prime example of the type of program that
may carry long- term cost implications. In 1997, we reported that
the current cashbased budget generally provides incomplete and
misleading information on the cost and fiscal impact of federal
insurance programs. 5 The use of

accrual concepts, such as budgeting for the cost of the risk
assumed by the government as in H. R. 853, has the potential to
better inform budget choices. In our report, we supported
supplemental reporting of these cost estimates in the budget, as
required by H. R. 853. We believe this supplemental reporting will
allow time to validate estimation methodologies and increase the
users' comfort levels with accrual estimates before considering
whether to move to a more comprehensive approach of incorporating
the risk- assumed estimates into the budget numbers.

H. R. 853 requires that estimates of the risk assumed by the
government in these programs be disclosed in the budget. It also
sets fiscal year 2006 as a date certain for moving to the
comprehensive approach. We recognize that setting a date for
inclusion in budget numbers may well increase agencies' attention
to and efforts to develop good quality estimates. However, the

bill also sunsets this provision at the end of fiscal year 2007--
thereby including these numbers in the budget for only 2 years.
This seems 5 Budget Issues: Budgeting for Federal Insurance
Programs (GAO/AIMD-97-16, September 30, 1997). See also Budget
Issues: Budgeting for Federal Insurance Programs (GAO/T-AIMD-98-
147, April 23, 1998).

Page 8 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

problematic for two reasons. First, the knowledge that the numbers
would only be used in the budget for 2 years could reduce the
pressure to do the hard work necessary to develop good estimates.
Second, changing the basis of budget numbers for only 2 years is
likely to be both burdensome

and confusing. This is not to say that there should be no
reexamination of a change of this magnitude. Certainly it makes
sense after some number of years of experience for the Congress
and the President to consider progress under budgeting on a risk-
assumed basis and make a decision whether to continue or not.
However, our experience with credit reform-  which is easier than
estimating risk- assumed costs for insurance-- tells us that a 2-
year trial is too short for making such a judgment .

Whatever approach to implementation is finally decided upon, I
must stress that the calculation of the risk- assumed costs is
complex. Some programs will be better able to make the estimates
than others. H. R. 853 also calls for OMB, CBO, and GAO to report
on the advisability and appropriate implementation of budgeting
for the risk- assumed costs. These reports

should play a significant role in a final decision about when
these numbers are ready to be incorporated into the budget. Role
of Long- Term Perspective in Increasing Control, Accountability,
and Transparency

Incorporating a long- term perspective into the budget process
advances the goals of control, accountability, and transparency.
Transparency is a complex goal. At times it demands simplicity--
and I would be the first to admit that incorporating long- term
cost estimates is unlikely to simplify the budget process.
However, transparency can also mean no hidden costs or few
surprises. This aspect of transparency is advanced by

understanding and disclosing the long- term cost implications of
as much of the budget as is possible. The Congress, the President,
and the taxpayers have a right to the best information possible
about the cost of the future commitments that they are making.
These long- term cost estimates are also important for control and
accountability. The Congress and the President are best able to
control the cost of a program when it is created or modified. For
example, cash- based budgeting for insurance programs provides not
only incorrect, but also misleading, information about the
expected cost of these programs to the federal government. If
these costs were available-- even as rough estimates -- at the
time an insurance program was proposed, policymakers could
consider design elements that might reduce costs.

Page 9 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

Technical Comments on H. R. 853

Since BEA's limits on budget authority and outlays remain in
effect through 2002, care must be taken in designing the
relationship between BEA and any changes in the budget laws that
take effect before its expiration. For

example, H. R. 853 is clear in its repeal of the current
requirement to adjust the spending limits for emergencies. The
interaction between the existing spending limits on budget
authority and/ or outlays and any joint resolution on the budget
vetoed by the President is less clear. BEA contains a number of
different limits on budget authority and/ or outlays. For fiscal
years 2001and 2002, it contains budget authority and outlay limits
for discretionary programs and separate outlay limits for highway
and mass transit programs.

