Nuclear Waste: Process to Remove Radioactive Waste From Savannah River
Tanks Fails to Work (Letter Report, 04/30/99, GAO/RCED-99-69).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to clean up nuclear waste at DOE's
Savannah River Site in South Carolina, focusing on: (1) the factors
causing the project's delays and cost growth; (2) the effect of the
in-tank precipitation process project's suspension on the Savannah River
Site's cleanup plans and costs; and (3) DOE's plans for developing an
alternative technology for separating high-level waste from the liquid.
GAO noted that: (1) a number of factors combined to cause DOE and
Westinghouse Savannah River Corporation to spend almost a half billion
dollars and to take about a decade to decide that the in-tank
precipitation process would not work safely and efficiently as designed;
(2) the most serious factors were the ineffectiveness of the
contractor's management and of the Department's oversight of the
project; (3) DOE and the contractor encountered delays in starting up
the in-tank precipitation facility because they began construction
before the design of the process was completed; (4) because DOE funded
the project with operating funds, rather than with construction funds,
the project was less visible to congressional oversight; (5) there was
also an inadequate understanding by DOE and the contractor of the
in-tank precipitation process and the cause of the benzene generation;
(6) the failure of the in-tank precipitation process to operate as
originally planned will delay the cleanup of high-level waste at the
Savannah River Site and increase costs; (7) the facility was planned to
begin operating in 1988, and now, DOE estimates that an alternative
process may not be available until as late as 2007 and could cost from
about $2.3 billion to $3.5 billion over its lifetime; (8) as a result,
the site has had to modify its plans for processing waste; (9) depending
on the alternative process selected, Westinghouse estimated that it
could be as late as 2025 before the waste tanks are empty; (10) thus,
DOE risks missing the dates in its waste removal plan and schedule
agreement with South Carolina and the Environmental Protection Agency to
close certain high-level waste tanks by no later than 2022; (11)
Westinghouse estimated that it could cost over $75 billion to construct
and operate the facilities necessary to clean up the high-level waste if
an alternative process is not developed for separating the waste in the
tanks; (12) DOE's plans for selecting an alternative process are still
being formulated; (13) soon after the in-tank precipitation project was
suspended in 1998, Westinghouse began evaluating 142 technologies to
replace the process and pared them down to 4 final alternative
technologies; (14) Westinghouse recommended to DOE that the small tank
precipitation process be selected; and (15) DOE has begun additional
research and testing to obtain the information needed to select the
preferred alternative by the end of fiscal year 1999.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-99-69
TITLE: Nuclear Waste: Process to Remove Radioactive Waste From
Savannah River Tanks Fails to Work
DATE: 04/30/99
SUBJECT: Nuclear waste disposal
Tanks (containers)
Toxic substances
Schedule slippages
Waterway costs
Cost overruns
Contract oversight
IDENTIFIER: Savannah River (SC)
DOE In-Tank Precipitation Process Project
DOE High Level Waste Plans
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rc99069.book GAO United States General Accounting Office
Report to the Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Commerce,
House of Representatives
April 1999 NUCLEAR WASTE Process to Remove Radioactive Waste From
Savannah River Tanks Fails to Work
GAO/RCED-99-69
GAO/RCED-99-69
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548
Lett er
Page 1 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
GAO
Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division
B-281907 Letter April 30, 1999 The Honorable John D. Dingell
Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce House of
Representatives Dear Mr. Dingell:
The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for cleaning up the
nuclear waste legacy created by over 50 years of producing nuclear
weapons material. At DOE's Savannah River Site in South Carolina,
34 million gallons of liquids that contain highly radioactive
waste (high- level waste) have accumulated in the storage tanks
since the site became operational in 1951. The in- tank
precipitation (ITP) process was selected in 1983 as the
preferred method for separating the high- level waste from the
liquid. In 1985, DOE estimated that it would take about 3 years
and $32 million to construct the ITP facility. After a number of
delays, the ITP facility was started up in 1995, but safety
concerns about the amount of explosive, toxic benzene gas that the
facility was generating halted start- up operations. Ultimately,
in February 1998, after about a decade of delays and spending
almost a half billion dollars, DOE suspended the ITP project
because it would not work safely and efficiently as designed. DOE
then directed its contractor, Westinghouse Savannah River
Corporation (Westinghouse), to
begin a process to identify and select an alternative process. You
asked us to (1) examine the factors causing the project's delays
and cost growth, (2) identify the effect of the ITP project's
suspension on the Savannah River Site's cleanup plans and costs,
and (3) provide information on DOE's plans for developing an
alternative technology for separating high- level waste from the
liquid.
Results in Brief A number of factors combined to cause the
Department of Energy and Westinghouse to spend almost a half
billion dollars and to take about a
decade to decide that the in- tank precipitation process would not
work safely and efficiently as designed. The most serious factors
were the ineffectiveness of the contractor's management and of the
Department's oversight of the project. For example, in 1993, a
technical review team
reported that the contractor tended to use reactive discovery
management to solve problems after they occurred, rather than
working to avoid problems in the first place. The team also found
that the
B-281907 Page 2 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Department lacked the necessary personnel for adequate oversight.
Moreover, the Department and the contractor encountered delays in
starting up the in- tank precipitation facility because they began
construction before the design of the process was completed.
Furthermore, because the Department funded the project with
operating funds, rather than with construction funds, the project
was less visible to congressional oversight. There was also an
inadequate understanding by DOE and the contractor of the in- tank
precipitation process and the cause of the benzene generation.
The failure of the in- tank precipitation process to operate as
originally planned will delay the cleanup of high- level waste at
the Savannah River Site and increase costs. Initially, the
facility was planned to begin operating in 1988, and now, DOE
estimates that an alternative process may not be available until
as late as 2007 and could cost from about $2.3 billion to $3.5
billion over its lifetime. As a result, the site has had to modify
its plans for
processing waste. Depending on the alternative process selected,
Westinghouse estimated that it could be as late as 2025 before the
waste tanks are empty. Thus, the Department risks missing the
dates in its waste removal plan and schedule agreement with the
state of South Carolina and
the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency to close certain high-
level waste tanks by no later than 2022. More importantly,
Westinghouse estimated that it could cost over $75 billion to
construct and operate the facilities necessary to clean up the
high- level waste if an alternative process is not
developed for separating the waste in the tanks. The Department's
plans for selecting an alternative process are still being
formulated. Soon after the in- tank precipitation project was
suspended in 1998, Westinghouse began evaluating 142 technologies
to replace the
process and pared them down to 4 final alternative technologies.
On October 29, 1998, Westinghouse recommended to the Department
that the small tank precipitation process be selected. Although
this process is similar to the failed one, several differences
exist that Westinghouse believes will address the safety hazards
caused by the benzene generated
by the process. For example, because small tanks will be used to
process the waste, the processing time will be cut significantly,
thereby reducing the time during which benzene can build up in the
tanks. Westinghouse officials estimate that it could cost about $1
billion to build the small tank precipitation facility by 2005.
Westinghouse ranked this process as being the most scientifically
mature, having the most manageable risk, and
having the greatest likelihood of success. Westinghouse also
recommended that an alternative process, crystalline
silicotitanate ion
B-281907 Page 3 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
exchange, be developed as a backup, using a different method to
remove the high- level waste from the tanks. The Department's
Savannah River Site evaluated Westinghouse's recommendation and
announced in December 1998 that testing and development work
should continue on both processes before a final decision is made.
In addition, the Department concluded that another process--
direct disposal in grout-- should not be eliminated from
consideration. As a result, DOE has begun additional research and
testing to obtain the information needed to select the preferred
alternative by the end of fiscal year 1999.
Background In the early 1980s, DOE's Savannah River Site in South
Carolina initiated efforts to remove 34 million gallons of liquids
containing high- level waste
being stored in 49 underground tanks. It developed plans for
constructing various facilities to treat the waste and transform
it into a more stable glass form-- a process referred to as
vitrification. 1 The glass canisters would then be shipped to a
repository for permanent disposal. The vitrification process is
performed at Savannah River's Defense Waste Processing Facility,
which began operating in 1996 and cost over $2 billion to
construct.
The ITP project was designed to be an integral part of the high-
level waste cleanup program that would speed up the process and
reduce the overall cost. Since only about 10 percent of the 31
million gallons of waste in the tanks is highly radioactive,
separating the high- level waste from the
remaining liquids greatly reduces the volume to be vitrified. 2
The ITP facility was to separate (precipitate) the high- level
waste (mainly cesium, but also trace amounts of strontium and
plutonium) in the waste tanks. To remove the cesium, a chemical
called sodium tetraphenylborate was to be mixed with liquids from
the underground tanks in a 1.3 million- gallon processing tank.
