    Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program (Letter
    Report, 12/03/98, GAO/RCED-99-25).

    Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on the
    status of the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) air traffic
    control modernization program, focusing on the: (1) status of the
    overall modernization program, including its cost; (2) status of 18 key
    modernization projects; and (3) challenges facing the overall
    modernization program.

    GAO noted that: (1) FAA, in collaboration with the aviation community,
    has taken steps to restructure its multibillion-dollar modernization
    program in order to achieve a more gradual and cost-effective approach
    by limiting the scope of projects to more manageable segments; (2) under
    FAA's new incremental approach, the agency plans to implement a new way
    of managing air traffic in order to provide immediate improvements for
    the system's safety, efficiency, and capacity; (3) under its most recent
    financial plan, FAA estimates that the total cost of modernization will
    be nearly $42 billion from fiscal year (FY) 1982 through FY 2004--a $3.8
    billion increase since the agency's last financial plan in February
    1998; (4) FAA's progress in meeting cost and schedule goals for its 18
    key projects has been mixed; (5) under FAA's new phased approach to
    modernization, two projects in GAO's review--Aeronautical Data Link and
    Air Traffic Management--have been revised, resulting in new cost and
    schedule estimates for those components that are planned for
    implementation under free flight; (6) approximately two-thirds of the 18
    projects are operating within cost and schedule estimates; (7) while FAA
    has taken action to address some of its long-standing problems, the
    agency still faces many challenges in effectively managing its
    multibillion-dollar investment in modernization; (8) FAA's internal
    evaluations and GAO's reviews have identified shortcomings in FAA's
    current process used to manage its investments in validating and
    prioritizing mission needs analyses, in establishing and monitoring
    baseline measurements for all projects, and in communicating and
    coordinating among cross-functional teams; (9) while FAA has begun to
    address some of the root causes of long-standing modernization problems
    that hinder its achievement of desired mission goals, these efforts are
    not yet complete; (10) GAO has identified problems with the agency's
    systems architecture, software acquisition processes, and organizational
    culture among those responsible for acquisitions; (11) FAA has actions
    under way to implement GAO's recommendations in all of these areas; (12)
    FAA has more work to do to ensure that its mission-critical air traffic
    control systems will work through the year 2000 date change and to
    determine how it will ensure the continuity of critical operations in
    the event of some systems' failures when January 1, 2000, arrives; and
    (13) FAA also has weaknesses in its computer security that will require
    action to ensure that air traffic control systems on which it depends
    are sufficiently resistant to intrusion.

    --------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

     REPORTNUM:  RCED-99-25
         TITLE:  Air Traffic Control: Status of FAA's Modernization Program
          DATE:  12/03/98
       SUBJECT:  Air traffic control systems
                 ADP procurement
                 Systems conversions
                 Navigation aids
                 Computer security
                 Requirements definition
                 Cost control
                 Future budget projections
                 Radar equipment
                 Information resources management
    IDENTIFIER:  FAA National Airspace System Plan
                 FAA Free Flight Operational Enhancement Program
                 FAA Aeronautical Data Link
                 FAA Advanced Traffic Management System
                 FAA Air Route Surveillance Radar-4
                 Y2K

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    Cover
    ================================================================ COVER

    Report to Congressional Requesters

    December 1998

    AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL - STATUS OF
    FAA'S MODERNIZATION PROGRAM

    GAO/RCED-99-25

    FAA's Modernization Program

    (348111)

    Abbreviations
    =============================================================== ABBREV

      AMASS - Airport Movement Area Safety System
      ARINC - Aeronautical Radio Incorporated
      ARSR - Air Route Surveillance Radar
      ARTS - Automated Radar Terminal System
      ATCBI - Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator
      ATM - Air Traffic Management
      ASDE - Airport Surface Detection Equipment
      ASOS - Automated Surface Observing System
      ASR - Airport Surveillance Radar
      AWOS - Automated Weather Observing System
      CTAS - Center Terminal Radar Approach Control Automation System
      DSR - Display System Replacement
      FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
      F&E - Facilities and Equipment
      GAO - General Accounting Office
      GPS - Global Positioning System
      ITWS - Integrated Terminal Weather System
      LAAS - Local Area Augmentation System
      NAS - National Airspace System
      NATCA - National Air Traffic Controllers Association
      OASIS - Operational Supportability and Implementation System
      STARS - Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System
      TDWR - Terminal Doppler Weather Radar
      TRACON - Terminal Radar Approach Control
      TRDRE - Terminal Radar Digitization, Replacement, and Establishment
      VHF - very high frequency
      VSCS - Voice Switching and Control System
      VTABS - VSCS Training and Backup Switch
      WAAS - Wide Area Augmentation System
      WARP - Weather and Radar Processor
      RTCA -

    Letter
    =============================================================== LETTER

    B-281077

    December 3, 1998

    Congressional Requesters

    In late 1981, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) began a
    modernization program to replace and upgrade the National Airspace
    System's (NAS) equipment and facilities to meet the expected increase
    in traffic volume, enhance the margin of air safety, and increase the
    efficiency of the air traffic control system--the principal component
    of the NAS.  Historically, the modernization program has experienced
    many problems in meeting cost, schedule, and performance goals.  As a
    result, many of the promised benefits from using new equipment have
    been delayed, and the aviation community's confidence in FAA's
    ability to manage the modernization program has been weakened.
    Because of the complexity, cost, and problem-plagued past of FAA's
    modernization program, we designated it a high-risk information
    technology initiative in 1995 and again in 1997.\1

    In light of past problems and continuing concerns about key projects
    being funded under this program, you asked us to provide current
    information on the status of the modernization program.  As agreed
    with your offices, this report provides information on the (1) status
    of the overall modernization program, including its cost; (2) status
    of 18 key modernization projects; and (3) challenges facing the
    overall modernization program.  (See app.  I for specific information
    on these 18 projects.  A listing of projects completed from 1983
    through August 1998 is included in app.  II.)

    --------------------
    \1 FAA's modernization program is one of four high-risk system
    development and modernization efforts.  See High-Risk Series:  An
    Overview (GAO/HR-95-1, Feb.  1995) and High-Risk Series:  Information
    Management and Technology (GAO/HR-97-9, Feb.  1997).

       RESULTS IN BRIEF
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

    Over the past year, FAA, in collaboration with the aviation
    community, has taken steps to restructure its multibillion-dollar
    modernization program in order to achieve a more gradual and
    cost-effective approach by, among other actions, limiting the scope
    of projects to more manageable segments.  This contrasts with the
    approach of the past, where the agency sought to develop highly
    complex software-intensive systems all at once and often established
    unrealistic cost, schedule, and performance goals.  Under FAA's new
    incremental approach, the agency plans to implement a new way of
    managing air traffic, known as "free flight," in order to provide
    immediate improvements for the system's safety, efficiency, and
    capacity.\2

    Under its most recent financial plan, FAA estimates that the total
    cost of modernization will be nearly $42 billion from fiscal year
    1982 through fiscal 2004--a $3.8 billion increase since the agency's
    last financial plan in February 1998.\3 \4 This increase in planned
    spending (1) is attributed to new funding levels that were provided
    by the Office of Management and Budget and (2) allows for the
    acceleration of the NAS' modernization.  Through fiscal year 1998,
    the Congress appropriated over $25 billion of the $42 billion for
    modernization (funded through FAA's Facilities and Equipment
    account), and FAA's latest financial plan indicates that $17 billion
    will be needed from fiscal year 1999 through fiscal 2004.

    We have identified 18 projects that are key to FAA's efforts to
    replace NAS' aging infrastructure and that provide a platform for
    improving the system's safety, efficiency, and/or capacity.  Total
    estimated Facilities and Equipment funding for each of these projects
    exceeds $100 million, and, collectively, these projects account for
    about 41 percent of the Facilities and Equipment funds requested for
    fiscal year 1999.  FAA's progress in meeting cost and schedule goals
    for these 18 key projects has been mixed.  Under FAA's new phased
    approach to modernization, two projects in our review--Aeronautical
    Data Link and Air Traffic Management--have been revised, resulting in
    new cost and schedule estimates for those components that are planned
    for implementation under free flight.  Including these two projects,
    approximately two-thirds of the 18 projects are operating within cost
    and schedule estimates.  Of the remaining projects, several have
    incurred cost increases and delays due, in part, to changes in
    requirements, difficulties in developing software, and changes
    designed to allow human operators to work better with new computer
    systems.  However, despite the delays with some projects, FAA has
    fielded new air traffic control equipment.  For example, since 1996,
    FAA has commissioned 38 of 43 planned Air Route Surveillance
    Radar-4s.\5 \6 Additionally, since early 1997, FAA has commissioned
    238 Automated Surface Observing Systems at new sites, bringing the
    total commissioned systems to 371 out of 597.\7

    While FAA has taken action to address some of its long-standing
    problems, the agency still faces many challenges in effectively
    managing its multibillion-dollar investment in modernization:

      -- FAA's internal evaluations and our reviews have identified
         shortcomings in FAA's current process used to manage its
         investments in validating and prioritizing mission needs
         analyses, in establishing and monitoring baseline measurements
         for all projects, and in communicating and coordinating among
         cross-functional teams.  Improvements in these areas, among
         others, will help ensure that FAA (1) selects those investments
         that best meet its mission needs; (2) monitors all investments
         using accurate and reliable cost, schedule, and other
         performance data; (3) evaluates investment projects after they
         are implemented to measure outcomes and incorporate lessons
         learned to improve its decision-making for new investment
         projects; and (4) facilitates effective partnerships among teams
         responsible for acquisitions.

      -- While FAA has begun to address some of the root causes of
         long-standing modernization problems that hinder its achievement
         of desired mission goals, these efforts are not yet complete.
         For example, we found that FAA lacked reliable cost-estimating
         processes and cost-accounting practices needed to effectively
         manage investments in information technology, leaving it at risk
         of making ill-informed decisions on critical and costly air
         traffic control systems.\8 FAA has begun to improve its
         cost-estimating practices and to acquire a cost-accounting
         system, but these efforts are not complete.  We have also
         identified problems with the agency's systems architecture,
         software acquisition processes, and organizational culture among
         those responsible for acquisitions.  FAA has actions under way
         to implement our recommendations in all of these areas.

      -- FAA has more work to do to ensure that its mission-critical air
         traffic control systems will work through the year 2000 date
         change and to determine how it will ensure the continuity of
         critical operations in the event of some systems' failures when
         January 1, 2000, arrives.  While FAA has completed critical
         steps in identifying which systems need to be fixed and
         repairing them, it must still test many of its mission-critical
         systems and implement needed fixes.  Also, the agency still
         needs to resolve a number of cross-cutting risks that threaten
         aviation operations, such as risks associated with exchanges of
         data with external partners--including airports and
         airlines--that are integral to managing air traffic operations.

      -- FAA also has weaknesses in its computer security that will
         require action to ensure that air traffic control systems on
         which it depends are sufficiently resistant to intrusion.
         Disruptions to the nation's air traffic control system could
         result if these systems are not adequately protected.  We
         identified shortcomings in four areas:  physical security of air
         traffic control facilities, operational system security, the
         security of future air traffic control systems, and management
         structure and security policy implementation.  We recommended
         that FAA build detailed security requirements into its design of
         future air traffic control systems and that the agency enforce
         computer security policy.  The agency has acknowledged
         weaknesses but has not yet formulated a plan to strengthen
         security.

    --------------------
    \2 Under "free flight," FAA will begin implementing new technologies
    and procedures that will allow the agency to move to a more
    collaborative system of managing traffic under which pilots, within
    limits, will be allowed to choose routes to save them time and money.

    \3 FAA's financial plan, which is based on the national airspace
    architecture--FAA's blueprint for defining the long-range needs of
    the NAS--takes into account the funding required for the service life
    of a project, including the amounts needed for upgrades
    (refreshments) to technology.  Previously, these amounts were not
    included in the financial plan.

    \4 Estimated costs may not add because of rounding.

    \5 The term "commissioned" is defined as the formal approval of the
    equipment for operational use.

    \6 The Air Route Surveillance Radar provides data on the movement of
    aircraft and weather and is used for the separation of aircraft, drug
    interdiction, and defense of the U.S.  borders.

    \7 The Automated Surface Observing System equipment automates the
    observation and dissemination of selected weather data.

    \8 See Air Traffic Control:  Improved Cost Information Needed to Make
    Billion Dollar Modernization Investment Decisions (GAO/AIMD-97-20,
    Jan.  22, 1997).

       BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

    FAA's mission is to promote the safe, orderly, and expeditious flow
    of air traffic in the national airspace.  To accomplish its mission,
    FAA provides air traffic control services 24 hours a day, 365 days a
    year.  The air traffic control system, which is the principal
    component of the NAS, comprises a vast network of radars; automated
    data processing, navigation, and communications equipment; and air
    traffic control facilities.

    Through its modernization program, FAA is upgrading and replacing
    equipment and facilities--such as controller workstations and airport
    towers--and developing new technologies--such as digital
    communications--to help improve the safety, efficiency, and capacity
    of the NAS.  FAA's air traffic services are provided primarily
    through four service areas--air traffic control towers, terminal-area
    facilities, en route centers, and flight service stations.  The
    functions of each type of service area are described below.

      -- Airport towers control the flow of aircraft--before landing, on
         the ground, and after takeoff--within 5 nautical miles of the
         airport and up to 3,000 feet above the airport.

      -- Terminal area facilities--known as Terminal Radar Approach
         Control (TRACON) facilities--direct aircraft in the airspace
         that extends from the point where the tower's control ends to
         about 50 nautical miles from the airport.  A TRACON can be
         located at or outside an airport.

      -- En route centers--known as air route traffic control
         centers--control aircraft in air routes outside of terminal
         airspace.  Planes are controlled through regions of airspace by
         en route centers responsible for the regions.  Control is passed
         from one center to another as a plane moves across a region
         until it reaches terminal airspace.  Two en route
         centers--Oakland and New York--also control aircraft over the
         ocean.  Because radar coverage over the ocean is limited, beyond
         the radars' sight, controllers must rely on periodic radio
         communications through a third party--Aeronautical Radio
         Incorporated (ARINC), a private organization funded by the
         airlines and FAA to operate radio stations--to determine
         aircraft locations.

      -- Flight Service Stations provide weather and flight plan services
         primarily for general aviation pilots.

    (See fig.  1 for a visual summary of air traffic control over the
    continental United States and oceans.)

       Figure 1:  Summary of Air
       Traffic Control Over the
       Continental United States and
       Oceans

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    The 18 key modernization projects will help upgrade the air traffic
    services provided through one or more of the four service areas that
    FAA uses.  Table 1 depicts the air traffic service areas that will be
    modernized by these projects.  (App.  I describes the functions of
    each of these projects.)

                                             Table 1

                                Air Traffic Services That Will Be
                                Modernized by 18 Major Air Traffic
                                         Control Projects

                                                                   Service areas
                                                      ---------------------------------------
                                                                                       Flight
                                                                          En route    service
    Project's title                                      Tower  Terminal    center    station
    ------------------------------------------------  --------  --------  --------  ---------
    Aeronautical Data Link                                   X         X         X
    Air Route Surveillance Radar-4                                               X
    Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3                    X
    Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator                                      X
    Air Traffic Management/Free Flight Phase 1                         X         X
     Program
    Automated Surface Observing System                       X                   X          X
    Display System Replacement                                                   X
    Global Positioning System Program: Wide Area             X         X         X
     Augmentation System
    Global Positioning System Program: Local Area            X         X
     Augmentation System
    Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement                                 X
     Program
    Integrated Terminal Weather System                       X         X
    Oceanic Automation Program                                                   X          X
    Operational and Supportability Implementation                                           X
     System
    Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System                    X
    Terminal Digitization, Replacement, and                            X
     Establishment Program/Airport Surveillance
     Radar-11 Project
    Terminal Doppler Weather Radar                           X         X
    Voice Switching and Control System                                           X
    Weather and Radar Processor                                                  X
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Note:  "X" denotes service areas where projects are utilized.

