Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and Partnerships Needed to
Address Risk of Major Disruptions (Testimony, 08/17/98,
GAO/T-AIMD-98-266).

GAO discussed the year 2000 risks facing the nation, focusing on: (1)
GAO's major concerns with the federal government's progress in
correcting its systems; (2) state and local government year 2000 issues;
and (3) critical year 2000 data exchange issues.

GAO noted that: (1) the public faces a high risk that critical services
provided by the government and the private sector could be severely
disrupted by the year 2000 computing crisis; (2) the year 2000 could
cause problems for the many facilities used by the federal government
that were built or renovated within the last 20 years and contain
embedded computer systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations;
(3) overall, the government's 24 major departments and agencies are
making slow progress in fixing their systems; (4) in May 1997, the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about 21 percent of
the mission-critical systems for these departments and agencies were
year 2000 compliant; (5) in May 1998, these departments reported that 40
percent of the mission-critical systems were year 2000 compliant; (6)
unless progress improves dramatically, a substantial number of
mission-critical systems will not be compliant in time; (7) in addition
to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, GAO's reviews of
federal agency year 2000 programs have found uneven progress; (8) some
agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at high risk that
they will not fix their systems in time; (9) other agencies have made
progress, although risks continue and a great deal of work remains; (10)
governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet been
established; (11) these governmentwide priorities need to be based on
such criteria as the potential for adverse health and safety effects on
American citizens, detrimental effects on national security, and adverse
economic consequences; (12) business continuity and contingency planning
across the government has been inadequate; (13) in their May 1998
quarterly reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had
drafted contingency plans for their core business processes; (14) OMB's
assessment of the current status of federal year 2000 progress is
predominantly based on agency reports that have not been consistently
reviewed or verified; (15) GAO found cases in which agencies' systems
compliance status as reported to OMB had been inaccurate; (16)
end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been defined; (17)
state and local governments also face a major risk of year 2000-induced
failures to the many vital services that they provide; (18) recent
surveys of state year 2000 efforts have indicated that much remains to
be completed; and (19) at the time of GAO's review, much work remained
to ensure that federal and state data exchanges will be year 2000
compliant.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-AIMD-98-266
     TITLE:  Year 2000 Computing Crisis: Strong Leadership and 
             Partnerships Needed to Address Risk of Major Disruptions
      DATE:  08/17/98
   SUBJECT:  Computer software verification and validation
             Computer software
             Data integrity
             Information resources management
             Strategic information systems planning
             Systems conversions
             Embedded computer systems
             Systems compatibility
             Federal/state relations
IDENTIFIER:  Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants, and 
             Children
             WIC
             FAA Year 2000 Program
             OMB Year 2000 Program
             SSA Year 2000 Program
             Food Stamp Program
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and
Technology, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery
Expected at
2 p.m.
Monday,
August 17, 1998

YEAR 2000 COMPUTING CRISIS -
STRONG LEADERSHIP AND PARTNERSHIPS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS RISK OF MAJOR
DISRUPTIONS

Statement of Joel C.  Willemssen
Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems
Accounting and Information Management Division

GAO/T-AIMD-98-266

GAO/AIMD-98-266t


(511473)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DFAS -
  DLA -
  DOD -
  FAA -
  IRS -
  LSSC -
  NRC -
  OMB -
  SEC -
  SSA -
  SSG -
  USDA -
  VBA -
  Y2K -

============================================================ Chapter 0

Mr.  Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for inviting us to participate in today's hearing on the
Year 2000 problem.  According to the report of the President's
Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection, the United
States--with close to half of all computer capacity and 60 percent of
Internet assets--is the world's most advanced and most dependent user
of information technology.\1 Should these systems--which perform
functions and services critical to our nation--suffer disruption, it
could create a widespread crisis.  Accordingly, the upcoming change
of century is a sweeping and urgent challenge for public- and
private-sector organizations alike. 

Because of its urgent nature and the potentially devastating impact
it could have on critical government operations, in February 1997 we
designated the Year 2000 problem as a high-risk area for the federal
government.\2 Since that time, we have issued over 50 reports and
testimony statements detailing specific findings and recommendations
related to the Year 2000 readiness of a wide range of federal
agencies.\3 We have also issued guidance to help organizations
successfully address the issue.\4

Today, I will briefly discuss the Year 2000 risks facing the nation,
highlight our major concerns with the federal government's progress
in correcting its systems, identify state and local government Year
2000 issues, and discuss critical Year 2000 data exchange issues. 


--------------------
\1 Critical Foundations:  Protecting America's Infrastructures
(President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection,
October 1997). 

\2 High-Risk Series:  Information Management and Technology
(GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997). 

\3 A list of these publications is included as an attachment to this
statement. 