This chemical would react with the waste, causing the high- level
waste to be separated from the liquids. The high- level waste was
then to be removed from the tank through a filtering process. To
remove the trace amounts of strontium and plutonium, another
chemical was to be 1 Vitrification is the process of blending
liquid high- level waste with other substances and melting them at
2,100 degrees Fahrenheit to form a solid glass. Once the high-
level waste is immobilized within the structure of the glass, it
cannot dissolve the glass and migrate into the environment. 2 Of
the 34 million gallons of waste in the tanks, about 3 million
gallons is sludge (highly radioactive insoluble waste that settles
to the bottom of the storage tanks) that requires different
handling than the 31 million gallons of liquid referred to here.
B-281907 Page 4 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
used, monosodium titanate. Once the high- level waste was
separated, it was to be sent through a late wash facility, where
nitrite concentrations would be reduced, and then sent to the
Defense Waste Processing Facility to be vitrified with sludge
wastes. After the separation process, the waste remaining in the
tank would be a solution with a low level of radioactivity that
could be safely treated and disposed of on site at Savannah
River's saltstone facility. 3
DOE officials said that in selecting the ITP process they were
looking for a less costly approach to separating the liquid
wastes. The alternative to ITP available in 1982 was estimated to
cost about $700 million to construct. 4 DOE officials said that
the ITP option was selected because (1) existing
scientific data indicated a reasonable chance for success, (2) the
technological uncertainties were believed to be comparable to
those of alternative technologies, and (3) the process could be
performed in existing waste tanks, thereby eliminating the need to
construct a new
major facility and significantly reducing the estimated cost. The
development of the ITP process began in the early 1980s when the
DuPont Chemical Company was DOE's management and operating
contractor at Savannah River. In 1985, the ITP facility was
projected to cost an estimated $32 million to construct and to be
operational in 1988. In addition, at that time, DOE estimated that
it would need to build three other facilities to support ITP that
would cost about $71 million to construct. 5 Westinghouse took
over as the site's management and operating contractor on April 1,
1989, and thus assumed responsibility for the ITP project. Ten
years after the original completion date, about $489
million had been spent on the ITP process and its related
facilities and 3 The saltstone facility is a disposal facility for
low- level radioactive waste that has been mixed with grout to
make a concrete- like substance. 4 A February 1982 final
environmental impact statement included a construction cost
estimate of $700 million (in constant 1980 dollars) for a process
called ion exchange, which was to separate the highly
radioactive waste from the tanks. A Westinghouse official said
that this cost would have exceeded $900 million if escalated for
inflation.
5 The three facilities were the saltstone facility, the salt
processing cell that readies the precipitate resulting from the
ITP process for the Defense Waste Processing Facility melter, and
the organic waste storage tank that would be used to store the
benzene recovered from the process.
B-281907 Page 5 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
activities. 6 (App. I contains additional information on the costs
of the ITP project and its associated facilities.)
The ITP facility began start- up operations in September 1995
using 130,000 gallons of waste solution and 37, 300 gallons of
sodium tetraphenylborate. During October and November, test
results showed a nearly constant release of benzene. In December
1995, benzene was released at a much
higher rate than expected, and the operations were stopped. This
led to an expanded scope of experiments to investigate the
generation, retention, and release of the excess benzene. In
January 1996, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board 7 sent
DOE a letter advising that additional safety precautions were
needed because of the excess benzene generation and
that DOE needed to better understand the mechanisms for the
generation and release of the gas. In March 1996, ITP operations
were suspended. On August 14, 1996, the Safety Board issued
Recommendation 96- 1 to address its safety concerns about ITP. In
part, it recommended that DOE better understand ITP's sodium
tetraphenylborate chemistry. It was eventually discovered that a
catalyst existed in the waste tanks that was causing the excess
benzene generation, a discovery that led to the formal suspension
of the ITP process in February 1998.
Ineffective Management and Oversight and Lack of Understanding of
the Process Delayed the
Suspension Decision A number of factors combined to cause DOE and
Westinghouse to spend
almost a half billion dollars and take about a decade to decide
that the intank precipitation technology would not work safely and
efficiently as designed. The ineffectiveness of management and
oversight during the 1980s and early 1990s resulted in the
problems with the ITP process not
being dealt with adequately early on in the technology's
development. In addition, the ITP process and the generation of
benzene (a toxic, highly flammable, and explosive gas) were not
fully understood. 6 The $489 million includes total estimated
construction costs of $157 million; other project costs of $151
million that include the costs of testing, training, and
operational readiness reviews; operating costs of $19 million that
include the cost to run the facility after it became operational;
and other supporting facilities costs of $162 million that include
the costs associated with activities needed to enhance the safety
and efficiency of the ITP process.
7 The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is an independent
executive branch organization responsible for providing advice and
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy on public health and
safety issues at DOE's defense nuclear facilities.
B-281907 Page 6 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Ineffective Management and Oversight Led to Project Delays and
Cost Growth Ineffective management and oversight by DOE and its
operating contractor
were principal factors contributing to the delays and increased
costs of the ITP project. Management and oversight were
ineffective during the 1980s and early 1990s primarily for the
following reasons: the weaknesses in the contractor's management
and DOE's oversight, the difficulty in managing the project's
start- up, and the limited oversight and visibility of the
project because of the
budgetary treatment it received. Weaknesses Existed in the
Contractor's Management and DOE's Oversight
In 1993, a DOE technical review team (referred to as the Red Team)
reported that the contractor tended to use reactive discovery
management to solve problems after they occurred, rather than
working to avoid problems in the first place. 8 The Red Team found
that this approach resulted in a high potential for inadequate
process development, lengthening the project and increasing its
costs. The Red Team also found that there were inadequacies in ITP
testing and in understanding the ITP process as well as
uncertainties about whether the
equipment to be used would function as expected. The Red Team also
reported that DOE Savannah River's oversight and support functions
were not adequate because they lacked the necessary personnel. The
Red Team found that, as a result, DOE's guidance and
responsiveness to Westinghouse were limited. Moreover, the team
found that DOE's organizational responsibilities appeared unclear
and that the DOE staff were forced to respond in a reactive manner
to emerging issues.
The contractor's management problems surfaced repeatedly in the
evaluations DOE performed every 6 months to assess Westinghouse's
eligibility for award fees. 9 For example, we found that in 14 of
the 16 evaluations performed from April 1990 through March 1998,
DOE identified
weaknesses needing attention in contractor management or ITP
planning activities. For example, a 1992 evaluation stated that
performance against planned work was not adequately monitored and
technical documents had
8 Independent Technical Review of In- Tank Precipitation (ITP) at
the Savannah River Site, DOE Office of Environmental Restoration
and Waste Management (June 1993).
9 In fiscal year 1995, the evaluation periods were 8 months and 4
months rather than 6 months. An award fee is an incentive for good
performance as defined in the contractual agreement that DOE
negotiates annually with a contractor.
B-281907 Page 7 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
deficiencies indicating a lack of management attention. In 1996,
an evaluation noted that while the ITP benzene issue was a key
issue, no single manager had been designated as having overall
responsibility for the resolution of the issue and the
implementation of the resolution program had been fragmented and
was not integrated. In addition, a 1995 evaluation noted that
insufficient resources had been assigned to meet the project's
schedule. (See app. II for examples of the deficiencies identified
in the award fee reports.)
Although DOE included the ITP project in its award fee
determination for the high- level waste program as a whole, there
was no indication that the deficiencies found in the ITP project
affected the amount of the award fee until fiscal year 1998-- when
the project had been formally suspended. From 1990 through 1997,
Westinghouse received, on average, 69 percent of
the available fee, or about $3 million per fee period, for
activities associated with the high- level waste program. In 1998,
after DOE and Westinghouse had agreed to make the ITP project a
performance- based incentive project, DOE evaluated Westinghouse
on ITP performance. Had Westinghouse resolved the technical issues
and put the ITP facility into operation, it could have earned up
to a $2 million award. Instead, DOE deducted $1 million from
Westinghouse's total fee award because the ITP facility remained
inoperable.
