Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Leadership and Partnerships Result in
Limited Rollover Disruptions (Testimony, 01/27/2000, GAO/T-AIMD-00-70).
Following the date change on January 1, 2000, federal, state, and local
governments as well as key sectors reported that they successfully met
the Year 2000 challenge. Although Year 2000 failures occurred--most of
them minor--these groups reported that almost all of these failure were
mitigated, either through the correction of systems or by the
implementation of contingency actions. The upshot is that few Year 2000
failures adversely affected the public. Although the Year 2000 challenge
is still not over because some key business processes have yet to be
fully executed and other risky dates remain, the nation's success so far
is a very positive indicator that these hurdles will also be overcome.
The leadership shown by the legislative and executive branches and the
partnerships formed by myriad organizations were crucial to this
success. The federal government now faces the challenge of applying the
lessons learned from the Year 2000 challenge to improve information
technology management. This testimony discusses (1) the reporting
structure established by the government to gather information on Year
2000 failures reported during the rollover period, (2) examples of Year
2000 errors and their resolution, and (3) the lessons from the Year 2000
effort that can be useful to strengthen the management of information
technology activities.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: T-AIMD-00-70
TITLE: Year 2000 Computing Challenge: Leadership and Partnerships
Result in Limited Rollover Disruptions
DATE: 01/27/2000
SUBJECT: Y2K
Emergency preparedness
Computer software verification and validation
Strategic information systems planning
Systems compatibility
Information resources management
Federal/state relations
International cooperation
Reporting requirements
Interagency relations
IDENTIFIER: Y2K
ICC Information Collection and Reporting System
DOE Dynamic Special Nuclear Material Control and
Accountability System
FAA Low Level Wind Shear Alert System
Kavouras Graphic Weather Display System
Grenada
Kazakhstan
Sudan
United Kingdom
Sri Lanka
Georgia
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GAO/T-AIMD-00-70
* For Release on Delivery
Expected at
* 10 a.m. EST
Thursday,
January 27, 2000
GAO/T-AIMD-00-70
year 2000 computing challenge
Leadership and Partnerships Result in Limited Rollover Disruptions
Statement of Joel C. Willemssen
Director, Civil Agencies Information Systems
Accounting and Information Management Division
Testimony
Before the Subcommittee on Government Management, Information and
Technology, Committee on Government Reform, and the Subcommittee on
Technology, Committee on Science, House of Representatives
United States General Accounting Office
GAO
Mr. Chairman, Ms. Chairwoman, and Members of the Subcommittees:
Thank you for inviting us to participate in today's hearing on the change of
century rollover. According to the report of the President's Commission on
Critical Infrastructure Protection, the United States-with close to half of
all computer capacity and 60 percent of Internet assets-is the world's most
advanced and most dependent user of information technology. Moreover,
America's infrastructures are a complex array of public and private
enterprises with many interdependencies at all levels. As a result, the
United States was particularly at risk that system failures resulting from
the change of century rollover would have adverse consequences on the
public.
At this time, federal, state, and local governments as well as key sectors
report that they have successfully met the Year 2000 challenge. While Year
2000 failures have occurred-some significant but most considered minor-these
entities report that almost all of these failures have been mitigated,
either through the correction of systems or by the implementation of
contingency actions. Accordingly, few Year 2000 failures have adversely
affected the public. While the Year 2000 challenge is not yet over because
some key business processes have not yet been fully executed and because
other risky dates remain, the nation's success thus far is a very positive
indicator that these hurdles will also be overcome. The leadership exhibited
by the legislative and executive branches and the partnerships formed by a
myriad of organizations were pivotal factors behind this success. Ensuring
that the lessons learned in addressing the year 2000 are effectively used to
improve information technology management is a key challenge now facing the
federal government.
