Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program (Letter
Report, 12/03/98, GAO/RCED-99-25).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
status of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic
control modernization program, focusing on the: (1) status of the
overall modernization program, including its cost; (2) status of 18 key
modernization projects; and (3) challenges facing the overall
modernization program.
GAO noted that: (1) FAA, in collaboration with the aviation community,
has taken steps to restructure its multibillion-dollar modernization
program in order to achieve a more gradual and cost-effective approach
by limiting the scope of projects to more manageable segments; (2) under
FAA's new incremental approach, the agency plans to implement a new way
of managing air traffic in order to provide immediate improvements for
the system's safety, efficiency, and capacity; (3) under its most recent
financial plan, FAA estimates that the total cost of modernization will
be nearly $42 billion from fiscal year (FY) 1982 through FY 2004--a $3.8
billion increase since the agency's last financial plan in February
1998; (4) FAA's progress in meeting cost and schedule goals for its 18
key projects has been mixed; (5) under FAA's new phased approach to
modernization, two projects in GAO's review--Aeronautical Data Link and
Air Traffic Management--have been revised, resulting in new cost and
schedule estimates for those components that are planned for
implementation under free flight; (6) approximately two-thirds of the 18
projects are operating within cost and schedule estimates; (7) while FAA
has taken action to address some of its long-standing problems, the
agency still faces many challenges in effectively managing its
multibillion-dollar investment in modernization; (8) FAA's internal
evaluations and GAO's reviews have identified shortcomings in FAA's
current process used to manage its investments in validating and
prioritizing mission needs analyses, in establishing and monitoring
baseline measurements for all projects, and in communicating and
coordinating among cross-functional teams; (9) while FAA has begun to
address some of the root causes of long-standing modernization problems
that hinder its achievement of desired mission goals, these efforts are
not yet complete; (10) GAO has identified problems with the agency's
systems architecture, software acquisition processes, and organizational
culture among those responsible for acquisitions; (11) FAA has actions
under way to implement GAO's recommendations in all of these areas; (12)
FAA has more work to do to ensure that its mission-critical air traffic
control systems will work through the year 2000 date change and to
determine how it will ensure the continuity of critical operations in
the event of some systems' failures when January 1, 2000, arrives; and
(13) FAA also has weaknesses in its computer security that will require
action to ensure that air traffic control systems on which it depends
are sufficiently resistant to intrusion.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-99-25
TITLE: Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program
DATE: 12/03/98
SUBJECT: Air traffic control systems
ADP procurement
Systems conversions
Navigation aids
Computer security
Requirements definition
Cost control
Future budget projections
Radar equipment
Information resources management
IDENTIFIER: FAA National Airspace System Plan
FAA Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program
FAA Aeronautical Data Link
FAA Advanced Traffic Management System
FAA Air Route Surveillance Radar-4
Y2K
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
December 1998
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL - STATUS OF
FAA'S MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
GAO/RCED-99-25
FAA's Modernization Program
(348111)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
AMASS - Airport Movement Area Safety System
ARINC - Aeronautical Radio Incorporated
ARSR - Air Route Surveillance Radar
ARTS - Automated Radar Terminal System
ATCBI - Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator
ATM - Air Traffic Management
ASDE - Airport Surface Detection Equipment
ASOS - Automated Surface Observing System
ASR - Airport Surveillance Radar
AWOS - Automated Weather Observing System
CTAS - Center Terminal Radar Approach Control Automation System
DSR - Display System Replacement
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
F&E - Facilities and Equipment
GAO - General Accounting Office
GPS - Global Positioning System
ITWS - Integrated Terminal Weather System
LAAS - Local Area Augmentation System
NAS - National Airspace System
NATCA - National Air Traffic Controllers Association
OASIS - Operational Supportability and Implementation System
STARS - Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
TDWR - Terminal Doppler Weather Radar
TRACON - Terminal Radar Approach Control
TRDRE - Terminal Radar Digitization, Replacement, and Establishment
VHF - very high frequency
VSCS - Voice Switching and Control System
VTABS - VSCS Training and Backup Switch
WAAS - Wide Area Augmentation System
WARP - Weather and Radar Processor
RTCA -
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-281077
December 3, 1998
Congressional Requesters
In late 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began a
modernization program to replace and upgrade the National Airspace
System's (NAS) equipment and facilities to meet the expected increase
in traffic volume, enhance the margin of air safety, and increase the
efficiency of the air traffic control system--the principal component
of the NAS. Historically, the modernization program has experienced
many problems in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals. As a
result, many of the promised benefits from using new equipment have
been delayed, and the aviation community's confidence in FAA's
ability to manage the modernization program has been weakened.
Because of the complexity, cost, and problem-plagued past of FAA's
modernization program, we designated it a high-risk information
technology initiative in 1995 and again in 1997.\1
In light of past problems and continuing concerns about key projects
being funded under this program, you asked us to provide current
information on the status of the modernization program. As agreed
with your offices, this report provides information on the (1) status
of the overall modernization program, including its cost; (2) status
of 18 key modernization projects; and (3) challenges facing the
overall modernization program. (See app. I for specific information
on these 18 projects. A listing of projects completed from 1983
through August 1998 is included in app. II.)
--------------------
\1 FAA's modernization program is one of four high-risk system
development and modernization efforts. See High-Risk Series: An
Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, Feb. 1995) and High-Risk Series: Information
Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, Feb. 1997).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Over the past year, FAA, in collaboration with the aviation
community, has taken steps to restructure its multibillion-dollar
modernization program in order to achieve a more gradual and
cost-effective approach by, among other actions, limiting the scope
of projects to more manageable segments. This contrasts with the
approach of the past, where the agency sought to develop highly
complex software-intensive systems all at once and often established
unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance goals. Under FAA's new
incremental approach, the agency plans to implement a new way of
managing air traffic, known as "free flight," in order to provide
immediate improvements for the system's safety, efficiency, and
capacity.\2
Under its most recent financial plan, FAA estimates that the total
cost of modernization will be nearly $42 billion from fiscal year
1982 through fiscal 2004--a $3.8 billion increase since the agency's
last financial plan in February 1998.\3 \4 This increase in planned
spending (1) is attributed to new funding levels that were provided
by the Office of Management and Budget and (2) allows for the
acceleration of the NAS' modernization. Through fiscal year 1998,
the Congress appropriated over $25 billion of the $42 billion for
modernization (funded through FAA's Facilities and Equipment
account), and FAA's latest financial plan indicates that $17 billion
will be needed from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal 2004.
We have identified 18 projects that are key to FAA's efforts to
replace NAS' aging infrastructure and that provide a platform for
improving the system's safety, efficiency, and/or capacity. Total
estimated Facilities and Equipment funding for each of these projects
exceeds $100 million, and, collectively, these projects account for
about 41 percent of the Facilities and Equipment funds requested for
fiscal year 1999. FAA's progress in meeting cost and schedule goals
for these 18 key projects has been mixed. Under FAA's new phased
approach to modernization, two projects in our review--Aeronautical
Data Link and Air Traffic Management--have been revised, resulting in
new cost and schedule estimates for those components that are planned
for implementation under free flight. Including these two projects,
approximately two-thirds of the 18 projects are operating within cost
and schedule estimates. Of the remaining projects, several have
incurred cost increases and delays due, in part, to changes in
requirements, difficulties in developing software, and changes
designed to allow human operators to work better with new computer
systems. However, despite the delays with some projects, FAA has
fielded new air traffic control equipment. For example, since 1996,
FAA has commissioned 38 of 43 planned Air Route Surveillance
Radar-4s.\5 \6 Additionally, since early 1997, FAA has commissioned
238 Automated Surface Observing Systems at new sites, bringing the
total commissioned systems to 371 out of 597.\7
While FAA has taken action to address some of its long-standing
problems, the agency still faces many challenges in effectively
managing its multibillion-dollar investment in modernization:
-- FAA's internal evaluations and our reviews have identified
shortcomings in FAA's current process used to manage its
investments in validating and prioritizing mission needs
analyses, in establishing and monitoring baseline measurements
for all projects, and in communicating and coordinating among
cross-functional teams. Improvements in these areas, among
others, will help ensure that FAA (1) selects those investments
that best meet its mission needs; (2) monitors all investments
using accurate and reliable cost, schedule, and other
performance data; (3) evaluates investment projects after they
are implemented to measure outcomes and incorporate lessons
learned to improve its decision-making for new investment
projects; and (4) facilitates effective partnerships among teams
responsible for acquisitions.
-- While FAA has begun to address some of the root causes of
long-standing modernization problems that hinder its achievement
of desired mission goals, these efforts are not yet complete.
For example, we found that FAA lacked reliable cost-estimating
processes and cost-accounting practices needed to effectively
manage investments in information technology, leaving it at risk
of making ill-informed decisions on critical and costly air
traffic control systems.\8 FAA has begun to improve its
cost-estimating practices and to acquire a cost-accounting
system, but these efforts are not complete. We have also
identified problems with the agency's systems architecture,
software acquisition processes, and organizational culture among
those responsible for acquisitions. FAA has actions under way
to implement our recommendations in all of these areas.
-- FAA has more work to do to ensure that its mission-critical air
traffic control systems will work through the year 2000 date
change and to determine how it will ensure the continuity of
critical operations in the event of some systems' failures when
January 1, 2000, arrives. While FAA has completed critical
steps in identifying which systems need to be fixed and
repairing them, it must still test many of its mission-critical
systems and implement needed fixes. Also, the agency still
needs to resolve a number of cross-cutting risks that threaten
aviation operations, such as risks associated with exchanges of
data with external partners--including airports and
airlines--that are integral to managing air traffic operations.
-- FAA also has weaknesses in its computer security that will
require action to ensure that air traffic control systems on
which it depends are sufficiently resistant to intrusion.
Disruptions to the nation's air traffic control system could
result if these systems are not adequately protected. We
identified shortcomings in four areas: physical security of air
traffic control facilities, operational system security, the
security of future air traffic control systems, and management
structure and security policy implementation. We recommended
that FAA build detailed security requirements into its design of
future air traffic control systems and that the agency enforce
computer security policy. The agency has acknowledged
weaknesses but has not yet formulated a plan to strengthen
security.
--------------------
\2 Under "free flight," FAA will begin implementing new technologies
and procedures that will allow the agency to move to a more
collaborative system of managing traffic under which pilots, within
limits, will be allowed to choose routes to save them time and money.
\3 FAA's financial plan, which is based on the national airspace
architecture--FAA's blueprint for defining the long-range needs of
the NAS--takes into account the funding required for the service life
of a project, including the amounts needed for upgrades
(refreshments) to technology. Previously, these amounts were not
included in the financial plan.
\4 Estimated costs may not add because of rounding.
\5 The term "commissioned" is defined as the formal approval of the
equipment for operational use.
\6 The Air Route Surveillance Radar provides data on the movement of
aircraft and weather and is used for the separation of aircraft, drug
interdiction, and defense of the U.S. borders.
\7 The Automated Surface Observing System equipment automates the
observation and dissemination of selected weather data.
\8 See Air Traffic Control: Improved Cost Information Needed to Make
Billion Dollar Modernization Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20,
Jan. 22, 1997).
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
FAA's mission is to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow
of air traffic in the national airspace. To accomplish its mission,
FAA provides air traffic control services 24 hours a day, 365 days a
year. The air traffic control system, which is the principal
component of the NAS, comprises a vast network of radars; automated
data processing, navigation, and communications equipment; and air
traffic control facilities.
Through its modernization program, FAA is upgrading and replacing
equipment and facilities--such as controller workstations and airport
towers--and developing new technologies--such as digital
communications--to help improve the safety, efficiency, and capacity
of the NAS. FAA's air traffic services are provided primarily
through four service areas--air traffic control towers, terminal-area
facilities, en route centers, and flight service stations. The
functions of each type of service area are described below.
-- Airport towers control the flow of aircraft--before landing, on
the ground, and after takeoff--within 5 nautical miles of the
airport and up to 3,000 feet above the airport.
-- Terminal area facilities--known as Terminal Radar Approach
Control (TRACON) facilities--direct aircraft in the airspace
that extends from the point where the tower's control ends to
about 50 nautical miles from the airport. A TRACON can be
located at or outside an airport.
-- En route centers--known as air route traffic control
centers--control aircraft in air routes outside of terminal
airspace. Planes are controlled through regions of airspace by
en route centers responsible for the regions. Control is passed
from one center to another as a plane moves across a region
until it reaches terminal airspace. Two en route
centers--Oakland and New York--also control aircraft over the
ocean. Because radar coverage over the ocean is limited, beyond
the radars' sight, controllers must rely on periodic radio
communications through a third party--Aeronautical Radio
Incorporated (ARINC), a private organization funded by the
airlines and FAA to operate radio stations--to determine
aircraft locations.
-- Flight Service Stations provide weather and flight plan services
primarily for general aviation pilots.
(See fig. 1 for a visual summary of air traffic control over the
continental United States and oceans.)
Figure 1: Summary of Air
Traffic Control Over the
Continental United States and
Oceans
(See figure in printed
edition.)
The 18 key modernization projects will help upgrade the air traffic
services provided through one or more of the four service areas that
FAA uses. Table 1 depicts the air traffic service areas that will be
modernized by these projects. (App. I describes the functions of
each of these projects.)
Table 1
Air Traffic Services That Will Be
Modernized by 18 Major Air Traffic
Control Projects
Service areas
---------------------------------------
Flight
En route service
Project's title Tower Terminal center station
------------------------------------------------ -------- -------- -------- ---------
Aeronautical Data Link X X X
Air Route Surveillance Radar-4 X
Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 X
Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator X
Air Traffic Management/Free Flight Phase 1 X X
Program
Automated Surface Observing System X X X
Display System Replacement X
Global Positioning System Program: Wide Area X X X
Augmentation System
Global Positioning System Program: Local Area X X
Augmentation System
Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement X
Program
Integrated Terminal Weather System X X
Oceanic Automation Program X X
Operational and Supportability Implementation X
System
Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System X
Terminal Digitization, Replacement, and X
Establishment Program/Airport Surveillance
Radar-11 Project
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar X X
Voice Switching and Control System X
Weather and Radar Processor X
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: "X" denotes service areas where projects are utilized.
OVERALL STATUS OF MODERNIZATION
PROGRAM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The NAS modernization program has undergone many changes since it was
established in 1981. Initially, the program comprised only about 80
projects, but in December 1990, it was redefined and expanded as the
Capital Investment Plan (hereafter, referred to as the financial
plan). Over the past year, FAA and industry have worked together to
develop a new approach to managing the program, which now includes
124 active projects funded through FAA's Facilities and Equipment
appropriation account. Eighty-nine projects have been completed
since the modernization program began.
FAA AND INDUSTRY HAVE AGREED
TO A PHASED APPROACH TO
MODERNIZATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Over the past year, FAA and industry, working through the RTCA,\9
have agreed on a phased approach to modernizing the NAS--including a
new way of managing air traffic, known as "free flight."\10 A central
tenet of this approach is the "build a little, test a little" concept
of technology development and deployment--intended to limit
development efforts to a manageable scope, identify and mitigate
risks, and deploy technologies prior to their full maturity so they
can provide immediate improvements to the system's safety,
efficiency, and/or capacity. This approach contrasts with the former
approach, where FAA sought to build highly complex systems, many of
which required the extensive development of software. In several
cases, FAA underestimated the technical complexity of the development
efforts, and, as a result, the systems were more costly and took
longer to develop than anticipated.
Under the first phase of the modernization program, FAA plans to
accelerate the development and deployment of certain technology
projects that have the potential to provide immediate benefits to
users.\11 Additionally, the agency plans to continue to develop and
deploy critical infrastructure replacement projects like the Standard
Terminal Automation Replacement System and Display System
Replacement, which provide new workstations and functionality to
controllers in terminal and en route centers, respectively.
Furthermore, other modernization projects, particularly those related
to communication, navigation, and surveillance, will be tested under
the agency's planned demonstration program.\12
--------------------
\9 RTCA serves in an advisory capacity to FAA. It was organized as
the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics in 1935 to provide a
forum where industry and government representatives could discuss
aviation issues and develop consensus-based recommendations. In
November 1991, it reorganized and shortened its name to RTCA.
\10 In September, we issued a report on the status of FAA's efforts
to implement free flight and the challenges that lie ahead. See
National Airspace System: FAA Has Implemented Some Initiatives, but
Challenges Remain (GAO/RCED-98-246, Sept. 28, 1998).
\11 Under this phase, FAA would implement new technologies and
procedures to allow the agency to gradually move to a "free flight"
operating system, where decisions for conducting flight operations
would be based increasingly on the collaborative efforts of FAA and
users. Components of two projects in our review--Aeronautical Data
Link and Air Traffic Management--are a part of the agency's free
flight effort.
\12 FAA has proposed to change the name of the demonstration from
Flight 2000 to "Safe Flight 21."
TOTAL COST OF MODERNIZATION
THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2004 IS
ESTIMATED TO BE $42 BILLION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
FAA, in its current financial plan, dated July 1998, estimated that
the cost of the modernization program for fiscal years 1982 through
2004 will total nearly $42 billion--a $3.8 billion increase over the
estimate included in the February 1998 plan.\13 Of the estimated $42
billion required, the Congress appropriated over $25 billion for
fiscal years 1982 through 1998. Of this amount, FAA has reported
spending $5.7 billion on 89 completed projects and $15.2 billion on
124 ongoing projects. Of the remaining amount, FAA has reported
spending about $2.8 billion on projects that have been canceled or
restructured and $1.6 billion for personnel-related expenses
associated with the acquisition of systems. The financial plan
estimates that approximately $17 billion will be required for fiscal
years 1999 through 2004.
The $3.8 billion increase in the estimated cost of modernization
since February 1998 results from new spending levels provided by the
Office of Management and Budget for accelerating the NAS'
modernization. This consists of $1.9 billion for existing projects
to allow for acceleration, new approaches (Free Flight Phase 1), and
cost growth. The remaining $1.9 billion increase results from the
addition of new projects identified in the architecture that could
not be accommodated under the old funding levels.
--------------------
\13 For the purposes of this report, the "cost of modernization"
means all actual and projected Facilities and Equipment
appropriations from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal 2004 for projects
in FAA's financial plan. This plan contains funding primarily for
projects, including prime contract costs; costs for personnel
compensation, benefits, and travel; and contract costs for technical
support service activities. The plan also includes estimated future
costs for some projects that have not yet been funded but are part of
the NAS architecture.
