Budget Process: Biennial Budgeting for the Federal Government (Testimony,
03/10/2000, GAO/T-AIMD-00-121).

Proposals have been made to move the federal budget process from an
annual to a biennial cycle. The goal would be (1) to streamline the
congressional budget and reduce the time that Members of Congress must
spend casting seemingly repetitive votes, (2) to allow agency officials
to spend more time on financial management and analyses of program
effectiveness rather than on budget preparations and justifications, and
(3) to help agencies better manage their operations by providing funding
certainty over a two-year period. This testimony discusses state
experiences with biennial budgeting, the questions of periodicity and
availability of funds, and technical and implementation issues that must
be considered if the federal budget is switched to a biennial cycle.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  T-AIMD-00-121
     TITLE:  Budget Process: Biennial Budgeting for the Federal
	     Government
      DATE:  03/10/2000
   SUBJECT:  Balanced budgets
	     Congressional oversight
	     Appropriations
	     Proposed legislation
	     Fiscal policies
	     Future budget projections
	     Presidential budgets
	     Budget administration
IDENTIFIER:  Ohio
	     Connecticut
	     Arizona

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GAO/T-AIMD-00-121

United States General Accounting Office

GAO

Testimony

FILLIN \o \* MERGEFORMAT Before the Committee on Rules, House of
Representatives

For Release on Delivery

FILLIN \* MERGEFORMAT Expected at

9:30 a.m.

Friday,

March 10, 2000

FILLIN \o \* MERGEFORMAT BUDGET PROCESS

FILLIN \o \* MERGEFORMAT Biennial Budgeting for the Federal Government

Statement of FILLIN \o \* MERGEFORMAT Susan J. Irving,

Associate Director, Federal Budget Issues

Accounting and Information Management Division

EMBED Word.Picture.8 GAO/ FILLIN \* MERGEFORMAT T-AIMD-00-121

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to join you as you consider proposals to change the entire
budget process from an annual to a biennial cycle. This change has been
advocated as a way to advance several objectives: (1) to provide more
focused time for congressional oversight of programs by streamlining the
congressional budget process and reducing the time Members of the Congress
must spend on seemingly repetitive votes; (2) to shift the allocation of
agency officials' time from the preparation of budgets and justifications to
improved financial management and analysis of program effectiveness; and (3)
to enhance agencies' abilities to manage their operations by providing more
certainty in funding over 2 years.

Almost everyone involved in the current budget process finds it frustrating.
The public finds the budget deliberations confusing. Executive branch
agencies say it is burdensome and time consuming. How to make the best use
of the new perspectives and information provided under the Chief Financial
Officers (CFO) Act and the Government Performance and Results Act (GRPA) in
the budget and resource allocation process is unclear. Many members of the
Congress say the annual budget process seems too lengthy, with its many
votes on authorizations, the budget resolution, reconciliation, and
appropriations.

At the same time, budget debates are important-and important debates often
take time. Budgeting is the process by which we as a nation resolve the
large number of often-conflicting objectives that citizens seek to achieve
through government action. The budget determines the fiscal policy stance of
the government-that is, the relationship between spending and revenues. And
it is through the budget process that the Congress and the President reach
agreement about the areas in which the federal government will be involved
and in what way.

Despite the nearly universal agreement that the current process has
problems, changes must be carefully considered. The current budget process
is, in part, the cumulative result of many changes made to address
previously-identified problems. For example, the Budget Enforcement Act
(BEA) was designed to enforce deficit-reduction agreements. With the shift
from deficit to surplus has come the question of whether and how to change
the process to deal with new challenges. Our recent work discussing how
other countries are dealing with current surpluses can be informative about
the character of a new fiscal paradigm for our nation. Some countries have
recognized that using fiscal targets such as debt-to-GDP ratios can be
useful to guide decision-making in a world where achieving a current-year
balance is no longer sufficient as a fiscal compass.

Although the shift from deficit to surplus does not mark the end of the
fiscal challenges you face, it does free you from an exclusive focus on
deficit reduction. It may permit taking a longer-term perspective both on
commitments and on the role of government. As the Comptroller General has
testified recently, there is a need for a serious debate about the role, the
performance, and the management of the federal government. However, the
Congress has no single established formal mechanism analogous to the budget
resolution in which it may articulate performance goals for the broad
missions of government, to assess alternative strategies that offer the most
promise for achieving these goals, or to define an oversight agenda targeted
on the most pressing crosscutting performance and management issues.