After providing brief background information, today I will discuss (1) the
reporting structure established by the government to obtain information on
Year 2000-related failures during the rollover period, (2) examples of Year
2000 errors and their resolution, and (3) lessons from the Year 2000 effort
that can be carried forward to improve the management of information
technology activities. Appendix I provides our objectives, scope, and
methodology.
Background
The public faced the risk that critical services provided by the government
and the private sector could be disrupted by the change of century rollover.
As we have previously testified, financial transactions could have been
delayed, flights grounded, power lost, and national defense affected.
Fortunately, as we testified before your Subcommittees in November 1999, at
the urging of congressional leaders and others, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) and federal agencies dramatically increased the amount of
attention and oversight given to the Year 2000 issue.
Most importantly, on February 4, 1998, the President signed an executive
order that established the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion,
chaired by an Assistant to the President and consisting of one
representative from each of the executive departments and from other federal
agencies as may be determined by the Chair. The Chair of the Council was
tasked with the following Year 2000 roles: (1) overseeing the activities of
agencies; (2) acting as chief spokesperson in national and international
forums; (3) providing policy coordination of executive branch activities
with state, local, and tribal governments; and
(4) promoting appropriate federal roles with respect to private-sector
activities. The council focused attention on the problem and provided a
forum for high-level communication among leaders in government, the private
sector, and the international community.
Among the many initiatives undertaken by the government, which improved its
own as well as the nation's preparedness, were the following:
* On March 26, 1999 OMB implemented our April 1998 recommendation that
governmentwide priorities be set by issuing a memorandum to federal
agencies designating lead agencies for the government's 42 high-impact
programs (e.g., food stamps, Medicare, and federal electric power
generation and delivery; OMB later added a 43rd high-impact program-the
Department of Justice's National Crime Information Center.) For each
program, the lead agency was charged with identifying to OMB the
partners integral to program delivery; taking a leadership role in
convening those partners; and assuring that each partner had an
adequate Year 2000 plan and, if not, helping each partner without one.
* OMB clarified its contingency plan instructions and, along with the
Chief Information Officers Council, adopted our business continuity and
contingency planning guide for federal use. In addition, on May 13,
1999 OMB required agencies to submit high-level versions of these
plans.
* Council officials participated in monthly, multistate conference calls
with state Year 2000 coordinators. The latest of these calls occurred
on January 3; 36 states participated and discussed the results of the
century rollover. Moreover, in July 1998, March 1999, and October 1999,
the Council-in partnership with the National Governors'
Association-convened Year 2000 summits with state and U.S. territory
Year 2000 coordinators.
* The Council established a nationwide campaign to promote "Y2K Community
Conversations" to support and encourage the efforts of government
officials, business leaders, and interested citizens to share
information on their progress. To support this initiative, the Council
developed a toolkit that provided examples of which sectors should be
represented at these events, and issues that should be addressed.
* The Council established over 25 sector-based working groups and
conducted outreach activities, likewise consistent with our April 1998
recommendation. Also consistent with an April 1998 recommendation, the
Chair directed the Council's sector working groups to assess their
sectors. In 1999, the Council subsequently issued four public reports
summarizing these assessments.
We testified before you in November 1999 that as a result of these efforts
substantial progress had been made to reduce the risk posed by the Year 2000
problem.
Information Coordination Center Established to Monitor and Assess Rollover
Period
ICC Reporting Process Structured to Obtain Selected Status Information From
Federal Agencies, State and Local Governments, Key Sectors, and Foreign
Countries
Each of the 24 major departments and agencies except for the Departments of
Defense and State reported on their status during the rollover period using
ICRS. Defense provided classified status information via a secured
telecommunications line to the ICC's Sensitive Compartmented Information
Facility. State provided the ICC with verbal reports and provided access to
its Weathervane system in the Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility.
The Weathervane system provided each embassy's assessment of the status of
its foreign country.