COST, SCHEDULE, AND RISKS
ASSOCIATED WITH 18 MAJOR
PROJECTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
The 18 projects represent the agency's priority projects in the areas
of communication, navigation and landing, surveillance, automation,
and weather. Total estimated spending for each of these projects
exceeds $100 million, and, collectively, they represent about 41
percent of the Facilities and Equipment funding requested for fiscal
year 1999. FAA's progress in meeting cost and schedule goals for
these 18 projects has been mixed. Under FAA's new phased approach to
modernization, two projects in our review--Aeronautical Data Link and
Air Traffic Management--have been revised, resulting in new cost and
schedule estimates for those components that are planned for
implementation under free flight. Including these two projects,
approximately two-thirds are meeting cost and schedule estimates,
while several of the remaining projects have incurred cost increases
and delays due, in part, to changes in requirements, difficulties in
developing software, and changes designed to allow human operators to
work better with new computer systems.
The net estimated Facilities and Equipment cost of the 18 major
modernization projects has increased by $482 million since the
original estimate was made.\14 This includes an increase of about
$530 million for six of these projects. Projects experiencing the
largest increase--due primarily to new requirements for additional
equipment and technical and siting problems--include the Airport
Surveillance Radar-11, Automated Surface Observing System, and
Terminal Doppler Weather Radar. The estimated cost for one
project--Oceanic Automation Program--decreased by about $48 million,
10 projects showed no change, and 1 project's original estimate was
too recent for comparison purposes. (See app. I.)
Schedules for completing implementation were delayed for 5 of the 18
projects. The delays ranged from 5 months to over 6 years.\15 For
example, the date for implementing the last of the Airport Surface
Detection Equipment-3 has slipped by over 3 years primarily because
of delays in completing towers or other structures at locations that
will receive the radars.\16 Of the remaining 13 projects, 9 had no
schedule delays, the schedules for 2 were accelerated, and the
original and current schedules for 2 could not be compared. For one
of these projects, the original implementation date had not been
established when the contract was signed. For the second project,
the agency established the schedule in October 1998. As an example,
the Display System Replacement project is still scheduled to be
completely implemented by May 2000.\17 FAA accelerated the schedule
for implementing the Oceanic Automation Program by 8 months when it
canceled four of five planned phases and significantly reduced the
requirements for the one remaining phase.\18 (See app. I.)
However, despite delays with some projects, FAA has fielded new air
traffic control equipment. For example, since 1996, FAA has
commissioned 38 of 43 planned Air Route Surveillance Radar-4s.
Additionally, since early 1997, FAA has commissioned 238 Automated
Surface Observing Systems at new sites, bringing the total
commissioned systems to 371 out of 597.
Several of the 18 projects face challenges and risks that could lead
to further cost increases and delays. For example, the Wide Area
Augmentation System was initially designed to serve as the only means
of navigation for civil aviation, thus allowing FAA to decommission
its existing, costly ground-based navigation system. However, the
future of the project is uncertain because of vulnerability
concerns-- related to both intentional and unintentional interference
with the satellite signal--and congressional concerns about whether
FAA's program, as currently planned, is cost-effective.\19 FAA is
revisiting the program's cost, schedule, and performance baselines
and will incorporate the results of the vulnerability assessment,
expected in January 1999, into its analyses.\20
--------------------
\14 The original estimate, representing when the investment decision
was made or the contract was signed--whichever is relevant--was
compared with the 1998 estimate to determine changes in costs. The
date of this estimate varies among projects.
\15 Implementation signifies that a system has been fielded and that
the personnel who will use and maintain it are satisfied that it is
ready for operation. Usually, commissioning soon follows
implementation. "Last-site implementation" is the date when the last
planned unit is scheduled to become operational.
\16 The Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 is a primary radar
designed to provide tower controllers with surveillance
information--a video display--of all aircraft and other vehicles on
an airport's surface.
\17 The Display System Replacement project will modernize en route
center equipment by replacing 20- to 30-year-old display channels,
controller workstations, and network infrastructure.
\18 The Oceanic Automation Program project is designed to provide a
platform for improving air traffic control over the oceans where
radar coverage is limited. Among other capabilities, the one segment
that FAA is implementing will provide pilots and controllers with
data link technology.
\19 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act for 1999 (P.L. 105-277, Division A, sec. 101 (g)(1998)).
\20 FAA, the Air Transport Association, and the Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association have initiated a risk assessment of using
satellite navigation as the only means of navigation in the NAS.
FAA FACES CHALLENGES IN
MANAGING THIS
MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR INVESTMENT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Long-standing problems, including cost increases in the overall
modernization program and in many of the individual projects as well
as difficulty in meeting project schedules, demonstrate the
difficulty of managing an investment of this size. Although FAA is
taking actions to address many of these problems, the agency faces
several challenges in seeking to improve its management of the
modernization program in order to deliver promised benefits and
thereby restore its credibility. Included among these challenges is
FAA's need to (1) implement an effective process for selecting,
controlling, and evaluating its air traffic control investments; (2)
sustain its commitment to addressing the root causes of its
modernization problems; (3) address the Year 2000 problem; and (4)
correct its computer security weaknesses.
MANAGING MODERNIZATION
REQUIRES A DISCIPLINED
INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
Recent federal management reforms have introduced requirements
emphasizing federal agencies' need to significantly improve their
management processes for selecting, monitoring, and evaluating
investments.\21
Our reviews and FAA's internal evaluation of its acquisition
management system identified shortcomings in two of these areas:
mission analyses (selection) and baseline management (monitoring).\22
\23 FAA's and our work also identified problems with FAA's
cross-functional team structure, which is key to successfully
acquiring new modernization systems and technology. It is critical
that FAA has processes in place to help ensure that its modernization
projects are being implemented at acceptable costs, within reasonable
and expected time frames, and are contributing to observable
improvements in mission performance. FAA's acquisition management
system, implemented on April 1, 1996, is intended to provide
high-level acquisition policy and guidance and to establish rigorous
investment management practices to guide modernization efforts. We
are currently reviewing FAA's investment management approach as
carried out through its acquisition management system.
First, the mission analysis process is intended to enable FAA to
determine and prioritize its most critical capability shortfalls and
its best technological opportunities for improving the safety,
security, capacity, and efficiency of the NAS. FAA's internal
evaluation identified major shortcomings relating to validating and
prioritizing all critical needs, evaluating mission needs statements
to ensure that needs were still valid, implementing the mission
analysis process across the entire agency, and coordinating the
mission analysis process among internal organizations. As a result
of these shortcomings, FAA's evaluation team found that the agency
cannot ensure that some of its most critical needs are being met,
that it is not duplicating efforts in identifying mission needs, and
that resources are being used in the most cost-effective manner.
Addressing shortcomings in mission analysis capabilities, among other
areas, would put FAA in a better position to effectively plan for its
needs and avoid crisis situations that result from inadequate
planning. At least two such situations arose during fiscal year
1998. FAA reprogrammed $37.7 million to cover expenses associated
with activities aimed at ensuring that the agency's critical air
traffic control-related computer systems will function properly at
the turn of the century (Year 2000 computer problem). Although FAA
recognized the Year 2000 initiative as a critical need and began
addressing it, the agency did not document the need in a mission
needs statement. The discipline associated with mission
analysis--identifying the shortfall, the impact of not satisfying the
shortfall, and an estimate of the resources the agency should commit
to resolve the need--might have eliminated the need to reprogram
funds to meet this priority. Additionally, the agency reprogrammed
$28.9 million for additional requirements for its new automation
system for terminal controllers. Included in this amount were funds
to implement solutions to address design concerns identified by human
operators of the system. As a result of the reprogramming, the
schedule for some projects may have to be pushed out several years,
increasing the likelihood that costs for these projects will also
increase.
Second, in the area of baseline management, the acquisition
management system requires that each program has a baseline, which
establishes performance, cost, schedule, and benefits parameters
within which the program is authorized to operate. These baselines
assist managers in monitoring the performance of projects. FAA's
internal evaluation identified numerous shortcomings in baseline
management, including the fact that only 54 percent of the 94
programs funded by the Facilities and Equipment account had some form
of approved baseline documentation.\24
Furthermore, the approved baselines did not always include enough
information to measure and monitor the program's performance. For
example, while documentation related to Facilities and Equipment
funding for a project was usually complete, funding for research and
development and operations was not always included in the baseline
document. Even when operations data were included, questions existed
about the reliability of these cost estimates. We found, as did the
FAA evaluation team, that poor or inaccurate cost estimates could
limit FAA's ability to make sound investment decisions about
modernization projects on the basis of economic merits.\25 FAA has
taken steps to improve its cost-estimating capabilities; these steps
are not yet complete. In a related area, an FAA official indicated
that the agency has begun to baseline a number of projects. In this
regard, future changes in cost and schedule estimates will be
measured against these new baselines. Although the requirement for
the Administrator to consider terminating a project that fails to
meet defined goals applies only to acquisitions initiated after
October 1996, this official indicated that the agency plans to
subject its ongoing projects to these requirements. Completing
efforts under way to improve cost-estimating capabilities and
tracking and monitoring the performance of projects against approved
baselines would be a step in the right direction as FAA seeks to
improve its management of projects and avoid past problems associated
with cost increases and delays.
Finally, the agency faces a continuing challenge in effectively
implementing its cross-functional integrated product development team
structure.\26 Our recent work relating to FAA's implementation of
free flight initiatives found continuing problems with communication
and coordination across program lines.\27 Some team members were
motivated primarily by the priorities and management of the offices
that they represented rather than the goals of a given team. FAA's
internal evaluation findings were similar, in that conflicts between
horizontal organizational structures (teams) and vertical
organizational structures (operating divisions, such as air traffic)
created a constraint to the team structure by, among other things,
delaying decisions that could affect a team's ability to support
successful acquisitions. As we noted in our September 1998 report,
FAA is attempting to improve cross-agency communication and
coordination through such initiatives as developing incentives for
staff to work toward the agency's goals and priorities. Because
FAA's successful implementation of the modernization program is tied
to the effective partnership among offices responsible for various
acquisition-related activities, it will be important for the agency
to continue its efforts to forge effective partnerships.
--------------------
\21 Included among these legislative reforms are revisions to the
Paperwork Reduction Act, the Government Performance and Results Act,
and the Chief Financial Officers Act.
\22 See Air Traffic Control: Observations on FAA's Modernization
Program (GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-93, Feb. 26, 1998).
\23 Evaluation of Acquisition Reform--The First Two Years: April
1996-March 1998, FAA Program Evaluation Branch, Office of Systems
Architecture and Investment Analysis, May 29, 1998.
\24 FAA's evaluation team also found that the agency had not
established definitions for or designations of "program,"
"substantial acquisition program," and "major systems acquisition."
Such definitions and designations are important because P.L. 104-264
(Air Traffic Management System Performance Improvement Act of 1996)
requires the Administrator to consider terminating substantial
acquisition programs that fail to meet defined goals. Office of
Management and Budget circulars require designation and reporting on
major systems acquisitions. FAA's team defined "program" for
purposes of the evaluation and identified 94 programs that should
have had an acquisition baseline.
\25 See GAO/AIMD-97-20.
\26 The integrated product development team structure was designed as
the implementing arm for the acquisition management system.
Integrated product teams are responsible for developing or procuring
equipment. The goals of these teams are to improve accountability
and coordination and infuse a more strategic, mission-oriented focus
into the acquisition process. Team members include contractors,
FAA's engineering division, and the FAA divisions that operate and
maintain air traffic control equipment.
\27 These findings were consistent with earlier findings in our work
on FAA's culture and how it affects acquisition management. See
GAO/RCED-98-246 and Aviation Acquisition: A Comprehensive Strategy
Is Needed for Cultural Change at FAA (GAO/RCED-96-159, Aug. 22,
1996).
IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF
THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
WILL REQUIRE SUSTAINED
COMMITMENT TO ADDRESS ROOT
CAUSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
Our reviews have identified some of the root causes of long-standing
problems that jeopardize the effective use of modernization
resources. These problems included unreliable cost information,
incomplete architecture, weak software acquisition capabilities, and
an organizational culture that did not reflect a strong commitment to
the agency's mission focus, accountability, coordination, and
adaptability. FAA has ongoing actions under way to address these
shortcomings.
In January 1997, we reported that FAA lacked reliable cost-estimating
processes and cost-accounting practices needed to effectively manage
investments in information technology, which leaves it at the risk of
making ill-informed decisions on critical and costly air traffic
control systems.\28 Without reliable cost information, the likelihood
of poor investments is increased. We recommended that FAA improve
its cost-estimating processes and fully implement a cost-accounting
system. FAA has begun to institutionalize defined cost-estimating
processes and to acquire a cost-accounting system as required by
legislation. According to officials responsible for the new cost
accounting system, the agency had planned to have the first phase of
the system--accumulating data for domestic and oceanic air traffic
services--operational by October 1998, but this milestone has been
delayed by complications associated with the method used to allocate
costs. These officials stated that it is too soon to tell how this
delay may affect other planned milestones.
With respect to the new system, the Department of Transportation's
Inspector General has identified design issues that call into
question whether the planned cost-accounting system can accurately
account for FAA's full cost of operations.\29 For example, among its
major findings, the report noted that FAA had yet to establish a
systematic method to identify and reflect the (1) cost for all
development projects, (2) correct labor charged to appropriate
projects, and (3) cost incurred by other agencies for air traffic
services.\30 Additionally, decisions had not been made on how to
allocate Facilities and Equipment costs among operating facilities
throughout FAA. According to a senior FAA finance official, the
agency has made a change in program management and has assigned
additional resources to the cost-accounting effort to address
problems cited by the Inspector General's report. For example, FAA
has developed and tested the capability to capture and report all of
a project's developmental costs. In addition, with respect to
decisions about how to allocate Facilities and Equipment costs among
operating divisions, this official noted that FAA had new procedures
for allocating property depreciation costs for fiscal year 1998.
Taking steps to ensure that its cost-accounting system is
complete--by correcting known design and allocation issues--will put
FAA in a better position to provide managers and other decisionmakers
with accurate information for use in determining and controlling the
agency's costs.
In February 1997, we reported that FAA attempted to modernize the NAS
without a complete systems architecture, or blueprint, to guide
development and evolution.\31
The result has been unnecessarily higher spending to buy, integrate,
and maintain hardware and software. We recommended that FAA develop
and enforce a complete systems architecture and implement a
management structure for doing so that is similar to the Chief
Information Officers provision of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996. FAA
has initiated activities to develop a complete systems architecture,
and project officials estimated in May 1998 that it would take 18 to
24 months to complete the development. Also, FAA is in the process
of hiring a Chief Information Officer that will report directly to
the Administrator.
Furthermore, in March 1997, we reported that FAA's processes for
acquiring software for air traffic control systems are ad hoc,
sometimes chaotic, and not repeatable across projects.\32 As a
result, FAA is at great risk of acquiring software that does not
perform as intended and is not delivered on time and within budget.
We recommended that FAA improve its software acquisition capabilities
by establishing a mature acquisition process throughout its entire
organization. While FAA has initiated efforts to improve its
software acquisition process, these efforts have not been implemented
agencywide.
Finally, we have reported that an underlying cause of FAA's air
traffic control acquisition problems is its organizational
culture--the values, beliefs, attitudes, and expectations shared by
an organization's members that affect their behavior and the behavior
of the whole organization.\33 We found that FAA's acquisitions were
impaired because employees acted in ways that did not reflect a
strong commitment to mission focus, accountability, coordination, and
adaptability. We recommended a comprehensive strategy for cultural
change that (1) addresses specific responsibilities and performance
measures for all stakeholders throughout FAA and (2) provides the
incentives needed for promoting the desired behaviors to achieve
cultural change.
In response to our recommendations, FAA issued a report outlining its
overall strategy for changing its acquisition culture and describing
its ongoing actions to influence organizational culture.\34 For
example, the Acquisition and Research organization has restructured
its personnel system to tie pay to performance based on achievement
of organizational goals. The Administrator has approved the
Acquisition and Research organization as the pilot for the new
compensation program that FAA plans to implement agencywide.
Additionally, the Acquisition and Research organization has developed
an organizational assessment process that identifies culture-related
factors that inhibit full achievement of organizational objectives.
The centerpiece of this process is the Acquisition and Research
organization's culture survey. The results of the 1998 survey showed
that while employees are motivated in their current job and are
pleased with the variety within and complexity of their job, a number
of opportunities for improvement still exist. For example, the data
showed that employees (1) do not believe that accurate information is
disseminated downward to work groups or teams, (2) believe that
decisionmakers are not able to anticipate problems before they occur,
(3) feel that training is an area needing improvement, and (4) do not
feel that they have a clear understanding of organizational and
job-specific goals. While recognizing that cultural change is a
complex and time-consuming undertaking, the Acquisition and Research
organization's management team has developed a set of actions to
begin addressing the shortcomings identified in the culture survey
and is proceeding with other initiatives.
--------------------
\28 GAO/AIMD-97-20.
\29 See Implementation of Cost Accounting System: Federal Aviation
Administration, U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of
Inspector General (Rpt. No. FE-1998-186, Aug. 10, 1998).
\30 The issue of allocating costs incurred by other agencies is
relevant to a discussion of moving to a cost-based fee system. The
Department of Defense provides military and civilian users with air
traffic control services, and its costs may be relevant to
determining user fees. However, for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, FAA
is constrained by the Office of Management and Budget's guidance from
recognizing air traffic service costs incurred by the Department of
Defense. For a discussion of issues related to cost allocation, see
National Airspace System: Issues in Allocating Costs for Air Traffic
Services to DOD and Other Users (GAO/RCED-97-106, Apr. 25, 1997).
\31 Air Traffic Control: Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed
for FAA Systems Modernization (GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb. 3, 1997).
\32 See Air Traffic Control: Immature Software Acquisition Processes
Increase FAA System Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar. 21,
1997).
\33 GAO/RCED-96-159.
\34 Strategy for Acquisition Culture Change, FAA (June 1997).