The DOE Savannah River officials responsible for overseeing the
ITP project told us that the project was poorly defined up front
and that this had led to higher costs and greater delays. However,
according to DOE, the
site has made improvements in project management in recent years.
For example, DOE noted that as a result of a National Research
Council report, DOE and Westinghouse performed a self- assessment
of the site's project management and developed and implemented a
project management improvement plan in 1998.
Managing the Project's Start- up Posed Difficulties The ITP
project was managed on a fast- track schedule-- design and
construction being done concurrently-- with an emphasis on pushing
ahead in the belief that the problems could be solved later.
Wanting to have the ITP process ready in time to provide
precipitate to the Defense Waste Processing Facility, project
managers began construction of the ITP facility before the design
of the ITP process was completed. Rather than expediting the ITP
project, this approach caused a series of delays that prolonged
the project for 10 years while costs mounted. A number of studies
in the early 1990s noted this problem, as the following examples
show:
B-281907 Page 8 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
A 1992 Westinghouse management assessment concluded that a number
of start- up activities were begun prematurely-- before the
foundation for an efficient program was in place. 10 The key
weaknesses observed included a lack of a technical baseline and a
potential for disconnects and inconsistencies among the project's
various activities because their integration was incomplete. Our
1992 report on Savannah River's Defense Waste Processing Facility,
which included the ITP project, cited the fast- track management
method being used as having contributed to the project's cost
growth. Our report also stated that there was a risk associated
with that method, especially when used with unique and complex
facilities. We recommended that an assessment be made comparing
ITP to an
alternative technology. 11 The 1993 Red Team report noted that
the project's start- up was not being managed as a first- of- a-
kind chemical processing system. It stated
that Westinghouse was not following the accepted chemical
engineering practice of completing process development,
demonstrating the operability of the process on a pilot scale, and
assessing all long- term impacts and requirements for sustaining
the process before beginning production plant operations. The Red
Team recommended that alternatives to the ITP process be
considered.
Westinghouse acknowledged that the risks associated with new
applications of existing technologies were not managed well on the
ITP project in terms of building enough time into the schedule to
allow for the kinds of technical problems that arose. DOE Savannah
River officials noted that ITP was a first- of- a- kind process
for which no proven technology
was available. They said that the project was complicated by the
fact that, because of funding constraints, they had to scale up
the technology from lab tests to full- scale without the benefit
of additional test facilities. DOE
officials explained that they considered alternatives to ITP as
the project progressed. From 1992 through 1994, comparisons were
made between ITP and alternative technologies. DOE said it
determined that risks were
inherent in ITP and the alternative processes but that costs still
favored the ITP process, so the project proceeded. 10 Management
Assessment: In- Tank Precipitation Project, Westinghouse Savannah
River Company (Mar. 1992). 11 Nuclear Waste: Defense Waste
Processing Facility Cost, Schedule, and Technical Issues
(GAO/RCED-92-183, June 17, 1992).
B-281907 Page 9 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Some of the officials we interviewed characterized the ITP
project's schedule as aggressive, while others described it as a
fast- track project in which construction began without a complete
design package in order to compress the project's schedule.
Westinghouse managed the project's start- up phase through
parallel activities, according to a former director of the DOE
Savannah River High- Level Waste Program. The original scheduled
completion date of 1988 was never realistic for a technical
project like ITP, according to the director. Because DOE wanted to
have
the ITP process ready in time to provide precipitate to the
Defense Waste Processing Facility, the design of the ITP process
was completed at the same time as the construction of the ITP
facility and was managed in a reactive manner, according to an ITP
program manager. In response to a recommendation in a 1998
National Research Council report, 12 the DOE Savannah River High-
Level Waste Division Director said
DOE is now attempting to manage the high- level waste program, of
which ITP is a part, using a systems engineering approach that
dictates more testing be done up front.
Oversight and Visibility Were Limited by the Project's Budgetary
Treatment DOE paid for the ITP project with operating funds
instead of capital construction funds, which caused the project to
receive less oversight and
visibility. Capital construction projects are subject to periodic
reviews and reports, and those costing $5 million or more are
shown as line items in the budget requests DOE submits to the
Congress. 13 Projects paid for with operating funds are not
subject to these requirements. DOE officials said they used
operating funds for the ITP project because throughout the life of
the project, they had expected the technical issues to be solved
shortly and
thus believed the conversion of the project to a line item in the
budget was not warranted. We raised concerns about this budgeting
practice in 1992, noting that because projects associated with
Savannah River's Defense Waste Processing Facility were being
funded from operating accounts, the
Congress was not receiving enough information to fully understand
the magnitude of the continuing cost increases and delays. 14 DOE,
however, 12 Assessing the Need for Independent Project Reviews in
the Department of Energy, National Research Council (Jan. 1998).
13 Prior to fiscal year 1997, capital- funded projects costing $2
million or more were to be line items. 14 GAO/RCED-92-183, June
17, 1992.
B-281907 Page 10 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
continued its practice of using operating funds for the ITP
project because it considered the technical issues to be solvable
in the short term. Inadequate Understanding of the ITP Process
Extended the Project
For many years, DOE and its contractors did not completely
understand the ITP chemistry that caused excess benzene to be
generated. Until recently, the Westinghouse staff at the Savannah
River Site believed that the principal cause was the decomposition
of the sodium tetraphenylborate
that was added to the high- level waste during the ITP process to
precipitate cesium from the waste solution. They believed that the
benzene became trapped in the solution and was released because of
the addition of water and mixing. In 1997, after a recommendation
by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, additional
research into the chemistry revealed that one or more catalysts
were present in the waste solution that reacted with the sodium
tetraphenylborate and produced large amounts of benzene. The
contractor based its initial belief on the results of a full-
scale test conducted in 1983 and on subsequent bench- scale tests.
For the 1983 test, sodium tetraphenylborate was added to a tank
with about 500,000 gallons of waste. During the test, good
separation of high- level waste occurred. However, a significant
release of benzene was also observed that for 6 hours was higher
than the instruments in the tank could register. As a result,
additional studies were conducted. In the mid- 1980s, work at the
University of Florida showed similar benzene phenomena but
concluded, incorrectly, that the cause was the benzene's being
trapped in the solution and released by water. Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board officials told us that the University of
Florida laboratory- scale testing provided an incomplete set of
data that was consistent with observed data from the 1983
demonstration; however, the university's approach did not include
a systematic evaluation of all potential contributors to benzene
generation, retention, and release. The Safety Board also told us
that additional tests in 1987 and 1994 by the Savannah River
Technology Center could not reproduce the high benzene rates.
These test results were an indication
that the ITP process was not fully understood. In 1994, however, a
Westinghouse High- Level Waste Review Committee examined the
highlevel waste process at the Savannah River Site and concluded
that the ITP process was well understood and that the
understanding of the chemistry was adequate. Until after the 1995
start- up test, no comprehensive analysis was done to determine
why the benzene was being produced and released-
DOE Savannah River and the contractor assumed they knew the
reasons.
B-281907 Page 11 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
According to many DOE ITP project employees with whom we spoke,
the test in 1983 was viewed as successful and provided credibility
to the project's technology. An ITP engineer told us that the fact
that the benzene level went over the instrumentation scale for 6
hours was not widely known. The test results that indicated that
the release of benzene
exceeded the levels the instrumentation could measure seemed to
have been forgotten over time. For example, two ITP project
managers involved with the project since 1997 told us they were
unaware of this aspect of the test.
During the development of the ITP process, we and the Red Team
raised the following concerns about the ITP process:
In 1992, we raised concerns about the ITP process's unresolved
technical issues and delays and recommended that the Secretary of
Energy direct that an assessment of an alternative technology (the
ion
exchange process) be prepared to determine whether DOE should
replace the ITP process. 15 In 1993, the Red Team noted that the
chemistry of the ITP process was not adequately understood and
that ITP appeared to cause more problems than it solved. These
problems included a need to control benzene emissions; increased
flammability risks; increased risk from aerosols, foams, and
respirable particulates; increased chemical reactivity of high-
level waste leading to possible explosions; and the
introduction of extremely complex organic chemistry. The Red Team
also questioned whether sodium tetraphenylborate, the chemical
used in the ITP process, was the best way to remove cesium from
the liquid waste. It concluded that effective technologies were
available and could be implemented. It noted that if the
environmental regulators in South Carolina adopted a more
restrictive benzene emissions policy, the entire high- level waste
complex, as well as the Savannah River Site itself, would be
better served by a thorough reevaluation of alternative
technologies. DOE Savannah River officials told us that they
considered the concerns
that were raised but did not change their approach for a number of
reasons. In their view, in 1992 and 1993, ITP was considered to be
the best technology available for the type of high- level waste
the Savannah River Site had. They said that the ion exchange
technology for separating waste 15 GAO/RCED-92-183, June 17, 1992.