       OVERALL STATUS OF MODERNIZATION
       PROGRAM
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

    The NAS modernization program has undergone many changes since it was
    established in 1981.  Initially, the program comprised only about 80
    projects, but in December 1990, it was redefined and expanded as the
    Capital Investment Plan (hereafter, referred to as the financial
    plan).  Over the past year, FAA and industry have worked together to
    develop a new approach to managing the program, which now includes
    124 active projects funded through FAA's Facilities and Equipment
    appropriation account.  Eighty-nine projects have been completed
    since the modernization program began.

          FAA AND INDUSTRY HAVE AGREED
          TO A PHASED APPROACH TO
          MODERNIZATION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

    Over the past year, FAA and industry, working through the RTCA,\9
    have agreed on a phased approach to modernizing the NAS--including a
    new way of managing air traffic, known as "free flight."\10 A central
    tenet of this approach is the "build a little, test a little" concept
    of technology development and deployment--intended to limit
    development efforts to a manageable scope, identify and mitigate
    risks, and deploy technologies prior to their full maturity so they
    can provide immediate improvements to the system's safety,
    efficiency, and/or capacity.  This approach contrasts with the former
    approach, where FAA sought to build highly complex systems, many of
    which required the extensive development of software.  In several
    cases, FAA underestimated the technical complexity of the development
    efforts, and, as a result, the systems were more costly and took
    longer to develop than anticipated.

    Under the first phase of the modernization program, FAA plans to
    accelerate the development and deployment of certain technology
    projects that have the potential to provide immediate benefits to
    users.\11 Additionally, the agency plans to continue to develop and
    deploy critical infrastructure replacement projects like the Standard
    Terminal Automation Replacement System and Display System
    Replacement, which provide new workstations and functionality to
    controllers in terminal and en route centers, respectively.
    Furthermore, other modernization projects, particularly those related
    to communication, navigation, and surveillance, will be tested under
    the agency's planned demonstration program.\12

    --------------------
    \9 RTCA serves in an advisory capacity to FAA.  It was organized as
    the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics in 1935 to provide a
    forum where industry and government representatives could discuss
    aviation issues and develop consensus-based recommendations.  In
    November 1991, it reorganized and shortened its name to RTCA.

    \10 In September, we issued a report on the status of FAA's efforts
    to implement free flight and the challenges that lie ahead.  See
    National Airspace System:  FAA Has Implemented Some Initiatives, but
    Challenges Remain (GAO/RCED-98-246, Sept.  28, 1998).

    \11 Under this phase, FAA would implement new technologies and
    procedures to allow the agency to gradually move to a "free flight"
    operating system, where decisions for conducting flight operations
    would be based increasingly on the collaborative efforts of FAA and
    users.  Components of two projects in our review--Aeronautical Data
    Link and Air Traffic Management--are a part of the agency's free
    flight effort.

    \12 FAA has proposed to change the name of the demonstration from
    Flight 2000 to "Safe Flight 21."

          TOTAL COST OF MODERNIZATION
          THROUGH FISCAL YEAR 2004 IS
          ESTIMATED TO BE $42 BILLION
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

    FAA, in its current financial plan, dated July 1998, estimated that
    the cost of the modernization program for fiscal years 1982 through
    2004 will total nearly $42 billion--a $3.8 billion increase over the
    estimate included in the February 1998 plan.\13 Of the estimated $42
    billion required, the Congress appropriated over $25 billion for
    fiscal years 1982 through 1998.  Of this amount, FAA has reported
    spending $5.7 billion on 89 completed projects and $15.2 billion on
    124 ongoing projects.  Of the remaining amount, FAA has reported
    spending about $2.8 billion on projects that have been canceled or
    restructured and $1.6 billion for personnel-related expenses
    associated with the acquisition of systems.  The financial plan
    estimates that approximately $17 billion will be required for fiscal
    years 1999 through 2004.

    The $3.8 billion increase in the estimated cost of modernization
    since February 1998 results from new spending levels provided by the
    Office of Management and Budget for accelerating the NAS'
    modernization.  This consists of $1.9 billion for existing projects
    to allow for acceleration, new approaches (Free Flight Phase 1), and
    cost growth.  The remaining $1.9 billion increase results from the
    addition of new projects identified in the architecture that could
    not be accommodated under the old funding levels.

    --------------------
    \13 For the purposes of this report, the "cost of modernization"
    means all actual and projected Facilities and Equipment
    appropriations from fiscal year 1982 through fiscal 2004 for projects
    in FAA's financial plan.  This plan contains funding primarily for
    projects, including prime contract costs; costs for personnel
    compensation, benefits, and travel; and contract costs for technical
    support service activities.  The plan also includes estimated future
    costs for some projects that have not yet been funded but are part of
    the NAS architecture.

       COST, SCHEDULE, AND RISKS
       ASSOCIATED WITH 18 MAJOR
       PROJECTS
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

    The 18 projects represent the agency's priority projects in the areas
    of communication, navigation and landing, surveillance, automation,
    and weather.  Total estimated spending for each of these projects
    exceeds $100 million, and, collectively, they represent about 41
    percent of the Facilities and Equipment funding requested for fiscal
    year 1999.  FAA's progress in meeting cost and schedule goals for
    these 18 projects has been mixed.  Under FAA's new phased approach to
    modernization, two projects in our review--Aeronautical Data Link and
    Air Traffic Management--have been revised, resulting in new cost and
    schedule estimates for those components that are planned for
    implementation under free flight.  Including these two projects,
    approximately two-thirds are meeting cost and schedule estimates,
    while several of the remaining projects have incurred cost increases
    and delays due, in part, to changes in requirements, difficulties in
    developing software, and changes designed to allow human operators to
    work better with new computer systems.

    The net estimated Facilities and Equipment cost of the 18 major
    modernization projects has increased by $482 million since the
    original estimate was made.\14 This includes an increase of about
    $530 million for six of these projects.  Projects experiencing the
    largest increase--due primarily to new requirements for additional
    equipment and technical and siting problems--include the Airport
    Surveillance Radar-11, Automated Surface Observing System, and
    Terminal Doppler Weather Radar.  The estimated cost for one
    project--Oceanic Automation Program--decreased by about $48 million,
    10 projects showed no change, and 1 project's original estimate was
    too recent for comparison purposes.  (See app.  I.)

    Schedules for completing implementation were delayed for 5 of the 18
    projects.  The delays ranged from 5 months to over 6 years.\15 For
    example, the date for implementing the last of the Airport Surface
    Detection Equipment-3 has slipped by over 3 years primarily because
    of delays in completing towers or other structures at locations that
    will receive the radars.\16 Of the remaining 13 projects, 9 had no
    schedule delays, the schedules for 2 were accelerated, and the
    original and current schedules for 2 could not be compared.  For one
    of these projects, the original implementation date had not been
    established when the contract was signed.  For the second project,
    the agency established the schedule in October 1998.  As an example,
    the Display System Replacement project is still scheduled to be
    completely implemented by May 2000.\17 FAA accelerated the schedule
    for implementing the Oceanic Automation Program by 8 months when it
    canceled four of five planned phases and significantly reduced the
    requirements for the one remaining phase.\18 (See app.  I.)

    However, despite delays with some projects, FAA has fielded new air
    traffic control equipment.  For example, since 1996, FAA has
    commissioned 38 of 43 planned Air Route Surveillance Radar-4s.
    Additionally, since early 1997, FAA has commissioned 238 Automated
    Surface Observing Systems at new sites, bringing the total
    commissioned systems to 371 out of 597.

    Several of the 18 projects face challenges and risks that could lead
    to further cost increases and delays.  For example, the Wide Area
    Augmentation System was initially designed to serve as the only means
    of navigation for civil aviation, thus allowing FAA to decommission
    its existing, costly ground-based navigation system.  However, the
    future of the project is uncertain because of vulnerability
    concerns-- related to both intentional and unintentional interference
    with the satellite signal--and congressional concerns about whether
    FAA's program, as currently planned, is cost-effective.\19 FAA is
    revisiting the program's cost, schedule, and performance baselines
    and will incorporate the results of the vulnerability assessment,
    expected in January 1999, into its analyses.\20

    --------------------
    \14 The original estimate, representing when the investment decision
    was made or the contract was signed--whichever is relevant--was
    compared with the 1998 estimate to determine changes in costs.  The
    date of this estimate varies among projects.

    \15 Implementation signifies that a system has been fielded and that
    the personnel who will use and maintain it are satisfied that it is
    ready for operation.  Usually, commissioning soon follows
    implementation.  "Last-site implementation" is the date when the last
    planned unit is scheduled to become operational.

    \16 The Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 is a primary radar
    designed to provide tower controllers with surveillance
    information--a video display--of all aircraft and other vehicles on
    an airport's surface.

    \17 The Display System Replacement project will modernize en route
    center equipment by replacing 20- to 30-year-old display channels,
    controller workstations, and network infrastructure.

    \18 The Oceanic Automation Program project is designed to provide a
    platform for improving air traffic control over the oceans where
    radar coverage is limited.  Among other capabilities, the one segment
    that FAA is implementing will provide pilots and controllers with
    data link technology.

    \19 Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations
    Act for 1999 (P.L.  105-277, Division A, sec.  101 (g)(1998)).

    \20 FAA, the Air Transport Association, and the Aircraft Owners and
    Pilots Association have initiated a risk assessment of using
    satellite navigation as the only means of navigation in the NAS.

       FAA FACES CHALLENGES IN
       MANAGING THIS
       MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR INVESTMENT
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

    Long-standing problems, including cost increases in the overall
    modernization program and in many of the individual projects as well
    as difficulty in meeting project schedules, demonstrate the
    difficulty of managing an investment of this size.  Although FAA is
    taking actions to address many of these problems, the agency faces
    several challenges in seeking to improve its management of the
    modernization program in order to deliver promised benefits and
    thereby restore its credibility.  Included among these challenges is
    FAA's need to (1) implement an effective process for selecting,
    controlling, and evaluating its air traffic control investments; (2)
    sustain its commitment to addressing the root causes of its
    modernization problems; (3) address the Year 2000 problem; and (4)
    correct its computer security weaknesses.

          MANAGING MODERNIZATION
          REQUIRES A DISCIPLINED
          INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT
          PROCESS
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

    Recent federal management reforms have introduced requirements
    emphasizing federal agencies' need to significantly improve their
    management processes for selecting, monitoring, and evaluating
    investments.\21

    Our reviews and FAA's internal evaluation of its acquisition
    management system identified shortcomings in two of these areas:
    mission analyses (selection) and baseline management (monitoring).\22
    \23 FAA's and our work also identified problems with FAA's
    cross-functional team structure, which is key to successfully
    acquiring new modernization systems and technology.  It is critical
    that FAA has processes in place to help ensure that its modernization
    projects are being implemented at acceptable costs, within reasonable
    and expected time frames, and are contributing to observable
    improvements in mission performance.  FAA's acquisition management
    system, implemented on April 1, 1996, is intended to provide
    high-level acquisition policy and guidance and to establish rigorous
    investment management practices to guide modernization efforts.  We
    are currently reviewing FAA's investment management approach as
    carried out through its acquisition management system.

    First, the mission analysis process is intended to enable FAA to
    determine and prioritize its most critical capability shortfalls and
    its best technological opportunities for improving the safety,
    security, capacity, and efficiency of the NAS.  FAA's internal
    evaluation identified major shortcomings relating to validating and
    prioritizing all critical needs, evaluating mission needs statements
    to ensure that needs were still valid, implementing the mission
    analysis process across the entire agency, and coordinating the
    mission analysis process among internal organizations.  As a result
    of these shortcomings, FAA's evaluation team found that the agency
    cannot ensure that some of its most critical needs are being met,
    that it is not duplicating efforts in identifying mission needs, and
    that resources are being used in the most cost-effective manner.

    Addressing shortcomings in mission analysis capabilities, among other
    areas, would put FAA in a better position to effectively plan for its
    needs and avoid crisis situations that result from inadequate
    planning.  At least two such situations arose during fiscal year
    1998.  FAA reprogrammed $37.7 million to cover expenses associated
    with activities aimed at ensuring that the agency's critical air
    traffic control-related computer systems will function properly at
    the turn of the century (Year 2000 computer problem).  Although FAA
    recognized the Year 2000 initiative as a critical need and began
    addressing it, the agency did not document the need in a mission
    needs statement.  The discipline associated with mission
    analysis--identifying the shortfall, the impact of not satisfying the
    shortfall, and an estimate of the resources the agency should commit
    to resolve the need--might have eliminated the need to reprogram
    funds to meet this priority.  Additionally, the agency reprogrammed
    $28.9 million for additional requirements for its new automation
    system for terminal controllers.  Included in this amount were funds
    to implement solutions to address design concerns identified by human
    operators of the system.  As a result of the reprogramming, the
    schedule for some projects may have to be pushed out several years,
    increasing the likelihood that costs for these projects will also
    increase.

    Second, in the area of baseline management, the acquisition
    management system requires that each program has a baseline, which
    establishes performance, cost, schedule, and benefits parameters
    within which the program is authorized to operate.  These baselines
    assist managers in monitoring the performance of projects.  FAA's
    internal evaluation identified numerous shortcomings in baseline
    management, including the fact that only 54 percent of the 94
    programs funded by the Facilities and Equipment account had some form
    of approved baseline documentation.\24

    Furthermore, the approved baselines did not always include enough
    information to measure and monitor the program's performance.  For
    example, while documentation related to Facilities and Equipment
    funding for a project was usually complete, funding for research and
    development and operations was not always included in the baseline
    document.  Even when operations data were included, questions existed
    about the reliability of these cost estimates.  We found, as did the
    FAA evaluation team, that poor or inaccurate cost estimates could
    limit FAA's ability to make sound investment decisions about
    modernization projects on the basis of economic merits.\25 FAA has
    taken steps to improve its cost-estimating capabilities; these steps
    are not yet complete.  In a related area, an FAA official indicated
    that the agency has begun to baseline a number of projects.  In this
    regard, future changes in cost and schedule estimates will be
    measured against these new baselines.  Although the requirement for
    the Administrator to consider terminating a project that fails to
    meet defined goals applies only to acquisitions initiated after
    October 1996, this official indicated that the agency plans to
    subject its ongoing projects to these requirements.  Completing
    efforts under way to improve cost-estimating capabilities and
    tracking and monitoring the performance of projects against approved
    baselines would be a step in the right direction as FAA seeks to
    improve its management of projects and avoid past problems associated
    with cost increases and delays.

    Finally, the agency faces a continuing challenge in effectively
    implementing its cross-functional integrated product development team
    structure.\26 Our recent work relating to FAA's implementation of
    free flight initiatives found continuing problems with communication
    and coordination across program lines.\27 Some team members were
    motivated primarily by the priorities and management of the offices
    that they represented rather than the goals of a given team.  FAA's
    internal evaluation findings were similar, in that conflicts between
    horizontal organizational structures (teams) and vertical
    organizational structures (operating divisions, such as air traffic)
    created a constraint to the team structure by, among other things,
    delaying decisions that could affect a team's ability to support
    successful acquisitions.  As we noted in our September 1998 report,
    FAA is attempting to improve cross-agency communication and
    coordination through such initiatives as developing incentives for
    staff to work toward the agency's goals and priorities.  Because
    FAA's successful implementation of the modernization program is tied
    to the effective partnership among offices responsible for various
    acquisition-related activities, it will be important for the agency
    to continue its efforts to forge effective partnerships.

    --------------------
    \21 Included among these legislative reforms are revisions to the
    Paperwork Reduction Act, the Government Performance and Results Act,
    and the Chief Financial Officers Act.

    \22 See Air Traffic Control:  Observations on FAA's Modernization
    Program (GAO/T-RCED/AIMD-98-93, Feb.  26, 1998).

    \23 Evaluation of Acquisition Reform--The First Two Years:  April
    1996-March 1998, FAA Program Evaluation Branch, Office of Systems
    Architecture and Investment Analysis, May 29, 1998.