SERIOUS CHALLENGES REMAIN
UNRESOLVED FOR YEAR 2000
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3
To perform its mission, FAA is dependent on an extensive array of
information- processing and communications technologies. Without
these specialized systems, the agency cannot effectively control
traffic or provide pilots and controllers with up-to-date weather
information, among other functions. FAA has identified 225
mission-critical NAS systems.\35 Examples of such systems include the
primary computer system used in en route centers (known as Host
computer), which processes radar and other data, and the long-range
radar systems, which allow controllers to monitor and separate
aircraft at higher altitudes. The implications of FAA's not meeting
the Year 2000 deadline are enormous and could affect hundreds of
thousands of people--through customer inconvenience, increased
airline costs, grounded or delayed flights, or degraded levels of
safety. Although FAA has made progress in managing its Year 2000
problem and has completed critical steps in defining which systems
need to be repaired and fixing them, the agency must still test many
of its mission-critical systems and implement needed changes.
In August 1998, we reported that, with less than 17 months left
before 2000, it was doubtful that FAA could do all of this in the
time remaining.\36 Accordingly, FAA must determine how to ensure the
continuity of critical operations in the event of some systems'
failure. FAA is preparing a NAS continuity plan to ensure that
critical operations continue, should its mission-critical systems
fail. We are currently reviewing FAA's business continuity plan.
Additionally, we noted that FAA must mitigate other critical,
cross-cutting risks, such as data exchanges with external entities;
international coordination to ensure safe, reliable aviation services
for U.S. travelers; and cooperation with contractors to ensure that
the telecommunications upon which FAA relies are dependable. FAA is
taking steps to address all of these issues.
--------------------
\35 These 225 systems are included among the 430 FAA-wide
mission-critical systems.
\36 See FAA Systems: Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year
2000 and Computer Security Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, Aug. 6,
1998).
WEAK SECURITY PRACTICES
DEGRADE SAFETY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4
In May 1998, we reported that FAA cannot ensure that the air traffic
control systems upon which it depends are sufficiently resistant to
intrusion.\37 The failure to adequately protect these systems
threatens to disrupt the nation's air traffic. We found weaknesses
in four areas: physical security of air traffic control facilities,
operational system security, the development of new systems, and
FAA's management structure and implementation of security policy.
First, FAA's management of physical security at its air traffic
control facilities that control aircraft has been ineffective. We
found that FAA had inspected some facilities and was aware of
physical security weaknesses at these facilities but was unaware of
weaknesses that might exist at other facilities because many had not
been inspected. Since our review, FAA officials indicated that they
have inspected all applicable facilities and have accredited over
half (199 out of 368) of these facilities.
Second, FAA has not assessed, certified, or accredited most of its
operational air traffic control systems as required by its policy.\38
As a result, FAA does not know how vulnerable those operational
systems are and, consequently, has no basis for determining how to
protect them. In addition, FAA has assessed only one of nine
FAA-owned or -leased air traffic control telecommunications systems
despite acknowledging that vulnerabilities in this area could
threaten property and public safety. FAA's 1997 Telecommunications
Strategic Plan continues to identify the security of
telecommunications systems as an area in need of improvement.
Third, FAA is not effectively incorporating security features into
new air traffic control systems. The agency does not consistently
include well-formulated security requirements in specifications for
all new modernization systems. Without security requirements that
are based on sound risk assessments, FAA lacks assurance that future
air traffic control systems will be protected from attack.
Finally, FAA's management structure is not effectively implementing
or enforcing computer security policy. Security responsibilities are
distributed among three different organizations, all of which have
been remiss in their air traffic control security duties. Until
existing computer security policy is effectively implemented and
enforced, operational and developmental air traffic control systems
will continue to be vulnerable to the compromise of sensitive
information and interruption of critical services.
To improve security for the future in the most efficient and
cost-effective manner, we recommended that FAA build detailed
security requirements into its design for new air traffic control
systems. We also recommended that FAA enforce its computer security
policy for air traffic control. FAA has acknowledged that major
improvements are needed in all areas of its computer security program
but has not yet formulated a plan to strengthen security.
--------------------
\37 See Air Traffic Control: Weak Computer Security Practices
Jeopardize Flight Safety [unclassified version] (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May
18, 1998).
\38 System certification is the technical evaluation that is
conducted to verify that FAA's systems comply with FAA's security
requirements, identify security deficiencies, specify remedies, and
justify exceptions. Accreditation is the formal declaration from
management that the appropriate security safeguards have been
properly implemented and that residual risk is acceptable.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
We provided copies of a draft of this report to FAA for its review
and comment. We met with FAA officials, including the Deputy
Director, Program Office, Free Flight Phase 1, and the Program
Director, NAS Programming and Financial Management, who generally
agreed with the contents of the report and provided clarifying
comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We reached agreement on the major projects to be included in our
review after discussions with officials from the office of the
Program Director, NAS Programming and Financial Management, within
FAA's Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisition
organization. We obtained the information on the overall costs of
air traffic system modernization as well as on appropriations and
obligations from documents provided by representatives of FAA's
Research and Acquisition organization and the Office of Financial
Services. Cost, schedule, and performance information on the 18 key
projects came from project officials within the Research and
Acquisition organization. We also obtained information from the
Office of Independent Operational Test and Evaluation. We did not
independently verify the accuracy of the cost data but did compare it
with past cost data for consistency. We developed the list of
challenges primarily from past reviews by us and others and from our
knowledge of FAA's progress in implementing past recommendations. We
conducted our review from July through October 1998 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1
We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of
Transportation; the Administrator, FAA; and other interested parties.
We will make copies available to others on request.
If you or your staff have any questions or need additional
information, please call me at (202) 512-3650. Major contributors to
this report are listed in appendix III.
Gerald L. Dillingham
Associate Director,
Transportation Issues
Congressional Requesters
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Transportation
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Chairman
The Honorable Martin O. Sabo
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF 18
MAJOR MODERNIZATION PROJECTS
=========================================================== Appendix I
This appendix provides detailed information on changes in the costs
and schedules as well as challenges and risks for 18 of the Federal
Aviation Administration's (FAA) major acquisitions. Collectively,
these projects account for about 41 percent of the Facilities and
Equipment (F&E) funding requested by FAA for fiscal year 1999.
In our past reports on the status of FAA's modernization program, we
used cost and schedule estimates that were developed when the
projects were approved for inclusion in the modernization plan.\1
Instead in February 1998, we began measuring FAA's progress against
revised baselines that represent the date of the contract, the
contract's revision, or the investment decision. This appendix uses
this benchmark.\2
However, where relevant, we provide historical cost and schedule
information in the project summaries to give a context for current
developments.
On the basis of the revised baselines, the net estimated F&E cost of
the 18 major modernization projects has increased by $482 million.
Six of these projects increased by a total of about $530 million.
Three projects experiencing the largest increase--due primarily to
new requirements for additional equipment and technical and siting
problems--include the Airport Surveillance Radar-11, Automated
Surface Observing System, and Terminal Doppler Weather Radar. One
project--the Oceanic Automation Program--decreased by about $48
million, 10 projects showed no change, and 1 had no basis for
comparison because FAA recently established baselines for it. (See
table I.1.)
Table I.1
Changes in Cost Estimates for 18 Major
Modernization Projects
(Dollars in millions)
Date of Change
original Original Current in F&E
F&E cost F&E cost F&E cost cost Original Current
estimate estimate estimate estimate planned planned Change
Project s s\a s\a s units units in units
----------------- -------- -------- -------- -------- -------- ---------- --------
Aeronautical Data 1998 $163.7 $163.7 N/A\b 22 units 22 units N/A\b
Link Program: En
Route
Controller/
Pilot Data Link
Communications
Air Route 1988 349.4 415.8 +66.4 43 44 radars +1
Surveillance radars
Radar-4
Airport Surface 1993 191.0 249.1 +58.1 40 40 radars None
Detection radars
Equipment-3
Air Traffic 1998 282.8 282.8 None 127 127 None
Control Beacon systems systems
Interrogator
Air Traffic 1997 251.1 251.1 None N/A\c N/A\d None
Management
Program: Center
Terminal Radar
Approach Control
Automation
System
Automated Surface 1991 151.3 287.5 +136.2 537 597 units +60
Observing System units
Display System 1994 1,055.3 1,055.3 None 22 22 systems None
Replacement systems
Global 1998 1,006.6 1,006.6 None \e \e \e
Positioning
System
Augmentation
Program: Wide
Area
Augmentation
System
Global 1998 535.8 535.8 None 143 143 None
Positioning systems systems
System
Augmentation
Program: Local
Area
Augmentation
System
Host and Oceanic 1998 424.1 424.1 None 24 24 systems None
Computer System systems
Replacement
Program
Integrated 1997 276.1 276.1 None 37 37 systems None
Terminal Weather systems
System
Oceanic 1995 236.5 189.0 -47.5 3 3 systems None
Automation systems
Program
Operational and 1997 174.7 190.5 +15.8 64 64 systems None
Supportability systems
Implementation
System
Standard Terminal 1996 940.2 940.2 None 171 173 +2
Automation systems systems
Replacement
System
Terminal Doppler 1988 322.2 393.5 +71.3 47 47 radars None
Weather Radar radars
Terminal Radar 1996 561.3 743.3 +182.0\f 48 112 radars +64
Digitization, radars
Replacement, and
Establishment
Program: Airport
Surveillance
Radar-11 Project
Voice Switching 1994 1,452.9 1,452.9 None 23 units 23 units None
and Control
System
Weather and Radar 1996 125.6 125.6 None 23 23 systems None
Processor systems
Total estimated $8,500.6 $8,982.9 +$482.3
costs
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
N/A = not applicable.
\a For this report, all dollars are expressed in current-year
dollars, unless otherwise noted, because they are a better indication
of the dollar amount that the Congress may have to appropriate.
\b There is no basis for comparing original and current cost
estimates and planned units because the investment decision for the
En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project (of the
Aeronautical Data Link Program) was made by FAA on October 30, 1998.
\c The number of original planned units for the Air Traffic
Management Program is not applicable because its primary purpose was
to prototype technologies for future use under "free flight." Under
free flight, FAA will gradually deploy a range of new technologies
and procedures and work collaboratively with users to manage air
traffic operations.
\d The number of current planned units is not applicable because
under the Free Flight Phase I Program, FAA plans to deploy
technologies developed under the Air Traffic Management Program for
early user benefits.
\e The initial Wide Area Augmentation System consists of 25 reference
stations, 2 master stations, and 4 ground stations joined by a
telecommunications network.
\f The increase in costs is largely attributed to FAA's decision to
replace older radars rather than upgrade them, thus, more than
doubling the number of planned units.
On the basis of the revised baselines, the date for completing
implementation was delayed from 5 months to more than 6 years for 5
of the 18 projects. Of the remaining 13 projects, the schedule for 2
was accelerated, 9 had no schedule delays, and 2 project's original
and current schedules had no basis for comparison. (See table I.2.)
Table I.2
Changes in Schedule for 18 Major
Modernization Projects
Last-site implementation
----------------------------------------
Changes in
Original 1998 months/
Project estimate estimate years
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Aeronautical Data Link Dec. 2005 Dec. 2005 N/A\a
Program: En Route
Controller/Pilot Data Link
Communications
Air Route Surveillance Nov. 1996 May 1999 +2 years,
Radar-4 6 months
Airport Surface Detection July 1996 Nov. 1999 +3 years,
Equipment-3 4 months
Air Traffic Control Beacon Sept. 2004 Sept. 2004 None
Interrogator
Air Traffic Management 2006\b 2006\b None
Program: Center Terminal
Radar Approach Control
Automation System
Automated Surface Observing Sept. 1996 Dec. 2002 +6 years,
System 3 months
Display System Replacement May 2000 May 2000 None
Global Positioning System Aug. 1999\c Aug. 1999\c None
Augmentation Program: Wide
Area Augmentation System
Global Positioning System 2006 2006 None
Augmentation Program: Local
Area Augmentation System
Host and Oceanic Computer Oct. 1999\d Sept. 1999\d -1 month
System Replacement Program
Integrated Terminal Weather July 2003 July 2003 None
System
Oceanic Automation Program June 2000 Oct. 1999 -8 months\e
Operational and Aug. 2001 Aug. 2001 None
Supportability
Implementation System
Standard Terminal Automation Feb. 2005 Feb. 2005 None
Replacement System
Terminal Doppler Weather Aug.1996 July 2001 +4 years,
Radar 11 months
Terminal Radar Digitization, Not Sept. 2005 N/A
Replacement, and determined
Establishment Program:
Airport Surveillance Radar-
11 Project
Voice Switching and Control May 2000 May 2000 None
System
Weather and Radar Processor Feb. 2000 July 2000 +5 months
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
N/A = not applicable
\a There is no basis for comparing changes to last-site
implementation because the investment decision for the En Route
Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project (of the
Aeronautical Data Link Program) was made by FAA on October 30, 1998.
\b FAA expects to accelerate the schedule of this project under the
Free Flight Phase 1 Program.
\c Implementation date represents when the project is expected to
achieve the system's initial capability.
\d Implementation date for completing the project is for phase 1 of a
planned four-phase system.
\e Implementation date for completing the project has been
accelerated by 8 months because FAA canceled four of the five phases
and significantly reduced requirements for the one remaining phase.
--------------------
\1 Since estimates for many projects were developed in the 1980s, FAA
officials asserted that the dates in the early modernization plans
did not represent a realistic baseline for measuring progress for a
variety of reasons, including changes to requirements for a number of
projects as well as to the number of systems being developed. As a
result, these officials suggested that we measure progress against
the contract date or the date of the investment decision.
\2 FAA officials informed us that they are currently baselining many
of their older projects in accordance with acquisition management
policy. According to these officials, this effort will facilitate
the agency's ability to report major variances in the achievement of
cost, schedule, and performance goals. (For the most part, FAA
officials indicated that the new baseline will be the cost and
schedule estimate as of 1998. As a result, in future years, the
baselines that we report, on the basis of the criteria indicated
above, may differ from those that FAA uses for external reporting).
AERONAUTICAL DATA LINK
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.1
Aeronautical Data Link is designed to provide digital data
communications between ground and airborne automation systems. It is
expected to give pilots direct access to weather and air traffic
control information and reduce voice communication errors. FAA has
been developing Aeronautical Data Link since the early 1980s. An
original National Airspace System (NAS) plan modernization program,
Aeronautical Data Link was designed to construct an En Route Data
Link Processor and associated software utilizing Mode-S.\3
In addition, Tower Data Link Services were planned to provide
airlines with predeparture clearances. Other components, such as
Terminal Data Link and Oceanic Data Link were also planned.
The program has experienced a number of changes to cost and schedule
estimates since its inception. Several factors have led to the
changes, including the addition of new projects, restructuring of
existing projects, and international agreements. The most
significant change to the program was the decision to cancel the En
Route Data Link Processor and transmit controller-pilot messages via
a service provider--very high frequency (VHF) Digital Link Mode 2.
This decision was reached for various reasons, including spectrum and
user equipage concerns. The En Route Data Link Processor equipment
will now be used for other FAA programs. FAA reports that it spent
$175.9 million of F&E funding on the Aeronautical Data Link Program
from its inception through fiscal year 1998. According to FAA
officials, funds were used primarily to establish Tower Data Link
Services and test and demonstrate the En Route Data Link Processor
and associated software.
The program currently comprises one major project--the En Route
Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project--which will provide
a two-way digital exchange of controller-pilot messages via VHF
Digital Link Mode 2--and six other projects. In October 1998, FAA
approved the En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications
project's baseline--the only active project to have a formerly
approved baseline. This project will be developed in two
phases--Build 1 and Build 1A. Build 1 will allow a limited number of
messages between pilots and controllers to be automated for use at
the Miami en route center. Build 1A will enhance this capability by
increasing the number of automated messages exchanged and will be
implemented at 20 en route centers, and one each at the FAA Technical
Center and the FAA Academy. Both builds will consist of Aeronautical
Telecommunication Network-compliant messages using VHF Mode 2.\4
The six other Aeronautical Data Link projects include (1) Tower Data
Link Services, (2) the Host Interface Device/National Airspace System
Local Area Network, (3) Traffic Information Service, (4) Terminal
Weather Information for Pilots, (5) Flight Information Services, and
(6) Decision Support System Services. Other programs, such as Free
Flight Phase 1, will use some of the services provided under this
program. Terminal Data Link and Oceanic Data Link are still in the
planning stages.
Tower Data Link Services enables data link communications between air
traffic controllers and aircraft. For example, it provides aircraft
with predeparture clearances and pilots with weather and facility
conditions at major airports. FAA has completed the installation of
Tower Data Link Services at 57 airports and one each at the FAA
Technical Center and the FAA Academy. FAA is considering requests
from additional airports for this service.
The Host Interface Device will provide the interface for digital
communications between the Host computer system, En Route
Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project, and other
automation systems and tools. FAA plans to implement a Host
Interface Device at 20 en route centers, two at the FAA Technical
Center, and one at the FAA Academy.
Traffic Information Service will display information on traffic and
potential conflict situations to pilots via data link. The
information will be a graphic depiction of radar traffic similar to
information received over voice radio. This information is intended
to improve the safety and efficiency of flight under visual flight
rules. FAA plans to implement the Traffic Information Service at 119
locations throughout the NAS with Mode-S radars.
Terminal Weather Information for Pilots will provide pilots with
weather information obtained through the Terminal Doppler Weather
Radar on conditions such as microbursts, gust fronts, wind shear, and
heavy precipitation within 15 miles of an airport. FAA plans to
deploy this function at all 47 Terminal Doppler Weather Radar sites.
Flight Information Services will provide pilots with general
aeronautical information, including weather and the status of special
use airspace to assist in flight planning. Currently, a pilot must
obtain this information on the ground before flight or in the cockpit
via voice. Using data link, a pilot will be able to read this
information on a cockpit display unit. One example of a flight
information service is Graphical Weather Services, which will provide
pilots with a map that shows real-time precipitation conditions
throughout the nation. FAA plans to implement Graphical Weather
Services at three sites that will provide NAS coverage as well as
systems at the FAA Technical Center and at the FAA Academy.
Decision Support System Services will allow pilots to plan more
optimal flight paths and to adhere more closely to
controller-approved flight paths by providing wind and air
temperature information via data link. This service will also
provide controllers with more accurate information on flight paths
using data obtained via data link from aircraft about their location,
speed, direction, intended flight paths, and performance
characteristics. Ultimately, FAA plans for this service to provide
automated negotiations and clearances of conflict-free flight paths
between pilots and controllers.
--------------------
\3 Mode-S is a secondary surveillance radar. A secondary
surveillance radar identifies, locates, and tracks aircraft by using
its signals to interrogate equipment (transponders) on board the
aircraft.