B-281907 Page 12 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
that was in use at that time at the West Valley Site in New York
would not have worked effectively on the Savannah River wastes. It
was not until late 1995 that Sandia National Laboratory developed
a new resin for ion exchange that should be able to process the
Savannah River Site's type of waste, according to these officials.
They noted that this alternative still poses a significant risk
since it has only recently become available and has never been
used on Savannah River's type of waste. In addition, they had
believed that they understood ITP's benzene generation problems
and thought the problems had been identified, evaluated, and
resolved. A number of modifications were made to the ITP facility,
primarily to address the generation of benzene and to meet more
stringent safety standards that were adopted for all of DOE's
facilities. Throughout this period, DOE
Savannah River officials said that they considered the ITP process
to have the lowest technical risk and the lowest cost of all the
alternatives. They also noted that until the process was started
up, there was no known scientifically based reason to believe that
ITP would not be successful as designed.
ITP's Suspension Altered the Site's Plans and Delayed Cleanup The
failure of the ITP process has caused DOE to reexamine and modify
its approach to cleaning up the high- level waste at Savannah
River. If building
and operating the alternative process is delayed, cost increases
may be expected because the production of additional glass
canisters may be necessary. The potential environmental impacts
also may increase if delays cause high- level waste to be stored
in the site's higher- risk tanks.
Originally, the plan was to clean up the high- level waste by
having the Defense Waste Processing Facility produce glass
canisters from a mixture of waste sludge and the high- level
precipitate produced by the ITP facility. Westinghouse officials
stated that the current plans are to rearrange the schedule to
allow sludge- only processing until the high- level waste becomes
available from whatever alternative process is used in place of
ITP. Officials expect that they can process sludge- only canisters
until 2007
without affecting the total number of canisters to be ultimately
produced (about 5,200 canisters at a life- cycle cost of $13.6
billion to $17.4 billion). If the start- up of the alternative
process is delayed beyond that time,
Westinghouse officials said they would need to consider slowing
down the sludge- only production or consider producing
precipitate- only canisters. Either of these options may cause the
program's costs to rise.
Slowing down the cleanup could raise costs because leaving the
high- level waste in the deteriorating storage tanks for a longer
period increases the
B-281907 Page 13 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
risks of leaks and potential environmental impacts that may
require expensive cleanup efforts. Producing precipitate- only
canisters will also raise costs. When precipitate waste and sludge
are used in combination,
the waste dissolves into the glass and does not create additional
volume; hence, fewer canisters need to be made if precipitate and
sludge can be combined. If production is switched to precipitate-
only and sludge- only
canisters, extra canisters will have to be made. The present
average lifecycle cost for each canister ranges from $2. 6 million
to $3.3 million.
Delaying the cleanup will also affect the site's ability to store
newly generated high- level waste, a problem that carries risks
and costs of its own. Savannah River's current operations could
fill the available storage
space by 2007. The site would then have to build additional tanks
or use older storage tanks that are more prone to leaks to store
the newly generated waste. DOE's 1998 High- Level Waste Plans
state that should the older tanks be needed, they may have to be
upgraded by installing modified
leak detection systems and seals, refurbishing ventilation
systems, repairing or upgrading pumps, and installing waste pipes
and valves. Using these older tanks or delays in building and
operating the alternative to the ITP process may have an impact on
an agreement the site has with the state of South Carolina and the
U. S. Environmental Protection Agency. As part of the agreed waste
removal plan and schedule for the site, DOE
has committed to closing certain of the older high- level waste
tanks by no later than 2022. If no alternative is instituted for
the ITP process, other approaches to cleaning up the wastes in
Savannah River's storage tanks would need to be investigated.
Westinghouse told us that if it is not possible to separate the
high- level and low- level components of the liquid waste, all of
the waste
will have to be handled as high- level waste. That would mean
processing the 31 million gallons of liquid waste into glass,
yielding an additional 118,000 canisters at an estimated cost of
over $75 billion. Recognizing the magnitude of this approach, DOE
officials said that other options would
need to be developed and pursued to address the Savannah River
tank waste.
B-281907 Page 14 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
DOE Is in the Process of Selecting an Alternative to ITP Soon
after the suspension of the ITP project, a number of teams were
formed to recommend an alternative technology and to evaluate the
selection process. In October 1998, Westinghouse recommended to
DOE Savannah River that the small tank precipitation process be
adopted as the preferred alternative and that the ion exchange
process be the secondary option. Westinghouse estimates that it
could cost as much as $1 billion and
take over 7 years to design, develop, construct, and test either
of these alternatives. DOE's Savannah River office did not agree
that there was sufficient differentiation between the options to
focus only on small tank precipitation and recommended further
development of three technologies: small tank precipitation, ion
exchange, and direct disposal in grout. DOE's Office of
Environmental Management approved this approach to explore the
three alternatives. (See app. III for additional
information on the three alternatives.) The Selection Process
Considered a Number of Alternatives
Soon after the ITP project was suspended, DOE and Westinghouse
began activities to select an alternative. At DOE's direction,
Westinghouse established the High- Level Waste Salt Disposition
Systems Engineering Team (Westinghouse Systems Engineering Team)
in March 1998. This team was composed of employees from
Westinghouse and its partners, with outside consultant support
from academia, the National Laboratories, and
the DOE complex. The purpose of this team was to identify and
recommend alternative processing options. The Westinghouse Systems
Engineering Team began its study by identifying 142 potential
alternatives to ITP. The identification process
included coordinating with various National Laboratories and
conducting a literature search to define the universe of options.
The team then narrowed down the options to 18 alternatives for
further evaluation. In July 1998, after these alternatives were
studied with visits to the facilities and laboratories involved in
their development and use, the team further narrowed the selection
to four alternatives. The Westinghouse Systems
Engineering Team then performed a risk analysis and evaluation of
the four alternatives. Using as criteria cost, technical maturity,
risk management, safety, professional judgment of the team,
historical experience, and the needs of the Savannah River Site
and the DOE complex, the team recommended a preferred alternative
and a secondary option.
B-281907 Page 15 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
In addition to the Westinghouse Systems Engineering Team, other
teams were formed to assist in the process (app. IV provides
additional information on the various teams):
The Independent Project Evaluation Team (Independent Review
Team), established by DOE headquarters, was to independently
provide oversight of the process being followed in selecting the
alternative. The Savannah River Review Team, established by DOE
Savannah River, was to oversee the Westinghouse Systems
Engineering Team.
The Westinghouse Review Panel Team, established by Westinghouse,
was to provide oversight and input on the approach and
decisionmaking process for the final selection of the preferred
alternatives. It has concurred with the Westinghouse Systems
Engineering Team's recommendation. Westinghouse
Recommended Two Alternatives
On October 29, 1998, Westinghouse recommended the use of small
tank precipitation. This process is similar to the ITP process. It
uses the same chemical to cause the precipitation of the high-
level waste constituents, and as a result, benzene is generated.
However, several differences exist. For example, two 15,000-
gallon tanks would be used to treat the high- level waste instead
of two 1. 3 million- gallon tanks, allowing for the process to be
completed in about 24 hours rather than taking weeks and thus
reducing the time during which benzene could build up in the
tanks. In addition, the tanks would be made of stainless steel and
cooled to reduce chemical volatility and benzene production. With
these features, Westinghouse believes that the process can be used
safely and effectively. In its final report, the Westinghouse
Systems Engineering Team noted that while the small tank
precipitation process did not have the lowest life- cycle cost, it
had the lowest project construction cost, the highest scientific
maturity, and the most manageable risk and was judged to have the
highest likelihood of success. 16 In addition, the report noted
that the safety concerns caused by the generation of flammable
benzene were considered and were addressed. As a backup
technology, the Westinghouse Systems Engineering Team
selected crystalline silicotitanate non- elutable ion exchange.
This process 16 Final Report, High- Level Waste Salt Disposition
Systems Engineering Team, Westinghouse, RP- 98- 00170 (Dec. 1998).