The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was the primary liaison for
gathering information from state and local governments. FEMA used its 10
Regional Operation Centers-interim command and control sites that can be
activated to monitor potential disasters such as hurricanes-to monitor the
rollover to the year 2000. From December 28, 1999, through January 4, 2000,
the Regional Operations Centers responsibilities included (1) reviewing
states' ICRS status reports,
(2) contacting states that did not submit reports and obtaining the state's
status, (3) preparing and submitting regional ICRS status reports to FEMA
headquarters, and (4) participating in daily teleconference calls with FEMA
headquarters. If requested, the centers also sent representatives to their
respective states' emergency operation centers for the rollover period to
provide on-site monitoring of states' Year 2000 status, and help states
request federal assistance if needed. FEMA headquarters was responsible for
reviewing and assessing regional input and summarizing national-level
information.
Individual states were responsible for designating a point of contact
responsible for submitting ICRS reports and determining how local reports
would be provided to the ICC. With respect to local reporting, states had
the option of using their own reporting mechanism or obtaining and
distributing ICRS passwords to localities that would allow them to submit
ICRS status reports. According to the ICC, about 750 localities in 37 states
and territories submitted ICRS status reports on or after
January 1, 2000. States were also responsible for reviewing and assessing
locality status information and entering state-level status information. In
addition, states were to submit a separate report on the status of federally
funded programs, such as food stamps and unemployment insurance.
To obtain status information from key sectors, six federal organizations
also worked with private-sector organizations designated as National
Information Centers to provide information to the ICC on critical sectors
during the rollover period. For example, for the rollover period the
Department of Energy implemented an emergency operations center that
included representatives from the North American Electric Reliability
Council, American Gas Association, American Petroleum Institute, and the
Interstate Natural Gas Association of America-each a National Information
Center. Along with the Department of Energy, these entities were charged
with monitoring reports from the field and performing impact analyses. Both
the Department of Energy and the North American Electric Reliability Council
periodically submitted ICRS reports. The Department of Energy reported on
the status of its mission-critical systems, online computer systems,
headquarters building infrastructure, field building structure, operational
health/safety systems, federal electric power, electric power, oil, and gas
areas. The North American Electric Reliability Council reported on the
status of specific electric power organizations. Table 1 lists the sectors
that had National Information Centers, responsible private-sector
organizations, and lead federal organizations.
Table 1: National Information Centers
Sector National Information Center Lead Federal Organization
Organization
Airlines Air Transport Association Department of
Transportation
Cyber Assurance Cyber Assurance National Information Coordination
Information Center Center
Electric Power North American Electric Department of Energy
Reliability Council
Financial ServicesSecurities Industry Securities and Exchange
Association Commission
Natural Gas American Gas Association Department of Energy
Natural Gas Interstate Natural Gas Department of Energy
Association of America
Oil American Petroleum Institute Department of Energy
Pharmaceuticals National Pharmaceutical Department of Health and
Alliance Human Services
Pharmaceuticals National Association of Department of Health and
Chain Drug Stores Human Services
Retail National Retail Federation Information Coordination
Center
TelecommunicationsNetwork Reliability and National Communications
Interoperability Council System
Source: ICC.
To obtain international information, the ICC relied on information provided
by the Departments of State, Defense, and Transportation, the National
Security Council, and the National Information Centers. In addition, the ICC
obtained information from the International Y2K Cooperation Center's Global
Status Watch system. This system, developed and operated by an ICC
contractor, was used by foreign countries to post information, using a
standard template, on the status of major infrastructure areas such as
energy, telecommunications, water, and government services. Similar to the
ICRS, this system called for countries to report on Year 2000- or non-Year
2000-related events and whether each sector was operating at normal
capacity, reduced capacity or service, or significantly reduced capacity or
service. During the rollover period, the Chair of the President's Council on
Year 2000 Conversion also participated in telephone calls with other
national Year 2000 coordinators.