All of these issues come into play as you consider whether to make any
changes to the budget process-whether that process remains on an annual
cycle or is shifted to a biennial one. For this hearing your staff asked me
to discuss state experiences with biennial budgeting, the question of
periodicity and availability of funds, and to comment on some technical or
implementation issues to consider if you were to shift the federal cycle to
a biennial one.

State Experiences

Seven states have a biennial legislative cycle and hence also a biennial
budget cycle. Of the 43 states with annual legislative cycles, 27 describe
their budget cycle as annual, 2-Kansas and Missouri-describe their cycle as
mixed, and 14 describe it as biennial. Table I below shows the legislative
and budget cycles of the states.

Table 1: State Legislative and Budget Cycles

 States With                           States With       States With Annual
 Biennial          States With Annual  Annual            Legislative and
 Legislative and   Legislative and     Legislative and   Biennial Budget
 Budget Cycles     Budget Cycles       Mixed Budget      Cycles
                                       Cycles
 1. Arkansas       1. Alabama          1. Kansas a       1. Arizona
 2. Kentucky       2. Alaska           2. Missouri b     2. Connecticut
 3. Montana        3. California                         3. Hawaii
 4. Nevada         4. Colorado                           4. Indiana
 5. North Dakota   5. Delaware                           5. Maine
 6. Oregon         6. Florida                            6. Minnesota
 7. Texas          7. Georgia                            7. Nebraska
                   8. Idaho                              8. New Hampshire

                   9. Illinois                           9. North Carolina
                                                         c
                   10. Iowa                              10. Ohio
                   11. Louisiana                         11. Virginia
                   12. Maryland                          12. Washington
                   13. Massachusetts                     13. Wisconsin
                   14. Michigan                          14. Wyoming
                   15. Mississippi
                   16. New Jersey
                   17. New Mexico
                   18. New York
                   19. Oklahoma
                   20. Pennsylvania
                   21. Rhode Island
                   22. South Carolina
                   23. South Dakota
                   24. Tennessee
                   25. Utah
                   26. Vermont
                   27. West Virginia

aIn Kansas, 19 agencies are on a biennial budget cycle.

bIn Missouri, the operating budget is on an annual cycle while the capital
budget is on a biennial cycle.

cAlthough statutorily North Carolina has a biennial legislature, in practice
the legislature meets annually, with a shorter session during the second
year.

Connecticut has changed its budget cycle from biennial to annual and back to
biennial. Since the mid-1960s, 17 other states have changed their budget
cycles: 11 from biennial to annual, 2 from annual to mixed, and 4 from
annual to biennial.

Translating state budget laws, practices, and experiences to the federal
level is always difficult. As we noted in our review of state balanced
budget practices state budgets fill a different role, may be sensitive to
different outside pressures, and are otherwise not directly comparable.
State legislatures generally don't separate the authorization and
appropriation function. In about one-third of the states appropriations are
contained in a single appropriations act. It also appears that they make
less use than does the Congress of tools like multiyear funding. The length
of a legislature's session may be limited. In addition, governors often have
more unilateral power over spending than the President does.

In your deliberations this year the experience of three states-Ohio,
Connecticut, and Arizona--may be of particular interest. Of the five largest
states in terms of general fund expenditures, Ohio is the only one with both
an annual legislative cycle and a biennial budget. Connecticut shifted to a
biennial budget cycle for 1993-94 with the avowed purpose of improving the
quality of oversight, and it now is in its fourth biennium. Beginning in
1993, Arizona took a phased approach to shifting from annual to biennial
budgeting, and this year is in the second year of the first biennium in
which the entire budget is on a biennial basis. Although we have not
completed our examination of just how biennial budgeting works in these
states, I will discuss each briefly based on preliminary work and interviews
with some state officials.

Ohio

Ohio has had a biennial budget cycle since the early 1900s. In odd-numbered
years the legislature adopts two 1-year operating budgets. Appropriations
for most state agencies are contained in a single bill. In even-numbered
years the legislature adopts two capital bills-a capital reappropriations
bill dealing with projects previously appropriated but not completed and a
separate capital budget for new projects. If there are legislative changes
in the appropriations, they may either be included in the capital
reappropriations bill and/or in a corrective bill. However, we are told that
significant changes are rare.

In Ohio, there is no mandate for increased legislative oversight in the
second year. The legislature generally has a shortened session in this year
and spends its time on the capital bills and business other than the budget.