    \24 FAA's evaluation team also found that the agency had not
    established definitions for or designations of "program,"
    "substantial acquisition program," and "major systems acquisition."
    Such definitions and designations are important because P.L.  104-264
    (Air Traffic Management System Performance Improvement Act of 1996)
    requires the Administrator to consider terminating substantial
    acquisition programs that fail to meet defined goals.  Office of
    Management and Budget circulars require designation and reporting on
    major systems acquisitions.  FAA's team defined "program" for
    purposes of the evaluation and identified 94 programs that should
    have had an acquisition baseline.

    \25 See GAO/AIMD-97-20.

    \26 The integrated product development team structure was designed as
    the implementing arm for the acquisition management system.
    Integrated product teams are responsible for developing or procuring
    equipment.  The goals of these teams are to improve accountability
    and coordination and infuse a more strategic, mission-oriented focus
    into the acquisition process.  Team members include contractors,
    FAA's engineering division, and the FAA divisions that operate and
    maintain air traffic control equipment.

    \27 These findings were consistent with earlier findings in our work
    on FAA's culture and how it affects acquisition management.  See
    GAO/RCED-98-246 and Aviation Acquisition:  A Comprehensive Strategy
    Is Needed for Cultural Change at FAA (GAO/RCED-96-159, Aug.  22,
    1996).

          IMPROVING THE MANAGEMENT OF
          THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM
          WILL REQUIRE SUSTAINED
          COMMITMENT TO ADDRESS ROOT
          CAUSES
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

    Our reviews have identified some of the root causes of long-standing
    problems that jeopardize the effective use of modernization
    resources.  These problems included unreliable cost information,
    incomplete architecture, weak software acquisition capabilities, and
    an organizational culture that did not reflect a strong commitment to
    the agency's mission focus, accountability, coordination, and
    adaptability.  FAA has ongoing actions under way to address these
    shortcomings.

    In January 1997, we reported that FAA lacked reliable cost-estimating
    processes and cost-accounting practices needed to effectively manage
    investments in information technology, which leaves it at the risk of
    making ill-informed decisions on critical and costly air traffic
    control systems.\28 Without reliable cost information, the likelihood
    of poor investments is increased.  We recommended that FAA improve
    its cost-estimating processes and fully implement a cost-accounting
    system.  FAA has begun to institutionalize defined cost-estimating
    processes and to acquire a cost-accounting system as required by
    legislation.  According to officials responsible for the new cost
    accounting system, the agency had planned to have the first phase of
    the system--accumulating data for domestic and oceanic air traffic
    services--operational by October 1998, but this milestone has been
    delayed by complications associated with the method used to allocate
    costs.  These officials stated that it is too soon to tell how this
    delay may affect other planned milestones.

    With respect to the new system, the Department of Transportation's
    Inspector General has identified design issues that call into
    question whether the planned cost-accounting system can accurately
    account for FAA's full cost of operations.\29 For example, among its
    major findings, the report noted that FAA had yet to establish a
    systematic method to identify and reflect the (1) cost for all
    development projects, (2) correct labor charged to appropriate
    projects, and (3) cost incurred by other agencies for air traffic
    services.\30 Additionally, decisions had not been made on how to
    allocate Facilities and Equipment costs among operating facilities
    throughout FAA.  According to a senior FAA finance official, the
    agency has made a change in program management and has assigned
    additional resources to the cost-accounting effort to address
    problems cited by the Inspector General's report.  For example, FAA
    has developed and tested the capability to capture and report all of
    a project's developmental costs.  In addition, with respect to
    decisions about how to allocate Facilities and Equipment costs among
    operating divisions, this official noted that FAA had new procedures
    for allocating property depreciation costs for fiscal year 1998.
    Taking steps to ensure that its cost-accounting system is
    complete--by correcting known design and allocation issues--will put
    FAA in a better position to provide managers and other decisionmakers
    with accurate information for use in determining and controlling the
    agency's costs.

    In February 1997, we reported that FAA attempted to modernize the NAS
    without a complete systems architecture, or blueprint, to guide
    development and evolution.\31

    The result has been unnecessarily higher spending to buy, integrate,
    and maintain hardware and software.  We recommended that FAA develop
    and enforce a complete systems architecture and implement a
    management structure for doing so that is similar to the Chief
    Information Officers provision of the Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996.  FAA
    has initiated activities to develop a complete systems architecture,
    and project officials estimated in May 1998 that it would take 18 to
    24 months to complete the development.  Also, FAA is in the process
    of hiring a Chief Information Officer that will report directly to
    the Administrator.

    Furthermore, in March 1997, we reported that FAA's processes for
    acquiring software for air traffic control systems are ad hoc,
    sometimes chaotic, and not repeatable across projects.\32 As a
    result, FAA is at great risk of acquiring software that does not
    perform as intended and is not delivered on time and within budget.
    We recommended that FAA improve its software acquisition capabilities
    by establishing a mature acquisition process throughout its entire
    organization.  While FAA has initiated efforts to improve its
    software acquisition process, these efforts have not been implemented
    agencywide.

    Finally, we have reported that an underlying cause of FAA's air
    traffic control acquisition problems is its organizational
    culture--the values, beliefs, attitudes, and expectations shared by
    an organization's members that affect their behavior and the behavior
    of the whole organization.\33 We found that FAA's acquisitions were
    impaired because employees acted in ways that did not reflect a
    strong commitment to mission focus, accountability, coordination, and
    adaptability.  We recommended a comprehensive strategy for cultural
    change that (1) addresses specific responsibilities and performance
    measures for all stakeholders throughout FAA and (2) provides the
    incentives needed for promoting the desired behaviors to achieve
    cultural change.

    In response to our recommendations, FAA issued a report outlining its
    overall strategy for changing its acquisition culture and describing
    its ongoing actions to influence organizational culture.\34 For
    example, the Acquisition and Research organization has restructured
    its personnel system to tie pay to performance based on achievement
    of organizational goals.  The Administrator has approved the
    Acquisition and Research organization as the pilot for the new
    compensation program that FAA plans to implement agencywide.
    Additionally, the Acquisition and Research organization has developed
    an organizational assessment process that identifies culture-related
    factors that inhibit full achievement of organizational objectives.
    The centerpiece of this process is the Acquisition and Research
    organization's culture survey.  The results of the 1998 survey showed
    that while employees are motivated in their current job and are
    pleased with the variety within and complexity of their job, a number
    of opportunities for improvement still exist.  For example, the data
    showed that employees (1) do not believe that accurate information is
    disseminated downward to work groups or teams, (2) believe that
    decisionmakers are not able to anticipate problems before they occur,
    (3) feel that training is an area needing improvement, and (4) do not
    feel that they have a clear understanding of organizational and
    job-specific goals.  While recognizing that cultural change is a
    complex and time-consuming undertaking, the Acquisition and Research
    organization's management team has developed a set of actions to
    begin addressing the shortcomings identified in the culture survey
    and is proceeding with other initiatives.

    --------------------
    \28 GAO/AIMD-97-20.

    \29 See Implementation of Cost Accounting System:  Federal Aviation
    Administration, U.S.  Department of Transportation, Office of
    Inspector General (Rpt.  No.  FE-1998-186, Aug.  10, 1998).

    \30 The issue of allocating costs incurred by other agencies is
    relevant to a discussion of moving to a cost-based fee system.  The
    Department of Defense provides military and civilian users with air
    traffic control services, and its costs may be relevant to
    determining user fees.  However, for fiscal years 1998 and 1999, FAA
    is constrained by the Office of Management and Budget's guidance from
    recognizing air traffic service costs incurred by the Department of
    Defense.  For a discussion of issues related to cost allocation, see
    National Airspace System:  Issues in Allocating Costs for Air Traffic
    Services to DOD and Other Users (GAO/RCED-97-106, Apr.  25, 1997).

    \31 Air Traffic Control:  Complete and Enforced Architecture Needed
    for FAA Systems Modernization (GAO/AIMD-97-30, Feb.  3, 1997).

    \32 See Air Traffic Control:  Immature Software Acquisition Processes
    Increase FAA System Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar.  21,
    1997).

    \33 GAO/RCED-96-159.

    \34 Strategy for Acquisition Culture Change, FAA (June 1997).

          SERIOUS CHALLENGES REMAIN
          UNRESOLVED FOR YEAR 2000
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

    To perform its mission, FAA is dependent on an extensive array of
    information- processing and communications technologies.  Without
    these specialized systems, the agency cannot effectively control
    traffic or provide pilots and controllers with up-to-date weather
    information, among other functions.  FAA has identified 225
    mission-critical NAS systems.\35 Examples of such systems include the
    primary computer system used in en route centers (known as Host
    computer), which processes radar and other data, and the long-range
    radar systems, which allow controllers to monitor and separate
    aircraft at higher altitudes.  The implications of FAA's not meeting
    the Year 2000 deadline are enormous and could affect hundreds of
    thousands of people--through customer inconvenience, increased
    airline costs, grounded or delayed flights, or degraded levels of
    safety.  Although FAA has made progress in managing its Year 2000
    problem and has completed critical steps in defining which systems
    need to be repaired and fixing them, the agency must still test many
    of its mission-critical systems and implement needed changes.

    In August 1998, we reported that, with less than 17 months left
    before 2000, it was doubtful that FAA could do all of this in the
    time remaining.\36 Accordingly, FAA must determine how to ensure the
    continuity of critical operations in the event of some systems'
    failure.  FAA is preparing a NAS continuity plan to ensure that
    critical operations continue, should its mission-critical systems
    fail.  We are currently reviewing FAA's business continuity plan.
    Additionally, we noted that FAA must mitigate other critical,
    cross-cutting risks, such as data exchanges with external entities;
    international coordination to ensure safe, reliable aviation services
    for U.S.  travelers; and cooperation with contractors to ensure that
    the telecommunications upon which FAA relies are dependable.  FAA is
    taking steps to address all of these issues.

    --------------------
    \35 These 225 systems are included among the 430 FAA-wide
    mission-critical systems.

    \36 See FAA Systems:  Serious Challenges Remain in Resolving Year
    2000 and Computer Security Problems (GAO/T-AIMD-98-251, Aug.  6,
    1998).

          WEAK SECURITY PRACTICES
          DEGRADE SAFETY
    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4

    In May 1998, we reported that FAA cannot ensure that the air traffic
    control systems upon which it depends are sufficiently resistant to
    intrusion.\37 The failure to adequately protect these systems
    threatens to disrupt the nation's air traffic.  We found weaknesses
    in four areas:  physical security of air traffic control facilities,
    operational system security, the development of new systems, and
    FAA's management structure and implementation of security policy.

    First, FAA's management of physical security at its air traffic
    control facilities that control aircraft has been ineffective.  We
    found that FAA had inspected some facilities and was aware of
    physical security weaknesses at these facilities but was unaware of
    weaknesses that might exist at other facilities because many had not
    been inspected.  Since our review, FAA officials indicated that they
    have inspected all applicable facilities and have accredited over
    half (199 out of 368) of these facilities.

    Second, FAA has not assessed, certified, or accredited most of its
    operational air traffic control systems as required by its policy.\38
    As a result, FAA does not know how vulnerable those operational
    systems are and, consequently, has no basis for determining how to
    protect them.  In addition, FAA has assessed only one of nine
    FAA-owned or -leased air traffic control telecommunications systems
    despite acknowledging that vulnerabilities in this area could
    threaten property and public safety.  FAA's 1997 Telecommunications
    Strategic Plan continues to identify the security of
    telecommunications systems as an area in need of improvement.

    Third, FAA is not effectively incorporating security features into
    new air traffic control systems.  The agency does not consistently
    include well-formulated security requirements in specifications for
    all new modernization systems.  Without security requirements that
    are based on sound risk assessments, FAA lacks assurance that future
    air traffic control systems will be protected from attack.

    Finally, FAA's management structure is not effectively implementing
    or enforcing computer security policy.  Security responsibilities are
    distributed among three different organizations, all of which have
    been remiss in their air traffic control security duties.  Until
    existing computer security policy is effectively implemented and
    enforced, operational and developmental air traffic control systems
    will continue to be vulnerable to the compromise of sensitive
    information and interruption of critical services.

    To improve security for the future in the most efficient and
    cost-effective manner, we recommended that FAA build detailed
    security requirements into its design for new air traffic control
    systems.  We also recommended that FAA enforce its computer security
    policy for air traffic control.  FAA has acknowledged that major
    improvements are needed in all areas of its computer security program
    but has not yet formulated a plan to strengthen security.

    --------------------
    \37 See Air Traffic Control:  Weak Computer Security Practices
    Jeopardize Flight Safety [unclassified version] (GAO/AIMD-98-155, May
    18, 1998).

    \38 System certification is the technical evaluation that is
    conducted to verify that FAA's systems comply with FAA's security
    requirements, identify security deficiencies, specify remedies, and
    justify exceptions.  Accreditation is the formal declaration from
    management that the appropriate security safeguards have been
    properly implemented and that residual risk is acceptable.

       AGENCY COMMENTS
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

    We provided copies of a draft of this report to FAA for its review
    and comment.  We met with FAA officials, including the Deputy
    Director, Program Office, Free Flight Phase 1, and the Program
    Director, NAS Programming and Financial Management, who generally
    agreed with the contents of the report and provided clarifying
    comments, which have been incorporated as appropriate.

       SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
    ------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

    We reached agreement on the major projects to be included in our
    review after discussions with officials from the office of the
    Program Director, NAS Programming and Financial Management, within
    FAA's Associate Administrator for Research and Acquisition
    organization.  We obtained the information on the overall costs of
    air traffic system modernization as well as on appropriations and
    obligations from documents provided by representatives of FAA's
    Research and Acquisition organization and the Office of Financial
    Services.  Cost, schedule, and performance information on the 18 key
    projects came from project officials within the Research and
    Acquisition organization.  We also obtained information from the
    Office of Independent Operational Test and Evaluation.  We did not
    independently verify the accuracy of the cost data but did compare it
    with past cost data for consistency.  We developed the list of
    challenges primarily from past reviews by us and others and from our
    knowledge of FAA's progress in implementing past recommendations.  We
    conducted our review from July through October 1998 in accordance
    with generally accepted government auditing standards.

    ---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

    We are providing copies of this report to the Secretary of
    Transportation; the Administrator, FAA; and other interested parties.
    We will make copies available to others on request.

    If you or your staff have any questions or need additional
    information, please call me at (202) 512-3650.  Major contributors to
    this report are listed in appendix III.

    Gerald L.  Dillingham
    Associate Director,
     Transportation Issues

    Congressional Requesters

    The Honorable Richard C.  Shelby
    Chairman
    The Honorable Frank R.  Lautenberg
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Transportation
    Committee on Appropriations
    United States Senate

    The Honorable Frank R.  Wolf
    Chairman
    The Honorable Martin O.  Sabo
    Ranking Minority Member
    Subcommittee on Transportation and
     Related Agencies
    Committee on Appropriations
    House of Representatives

    INFORMATION ON THE STATUS OF 18
    MAJOR MODERNIZATION PROJECTS
    =========================================================== Appendix I

    This appendix provides detailed information on changes in the costs
    and schedules as well as challenges and risks for 18 of the Federal
    Aviation Administration's (FAA) major acquisitions.  Collectively,
    these projects account for about 41 percent of the Facilities and
    Equipment (F&E) funding requested by FAA for fiscal year 1999.

    In our past reports on the status of FAA's modernization program, we
    used cost and schedule estimates that were developed when the
    projects were approved for inclusion in the modernization plan.\1
    Instead in February 1998, we began measuring FAA's progress against
    revised baselines that represent the date of the contract, the
    contract's revision, or the investment decision.  This appendix uses
    this benchmark.\2

    However, where relevant, we provide historical cost and schedule
    information in the project summaries to give a context for current
    developments.

    On the basis of the revised baselines, the net estimated F&E cost of
    the 18 major modernization projects has increased by $482 million.
    Six of these projects increased by a total of about $530 million.
    Three projects experiencing the largest increase--due primarily to
    new requirements for additional equipment and technical and siting
    problems--include the Airport Surveillance Radar-11, Automated
    Surface Observing System, and Terminal Doppler Weather Radar.  One
    project--the Oceanic Automation Program--decreased by about $48
    million, 10 projects showed no change, and 1 had no basis for
    comparison because FAA recently established baselines for it.  (See
    table I.1.)