B-281907 Page 16 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
uses a crystalline silicotitanate resin to remove the cesium and
monosodium titanate to remove the strontium, plutonium, and
uranium in the liquid waste. Ion exchange has been used at DOE's
Hanford and West Valley sites. However, the process recommended
for Savannah River
would use a different type of resin to cause the separation of the
high- level waste. Crystalline silicotitanate was developed by
Sandia National Laboratory and has been demonstrated on a small
scale at Oak Ridge
National Laboratory. It was selected as the second option because
of its costs, its scientific maturity, and the opportunity for
recovery from process performance problems.
The Savannah River Review Team evaluated the recommendations
offered by Westinghouse. The team concluded that the information
evaluated in the selection process and the resulting conclusions
were not sufficiently discriminating to select a preferred
alternative. The team recommended
that additional research and development activities be undertaken
to address the technical uncertainties associated with the ion
exchange and small tank precipitation technologies. In addition,
the team concluded that the option of direct disposal in grout
should not be eliminated from consideration because it provides a
way to significantly reduce construction and operating costs and
the team had high confidence in its technology, safety, and
technical feasibility. As a result, the Savannah River Review Team
recommended actions be initiated to identify and resolve the
potential regulatory, public, and legal risks and uncertainties
associated with this option. Table 1 compares the costs and
schedules for the small tank precipitation, ion exchange, and
grout processes. 17 17 High- Level Waste Salt Disposition Systems
Engineering Team. Dollars presented are escalated for inflation.
B-281907 Page 17 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Table 1: Cost and Schedule Data for Westinghouse's Recommended
Alternatives
The Independent Review Team established by DOE headquarters found
that both the small tank precipitation and ion exchange
alternatives are technically feasible and should meet all of
Savannah River's high- level waste requirements. The team, using
the same evidence and qualitative
selection criteria that the Westinghouse Systems Engineering Team
used, also found that ion exchange could have been selected as the
preferred alternative. The Independent Review Team agreed that
direct disposal in grout should be eliminated as an alternative
because of large uncertainties involving institutional and
regulatory issues. 18 The Independent Review Team recommended that
(1) all essential research and development activities be completed
for both alternatives, (2) quantitative criteria be formulated and
applied at the end of the research and development activities to
choose the primary alternative, and (3) a conceptual design phase
be initiated but complete only those activities common to both
alternatives until the primary alternative is chosen. The
Independent Review Team disagreed with the Westinghouse Systems
Engineering Team's inclusion of $557 million in the cost of the
ion exchange option to operate an incinerator over the life of the
project. The Independent Review Team noted that the incinerator is
not necessary for ion exchange and that excluding its cost would,
over the life of the project,
make ion exchange over $1 billion less expensive than the small
tank
Small tank precipitation Ion exchange Disposal in grout
Project capital cost $751 million $843 million $691 million Other
project costs $417 million $463 million $300 million Estimated
life- cycle cost $3, 440 million $3,081 million $2,335 million
Estimated plant start- up May 2006 March 2007 March 2006 Estimated
plant start- up, with contingency May 2010 January 2012 June 2015
Baseline date for tank emptying October 2020 March 2020 April 2018
Date for tank emptying, with contingency July 2024 February 2025
April 2028
18 The Independent Review Team noted that direct disposal in grout
would require a full environmental impact statement be done. In
addition, the team concluded that the grout containing the cesium
would need to be reclassified by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
as incidental waste from high- level waste, which could require
many years to complete. In commenting on a draft of this report,
DOE stated that an environmental impact statement is under way
considering all three alternatives. In addition, DOE commented
that it, rather than the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, will make
the incidental waste determination since this activity is covered
by the Atomic Energy Act.
B-281907 Page 18 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
process. Westinghouse officials told us that they disagree and
that the incinerator costs should be included in the cost of all
options. They said that the incinerator is already constructed and
will be operated regardless of the option selected. In addition,
the officials told us that the benzene produced by the small tank
process would be used as fuel for the incinerator, reducing the
need to purchase fuel.
DOE Savannah River plans to conduct additional research and
testing to further evaluate the technical, regulatory, and public
acceptance risks associated with the three alternatives. (See app.
V for information on the planned research, testing, and other
activities to be conducted before a selection decision is made.)
Because the three alternatives constitute a change in the
previously planned operations, a supplemental environmental impact
statement will be prepared to determine if a proposed action is
(1) compatible with existing regulatory requirements, (2)
acceptable to regulatory agencies, and (3) acceptable to the
general public. DOE Savannah River is also studying ways to
maximize the site's existing storage tank space to accommodate any
of the three alternatives. DOE plans to complete the research and
testing activities necessary to
identify a preferred alternative by September 30, 1999. DOE
headquarters will make the final decision on the preferred
alternative and expects a record of decision document to be
completed by mid- 2000. Conclusions A number of factors
contributed to the delays and cost increases of the intank
precipitation project. In our view, among the most important were
ineffective management and oversight. This project was not handled
the
way a high- risk, first- of- a- kind construction project should
be, and as a result, the associated program structures and project
designs were not adequate. Allowing the project to be funded with
operating funds rather than making it a capital line item
contributed to this situation because it limited the visibility of
the project. Additionally, while the Department of Energy's award
fee process noted numerous significant deficiencies on the part of
the contractor, there is no evidence that the deficiencies
affected the fees until 1998. Another contributing factor was the
lack of adequate early testing and a complete understanding of the
in- tank precipitation process. In 1983, when the first test was
conducted, benzene was produced in amounts that went off the scale
of the tank's instruments. However, the test was viewed as a
success because the high- level waste was separated from the
solution. Even though we, the Red Team, and others raised
concerns, the
B-281907 Page 19 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Department of Energy and the contractor assumed they knew the
reason for the benzene problem and thought they could work out a
solution, so they proceeded. Unfortunately, the testing that was
done did not correctly identify the specific cause of the excess
benzene nor were large- scale tests
attempted again before Westinghouse started up the facility in
1995. Since the project's suspension, the Department and
Westinghouse have taken steps that, if fully implemented, should
better ensure a successful alternative. For example, the
Department and Westinghouse have identified and evaluated numerous
alternatives to the in- tank precipitation process. Independent
review processes are being used to consider alternatives as well
as to examine the selection process being used.
Agency Comments We provided a draft of this report to the
Department of Energy for its review and comment, and the
Department provided its comments in a
letter and three enclosures. The letter and enclosure I, which
contain the Department's overall comments and a historical and
technical perspective on the in- tank precipitation project, are
included in this report as appendix
VI. DOE's enclosures II and III, which are not included in this
report, contain more detailed comments that we incorporated into
the report as appropriate. DOE recognized that weaknesses within
the Department and on the part of the contractor contributed to
the failure of the in- tank precipitation process. Moreover, DOE
stated that it recognized that there were management and oversight
issues identified that were not adequately addressed in a timely
fashion. DOE also pointed out two other reasons for the difficulty
with the in- tank precipitation project: (1) The project was
attempting to solve a very challenging technical problem in that
no proven technologies were available for the Savannah River high-
level waste stream, and (2) the project was implemented at a time
of rapidly changing standards as the DOE complex made the
transition from chemical to nuclear safety standards. We agree
that the two factors that DOE cited could have contributed to the
delays and cost growth. For example, our report discusses the
technical challenges that DOE and the contractor faced and
identifies the changing standards as a reason for some of the
delays. While these factors contributed to the delays and cost
growth, the weaknesses in management and oversight were the
primary factor.
DOE also stated that it has taken a number of positive steps in
the past 18 months to ensure that a safe, economical, and high-
confidence alternative
B-281907 Page 20 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
is successfully implemented to treat the Savannah River Site's
tank waste. Examples the Department cited include (1) the use of a
disciplined systems engineering approach in the selection of final
alternatives; (2) the use by both headquarters and Savannah River
of independent review teams to provide oversight feedback directly
to senior management; (3) the use of pilot- scale demonstrations
to validate technology and engineering; (4) a
higher level of safety awareness for all aspects of activities at
Savannah River through the implementation of DOE's Functions,
Responsibilities, and Authorities Manual; and (5) the application
of lessons learned not only to project management but also to
high- level waste processing across DOE's complex. This report
discusses many of the activities that DOE identified. While DOE
has taken a number of actions that, if fully implemented, should
better ensure a successful alternative will be found, it will be
many months before the selection process is complete and the
alternative selected is ultimately built. Until that time, it will
not be known whether these activities have been sufficient to
achieve the desired results. Scope and Methodology
To examine the factors for the ITP project's delays and cost
growth, we examined various internal and external reports about
ITP and the highlevel waste cleanup process. In addition, we
interviewed DOE and contractor officials involved with the project
at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina and officials at DOE
headquarters in Washington, D. C. We also discussed the issues
with officials of the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board and DOE's Office of Inspector General and with the
University of Florida professor who was involved with ITP testing.