Adjustments during the biennium are generally handled by the Controlling
Board. The Director of the Governor's Budget Office or his designee chairs
this Board-we were told this is usually the Deputy Director of the Office of
Budget and Management. Its other six members are members of the legislature.
One official described the Controlling Board as legislative oversight. This
Board approves all contracts over $25,000 (or $75,000 for larger
institutions). It also has broad powers over spending. The Board may
authorize increased spending from dedicated revenues, fees, federal
reimbursements, or private grants. We were told that agencies may begin new
projects if approved by the Controlling Board. Although under its general
authority the Board cannot increase or decrease General Revenue Fund
appropriations, it can move such funds across years and between purposes
within an agency within a single biennium. The Governor in Ohio has
authority to unilaterally reduce spending in any area if necessary to ensure
the fiscal year ends in balance.

Connecticut

Beginning in 1993 Connecticut converted its budget cycle from annual to
biennial. In odd-numbered years the Governor proposes and the legislature
adopts two 1-year budgets. The Governor's budget proposal is reviewed by the
legislature's Appropriations and Finance Committees. Appropriations for all
state agencies are contained in a single bill. In even-numbered years the
Governor transmits a report on the status of the enacted budget along with
any recommendations for revisions or adjustments.

Adjustments during the biennium can be handled in one of three ways. As
mentioned above, they may be contained in the Governor's bill for the second
year. Also, the Finance Advisory Committee (a joint executive and
legislative branch committee) must approve larger transfers between
appropriations accounts within an agency. Finally, the Governor, with
Finance Advisory Committee approval, has the authority to reduce overall
appropriations up to 3 percent of the total appropriation of any fund or up
to 5 percent of any appropriation account in cases where a deficit is
projected or in cases where there is a change of circumstances.

The main reasons given for a conversion to a biennial budget cycle were that
an annual budget process takes too long, is repetitive, and leaves little
time for the legislature to carry out its oversight responsibilities.
Connecticut's reform envisioned a process whereby budget activities would
take place during the first year with the second year devoted to oversight
and any necessary technical adjustments to the budget. However, phone
conversations with a senior budget official indicate that this has not been
the experience. In practice, the Governor has introduced new policy
initiatives for the second year of the biennium. As a result, budget
activities in the "off-year" have not been limited to technical adjustments
and the legislative calendar, which is shorter in the second year, has been
largely consumed by budget-related deliberations.

Arizona

Arizona is currently in the second year of its first full biennial budget.
Arizona began its transition to a biennial budget cycle in 1993 when it
moved 26 smaller regulatory agencies to a biennial basis. In 1996, all
agencies except for the 15 largest were moved to a biennial cycle-bringing
the total to about 100. The 15 largest agencies, which represent more than
90 percent of general fund expenditures, were converted to a biennial cycle
in fiscal year 1999-2000. In Arizona general funds constitute approximately
50 percent of revenues. The other half is split approximately evenly between
federal funds-which are not appropriated but flow directly to the designated
agency-and nonappropriated funds-which include user fees, regulatory fees,
and revenues enacted through voter initiative.

Arizona linked the shift to a biennial budget cycle with an attempt to
increase program review. Beginning in 1993 when Arizona first started its
move toward biennial budgeting, the legislature also established a Program
Authorization Review (PAR) process whereby agencies were to annually submit
self-assessments to the legislative and executive budget offices. The
directors of each budget office are to jointly review the self-assessments
and submit a report with their findings to the legislature. In 1997 the PAR
process was converted to a biennial process, whereby the reviews were to
occur in the non-budget years. Finally, in 1999, the legislature modified
the program evaluation process further, creating a Strategic Program Area
Review (SPAR) process to look more closely at broad program areas. For the
first year it was specified that the process would look at three program
areas: (1) Arizona Ports of Entry; (2) Domestic Violence programs; and (3)
University Extended Education programs.

Biennial Budgeting at the Federal Level

The biennial bills before the Congress would shift the entire budget cycle
from annual to biennial. The President would submit a budget every other
year. Authorizations would be for 2 years or longer. Budget resolutions
would be adopted and appropriations enacted every 2 years. The Congress
would be required to enact two 1-year appropriations. All the biennial
budget bills introduced in this Congress provide for this kind of cycle.
Most extend the time provided for development of the budget
resolution-moving it from April 15 to May 15-and hence shorten the time
provided for appropriations action in the first session of a Congress.