                                            Table I.1

                              Changes in Cost Estimates for 18 Major
                                      Modernization Projects

                                      (Dollars in millions)

                        Date of                        Change
                       original  Original   Current    in F&E
                       F&E cost  F&E cost  F&E cost      cost  Original     Current
                       estimate  estimate  estimate  estimate   planned     planned    Change
    Project                   s       s\a       s\a         s     units       units  in units
    -----------------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  ----------  --------
    Aeronautical Data      1998    $163.7    $163.7     N/A\b  22 units    22 units     N/A\b
     Link Program: En
     Route
     Controller/
     Pilot Data Link
     Communications
    Air Route              1988     349.4     415.8     +66.4        43   44 radars        +1
     Surveillance                                                radars
     Radar-4
    Airport Surface        1993     191.0     249.1     +58.1        40   40 radars      None
     Detection                                                   radars
     Equipment-3
    Air Traffic            1998     282.8     282.8      None       127         127      None
     Control Beacon                                             systems     systems
     Interrogator
    Air Traffic            1997     251.1     251.1      None     N/A\c       N/A\d      None
     Management
     Program: Center
     Terminal Radar
     Approach Control
     Automation
     System
    Automated Surface      1991     151.3     287.5    +136.2       537   597 units       +60
     Observing System                                             units
    Display System         1994   1,055.3   1,055.3      None        22  22 systems      None
     Replacement                                                systems
    Global                 1998   1,006.6   1,006.6      None        \e          \e        \e
     Positioning
     System
     Augmentation
     Program: Wide
     Area
     Augmentation
     System
    Global                 1998     535.8     535.8      None       143         143      None
     Positioning                                                systems     systems
     System
     Augmentation
     Program: Local
     Area
     Augmentation
     System
    Host and Oceanic       1998     424.1     424.1      None        24  24 systems      None
     Computer System                                            systems
     Replacement
     Program
    Integrated             1997     276.1     276.1      None        37  37 systems      None
     Terminal Weather                                           systems
     System
    Oceanic                1995     236.5     189.0     -47.5         3   3 systems      None
     Automation                                                 systems
     Program
    Operational and        1997     174.7     190.5     +15.8        64  64 systems      None
     Supportability                                             systems
     Implementation
     System
    Standard Terminal      1996     940.2     940.2      None       171         173        +2
     Automation                                                 systems     systems
     Replacement
     System
    Terminal Doppler       1988     322.2     393.5     +71.3        47   47 radars      None
     Weather Radar                                               radars
    Terminal Radar         1996     561.3     743.3  +182.0\f        48  112 radars       +64
     Digitization,                                               radars
     Replacement, and
     Establishment
     Program: Airport
     Surveillance
     Radar-11 Project
    Voice Switching        1994   1,452.9   1,452.9      None  23 units    23 units      None
     and Control
     System
    Weather and Radar      1996     125.6     125.6      None        23  23 systems      None
     Processor                                                  systems
    Total estimated              $8,500.6  $8,982.9   +$482.3
     costs
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legend

    N/A = not applicable.

    \a For this report, all dollars are expressed in current-year
    dollars, unless otherwise noted, because they are a better indication
    of the dollar amount that the Congress may have to appropriate.

    \b There is no basis for comparing original and current cost
    estimates and planned units because the investment decision for the
    En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project (of the
    Aeronautical Data Link Program) was made by FAA on October 30, 1998.

    \c The number of original planned units for the Air Traffic
    Management Program is not applicable because its primary purpose was
    to prototype technologies for future use under "free flight." Under
    free flight, FAA will gradually deploy a range of new technologies
    and procedures and work collaboratively with users to manage air
    traffic operations.

    \d The number of current planned units is not applicable because
    under the Free Flight Phase I Program, FAA plans to deploy
    technologies developed under the Air Traffic Management Program for
    early user benefits.

    \e The initial Wide Area Augmentation System consists of 25 reference
    stations, 2 master stations, and 4 ground stations joined by a
    telecommunications network.

    \f The increase in costs is largely attributed to FAA's decision to
    replace older radars rather than upgrade them, thus, more than
    doubling the number of planned units.

    On the basis of the revised baselines, the date for completing
    implementation was delayed from 5 months to more than 6 years for 5
    of the 18 projects.  Of the remaining 13 projects, the schedule for 2
    was accelerated, 9 had no schedule delays, and 2 project's original
    and current schedules had no basis for comparison.  (See table I.2.)

                                   Table I.2

                        Changes in Schedule for 18 Major
                             Modernization Projects

                                          Last-site implementation
                                  ----------------------------------------
                                                                Changes in
                                      Original          1998       months/
    Project                           estimate      estimate         years
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Aeronautical Data Link           Dec. 2005     Dec. 2005         N/A\a
     Program: En Route
     Controller/Pilot Data Link
     Communications
    Air Route Surveillance           Nov. 1996      May 1999     +2 years,
     Radar-4                                                      6 months
    Airport Surface Detection        July 1996     Nov. 1999     +3 years,
     Equipment-3                                                  4 months
    Air Traffic Control Beacon      Sept. 2004    Sept. 2004          None
     Interrogator
    Air Traffic Management              2006\b        2006\b          None
     Program: Center Terminal
     Radar Approach Control
     Automation System
    Automated Surface Observing     Sept. 1996     Dec. 2002     +6 years,
     System                                                       3 months
    Display System Replacement        May 2000      May 2000          None
    Global Positioning System      Aug. 1999\c   Aug. 1999\c          None
     Augmentation Program: Wide
     Area Augmentation System
    Global Positioning System             2006          2006          None
     Augmentation Program: Local
     Area Augmentation System
    Host and Oceanic Computer      Oct. 1999\d  Sept. 1999\d      -1 month
     System Replacement Program
    Integrated Terminal Weather      July 2003     July 2003          None
     System
    Oceanic Automation Program       June 2000     Oct. 1999   -8 months\e
    Operational and                  Aug. 2001     Aug. 2001          None
     Supportability
     Implementation System
    Standard Terminal Automation     Feb. 2005     Feb. 2005          None
     Replacement System
    Terminal Doppler Weather          Aug.1996     July 2001     +4 years,
     Radar                                                       11 months
    Terminal Radar Digitization,           Not    Sept. 2005           N/A
     Replacement, and               determined
     Establishment Program:
     Airport Surveillance Radar-
     11 Project
    Voice Switching and Control       May 2000      May 2000          None
     System
    Weather and Radar Processor      Feb. 2000     July 2000     +5 months
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legend

    N/A = not applicable

    \a There is no basis for comparing changes to last-site
    implementation because the investment decision for the En Route
    Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project (of the
    Aeronautical Data Link Program) was made by FAA on October 30, 1998.

    \b FAA expects to accelerate the schedule of this project under the
    Free Flight Phase 1 Program.

    \c Implementation date represents when the project is expected to
    achieve the system's initial capability.

    \d Implementation date for completing the project is for phase 1 of a
    planned four-phase system.

    \e Implementation date for completing the project has been
    accelerated by 8 months because FAA canceled four of the five phases
    and significantly reduced requirements for the one remaining phase.

    --------------------
    \1 Since estimates for many projects were developed in the 1980s, FAA
    officials asserted that the dates in the early modernization plans
    did not represent a realistic baseline for measuring progress for a
    variety of reasons, including changes to requirements for a number of
    projects as well as to the number of systems being developed.  As a
    result, these officials suggested that we measure progress against
    the contract date or the date of the investment decision.

    \2 FAA officials informed us that they are currently baselining many
    of their older projects in accordance with acquisition management
    policy.  According to these officials, this effort will facilitate
    the agency's ability to report major variances in the achievement of
    cost, schedule, and performance goals.  (For the most part, FAA
    officials indicated that the new baseline will be the cost and
    schedule estimate as of 1998.  As a result, in future years, the
    baselines that we report, on the basis of the criteria indicated
    above, may differ from those that FAA uses for external reporting).

       AERONAUTICAL DATA LINK
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.1

    Aeronautical Data Link is designed to provide digital data
    communications between ground and airborne automation systems.  It is
    expected to give pilots direct access to weather and air traffic
    control information and reduce voice communication errors.  FAA has
    been developing Aeronautical Data Link since the early 1980s.  An
    original National Airspace System (NAS) plan modernization program,
    Aeronautical Data Link was designed to construct an En Route Data
    Link Processor and associated software utilizing Mode-S.\3

    In addition, Tower Data Link Services were planned to provide
    airlines with predeparture clearances.  Other components, such as
    Terminal Data Link and Oceanic Data Link were also planned.

    The program has experienced a number of changes to cost and schedule
    estimates since its inception.  Several factors have led to the
    changes, including the addition of new projects, restructuring of
    existing projects, and international agreements.  The most
    significant change to the program was the decision to cancel the En
    Route Data Link Processor and transmit controller-pilot messages via
    a service provider--very high frequency (VHF) Digital Link Mode 2.
    This decision was reached for various reasons, including spectrum and
    user equipage concerns.  The En Route Data Link Processor equipment
    will now be used for other FAA programs.  FAA reports that it spent
    $175.9 million of F&E funding on the Aeronautical Data Link Program
    from its inception through fiscal year 1998.  According to FAA
    officials, funds were used primarily to establish Tower Data Link
    Services and test and demonstrate the En Route Data Link Processor
    and associated software.

    The program currently comprises one major project--the En Route
    Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project--which will provide
    a two-way digital exchange of controller-pilot messages via VHF
    Digital Link Mode 2--and six other projects.  In October 1998, FAA
    approved the En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications
    project's baseline--the only active project to have a formerly
    approved baseline.  This project will be developed in two
    phases--Build 1 and Build 1A.  Build 1 will allow a limited number of
    messages between pilots and controllers to be automated for use at
    the Miami en route center.  Build 1A will enhance this capability by
    increasing the number of automated messages exchanged and will be
    implemented at 20 en route centers, and one each at the FAA Technical
    Center and the FAA Academy.  Both builds will consist of Aeronautical
    Telecommunication Network-compliant messages using VHF Mode 2.\4

    The six other Aeronautical Data Link projects include (1) Tower Data
    Link Services, (2) the Host Interface Device/National Airspace System
    Local Area Network, (3) Traffic Information Service, (4) Terminal
    Weather Information for Pilots, (5) Flight Information Services, and
    (6) Decision Support System Services.  Other programs, such as Free
    Flight Phase 1, will use some of the services provided under this
    program.  Terminal Data Link and Oceanic Data Link are still in the
    planning stages.

    Tower Data Link Services enables data link communications between air
    traffic controllers and aircraft.  For example, it provides aircraft
    with predeparture clearances and pilots with weather and facility
    conditions at major airports.  FAA has completed the installation of
    Tower Data Link Services at 57 airports and one each at the FAA
    Technical Center and the FAA Academy.  FAA is considering requests
    from additional airports for this service.

    The Host Interface Device will provide the interface for digital
    communications between the Host computer system, En Route
    Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project, and other
    automation systems and tools.  FAA plans to implement a Host
    Interface Device at 20 en route centers, two at the FAA Technical
    Center, and one at the FAA Academy.

    Traffic Information Service will display information on traffic and
    potential conflict situations to pilots via data link.  The
    information will be a graphic depiction of radar traffic similar to
    information received over voice radio.  This information is intended
    to improve the safety and efficiency of flight under visual flight
    rules.  FAA plans to implement the Traffic Information Service at 119
    locations throughout the NAS with Mode-S radars.

    Terminal Weather Information for Pilots will provide pilots with
    weather information obtained through the Terminal Doppler Weather
    Radar on conditions such as microbursts, gust fronts, wind shear, and
    heavy precipitation within 15 miles of an airport.  FAA plans to
    deploy this function at all 47 Terminal Doppler Weather Radar sites.

    Flight Information Services will provide pilots with general
    aeronautical information, including weather and the status of special
    use airspace to assist in flight planning.  Currently, a pilot must
    obtain this information on the ground before flight or in the cockpit
    via voice.  Using data link, a pilot will be able to read this
    information on a cockpit display unit.  One example of a flight
    information service is Graphical Weather Services, which will provide
    pilots with a map that shows real-time precipitation conditions
    throughout the nation.  FAA plans to implement Graphical Weather
    Services at three sites that will provide NAS coverage as well as
    systems at the FAA Technical Center and at the FAA Academy.

    Decision Support System Services will allow pilots to plan more
    optimal flight paths and to adhere more closely to
    controller-approved flight paths by providing wind and air
    temperature information via data link.  This service will also
    provide controllers with more accurate information on flight paths
    using data obtained via data link from aircraft about their location,
    speed, direction, intended flight paths, and performance
    characteristics.  Ultimately, FAA plans for this service to provide
    automated negotiations and clearances of conflict-free flight paths
    between pilots and controllers.

    --------------------
    \3 Mode-S is a secondary surveillance radar.  A secondary
    surveillance radar identifies, locates, and tracks aircraft by using
    its signals to interrogate equipment (transponders) on board the
    aircraft.

    \4 The Aeronautical Telecommunications Network is a data network
    being developed in accordance with internationally accepted standards
    to provide a link between many U.S.  and international airlines and
    civil aviation authorities for the exchanging of flight plans,
    weather data, distress messages, and other data.

          DATA LINK'S COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.2

    Table I.3 summarizes the Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications'
    cost and schedule.

                                   Table I.3

                      En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link
                       Communications' Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                    Vendors: Computer Sciences Corporation,
                       Calverton, Md.; Aeronautical Radio
                     Incorporated, Annapolis, Md; Lockheed
                     Martin Corporation, Bethesda, Md.; and
                     Universal Systems and Technology, Inc.
                                 Fairfax, Va.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information            Oct. 1998     Oct. 1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total estimated F&E cost            $163.7        $163.7         N/A\a
    Cumulative F&E                                      None
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                         Oct. 1998     Oct. 1998        Change
    Estimated first-site            Sept. 2002    Sept. 2002         N/A\a
     implementation (Controller/
     Pilot Data Link
     Communications Build 1)
    Estimated last-site              Dec. 2005     Dec. 2005         N/A\a
     implementation (Controller/
     Pilot Data Link
     Communications Build 1A)
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a There is no basis for comparison of original and current cost
    estimates and first- and last-site implementation because the
    investment decision for the En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link
    Communications project (of the Aeronautical Data Link Program) was
    made by FAA on October 30, 1998.

          DATA LINK'S CHALLENGES AND
          RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.3

    The En Route Controller/Pilot Data Link Communications project has
    aggressive development and implementation schedules for Build 1 and
    Build 1A.  The project also has a major schedule interdependency with
    Aeronautical Telecommunications Network Systems, Inc.-developed
    software.  Any software development delays by the company will likely
    jeopardize FAA's ability to meet the project's baselined schedule.
    Additionally, FAA has assumed that the service provider message costs
    of VHF Data Link Mode 2 will be shared between FAA and industry.
    However, FAA has yet to formalize this arrangement with industry.

       AIR ROUTE SURVEILLANCE RADAR-4
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1

    Air Route Surveillance Radar-4 (ARSR-4) is a long-range primary
    surveillance radar that tracks en route aircraft and weather by
    emitting radio signals that are reflected back to the radar.\5 (See
    fig.  I.1.) Data from this radar on the movement of aircraft and on
    weather are used for keeping aircraft separated, drug interdiction,
    and the defense of U.S.  borders.  Radar data are merged with data
    from a collocated secondary beacon system and then transmitted to
    FAA's en route air traffic control centers, Air Force Air Defense
    Sectors, and the Customs Service.  ARSR-4 is a part of FAA's Long
    Range Radar Replacement Program--a multiyear program funded jointly
    by FAA, the Air Force, and the Navy.