ICC Gathered and Analyzed Status Information During the Rollover Period
Table 2: ICC Structure
Sector Lead Federal Organization(s)
ICC, Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, the
Cyber-assurance Federal Computer Incident Response Capability, and
the National Infrastructure Protection Center
Financial services Federal Reserve Board
Small business Small Business Administration
Chemical related
manufacturing Environmental Protection Agency
Drinking water Environmental Protection Agency
Hazardous materials Environmental Protection Agency and the U.S. Coast
Guard
Wastewater treatment Environmental Protection Agency
Emergency services FEMA
Mission-critical
systems Office of Management and Budget
Public safety Department of Justice
State & local
governments FEMA
Tribal governments Department of the Interior
Education Department of Education
Employment-related
protection Department of Labor
Federal benefits
payment programs Social Security Administration
Food supply Department of Agriculture
Health care Department of Health and Human Services
High-impact federal
programs Office of Management and Budget
State-administered
federal programs Office of Management and Budget
National security &
international affairs Departments of Commerce, Defense, and State
Building operations General Services Administration
Energy Department of Energy
Communications Federal Communications Commission/General Services
Administration
Transportation Department of Transportation
Source: ICC.
Sector leads, and their supporting staff, were responsible for maintaining
continuous understanding and current status information on their sector
during the century rollover period. In performing these duties, they
reviewed ICRS status reports, obtained relevant information from their
respective organizations through telephone conversations, faxes, and
e-mails, and reviewed media reports. Each sector also provided periodic
summaries of its status. These summaries were used to provide status
information to the Chair of the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion
as well as to the public.
Since ending full operations on January 7, the ICC discontinued ICRS
reporting and directed federal agencies to report on their status daily via
e-mail until January 31. The ICC plans to begin full operation again during
the leap year rollover between February 28 and March 1.
ICRS Reporting Processes Generally Worked as Expected
Information gathered from these various sources at the ICC was intended to
concentrate on events that were the result of system and operational
disruptions or that might be impacted by such disruptions. Accordingly, not
all Year 2000 incidents were expected to be reported and assessed. At the
same time, the Director of the ICC stated that he encouraged entities to use
the remarks section in the ICRS to elaborate on other important Year
2000-related incidents. However, he stated that organizations' use of the
remarks section was "mixed"-some organizations provided a considerable
amount of data on minor anomalies while others had no incidents or elected
not to elaborate on any issues that they might have had.
With respect to key sectors, while private-sector representatives in the
United States provided information to the ICC, it is not likely that all
Year 2000-related errors were reported since the government could not
mandate that all incidents be reported. Indeed, on January 3, 2000, the
Chair of the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion stated that
"probably some of them [private companies] are having computer glitches and
not reporting it to us." He added that if a business is having a minor
problem that they were probably not reporting it.
Data limitations were particularly applicable in the international arena. On
January 2, 2000, the Chair of the President's Council noted these
limitations. He stated that U.S. embassies were not collecting data at the
same level as in the United States, and that they did not have the same
ability to check with all of the private-sector providers in other
countries. The Chair characterized the Department of State's Weathervane
system, which captured information from U.S. embassies, as a users' report
on whether there were any problems with areas such as power and
telecommunications. Moreover, the International Y2K Cooperation Center's
Global Status Watch system reflects self-reported data and, as discussed
earlier, concentrates on the reporting of problems that cause sectors to
operate in a reduced capacity or service.
Reported Year-2000 Incidents Addressed Quickly and Had Little Effect on the
Delivery of Key Services
In guidance on planning for the rollover period, called "day one" or "day
zero" planning, we stated that organizations should activate
coordination/command center(s), conduct facility inspections, and perform
post-rollover tests, evaluations, and assessments of key business processes
and supporting systems. According to the Chair of the President's Council,
every emergency operating center in the federal government was operating on
January 1, 2000, and agencies used the weekend to test their systems and
operations. In addition, the Chair stated that organizations running
critical services in the private sector were also staffed on January 1,
2000. For example, major banks and exchanges both in the United States and
in foreign countries used the rollover weekend for final systems and
interconnectivity testing in the year 2000 prior to opening for business.