Experience with multiyear fiscal policy agreements and multiyear
authorizations provides no evidence to suggest that budget agreements,
authorizations, budget resolutions, and appropriations need to cover the
same time period. Multiyear fiscal policy agreements and multiyear
authorizations make a great deal of sense, but they do not require changing
the appropriations decision cycle from annual to biennial. If multiyear
agreements on spending caps and enforcement regimes are continued, a
biennial budget resolution may also be possible. While biennial
appropriations could save time for agencies and for the Congress, they would
result in a change in the nature of congressional control and oversight.
Proposals to change the process should be considered partly on the basis of
their effect on the relative balance of power in this debate. Similarly, any
mechanisms developed to implement biennial budgeting could have an impact on
the balance of power.

Longer Term Perspective is Important

We have previously supported the use of multiyear authorizations for federal
programs. These can help both the Congress and the executive branch by
providing a longer-term perspective within which a program may operate and
appropriations be determined. Multiyear authorizations are the normal
practice for most of the nondefense portion of the budget.

Increasingly, informed budget and policy decisions require an even
longer-term perspective. There has been a growing recognition that
policymakers need information on the long-term cost consequences of today's
commitments. The long-term costs implied by the government's current
commitments can encumber major shares of future budget resources. Our
long-term budget model illustrates that the growth in Social Security and
health commitments threatens to crowd out discretionary spending in the long
run, assuming a constant tax burden. While the congressional budget process
has made progress in considering the longer term in budgeting by requiring a
multiyear focus, it does not fully address sustainability issues. We have
suggested that this could be improved for some programs, like employee
pension, retiree health, and federal insurance programs, by adopting accrual
measurements in the budget. Doing so would provide a more complete picture
of the cost of current decisions and thus may encourage timely changes in
these programs to control costs. For other long-term commitments, like
social insurance, which are not considered to be liabilities under current
accounting standards but nevertheless represent a commitment of the
government, alternative approaches drawing upon accrual concepts may be
useful to explore and could very well lead to new ways of budgeting for such
commitments. However, while this perspective is important, the uncertainty
of long-term projections argues against incorporating them directly into the
budget numbers.

Budgeting always involves forecasting, which itself is uncertain, and the
longer the period of the forecast, the greater the uncertainty. Increased
difficulty in forecasting was one of the primary reasons states gave for
shifting from biennial to annual cycles. Among the issues that would need to
be worked out if the Congress moves to a biennial budget cycle are how to
update the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) forecast and baseline against
which legislative action is "scored" and how to deal with unexpected events.
The baseline is important because, as you know, CBO scores legislation based
on the economic assumptions in effect at the time of the budget resolution.
Even under the current system there are years when this practice presents
problems: in 1990 the economic slowdown was evident during the year, but
consistent practice meant that bills reported in compliance with
reconciliation instructions were scored based on the assumptions in the
budget resolution rather than updated assumptions. However, the economic
slowdown caused spending to increase and federal revenues to decline by more
than the savings projected from the reconciliation act's policy changes. If
budget resolutions were biennial, this problem of outdated assumptions would
be greater-some sort of update in the "off-year" would be necessary.

Annual Appropriation Cycle Permits Flexible Periods of

Fund Availability and Changes in Levels Year toYear

In considering whether the federal government should shift to a biennial
budget, it is important to recognize the critical distinction between how
often budget decisions are made and how long the spending authority provided
for agency use is available. That is the difference between the frequency of
decisions and the period of availability of funds. To date biennial budget
proposals have sought to change the frequency with which decisions are
made-from annual to biennial-without changing the periodicity of funds.

Sometimes a shift to biennial appropriations is discussed as though it were
necessary to change the frequency of decisions in order to change the length
of time funds are available. As you know, however, this is a misconception.
First, nearly two-thirds of the budget goes for mandatory programs and
entitlements on which decisions are not made annually. Even the remaining
portion of the federal budget on an annual appropriations cycle is not
composed entirely of 1-year monies. Not all appropriated funds expire on
September 30 of each year. The Congress has routinely provided multiyear or
no-year appropriations for accounts or for projects within accounts when it
seemed to make sense to do so. For example, just looking at the accounts
that in fiscal year 2000 were on an annual appropriations cycle shows that
over 60 percent of these accounts contained some multiyear or no-year funds.
For these accounts, some previously enacted appropriations remain available
for obligation beyond September 30, 2000 without further congressional
action. The Congress has also responded to situations in which the program
year and the fiscal year do not match; for example, education programs
routinely receive forward funding. Thus, to the extent that biennial
budgeting is proposed as a way to ease a budget execution problem, the
Congress has shown itself willing and able to meet that need under the
current cycle.