\4 The Aeronautical Telecommunications Network is a data network
being developed in accordance with internationally accepted standards
to provide a link between many U.S. and international airlines and
civil aviation authorities for the exchanging of flight plans,
weather data, distress messages, and other data.
DATA LINK'S COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.2
Table I.3 summarizes the Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications'
cost and schedule.
Table I.3
En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link
Communications' Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendors: Computer Sciences Corporation,
Calverton, Md.; Aeronautical Radio
Incorporated, Annapolis, Md; Lockheed
Martin Corporation, Bethesda, Md.; and
Universal Systems and Technology, Inc.
Fairfax, Va.)
Change in
Financial information Oct. 1998 Oct. 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total estimated F&E cost $163.7 $163.7 N/A\a
Cumulative F&E None
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule Oct. 1998 Oct. 1998 Change
Estimated first-site Sept. 2002 Sept. 2002 N/A\a
implementation (Controller/
Pilot Data Link
Communications Build 1)
Estimated last-site Dec. 2005 Dec. 2005 N/A\a
implementation (Controller/
Pilot Data Link
Communications Build 1A)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a There is no basis for comparison of original and current cost
estimates and first- and last-site implementation because the
investment decision for the En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link
Communications project (of the Aeronautical Data Link Program) was
made by FAA on October 30, 1998.
DATA LINK'S CHALLENGES AND
RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.3
The En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project has
aggressive development and implementation schedules for Build 1 and
Build 1A. The project also has a major schedule interdependency with
Aeronautical Telecommunications Network Systems, Inc.-developed
software. Any software development delays by the company will likely
jeopardize FAA's ability to meet the project's baselined schedule.
Additionally, FAA has assumed that the service provider message costs
of VHF Data Link Mode 2 will be shared between FAA and industry.
However, FAA has yet to formalize this arrangement with industry.
AIR ROUTE SURVEILLANCE RADAR-4
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1
Air Route Surveillance Radar-4 (ARSR-4) is a long-range primary
surveillance radar that tracks en route aircraft and weather by
emitting radio signals that are reflected back to the radar.\5 (See
fig. I.1.) Data from this radar on the movement of aircraft and on
weather are used for keeping aircraft separated, drug interdiction,
and the defense of U.S. borders. Radar data are merged with data
from a collocated secondary beacon system and then transmitted to
FAA's en route air traffic control centers, Air Force Air Defense
Sectors, and the Customs Service. ARSR-4 is a part of FAA's Long
Range Radar Replacement Program--a multiyear program funded jointly
by FAA, the Air Force, and the Navy.
This project replaces some of the obsolete FAA and military air route
surveillance radars and aging long-range radars. FAA has acquired 44
ARSR-4s. Forty-two of these will be placed along the perimeter of
the continental United States, Hawaii, Guam, and Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, and will be owned and maintained by FAA for the agency's and
the Air Force's use. One radar will be used exclusively by the Air
Force at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. The remaining radar
is to be used for field support and training in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, and will not be commissioned.
--------------------
\5 A primary surveillance radar system tracks aircraft and weather by
emitting radio signals that are reflected by all of the aircraft and
weather conditions present in the area covered by the system.
CHANGES TO ARSR-4'S COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2
The estimated cost of the ARSR-4 has increased by $66.4 million to
$415.8 million since the contract was awarded in 1988. About $50
million of this increase occurred in the early-to-mid-1990s because
of the relocation of eight sites and the addition of one radar. The
remaining $16 million increase, which occurred in 1997, is due in
part to (1) technical corrections required for the system, (2) an
increase in the costs of spare parts, (3) an increase in the length
of depot repair service from 3 to 5 years, (4) the installation of
uninterruptible power systems at all sites, and (5) software
upgrades.
The project's first-site implementation date was delayed by 2 years
and 7 months, from September 1993 to April 1996 by several technical
issues--that were eventually resolved--and by new requirements.
However, within the last 2 years, FAA has made progress with
implementing the ARSR-4. As of October 1998, the agency had
commissioned 38 of 43 ARSR-4s and had 3 additional sites planned for
commissioning by December 1998. Commissioning at the last two
sites--Guam and Ajo, Arizona--is planned in 1999. Guam's original
implementation date for ARSR-4 was delayed because new equipment had
to be replaced after being damaged by a typhoon. Ajo will be the
last site installed. This site alone has contributed 5 months to the
total last-site implementation delay because of environmental issues.
However, FAA recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to mitigate the environmental issues
at or near the site, and construction at the site has started. Table
I.4 summarizes the changes to ARSR-4's cost and schedule since 1988.
Table I.4
Changes to ARSR-4's Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Northrup-Grumman Corporation,
Linthicum, Md.)
Change in
Financial information 1988 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $349.4 $415.8 +$66.4
Cumulative F&E $408.8
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1988 1998 Change in
years/
months
First-site implementation Sept. 1993 Apr. 1996 +2 years,
7 months
Estimated last-site Nov. 1996 May 1999 +2 years,
implementation 6 months
----------------------------------------------------------------------
ARSR-4'S CHALLENGES AND
RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3
Total funding for this project could increase by about $2.5 million
because of the reprogramming of the project's fiscal year 1998 funds.
The program office had planned for fiscal year 1999 to be the final
year of F&E funding for the ARSR-4 project. However, FAA
reprogrammed $1.3 million of the project's fiscal year 1998 funds for
other modernization activities, including the Standard Terminal
Automation Replacement System and Year 2000 computer problems. The
restoration of these funds--which the program office planned to use
to complete modifications to enhance the system--is not expected
until 2001. This action will most likely force the program office to
let a new contract for system modifications and, as a result, spend
an additional $2.5 million on the project's costs.
Figure I.1: ARSR-4
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
AIRPORT SURFACE DETECTION
EQUIPMENT-3
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.1
The Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 (ASDE-3) is a primary radar
designed to provide tower controllers with surveillance
information--a video display--of all aircraft and other vehicle
operations on an airport's runways and taxiways. ASDE-3 will help
prevent accidents by allowing controllers to efficiently move
traffic, especially during low visibility, such as in fog or during
night operations. (See fig. I.2.) FAA developed these radars to
replace the aging and less reliable ASDE-2 radars. While ASDE-3
provides a video display for controllers to assist them in preventing
potential runway collisions, controllers are not able to watch the
display at all times. As a result, FAA is developing an Airport
Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) to provide automated aural and
visual warnings (conflict alerts) to alert controllers of potential
runway collisions.
FAA has procured a total of 40 ASDE-3 systems--33 under the original
contract and 7 under a contract with the same contractor (Northrup
Grumman-Norden Systems)--that was signed in September 1993.
Thirty-eight of the systems are for airport use, and two systems are
for support and training use in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.
In the 1983 financial plan, ASDE-3's F&E cost was $83.2 million, and
the first- and last-site implementation dates were 1987 and 1990,
respectively. Cost increases from 1983 through 1993 were due to
increases in the number of systems being acquired and software and
hardware changes. Slips in implementation dates through 1993 were
due in part to performance problems with ASDE-3's ability to
accurately track targets and conflicts with ongoing construction
projects at airports that were scheduled to receive these radars.
CHANGES TO ASDE-3'S COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.2
Since the project was expanded in 1993, the cost of ASDE-3 increased
by $58.1 million to procure and install additional equipment items
needed for remote site operation, additional radar displays, spare
parts, test equipment, and modifications to enhance the reliability
and maintainability of component parts for the system (such as
bearings and transmitters) that were deteriorating more quickly than
anticipated.
ASDE-3's first-site implementation was delayed in part because of
technical problems at the first site. The last-site implementation
has been delayed by more than 40 months-- from July 1996 to November
1999--primarily because of delays in the completion of towers or
structures at locations receiving ASDE-3 systems. Other factors
contributing to delays include problems associated with the buildup
of cadmium dust that was generated by components needed to operate
ASDE-3 antenna heaters. A project official stated that although FAA
has resolved this problem, the agency has delayed the project's
installation schedule by 9 months.
As of September 1998, 37 of the 40 systems had been delivered to FAA,
and the last 3 were planned for delivery in 1999. Thirty of the 37
systems have been commissioned, and 2 are being used as support
systems. Of the remaining five systems at operational sites, four
are awaiting commissioning, and one is undergoing implementation.
Table I.5 summarizes the changes to ASDE-3's cost and schedule since
1993.
Table I.5
Changes to ASDE-3's Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Northrup Grumman-Norden Systems,
Inc., Norwalk, Conn.)
Change in
Financial information 1993 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $191.0 $249.1 +$58.1
Cumulative F&E $241.1
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1993 1998 Change in
years/
months
First-site implementation Mar. 1993 Dec. 1993 + 9 months
Estimated last-site July 1996 Nov. 1999 + 3 years,
implementation 4 months
----------------------------------------------------------------------
ASDE-3'S/AMASS' CHALLENGES
AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.3
Achieving the full safety benefits from ASDE-3 hinges on AMASS. FAA
plans to install an AMASS system at each of the 40 ASDE-3 sites; as
of September 1998, three AMASS systems had been delivered to FAA, and
the first of these is planned for implementation in October 1999.
Additionally, FAA plans to take delivery of the remaining 37 systems
by March 2000 and have the last site implemented by August 2000.
There are several challenges to meeting this schedule.
Preliminary tests have shown that AMASS can provide accurate and
timely warnings of potential conflicts. Additionally, AMASS is
designed to place symbols on real targets so controllers can visually
distinguish them from false targets caused by multipath problems from
the ASDE-3 radar.\6 However, during early testing of AMASS, false
alerts from multipath were considered a challenging issue. For
example, if excessive levels of false alerts continued, controller
confidence in AMASS could be eroded and could affect the flow of air
traffic. FAA has made system changes to address these problems and
continues to evaluate software algorithms and other technical
enhancements to mitigate false alerts. Operational testing is
expected to be completed in 1999.
Implementing AMASS could also prove to be operationally challenging.
For example, AMASS' performance in accurately detecting conflicts is
directly affected by each airport's physical layout, local procedures
for traffic flow, and ASDE-3's performance during inclement weather.
Consequently, cooperation within FAA to optimize each system on the
basis of sight-specific parameters is key to the system's
implementation. Standards and procedures will need to be developed
to address such issues as the acceptable AMASS performance rates for
accurately detecting conflicts and how controllers will use the tool
in an operational setting. To use AMASS in an operational setting,
FAA will also have to resolve issues surrounding controllers' actions
based on AMASS data, such as disruptions caused by false alerts.
According to an FAA official, the agency has begun to address these
issues.
Figure I.2: Rotodome
Containing ASDE-3 Radar on Top
of Air Traffic Control Tower
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\6 Multipath problems occur when radio-frequency energy radiates off
buildings or other aircraft, thus creating a momentary false target
on the ASDE-3 radar's display. All radars experience multipath
problems, but radars like ASDE-3, which radiate energy downward, are
especially prone to such problems.
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL BEACON
INTERROGATOR
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.1
The Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator (ATCBI) project will
replace 30-year-old model 4 and 5 secondary surveillance
radars--located mainly at en route sites--with a new model 6 radar.
The existing model 4 and 5 radars are extremely vulnerable to outages
as well as critical part shortages, since they were planned to have
only a 20-year life.
In August 1998, after a 10-month evaluation of potential vendors, FAA
awarded Raytheon a contract for up to 150 model 6 secondary
surveillance radars. As of November 1998, FAA is committed to
purchasing 127 systems. FAA expects to begin testing two
preproduction systems in January 1999 and to begin fielding the new
model 6 radar no later than March 2001.
ATCBI'S COST AND SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.2
Table I.6 summarizes ATCBI's costs and schedule since August 1998.
Table I.6
ATCBI's Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company,
Marlborough, Mass.)
Change in
Financial information Aug. 1998 Oct.1998 dollars
----------------------------- ------------------ ------------------ ------------------
Total F&E cost $282.8 $282.8 None
Cumulative F&E appropriations $8.4
through
fiscal year 1998
=========================================================================================
Schedule Aug. 1998 Oct. 1998 Change
Estimated first-site Sept. 2001 Sept. 2001 None
implementation
Estimated last-site Sept. 2004 Sept. 2004 None
implementation
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ATCBI'S CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.3
The project faces both technical and schedule risks related to
interface requirements. ATCBI-6 must interface with existing and
future automation systems as well as all primary radars collocated
with the existing equipment that ATCBI-6 will replace. According to
project officials, the contractor has limited experience with known
interfaces and no experience with those interfaces that are not yet
defined. Project officials plan to develop interfaces in the order
of "easiest" to "most difficult." The interfaces to existing en route
automation systems will be the first to be developed. Next,
interfaces to existing primary radars will be developed, and,
finally, ATCBI-6 interfaces will be developed for future automation
systems.
Because some of ATCBI-6's interface requirements are "moving
targets," the ATCBI-6 project officials will need to maintain close
coordination with other project teams to help ensure that the ATCBI
team meets its schedule. The procurement, delivery, and installation
of government equipment must also be monitored closely to ensure that
all ancillary equipment required for complete installation and
testing is available to the contractor.
AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
PROGRAM/FREE FLIGHT PHASE 1
PROGRAM
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.1
The Air Traffic Management (ATM) program integrated the development
and prototyping of automated tools designed to improve the management
of air traffic control. Traffic flow management tools included the
Enhanced Traffic Management System and Collaborative Decision Making.
Air traffic control tools included the User Request Evaluation Tool,
Center Terminal Radar Approach Control Automation System (CTAS), and
Surface Movement Advisor. FAA has been developing these new
capabilities to support the agency's efforts to implement a new, more
flexible system of air traffic management known as "free flight."
Under free flight, FAA will gradually deploy a range of new
technologies and procedures and work collaboratively with users to
manage air traffic operations.
As of September 30, 1998, the ATM program was completed--including
all of its prototyping efforts in support of Free Flight Phase 1--and
the program's structure was eliminated. Under the ATM program, FAA
estimates that it spent $405 million on F&E through fiscal year 1998,
including funding for the Enhanced Traffic Management System. On
October 1, 1998, the recently established Free Flight Phase 1 program
commenced operations under a new charter to move these former ATM
prototypes into full-scale development.\7 Projects under this program
include CTAS, Surface Movement Advisor, User Request Evaluation Tool,
and Collaborative Decision Making. While not officially a part of
Free Flight Phase 1, Enhanced Traffic Management System will be
managed by the program office. FAA estimates the cost of Free Flight
Phase 1 through its completion in 2002 at $633 million.
CTAS has two components that are planned for use under Free Flight
Phase 1--Traffic Management Advisor Build 2 and Passive Final
Approach Spacing Tool. Traffic Management Advisor will provide en
route/terminal controllers with automation tools to schedule aircraft
to enter or depart from airspace that is between 5 and 50 miles from
an airport. Similarly, the Passive Final Approach Spacing Tool is an
automated device that provides terminal controllers with sequence
numbers and runway assignments during final approach and landing.
The Surface Movement Advisor is intended to enhance the efficiency of
aircraft movements on the airport surface by facilitating the sharing
of real-time information among airspace users and airport operators.
User Request Evaluation Tool is an automated device that assists en
route controllers in identifying and resolving potential conflicts
between aircraft up to 20 minutes before their occurrence.
Collaborative Decision Making provides a real-time exchange of
information on flight plans and system constraints to assist airline
and air traffic control personnel in making decisions about NAS
resources. Finally, Enhanced Traffic Management System provides the
current traffic management system with software and hardware upgrades
to convert it to an open system platform that is Year 2000 compliant.
--------------------
\7 FAA plans to move Free Flight Phase 1 technologies to full-scale
development using an evolutionary spiral development approach to the
development and deployment of technology, as appropriate. Under such
an approach, the agency plans to limit the scope of project segments
so that it can deploy, test, evaluate, and refine a given technology
in a cyclical manner until it can perform at the desired level.
ATM PROGRAM'S COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.2
According to an FAA program official, CTAS is the only project to
have a formally approved baseline. The current baseline was approved
under the former ATM program, but FAA plans to request a revised
baseline in January 1999. At the same time, project officials plan
to request the approval of baselines for the remaining projects. FAA
plans to deploy all of these projects by 2002. Table I.7 summarizes
CTAS' cost and schedule since 1997.
Table I.7
CTAS' Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendors: Computer Science Corporation;
Lockheed Martin; NASA Ames;
Massachusetts Institute of Technology/
Lincoln Laboratory; Wyndemer and EDS.)
Changes in
Financial Information 1997 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $251.1 $251.1 None
Cumulative F&E $69.0
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1997 1998 Change
Estimated first-site 2002\a,b 2002\a,b None
implementation
Estimated last-site 2006\b 2006\b None
implementation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a First-site implementation date is for both components of
CTAS--Traffic Management Advisor Build 2 and Passive Final Approach
Spacing Tool.
\b FAA expects to accelerate this schedule under Free Flight Phase I.
FREE FLIGHT PHASE 1'S
CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.3
In a recent report on FAA's free flight implementation efforts, we
reported that FAA and the aviation community face numerous challenges
in their efforts to implement free flight--including Phase 1--in a
cost-effective manner.\8 Among the challenges, we identified the need
for FAA to (1) provide effective leadership and management of
modernization efforts both within and outside the agency, including
effective collaboration with stakeholders and improvements to
cross-program communication and coordination within FAA; (2) work
collaboratively with the aviation community to develop goals and
sufficiently detailed plans for what it intends to achieve and
develop measures for tracking progress; and (3) address outstanding
issues related to the development of technology, such as identifying
and addressing the impacts of modernization on human operators,
including maintenance staff, controllers, and pilots.
FAA recently identified similar challenges, such as its need to
provide strong leadership and accountability for implementing Free
Flight Phase 1. A senior FAA official told us that the key challenge
facing the agency in implementing free flight--including Phase
1--will be maintaining a consensus between FAA and the aviation
community as implementation efforts move forward. Other challenges
highlighted by FAA include (1) managing the expectations of the
aviation community on the expected benefits of free flight
capabilities, in part, by taking care not to overstate expected
benefits; (2) taking steps to ensure that vendors and research
organizations focus on Phase 1 from a system's perspective rather
than on their individual products; (3) holding to the number of sites
selected and the agreed upon locations--to keep the program
manageable and affordable; (4) coordinating with projects on which
Phase 1 is dependent; and (5) managing an aggressive schedule for
deploying Phase 1's capabilities by 2002 as planned.