The following are specific examples of how testing during the rollover
weekend helped to identify and correct problems quickly.
* Shortly after the rollover to the year 2000, the General Services
Administration and other agencies began checking federally owned and
leased buildings to determine whether any Year 2000-related problems
had occurred. As a result of these inspections, certain building
operations-such as access control systems-were found to have
malfunctioned and were corrected and/or contingency plans implemented.
* A "zero day" test of the DOE Oak Ridge facility's Dynamic Special
Nuclear Material Control and Accountability System-a system normally
not operating during the weekend-found a Year 2000-related file
transfer error. After the rollover, one segment of the software began
generating file identifiers with a 4-digit year format, while the file
transfer software was expecting a 2-digit year format. As a result, the
test of the transfer failed. According to DOE, contingency plans that
had been updated and tested because of the Year 2000 problem were
implemented and magnetic tapes were used to successfully transfer the
information and the Year 2000 failure was corrected a short time later.
* A foreign country reported to the International Y2K Cooperation
Center's Global Status Watch system on January 2, 2000, that "numerous
tests [were] carried out in banking, administration, and industries.
Only minor problems [were found], corrected on the spot."
Reported Year 2000-Related Errors in the Federal Government
The federal government's efforts have paid off. During the rollover period,
most Year 2000-related errors reported by the federal government were minor
and did not have an effect on operations or the delivery of services. Even
those that were significant (those that resulted in degraded service or, if
not corrected, would have resulted in degraded service) were mitigated by
quick action to fix the problem or through the implementation of contingency
plans. Among the most significant incidents were the following.
* On January 1, 2000, the Deputy Secretary of Defense reported that one
of its satellite-based intelligence systems experienced a Year 2000
failure shortly after the rollover of Greenwich Mean Time; Defense was
not able to process information from that system. According to the
Deputy Secretary, the problem was with the ground processing station,
not the satellite itself. The Deputy Secretary also stated that Defense
adopted backup procedures, which resulted in its operating at less than
its full peacetime level of activity but allowed it to continue to meet
its high-priority needs. Defense reported that the satellite ground
processing system was returned to full operational status on January 3,
2000.
* The Health Care Financing Administration's (HCFA) Medicare program, a
high-impact program, was affected by Year 2000-related errors
experienced by its business partners. For example, on January 3, HCFA
was informed that a bank that handles electronic fund transfer
transactions for six contractors to the Federal Reserve could not
receive those transactions electronically. A temporary workaround was
implemented which involved having the contractors send diskettes with
the transactions to the bank via overnight mail until the bank fixed
and tested the electronic communication software error on January 6,
2000. While this workaround allowed HCFA to make payments to providers
within the required 30 days, payments were nevertheless delayed.
Specifically, at least $50 million in payments to Medicare Part A
health care providers (e.g., hospitals and nursing facilities) were
delayed 1-day.
Medicare provider claims are being returned because claims have been
submitted dated 1900 or 2099. Some Medicare data centers reported that they
received claims from providers with these erroneous dates after the
rollover. For example, according to HCFA officials, one contractor had
received about 11,000 claims with these erroneous dates in the first two
weeks of January. According to HCFA's Deputy Director of Information
Services, most of these claims were traced to providers that had not
upgraded their systems. The Medicare contractors have advised the providers
to update their systems, and HCFA has instructed the data centers to return
claims with erroneous dates.
* The Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic control system,
another high-impact program, reported experiencing Year 2000-related
systems problems. According to FAA, none affected safety, service, or
capacity and some merely involved inaccurate date displays. In all
cases, FAA reported that it was able to quickly fix the system or
implement contingency plans that allowed operations to continue.