To determine the effect of the ITP project's suspension on the
Savannah River Site's cleanup plans and costs, we examined the
site's cleanup plans prior to the suspension and afterwards. We
also interviewed DOE and
contractor officials to get their views on any potential impact
that the suspension may have on the cleanup program.
To gather information on DOE's plans for developing an alternative
technology, we met with the leader of the Westinghouse Systems
Engineering Team. We also reviewed the team's final report and the
supporting documents generated by the team. We discussed the final
selection with DOE officials at the Savannah River Site and
reviewed the final report completed by DOE headquarters'
Independent Review Team.
We conducted our work from April 1998 through April 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
B-281907 Page 21 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
As arranged with your office, we plan no further distribution of
this report until 15 days after the date of this letter unless you
publicly announce the contents earlier. At that time, we will send
copies to the Honorable Bill Richardson, Secretary of Energy; the
Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and other interested parties. We will make copies available to
others on request. If you or your staff have any questions about
this report, please contact me
at (202) 512- 3841. Major contributors to this report were Gene M.
Barnes, Gary Malavenda, and Glen Trochelman.
Sincerely yours, (Ms.) Gary L. Jones Associate Director, Energy,
Resources, and Science Issues
Page 22 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Cost of the In- Tank Precipitation
Project and Its Associated Facilities
24 Appendix II Examples of ITP Deficiencies Identified by the
Award Fee Board
25 Appendix III Final Three Alternative Technologies
30 Appendix IV Characteristics of Teams Involved in Selecting
Alternatives
to the ITP Process 31
Appendix V Research, Testing, and Other Activities
Planned to Support the Final Technology Decision
32
Contents Page 23 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Energy
37 Tables Table 1: Cost and Schedule Data for Westinghouse's
Recommended Alternatives 17
Abbreviations
CST crystalline silicotitanate DOE Department of Energy GAO
General Accounting Office ITP in- tank precipitation
Page 24 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix I Cost of the In- Tank Precipitation Project and Its
Associated Facilities Appendi x I
a Other project costs include testing, training, and operational
readiness reviews. b Operating costs include the cost to run the
facility after it became operational. c This facility reduces the
nitrite concentration of the precipitate from the in- tank
precipitation (ITP) process. If not removed, nitrites could foul
the Defense Waste Processing Facility's heat transfer surfaces and
plug filters and instrumentation. d This part of the Defense Waste
Processing Facility prepares the precipitate to be fed to the
melter.
e This tank stores benzene for recovery. f This facility processes
low- level radioactive liquid waste from the ITP facility. The
waste remaining after the high- level precipitate has been removed
is mixed with a blend of cement, fly ash, and blast furnace slag
to form a grout. This grout is pumped into disposal vaults where
it hardens into a nonhazardous form of waste. Sources: The
Department of Energy and Westinghouse Savannah River Corporation.
Dollars in thousands Facility
Total estimated construction
costs Other project costs a Operating
cost b Total
In- tank precipitation $157,096 $151,234 $18, 800 $327, 130 Late
wash facility c 51,720 10,334 4, 000 66, 054 Salt process cell d
15,000 15,000 - 30, 000 Organic waste storage tank e 4,000 1, 000
- 5, 000
Saltstone facility f 25,392 2, 539 32, 698 60, 629 Total $253,208
$180,107 $55, 498 $488, 813
Page 25 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix II Examples of ITP Deficiencies Identified by the Award
Fee Board Appendi x I I
The following examples of deficiencies were identified in
Department of Energy's (DOE) Award Fee Board reports covering the
period from April 1, 1990, through March 31, 1998. The
deficiencies are shown in chronological order. April 1, 1990-
September 30, 1990. Progress was slow in the establishment of
detailed schedules and in commitment to meeting scheduled dates.
Schedules were finally developed for the in- tank precipitation
(ITP) project but lacked some required details for the operations
readiness and start- up reviews. October 1, 1990- March 31, 1991.
Overall start- up management and
planning is weak (in reference to efforts to meet or exceed
commercial nuclear industry standards). The lack of overall
planning and management of restart and start- up activities for
ITP continues to further impose delays.
April 1, 1991- September 30, 1991. The contractor's performance in
the ITP start- up activities fell far below expectations as
evidenced by a lack of commitment to the continually revised
schedules. Overall start- up management is weak for ITP;
Westinghouse's commitment to schedule is lacking. The scheduled
start- up for ITP was delayed during this period
from April 1991 to early 1992. The schedule currently presented to
DOE has several deficiencies, and it appears that start- up will
be further delayed. DOE has identified concerns in training,
testing, operations readiness review, design basis documentation,
and the quality of the schedules. The
management of ITP is a carryover concern from the last award fee
period, and no improvements have been made. In fact, DOE's concern
has heightened over this period. Immediate Westinghouse management
attention is required to correct this problem. Westinghouse
submitted an integrated plan for interim waste activities, but
there is a concern that
these schedules may not be effectively treated as a management
tool. It appears that Westinghouse facility managers are not held
accountable to these schedules. October 1, 1991- March 31, 1992.
Management attention was needed to ensure the inclusion of
complete resource loading for the ITP schedules. ITP project work
also experienced some problems with project costs. The culture
change required to improve the conduct of operations sitewide has
not been effectively emphasized by lower- level management to
bring it to reality.
Appendix II Examples of ITP Deficiencies Identified by the Award
Fee Board
Page 26 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility April 1,
1992- September 30, 1992. Westinghouse delayed initiation of the
DOE operational readiness review for the ITP simulant testing
phase because of major deficiencies in the ITP training program.
Although this caused delays in the overall schedule,
Westinghouse's decision to delay the
operations readiness review probably avoided even more significant
delays in the schedule had the training deficiencies not been
resolved. The potential for ITP to experience considerable cost
overruns was identified in April, and the revised budget remains
undefined. Performance against
planned work was not adequately monitored, technical documents had
deficiencies indicating a lack of management attention, and
performance of the waste removal program was poor because of the
lack of basis and adequate planning for waste removal to support
the Defense Waste
Processing Facility.
October 1, 1992- March 31, 1993. The milestones for initiating
radioactive operation of ITP and starting removal from one storage
tank, Tank 41, were not met. This is evidence of continued poor
planning and management of activities associated with ITP. An
unanticipated criticality issue prevented the milestone to start
the removal of waste from Tank 41 from being realized and has
required new efforts to identify alternative feed sources for ITP.
A number of prominent technical issues, such as the soils and
geotechnical issue and the benzene stripper issue, continue to
delay
ITP start- up.
April 1, 1993- September 30, 1993. Major program milestones were
not met for ITP. Poor budget management resulted in the
curtailment of key activities late in the fiscal year. Because of
poor implementation of the cost collection and maintenance system,
Westinghouse reported a shortage of funding for important
programs, including ITP, that would delay work.
Westinghouse has not performed adequate staffing reviews.
Engineering support for equipment and process problems at ITP has
been poor. Weaknesses in the general management of the ITP project
resulted in Westinghouse not being ready for facility start- up.
The ITP start- up schedule revision has not been submitted, even
though it has been known
for several months that the October 20, 1993, operations readiness
review date was unachievable. A realistic date for being ready to
start the operations readiness review has not yet been determined.
Several other plant modifications that remain to be completed
could further delay the schedule.
April 1, 1994- September 30, 1994. Cost and schedule overruns
incurred at ITP were not adequately managed to minimize the impact
(i. e.,
Appendix II Examples of ITP Deficiencies Identified by the Award
Fee Board
Page 27 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
forecasting was not timely, effective workarounds were not
proposed). Senior Westinghouse management effort on cost reduction
and productivity initiatives appears to be diminishing, is not
integrated, and lacks creativity and innovation. Inadequate
planning resulted in items being identified by the ITP readiness
self- assessment that contributed to cost overruns. ITP operators
have not been adequately trained prior to
conducting drills on emergency operating procedures. Westinghouse
did not take the actions necessary to prevent procedure
development from becoming a critical path to the operations
readiness review, and this has contributed to a delay in the start
of the Westinghouse operations readiness review and potentially in
the start of operations. Management of the readiness self-
assessment process following initial field assessments was not
effective in supporting the schedule. Finding closure was not well
organized, and management did not readily make a clear, defensible
declaration of readiness to start the Westinghouse operations
readiness
review. Cost overruns on ITP required downturns in other high-
level waste programs during the last half of fiscal year 1994.