According to FAA, the structure of the Free Flight Phase 1 program
office is designed to facilitate communication and coordination with
other FAA organizations and the aviation community. For example, the
office includes a stakeholder council to help assure adequate
involvement of key FAA and aviation community stakeholders in its
implementation efforts. This council will be responsible for
maintaining consensus agreement and addressing global issues related
to the implementation of free flight. The office also has a team
that is working directly with the airlines to build baseline
performance data needed for measuring progress under free flight and
is addressing human factors issues, among other tasks.
--------------------
\8 See National Airspace System: FAA Has Implemented Some Free
Flight Initiatives, but Challenges Remain (GAO/RCED-98-246, Sept.
28, 1998).
AUTOMATED SURFACE OBSERVING
SYSTEM
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6.1
The Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) automates the
observation and dissemination of data on temperature and dew point,
visibility, wind direction and speed, pressure, cloud height and
amount, and the types and amounts of precipitation. (See fig. I.3.)
ASOS is intended to improve the weather services at the nation's
large airports and provide smaller airports used by general aviation
pilots with new service. ASOS is intended to replace some of the
human observers who provide FAA with similar services under contract.
According to FAA's Air Traffic officials, it is estimated that $18
million a year can be avoided by replacing human observers.
Under ASOS--a joint program administered by the National Weather
Service--597 ASOS units will be procured, installed, and maintained
by FAA at both towered and nontowered airports. Prior to fiscal year
1998, FAA provided ASOS with funds under the umbrella of the
Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) program, which also
included AWOS, AWOS Data Acquisition System, and the Automated
Lightning Detection and Reporting System projects.\9 AWOS filled an
immediate need for automated weather information during the
development of the more sophisticated ASOS. The last of 200 AWOS
sites was implemented in April 1998. Each AWOS Data Acquisition
System acquires weather information from up to 137 AWOS and ASOS
units, disseminates this information via FAA's National Weather
Network, and archives weather data products. According to project
officials, all 22 operational AWOS Data Acquisition Systems, located
primarily at en route centers, have been commissioned. Three
additional support systems are also operational.
--------------------
\9 The Automated Lightning Detection and Reporting System will
provide AWOS and ASOS with data on lightning via AWOS' Data
Acquisition System.
CHANGES TO ASOS' COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6.2
As of October 1998, FAA had commissioned 371 of the 597 ASOSs--238
new sites since early 1997. FAA plans to commission an additional 79
systems by the end of December 1999 and the remaining 147 sites by
the end of December 2002. Currently, FAA cannot commission 70
nontowered sites because it placed a moratorium on their
commissioning as a result of contract weather observers' concerns.
According to FAA project officials, the agency may place a moratorium
on an additional 40 nontowered sites. Contract weather observers
claim that ASOS provides a lower level of service than they provide,
and, as a result, they should not be replaced by ASOSs at these
sites. The estimated total cost of ASOS has increased by $136.2
million since the contract was awarded in February 1991, and the
project's last-site implementation schedule has slipped by more than
6 years. Five major factors caused changes to the project's cost and
schedule baselines.
First, at the time of the contract's award, the scope of ASOS'
commissioning process was still under development. The schedule was
extended once the scope was fully defined to allow for such
activities as the evaluation of planned sites. The schedule also
slipped because of limited manpower resources in FAA's regional
offices responsible for commissioning ASOS equipment. These events
caused the first-site and last-site implementation to slip by 27 and
8 months, respectively. Also contributing to the schedule slippage
was the shifting of telecommunications costs from the operations and
maintenance budget to the F&E budget. This change in policy
regarding telecommunications funding also resulted in an increase of
$10.5 million to the project's F&E cost.
Second, FAA added new requirements to the ASOS project from 1994
through 1998 because it determined that the original requirements
were unacceptable. As a result, FAA added requirements for freezing
rain sensors, backup equipment, and a new tower display--ASOS
Controller Equipment.\10 This additional equipment caused the
project's cost to increase by $47.8 million and the project's
last-site implementation date to slip by 13 months.
Third, FAA reduced the project's 1994 funding by $10 million, causing
the National Weather Service to restructure the ASOS contract. As a
result, the project's cost increased by $14.6 million, and its
last-site implementation date slipped by 18 months.
Fourth, in 1994 and 1995, the National Weather Service imposed a
moratorium on commissioning any ASOSs until the systems' technical
deficiencies and logistic problems were resolved. FAA also agreed to
halt commissioning because the National Air Traffic Controllers
Association (NATCA) has similar concerns about the system. As a
result, this caused the project's cost to increase by $10 million and
the last-site implementation date to slip by 1 year.
Fifth, the conferees for the fiscal year 1997 and 1998 Department of
Transportation Appropriations Acts directed the purchase of
additional systems in 1997 and 1998. This caused the project's cost
to increase by $20 million, which FAA plans to use to purchase 60
additional systems--30 of which FAA has already purchased. The 1997
congressional direction caused the last-site implementation date to
slip by 1 year. In addition, the 1998 direction will cause the
last-site implementation date to slip from December 2001 to December
2002.
Additionally, an increase of $33.3 million in the cost baseline from
1991 through 1998 can be attributed to several other factors. These
include spare parts, congressionally directed ASOS augmentation for
Alaska, special site considerations in Alaska, equipment relocations,
earthquake anchoring, an ASOS assessment study, initial maintenance,
preplanned product improvements, and the procurement of modems.
Table I.8 summarizes the changes to ASOS' cost and schedule since
1991.
Table I.8
Changes to ASOS' Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: SMI Corporation, Hunt Valley,
Md.)
Change in
Financial information 1991 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $151.3 $287.5 +$136.2
Cumulative F&E $215.8
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1991 1998 Change in
years/
months
First-site implementation Aug. 1991 Nov. 1993 +2 years,
3 months
Estimated last-site Sept. 1996 Dec. 2002 +6 years,
implementation 3 months
----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
\10 This equipment consists of a local area network located in air
traffic control towers and associated terminal radar approach control
facilities that are used for displaying ASOS-generated weather data
at controllers' workstations in easily understood graphical displays.
This equipment allows multiple controllers to access similar ASOS
data at the same time in both the terminal radar approach control
facility and tower.
ASOS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6.3
The ASOS project faces two primary challenges. First, FAA has
experienced reliability problems with ASOS' temperature/dew point
sensor. This faulty sensor accounts for more than 50 percent of all
ASOS data errors, thereby limiting FAA's ability to utilize ASOS to
its full potential. FAA and the National Weather Service are
attempting to resolve this problem.
Second, as stated above, FAA has placed a moratorium on ASOS'
commissioning as a result of contract weather observers' concerns.
After a reassessment of ASOS' performance, which was conducted during
1997-98, FAA determined that it should continue commissioning ASOS at
selected sites. However, in September 1998, in response to
congressional concerns about the contract weather observers' opinions
on ASOS' performance, FAA requested that the Air Force conduct an
independent assessment to validate the results of the first study.
The Air Force plans to complete its assessment by December 1998. FAA
hopes to have closure on this matter by year's end to prevent further
schedule slips.
Figure I.3: ASOS
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
DISPLAY SYSTEM REPLACEMENT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7.1
The Display System Replacement (DSR) project will modernize en route
center equipment by replacing 20- to 30-year-old display channels,
controllers' workstations, and network infrastructure. (See fig.
I.4.) DSR will also provide a platform for FAA to implement planned
capabilities, such as the User Request Evaluation Tool, which will
allow airlines to request more direct routings, thereby providing
them with benefits including fuel and time savings. DSR is a
scaled-back version of the Initial Sector Suite System--a segment of
the former Advanced Automation System, which FAA restructured in 1994
to solve long-standing cost, schedule, and technical problems. In
1994, the Initial Sector Suite System was estimated to cost $3
billion, and, at the time of the restructuring, FAA had sunk $1.8
billion into the project. The Initial Sector Suite System's first-
and last-site implementation dates were 1996 and 1998, respectively.
CHANGES TO DSR'S COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7.2
Table I.9 summarizes the changes to DSR's cost and schedule since
1994.
Table I.9
Changes to DSR's Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Lockheed Martin Corporation,
Rockville, Md.)
Change in
Financial information 1994 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $1,055.3 $1,055.3 None
Cumulative F&E $771.0
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1994 1998 Change in
months
Estimated first-site Oct. 1998 Dec. 1998 +1.5 months
implementation
Estimated last-site May 2000 May 2000 None
implementation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
DSR'S CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7.3
According to project officials, FAA achieved initial operational
capability of the system as scheduled at its first site, Seattle,
Washington, on June 1, 1998. However, full implementation of DSR was
suspended for a few months in response to 19 computer-human interface
issues expressed by NATCA. On June 16, 1998, FAA and NATCA agreed to
solutions for these 19 issues, and, in October 1998, full
implementation of DSR in Seattle resumed in accordance with the terms
of the June 16 agreement. The project office estimates that
activities associated with modifications to DSR could result in a 1-
to 3-month slip in Seattle's original first-site implementation date
of October 31, 1998.\11
However, the project office is only currently projecting a 6-week
slip to December 15, 1998. Moreover, according to project officials,
although FAA's agreement with NATCA resulted in adjustments to DSR's
schedule, the estimate last-site implementation date scheduled for
May 2000 at Indianapolis, Indiana, is not projected to change.
The Professional Airways Systems Specialists--the union for airway
facilities personnel-- has also expressed some concerns regarding the
fielding of DSR. Chief among these is the ease of access for
maintaining Voice Switching and Control System electronics equipment
located within the DSR controller workstation. FAA reached an
agreement in May 1998 to cooperate with the union to identify
acceptable solutions to these concerns. However, until these
solutions have been identified and implemented, a risk to the DSR
schedule remains.
Figure I.4: DSR
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\11 In accordance with the agreement with NATCA, FAA incorporated a
generic keyboard layout and the use of color for display attributes
along with software and hardware modifications.
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
AUGMENTATION PROGRAM: WIDE
AREA AUGMENTATION SYSTEM/LOCAL
AREA AUGMENTATION SYSTEM
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.1
FAA's current policy is to transition from its present ground-based
navigation and landing system to a satellite-based system using
signals generated by the Department of Defense's Global Positioning
System (GPS).\12 However, GPS, by itself, does not satisfy all
aviation requirements, such as the one requiring the system to be
available virtually all of the time and another requiring the system
be accurate enough to support landings in the worst weather
conditions. To satisfy these requirements, FAA has taken a
two-pronged approach to augmenting GPS through its Wide Area
Augmentation System (WAAS) and Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)
projects.
WAAS is expected to support the navigation for all phases of flight
from nonprecision through category I precision approaches.\13 LAAS is
needed to support the more stringent category II and III precision
approach requirements.\14 LAAS is also expected to complement WAAS
and provide a category I precision approach at airports where WAAS
does not provide sufficient coverage or where there is a higher
requirement for availability. FAA and the aviation industry expect
that these systems will result in major benefits, including a
reduction in landing accidents, by providing more precision-landing
capabilities than currently exist and a reduction in flight times,
fuel consumption, and delays due to bad weather. WAAS and LAAS are
eventually expected to serve as "sole means" navigation systems that
would enable FAA to phase out its costly network of ground-based
navigation aids.\15
In August 1995, after several years of research, FAA contracted with
Wilcox Electric to develop WAAS. However, because of concerns about
the contractor's work, FAA terminated the contract in April 1996. In
May 1996, FAA entered into an interim contract with Hughes Aircraft
Company (now Raytheon Systems), and the contract became final in
October 1996. FAA rebaselined the project in January 1998 to reflect
safety changes that occurred since Wilcox's contract termination.
Operations and Maintenance costs were also included in the January
1998 baseline.\16
At the time of the original baseline for WAAS in 1994, FAA estimated
the project's cost at $509 million. Also at this time, FAA expected
that the initial and full system could be completed by June 1997 and
December 2000, respectively. From 1994 through 1998, baseline costs
increased because of higher development costs to build greater
redundancy into the system's ground components and
higher-than-originally-estimated satellite-leasing costs. In
addition to an already aggressive schedule, such factors as the need
to build greater reliability into the systems and certify system
software further contributed to the schedule's slippage.
Currently, the initial WAAS network consists of 25 reference
stations, 2 master stations, and 4 ground stations joined by a
telecommunications network. The initial system, still in testing,
also uses two leased geostationary communication satellites to
provide signals for making corrections and for transmitting
information to aircraft.\17 In September 1998, FAA decided to add an
interim step between the initial and full system. During this
interim step, FAA plans to add additional ground stations and make
performance upgrades to the initial system's software in order to
evaluate operational experience before moving ahead to complete the
full system. For the full system, FAA envisions a design consisting
of up to 54 reference stations, 8 master stations, and 14 ground
earth stations. (See fig. I.5.)\18
LAAS is a joint research effort with industry. In January 1998, FAA
approved the first LAAS baseline and anticipates moving to full-scale
development by December 1998. During full-scale development, some
systems will be built to test and evaluate the capabilities of
meeting category I, II, and III precision-landing requirements.
After full-scale development, FAA anticipates acquiring 143 systems.
About 42 systems will be installed at airports and will provide a
category I capability, where WAAS cannot.\19 The remaining 101
systems will provide category II and III capabilities. LAAS will
consist of precisely surveyed reference stations for receiving GPS
signals, detecting malfunctions, calculating corrections, and
transmitting corrections to aircraft. The system will also consist
of a ground station, known as a "pseudolite," which will broadcast an
additional signal to aircraft for making corrections. (See fig.
I.6.)
--------------------
\12 There are currently 27 GPS satellites (24 in operation and 3 in
reserve) located in six orbits at approximately 11,000 miles above
the earth. These satellites are positioned so that a user will have
at least four satellites in view at any given location.
\13 On a nonprecision approach, an aircraft receives electronic
guidance for flying toward the runway's center line. On a precision
approach, an aircraft not only receives this guidance but also
guidance on the slope of descent to the runway. As a result, on a
precision approach, an aircraft can safely descend closer to the
ground while attempting to land in bad weather. FAA currently
categorizes precision-landing systems according to their ability to
safely guide an aircraft to a runway in poor weather conditions. A
category I system provides aircraft with safe vertical guidance to a
height of not less than 200 feet with runway visibility of at least
1,800 feet.
\14 A category II system provides aircraft with a safe vertical
guidance to a height of not less than 100 feet with runway visibility
of not less than 1,200 feet. A category III system provides aircraft
with safe vertical guidance all the way to touchdown under conditions
where a runway's visibility is extremely limited, for example, where
a runway's visibility is not less than 150 feet.
\15 A "sole means" navigation system must, for a given operation or
phase of flight, allow the aircraft to meet all performance
requirements for the navigation system.
\16 During the January 1998 rebaselining, the agency conducted an
economic analysis to reevaluate whether WAAS was still a sound
investment. The analysis assessed how such events as the range of
satellite costs and the inclusion of the costs of decommissioning
ground-based navigation aids would affect the investment. FAA found
that WAAS' benefits still outweighed costs.
\17 Unlike GPS satellites, the WAAS geostationary satellites are
located at fixed positions in orbit 22,000 miles above the earth.
\18 Neighboring countries may field additional ground stations and
reduce the need for FAA to invest in as many ground stations as
originally envisioned.
\19 WAAS may not provide sufficient coverage for precision landing
guidance in remote areas, such as in parts of Alaska. Also, some
airports (e.g., Miami International) have higher availability
requirements than WAAS can provide. Availability is the probability
that, at any given time, the system will meet the accuracy and
integrity requirements for each phase of flight.
WAAS' AND LAAS' COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.2
Table I.10 summarizes WAAS' and LAAS' costs and schedules since
January 1998.
Table I.10
WAAS' and LAAS' Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendors: WAAS-Raytheon Systems Company,
Fullerton, Calif.;
COMSAT/Mobile Communications, Bethesda,
Md.
Partners: LAAS-Honeywell, Minneapolis,
Minn.; Raytheon Systems Company,
Fullerton, Calif.)
Financial Change in
information Jan. 1998\a Oct. 1998 dollars
---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Total WAAS F&E $1,006.6 $1,006.6 None
cost
F&E $400.4
appropriations
through fiscal
year 1998
Total LAAS F&E $535.8 $535.8 None
cost
F&E $11.2
appropriations
through fiscal
year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule Jan. 1998 Oct. 1998 Change
WAAS' initial Aug. 1999 Aug. 1999 None
capability
WAAS' interim N/A Dec. 2001 N/A
capability
WAAS' full Dec. 2001 TBD N/A
capability
LAAS' first- 2003 2003 None
site
implementation\
b
Last-site 2006 2006 None
implementation\b
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
N/A = not applicable
TBD = to be determined
\a The revised WAAS baseline also includes $2.043 billion for
operations and maintenance through 2016. In 1997, FAA estimated
these costs at $1.5 billion. LAAS' operations and maintenance costs
are estimated to reach $296 million.
\b These dates reflect the first- and last-site implementation dates
for full production of LAAS.
WAAS'/LAAS' CHALLENGES AND
RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3
Several uncertainties--related to cost, performance, and technical
issues--surround FAA's satellite navigation program. While FAA's
revised baseline recognizes that WAAS' estimated costs have grown
significantly, questions persist about whether the WAAS program is
cost-effective. Closely related to the issue of whether the expected
benefits justify the cost are several performance and technical
issues, including the vulnerability of the GPS signal to
interference, the selection of a second broadcast frequency for
civilian use, and the acquisition of additional geostationary
satellites for WAAS. FAA's current efforts to identify alternatives
to satisfy its future satellite navigation needs and the resolution
of the outstanding issues could affect the cost, schedule, and
delivery of benefits to users and to FAA.
QUESTIONS PERSIST ABOUT
THE COST AND BENEFITS OF
WAAS
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3.1
In the Department of Transportation Appropriations Acts for fiscal
years 1998 and 1999 and their accompanying legislative histories,
congressional concerns were expressed about certain aspects of the
WAAS program, including its cost, schedule, performance, and
risks.\20 For example, in the conference report accompanying the
fiscal year 1999 appropriations, the conferees noted that proponents
of the WAAS program have not been able to provide compelling
assurance that the program will be cost-effective beyond the initial
phase, which is expected to become operational in 1999. The
conferees further asserted that serious and persistent technical
concerns await resolution by the FAA at an unknown cost and in
unknown time frames. The fiscal year 1999 appropriations act
includes a provision which prohibits the use of funds for any WAAS
activity beyond phase 1.
FAA's analyses of WAAS have shown the project to be cost beneficial.