\4 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  An Assessment Guide
(GAO/AIMD-10.1.14, September 1997), which addresses the key tasks
needed to complete each phase of a Year 2000 program (awareness,
assessment, renovation, validation, and implementation); Year 2000
Computing Crisis:  Business Continuity and Contingency Planning
(GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, August 1998), which describes the tasks needed to
ensure the continuity of agency operations; and Year 2000 Computing
Crisis:  A Testing Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.21, Exposure Draft, June
1998), which discusses the need to plan and conduct Year 2000 tests
in a structured and disciplined fashion. 


   RISK OF YEAR 2000 DISRUPTION TO
   THE PUBLIC IS HIGH
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The public faces a high risk that critical services provided by the
government and the private sector could be severely disrupted by the
Year 2000 computing crisis.  Financial transactions could be delayed,
flights grounded, power lost, and national defense affected. 
Moreover, America's infrastructures are a complex array of public and
private enterprises with many interdependencies at all levels.  These
many interdependencies among governments and within key economic
sectors could cause a single failure to have adverse repercussions. 
Key economic sectors that could be seriously affected if their
systems are not Year 2000 compliant include information and
telecommunications; banking and finance; health, safety, and
emergency services; transportation; power and water; and
manufacturing and small business. 

The information and telecommunications sector is especially
important.  In testimony in June, we reported that the Year 2000
readiness of the telecommunications sector is one of the most crucial
concerns to our nation because telecommunications are critical to the
operations of nearly every public-sector and private-sector
organization.\5 For example, the information and telecommunications
sector (1) enables the electronic transfer of funds, the distribution
of electrical power, and the control of gas and oil pipeline systems,
(2) is essential to the service economy, manufacturing, and efficient
delivery of raw materials and finished goods, and (3) is basic to
responsive emergency services.  Reliable telecommunications services
are made possible by a complex web of highly interconnected networks
supported by national and local carriers and service providers,
equipment manufacturers and suppliers, and customers. 

In addition to the risks associated with the nation's key economic
sectors, one of the largest, and largely unknown, risks relates to
the global nature of the problem.  With the advent of electronic
communication and international commerce, the United States and the
rest of the world have become critically dependent on computers. 
However, there are indications of Year 2000 readiness problems in the
international arena.  For example, in a June 1998 informal World Bank
survey of foreign readiness, only 18 of 127 countries (14 percent)
had a national Year 2000 program, 28 countries (22 percent) reported
working on the problem, and 16 countries (13 percent) reported only
awareness of the problem.  No conclusive data were received from the
remaining 65 countries surveyed (51 percent). 

The following are examples of some of the major disruptions the
public and private sectors could experience if the Year 2000 problem
is not corrected. 

  -- Unless the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) takes much more
     decisive action, there could be grounded or delayed flights,
     degraded safety, customer inconvenience, and increased airline
     costs.\6

  -- Aircraft and other military equipment could be grounded because
     the computer systems used to schedule maintenance and track
     supplies may not work.  Further, the Department of Defense (DOD)
     could incur shortages of vital items needed to sustain military
     operations and readiness.\7

  -- Medical devices and scientific laboratory equipment may
     experience problems beginning January 1, 2000, if the computer
     systems, software applications, or embedded chips used in these
     devices contain two-digit fields for year representation. 

  -- According to the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision--an
     international committee of banking supervisory
     authorities--failure to address the Year 2000 issue would cause
     banking institutions to experience operational problems or even
     bankruptcy. 

Recognizing the seriousness of the Year 2000 problem, on February 4,
1998, the President signed an executive order that established the
President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion led by an Assistant to
the President and composed of one representative from each of the
executive departments and from other federal agencies as may be
determined by the Chair.  The Chair of the Council was tasked with
the following Year 2000 roles:  (1) overseeing the activities of
agencies, (2) acting as chief spokesperson in national and
international forums, (3) providing policy coordination of executive
branch activities with state, local, and tribal governments, and (4)
promoting appropriate federal roles with respect to private-sector
activities. 


--------------------
\5 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Telecommunications Readiness
Critical, Yet Overall Status Largely Unknown (GAO/T-AIMD-98-212, June
16, 1998). 

\6 FAA Systems:  Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year 2000 and
Computer Security Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, August 6, 1998). 

\7 Defense Computers:  Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD
Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, April 30, 1998). 


   MUCH WORK REMAINS TO CORRECT
   THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S YEAR
   2000 PROBLEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Addressing the Year 2000 problem in time will be a tremendous
challenge for the federal government.  Many of the federal
government's computer systems were originally designed and developed
20 to 25 years ago, are poorly documented, and use a wide variety of
computer languages, many of which are obsolete.  Some applications
include thousands, tens of thousands, or even millions of lines of
code, each of which must be examined for date-format problems. 