The federal government has had some experience with requirements for a
biennial budget. The 1986 Defense Authorization Act directed the Department
of Defense (DoD) to submit a biennial budget for fiscal years 1988 and 1989
and every 2 years thereafter. DoD has submitted 2-year budgets to the first
session of a Congress for most biennia since then, including for the
biennium that would have begun with fiscal year 2000. However, it has never
received both authorizations and appropriations to cover a biennium. Thus,
it then submits a 1-year budget to the second session of a Congress to
request appropriations for the second year of the biennium. According to a
DoD official, this attempt to implement biennial budgeting has created
additional workload, as DoD routinely must prepare budget justifications for
the second year of the biennium twice.

Implementation Issues: Integration With BEA, GPRA

If BEA is extended, there are a number of technical issues to be considered
in terms of the integration of any biennial budget cycle with the BEA. For
example, would biennial budgeting change the timing of the BEA-required
sequestration reports? How would sequestrations be applied to the 2 years in
the biennium and when would they occur? For example, if annual caps are
continued and are exceeded in the second year of the biennium, when would
the Presidential Order causing the sequestration be issued? Would the
sequestration affect both years of the biennium? We would be happy to work
with your staff on these and other technical issues should you wish.

The interaction between biennial budgeting and GPRA presents several
challenges. These are especially important given the expressed desire to use
a shift to biennial budgeting as a way to increase and improve oversight. At
a minimum, as recognized in several of the bills that have been introduced,
there would need to be conforming calendar changes in GPRA. However, if a
shift to a biennial cycle is intended to facilitate oversight, integration
will need to go beyond such calendar adjustments to thinking about the
purposes of GPRA and how it can best assist congressional decision-making.
Again, we would be happy to work with your staff on the integration of these
initiatives.

Potential Effects of Biennial Appropriations

For agency budget officials-both agency budget officers and program
managers-the arguments for biennial budgeting may seem quite strong.
Currently, agency budget officers spend several months every year preparing
a "from-the-ground-up" budget with voluminous written justifications. Much
of this work is repetitious. In contrast, requests for supplemental
appropriations are handled on an exception basis. Only those agencies
requesting supplemental appropriations prepare and present justifications,
and those justifications are less complex than for the annual budget. If,
under a biennial appropriations process, the "off-year" updates, amendments,
or adjustments were treated like supplemental appropriations, the savings in
agency time could be significant, even if the Congress required-as seems
reasonable-that agencies submit performance reports and audited financial
and spending reports every year.

Would agency time and energy be shifted to improved financial management or
better program evaluation? That is likely to depend on the President's and
the agency's leadership and on what the Congress demanded of the agencies.

For agency program managers, the interest in biennial budgets is slightly
different. Although preparation and analysis for the annual budget
preparation and submission process is time-consuming and burdensome for
program managers, they are likely to have a greater interest in how long
money is available for use. For managers with program cycles that are longer
than or different from a single fiscal year, multiyear appropriations tend
to smooth program functioning. However, as noted above, the Congress has
already addressed this budget execution problem for many of these programs
by giving them some multiyear funding. While a shift of the entire cycle
would ease planning and increase predictability for all program managers,
multiyear or forward funding can be provided for those programs for which
1-year money seriously impairs program effectiveness.

Regardless of the potential benefits to agencies, the decision on biennial
budgeting will depend on how the Congress chooses to exercise its
constitutional authority over appropriations and its oversight functions.
Annual enacted appropriations have long been a basic means of exerting and
enforcing congressional policy. Oversight has often been conducted in the
context of agency requests for funds. A 2-year appropriation cycle would
change-and could lessen-congressional influence over program and spending
matters, since the process would afford fewer scheduled opportunities to
affect agency programs and budgets. Even in an era of fixed-dollar caps on
discretionary spending, the Congress has retained the right to rearrange
priorities within the aggregate cap. Indeed, at the individual account level
year-to-year volatility is much greater than the volatility of
appropriations in the aggregate. For example, while overall discretionary
appropriations were changing by only 2 to 4 percent per year between fiscal
years 1995 and 1998, 37 percent or more of the individual accounts changed
by more than +/-10 percent. In addition, appropriations subcommittees may
feel a need to provide more flexible budget execution tools to program
managers-in the form of greater multiyear funding, lump sum appropriations,
and/or transfer authority-to address the greater uncertainty associated with
lengthened funding horizons.