In fact, during the January 1998 rebaselining of the project, FAA
conducted an economic analysis to reevaluate whether WAAS was still a
sound investment. The analysis assessed how such events as the range
of satellite costs and the inclusion of the costs of decommissioning
ground-based navigation aids would affect the investment. At that
time, FAA found that benefits still outweighed costs. However, since
then questions have arisen about the WAAS investment and in
particular, the conferees for the fiscal year 1999 Transportation
Appropriations Act expressed concern that the benefits of WAAS may be
overstated.
It is expected that FAA will identify its future needs for satellite
navigation and analyze a range of alternatives for meeting those
needs. In fact, the conferees for the fiscal year 1999
Transportation Appropriations Act directed FAA to complete an
alternatives analysis which looks at various combinations of existing
and new, ground-based and satellite-based technology. In response,
FAA has completed a draft alternative analysis plan, which calls for
the identification of possible alternatives by early 1999. Once
possible alternatives have been identified, the Center for Advanced
Aviation System Development of the Mitre Corporation is expected to
do a technical evaluation of the alternatives.\21
Following Mitre's evaluation, FAA's investment analysis team will
analyze the costs, benefits, schedule, performance, and risks of each
alternative and expects to recommend a proposed alternative to FAA's
senior acquisition managers by the end of May 1999. The Congress is
expected to use the results of various analyses of WAAS in
determining the level of appropriations needed for FAA's future
navigation program including both WAAS and LAAS.
--------------------
\20 Senate Report 105-55, Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1998 (July 22, 1997), and House
of Representatives Conference Report 105-313, Department of
Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1998
(Oct. 7, 1997) and House of Representatives Conference Report
105-825, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1999 (Oct. 19, 1998).
\21 Mitre Corporation operates, under a memorandum of agreement with
funding from FAA, the Center for Advanced Aviation System
Development. The Center carries out a continuing program of
research, development, system architecture, and high-level system
engineering to support FAA's NAS needs.
GPS SIGNALS ARE
VULNERABLE TO
INTERFERENCE
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3.2
GPS provides low-power signals that are susceptible to both
unintentional and intentional radio frequency interference.\22 For
example, accidental or inadvertent interference by extraneous radio
transmissions on the GPS frequency could cause the loss of service.
Also, the potential exists that an individual or organization could
disrupt the GPS navigation signals by jamming them.
FAA has recognized that the interference issue must be addressed and
that appropriate measures must be in place before satellite
navigation can become a "sole means" system. One mitigation strategy
that FAA may employ includes retaining a portion of its existing
ground-based navigation aids as a backup. Also, during the
transition from ground-based navigation aids to WAAS, which would
last for about a decade, both would be available to users and FAA.
During this period, users would have time to equip their aircraft,
and FAA would have time to test several countermeasures, including
the use of the existing air traffic control and surveillance networks
to safely control traffic in areas where there is interference and
the use of flight inspection aircraft to detect interference events.
In recent months, vulnerability concerns about whether satellite
navigation should be used as the "sole means" of providing aircraft
landing guidance have been reemphasized. Consequently, FAA has begun
assessing whether, and to what extent, it may have to maintain some
portion of existing ground-based navigation aids as a backup
navigation service.\23 As part of this effort, in July 1998, FAA, in
a joint effort with industry, contracted with Johns Hopkins
University Applied Physics Laboratory to conduct a detailed risk
assessment of using GPS along with WAAS' and LAAS' augmentations as a
"sole means" system for aircraft navigation. FAA expects to have the
final report of this assessment by January 1999.
--------------------
\22 These vulnerabilities are common to ground-based navigation aids.
However, because GPS broadcasts its signal at a very low power level,
its signal may be somewhat more vulnerable to interference.
\23 The issue of satellite navigation's vulnerability to interference
was raised by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
Protection of October 1997. The purpose of this commission was to
study the nation's infrastructure, which constitutes the life support
system of the United States; determine the vulnerability of these
support systems; and propose a strategy for protecting them in the
future. Also, in October 1997, a group of independent experts from
outside FAA, and called together by the agency, also raised concerns
about the intentional jamming of GPS signals.
FAA ASSERTS THAT THE
SELECTION OF A SECOND
FREQUENCY WOULD BENEFIT
THE WAAS PROGRAM
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3.3
The present GPS satellites broadcast position data for the Department
of Defense's use on two frequencies referred to as L1 and L2. WAAS
will use data on the L1 frequency in conjunction with limited data
available from the L2 frequency to make corrections. LAAS will rely
solely on the L1 frequency for making corrections. According to FAA,
providing full access to a second frequency can provide significant
benefits in the long term for both these systems. A second frequency
could provide another risk mitigation strategy to counteract these
systems' vulnerability to electronic interference (mainly
unintentional interference). If one frequency were lost because of
interference, a second frequency could be used to provide service.
With a second frequency, FAA could build WAAS so that aircraft
operators would be able to use receivers that could function on a
single frequency now and on a dual frequency in the future. Building
this type of "forward" compatibility into WAAS could cut down on
users' investment in new receivers and FAA's future investments in
WAAS to accommodate aircraft with single- and dual-frequency
receivers. Another potential advantage is that FAA would need fewer
WAAS ground stations and a smaller ground communications network in
the future if dual frequency receivers are used to correct position
data that may be distorted as GPS signals pass through the
ionosphere. Also, dual-frequency receivers could be used by LAAS to
detect and mitigate multipath problems caused when radio frequencies
radiate off objects and create data errors.
However, challenges need to be resolved before these benefits can be
realized. While the Interagency GPS Executive Board, together with
its joint chairs, the Department of Defense and the Department of
Transportation, has agreed that a second frequency protected for
civil air navigation's safety of life function will be provided,
there is still ongoing discussion within the executive board to
identify the protected frequency.\24 The executive board has
tentatively set December 1998 as the date for selecting this
frequency. Furthermore, once the executive board agrees upon the
second frequency, the United States will have to gain concurrence
from the International Telecommunications Union at the next World
Radio Conference. According to FAA officials, the next World Radio
Conference is scheduled for 2000, and there have been earlier
proposals that the conference is studying to share the spectrum used
by GPS with nonaviation users.\25
Beyond the challenge of identifying an additional frequency, funding
issues need resolution. The Department of Transportation has agreed
to fund the implementation of an additional frequency on the next
generation of GPS satellites. While it may not be until 2010 before
a significant number of these satellites will be placed in orbit, the
Department of Transportation believes it has to begin making the
investment soon in order to allow the manufacturer to build the
second frequency into the design for next-generation satellites.
According to the Department of Transportation, the amount that the
agency has to invest can be established only once an agreement is
reached on the additional frequency to be provided for civil air
navigation use. Finally, current-generation GPS satellites still in
production could be retrofitted to provide a second frequency
capability and potentially bring about the expected benefits before
2010. However, because of concerns about the potential high costs of
this solution--estimated to be about $130 million--the Department of
Transportation has not agreed to fund this solution.
--------------------
\24 The Interagency GPS Executive Board manages the dual civil and
military use of GPS. The board is made up of representatives from
the Departments of Transportation, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce,
the Interior, Justice, and State, and the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration.
\25 Every 2 years, the International Telecommunications Union of the
United Nations holds a World Radio Conference to develop policy and
decide major international telecommunications and radio spectrum
issues affecting navigation and transportation systems.
ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL
WAAS SATELLITES PRESENTS
SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES
----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3.4
We reported in April 1998 that the acquisition of geosatellites for
WAAS present some of the most significant cost, funding, and schedule
challenges to the project.\26 Today, these challenges remain and have
led to FAA's decision to delay the full implementation of the system
to a date that has not yet been determined.
The greatest degree of uncertainty about the cost of WAAS surrounds
the costs of satellites. This uncertainty exists because FAA does
not know exactly how many additional satellites will be needed and
how much the per-unit costs will be.\27 Although FAA had initially
planned to award a contract in July 1998 for additional satellites,
it did not meet this target date. FAA is currently analyzing various
options to identify additional satellites, which include obtaining
them from the existing provider. However, according to FAA
officials, since the need for additional satellites and the timing
for acquiring these satellites hinges on the outcome of the
previously mentioned risk assessment, they opted to wait for the
results of the assessment, which is expected in January 1999, before
deciding on a procurement strategy.
While the outcome of the risk assessment has postponed any decision
to lease additional satellites, FAA officials stated that entering
into any leasing negotiations with vendors has also been deferred for
two other reasons. First, they stated that during this period of
uncertainty, negotiations with satellite vendors would be precarious,
at best. Since vendors are expected to absorb most of the costs
associated with building and leasing the satellites, they may require
huge premiums on leasing fees or large cancellation fees to cover
their investment in case FAA subsequently decides against adding the
satellites. Second, while FAA officials believe that they could not
afford to purchase the satellites from the agency's F&E appropriation
without significantly reducing other capital projects, the House
mandated that the agency not sign a lease for WAAS satellites
services until it evaluates whether a lease versus purchase
acquisition will result in the lowest overall cost to the agency.\28
In our April 1998 report, we questioned whether FAA would find a
vendor willing and able to complete the launching and testing of
satellites in time to meet FAA's December 2001 date for implementing
the full WAAS capability. In this report, we stated that potential
vendors pointed to 2002 or 2003 as a more realistic schedule for
putting the satellites in orbit. Since our report, FAA's decision to
postpone satellite acquisition activity, pending the outcome of the
current risk assessment, coupled with the agency's efforts to
evaluate operational experience with WAAS before moving to full
capability and the need to resolve the lease versus purchase issue,
will likely result in delays to the schedule. FAA officials
recognize that the original date must change to allow enough time to
address the above issues, and they stated that they did not expect to
make this decision on the additional satellites until September
1999.\29 Notwithstanding this decision date, officials stated that a
more realistic schedule for putting satellites in orbit would be
around 2003 or 2004.
Figure I.5: WAAS' Architecture
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure I.6: LAAS' Architecture
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\26 National Airspace System: Status of Wide Area Augmentation
System Project (GAO/RCED-98-79, Apr. 30, 1998).
\27 According to FAA officials, if more GPS satellites and a second
civil frequency were available along with deactivation of selective
availability, the quantity of additional WAAS geostationary
satellites and life-cycle costs for the geostationary satellites
could be reduced.
\28 The Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
Appropriations Act for 1999, P.L. 105-277, Division A, sec. 101,
(g)(1998).
\29 FAA's ongoing alternatives analysis may impact the decision
regarding the need for the additional satellites. The results of
this analysis is expected in May 1999.
HOST AND OCEANIC COMPUTER
SYSTEM REPLACEMENT
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9.1
Many of the hardware components of the En Route and Oceanic
automation systems have reached or are near the end of their service
life, and are no longer supportable. Additionally, concerns existed
that these systems would suffer potential Year 2000 problems.
Therefore, an immediate need exists for FAA to ensure that current
and planned service levels can be maintained until the replacement
system is fully operational. The Host and Oceanic Computer System
Replacement program replaces existing En Route and Oceanic automation
hardware and software over a 4-year period. The project is
structured into four phases to help minimize schedule and funding
risks. Phase 1 of the project replaces existing En Route and Oceanic
hardware, but it does not replace the existing software's
functionality. Phase 2 provides new software, which basically
duplicates the existing software functionality. Phases 3 and 4
replace peripheral equipment and add new software functionality.
According to project officials, in June 1998, FAA awarded Lockheed
Martin a contract for up to 24 operational systems and 7 support
systems. The project's total F&E cost is estimated at $424.1
million, over an 8- year period that includes technology refreshment.
To date, only Phase 1 of the project has a schedule baseline.
CHANGES TO THE HOST AND
OCEANIC COMPUTER SYSTEM
REPLACEMENT PROGRAM'S COST
AND SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9.2
Table I.11 summarizes the changes to the Host and Oceanic Computer
System Replacement program's cost and schedule since June 1998.
Table I.11
Changes to Host and Oceanic Computer
System Replacement Program's Cost and
Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Lockheed Martin, Rockville, Md.)
Change in
Financial information June 1998 Oct. 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $424.1 $424.1 None
Cumulative F&E $86.4
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule June 1998 Oct. 1998 Change in
months
Estimated first-site Jan. 1999 Jan. 1999 None
implementation\a
Estimated last-site Oct. 1999 Sept. 1999 -1 month
implementation\a
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The implementation dates are only for Phase 1 of the program.
HOST AND OCEANIC COMPUTER
SYSTEM REPLACEMENT PROGRAM'S
CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9.3
According to project officials, the project's schedule is the primary
risk. Because the project's schedule is aggressive and coincides
with other en route and oceanic modernization activities, the project
office must maintain close coordination with other project teams and
operational sites. The procurement, delivery, and installation of
government-furnished equipment must also be monitored closely to
ensure that all ancillary equipment required for complete
installation and testing is available to the contractor. Project
officials report that all Phase 1 hardware deliveries and site
implementation plans are on or ahead of schedule.
According to project officials, the project's technical risk is low
because the contractor is utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf
equipment for this procurement. Moreover, the lead contractor is
experienced at installing existing software on new equipment. In
addition, the Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement team
successfully completed a "proof of concept" that showed that the
existing software could run on the new platform in a demonstration at
the FAA Technical Center.
INTEGRATED TERMINAL WEATHER
SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:10
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:10.1
Air traffic personnel in tower and terminal facilities rely on a
number of sensors to obtain weather data. The interpretation of
these data is performed manually and is labor-intensive. The main
shortcoming of the present system is that it cannot anticipate
short-term changes in ceilings, visibility, winds, and precipitation.
The Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) is designed to
automatically integrate data from terminal weather sensors to provide
current weather conditions--as well as forecasts out to about 30
minutes in the future--in easily understood graphical and textual
form to air traffic supervisors and controllers. ITWS will integrate
information originating from several sources, such as next-generation
weather radar products, Terminal Doppler Weather Radar, aircraft
weather systems, surveillance radars, or weather-observing systems,
and present it on displays located in the tower and Terminal Radar
Approach Control (TRACON) facilities. ITWS' products include wind
shear and microburst predictions, storm cell and lightning
information, terminal area winds aloft, runway winds, and short-term
ceiling and visibility predictions. FAA intends to deploy 37 ITWSs,
including 34 at terminal facilities and 3 at other locations, for
training, testing of interfaces, and software support and
maintenance. The 34 systems that FAA plans to deploy at terminal
facilities will enable air traffic controllers to better identify
terminal area weather hazards at 45 major airports, thereby improving
safety and capacity in bad weather.\30
--------------------
\30 TRACONs can control airspace surrounding multiple airports;
therefore, one ITWS can serve more than one airport.
ITWS' COST AND SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:10.2
The total estimated F&E cost of ITWS has not changed since the
contract was awarded in January 1997. Cost estimates were
rebaselined during the contract's award because of a decrease
associated with a higher-than-anticipated level of software
productivity and reuse and a reduction in newly developed software
lines of code. As of September 1998, FAA had obligated all of the
$87.8 million appropriated since 1992 for the ITWS project. Funding
was used to develop and test terminal weather algorithms, conduct
demonstration/validation of the system using three functional
prototypes, continue the operation of these prototypes, and test
initial software.
ITWS has been on or ahead of schedule since the contract was awarded.
For example, the Preliminary Design Review was conducted 2 months
ahead of schedule in March 1998, and the Critical Design Review
scheduled for January 1999 was completed 4 months ahead of schedule
in September 1998. FAA plans to have the first of the 34 systems
operational by April 2002 and have all 34 systems operational by July
2003. FAA has been successfully operating ITWS prototypes at the
Memphis International Airport and Orlando International Airport since
1994 and at Dallas/Ft. Worth International Airport since 1995. As a
result of their success, a fourth prototype was installed and became
operational at LaGuardia Airport in August 1998. This prototype
provides displays at LaGuardia, Kennedy, Newark and the Teterboro,
New Jersey, airports; New York TRACON; New York, Boston, and
Washington, D.C., en route centers, and at the Air Traffic Control
System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia. The prototype is being
funded by the New York/New Jersey Port Authority in conjunction with
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Lincoln Laboratory. These
prototypes allow for testing the system at different-sized airports
and provide experience with different types of weather. The four
prototypes will be among the first eight sites commissioned. Table
I.12 summarizes ITWS' cost and schedule since 1997.
Table I.12
ITWS' Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendors: Raytheon Systems Company,
Marlborough, Mass.; Massachusetts
Institute of Technology/Lincoln
Laboratory, Boston, Mass.)
Change in
Financial information 1997 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $276.1 $276.1 None
Cumulative F&E $87.8
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1997 1998 Change
Estimated first-site Apr. 2002 Apr. 2002 None
implementation
Estimated last-site July 2003 July 2003 None
implementation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
ITWS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:10.3
Although ITWS is currently on schedule, software development efforts
present a potential risk. To mitigate the risk of the project's
schedule slipping, the ITWS project plans to continue Massachusetts
Institute of Technology's/Lincoln Laboratory's support during the
software development effort to provide for the transfer of technology
from the actual research scientists to the software developers.
Also, the actual implementation effort introduces potential risk to
the project. For example, ITWS will require at least one
telecommunications line from each of the sensors during the
implementation. Although, FAA officials have stated that this is not
technically difficult, the sheer volume and coordination effort
required to install all of these communication lines adds risk.
OCEANIC AUTOMATION PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:11
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:11.1
With radar coverage largely unavailable and aircraft navigation
limited to onboard systems, the current oceanic air traffic control
system is significantly different from the domestic air traffic
control system. The current oceanic air traffic control system is
largely manual, dependent on air/ground communications through a
third party, subject to atmospheric anomalies and human error, and
troublesome when obtaining accurate aircraft position reports. This
lack of reliable and timely position information, in turn, requires
greater separation standards for aircraft, which severely limit the
system's capacity. As a result, oceanic users are rarely able to
obtain maximum fuel efficiency, minimum travel time, and access to
preferred takeoff times and flight paths.
The Oceanic Automation Program is designed to provide a platform for
improved air traffic control over the oceans. It evolved from the
Oceanic Display and Planning System into the Oceanic Automation
System, and, now, into the Advanced Oceanic Automation System. In
the late 1980s, the Oceanic Display and Planning System improved
oceanic traffic control by providing flight data processing and a
situational display of estimated aircraft positions. This system
also provided a conflict probe capability that alerted controllers
when any flight plan or pilot-requested aircraft route change
violated appropriate separation standards. In the early 1990s, FAA
improved on the Oceanic Display and Planning System with the Oceanic
Automation System, which improved data display and communications.