The federal government also depends on the telecommunications
infrastructure to deliver a wide range of services.  For example, the
route of an electronic Medicare payment may traverse several
networks--those operated by the Department of Health and Human
Services, the Department of the Treasury's computer systems and
networks, and the Federal Reserve's Fedwire electronic funds transfer
system.  In addition, the year 2000 could cause problems for the many
facilities used by the federal government that were built or
renovated within the last 20 years and contain embedded computer
systems to control, monitor, or assist in operations.  For example,
building security systems, elevators, and air conditioning and
heating equipment could malfunction or cease to operate. 

Agencies cannot afford to neglect any of these issues.  If they do,
the impact of Year 2000 failures could be widespread, costly, and
potentially disruptive to vital government operations worldwide. 
Nevertheless, overall, the government's 24 major departments and
agencies are making slow progress in fixing their systems.  In May
1997, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reported that about
21 percent of the mission-critical systems (1,598 of 7,649) for these
departments and agencies were Year 2000 compliant.\8

A year later, in May 1998, these departments and agencies reported
that 2,914 of the 7,336 mission-critical systems in their current
inventories, or about 40 percent, were compliant.  Unless progress
improves dramatically, a substantial number of mission-critical
systems will not be compliant in time. 

In addition to slow governmentwide progress in fixing systems, our
reviews of federal agency Year 2000 programs have found uneven
progress.  Some agencies are significantly behind schedule and are at
high risk that they will not fix their systems in time.  Other
agencies have made progress, although risks continue and a great deal
of work remains.  The following are examples of the results of some
of our recent reviews. 

  -- Earlier this month, we testified\9 about FAA's progress in
     implementing a series of recommendations we had made earlier
     this year to assist FAA in completing overdue awareness and
     assessment activities.\10 These recommendations included
     assessing how the major FAA components and the aviation industry
     would be affected if Year 2000 problems were not corrected in
     time and completing inventories of all information systems,
     including data interfaces.  Officials at both FAA and the
     Department of Transportation agreed with these recommendations,
     and the agency has made progress in implementing them.  In our
     August testimony, we reported\11 that FAA had made progress in
     managing its Year 2000 problem and had completed critical steps
     in defining which systems needed to be corrected and how to
     accomplish this.  However, with less than 17 months to go, FAA
     must still correct, test, and implement many of its
     mission-critical systems.  It is doubtful that FAA can
     adequately do all of this in the time remaining.  Accordingly,
     FAA must determine how to ensure continuity of critical
     operations in the likely event of some systems' failures. 

  -- In October 1997, we reported that while SSA had made significant
     progress in assessing and renovating mission-critical mainframe
     software, certain areas of risk in its Year 2000 program
     remained.\12 Accordingly, we made several recommendations to
     address these risk areas, which included the Year 2000
     compliance of the systems used by the 54 state Disability
     Determination Services\13 that help administer the disability
     programs.  SSA agreed with these recommendations and, in July
     1998, we reported that actions to implement these
     recommendations had either been taken or were underway.\14
     Further, we found that SSA has maintained its place as a federal
     leader in addressing Year 2000 issues and has made significant
     progress in achieving systems compliance.  However, essential
     tasks remain.  For example, many of the states' Disability
     Determination Service systems still had to be renovated, tested,
     and deemed Year 2000 compliant. 

  -- Our work has shown that much likewise remains to be done in DOD
     and the military services.\15 For example, our recent report on
     the Navy found that while positive actions have been taken,
     remediation progress had been slow and the Navy was behind
     schedule in completing the early phases of its Year 2000
     program.\16 Further, the Navy had not been effectively
     overseeing and managing its Year 2000 efforts and lacked
     complete and reliable information on its systems and on the
     status and cost of its remediation activities.  We have
     recommended improvements to DOD's and the military services'
     Year 2000 programs with which they have concurred. 

In addition to these examples, our reviews have shown that many
agencies had not adequately acted to establish priorities, solidify
data exchange agreements, or develop contingency plans.  Likewise,
more attention needs to be devoted to (1) ensuring that the
government has a complete and accurate picture of Year 2000 progress,
(2) setting governmentwide priorities, (3) ensuring that the
government's critical core business processes are adequately tested,
(4) recruiting and retaining information technology personnel with
the appropriate skills for Year 2000-related work, and (5) assessing
the nation's Year 2000 risks, including those posed by key economic
sectors.  I would like to highlight some of these vulnerabilities,
and our recommendations made in April 1998 for addressing them.\17

  -- First, governmentwide priorities in fixing systems have not yet
     been established.  These governmentwide priorities need to be
     based on such criteria as the potential for adverse health and
     safety effects, adverse financial effects on American citizens,
     detrimental effects on national security, and adverse economic
     consequences.  Further, while individual agencies have been
     identifying mission-critical systems, this has not always been
     done on the basis of a determination of the agency's most
     critical operations.  If priorities are not clearly set, the
     government may well end up wasting limited time and resources in
     fixing systems that have little bearing on the most vital
     government operations.  Other entities have recognized the need
     to set priorities.  For example, Canada has established 48
     national priorities covering areas such as national defense,
     food production, safety, and income security. 