Shifting the entire budget and appropriations cycle to a biennial one is
likely to require the reexamination of a number of congressional processes.
How would the rules of each body need to be changed to facilitate the
desired operation of such a cycle? What new mechanisms might be created and
how would they work? For example, the question of how to respond to changing
conditions becomes increasingly important if appropriations are to be
enacted every 2 years. A biennial cycle is likely to increase the number of
unexpected developments between appropriations. Already the Congress adjusts
its annual spending decisions as it responds to emergencies or changes in
the world that occur within the year. Over a 2-year period there are likely
to be more such outside events demanding "adjustments." How would those be
handled?

Integration of GPRA with a biennial cycle also raises a number of questions
beyond adjusting the dates. Among the questions are: How will annual
performance reports be used in a biennial cycle? Will the President's
governmentwide performance plan submitted with his biennial budget reflect
performance goals and measures on an annual or a biennial basis? Agencies
will be expected to prepare performance plans including annual goals and
measures covering each year of the biennium--how will these affect the
governmentwide performance plan? Agencies will still be expected to submit
annual performance reports-how are these to be used in a biennial cycle?

We have long advocated regular and rigorous congressional oversight of
federal programs. Such oversight should examine both the design and
effectiveness of federal programs and the efficiency and skill with which
they are managed. In testimonies before both the House and Senate Budget
Committees last month the Comptroller General offered some organizing themes
or questions for use in structuring systematic oversight. As a result of
recent reform efforts, the Congress will soon begin receiving more
consistent and complete information about the costs, efficiency, and
effectiveness of federal programs and activities. However, to be fully
useful, this information must become a routine component of congressional
authorization, oversight, and appropriations processes. While individual
authorization and oversight committees are well-suited to address
performance or financial issues affecting individual agencies or programs,
many of the key performance questions are not confined to, and cannot be
addressed effectively on, an agency-by-agency or committee-by-committee
basis. In his testimony last month, the Comptroller General suggested that
the Congress could consider the need for mechanisms that would allow it to
more systematically focus its oversight on problems with the most serious
and systemic weaknesses and risks. One possible approach would involve
modifying the current budget resolution to include a "performance
resolution" to permit the Congress to respond to, and present a coordinated
congressional perspective on, the President's governmentwide performance
plan.

In this context, we note that several of the bills make a substantive change
to the budget act by requiring that GPRA plans and reports be reviewed by
each committee of jurisdiction. These bills go on to say that each committee
"may provide its views on such plans or reports to the Budget Committee."
This represents an expansion of the scope of what is colloquially known as
"views and estimates reports." It is unclear just how this information would
be used by the Budget Committee--the bills do not amend the content of the
budget resolution or provide for a companion "performance resolution," as
suggested in our earlier testimony. However, since one of the consequences
of a biennial process will be fewer opportunities to respond to executive
agency plans, some structured forum for responding to the President's
governmentwide plan may be useful.

Conclusion

Mr. Chairman, we have testified before that the decision to change the
entire budget process to a biennial one is fundamentally a decision about
the nature of congressional oversight. Whether a biennial cycle offers the
benefits sought will depend heavily on the ability of the Congress and the
President to reach agreement on how to respond to uncertainties inherent in
a longer forecasting period. If biennial appropriations bills are changed
rarely, the planning advantages for those agencies that do not now have
multiyear or advance appropriations may be significant.

Whether a biennial cycle would in fact reduce congressional workload and
increase the time for oversight is unclear. As I noted above, most current
proposals actually shorten the time available for appropriations action in
the first session of the Congress-the session in which all appropriations
action is supposed to take place-by reducing the time between completion of
congressional action on the budget resolution and the beginning of the
biennium at issue by 1 month.

Mr. Chairman, biennial budgeting would bring neither the end of
congressional control nor the guarantee of improved oversight. It would
require a change in the nature of that control. If the Congress decides to
proceed with a change to a biennial budget cycle-including a biennial
appropriations cycle-careful thought will need to be given to implementation
issues. We stand willing to assist your staff either with those technical
and implementation questions or with other approaches to improved oversight
under the current annual cycle.
  
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