However, under H. R. 853, if a joint resolution is enacted into
law, it would specify subtotals of new budget authority and
outlays for nondefense and defense discretionary spending, direct
spending, emergencies, and other subsets of spending if deemed
necessary. If the President signs the joint resolution and it is
enacted, these subtotals would replace the current law's spending
limits. However, H. R. 853 contains fall- back procedures for
expediting a concurrent resolution if the President vetoes the
joint resolution. While this is a workable way for dealing with
the possibility of a presidential veto, failure to enact the joint
resolution on the budget means

that BEA's limits on discretionary, highway, and mass transit are
still in effect. This would lead to a situation in which the
concurrent resolution would contain subtotals for defense,
nondefense, and emergencies while the governing law contained
statutory limits on discretionary, highway, and mass transit
spending. It would appear that the concurrent resolution on

the budget's subtotals for defense, nondefense, and emergencies
would serve as a blueprint/ guide for congressional action on
spending, revenue, and debt without the force of law.

Technical Issues in Approach to Insurance Budgeting: I have
previously discussed insurance budgeting and our support for
having the Congress encourage the development and reporting of
annual risk- assumed cost estimates with the idea of moving toward
a comprehensive accrual- based budgeting approach when feasible.
H. R. 853 definitely moves in that direction. I do have two
technical concerns. The first is related to the budget accounting
for administrative costs described in the bill. Although the bill
is somewhat unclear on some issues, it appears that the goal is to
make the administrative costs a part of the risk- assumed cost, a
feature

that has been considered as desirable. The bill specifies that all
funding for administrative expenses will be displayed in the
program account and

Page 10 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

that the financing account will transfer to the program account
the amounts necessary to pay the administrative costs. The
financing account is the nonbudgetary account that accounts for
all cash flows related to the

insurance program, including premiums. The bill specifies that in
calculating the risk- assumed cost of insurance, administrative
expenses are to be subtracted from premiums. Presumably, although
the bill is not clear on this point, this is the financing source
that the financing account will use to pay the administrative
expenses to the program account. I would be happy to work with
your staff to clarify how administrative costs are to be financed.

The second technical concern relates to the financing of
reestimates. The bill specifies that the amount of the reestimate
shall be paid from the program account to the financing account.
It is silent as to whether the program account receives a
permanent appropriation for the reestimate or whether some other
financing source is envisioned. As you know, in credit reform a
permanent appropriation was provided for reestimates, but some

have raised the issue that this does not provide agencies an
incentive to make good initial estimates. Again, I will be happy
to discuss this issue in greater depth with your staff.

GAO Report Requirement: Finally, I note that the bill would
require that we study, at least every 5 years, the provisions of
law that provide mandatory spending, and recommend the appropriate
form of financing for activities or programs financed by such
provisions of law. Current law requires this study but leaves the
timing open-- it must be revised from time to time. We have issued
reports under this requirement three times since mid- 1987 and
have found that it requires so significant a commitment of time
and staff that it constrains our ability to do other work.
Therefore, I would like to talk with your staff about how to
provide the information in which you are interested promptly and
efficiently. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be
happy to answer any questions that you or the Members of the
Committee may have.

Page 11 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

Page 12 GAO/T-AIMD-99-188

Related GAO Testimonies Budget Issues: Budgeting for Federal
Insurance Programs (GAO/T-AIMD-98-147, April 23, 1998).

Budget Issues: Long- Term Fiscal Outlook (GAO/ T- AIMD/ OCE- 98-
83, February 25, 1998).

Budget Process: Evolution and Challenges (GAO/T-AIMD-96-129, July
11, 1996).

Budget Process: History and Future Directions (GAO/T-AIMD-95-214,
July 13, 1995).

Budget Process: Biennial Budgeting for the Federal Government
(GAO/T-AIMD-94-112, April 28, 1994).

Budget Process: Some Reforms Offer Promise (GAO/T-AIMD-94-86,
March 2, 1994).

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