  -- Second, business continuity and contingency planning across the
     government has been inadequate.  In their May 1998 quarterly
     reports to OMB, only four agencies reported that they had
     drafted contingency plans for their core business processes. 
     Without such plans, when unpredicted failures occur, agencies
     will not have well-defined responses and may not have enough
     time to develop and test alternatives.  Federal agencies depend
     on data provided by their business partners as well as services
     provided by the public infrastructure (e.g., power, water,
     transportation, and voice and data telecommunications).  One
     weak link anywhere in the chain of critical dependencies can
     cause major disruptions to business operations.  Given these
     interdependencies, it is imperative that contingency plans be
     developed for all critical core business processes and
     supporting systems, regardless of whether these systems are
     owned by the agency.  Our recently issued guidance aims to help
     agencies ensure such continuity of operations through
     contingency planning.\18

  -- Third, OMB's assessment of the current status of federal Year
     2000 progress is predominantly based on agency reports that have
     not been consistently reviewed or verified.  Without independent
     reviews, OMB and the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion
     have little assurance that they are receiving accurate
     information.  In fact, we have found cases in which agencies'
     systems compliance status as reported to OMB has been
     inaccurate.  For example, the DOD Inspector General estimated
     that almost three quarters of DOD's mission-critical systems
     reported as compliant in November 1997 had not been certified as
     compliant by DOD components.\19 In May 1998, the Department of
     Agriculture reported (USDA) 15 systems as compliant, even though
     these were replacement systems that were still under development
     or were planned for development.\20 (The department plans to
     remove these systems from compliant status in its next quarterly
     report.)

  -- Fourth, end-to-end testing responsibilities have not yet been
     defined.  To ensure that their mission-critical systems can
     reliably exchange data with other systems and that they are
     protected from errors that can be introduced by external
     systems, agencies must perform end-to-end testing for their
     critical core business processes.  The purpose of end-to-end
     testing is to verify that a defined set of interrelated systems,
     which collectively support an organizational core business area
     or function, will work as intended in an operational
     environment.  In the case of the year 2000, many systems in the
     end-to-end chain will have been modified or replaced.  As a
     result, the scope and complexity of testing--and its
     importance--is dramatically increased, as is the difficulty of
     isolating, identifying, and correcting problems.  Consequently,
     agencies must work early and continually with their data
     exchange partners to plan and execute effective end-to-end
     tests.  So far, lead agencies have not been designated to take
     responsibility for ensuring that end-to-end testing of processes
     and supporting systems is performed across boundaries, and that
     independent verification and validation of such testing is
     ensured.  We have set forth a structured approach to testing in
     our recently released exposure draft.\21

In our April 1998 report on governmentwide Year 2000 progress, we
made a number of recommendations to the Chair of the President's
Council on Year 2000 Conversion aimed at addressing these problems. 
These included

  -- establishing governmentwide priorities and ensuring that
     agencies set agencywide priorities,

  -- developing a comprehensive picture of the nation's Year 2000
     readiness,

  -- requiring agencies to develop contingency plans for all critical
     core business processes,

  -- requiring agencies to develop an independent verification
     strategy to involve inspectors general or other independent
     organizations in reviewing Year 2000 progress, and

  -- designating lead agencies responsible for ensuring that
     end-to-end operational testing of processes and supporting
     systems is performed. 

We are encouraged by actions the Council is taking in response to
some of our recommendations.  For example, OMB and the Chief
Information Officers Council adopted our guide providing information
on business continuity and contingency planning issues common to most
large enterprises as a model for federal agencies.\22 However, as we
recently testified before this Subcommittee, some actions have not
been initiated--principally with respect to setting national
priorities and end-to-end testing.\23


--------------------
\8 The Social Security Administration's (SSA) mission-critical
systems were not included in these totals because SSA did not report
in May 1997 on a system basis.  Rather, SSA reported at that time,
and again in August 1997, on portions of systems that were compliant. 
For example, SSA reported on the status of 20,000-plus modules rather
than 200-plus systems. 

\9 GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, August 6, 1998. 

\10 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  FAA Must Act Quickly to Prevent
Systems Failures (GAO/T-AIMD-98-63, February 4, 1998) and FAA
Computer Systems:  Limited Progress on Year 2000 Issue Increases Risk
Dramatically (GAO/AIMD-98-45, January 30, 1998). 

\11 GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, August 6, 1998. 

\12 Social Security Administration:  Significant Progress Made in
Year 2000 Effort, But Key Risks Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-6, October 22,
1997). 

\13 These include the systems in all 50 states, the District of
Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 

\14 Social Security Administration:  Subcommittee Questions
Concerning Information Technology Challenges Facing the Commissioner
(GAO/AIMD-98-235R, July 10, 1998). 