Two key FAA systems that had problems were the Low Level Wind Shear Alert
System and a contractor-maintained Kavouras Graphic Weather Display System.
In the case of the Low Level Wind Shear Alert System, the system displayed
an error at eight sites following the rollover from 1999 to 2000 Greenwich
Mean Time, and failed to operate. FAA field staff rebooted the systems, and
the longest length of time that one of the systems took to return to normal
operations was 2 hours and 12 minutes. Because the systems were not
operational for this short period of time and because FAA does not operate
backup systems, this problem could have affected aviation operations if
weather conditions had been severe. In the case of the Kavouras Graphic
Weather Display System, ten minutes after the Greenwich Mean Time rollover,
the system began sending data showing the year as 2010. This resulted in the
system rejecting weather data from the National Weather Service and failing
to properly update data going to 13 Automated Flight Service Stations.
Within 10 minutes, the contractor reloaded system software in order to
restore the service and all systems were reported to be normal in about 2
hours.
Reported Year 2000-Related Errors in State and Local Government
* Oregon had Year 2000-related errors in systems used for the Food
Stamps, Child Support Enforcement, and Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families programs. Regarding food stamps, the state's system for
processing daily updates failed, creating a backlog of batch records.
This problem was corrected by the installation of a new system on the
next business day, and no impact on business operations was reported.
The state's system that tracks data in numerous programs, including
Child Support Enforcement and Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
had a Year 2000-related problem that was fixed by January 7, 2000. This
problem resulted in a 1-day delay in payments to clients.
* Florida and Kentucky reported Year 2000-related problems with their
unemployment benefits' automated telephone call processing system which
would not allow claims to be processed for claimants filing claims on
January 3, 2000, who had earnings in 1999. About 100 claimants were
affected in Florida and fewer than 50 in Kentucky. Claimants were
instructed to complete and mail claims forms that had already been
provided in advance. Florida reported correcting its system on January
4, while Kentucky reported fixing the problem on January 7.
* Guam reported it had successfully implemented contingency plans (i.e.,
manual processing) in the Food Stamps, Women, Infants, and Children,
Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, Child Care, and
Child Welfare programs. Such contingencies were necessary because the
systems that supported these programs were not compliant and the
replacement systems were not implemented before the century change.
In addition to state-administered federal human services programs, other
state and local Year 2000-related errors were found. Examples include Year
2000-related problems with issuing drivers licenses for the wrong number of
years and marriage license software registering the date as 1900 (both of
these problems were reported as corrected). In another example, the Navajo
Nation Law Enforcement Office reported that seven of its eight
computer-aided dispatch system servers failed and a manual process was used
until the servers were fixed. According to a Navajo Nation Law Enforcement
Office information systems analyst, all of the servers were fixed by January
19, 2000.
Reported Infrastructure and Key Sector Year 2000-Related Errors
Many of the reported problems in the private sector related to the retail
sector, including a retailer whose cash registers and other systems did not
work until a software patch was installed, slot machines that did not work,
and a small business that could not access its accounting information.
Perhaps the most widespread Year 2000-related problem related to retail
credit card processing. Credit card companies reported to financial
regulators on January 6, 2000, that they had identified a Year 2000 failure
resulting in over 470,000 duplicate transactions on charges generated after
January 1, 2000. The problem was due to over 7,000 small merchants and
mail-order businesses using a particular electronic credit card processing
system that they had not upgraded although the vendor stated that it had
notified users in February 1999 that upgrades would be necessary. The
merchants were notified of the problem and the credit card companies
prohibited them from receiving settlement services until their systems had
been upgraded.
According to an official at the Federal Reserve, credit card industry
representatives participating in an industry-wide effort to resolve this
issue reported that as of January 19, 2000, a small number of merchants
remained to be contacted, and over 5,800 merchants have fixed their systems.
On January 26, 2000, officials from two major credit card companies told us
that the vast majority of the duplicate transactions had been corrected.