    This project replaces some of the obsolete FAA and military air route
    surveillance radars and aging long-range radars.  FAA has acquired 44
    ARSR-4s.  Forty-two of these will be placed along the perimeter of
    the continental United States, Hawaii, Guam, and Guantanamo Bay,
    Cuba, and will be owned and maintained by FAA for the agency's and
    the Air Force's use.  One radar will be used exclusively by the Air
    Force at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California.  The remaining radar
    is to be used for field support and training in Oklahoma City,
    Oklahoma, and will not be commissioned.

    --------------------
    \5 A primary surveillance radar system tracks aircraft and weather by
    emitting radio signals that are reflected by all of the aircraft and
    weather conditions present in the area covered by the system.

          CHANGES TO ARSR-4'S COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2

    The estimated cost of the ARSR-4 has increased by $66.4 million to
    $415.8 million since the contract was awarded in 1988.  About $50
    million of this increase occurred in the early-to-mid-1990s because
    of the relocation of eight sites and the addition of one radar.  The
    remaining $16 million increase, which occurred in 1997, is due in
    part to (1) technical corrections required for the system, (2) an
    increase in the costs of spare parts, (3) an increase in the length
    of depot repair service from 3 to 5 years, (4) the installation of
    uninterruptible power systems at all sites, and (5) software
    upgrades.

    The project's first-site implementation date was delayed by 2 years
    and 7 months, from September 1993 to April 1996 by several technical
    issues--that were eventually resolved--and by new requirements.
    However, within the last 2 years, FAA has made progress with
    implementing the ARSR-4.  As of October 1998, the agency had
    commissioned 38 of 43 ARSR-4s and had 3 additional sites planned for
    commissioning by December 1998.  Commissioning at the last two
    sites--Guam and Ajo, Arizona--is planned in 1999.  Guam's original
    implementation date for ARSR-4 was delayed because new equipment had
    to be replaced after being damaged by a typhoon.  Ajo will be the
    last site installed.  This site alone has contributed 5 months to the
    total last-site implementation delay because of environmental issues.
    However, FAA recently signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the
    U.S.  Fish and Wildlife Service to mitigate the environmental issues
    at or near the site, and construction at the site has started.  Table
    I.4 summarizes the changes to ARSR-4's cost and schedule since 1988.

                                   Table I.4

                     Changes to ARSR-4's Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                     Vendor: Northrup-Grumman Corporation,
                                Linthicum, Md.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1988          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $349.4        $415.8        +$66.4
    Cumulative F&E                                    $408.8
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1988          1998     Change in
                                                                    years/
                                                                    months
    First-site implementation       Sept. 1993     Apr. 1996     +2 years,
                                                                  7 months
    Estimated last-site              Nov. 1996      May 1999     +2 years,
     implementation                                               6 months
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

          ARSR-4'S CHALLENGES AND
          RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3

    Total funding for this project could increase by about $2.5 million
    because of the reprogramming of the project's fiscal year 1998 funds.
    The program office had planned for fiscal year 1999 to be the final
    year of F&E funding for the ARSR-4 project.  However, FAA
    reprogrammed $1.3 million of the project's fiscal year 1998 funds for
    other modernization activities, including the Standard Terminal
    Automation Replacement System and Year 2000 computer problems.  The
    restoration of these funds--which the program office planned to use
    to complete modifications to enhance the system--is not expected
    until 2001.  This action will most likely force the program office to
    let a new contract for system modifications and, as a result, spend
    an additional $2.5 million on the project's costs.

       Figure I.1:  ARSR-4

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       AIRPORT SURFACE DETECTION
       EQUIPMENT-3
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.1

    The Airport Surface Detection Equipment-3 (ASDE-3) is a primary radar
    designed to provide tower controllers with surveillance
    information--a video display--of all aircraft and other vehicle
    operations on an airport's runways and taxiways.  ASDE-3 will help
    prevent accidents by allowing controllers to efficiently move
    traffic, especially during low visibility, such as in fog or during
    night operations.  (See fig.  I.2.) FAA developed these radars to
    replace the aging and less reliable ASDE-2 radars.  While ASDE-3
    provides a video display for controllers to assist them in preventing
    potential runway collisions, controllers are not able to watch the
    display at all times.  As a result, FAA is developing an Airport
    Movement Area Safety System (AMASS) to provide automated aural and
    visual warnings (conflict alerts) to alert controllers of potential
    runway collisions.

    FAA has procured a total of 40 ASDE-3 systems--33 under the original
    contract and 7 under a contract with the same contractor (Northrup
    Grumman-Norden Systems)--that was signed in September 1993.
    Thirty-eight of the systems are for airport use, and two systems are
    for support and training use in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.

    In the 1983 financial plan, ASDE-3's F&E cost was $83.2 million, and
    the first- and last-site implementation dates were 1987 and 1990,
    respectively.  Cost increases from 1983 through 1993 were due to
    increases in the number of systems being acquired and software and
    hardware changes.  Slips in implementation dates through 1993 were
    due in part to performance problems with ASDE-3's ability to
    accurately track targets and conflicts with ongoing construction
    projects at airports that were scheduled to receive these radars.

          CHANGES TO ASDE-3'S COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.2

    Since the project was expanded in 1993, the cost of ASDE-3 increased
    by $58.1 million to procure and install additional equipment items
    needed for remote site operation, additional radar displays, spare
    parts, test equipment, and modifications to enhance the reliability
    and maintainability of component parts for the system (such as
    bearings and transmitters) that were deteriorating more quickly than
    anticipated.

    ASDE-3's first-site implementation was delayed in part because of
    technical problems at the first site.  The last-site implementation
    has been delayed by more than 40 months-- from July 1996 to November
    1999--primarily because of delays in the completion of towers or
    structures at locations receiving ASDE-3 systems.  Other factors
    contributing to delays include problems associated with the buildup
    of cadmium dust that was generated by components needed to operate
    ASDE-3 antenna heaters.  A project official stated that although FAA
    has resolved this problem, the agency has delayed the project's
    installation schedule by 9 months.

    As of September 1998, 37 of the 40 systems had been delivered to FAA,
    and the last 3 were planned for delivery in 1999.  Thirty of the 37
    systems have been commissioned, and 2 are being used as support
    systems.  Of the remaining five systems at operational sites, four
    are awaiting commissioning, and one is undergoing implementation.
    Table I.5 summarizes the changes to ASDE-3's cost and schedule since
    1993.

                                   Table I.5

                     Changes to ASDE-3's Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                    Vendor: Northrup Grumman-Norden Systems,
                             Inc., Norwalk, Conn.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1993          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $191.0        $249.1        +$58.1
    Cumulative F&E                                    $241.1
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1993          1998     Change in
                                                                    years/
                                                                    months
    First-site implementation        Mar. 1993     Dec. 1993    + 9 months
    Estimated last-site              July 1996     Nov. 1999    + 3 years,
     implementation                                               4 months
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

          ASDE-3'S/AMASS' CHALLENGES
          AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3.3

    Achieving the full safety benefits from ASDE-3 hinges on AMASS.  FAA
    plans to install an AMASS system at each of the 40 ASDE-3 sites; as
    of September 1998, three AMASS systems had been delivered to FAA, and
    the first of these is planned for implementation in October 1999.
    Additionally, FAA plans to take delivery of the remaining 37 systems
    by March 2000 and have the last site implemented by August 2000.
    There are several challenges to meeting this schedule.

    Preliminary tests have shown that AMASS can provide accurate and
    timely warnings of potential conflicts.  Additionally, AMASS is
    designed to place symbols on real targets so controllers can visually
    distinguish them from false targets caused by multipath problems from
    the ASDE-3 radar.\6 However, during early testing of AMASS, false
    alerts from multipath were considered a challenging issue.  For
    example, if excessive levels of false alerts continued, controller
    confidence in AMASS could be eroded and could affect the flow of air
    traffic.  FAA has made system changes to address these problems and
    continues to evaluate software algorithms and other technical
    enhancements to mitigate false alerts.  Operational testing is
    expected to be completed in 1999.

    Implementing AMASS could also prove to be operationally challenging.
    For example, AMASS' performance in accurately detecting conflicts is
    directly affected by each airport's physical layout, local procedures
    for traffic flow, and ASDE-3's performance during inclement weather.
    Consequently, cooperation within FAA to optimize each system on the
    basis of sight-specific parameters is key to the system's
    implementation.  Standards and procedures will need to be developed
    to address such issues as the acceptable AMASS performance rates for
    accurately detecting conflicts and how controllers will use the tool
    in an operational setting.  To use AMASS in an operational setting,
    FAA will also have to resolve issues surrounding controllers' actions
    based on AMASS data, such as disruptions caused by false alerts.
    According to an FAA official, the agency has begun to address these
    issues.

       Figure I.2:  Rotodome
       Containing ASDE-3 Radar on Top
       of Air Traffic Control Tower

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    --------------------
    \6 Multipath problems occur when radio-frequency energy radiates off
    buildings or other aircraft, thus creating a momentary false target
    on the ASDE-3 radar's display.  All radars experience multipath
    problems, but radars like ASDE-3, which radiate energy downward, are
    especially prone to such problems.

       AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL BEACON
       INTERROGATOR
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.1

    The Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator (ATCBI) project will
    replace 30-year-old model 4 and 5 secondary surveillance
    radars--located mainly at en route sites--with a new model 6 radar.
    The existing model 4 and 5 radars are extremely vulnerable to outages
    as well as critical part shortages, since they were planned to have
    only a 20-year life.

    In August 1998, after a 10-month evaluation of potential vendors, FAA
    awarded Raytheon a contract for up to 150 model 6 secondary
    surveillance radars.  As of November 1998, FAA is committed to
    purchasing 127 systems.  FAA expects to begin testing two
    preproduction systems in January 1999 and to begin fielding the new
    model 6 radar no later than March 2001.

          ATCBI'S COST AND SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.2

    Table I.6 summarizes ATCBI's costs and schedule since August 1998.

                                            Table I.6

                                    ATCBI's Cost and Schedule

                                       (Dollars in millions

                                Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company,
                                       Marlborough, Mass.)

                                                                                    Change in
    Financial information                   Aug. 1998            Oct.1998             dollars
    -----------------------------  ------------------  ------------------  ------------------
    Total F&E cost                             $282.8              $282.8                None
    Cumulative F&E appropriations                                    $8.4
     through
     fiscal year 1998
    =========================================================================================
    Schedule                                Aug. 1998           Oct. 1998              Change
    Estimated first-site                   Sept. 2001          Sept. 2001                None
     implementation
    Estimated last-site                    Sept. 2004          Sept. 2004                None
     implementation
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

          ATCBI'S CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4.3

    The project faces both technical and schedule risks related to
    interface requirements.  ATCBI-6 must interface with existing and
    future automation systems as well as all primary radars collocated
    with the existing equipment that ATCBI-6 will replace.  According to
    project officials, the contractor has limited experience with known
    interfaces and no experience with those interfaces that are not yet
    defined.  Project officials plan to develop interfaces in the order
    of "easiest" to "most difficult." The interfaces to existing en route
    automation systems will be the first to be developed.  Next,
    interfaces to existing primary radars will be developed, and,
    finally, ATCBI-6 interfaces will be developed for future automation
    systems.

    Because some of ATCBI-6's interface requirements are "moving
    targets," the ATCBI-6 project officials will need to maintain close
    coordination with other project teams to help ensure that the ATCBI
    team meets its schedule.  The procurement, delivery, and installation
    of government equipment must also be monitored closely to ensure that
    all ancillary equipment required for complete installation and
    testing is available to the contractor.

       AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT
       PROGRAM/FREE FLIGHT PHASE 1
       PROGRAM
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.1

    The Air Traffic Management (ATM) program integrated the development
    and prototyping of automated tools designed to improve the management
    of air traffic control.  Traffic flow management tools included the
    Enhanced Traffic Management System and Collaborative Decision Making.
    Air traffic control tools included the User Request Evaluation Tool,
    Center Terminal Radar Approach Control Automation System (CTAS), and
    Surface Movement Advisor.  FAA has been developing these new
    capabilities to support the agency's efforts to implement a new, more
    flexible system of air traffic management known as "free flight."
    Under free flight, FAA will gradually deploy a range of new
    technologies and procedures and work collaboratively with users to
    manage air traffic operations.

    As of September 30, 1998, the ATM program was completed--including
    all of its prototyping efforts in support of Free Flight Phase 1--and
    the program's structure was eliminated.  Under the ATM program, FAA
    estimates that it spent $405 million on F&E through fiscal year 1998,
    including funding for the Enhanced Traffic Management System.  On
    October 1, 1998, the recently established Free Flight Phase 1 program
    commenced operations under a new charter to move these former ATM
    prototypes into full-scale development.\7 Projects under this program
    include CTAS, Surface Movement Advisor, User Request Evaluation Tool,
    and Collaborative Decision Making.  While not officially a part of
    Free Flight Phase 1, Enhanced Traffic Management System will be
    managed by the program office.  FAA estimates the cost of Free Flight
    Phase 1 through its completion in 2002 at $633 million.

    CTAS has two components that are planned for use under Free Flight
    Phase 1--Traffic Management Advisor Build 2 and Passive Final
    Approach Spacing Tool.  Traffic Management Advisor will provide en
    route/terminal controllers with automation tools to schedule aircraft
    to enter or depart from airspace that is between 5 and 50 miles from
    an airport.  Similarly, the Passive Final Approach Spacing Tool is an
    automated device that provides terminal controllers with sequence
    numbers and runway assignments during final approach and landing.
    The Surface Movement Advisor is intended to enhance the efficiency of
    aircraft movements on the airport surface by facilitating the sharing
    of real-time information among airspace users and airport operators.
    User Request Evaluation Tool is an automated device that assists en
    route controllers in identifying and resolving potential conflicts
    between aircraft up to 20 minutes before their occurrence.
    Collaborative Decision Making provides a real-time exchange of
    information on flight plans and system constraints to assist airline
    and air traffic control personnel in making decisions about NAS
    resources.  Finally, Enhanced Traffic Management System provides the
    current traffic management system with software and hardware upgrades
    to convert it to an open system platform that is Year 2000 compliant.

    --------------------
    \7 FAA plans to move Free Flight Phase 1 technologies to full-scale
    development using an evolutionary spiral development approach to the
    development and deployment of technology, as appropriate.  Under such
    an approach, the agency plans to limit the scope of project segments
    so that it can deploy, test, evaluate, and refine a given technology
    in a cyclical manner until it can perform at the desired level.

          ATM PROGRAM'S COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.2

    According to an FAA program official, CTAS is the only project to
    have a formally approved baseline.  The current baseline was approved
    under the former ATM program, but FAA plans to request a revised
    baseline in January 1999.  At the same time, project officials plan
    to request the approval of baselines for the remaining projects.  FAA
    plans to deploy all of these projects by 2002.  Table I.7 summarizes
    CTAS' cost and schedule since 1997.

                                   Table I.7

                            CTAS' Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                     Vendors: Computer Science Corporation;
                          Lockheed Martin; NASA Ames;
                     Massachusetts Institute of Technology/
                     Lincoln Laboratory; Wyndemer and EDS.)

                                                                Changes in
    Financial Information                 1997          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $251.1        $251.1          None
    Cumulative F&E                                     $69.0
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1997          1998        Change
    Estimated first-site              2002\a,b      2002\a,b          None
     implementation
    Estimated last-site                 2006\b        2006\b          None
     implementation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a First-site implementation date is for both components of
    CTAS--Traffic Management Advisor Build 2 and Passive Final Approach
    Spacing Tool.

    \b FAA expects to accelerate this schedule under Free Flight Phase I.

          FREE FLIGHT PHASE 1'S
          CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5.3

    In a recent report on FAA's free flight implementation efforts, we
    reported that FAA and the aviation community face numerous challenges
    in their efforts to implement free flight--including Phase 1--in a
    cost-effective manner.\8 Among the challenges, we identified the need
    for FAA to (1) provide effective leadership and management of
    modernization efforts both within and outside the agency, including
    effective collaboration with stakeholders and improvements to
    cross-program communication and coordination within FAA; (2) work
    collaboratively with the aviation community to develop goals and
    sufficiently detailed plans for what it intends to achieve and
    develop measures for tracking progress; and (3) address outstanding
    issues related to the development of technology, such as identifying
    and addressing the impacts of modernization on human operators,
    including maintenance staff, controllers, and pilots.