\15 Defense Computers:  Year 2000 Computer Problems Put Navy
Operations At Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-150, June 30, 1998), Defense
Computers:  Army Needs to Greatly Strengthen Its Year 2000 Program
(GAO/AIMD-98-53, May 29, 1998), GAO/AIMD-98-72, April 30, 1998, and
Defense Computers:  Air Force Needs to Strengthen Year 2000 Oversight
(GAO/AIMD-98-35, January 16, 1998). 

\16 GAO/AIMD-98-150, June 30, 1998. 

\17 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Potential for Widespread Disruption
Calls for Strong Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April
30, 1998). 

\18 GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, August 1998. 

\19 Year 2000 Certification of Mission-Critical DOD Information
Technology Systems (DOD Office of the Inspector General, Report No. 
98-147, June 5, 1998). 

\20 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  USDA Faces Tremendous Challenges in
Ensuring That Vital Public Services Are Not Disrupted
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-167, May 14, 1998). 

\21 GAO/AIMD-10.1.21, Exposure Draft, June 1998. 

\22 GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, August 1998. 

\23 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Actions Must Be Taken Now to Address
Slow Pace of Federal Progress (GAO/T-AIMD-98-205, June 10, 1998). 


   STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
   FACE SIGNIFICANT YEAR 2000
   RISKS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

State and local governments also face a major risk of Year
2000-induced failures to the many vital services--such as benefits
payments, transportation, and public safety--that they provide.  For
example,

  -- food stamps and other types of payments may not be made or could
     be made for an incorrect amount,

  -- date-dependent signal timing patterns could be incorrectly
     implemented at highway intersections, and safety severely
     compromised, if traffic signal systems run by state and local
     governments do not process four-digit years correctly, and

  -- criminal records (i.e., prisoner release or parole eligibility
     determinations) may be adversely affected by the Year 2000
     problem. 

Recent surveys of state Year 2000 efforts have indicated that much
remains to be completed.  For example, a July 1998 survey of state
Year 2000 readiness conducted by the National Association of State
Information Resource Executives, Inc., found that only about
one-third of the states reported that 50 percent or more of their
critical systems\24

had been completely assessed, remediated, and tested. 

In a June 1998 survey conducted by USDA's Food and Nutrition Service,
only 3 and 14 states,\25 respectively, reported that the software,
hardware, and telecommunications that support the Food Stamp Program,
and the Women, Infants, and Children program, were Year 2000
compliant.  Although all but one of the states reported that they
would be Year 2000 compliant by January 1, 2000, many of the states
reported that their systems are not due to be compliant until after
March 1999 (the federal government's Year 2000 implementation goal). 
Indeed, 4 and 5 states, respectively, reported that the software,
hardware, and telecommunications supporting the Food Stamp Program,
and the Women, Infants, and Children program would not be Year 2000
compliant until the last quarter of calendar year 1999, which puts
them at high risk of failure due to the need for extensive testing. 

To effectively manage their Year 2000 projects and mitigate their
Year 2000 risks, state and local governments must perform the same
types of activities as the federal government.  Such activities would
include priority setting, progress reporting, and contingency
planning.  For example, according to the Texas Year 2000 Project
Office's Internet World Wide Web site, the project office has set up
a mechanism for state agencies and universities to use to report on
their progress and actively monitors the progress of the state's
highest priority agencies (those that affect public health and safety
and the economic well-being of the State of Texas). 

In May 1998, the Texas project office stated that it was "cautiously
optimistic that most Mission Critical functions will not be disrupted
by the Year 2000 problem." However, the project office added that
"this does not mean that agencies and universities will complete
their projects on time and on budget." The project office reported\26
that 3 priority agencies were "on target,"\27 12 priority agencies
were in the "watch" category,\28 and 4 priority agencies "at
risk."\29

The Texas Year 2000 Project Office has also issued a business
contingency planning guide to its agencies and universities, and
directed that agencies and universities meet certain milestones
related to business contingency planning.  For example, by the end of
this month, agencies and universities are to begin the contingency
planning process and develop Year 2000 contingency planning
assessments that would identify areas that may be at risk.  In
addition, by January 31, 1999, agencies and universities are to
develop detailed business contingency plans. 

Texas' Office of the State Auditor recently reported\30 on the
state's efforts to remediate its embedded systems,\31 which, if not
corrected, could disrupt critical state services.  The State Auditor
found that many state entities had not finished their embedded
systems inventories and, therefore, it is not likely that they will
complete their embedded systems repairs before the year 2000.  In
addition, the report noted that (1) many entities lacked contingency
plans in case their embedded systems fail, (2) several entities cited
a lack of funds as a barrier to embedded systems repair efforts, and
(3) no entity is responsible for coordinating and reporting on
statewide embedded systems repair efforts.  To address these
concerns, the Office of the State Auditor also made recommendations,
such as the Texas Year 2000 Project Office including embedded systems
in its Year 2000 contingency plan requirements. 