This system is now being upgraded to the Advanced Oceanic Automation
System, which is designed to provide such features as a new flight
data processor, Automatic Dependent Surveillance position reporting,
an advanced conflict probe, and data link. FAA awarded a contract to
the Raytheon Systems Company in September 1995 for the Advanced
Oceanic Automation System. The contract is composed of flexible
segments, which will allow for incremental functional development and
delivery of benefits. Oceanic air traffic control systems are
installed at the en route centers at Oakland and New York and in
Anchorage, Alaska.
CHANGES TO THE OCEANIC
AUTOMATION PROGRAM'S COST
AND SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:11.2
Over the past 3 years, FAA has reduced the cost and schedule
baselines for the Oceanic Automation Program. Since FAA awarded the
Advanced Oceanic Automation System's contract in September 1995, the
scope of the project has been gradually revised from an original plan
of five segments (incremental deliveries of capabilities) to only a
portion of the first segment. In July 1996, 10 months after the
contract's award, FAA canceled segments three, four, and five of the
project because the agency recognized that the cost of executing
these segments was beyond the funding that had been allocated for
this project. As a result, FAA abandoned many controller
productivity tools needed to increase the system's capacity. Then,
in December 1996, funding concerns forced FAA to revise the second
segment of the project, which replaces existing infrastructure
hardware and software that supports controller equipment.
Eventually, in September 1997, FAA canceled the entire second segment
of the project because of the agency's need to use the project's
funds to correct Year 2000 problems in existing oceanic automation
software and because of the need to transfer funds to the Host
replacement program.\31
Meanwhile, FAA's contractor was reporting performance problems with
the first segment of the project, which adds data link and automatic
dependent surveillance in the oceanic environment. To avoid a
potential $45 million contractor cost overrun associated with this
segment, FAA then reduced the scope of segment one of the project in
September 1998 by eliminating the capability for automatic dependent
surveillance. According to project officials, the remaining elements
of segment one (air-to-ground data link, ground-to-ground data link,
and controller tools) have successfully completed the operational
test and evaluation and are expected to be delivered on schedule.
Table I.13 summarizes the changes to the Oceanic Automation Program's
cost and schedule since 1996.
Table I.13
Changes to Oceanic Automation Program's
Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company,
Reston, Va.)
Change in
Financial information 1996 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $236.5 $189.0 -$47.5
Cumulative F&E $189.0
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1996 1998 Change in
months
Estimated first-site Feb. 2000 Sept. 1999 -5 months
implementation
Estimated last-site June 2000 Oct. 1999 -8 months
implementation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
--------------------
\31 The Host replacement project replaces en route center and oceanic
automation hardware that has reached the end of its commercial
support life and may have problems with Year 2000 date requirements.
OCEANIC AUTOMATION PROGRAM'S
CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:11.3
Project officials state that the Advanced Oceanic Automation System's
original requirements to improve oceanic air traffic control
automation remain valid today and that they will require FAA's
attention in the very near future, particularly those that increase
controller's efficiency. According to project officials, FAA is
presently examining alternatives for satisfying these needs.
OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORTABILITY
IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:12
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:12.1
The Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS)
project (1) replaces all existing Flight Service Automation System
hardware and software with a leased commercial, off-the-shelf-based
service; (2) provides a graphic weather display capability that is
currently being obtained through the Interim Graphic Weather Display
system; and (3) incorporates direct user-access functionality that is
currently being obtained through two Direct User Access Terminal
contracts. The integration of these three capabilities and functions
into a single system will enable flight service specialists to more
efficiently produce weather and flight-planning information for
pilots. In August 1997, FAA awarded Harris Corporation a contract
for OASIS services. The contract requires Harris to provide up to 61
operational systems and 3 support systems.
CHANGES TO OASIS' COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:12.2
FAA's May 1998 decision to replace existing workstation consoles and
install new ones in response to human-factor concerns raised by the
unions that represent the controllers and the technicians caused the
project's cost to increase by $15.8 million. Table I.14 summarizes
the changes to OASIS' cost and schedule since 1997.
Table I.14
Changes to OASIS' Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne,
Fla.)
Change in
Financial information 1997 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $174.7 $190.5 +$15.8
Cumulative F&E $25.9
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1997 1998 Change in
months
Estimated first-site July 1998 Jan. 1999 +6 months
implementation
Estimated last-site Aug. 2001 Aug. 2001 None
implementation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
OASIS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:12.3
Since FAA awarded the contract for OASIS services in August 1997, the
agency has seen the project's schedule slip because of a
larger-than-planned developmental effort. FAA's January 1998 review
of the Harris system's architecture for OASIS revealed that the
contractor's commercial-off-the-shelf solution was not as mature as
FAA had envisioned when the contract was awarded and revealed that
many of the contractor's commercial products did not fully satisfy
its requirements. FAA delayed first-site implementation from July
1998 to January 1999--a 6-month slip. Last-site implementation is
not affected by the protracted development effort and remains
scheduled for August 2001.
Adding more risk to the project's schedule are a number of
human-factor issues that have been raised by the National Association
of Air Traffic Specialist union and the Professional Airways Systems
Specialists. While the unions have yet to formally develop a
comprehensive list of concerns, project officials said that the
unions are troubled about such issues as lighting glare, shelf
height, and immoveable keyboards. The unions want these issues
resolved before OASIS is deployed. FAA officials responsible for
requirements are working collaboratively with the program office to
address these concerns.
Finally, according to project officials, the project's schedule has
the potential to slip further because the amount of fiscal year 1999
funding was less than requested.
STANDARD TERMINAL AUTOMATION
REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:13.1
The Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) is
designed to replace FAA's automated radar terminal system, which
comprises 15- to 25-year-old controller workstations, and supporting
computer systems that allow controllers at TRACONs to separate and
sequence aircraft. According to FAA, this system is prone to
failures and is maintenance intensive. The system also has capacity
constraints that restrict the agency from making required safety and
efficiency enhancements. STARS equipment is also expected to provide
the platform needed to make enhancements to the system that would
increase the level of air traffic control automation and improve
surveillance, communications, and weather display. (See fig. I.7.)
In September 1996, FAA signed a contract with Raytheon Systems
Company to acquire STARS. In producing the system, Raytheon
originally intended to rely exclusively on commercially available
hardware and, to a large extent, on commercially available software.
The strategy for replacing and enhancing the system is divided into
two stages--the initial system capability stage and the final system
capability stage. Stage 1 is expected to provide the same functions
as the current automated radar terminal systems. Under Stage 2, FAA
expects to implement new functions to help controllers move aircraft
more safely and efficiently. In 1997, FAA created another stage,
known as early display configuration, because of concerns about
operational problems at Ronald Reagan National Airport. This new
stage will be implemented prior to Stages 1 and 2. The new stage
replaces the current controller displays and monitoring equipment but
will require the use of the existing computer system and software.
It also provides an emergency back-up system.
STARS replaced the Terminal Advanced Automation System segment of the
Advanced Automation System project, which was terminated because of
serious cost and schedule problems. The terminal segment was
estimated to cost about $810 million, and at the time of termination,
FAA had sunk about $317 million into it. The terminal segment's
first-site implementation date was August 1997. FAA did not
establish a last-site implementation date.
STARS' COST AND SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:13.2
Table I.15 summarizes STARS' cost and schedule since 1996.
Table I.15
STARS' Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendors: Raytheon Systems Company,
Marlborough, Mass.)
Change in
Financial information 1996 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $940.2 $940.2 None
Cumulative F&E $211.6
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1996 1998 Change
Estimated first-site Dec. 1998 Dec. 1998 None
implementation--initial
stage
Estimated last-site Feb. 2005 Feb. 2005 None
implementation--final stage
----------------------------------------------------------------------
STARS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:13.3
Although FAA has not officially changed the STARS' baseline that was
approved in 1996, the baseline is in jeopardy of being breached
because of unions' concerns surrounding human-factor and design
issues, the refinement of requirements, and the interjection of a new
project phase. FAA estimates that these issues have the potential to
increase the project's costs from $294 million to $410 million over
the approved baseline. FAA also estimates that the project's initial
completion could be delayed by almost 2-1/2 years. For future
projects, cost overruns and schedule slippages in excess of 10
percent of the cost and schedule baselines will require the
Administrator of FAA to consider terminating the project under
recently passed legislation.\32
In addition to the issues cited above, the project has experienced
other challenges related mainly to software testing. While project
officials stated that they have been able to absorb the cost
increases within the existing baseline, additional risks could cause
further cost increases and schedule delays.
--------------------
\32 Air Traffic Management System Performance Improvement Act of 1996
(P.L. 104-264, Oct. 9, 1996).
UNIONS' CONCERNS
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13.3.1
NATCA and the Professional Airways Systems Specialists are working to
resolve 98 and 59 human-factor problems with STARS, respectively. In
September 1998, FAA estimated that the total cost for incorporating
all human-factors issues into the final design of STARS would be $192
million. According to FAA, if the full scope of these issues is
incorporated into the system's design, doing so would require the
development of an additional 220,000 lines of software code and delay
the deployment of the final design of the system to June 2001--an
almost 2-1/2-year delay from the initial systems capability.
For example, one of NATCA's human-factor concerns centered around a
lack of sufficient details about an aircraft's position and movement,
which could hamper controllers' ability to monitor traffic movement.
The Professional Airways Systems Specialists' concerns centered
mainly on a lack of standardization between the primary and backup
STARS systems. For example, technicians must use two different
screens to monitor the integrity of both systems, and the visual
warning alarms and color coding to denote problems in the systems
were not standard.
FAA could incur an additional cost of $116 million, if the agency
addresses NATCA's concerns that the system's design include
synchronization between the primary and backup systems. If the
primary system fails, synchronization would provide the backup with a
smoother transition by enabling controllers to forego having to
recalibrate information needed for controlling and separating
aircraft. Without synchronization, such system inefficiencies as
slowing down traffic or increasing the separation between aircraft
could occur.
REQUIREMENTS REFINEMENT
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13.3.2
In order to promote competition among vendors who may have had
commercial and nondevelopmental applications that could address FAA's
needs, the STARS system specification was written at a high-level.
Consequently, when FAA awarded the contract, it left the system's
functional specifications open to interpretation. As a result,
according to FAA officials, considerable engineering was expended in
an effort to clarify the system's requirements. For example, the
additional engineering effort caused software development to grow
from an estimated 124,000 lines of software code to about 162,000
lines of code because of more-detailed specifications on how STARS
was expected to function. The engineering effort also identified,
among other things, the need to strengthen security and seismic
requirements and add additional equipment. FAA officials estimate
the added cost for these requirements refinements to be about $56
million.
NEW EARLY DISPLAY
CONFIGURATION STAGE
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13.3.3
Because of the concerns about human-factors problems and delays in
developing the initial system, FAA now anticipates that it may have
to deploy the system's early display configuration to as many as 33
additional TRACONs and to install automated radar terminal systems in
new TRACONs that were scheduled to begin operation prior to June
2001. FAA believes that this early deployment of the system's
displays solves one of its most immediate problems--the failure of
displays in the existing system. FAA estimates that the additional
costs associated with these changes account for about $46 million of
the cost growth.
OTHER CHALLENGES
---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13.3.4
Other challenges that could have an impact on the STARS project
include FAA's software development problems related to the system's
early display configuration and its initial system capability. For
example, software problems have pushed back the initial deployment of
the early display configuration at Ronald Reagan National Airport
from September 1998 to March 1999. An additional deployment of
software to make the system operationally ready is scheduled for July
1999. According to FAA, because of concerns about completing the
development of software and resolving testing issues, a high
probability exists that meeting both the March and July 1999 dates
will not be achieved. Technical problems with software are also
affecting the development of the system's initial system capability
software. For example, Raytheon and FAA report software problems
through their program trouble reports. Two of the most worrisome
program trouble reports are types 1 and 2. Type 1 program trouble
reports, if not corrected, could prevent the accomplishment of
mission-essential capabilities. Type 2 program trouble reports must
be corrected before key site testing of software can proceed. As of
September 1998, the total number of open program trouble reports
totaled nearly 570, and type 1 and 2 program trouble reports totaled
8 and 231, respectively.
FAA and Raytheon have mitigation efforts under way, including monthly
reviews that involve software demonstrations and the weekly
monitoring of the progress of software testing. Also, according to
project officials, they have been able to contain cost increases
within the existing baseline by using planned baseline reserves and
by eliminating, combining, and compressing certain tests. These
actions may cause further cost and schedule delays in the future.
For example, we have reported that systems development without
careful and thorough testing has proven to be imprudent and
unproductive in many software development efforts. The results from
such shortcuts are systems that typically cost more, are of low
quality, and are generally late.\33
Finally, FAA has assured the Congress that it will not place a new
system into service without first verifying that the system will not
experience Year 2000 problems. FAA is now in the process of
assessing whether STARS will have a Year 2000 problem, and it plans
to invest over $4 million to carry out Year 2000 assessment and
testing activities. While FAA's initial assessment results show the
Year 2000 processing risks to be low to medium, officials are
awaiting the results of final assessments, and tests needed to
determine whether additional software changes may be needed.
Figure I.7: STARS
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
--------------------
\33 In Air Traffic Control: Immature Software Acquisition Processes
Increase FAA System Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar. 21,
1997), we pointed out that the lack of a disciplined software
development process has contributed to FAA's past problems to deliver
systems capabilities on time and within budget.
TERMINAL DOPPLER WEATHER RADAR
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:14
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:14.1
The Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) system will alert aircraft
in the terminal area of hazardous weather conditions, such as
microbursts, gust fronts, and precipitation. The radar also will
alert controllers of changing wind conditions, thereby permitting
them to make timely runway changes. (See fig. I.8.) In November
1988, FAA contracted with Raytheon to develop, produce, and install
47 TDWR systems.
CHANGES TO TDWR'S COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:14.2
According to FAA officials, three factors have caused the cost of the
project to increase by $71.3 million since November 1988. First,
FAA's failure to properly estimate the cost for installing TDWR
systems caused the project's cost to increase by $30 million.
Second, environmental reviews conducted by FAA at proposed sites
identified environmental issues that caused the project's costs to
increase by $26 million. Finally, land acquisition problems
necessitated that FAA and its contractor keep key project personnel
longer than planned to field the systems. This caused the project's
cost to increase by $15.3 million. The project's schedule delays are
primarily due to land acquisition and environmental problems. Table
I.16 summarizes the changes to TDWR's cost and schedule since 1988.
Table I.16
Changes to TDWR's Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company,
Marlborough, Mass.)
Change in
Financial information 1988 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $322.2 $393.5 +$71.3
Cumulative F&E $382.8
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1988 1998 Change in
years/
months
First-site implementation Aug. 1993 July 1994 +11 months
Estimated last-site Aug. 1996 July 2001 +4 years,
implementation 11 months
----------------------------------------------------------------------
TDWR'S CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:14.3
For the past 10 years, land acquisition and environmental problems
have plagued the project. These problems continue, causing increased
delays to installation schedules and increased installation costs.
As a result, FAA does not have much confidence in its last-site
implementation date for completion of the project. The project
office is working toward implementing 45 of the 47 planned systems by
December 1998. The final two systems, scheduled for Chicago's Midway
Airport and New York, remain in storage at FAA's Aeronautical Center
in Oklahoma City.
According to project officials, FAA's progress with Chicago-Midway
had been stymied for 2 years by problems associated with buying land.
As a last resort, FAA used condemnation procedures to reach closure
on this matter. In June 1998, FAA acquired the land for the
Chicago-Midway TDWR installation. Project officials anticipate that
an operational system will be available at Chicago-Midway in the
summer of 2000.
Project officials stated that New York has experienced great
difficulty in finding a suitable location for the TDWR. Over a
4-year period, proposed locations were rejected by both residents and
local politicians on the grounds that the radar's electromagnetic
radiation posed potential health problems. Residents also rejected
the radar itself as being inappropriate and unsightly for a
residential community. FAA's current preferred site is located on
public land. According to project officials, an extensive
environmental impact study is being made of the site, which has
prolonged the system's installation. Project officials expect to
receive the necessary environmental approvals by November 1998.
Project officials also expect residents who oppose FAA's planned use
of the site to initiate a court action. Because of the expected
court action, the last-site implementation date remains tentative and
could be pushed back even further.
Figure I.8: TDWR
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
TERMINAL RADAR DIGITIZATION,
REPLACEMENT, AND ESTABLISHMENT
PROGRAM: AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE
RADAR-11 PROJECT
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:15
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:15.1
The Terminal Radar Digitization, Replacement, and Establishment
(TRDRE) program includes projects to replace and upgrade current
surveillance radars. The Air Route Surveillance Radar-11 (ASR-11)
project is a primary and secondary surveillance radar system that
will enable air traffic controllers to monitor aircraft approaching,
departing, and passing through airport terminal areas. (See fig.
I.9.) ASR-11 will provide a more reliable replacement for aging
analog ASR-7s and ASR-8s, and will also provide digitized radar data
necessary for interfacing with new automation systems, such as STARS,
planned to be used by terminal controllers. FAA also plans to
upgrade several ASR-8s with interim digitizers under a separate
contract to ensure that the radars are available to meet STARS'
implementation schedule.
Through a contract managed by the Department of Defense, FAA is
providing the Air Force with funding for the procurement of 112
ASR-11 radars that are designated for use at midsize airports.
Ninety-five systems will replace aging ASR-7/8s; 13 systems will be
used for new establishments or the Department of Defense takeover
sites; 2 will be mobile units; and 2 will be support systems. Unlike
the existing ASR-7/8s, ASR-11s are intended to be more reliable and
easier to maintain. They are also designed to provide more accurate
weather and target information, less clutter, and fewer false targets
on the controllers' displays. The ASR-11 is a nondevelopmental item
with modifications to approximately 15 percent of the system. The
most significant modifications are to the interface equipment.
CHANGES TO ASR-11'S COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:15.2
At the time the contract was awarded in August 1996, FAA had yet to
determine the total number of ASR-11 systems that it would require or
the total cost estimates of the project. The agency had preliminary
project cost estimates of $561.3 million for the purchase of 48
ASR-11s and the upgrade of the ASR-8s with digitizers. However,
during 1997, FAA conducted an analysis that demonstrated that it
would be more cost beneficial to replace all the ASR-8s with ASR-11s
rather than upgrade them with digitizers. As a result, in November
1997, FAA approved an estimated $743.3 million for 112 ASR-11s.