    FAA recently identified similar challenges, such as its need to
    provide strong leadership and accountability for implementing Free
    Flight Phase 1.  A senior FAA official told us that the key challenge
    facing the agency in implementing free flight--including Phase
    1--will be maintaining a consensus between FAA and the aviation
    community as implementation efforts move forward.  Other challenges
    highlighted by FAA include (1) managing the expectations of the
    aviation community on the expected benefits of free flight
    capabilities, in part, by taking care not to overstate expected
    benefits; (2) taking steps to ensure that vendors and research
    organizations focus on Phase 1 from a system's perspective rather
    than on their individual products; (3) holding to the number of sites
    selected and the agreed upon locations--to keep the program
    manageable and affordable; (4) coordinating with projects on which
    Phase 1 is dependent; and (5) managing an aggressive schedule for
    deploying Phase 1's capabilities by 2002 as planned.

    According to FAA, the structure of the Free Flight Phase 1 program
    office is designed to facilitate communication and coordination with
    other FAA organizations and the aviation community.  For example, the
    office includes a stakeholder council to help assure adequate
    involvement of key FAA and aviation community stakeholders in its
    implementation efforts.  This council will be responsible for
    maintaining consensus agreement and addressing global issues related
    to the implementation of free flight.  The office also has a team
    that is working directly with the airlines to build baseline
    performance data needed for measuring progress under free flight and
    is addressing human factors issues, among other tasks.

    --------------------
    \8 See National Airspace System:  FAA Has Implemented Some Free
    Flight Initiatives, but Challenges Remain (GAO/RCED-98-246, Sept.
    28, 1998).

       AUTOMATED SURFACE OBSERVING
       SYSTEM
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6.1

    The Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS) automates the
    observation and dissemination of data on temperature and dew point,
    visibility, wind direction and speed, pressure, cloud height and
    amount, and the types and amounts of precipitation.  (See fig.  I.3.)
    ASOS is intended to improve the weather services at the nation's
    large airports and provide smaller airports used by general aviation
    pilots with new service.  ASOS is intended to replace some of the
    human observers who provide FAA with similar services under contract.
    According to FAA's Air Traffic officials, it is estimated that $18
    million a year can be avoided by replacing human observers.

    Under ASOS--a joint program administered by the National Weather
    Service--597 ASOS units will be procured, installed, and maintained
    by FAA at both towered and nontowered airports.  Prior to fiscal year
    1998, FAA provided ASOS with funds under the umbrella of the
    Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS) program, which also
    included AWOS, AWOS Data Acquisition System, and the Automated
    Lightning Detection and Reporting System projects.\9 AWOS filled an
    immediate need for automated weather information during the
    development of the more sophisticated ASOS.  The last of 200 AWOS
    sites was implemented in April 1998.  Each AWOS Data Acquisition
    System acquires weather information from up to 137 AWOS and ASOS
    units, disseminates this information via FAA's National Weather
    Network, and archives weather data products.  According to project
    officials, all 22 operational AWOS Data Acquisition Systems, located
    primarily at en route centers, have been commissioned.  Three
    additional support systems are also operational.

    --------------------
    \9 The Automated Lightning Detection and Reporting System will
    provide AWOS and ASOS with data on lightning via AWOS' Data
    Acquisition System.

          CHANGES TO ASOS' COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6.2

    As of October 1998, FAA had commissioned 371 of the 597 ASOSs--238
    new sites since early 1997.  FAA plans to commission an additional 79
    systems by the end of December 1999 and the remaining 147 sites by
    the end of December 2002.  Currently, FAA cannot commission 70
    nontowered sites because it placed a moratorium on their
    commissioning as a result of contract weather observers' concerns.
    According to FAA project officials, the agency may place a moratorium
    on an additional 40 nontowered sites.  Contract weather observers
    claim that ASOS provides a lower level of service than they provide,
    and, as a result, they should not be replaced by ASOSs at these
    sites.  The estimated total cost of ASOS has increased by $136.2
    million since the contract was awarded in February 1991, and the
    project's last-site implementation schedule has slipped by more than
    6 years.  Five major factors caused changes to the project's cost and
    schedule baselines.

    First, at the time of the contract's award, the scope of ASOS'
    commissioning process was still under development.  The schedule was
    extended once the scope was fully defined to allow for such
    activities as the evaluation of planned sites.  The schedule also
    slipped because of limited manpower resources in FAA's regional
    offices responsible for commissioning ASOS equipment.  These events
    caused the first-site and last-site implementation to slip by 27 and
    8 months, respectively.  Also contributing to the schedule slippage
    was the shifting of telecommunications costs from the operations and
    maintenance budget to the F&E budget.  This change in policy
    regarding telecommunications funding also resulted in an increase of
    $10.5 million to the project's F&E cost.

    Second, FAA added new requirements to the ASOS project from 1994
    through 1998 because it determined that the original requirements
    were unacceptable.  As a result, FAA added requirements for freezing
    rain sensors, backup equipment, and a new tower display--ASOS
    Controller Equipment.\10 This additional equipment caused the
    project's cost to increase by $47.8 million and the project's
    last-site implementation date to slip by 13 months.

    Third, FAA reduced the project's 1994 funding by $10 million, causing
    the National Weather Service to restructure the ASOS contract.  As a
    result, the project's cost increased by $14.6 million, and its
    last-site implementation date slipped by 18 months.

    Fourth, in 1994 and 1995, the National Weather Service imposed a
    moratorium on commissioning any ASOSs until the systems' technical
    deficiencies and logistic problems were resolved.  FAA also agreed to
    halt commissioning because the National Air Traffic Controllers
    Association (NATCA) has similar concerns about the system.  As a
    result, this caused the project's cost to increase by $10 million and
    the last-site implementation date to slip by 1 year.

    Fifth, the conferees for the fiscal year 1997 and 1998 Department of
    Transportation Appropriations Acts directed the purchase of
    additional systems in 1997 and 1998.  This caused the project's cost
    to increase by $20 million, which FAA plans to use to purchase 60
    additional systems--30 of which FAA has already purchased.  The 1997
    congressional direction caused the last-site implementation date to
    slip by 1 year.  In addition, the 1998 direction will cause the
    last-site implementation date to slip from December 2001 to December
    2002.

    Additionally, an increase of $33.3 million in the cost baseline from
    1991 through 1998 can be attributed to several other factors.  These
    include spare parts, congressionally directed ASOS augmentation for
    Alaska, special site considerations in Alaska, equipment relocations,
    earthquake anchoring, an ASOS assessment study, initial maintenance,
    preplanned product improvements, and the procurement of modems.
    Table I.8 summarizes the changes to ASOS' cost and schedule since
    1991.

                                   Table I.8

                       Changes to ASOS' Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                     Vendor: SMI Corporation, Hunt Valley,
                                      Md.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1991          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $151.3        $287.5       +$136.2
    Cumulative F&E                                    $215.8
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1991          1998     Change in
                                                                    years/
                                                                    months
    First-site implementation        Aug. 1991     Nov. 1993     +2 years,
                                                                  3 months
    Estimated last-site             Sept. 1996     Dec. 2002     +6 years,
     implementation                                               3 months
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

    --------------------
    \10 This equipment consists of a local area network located in air
    traffic control towers and associated terminal radar approach control
    facilities that are used for displaying ASOS-generated weather data
    at controllers' workstations in easily understood graphical displays.
    This equipment allows multiple controllers to access similar ASOS
    data at the same time in both the terminal radar approach control
    facility and tower.

          ASOS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6.3

    The ASOS project faces two primary challenges.  First, FAA has
    experienced reliability problems with ASOS' temperature/dew point
    sensor.  This faulty sensor accounts for more than 50 percent of all
    ASOS data errors, thereby limiting FAA's ability to utilize ASOS to
    its full potential.  FAA and the National Weather Service are
    attempting to resolve this problem.

    Second, as stated above, FAA has placed a moratorium on ASOS'
    commissioning as a result of contract weather observers' concerns.
    After a reassessment of ASOS' performance, which was conducted during
    1997-98, FAA determined that it should continue commissioning ASOS at
    selected sites.  However, in September 1998, in response to
    congressional concerns about the contract weather observers' opinions
    on ASOS' performance, FAA requested that the Air Force conduct an
    independent assessment to validate the results of the first study.
    The Air Force plans to complete its assessment by December 1998.  FAA
    hopes to have closure on this matter by year's end to prevent further
    schedule slips.

       Figure I.3:  ASOS

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       DISPLAY SYSTEM REPLACEMENT
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7.1

    The Display System Replacement (DSR) project will modernize en route
    center equipment by replacing 20- to 30-year-old display channels,
    controllers' workstations, and network infrastructure.  (See fig.
    I.4.) DSR will also provide a platform for FAA to implement planned
    capabilities, such as the User Request Evaluation Tool, which will
    allow airlines to request more direct routings, thereby providing
    them with benefits including fuel and time savings.  DSR is a
    scaled-back version of the Initial Sector Suite System--a segment of
    the former Advanced Automation System, which FAA restructured in 1994
    to solve long-standing cost, schedule, and technical problems.  In
    1994, the Initial Sector Suite System was estimated to cost $3
    billion, and, at the time of the restructuring, FAA had sunk $1.8
    billion into the project.  The Initial Sector Suite System's first-
    and last-site implementation dates were 1996 and 1998, respectively.

          CHANGES TO DSR'S COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7.2

    Table I.9 summarizes the changes to DSR's cost and schedule since
    1994.

                                   Table I.9

                       Changes to DSR's Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                      Vendor: Lockheed Martin Corporation,
                                Rockville, Md.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1994          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                    $1,055.3      $1,055.3          None
    Cumulative F&E                                    $771.0
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1994          1998     Change in
                                                                    months
    Estimated first-site             Oct. 1998     Dec. 1998   +1.5 months
     implementation
    Estimated last-site               May 2000      May 2000          None
     implementation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

          DSR'S CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:7.3

    According to project officials, FAA achieved initial operational
    capability of the system as scheduled at its first site, Seattle,
    Washington, on June 1, 1998.  However, full implementation of DSR was
    suspended for a few months in response to 19 computer-human interface
    issues expressed by NATCA.  On June 16, 1998, FAA and NATCA agreed to
    solutions for these 19 issues, and, in October 1998, full
    implementation of DSR in Seattle resumed in accordance with the terms
    of the June 16 agreement.  The project office estimates that
    activities associated with modifications to DSR could result in a 1-
    to 3-month slip in Seattle's original first-site implementation date
    of October 31, 1998.\11

    However, the project office is only currently projecting a 6-week
    slip to December 15, 1998.  Moreover, according to project officials,
    although FAA's agreement with NATCA resulted in adjustments to DSR's
    schedule, the estimate last-site implementation date scheduled for
    May 2000 at Indianapolis, Indiana, is not projected to change.

    The Professional Airways Systems Specialists--the union for airway
    facilities personnel-- has also expressed some concerns regarding the
    fielding of DSR.  Chief among these is the ease of access for
    maintaining Voice Switching and Control System electronics equipment
    located within the DSR controller workstation.  FAA reached an
    agreement in May 1998 to cooperate with the union to identify
    acceptable solutions to these concerns.  However, until these
    solutions have been identified and implemented, a risk to the DSR
    schedule remains.

       Figure I.4:  DSR

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    --------------------
    \11 In accordance with the agreement with NATCA, FAA incorporated a
    generic keyboard layout and the use of color for display attributes
    along with software and hardware modifications.

       GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
       AUGMENTATION PROGRAM:  WIDE
       AREA AUGMENTATION SYSTEM/LOCAL
       AREA AUGMENTATION SYSTEM
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.1

    FAA's current policy is to transition from its present ground-based
    navigation and landing system to a satellite-based system using
    signals generated by the Department of Defense's Global Positioning
    System (GPS).\12 However, GPS, by itself, does not satisfy all
    aviation requirements, such as the one requiring the system to be
    available virtually all of the time and another requiring the system
    be accurate enough to support landings in the worst weather
    conditions.  To satisfy these requirements, FAA has taken a
    two-pronged approach to augmenting GPS through its Wide Area
    Augmentation System (WAAS) and Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)
    projects.

    WAAS is expected to support the navigation for all phases of flight
    from nonprecision through category I precision approaches.\13 LAAS is
    needed to support the more stringent category II and III precision
    approach requirements.\14 LAAS is also expected to complement WAAS
    and provide a category I precision approach at airports where WAAS
    does not provide sufficient coverage or where there is a higher
    requirement for availability.  FAA and the aviation industry expect
    that these systems will result in major benefits, including a
    reduction in landing accidents, by providing more precision-landing
    capabilities than currently exist and a reduction in flight times,
    fuel consumption, and delays due to bad weather.  WAAS and LAAS are
    eventually expected to serve as "sole means" navigation systems that
    would enable FAA to phase out its costly network of ground-based
    navigation aids.\15

    In August 1995, after several years of research, FAA contracted with
    Wilcox Electric to develop WAAS.  However, because of concerns about
    the contractor's work, FAA terminated the contract in April 1996.  In
    May 1996, FAA entered into an interim contract with Hughes Aircraft
    Company (now Raytheon Systems), and the contract became final in
    October 1996.  FAA rebaselined the project in January 1998 to reflect
    safety changes that occurred since Wilcox's contract termination.
    Operations and Maintenance costs were also included in the January
    1998 baseline.\16

    At the time of the original baseline for WAAS in 1994, FAA estimated
    the project's cost at $509 million.  Also at this time, FAA expected
    that the initial and full system could be completed by June 1997 and
    December 2000, respectively.  From 1994 through 1998, baseline costs
    increased because of higher development costs to build greater
    redundancy into the system's ground components and
    higher-than-originally-estimated satellite-leasing costs.  In
    addition to an already aggressive schedule, such factors as the need
    to build greater reliability into the systems and certify system
    software further contributed to the schedule's slippage.

    Currently, the initial WAAS network consists of 25 reference
    stations, 2 master stations, and 4 ground stations joined by a
    telecommunications network.  The initial system, still in testing,
    also uses two leased geostationary communication satellites to
    provide signals for making corrections and for transmitting
    information to aircraft.\17 In September 1998, FAA decided to add an
    interim step between the initial and full system.  During this
    interim step, FAA plans to add additional ground stations and make
    performance upgrades to the initial system's software in order to
    evaluate operational experience before moving ahead to complete the
    full system.  For the full system, FAA envisions a design consisting
    of up to 54 reference stations, 8 master stations, and 14 ground
    earth stations.  (See fig.  I.5.)\18

    LAAS is a joint research effort with industry.  In January 1998, FAA
    approved the first LAAS baseline and anticipates moving to full-scale
    development by December 1998.  During full-scale development, some
    systems will be built to test and evaluate the capabilities of
    meeting category I, II, and III precision-landing requirements.
    After full-scale development, FAA anticipates acquiring 143 systems.
    About 42 systems will be installed at airports and will provide a
    category I capability, where WAAS cannot.\19 The remaining 101
    systems will provide category II and III capabilities.  LAAS will
    consist of precisely surveyed reference stations for receiving GPS
    signals, detecting malfunctions, calculating corrections, and
    transmitting corrections to aircraft.  The system will also consist
    of a ground station, known as a "pseudolite," which will broadcast an
    additional signal to aircraft for making corrections.  (See fig.
    I.6.)

    --------------------
    \12 There are currently 27 GPS satellites (24 in operation and 3 in
    reserve) located in six orbits at approximately 11,000 miles above
    the earth.  These satellites are positioned so that a user will have
    at least four satellites in view at any given location.

    \13 On a nonprecision approach, an aircraft receives electronic
    guidance for flying toward the runway's center line.  On a precision
    approach, an aircraft not only receives this guidance but also
    guidance on the slope of descent to the runway.  As a result, on a
    precision approach, an aircraft can safely descend closer to the
    ground while attempting to land in bad weather.  FAA currently
    categorizes precision-landing systems according to their ability to
    safely guide an aircraft to a runway in poor weather conditions.  A
    category I system provides aircraft with safe vertical guidance to a
    height of not less than 200 feet with runway visibility of at least
    1,800 feet.