Downturn actions were initiated with little or no communication
with DOE counterparts.
Consequently, some items that were thought to be priority tasks
were eliminated without DOE's concurrence. Management attention
needs to be focused on cost control. Accountability for
maintaining cost control needs to be established as a management
priority. Cost reduction and productivity efforts have diminished
from what was a fairly aggressive program at the beginning of the
period. Proposed reductions to meet fiscal year 1995 budget
reduction goals lacked innovation and were not aggressive. Most
efforts in this area are driven by DOE's initiatives.
October 1, 1994- May 31, 1995. ITP scheduling remains a
significant weakness in that it is not always resource- loaded
properly, resulting in missed milestones (e. g., the radiological
operations start date is projected to slip). The commitment date
for ITP operating safety requirement
implementation was missed, and a revised commitment date was not
provided. The ITP schedule for completing the activities that are
required to start operations in July 1995 is projected to slip
until September 1995 or later. Schedule deficiencies continue at
ITP in that the schedules are not resource- loaded to project
realistic and achievable milestone dates in all cases. Improvement
in recovery planning is needed at ITP to minimize schedule
slippage. ITP lacked aggressive effort to resolve readiness
selfassessment
and Westinghouse operations readiness review findings. October 1,
1995- March 31, 1996. Effective management of critical engineering
issues, project activities, and technology development
Appendix II Examples of ITP Deficiencies Identified by the Award
Fee Board
Page 28 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
demonstrations at ITP and the tank farms do not meet DOE's
expectations in that they are not timely or properly resource-
loaded to meet projected schedules. While the ITP benzene issue is
a key issue, no single manager has been designated overall
responsibility for resolving it. Schedule logic
and supporting details are not identified. Implementation of the
resolution program for the ITP benzene issue has been fragmented
and is not integrated. In addition, the plan does not clearly
identify the actions necessary to develop a bounding model for
benzene generation and release for future operations. Conduct- of-
operations issues were experienced that involved status control
and conduct of special procedures. System status
control involving special procedures resulted in the failure to
maintain proper system status during the performance of a special
procedure, which led to the inadvertent draining of an ITP filter.
Communication failure had a further impact on this multifacility
operation, causing uncoordinated efforts between a tank farm and
ITP. April 1, 1996- September 30, 1996. Progress at ITP toward the
resolution of benzene problems for the precipitate feed to the
Defense Waste Processing Facility was slow. There has been a lack
of significant progress. Significant weaknesses exist in
management's commitment to
the resolution of technical issues, which resulted in
inefficiencies in engineering services, schedule slippage, and
ultimately rendered the highlevel waste system inoperable for
precipitate feed. Conduct of operations was less than expected at
ITP. During the rating period, management and leadership did not
pursue issues in an effective and integrated manner to resolve the
benzene issue, even with emphasis from DOE. The lack of final
needs input from the chemistry team and authorization basis is
resulting in at- risk designs and schedules. What was projected as
a $13 million safety upgrade in August 1996 has grown to an
estimated $28.06 million. An
additional concern is the number of lapses in conduct of
operations. The contractor did not fully meet customer
expectations in terms of bringing ITP into fully integrated
operation because of the excessive benzene
generated in the process. DOE's main concern from the last report
that is, poor project management resulting in schedule slippage
and cost overruns-- was not adequately addressed.
October 1, 1996- March 31, 1997. System status control execution
at ITP is below DOE's expectations. The development of a path
forward and progress toward the resolution of the ITP vapor space
mixing issue (testing, computer modeling) were unacceptable in
support of the ITP safety analysis report development. This issue
was critical to the successful resolution of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board's
Appendix II Examples of ITP Deficiencies Identified by the Award
Fee Board
Page 29 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Recommendation 96- 1 and to providing a defensible safety basis
for resuming ITP processing. Attention by Westinghouse management
is needed on the resolution of these issues. Several operational
programs have not progressed as expected. During a January 1996
assessment at ITP, DOE staff identified numerous deficiencies with
the system status files that resulted in a concern being issued.
DOE staff again looked at the status
files in October 1996, and although a noticeable improvement was
evident, numerous deficiencies were still noted.
April 1, 1997- September 30, 1997. ITP had several events that
indicated the need for increased personnel awareness of
authorization basis requirements as well. Examples included the
failure to recognize the requirements for slurry pump lockout
during air- based operations and the use of inoperable equipment
to satisfy limited condition for operation action items. While
increased management attention resulted in significant
improvements in many areas, improvement in the basic conduct of
operations principles did not meet DOE's expectations for the ITP
facilities. Of particular concern was the number of instances
involving the failure to execute the fundamental principle of
procedural compliance, and the number of minor equipment and
programmatic deficiencies identified by DOE personnel that were
not been previously identified by facility personnel and entered
into corrective action processes.
October 1, 1997- March 31, 1998. At the ITP facility, high liquid
level conductivity probes were positioned incorrectly, which
failed to preserve assumptions from the safety analysis review.
The distributed control system replacement work at the ITP control
room was behind schedule because it was not well planned; the
outage was disorganized without a predetermined path to complete,
test, and exit the outage. Completion of ITP cost project physical
work was slower than expected. Facility modifications were
scheduled to be completed for a June 1997 start- up,
then for an October 1997 start- up, and then for a January 1998
start- up. None of the dates were met.
Page 30 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix III Final Three Alternative Technologies Appendi x I I I
Source: Westinghouse Savannah River Corporation.
Alternative Description
Small tank precipitation This process involves adding sodium
tetraphenylborate to remove cesium and monosodium titanate to
remove strontium, plutonium, and uranium. Once these radioactive
elements are removed, some additional processing is done. The
solidified chemicals would then be sent to the Defense Waste
Processing Facility for vitrification. Crystalline silicotitanate
ion exchange A crystalline silicotitanate resin is used to remove
cesium, and monosodium titanate is used to remove strontium,
plutonium, and uranium. Once these radioactive elements are
removed, some additional processing is done. The solidified
chemicals would be sent to the Defense
Waste Processing Facility for vitrification. Direct disposal in
grout In this process, the cesium is not separated from the liquid
waste. Instead, the salt solution is made directly into grout.
Monosodium titanate would be used to remove strontium, plutonium,
and uranium; after some additional processing, these radioactive
elements would be sent to the Defense Waste Processing Facility
for vitrification.
Page 31 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix IV Characteristics of Teams Involved in Selecting
Alternatives to the ITP Process Appe ndi x I V
Sources: Westinghouse Savannah River Corporation and the
Department of Energy.
Review team Members Charter and timeframes
Westinghouse Systems Engineering Team 10 members (6 from
Westinghouse, 3 from external contractors, and 1 from a university
affiliate)
Formed in March 1998 by Westinghouse at DOE's direction. Determine
the best path forward for processing liquid waste. Recommendations
were provided to DOE Savannah River on October
29, 1998. Savannah River Review Team 10 members
(8 from DOE Savannah River's High- Level Waste Division and 2 from
DOE Savannah River's Science and Technology Division) Formed in
March 1998 by DOE Savannah River.
Provide technical oversight of the day- to- day activities of the
Westinghouse Systems Engineering Team. Review System Engineering
Team's results and provide a recommendation to the Manager of
Savannah River. Final site team report issued on December 17,
1998. Independent Review Team 11 members (2 from DOE, 8 from
private
firms, and 1 from a university affiliate) Formed in June 1998 by
DOE headquarters. Evaluate the process used by, and the results
of, the Westinghouse Systems Engineering Team. Review the cost
estimates developed by the Systems Engineering Team. Final review
and assessment issued on December 26, 1998. Westinghouse Review
Panel Team 8 members (4 senior Westinghouse
managers and 4 outside consultants)
Formed in June 1998 by Westinghouse. Provide oversight and input
on the approach and the decision- making process for the final
selection of the preferred alternative( s). Final report issued
November 14, 1998.