Audits of other states by their audit organizations have identified
other significant Year 2000 concerns.  For example, (1) Illinois'
Office of the Auditor General reported that significant future
efforts were needed to ensure that the year 2000 would not adversely
affect state government operations,\32 (2) Vermont's Office of
Auditor of Accounts reported that the state faces the risk that
critical portions of its Year 2000 compliance efforts could fail,\33
and (3) Florida's Auditor General has issued several reports
detailing the need for additional Year 2000 planning at various
district school boards and community colleges.\34

State audit offices have also made recommendations, including the
need for increased oversight, Year 2000 project plans, contingency
plans, and personnel recruitment and retention strategies. 


--------------------
\24 Critical systems were defined as "systems that effect public
safety, public health, and financial and personnel aspects of
government services."

\25 The Food and Nutrition Service included the District of Columbia,
Guam, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands in its survey.  The Food
and Nutrition Service did not verify the information provided by the
states. 

\26 Based on March 1998 data. 

\27 According to the Texas Year 2000 Project Office, "on target"
means that the project office has confidence that Year 2000
remediation is complete or on schedule for completion well before
problems would occur or that adequate planning is in place to ensure
that the state will not be affected by any failures. 

\28 According to the Texas Year 2000 Project Office, "watch" means
that Year 2000 remediation was not complete and the schedule for
remediation is not robust or that certain risks must be managed
successfully in order to complete the project on time.  Agencies or
universities may also be classified in the "watch" category because
of the importance of their Year 2000 projects to the overall
operation of Texas' state government. 

\29 According to the Texas Year 2000 Project Office, the "at risk"
agencies are similar to the "watch" agencies but are a greater risk
to manage and, because of their special importance to the people of
Texas, the consequences of failure are especially acute. 

\30 A Review of Oversight for the State's Embedded Systems Year 2000
Repair Efforts (SAO Report No.  98-056, August 10, 1998). 

\31 Embedded systems are special-purpose computers built into other
devices.  They are used in, for example, security systems, prison
control units, and certain medical equipment. 

\32 Bureau of Communications and Computer Services Third Party Review
(July 1, 1998). 

\33 State Auditor's Report On Vermont's Year 2000 Preparedness For
The Period Ending April 1, 1998 (May 5, 1998). 

\34 Examples of these reports include, Report on Audit of the Alachua
County District School Board For The Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 1997
(Report No.  13219, April 21, 1998) and Operational Audit of the
District Board of Trustees Broward Community College For The Period
July 1, 1996 through June 30, 1997 (Report No.  13222, April 30,
1998).  The Year 2000 work for these reports was performed in early
1998. 


   FEDERAL/STATE DATA EXCHANGES
   CRITICAL TO DELIVERY OF
   SERVICES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4

To fully address the Year 2000 risks that states and the federal
government face, data exchanges must also be confronted--a monumental
issue.  As computers play an ever-increasing role in our society,
exchanging data electronically has become a common method of
transferring information among federal, state, and local governments. 
For example, SSA exchanges data files with the states to determine
the eligibility of disabled persons for disability benefits.  In
another example, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
provides states with information needed for driver registrations.  As
computer systems are converted to process Year 2000 dates, the
associated data exchanges must also be made Year 2000 compliant.  If
the data exchanges are not Year 2000 compliant, data will not be
exchanged or invalid data could cause the receiving computer systems
to malfunction or produce inaccurate computations. 

Our recent report\35 on actions that have been taken to address Year
2000 issues for electronic data exchanges\36 revealed that federal
agencies and the states use thousands of such exchanges to
communicate with each other and other entities.  For example, federal
agencies reported that their mission-critical systems have almost
500,000 data exchanges with other federal agencies, states, local
governments, and the private sector. 

To successfully remediate their data exchanges, federal agencies and
the states must (1) assess information systems to identify data
exchanges that are not Year 2000 compliant, (2) contact exchange
partners and reach agreement on the date format to be used in the
exchange, (3) determine if data bridges and filters are needed and,
if so, reach agreement on their development, (4) develop and test
such bridges and filters,\37 (5) test and implement new exchange
formats, and (6) develop contingency plans and procedures for data
exchanges. 

At the time of our review, much work remained to ensure that federal
and state data exchanges will be Year 2000 compliant.  About half of
the federal agencies reported during the first quarter of 1998 that
they had not yet finished assessing their data exchanges.  Moreover,
almost half of the federal agencies reported that they had reached
agreements on 10 percent or fewer of their exchanges,\38 few federal
agencies reported having installed bridges or filters, and only 38
percent of the agencies reported that they had developed contingency
plans for data exchanges. 