    \14 A category II system provides aircraft with a safe vertical
    guidance to a height of not less than 100 feet with runway visibility
    of not less than 1,200 feet.  A category III system provides aircraft
    with safe vertical guidance all the way to touchdown under conditions
    where a runway's visibility is extremely limited, for example, where
    a runway's visibility is not less than 150 feet.

    \15 A "sole means" navigation system must, for a given operation or
    phase of flight, allow the aircraft to meet all performance
    requirements for the navigation system.

    \16 During the January 1998 rebaselining, the agency conducted an
    economic analysis to reevaluate whether WAAS was still a sound
    investment.  The analysis assessed how such events as the range of
    satellite costs and the inclusion of the costs of decommissioning
    ground-based navigation aids would affect the investment.  FAA found
    that WAAS' benefits still outweighed costs.

    \17 Unlike GPS satellites, the WAAS geostationary satellites are
    located at fixed positions in orbit 22,000 miles above the earth.

    \18 Neighboring countries may field additional ground stations and
    reduce the need for FAA to invest in as many ground stations as
    originally envisioned.

    \19 WAAS may not provide sufficient coverage for precision landing
    guidance in remote areas, such as in parts of Alaska.  Also, some
    airports (e.g., Miami International) have higher availability
    requirements than WAAS can provide.  Availability is the probability
    that, at any given time, the system will meet the accuracy and
    integrity requirements for each phase of flight.

          WAAS' AND LAAS' COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.2

    Table I.10 summarizes WAAS' and LAAS' costs and schedules since
    January 1998.

                                   Table I.10

                       WAAS' and LAAS' Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                    Vendors: WAAS-Raytheon Systems Company,
                               Fullerton, Calif.;
                    COMSAT/Mobile Communications, Bethesda,
                                      Md.
                     Partners: LAAS-Honeywell, Minneapolis,
                        Minn.; Raytheon Systems Company,
                               Fullerton, Calif.)

    Financial                                                Change in
    information         Jan. 1998\a        Oct. 1998          dollars
    ----------------  ----------------  ----------------  ----------------
    Total WAAS F&E        $1,006.6          $1,006.6            None
     cost
    F&E                                      $400.4
     appropriations
     through fiscal
     year 1998
    Total LAAS F&E         $535.8            $535.8             None
     cost
    F&E                                      $11.2
     appropriations
     through fiscal
     year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule             Jan. 1998         Oct. 1998           Change
    WAAS' initial        Aug. 1999         Aug. 1999            None
     capability
    WAAS' interim           N/A            Dec. 2001            N/A
     capability
    WAAS' full           Dec. 2001            TBD               N/A
     capability
    LAAS' first-            2003              2003              None
     site
     implementation\
     b
    Last-site               2006              2006              None
     implementation\b
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legend

    N/A = not applicable

    TBD = to be determined

    \a The revised WAAS baseline also includes $2.043 billion for
    operations and maintenance through 2016.  In 1997, FAA estimated
    these costs at $1.5 billion.  LAAS' operations and maintenance costs
    are estimated to reach $296 million.

    \b These dates reflect the first- and last-site implementation dates
    for full production of LAAS.

          WAAS'/LAAS' CHALLENGES AND
          RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3

    Several uncertainties--related to cost, performance, and technical
    issues--surround FAA's satellite navigation program.  While FAA's
    revised baseline recognizes that WAAS' estimated costs have grown
    significantly, questions persist about whether the WAAS program is
    cost-effective.  Closely related to the issue of whether the expected
    benefits justify the cost are several performance and technical
    issues, including the vulnerability of the GPS signal to
    interference, the selection of a second broadcast frequency for
    civilian use, and the acquisition of additional geostationary
    satellites for WAAS.  FAA's current efforts to identify alternatives
    to satisfy its future satellite navigation needs and the resolution
    of the outstanding issues could affect the cost, schedule, and
    delivery of benefits to users and to FAA.

             QUESTIONS PERSIST ABOUT
             THE COST AND BENEFITS OF
             WAAS
    ----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3.1

    In the Department of Transportation Appropriations Acts for fiscal
    years 1998 and 1999 and their accompanying legislative histories,
    congressional concerns were expressed about certain aspects of the
    WAAS program, including its cost, schedule, performance, and
    risks.\20 For example, in the conference report accompanying the
    fiscal year 1999 appropriations, the conferees noted that proponents
    of the WAAS program have not been able to provide compelling
    assurance that the program will be cost-effective beyond the initial
    phase, which is expected to become operational in 1999.  The
    conferees further asserted that serious and persistent technical
    concerns await resolution by the FAA at an unknown cost and in
    unknown time frames.  The fiscal year 1999 appropriations act
    includes a provision which prohibits the use of funds for any WAAS
    activity beyond phase 1.

    FAA's analyses of WAAS have shown the project to be cost beneficial.
    In fact, during the January 1998 rebaselining of the project, FAA
    conducted an economic analysis to reevaluate whether WAAS was still a
    sound investment.  The analysis assessed how such events as the range
    of satellite costs and the inclusion of the costs of decommissioning
    ground-based navigation aids would affect the investment.  At that
    time, FAA found that benefits still outweighed costs.  However, since
    then questions have arisen about the WAAS investment and in
    particular, the conferees for the fiscal year 1999 Transportation
    Appropriations Act expressed concern that the benefits of WAAS may be
    overstated.

    It is expected that FAA will identify its future needs for satellite
    navigation and analyze a range of alternatives for meeting those
    needs.  In fact, the conferees for the fiscal year 1999
    Transportation Appropriations Act directed FAA to complete an
    alternatives analysis which looks at various combinations of existing
    and new, ground-based and satellite-based technology.  In response,
    FAA has completed a draft alternative analysis plan, which calls for
    the identification of possible alternatives by early 1999.  Once
    possible alternatives have been identified, the Center for Advanced
    Aviation System Development of the Mitre Corporation is expected to
    do a technical evaluation of the alternatives.\21

    Following Mitre's evaluation, FAA's investment analysis team will
    analyze the costs, benefits, schedule, performance, and risks of each
    alternative and expects to recommend a proposed alternative to FAA's
    senior acquisition managers by the end of May 1999.  The Congress is
    expected to use the results of various analyses of WAAS in
    determining the level of appropriations needed for FAA's future
    navigation program including both WAAS and LAAS.

    --------------------
    \20 Senate Report 105-55, Department of Transportation and Related
    Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1998 (July 22, 1997), and House
    of Representatives Conference Report 105-313, Department of
    Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1998
    (Oct.  7, 1997) and House of Representatives Conference Report
    105-825, Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
    Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 1999 (Oct.  19, 1998).

    \21 Mitre Corporation operates, under a memorandum of agreement with
    funding from FAA, the Center for Advanced Aviation System
    Development.  The Center carries out a continuing program of
    research, development, system architecture, and high-level system
    engineering to support FAA's NAS needs.

             GPS SIGNALS ARE
             VULNERABLE TO
             INTERFERENCE
    ----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3.2

    GPS provides low-power signals that are susceptible to both
    unintentional and intentional radio frequency interference.\22 For
    example, accidental or inadvertent interference by extraneous radio
    transmissions on the GPS frequency could cause the loss of service.
    Also, the potential exists that an individual or organization could
    disrupt the GPS navigation signals by jamming them.

    FAA has recognized that the interference issue must be addressed and
    that appropriate measures must be in place before satellite
    navigation can become a "sole means" system.  One mitigation strategy
    that FAA may employ includes retaining a portion of its existing
    ground-based navigation aids as a backup.  Also, during the
    transition from ground-based navigation aids to WAAS, which would
    last for about a decade, both would be available to users and FAA.
    During this period, users would have time to equip their aircraft,
    and FAA would have time to test several countermeasures, including
    the use of the existing air traffic control and surveillance networks
    to safely control traffic in areas where there is interference and
    the use of flight inspection aircraft to detect interference events.

    In recent months, vulnerability concerns about whether satellite
    navigation should be used as the "sole means" of providing aircraft
    landing guidance have been reemphasized.  Consequently, FAA has begun
    assessing whether, and to what extent, it may have to maintain some
    portion of existing ground-based navigation aids as a backup
    navigation service.\23 As part of this effort, in July 1998, FAA, in
    a joint effort with industry, contracted with Johns Hopkins
    University Applied Physics Laboratory to conduct a detailed risk
    assessment of using GPS along with WAAS' and LAAS' augmentations as a
    "sole means" system for aircraft navigation.  FAA expects to have the
    final report of this assessment by January 1999.

    --------------------
    \22 These vulnerabilities are common to ground-based navigation aids.
    However, because GPS broadcasts its signal at a very low power level,
    its signal may be somewhat more vulnerable to interference.

    \23 The issue of satellite navigation's vulnerability to interference
    was raised by the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
    Protection of October 1997.  The purpose of this commission was to
    study the nation's infrastructure, which constitutes the life support
    system of the United States; determine the vulnerability of these
    support systems; and propose a strategy for protecting them in the
    future.  Also, in October 1997, a group of independent experts from
    outside FAA, and called together by the agency, also raised concerns
    about the intentional jamming of GPS signals.

             FAA ASSERTS THAT THE
             SELECTION OF A SECOND
             FREQUENCY WOULD BENEFIT
             THE WAAS PROGRAM
    ----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3.3

    The present GPS satellites broadcast position data for the Department
    of Defense's use on two frequencies referred to as L1 and L2.  WAAS
    will use data on the L1 frequency in conjunction with limited data
    available from the L2 frequency to make corrections.  LAAS will rely
    solely on the L1 frequency for making corrections.  According to FAA,
    providing full access to a second frequency can provide significant
    benefits in the long term for both these systems.  A second frequency
    could provide another risk mitigation strategy to counteract these
    systems' vulnerability to electronic interference (mainly
    unintentional interference).  If one frequency were lost because of
    interference, a second frequency could be used to provide service.

    With a second frequency, FAA could build WAAS so that aircraft
    operators would be able to use receivers that could function on a
    single frequency now and on a dual frequency in the future.  Building
    this type of "forward" compatibility into WAAS could cut down on
    users' investment in new receivers and FAA's future investments in
    WAAS to accommodate aircraft with single- and dual-frequency
    receivers.  Another potential advantage is that FAA would need fewer
    WAAS ground stations and a smaller ground communications network in
    the future if dual frequency receivers are used to correct position
    data that may be distorted as GPS signals pass through the
    ionosphere.  Also, dual-frequency receivers could be used by LAAS to
    detect and mitigate multipath problems caused when radio frequencies
    radiate off objects and create data errors.

    However, challenges need to be resolved before these benefits can be
    realized.  While the Interagency GPS Executive Board, together with
    its joint chairs, the Department of Defense and the Department of
    Transportation, has agreed that a second frequency protected for
    civil air navigation's safety of life function will be provided,
    there is still ongoing discussion within the executive board to
    identify the protected frequency.\24 The executive board has
    tentatively set December 1998 as the date for selecting this
    frequency.  Furthermore, once the executive board agrees upon the
    second frequency, the United States will have to gain concurrence
    from the International Telecommunications Union at the next World
    Radio Conference.  According to FAA officials, the next World Radio
    Conference is scheduled for 2000, and there have been earlier
    proposals that the conference is studying to share the spectrum used
    by GPS with nonaviation users.\25

    Beyond the challenge of identifying an additional frequency, funding
    issues need resolution.  The Department of Transportation has agreed
    to fund the implementation of an additional frequency on the next
    generation of GPS satellites.  While it may not be until 2010 before
    a significant number of these satellites will be placed in orbit, the
    Department of Transportation believes it has to begin making the
    investment soon in order to allow the manufacturer to build the
    second frequency into the design for next-generation satellites.
    According to the Department of Transportation, the amount that the
    agency has to invest can be established only once an agreement is
    reached on the additional frequency to be provided for civil air
    navigation use.  Finally, current-generation GPS satellites still in
    production could be retrofitted to provide a second frequency
    capability and potentially bring about the expected benefits before
    2010.  However, because of concerns about the potential high costs of
    this solution--estimated to be about $130 million--the Department of
    Transportation has not agreed to fund this solution.

    --------------------
    \24 The Interagency GPS Executive Board manages the dual civil and
    military use of GPS.  The board is made up of representatives from
    the Departments of Transportation, Defense, Agriculture, Commerce,
    the Interior, Justice, and State, and the National Aeronautics and
    Space Administration.

    \25 Every 2 years, the International Telecommunications Union of the
    United Nations holds a World Radio Conference to develop policy and
    decide major international telecommunications and radio spectrum
    issues affecting navigation and transportation systems.

             ACQUISITION OF ADDITIONAL
             WAAS SATELLITES PRESENTS
             SIGNIFICANT CHALLENGES
    ----------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:8.3.4

    We reported in April 1998 that the acquisition of geosatellites for
    WAAS present some of the most significant cost, funding, and schedule
    challenges to the project.\26 Today, these challenges remain and have
    led to FAA's decision to delay the full implementation of the system
    to a date that has not yet been determined.

    The greatest degree of uncertainty about the cost of WAAS surrounds
    the costs of satellites.  This uncertainty exists because FAA does
    not know exactly how many additional satellites will be needed and
    how much the per-unit costs will be.\27 Although FAA had initially
    planned to award a contract in July 1998 for additional satellites,
    it did not meet this target date.  FAA is currently analyzing various
    options to identify additional satellites, which include obtaining
    them from the existing provider.  However, according to FAA
    officials, since the need for additional satellites and the timing
    for acquiring these satellites hinges on the outcome of the
    previously mentioned risk assessment, they opted to wait for the
    results of the assessment, which is expected in January 1999, before
    deciding on a procurement strategy.

    While the outcome of the risk assessment has postponed any decision
    to lease additional satellites, FAA officials stated that entering
    into any leasing negotiations with vendors has also been deferred for
    two other reasons.  First, they stated that during this period of
    uncertainty, negotiations with satellite vendors would be precarious,
    at best.  Since vendors are expected to absorb most of the costs
    associated with building and leasing the satellites, they may require
    huge premiums on leasing fees or large cancellation fees to cover
    their investment in case FAA subsequently decides against adding the
    satellites.  Second, while FAA officials believe that they could not
    afford to purchase the satellites from the agency's F&E appropriation
    without significantly reducing other capital projects, the House
    mandated that the agency not sign a lease for WAAS satellites
    services until it evaluates whether a lease versus purchase
    acquisition will result in the lowest overall cost to the agency.\28

    In our April 1998 report, we questioned whether FAA would find a
    vendor willing and able to complete the launching and testing of
    satellites in time to meet FAA's December 2001 date for implementing
    the full WAAS capability.  In this report, we stated that potential
    vendors pointed to 2002 or 2003 as a more realistic schedule for
    putting the satellites in orbit.  Since our report, FAA's decision to
    postpone satellite acquisition activity, pending the outcome of the
    current risk assessment, coupled with the agency's efforts to
    evaluate operational experience with WAAS before moving to full
    capability and the need to resolve the lease versus purchase issue,
    will likely result in delays to the schedule.  FAA officials
    recognize that the original date must change to allow enough time to
    address the above issues, and they stated that they did not expect to
    make this decision on the additional satellites until September
    1999.\29 Notwithstanding this decision date, officials stated that a
    more realistic schedule for putting satellites in orbit would be
    around 2003 or 2004.

       Figure I.5:  WAAS' Architecture

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Figure I.6:  LAAS' Architecture

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    --------------------
    \26 National Airspace System:  Status of Wide Area Augmentation
    System Project (GAO/RCED-98-79, Apr.  30, 1998).

    \27 According to FAA officials, if more GPS satellites and a second
    civil frequency were available along with deactivation of selective
    availability, the quantity of additional WAAS geostationary
    satellites and life-cycle costs for the geostationary satellites
    could be reduced.

    \28 The Department of Transportation and Related Agencies
    Appropriations Act for 1999, P.L.  105-277, Division A, sec.  101,
    (g)(1998).