Another Year 2000 incident occurred in the Federal Reserve System, which is
instrumental to our nation's economic well-being since it provides
depository institutions and government agencies with services such as
transferring funds and securities. On January 3, 2000, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago reported a Year 2000 failure involving the transmission of
about $700,000 in tax payments of 68 area banks to the Treasury's general
account. Banks have various options for providing payment instructions to
make tax payments to the Treasury using a voice response mechanism. However,
an interface linking the Bank's voice response unit with the Treasury Tax
and Loan system did not operate properly during the rollover period and it
was unable to transfer tax payments totaling nearly $700,000 to the Treasury
for banks that had used the voice response system (the Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago processed about $5 billion in tax payments that day). The problem
was corrected overnight and the tax payments were processed the next day
with an as of date of January 3.
Reported International Year 2000-Related Errors
Several foreign countries reported Year 2000-related errors to the
International Y2K Cooperation Center's Global Status Watch system, but none
were reported to have resulted in reduced capacity, capability, or service.
For example:
* On January 5, 2000 Grenada reported that a compliant version of the
computer systems for their customs services would not be installed
until January 30, 2000 but that a manual backup system was "just as
efficient."
* On January 6, 2000, Kazakhstan reported that a technology process at a
power station had been handled manually since January 1, 2000, because
noncompliant systems had not been replaced due to a lack of funds.
According to the report, "manual handling causes certain difficulties,
since at every power unit there are 250 devices to be controlled."
* On January 12, 2000, the Sudan reported that the interbank
communications between two banks was delayed by 2 days due to a Year
2000 problem in the communications software. This problem was reported
as fixed.
Other Year 2000-related errors were also found. For example, in the United
Kingdom before the change of century, retailers had problems with credit
card readers that looked 4-days ahead. According to the United Kingdom's
government millennium center, this problem affected about 5 percent of
terminals supplied by banks to process credit and debit card transactions.
The problem was reported to have been largely resolved by the morning of
December 30.
A variety of biomedical devices had Year 2000-related errors in foreign
countries but none were reported to affect patient safety. For example, Sri
Lanka reported that a hospital found that two blood gas analyzers were
noncompliant. However, Sri Lanka reported that the problem had no
significant effect on the clinical tests being carried out by the analyzers.
Another hospital in Sri Lanka found that a E.C.G. Monitoring Unit was not
compliant and that it could not be used.
Lessons Learned From the Government's Year 2000 Efforts Can Be Used to
Improve Management of Information Technology
* providing high-level congressional and executive branch leadership,
* understanding the importance of computer-supported operations,
* providing standard guidance,
* establishing partnerships,
* facilitating progress and monitoring performance, and
* implementing fundamental information technology improvements.
A recent report issued jointly by the Intergovernmental Advisory Board and
the General Services Administration provides information on similar
experiences from federal agencies, states, local governments, and foreign
countries.
Providing High-level Congressional and Executive Branch Leadership
In the Silver Linings report, Georgia reported similar experiences with the
effectiveness of executive branch leadership and legislative oversight.
Georgia's Chief Information Officer reported that the principal direction
for the state's Year 2000 program was set by the governor. Further, Georgia
created a Y2K Executive Oversight Committee comprised of members of the
state legislature and representatives from the state's executive branch that
provided oversight and support.
Understanding the Importance of Computer-Supported Operations
The Silver Linings report also highlighted benefits in this area. For
example, Michigan reported that it had to focus on its core business
processes and how they work, which it believes will be useful in identifying
opportunities for information technology to play a pivotal role in
transforming business practices. The Commonwealth of Virginia reported that
one area it can capitalize on to improve its use and management of
information technology is the extent to which such technology has permeated
agency operations, and the attendant operational risks such dependencies
entail.
In addition, the telecommunications sector stated that due to the Year 2000
problem, management now fully understands its dependence on technology and
the importance of good engineering practice, process, and continuity.