Further, the status of the data exchange efforts of 15 of the 39
state-level organizations that responded to our survey was not
discernable because they were not able to provide us with information
on their total number of exchanges and the number assessed.  Of the
24 state-level organizations that provided actual or estimated data,
they reported, on average, that 47 percent of the exchanges had not
been assessed.  In addition, similar to the federal agencies,
state-level organizations reported having made limited progress in
reaching agreements with exchange partners, installing bridges and
filters, and developing contingency plans.  However, we could draw
only limited conclusions on the status of the states actions because
data were provided on only a small portion of states' data exchanges. 

To strengthen efforts to address data exchanges, we made several
recommendations to OMB.  In response, OMB agreed that it needed to
increase its efforts in this area.  For example, OMB noted that
federal agencies had provided the General Services Administration
with a list of their data exchanges with the states.  In addition, as
a result of an agreement reached at an April 1998 federal/state data
exchange meeting,\39 the states were supposed to verify the accuracy
of these initial lists by June 1, 1998.\40 OMB also noted that the
General Services Administration is planning to collect and post
information on its Internet World Wide Web site on the progress of
federal agencies and states in implementing Year 2000 compliant data
exchanges. 


--------------------
\35 Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Actions Needed on Electronic Data
Exchanges (GAO/AIMD-98-124, July 1, 1998). 

\36 To perform this review, we developed and sent a data collection
instrument to survey 42 federal departments, all states, the District
of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. 

\37 A bridge is used to convert incoming two-digit years to
four-digit years or to convert outgoing four-digit years to two-digit
years.  A filter is used to screen and identify incoming noncompliant
data to prevent them from corrupting data in the receiving system. 

\38 This does not include the status of agreements reported by the
Federal Reserve.  The Federal Reserve controls the data exchange
software used by its partners and does not need to reach agreement
with exchange partners on formats. 

\39 Initial agreements between the federal government and the states
on steps to address Year 2000 data exchange issues were reached at an
October 1997 state/federal summit, sponsored by the federal Chief
Information Officer Council and National Association of State
Information Resource Executives, Inc., and hosted by the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. 

\40 According to the National Association of State Information
Resource Executives, Inc., as of early August 1998, 16 states had
completed the verification of their federal/state data exchanges and
an additional 9 states had completed 80 percent of the verification. 


-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

In summary, federal, state, and local efforts must increase
substantially to ensure that major service disruptions do not occur. 
Greater leadership and partnerships are essential if government
programs are to meet the needs of the public at the turn of the
century. 

Mr.  Chairman, this concludes my statement.  I would be happy to
respond to any questions that you or other members of the
Subcommittee may have at this time. 




GAO REPORTS AND TESTIMONY
ADDRESSING THE YEAR 2000 CRISIS
=================================================== Chapter Attachment

FAA Systems:  Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year 2000 and
Computer Security Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, August 6, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Business Continuity and Contingency
Planning (GAO/AIMD-10.1.19, August 1998). 

Internal Revenue Service:  Impact of the IRS Restructuring and Reform
Act on Year 2000 Efforts (GAO/GGD-98-158R, August 4, 1998). 

Social Security Administration:  Subcommittee Questions Concerning
Information Technology Challenges Facing the Commissioner
(GAO/AIMD-98-235R, July 10, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Actions Needed on Electronic Data
Exchanges (GAO/AIMD-98-124, July 1, 1998). 

Defense Computers:  Year 2000 Computer Problems Put Navy Operations
At Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-150, June 30, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  A Testing Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.21,
Exposure Draft, June 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Testing and Other Challenges Confronting
Federal Agencies (GAO/T-AIMD-98-218, June 22, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Telecommunications Readiness Critical,
Yet Overall Status Largely Unknown (GAO/T-AIMD-98-212, June 16,
1998). 

GAO Views on Year 2000 Testing Metrics (GAO/AIMD-98-217R, June 16,
1998). 

IRS' Year 2000 Efforts:  Business Continuity Planning Needed for
Potential Year 2000 System Failures (GAO/GGD-98-138, June 15, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Actions Must Be Taken Now to Address
Slow Pace of Federal Progress (GAO/T-AIMD-98-205, June 10, 1998). 

Defense Computers:  Army Needs to Greatly Strengthen Its Year 2000
Program (GAO/AIMD-98-53, May 29, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  USDA Faces Tremendous Challenges in
Ensuring That Vital Public Services Are Not Disrupted
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-167, May 14, 1998). 

Securities Pricing:  Actions Needed for Conversion to Decimals
(GAO/T-GGD-98-121, May 8, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Continuing Risks of Disruption to Social
Security, Medicare, and Treasury Programs (GAO/T-AIMD-98-161, May 7,
1998). 

IRS' Year 2000 Efforts:  Status and Risks (GAO/T-GGD-98-123, May 7,
1998). 

Air Traffic Control:  FAA Plans to Replace Its Host Computer System
Because Future Availability Cannot Be Assured (GAO/AIMD-98-138R, May
1, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Potential For Widespread Disruption
Calls For Strong Leadership and Partnerships (GAO/AIMD-98-85, April
30, 1998). 