Also, included in this amount was more than $9 million to upgrade 10
ASR-8s with interim digitizers. As of September 1998, FAA had
provided $70.4 million for the procurement of two preproduction units
for the initial development of the automation interface, in-plant
testing, five production units, and three ASR-8 interim digitizers.
Factory testing of the ASR-11 began in October 1997, and, in
September 1998, the installation of the ASR-11 at the Department of
Defense's test site at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, was completed.
Site preparation at FAA's test site at Stockton, California (the
first of two FAA preproduction sites) has begun and is scheduled to
be completed in December 1998. First-site implementation at Stockton
is scheduled for January 2000. As of October 1998, the current
last-site implementation date is scheduled for September 2005 at a
presently undetermined location. Table I.17 summarizes the changes
to ASR-11's cost and schedule since 1996.
Table I.17
Changes to ASR-11's Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company,
Marlborough, Mass.)
Change in
Financial information 1996 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $561.3 $743.3 +$182.0
Cumulative F&E $70.4
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1996 1998 Change
Estimated first-site Jan. 2000 Jan. 2000 None
implementation
Estimated last-site Not Sept. 2005 N/A
implementation determined
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Legend
N/A = not applicable
ASR-11'S CHALLENGES AND
RISKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:15.3
ASR-11 faces risk if (1) unexpected environmental problems and bad
weather occur, (2) the schedule for STARS continues to slip, and (3)
the contractor's test and system modification development strategy
for the project is not successful.
First, seasonal constraints for site surveys and preparations and
additional processing time related to environmental impact surveys
could cause ASR-11's schedule to slip. A risk mitigation strategy
was employed to accomplish site surveys up to 2 years in advance of
delivering systems and site designs up to 1 year in advance of
delivering systems.
Second, the ASR-11 deployment schedule is currently based on the need
to have a digital signal available for STARS. STARS requires a
digital radar, but ASR-11 can be delivered and commissioned without
STARS. Although STARS' schedule is slipping, an operational need for
ASR-11 still remains because the current ASR-7 and ASR-8 equipment is
aging and needs to be replaced. According to project officials, if
STARS' schedule slips more than 1 year, FAA will likely reevaluate
the ASR-11 deployment schedule on the basis of the condition of the
current ASR-7 and ASR-8 equipment rather than on the basis of the
STARS' schedule.
Finally, the ASR-11 contractor's current strategy for testing
requirements and developing system modifications could lead to delays
in the project's baseline schedule. The original strategy called for
a test program that utilized previous test data and quick approval of
test documentation from the Contract Data Requirements List.
Currently, however, little previous test data have been used to
verify specification requirements, and the test Contract Data
Requirements Lists originally submitted by the contractor did not
meet minimal requirements. As a result, testing has been delayed.
In April 1998, FAA implemented a streamlined test documentation
development and approval process to facilitate better management of
the testing process.
In addition, contractor's delays have occurred in the completion of
the development and integration of system modifications. As a
result, resources for the radar system have been dedicated to
development activity rather than test activity. This has caused
additional delays in the test program. The contractor has proposed
double shifts for testing and parallel testing as a means of
offsetting these delays.
Figure I.9: ASR-11 at Eglin
Air Force Base, Florida
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
VOICE SWITCHING AND CONTROL
SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:16
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:16.1
The Voice Switching and Control System (VSCS) replaces existing
communication systems at en route centers with an expandable, highly
reliable system for both ground-to-ground and air-to-ground
communication. VSCS will also provide a communication capability for
new en route center controller workstations. (See fig. I-10.) FAA
is also installing the VSCS Training and Backup Switch (VTABS)--an
emergency back-up communications system, should VSCS experience an
equipment outage--at all en route centers.
VSCS was designed to provide the communication capabilities for the
new Initial Sector Suite System workstations under the Advanced
Automation System program. By the time that the VSCS contract was
awarded in December 1991 to the Harris Corporation, FAA had spent 5
years in developing prototypes and had incurred cost growth of around
$1 billion.\34 The contract required Harris to deliver 23 VSCS
systems--21 for en route centers and 2 support systems. FAA's plans
called for VSCS to be installed with the current equipment and with
the new controller workstations. During the initial development, the
cost of the VSCS project increased by $53.1 million to approximately
$1.45 billion--costs associated primarily with FAA's decision in 1994
to cancel the Initial Sector Suite System component of the Advanced
Automation System and replace it with the DSR project. The
restructuring resulted in the need for additional equipment and
testing and the extension of contractor and project personnel longer
than planned to field VSCS equipment with DSR equipment. FAA has
also added new functionality requirements to the project. Harris
developed and installed the system in the existing en route
controller work stations in February 1997--5 months ahead of schedule
established at the time of contract award.
Harris is reinstalling the controller interface equipment into the en
route DSR controller workstations. First- and last-site
implementation dates for this phase are the same as those for
DSR--October 1998 and May 2000, respectively.
--------------------
\34 According to project officials, the primary reason for this
growth was the inability of commercially available products to
effectively and accurately manage air traffic control communications
functions.
CHANGES TO VSCS' COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:16.2
Since the schedule for transferring VSCS to the DSR console is the
same as that for the DSR project, the agency is projecting a
1-1/2-month slip in first-site implementation from October to
December 1998. Table I.18 summarizes the changes to VSCS' cost and
schedule since 1994.
Table I.18
Changes to VSCS' Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne,
Fla.)
Change in
Financial information 1994 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $1,452.9 $1,452.9 None
Cumulative F&E $1,388.9
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1994\a 1998 Change in
months
Estimated first-site Oct. 1998 Dec. 1998 +1.5 months
Implementation
Estimated last-site May 2000 May 2000 None
implementation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Schedule is for activities that coincide with the schedule for the
DSR project.
VSCS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:16.3
Harris has completed software development for the primary system to
be fielded with the new DSR controller workstations. According to
the project manager, the project has not encountered any technical
problems and is not expected to incur any major schedule slips.
Meanwhile, FAA is in the process of installing VTABS at all en route
centers. By the end of 1998, FAA expects to have VTABS equipment
installed at 10 en route centers, the FAA Technical Center, and the
FAA Academy. FAA plans to have VTABS installed at the remaining en
route centers and in Alaska by November 1999.
In fiscal year 1998, FAA reprogrammed $22 million of the $45.4
million appropriated for VSCS to support the Host replacement
project. This reprogramming action forced the project office to
defer, until at least 2001, the replacement of Tandem computers used
by VSCS in its operating system. The project office views this
computer replacement as critical because Tandem will not certify the
existing computers as Year 2000 compliant. Currently, FAA and its
contractor are conducting tests to determine if there is a Year 2000
problem. Tests to date have uncovered only minor problems for which
FAA has identified solutions.
According to the VSCS project manager, although no significant Year
2000 problems have been identified with the Tandem computer, the
computer and its operating system are several generations old. FAA's
current software licensing and hardware maintenance agreements have
expired for FAA's Technical Center and FAA's Academy systems, greatly
increasing the monthly licensing and maintenance fees. Software
licensing agreements for the operational systems will begin to expire
in 2003 and will have similar program effects. On the basis of the
fees that Tandem charges FAA for the obsolete operating systems at
FAA's Technical Center, it is conceivable that the fees that Tandem
will charge for the obsolete operating systems for the operational
sites for one year could exceed the cost to replace the Tandem
computers. FAA currently has efforts under way to restore funding
for the Tandem computer replacement project in fiscal year 1999 to
ensure that the computers are replaced before the license agreement
expires for the operational system.
Figure I.10: VSCS Display
Module
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: FAA.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
WEATHER AND RADAR PROCESSOR
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:17
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:17.1
The Weather and Radar Processor (WARP) is an automated processing and
display system that will acquire, process, and disseminate Next
Generation Weather Radar data to air traffic personnel at 21 en route
centers and one each at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center
and the FAA Technical Center. Meteorologists will receive the data
at their workstation; area supervisors, via WARP briefing terminals;
and en route controllers, via the situation displays provided by DSR.
WARP is being acquired in three stages and will replace the current
Meteorological Weather Processor system. Stage 0 is an early
deployment of a commercial off-the-shelf system that will replace and
improve the functionality of the current system that experienced many
problems in the past. Stage 1/2 is the core of the project, where
interfaces with DSR, several Next Generation Weather Radar
products--such as precipitation detection at multiple levels--and
other current systems will be developed. The latter part of this
stage is intended to improve the interface with Next Generation
Weather Radar products and allow for other improvements, such as
providing the controller with the ability to request and reply to
data. FAA plans to implement Stage 3 in the future to provide WARP
with critical operational changes. This stage will also allow WARP
to interface with other systems now being developed, such as ATM/Free
Flight Phase 1, ITWS, OASIS, and Oceanic Automation Program.
CHANGES TO WARP'S COST AND
SCHEDULE
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:17.2
Stage 0 has been completed. The project met all its milestones on or
ahead of schedule for this stage since the contract was signed in
July 1996. For example, the first operational readiness
demonstration for Stage 0 was met 2 months ahead of schedule in July
1997, and the last demonstration was met 5 months ahead of schedule.
Also, in 1997, both preliminary and critical design reviews for Stage
1/2 were achieved months ahead of schedule. According to an FAA
Office of Aviation Research official, a working group was also
initiated during preliminary design review to address any
human-factor questions that might be raised in the project's early
stages. However, first- and last-site implementation for Stage 1/2
have slipped 5 months each because of Year 2000 testing requirements;
a slip in the Next Generation Weather Radar certification testing
schedule; an anticipated delay in operational test and evaluation
because of the unavailability of the DSR interface; and an additional
requirement to develop initial weather telecommunications
capabilities. Currently, Stage 1/2 is in full-scale development, and
three limited production systems for Stage 1/2 have been procured.
Cost estimates for the project have remained constant since the
contract's award. Stage 3 was originally scheduled to get started in
1999. Stage 3 is not considered part of the project schedule's
official baseline. Table I.19 summarizes the changes to WARP's cost
and schedule since 1996.
Table I.19
Changes to WARP's Cost and Schedule
(Dollars in millions
Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne,
Fla.)
Change in
Financial information 1996 1998 dollars
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Total F&E cost $125.6 $125.6 None
Cumulative F&E $57.7
appropriations through
fiscal year 1998
======================================================================
Schedule 1996 1998 Change in
months
Estimated first-site Sept. 1999\a Feb. 2000\a + 5 months
implementation
Estimated last-site Feb. 2000\a July 2000\a + 5 months
implementation
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Represents Stage 1/2.
WARP'S CHALLENGES AND RISKS
------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:17.3
According to an FAA project official, three of the four issues that
caused the 5-month slip in the project's first- and last-site
implementation have been mitigated. The required development of
initial weather telecommunications capabilities--the fourth issue--is
an ongoing effort but should not cause further slips in the project's
first- and last-site implementation.
MODERNIZATION PROJECTS COMPLETED
THROUGH AUGUST 1998
========================================================== Appendix II
(Dollars in millions)
Total reported facilities
Project (project number) Completion date and equipment cost
----------------------------- ---------------------------- ----------------------------
Automated Radar Terminal 1983 0\a
System (ARTS) IIIA Assembler
(22-02)
ARTS II Displays (22-07) 1984 $ 3.6
Radar Remote Weather Display 1984 0\a
System (23-10)
Interim Voice Response System 1985 0\a
(23-06)
Geostationary Operational 1985 1.9
Environmental Satellite
Recorders (23-11)
En Route Automation (21-01) 1986 2.3
ARTS IIIA Memory (22-04) 1986 8.6
Additional ARTS IIIA at FAA 1986 4.7
Technical Center (22-05)
ARTS II Interfacility 1986 0\a
Interface (22-08)
Consolidated Notice to Airmen 1986 0\a
System (23-03)
Radar Microwave Link Trunking 1986 8.2
(25-01)
Teletypewriter Replacement 1986 5.1
(25-09)
Nonradar Approach (21-14) 1987 1.6
Air Traffic Control Tower 1987 1.5
Closures (22-14)
Air/Ground Communications 1987 60.6
Equipment Modernization (24-
01)
Airport Telecommunications 1987 4.2
(25-05)
Data System Specialist 1987 32.0
Support (51-20)
Host Computer (21-07)\b 1988 290.7
Altitude Reporting Mode of 1988 0\a
Secondary Radar (Mode-C)
(21-10)
Enhanced Target Generator 1988 0\a
Displays (ARTS III) (22-03)
Nondirectional Beacon (24- 1988 23.8
04)
National Airspace Data 1988 17.0
Interchange Network IA (25-
06)
Aircraft Fleet Conversion 1988 68.6
(26-11)
Enhanced Terminal Conflict 1989 0.4
Alert (22-01)
Automatic Terminal 1989 11.2
Information Service
Recorders (22-10)
High-Altitude En Route Flight 1989 6.3
Advisory Service (23-07)
Hazardous In Flight Weather 1989 7.3
Advisory Service (23-08)
Instrument Landing System 1989 69.6
(24-06)
Power Conditioning Systems 1989 21.5
for ARTS III (26-06)
TPX-42 Replacement (22-17) 1990 40.0
Flight Data Entry and Print- 1991 18.8
Out Devices (21-02)
En Route Automated Radar 1991 2.8
Tracking System Enhancements
(21-04)
Offshore Flight Data 1991 1.0
Processing System (21-16)
Sustain New York Terminal 1991 95.4
Radar Approach Control
(TRACON) (22-18)
Computer-Based Instruction 1991 10.4
(26-02)
National Radio Communication 1991 82.7
System (26-14)
Direct Access Radar Channel 1992 45.0
System (21-03)
Air Traffic Control Tower/ 1992 391.4
TRACON Modernization (22-
13)\c
Communications Facilities 1992 16.8
Consolidation/Network (24-
02)
National Airspace Data 1992 42.4
Interchange Network II (25-
07)
Power System (26-07) 1992 71.5
Modernization of Unmanned FAA 1992 85.7
Buildings and Equipment (26-
08)
Aircraft and Related 1992 68.9
Equipment (26-12)
National Airspace System 1992 9.4
Spectrum Engineering (26-
15)
System Support Lab (26-17) 1992 31.5
General Support Lab (26-18) 1992 25.6
ARTS IIA Enhancements (22- 1993 12.9
06)
Area Control Facilities (21- 1993 9.6
15)
Data Multiplexing Network 1993 34.0
(25-02)
Radar Microwave Link 1993 268.4
Replacement and Expansion
(25-03)\d
Large Airport Cable Loop 1993 20.3
Systems (26-05)
Interfacility Data Transfer 1994 1.8
System for Edwards Air Force
Base Radar Approach Control
(35-20)
Visual Navaids (24-09) 1994 137.7
Acquisition of Flight Service 1994 79.7
Facilities (26-10)
Interim Support Plan\e (46- 1994 362.9
30)
Tower Integration Program 1994 11.2
(42-20)
Radar Pedestal Vibration 1994 5.0
Analysis (44-43)
Low-Level Wind Shear Alert 1994 47.2
System (23-12)
Human Resource Management 1994 7.3
(56-22)
Brite Radar Indicator Tower 1994 64.5
Equipment (22-16)
Approach Lighting System 1994 121.9
Improvement Program (24-10)
Central Weather Processor 1994 81.1
(23-02)
General Support (26-16)\f 1994 824.0
National Implementation of 1994 4.6
the "Imaging" Aid for
Dependent Converging Runway
Approaches (62-24)
Integrated Communications 1995 98.3
Switching System (23-13)
System Engineering and 1995 759.3
Integration Contract (26-
13)
National Airspace Data 1995 23.7
Interchange Network II
Continuation (35-07)
ARTS IIIA Peripheral Adapter 1995 5.9
Module Modernization (52-
21)
Instrument Landing System and 1995 13.1
Visual Navaids Engineering
and Sparing (44-24)
Air Traffic Control Tower/ 1995 13.1
TRACON Establishment (32-
13)
Flight Service Automation 1995 313.7
System (23-01)
Multichannel Voice Recorders 1996 40.2
(22-11)
Weather Message Switching 1996 32.5
Center Replacement (23-04)
Computer Aided Engineering 1996 3.7
Graphics Enhancements (56-
25)
Oceanic Display and Planning 1996 36.8
System (21-05)
Integrated Communications 1996 10.6
Switching System Logistics
Support (43-14)
Maintenance Control Center 1996 47.9
(26-04)
Long-Range Navigation-C 1996 51.9
(LORAN-C) Systems (24-17)
ARTS IIA Interface with Mode- 1996 0\a
S/Airport Surveillance
Radar-9 (22-09)
Replacement of Controllers 1996 5.1
Chairs (42-24)
ARTS IIIA-Expand Capacity and 1997 109.8
Provide Mode-C Intruder
Capability (32-20)
Display Channel Complex 1997 61.3
Rehost (A-01)
Digital Bright Radar 1998 24.2
Indicator Tower Equipment
(32-16)
Civil Aviation Registry 1998 34.4
Modernization (56-24)
FAA Telecommunications (45- 1998 16.1
21)
Precision Automated Tracking 1998 3.3
System (56-16)
National Airspace Integrated 1998 27.6
Logistic Support (56-58)
Long Range Radar Radome 1998 39.5
Replacement (44-42)
Computer Resources Nucleus 1998 158.1
(56-28)
=========================================================================================
Total $5,714.2
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The cost of this project was covered under another facilities and
equipment project.
\b Installed at en route centers to allow processing of existing air
traffic control software on new equipment.
\c Project comprised a variety of tower and terminal replacement and
modernization projects. Project was continued in the Capital
Investment Plan under projects 42-13 and 42-14.
\d Also known as the Radio Communications Link project, it was
designed to convert aging "special purpose" Radar Microwave Link
System into a "general purpose" system for data, voice, and radar
communications among en route centers and other major FAA facilities.
\e Project was activated to sustain and upgrade air traffic control
operations and acquire eight terminal radars awaiting the full
implementation of the Advanced Automation System.
\f Project comprised a variety of diverse support projects and has
been continued in the Capital Investment Plan under Continued General
Support (46-16).
Source: FAA. We did not independently verify the schedule and cost
information.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
John H. Anderson, Jr.
Gregory P. Carroll
Beverly Norwood Dulaney
David B. Goldstein
Peter G. Maristch
Belva M. Martin
John T. Noto
Earl P. Williams, Jr.
ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Colleen M. Phillips
*** End of document. ***