Page 32 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix V Research, Testing, and Other Activities Planned to
Support the Final Technology Decision Appe ndi x V
DOE Savannah River and Westinghouse are planning to conduct
additional research and testing before selecting the preferred
alternative technology for processing the high- level waste at the
Savannah River Site. The alternative technologies under
consideration are small tank precipitation, ion exchange, and
direct disposal in grout. DOE has developed a management plan that
describes the actions necessary to (1) further evaluate the
technical, regulatory, and public acceptance risks associated with
the three alternatives; (2) initiate a supplemental environmental
impact statement to address the alternatives; and (3) further
develop the management strategies
for the site's high- level waste tanks. In addition, a scope- of-
work matrix has been prepared for each alternative that identifies
such items as the testing and development activities to be
undertaken, their costs, and
the organizations involved. Small Tank Precipitation
The purpose of the small tank precipitation experimental program
outlined for fiscal year 1999 is to demonstrate that cesium and
strontium can be removed from high- level radioactive waste using
a continuous process. The precipitation of cesium by
tetraphenylborate and the absorption of strontium with monosodium
titanate have only been demonstrated on a
batch scale. This proof- of- concept testing has several
components, including the following:
Proper sizing of the components for the continuous processing of
the waste is to be determined. Tests are planned in a single
continuous test unit to provide such data. These tests will
develop data for cesium and strontium removal that will be used to
operate the small- scale continuous integrated tests. The impact
of washing the sodium from the precipitate is to be studied to
ensure that the excess sodium tetraphenylborate that is added to
the
waste is removed before the precipitate is transferred to the
Defense Waste Processing Facility. Tests that determine the
dissolution rate will be used to answer this question.
Tests are also to be conducted to demonstrate that the filtration
required for continuous concentration and washing can be done
using equipment that has been demonstrated on a batch basis.
The results of these tests will be used to provide input for a
small- scale integrated test that will demonstrate the feasibility
of a continuous small tank process. These tests will use simulated
waste solutions. An integrated test using actual waste will be
conducted to demonstrate that
Appendix V Research, Testing, and Other Activities Planned to
Support the Final Technology Decision
Page 33 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
the simulated tests are representative of the actual expected
performance of the small tank precipitation process. Testing will
also examine the continuous stirred tanks and verify that the
product from the small tank process is compatible with the Defense
Waste Processing Facility's requirements. DOE estimates that it
will spend about $2 million to conduct the research and testing on
the small tank precipitation process.
Ion Exchange One of the principal alternatives to ITP in the 1980s
and early 1990s was a process referred to as resorcinol-
formaldehyde ion exchange. In this process, originally developed
at the Savannah River Site, a bed of resin- like
material would capture cesium as waste solution passes over the
resin. The resin, in this case resorcinol- formaldehyde, would
then be washed to remove the cesium. DOE officials told us that
while this process was a
promising alternative, significant technical issues and potential
costs were involved. For example, there were problems with the
resin's swelling and shrinking, the instability of the resin in
the presence of various chemicals and in the presence of
radiation, the generation of gases, and a complex pretreatment
that was required. In 1983, DOE's contractor estimated that the
cost of using this technology was similar to the cost of ITP, but
the need for and cost of additional research and development led
to the selection of ITP. DOE officials said they continued working
on this resin until 1993,
when work was halted because of budget constraints. DOE was unable
to provide an estimate of the costs associated with this
development effort because it funded the activities with operating
funds. Crystalline silicotitanate (CST) ion exchange was invented
by researchers at Texas A& M University and Sandia National
Laboratory in 1992. CST ion exchange appeared to offer a number of
advantages over other types of ion exchange. For example, it
appeared to work on a wide variety of wastes. In 1993, as part of
DOE's Office of Science and Technology programs, Sandia and a
company, UOP, entered into a cooperative research and development
agreement in which UOP was to develop CST in powder form and in an
engineered form (beads, pellets, or granules) suitable for ion
exchange use. It took UOP about 18 months to complete its efforts.
In 1996, Oak Ridge National Laboratory began operating the Melton
Valley
demonstration project, which uses the CST ion exchange technology.
Over an 8- month period, Oak Ridge processed more than 30, 000
gallons of waste
Appendix V Research, Testing, and Other Activities Planned to
Support the Final Technology Decision
Page 34 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
and removed more than 1, 000 curies of cesium. 1 Oak Ridge plans
to continue using the demonstration plant to separate the cesium
from its tank waste. DOE estimates that about $25 million was
spent developing
and demonstrating the CST ion exchange process. DOE Savannah River
and Westinghouse have identified a number of uncertainties with
the CST ion exchange process. The management plan identifies
research and development to be conducted to address the
following issues: the effect of the waste solution, pressure, and
processing flow rates on
CST capacity; gas generation within the ion exchange column and
its effect on
performance; heat generation by radiological decay of large
accumulated quantities of cesium and its impact on CST's
stability, waste steam, and heat removal;
chemical stability during long- term exposure to heat and the
process stream; CST's performance on actual Savannah River waste;
and Defense Waste Processing Facility glass issues, including the
effect of a
component of CST (titanium) that may exceed the current glass
limits and operational issues associated with hydrogen generation
and potential foaming.
To conduct some of these tests, a bench- scale ion exchange column
will be used on actual Savannah River waste. In addition, some
tests have been conducted at Oak Ridge National Laboratory's
demonstration plant that uses the CST ion exchange technology.
About $2. 5 million is expected to be spent conducting the ion
exchange activities during fiscal year 1999. Direct Disposal in
Grout
The direct disposal in grout alternative is based on what DOE
considers to be generally mature and viable technology. Testing is
planned to address (1) the use of monosodium titanate, which is
needed to ensure that the grout waste form does not exceed
radioactive concentration limits, and (2) the leaching
characteristics of the grout waste form and its physical
characteristics and stability. Other physical properties of the
waste form
1 A curie is the amount of radioactivity in 1 gram of radium. DOE
officials told us that the concentration of cesium in the Savannah
River Site's waste is about 150 times that of the Oak Ridge waste
that was processed.
Appendix V Research, Testing, and Other Activities Planned to
Support the Final Technology Decision
Page 35 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
will be tested to determine whether they meet DOE's requirements.
For example, according to the management plan, the waste must
exhibit higher resistance to cracking when compressed than a
similar waste containing a
much lower concentration of cesium. DOE Savannah River will take
additional actions to evaluate the regulatory, legal, and public
acceptance risks associated with the direct disposal in grout
alternative. These actions include the following:
development of an incidental waste determination to support
disposal of the cesium in grout; discussion and consultation with
DOE headquarters' organizations; feedback discussions with the U.
S. Environmental Protection Agency
and the South Carolina Department of Heath, Environment, and
Conservation; and feedback discussions with the Citizen's
Advisory Board and the South
Carolina Governor's Office. Oversight and Final Selection
According to the management plan, the DOE Savannah River Review
Team will provide technical oversight of Westinghouse's day- to-
day activities, including attending meetings and discussions,
reviewing test plans and engineering documents, and evaluating
test results. The team will also review the final results and
provide a recommendation to the DOE
Savannah River Manager about which of the three alternative
technologies should be used. The recommendation is to be based on
a selection process that involves both quantitative and
qualitative evaluations of the alternatives. For example, a level
of confidence will be developed for each alternative in the areas
of technical uncertainty, schedule and mission impacts, safety and
environmental impacts, and regulator and public acceptance. An
evaluation of life- cycle and project costs will be considered in
comparing the alternatives and will be weighed against the
levels of confidence. The Independent Review Team organized by DOE
headquarters is continuing to provide oversight to the
Westinghouse and Savannah River activities. The team will conduct
an assessment of the research and development plan, perform an
analysis of its implementation, review test results, and offer
advice and assistance on technical issues to
Westinghouse and DOE Savannah River.
Appendix V Research, Testing, and Other Activities Planned to
Support the Final Technology Decision
Page 36 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
After the Savannah River Review Team makes its recommendation, the
Savannah River Manager will consider it and provide a
recommendation to DOE's Environmental Management office.
Environmental Management, with input from the Independent Review
Team, is to decide on the
preferred alternative. Once authorization is given, conceptual
design activities are to proceed. Detailed design is not to begin
until the supplemental environmental impact statement process has
confirmed the selection of the preferred alternative by
designating it in the final supplemental environmental impact
statement and the record of decision.
DOE estimates that this may occur in mid- 2000.
Page 37 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Energy Appe ndi x VI
Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Energy
Page 38 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Energy
Page 39 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility
Appendix VI Comments From the Department of Energy
Page 40 GAO/RCED-99-69 In- tank Precipitation Facility (141189)
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