Defense Computers:  Year 2000 Computer Problems Threaten DOD
Operations (GAO/AIMD-98-72, April 30, 1998). 

Department of the Interior:  Year 2000 Computing Crisis Presents Risk
of Disruption to Key Operations (GAO/T-AIMD-98-149, April 22, 1998). 

Tax Administration:  IRS' Fiscal Year 1999 Budget Request and Fiscal
Year 1998 Filing Season (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-98-114, March 31, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Strong Leadership Needed to Avoid
Disruption of Essential Services (GAO/T-AIMD-98-117, March 24, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Federal Regulatory Efforts to Ensure
Financial Institution Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-116, March 24, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Office of Thrift Supervision's Efforts
to Ensure Thrift Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant (GAO/T-AIMD-98-102,
March 18, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Strong Leadership and Effective
Public/Private Cooperation Needed to Avoid Major Disruptions
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-101, March 18, 1998). 

Post-Hearing Questions on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
Year 2000 (Y2K) Preparedness (GAO/AIMD-98-108R, March 18, 1998). 

SEC Year 2000 Report:  Future Reports Could Provide More Detailed
Information (GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-51, March 6, 1998). 

Year 2000 Readiness:  NRC's Proposed Approach Regarding Nuclear
Powerplants (GAO/AIMD-98-90R, March 6, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation's
Efforts to Ensure Bank Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-73, February 10, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  FAA Must Act Quickly to Prevent Systems
Failures (GAO/T-AIMD-98-63, February 4, 1998). 

FAA Computer Systems:  Limited Progress on Year 2000 Issue Increases
Risk Dramatically (GAO/AIMD-98-45, January 30, 1998). 

Defense Computers:  Air Force Needs to Strengthen Year 2000 Oversight
(GAO/AIMD-98-35, January 16, 1998). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Actions Needed to Address Credit Union
Systems' Year 2000 Problem (GAO/AIMD-98-48, January 7, 1998). 

Veterans Health Administration Facility Systems:  Some Progress Made
In Ensuring Year 2000 Compliance, But Challenges Remain
(GAO/AIMD-98-31R, November 7, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  National Credit Union Administration's
Efforts to Ensure Credit Union Systems Are Year 2000 Compliant
(GAO/T-AIMD-98-20, October 22, 1997). 

Social Security Administration:  Significant Progress Made in Year
2000 Effort, But Key Risks Remain (GAO/AIMD-98-6, October 22, 1997). 

Defense Computers:  Technical Support Is Key to Naval Supply Year
2000 Success (GAO/AIMD-98-7R, October 21, 1997). 

Defense Computers:  LSSC Needs to Confront Significant Year 2000
Issues (GAO/AIMD-97-149, September 26, 1997). 

Veterans Affairs Computer Systems:  Action Underway Yet Much Work
Remains To Resolve Year 2000 Crisis (GAO/T-AIMD-97-174, September 25,
1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Success Depends Upon Strong Management
and Structured Approach (GAO/T-AIMD-97-173, September 25, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  An Assessment Guide (GAO/AIMD-10.1.14,
September 1997). 

Defense Computers:  SSG Needs to Sustain Year 2000 Progress
(GAO/AIMD-97-120R, August 19, 1997). 

Defense Computers:  Improvements to DOD Systems Inventory Needed for
Year 2000 Effort (GAO/AIMD-97-112, August 13, 1997). 

Defense Computers:  Issues Confronting DLA in Addressing Year 2000
Problems (GAO/AIMD-97-106, August 12, 1997). 

Defense Computers:  DFAS Faces Challenges in Solving the Year 2000
Problem (GAO/AIMD-97-117, August 11, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Time Is Running Out for Federal Agencies
to Prepare for the New Millennium (GAO/T-AIMD-97-129, July 10, 1997). 

Veterans Benefits Computer Systems:  Uninterrupted Delivery of
Benefits Depends on Timely Correction of Year-2000 Problems
(GAO/T-AIMD-97-114, June 26, 1997). 

Veterans Benefits Computer Systems:  Risks of VBA's Year-2000 Efforts
(GAO/AIMD-97-79, May 30, 1997). 

Medicare Transaction System:  Success Depends Upon Correcting
Critical Managerial and Technical Weaknesses (GAO/AIMD-97-78, May 16,
1997). 

Medicare Transaction System:  Serious Managerial and Technical
Weaknesses Threaten Modernization (GAO/T-AIMD-97-91, May 16, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Risk of Serious Disruption to Essential
Government Functions Calls for Agency Action Now (GAO/T-AIMD-97-52,
February 27, 1997). 

Year 2000 Computing Crisis:  Strong Leadership Today Needed To
Prevent Future Disruption of Government Services (GAO/T-AIMD-97-51,
February 24, 1997). 

High-Risk Series:  Information Management and Technology
(GAO/HR-97-9, February 1997). 


*** End of document. ***