Similarly, the pharmaceutical industry reported that that it had spent a
great deal of resources understanding every aspect of its downstream
distribution system.
Providing Standard Guidance
Establishing Partnerships
Other types of partnerships were also formed to address the Year 2000 issue,
partnerships that should serve the nation well in the future. Several
organizations reported to the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion on
the benefits of such partnerships. For example,
* The telecommunications industry reported that industries came together
to support a common national interest.
* The oil industry reported that U.S. oil companies formed informal
partnerships with associations in other countries.
In the Silver Linings report, Tennessee reported that the Year 2000
challenge encouraged all parties, especially in the government arena, to
work together.
Facilitating Progress and Monitoring Performance
The development of project metrics to monitor progress internal to the
organization was also a useful tool that was often developed in response to
the Year 2000 challenge. In the Silver Linings report, agencies and states
cited the following.
* The Department of Housing and Urban Development reported that it
developed a system to track progress and view interdependent
relationships between information development efforts.
* The U.S. Customs Service reported that it developed a master schedule
that was the foundation for measuring project progress.
* Michigan reported that it determined the need to develop a
comprehensive project reporting system.
* North Carolina reported that statewide project planning and analysis as
well as statewide project management and status reporting were Year
2000 activities that set the groundwork for a new, more efficient
direction in enterprise management and business integration.
Implementing Fundamental Information Technology Improvements
The Year 2000 problem has also prompted some agencies to establish
much-needed information technology policies in areas such as configuration
management, risk management, and software testing. In addition, Year 2000
efforts have reinforced an understanding of the importance of consistent and
persistent top management attention, which is essential to solving any
intractable problem. According to officials at OMB, the Year 2000 problem
also gave agency Chief Information Officers a "crash course" in how to
accomplish projects. Many Chief Information Officers were relatively new in
their positions and expediting Year 2000 efforts required many of them to
quickly gain an understanding of their agency's systems, work extensively
with agency program managers and Chief Financial Officers, and become
familiar with budgeting and financial management practices.
Many of these same critical information management technology practices were
also cited as improvements in the Silver Linings report. For example, (1)
Georgia reported that new testing standards were initiated to meet critical
Year 2000 deadlines, (2) Michigan reported that lessons learned for the
future included the development of a formal risk analysis and comprehensive
quality assurance program, and (3) Howard County, Maryland, reported that
its Year 2000 projects required a complete inventory and assessment of
technology resources used throughout county government.
Mr. Chairman, Ms. Chairwoman, this concludes my statement. I would be
pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the
Subcommittees may have at this time.
Contacts
Appendix I TC "Appendix I: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY: " \l 3
Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
The objectives of our review were to assess and report on (1) the response
of the ICC and key federal agencies during the century rollover period, and
(2) the nature and extent of Y2K-induced disruptions that occurred during
the rollover period. In addition, as requested, we reported on lessons
learned by the government and others while correcting their Year 2000
problems.
To meet these objectives, we placed observers at the ICC, key federal
organizations (see table 3), the 10 FEMA Regional Operations Centers, and
the District of Columbia during the rollover weekend.
Table 3: Federal Organizations Where GAO Observed Rollover Activity
Federal Organization
Information Coordination Center
FEMA
Federal Aviation Administration
Social Security Administration
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
HCFA
Federal Communications Commission
Federal Reserve System
Department of State
Department of Defense
U.S. Postal Service
As part of observing the rollover, we obtained and reviewed agency day one
strategies, reviewed ICRS and incident reports, and discussed issues with
appropriate personnel, including the Director of the ICC. We also reviewed
key ICC documentation, such as the ICC Operations Guide. In addition, we
received comments from the Director of the ICC on a draft of this testimony.
The Director of the ICC stated that he generally agreed with the facts in
the statement and provided some technical corrections which we incorporated.
We performed our work between December 1999 and mid-January 2000 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
(511817)
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