    \29 FAA's ongoing alternatives analysis may impact the decision
    regarding the need for the additional satellites.  The results of
    this analysis is expected in May 1999.

       HOST AND OCEANIC COMPUTER
       SYSTEM REPLACEMENT
    --------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9.1

    Many of the hardware components of the En Route and Oceanic
    automation systems have reached or are near the end of their service
    life, and are no longer supportable.  Additionally, concerns existed
    that these systems would suffer potential Year 2000 problems.
    Therefore, an immediate need exists for FAA to ensure that current
    and planned service levels can be maintained until the replacement
    system is fully operational.  The Host and Oceanic Computer System
    Replacement program replaces existing En Route and Oceanic automation
    hardware and software over a 4-year period.  The project is
    structured into four phases to help minimize schedule and funding
    risks.  Phase 1 of the project replaces existing En Route and Oceanic
    hardware, but it does not replace the existing software's
    functionality.  Phase 2 provides new software, which basically
    duplicates the existing software functionality.  Phases 3 and 4
    replace peripheral equipment and add new software functionality.
    According to project officials, in June 1998, FAA awarded Lockheed
    Martin a contract for up to 24 operational systems and 7 support
    systems.  The project's total F&E cost is estimated at $424.1
    million, over an 8- year period that includes technology refreshment.
    To date, only Phase 1 of the project has a schedule baseline.

          CHANGES TO THE HOST AND
          OCEANIC COMPUTER SYSTEM
          REPLACEMENT PROGRAM'S COST
          AND SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9.2

    Table I.11 summarizes the changes to the Host and Oceanic Computer
    System Replacement program's cost and schedule since June 1998.

                                   Table I.11

                      Changes to Host and Oceanic Computer
                     System Replacement Program's Cost and
                                    Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                    Vendor: Lockheed Martin, Rockville, Md.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information            June 1998     Oct. 1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $424.1        $424.1          None
    Cumulative F&E                                     $86.4
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                         June 1998     Oct. 1998     Change in
                                                                    months
    Estimated first-site             Jan. 1999     Jan. 1999          None
     implementation\a
    Estimated last-site              Oct. 1999    Sept. 1999      -1 month
     implementation\a
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a The implementation dates are only for Phase 1 of the program.

          HOST AND OCEANIC COMPUTER
          SYSTEM REPLACEMENT PROGRAM'S
          CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:9.3

    According to project officials, the project's schedule is the primary
    risk.  Because the project's schedule is aggressive and coincides
    with other en route and oceanic modernization activities, the project
    office must maintain close coordination with other project teams and
    operational sites.  The procurement, delivery, and installation of
    government-furnished equipment must also be monitored closely to
    ensure that all ancillary equipment required for complete
    installation and testing is available to the contractor.  Project
    officials report that all Phase 1 hardware deliveries and site
    implementation plans are on or ahead of schedule.

    According to project officials, the project's technical risk is low
    because the contractor is utilizing commercial-off-the-shelf
    equipment for this procurement.  Moreover, the lead contractor is
    experienced at installing existing software on new equipment.  In
    addition, the Host and Oceanic Computer System Replacement team
    successfully completed a "proof of concept" that showed that the
    existing software could run on the new platform in a demonstration at
    the FAA Technical Center.

       INTEGRATED TERMINAL WEATHER
       SYSTEM
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:10

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:10.1

    Air traffic personnel in tower and terminal facilities rely on a
    number of sensors to obtain weather data.  The interpretation of
    these data is performed manually and is labor-intensive.  The main
    shortcoming of the present system is that it cannot anticipate
    short-term changes in ceilings, visibility, winds, and precipitation.

    The Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS) is designed to
    automatically integrate data from terminal weather sensors to provide
    current weather conditions--as well as forecasts out to about 30
    minutes in the future--in easily understood graphical and textual
    form to air traffic supervisors and controllers.  ITWS will integrate
    information originating from several sources, such as next-generation
    weather radar products, Terminal Doppler Weather Radar, aircraft
    weather systems, surveillance radars, or weather-observing systems,
    and present it on displays located in the tower and Terminal Radar
    Approach Control (TRACON) facilities.  ITWS' products include wind
    shear and microburst predictions, storm cell and lightning
    information, terminal area winds aloft, runway winds, and short-term
    ceiling and visibility predictions.  FAA intends to deploy 37 ITWSs,
    including 34 at terminal facilities and 3 at other locations, for
    training, testing of interfaces, and software support and
    maintenance.  The 34 systems that FAA plans to deploy at terminal
    facilities will enable air traffic controllers to better identify
    terminal area weather hazards at 45 major airports, thereby improving
    safety and capacity in bad weather.\30

    --------------------
    \30 TRACONs can control airspace surrounding multiple airports;
    therefore, one ITWS can serve more than one airport.

          ITWS' COST AND SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:10.2

    The total estimated F&E cost of ITWS has not changed since the
    contract was awarded in January 1997.  Cost estimates were
    rebaselined during the contract's award because of a decrease
    associated with a higher-than-anticipated level of software
    productivity and reuse and a reduction in newly developed software
    lines of code.  As of September 1998, FAA had obligated all of the
    $87.8 million appropriated since 1992 for the ITWS project.  Funding
    was used to develop and test terminal weather algorithms, conduct
    demonstration/validation of the system using three functional
    prototypes, continue the operation of these prototypes, and test
    initial software.

    ITWS has been on or ahead of schedule since the contract was awarded.
    For example, the Preliminary Design Review was conducted 2 months
    ahead of schedule in March 1998, and the Critical Design Review
    scheduled for January 1999 was completed 4 months ahead of schedule
    in September 1998.  FAA plans to have the first of the 34 systems
    operational by April 2002 and have all 34 systems operational by July
    2003.  FAA has been successfully operating ITWS prototypes at the
    Memphis International Airport and Orlando International Airport since
    1994 and at Dallas/Ft.  Worth International Airport since 1995.  As a
    result of their success, a fourth prototype was installed and became
    operational at LaGuardia Airport in August 1998.  This prototype
    provides displays at LaGuardia, Kennedy, Newark and the Teterboro,
    New Jersey, airports; New York TRACON; New York, Boston, and
    Washington, D.C., en route centers, and at the Air Traffic Control
    System Command Center in Herndon, Virginia.  The prototype is being
    funded by the New York/New Jersey Port Authority in conjunction with
    the Massachusetts Institute of Technology/Lincoln Laboratory.  These
    prototypes allow for testing the system at different-sized airports
    and provide experience with different types of weather.  The four
    prototypes will be among the first eight sites commissioned.  Table
    I.12 summarizes ITWS' cost and schedule since 1997.

                                   Table I.12

                            ITWS' Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                       Vendors: Raytheon Systems Company,
                       Marlborough, Mass.; Massachusetts
                        Institute of Technology/Lincoln
                           Laboratory, Boston, Mass.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1997          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $276.1        $276.1          None
    Cumulative F&E                                     $87.8
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1997          1998        Change
    Estimated first-site             Apr. 2002     Apr. 2002          None
     implementation
    Estimated last-site              July 2003     July 2003          None
     implementation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

          ITWS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:10.3

    Although ITWS is currently on schedule, software development efforts
    present a potential risk.  To mitigate the risk of the project's
    schedule slipping, the ITWS project plans to continue Massachusetts
    Institute of Technology's/Lincoln Laboratory's support during the
    software development effort to provide for the transfer of technology
    from the actual research scientists to the software developers.
    Also, the actual implementation effort introduces potential risk to
    the project.  For example, ITWS will require at least one
    telecommunications line from each of the sensors during the
    implementation.  Although, FAA officials have stated that this is not
    technically difficult, the sheer volume and coordination effort
    required to install all of these communication lines adds risk.

       OCEANIC AUTOMATION PROGRAM
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:11

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:11.1

    With radar coverage largely unavailable and aircraft navigation
    limited to onboard systems, the current oceanic air traffic control
    system is significantly different from the domestic air traffic
    control system.  The current oceanic air traffic control system is
    largely manual, dependent on air/ground communications through a
    third party, subject to atmospheric anomalies and human error, and
    troublesome when obtaining accurate aircraft position reports.  This
    lack of reliable and timely position information, in turn, requires
    greater separation standards for aircraft, which severely limit the
    system's capacity.  As a result, oceanic users are rarely able to
    obtain maximum fuel efficiency, minimum travel time, and access to
    preferred takeoff times and flight paths.

    The Oceanic Automation Program is designed to provide a platform for
    improved air traffic control over the oceans.  It evolved from the
    Oceanic Display and Planning System into the Oceanic Automation
    System, and, now, into the Advanced Oceanic Automation System.  In
    the late 1980s, the Oceanic Display and Planning System improved
    oceanic traffic control by providing flight data processing and a
    situational display of estimated aircraft positions.  This system
    also provided a conflict probe capability that alerted controllers
    when any flight plan or pilot-requested aircraft route change
    violated appropriate separation standards.  In the early 1990s, FAA
    improved on the Oceanic Display and Planning System with the Oceanic
    Automation System, which improved data display and communications.
    This system is now being upgraded to the Advanced Oceanic Automation
    System, which is designed to provide such features as a new flight
    data processor, Automatic Dependent Surveillance position reporting,
    an advanced conflict probe, and data link.  FAA awarded a contract to
    the Raytheon Systems Company in September 1995 for the Advanced
    Oceanic Automation System.  The contract is composed of flexible
    segments, which will allow for incremental functional development and
    delivery of benefits.  Oceanic air traffic control systems are
    installed at the en route centers at Oakland and New York and in
    Anchorage, Alaska.

          CHANGES TO THE OCEANIC
          AUTOMATION PROGRAM'S COST
          AND SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:11.2

    Over the past 3 years, FAA has reduced the cost and schedule
    baselines for the Oceanic Automation Program.  Since FAA awarded the
    Advanced Oceanic Automation System's contract in September 1995, the
    scope of the project has been gradually revised from an original plan
    of five segments (incremental deliveries of capabilities) to only a
    portion of the first segment.  In July 1996, 10 months after the
    contract's award, FAA canceled segments three, four, and five of the
    project because the agency recognized that the cost of executing
    these segments was beyond the funding that had been allocated for
    this project.  As a result, FAA abandoned many controller
    productivity tools needed to increase the system's capacity.  Then,
    in December 1996, funding concerns forced FAA to revise the second
    segment of the project, which replaces existing infrastructure
    hardware and software that supports controller equipment.
    Eventually, in September 1997, FAA canceled the entire second segment
    of the project because of the agency's need to use the project's
    funds to correct Year 2000 problems in existing oceanic automation
    software and because of the need to transfer funds to the Host
    replacement program.\31

    Meanwhile, FAA's contractor was reporting performance problems with
    the first segment of the project, which adds data link and automatic
    dependent surveillance in the oceanic environment.  To avoid a
    potential $45 million contractor cost overrun associated with this
    segment, FAA then reduced the scope of segment one of the project in
    September 1998 by eliminating the capability for automatic dependent
    surveillance.  According to project officials, the remaining elements
    of segment one (air-to-ground data link, ground-to-ground data link,
    and controller tools) have successfully completed the operational
    test and evaluation and are expected to be delivered on schedule.
    Table I.13 summarizes the changes to the Oceanic Automation Program's
    cost and schedule since 1996.

                                   Table I.13

                    Changes to Oceanic Automation Program's
                               Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                       Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company,
                                  Reston, Va.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1996          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $236.5        $189.0        -$47.5
    Cumulative F&E                                    $189.0
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1996          1998     Change in
                                                                    months
    Estimated first-site             Feb. 2000    Sept. 1999     -5 months
     implementation
    Estimated last-site              June 2000     Oct. 1999     -8 months
     implementation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

    --------------------
    \31 The Host replacement project replaces en route center and oceanic
    automation hardware that has reached the end of its commercial
    support life and may have problems with Year 2000 date requirements.

          OCEANIC AUTOMATION PROGRAM'S
          CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:11.3

    Project officials state that the Advanced Oceanic Automation System's
    original requirements to improve oceanic air traffic control
    automation remain valid today and that they will require FAA's
    attention in the very near future, particularly those that increase
    controller's efficiency.  According to project officials, FAA is
    presently examining alternatives for satisfying these needs.

       OPERATIONAL AND SUPPORTABILITY
       IMPLEMENTATION SYSTEM
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:12

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:12.1

    The Operational and Supportability Implementation System (OASIS)
    project (1) replaces all existing Flight Service Automation System
    hardware and software with a leased commercial, off-the-shelf-based
    service; (2) provides a graphic weather display capability that is
    currently being obtained through the Interim Graphic Weather Display
    system; and (3) incorporates direct user-access functionality that is
    currently being obtained through two Direct User Access Terminal
    contracts.  The integration of these three capabilities and functions
    into a single system will enable flight service specialists to more
    efficiently produce weather and flight-planning information for
    pilots.  In August 1997, FAA awarded Harris Corporation a contract
    for OASIS services.  The contract requires Harris to provide up to 61
    operational systems and 3 support systems.

          CHANGES TO OASIS' COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:12.2

    FAA's May 1998 decision to replace existing workstation consoles and
    install new ones in response to human-factor concerns raised by the
    unions that represent the controllers and the technicians caused the
    project's cost to increase by $15.8 million.  Table I.14 summarizes
    the changes to OASIS' cost and schedule since 1997.

                                   Table I.14

                      Changes to OASIS' Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                     Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne,
                                     Fla.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1997          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $174.7        $190.5        +$15.8
    Cumulative F&E                                     $25.9
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1997          1998     Change in
                                                                    months
    Estimated first-site             July 1998     Jan. 1999     +6 months
     implementation
    Estimated last-site              Aug. 2001     Aug. 2001          None
     implementation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

          OASIS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:12.3

    Since FAA awarded the contract for OASIS services in August 1997, the
    agency has seen the project's schedule slip because of a
    larger-than-planned developmental effort.  FAA's January 1998 review
    of the Harris system's architecture for OASIS revealed that the
    contractor's commercial-off-the-shelf solution was not as mature as
    FAA had envisioned when the contract was awarded and revealed that
    many of the contractor's commercial products did not fully satisfy
    its requirements.  FAA delayed first-site implementation from July
    1998 to January 1999--a 6-month slip.  Last-site implementation is
    not affected by the protracted development effort and remains
    scheduled for August 2001.

    Adding more risk to the project's schedule are a number of
    human-factor issues that have been raised by the National Association
    of Air Traffic Specialist union and the Professional Airways Systems
    Specialists.  While the unions have yet to formally develop a
    comprehensive list of concerns, project officials said that the
    unions are troubled about such issues as lighting glare, shelf
    height, and immoveable keyboards.  The unions want these issues
    resolved before OASIS is deployed.  FAA officials responsible for
    requirements are working collaboratively with the program office to
    address these concerns.

    Finally, according to project officials, the project's schedule has
    the potential to slip further because the amount of fiscal year 1999
    funding was less than requested.

       STANDARD TERMINAL AUTOMATION
       REPLACEMENT SYSTEM
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:13.1

    The Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) is
    designed to replace FAA's automated radar terminal system, which
    comprises 15- to 25-year-old controller workstations, and supporting
    computer systems that allow controllers at TRACONs to separate and
    sequence aircraft.  According to FAA, this system is prone to
    failures and is maintenance intensive.  The system also has capacity
    constraints that restrict the agency from making required safety and
    efficiency enhancements.  STARS equipment is also expected to provide
    the platform needed to make enhancements to the system that would
    increase the level of air traffic control automation and improve
    surveillance, communications, and weather display.  (See fig.  I.7.)

    In September 1996, FAA signed a contract with Raytheon Systems
    Company to acquire STARS.  In producing the system, Raytheon
    originally intended to rely exclusively on commercially available
    hardware and, to a large extent, on commercially available software.
    The strategy for replacing and enhancing the system is divided into
    two stages--the initial system capability stage and the final system
    capability stage.  Stage 1 is expected to provide the same functions
    as the current automated radar terminal systems.  Under Stage 2, FAA
    expects to implement new functions to help controllers move aircraft
    more safely and efficiently.  In 1997, FAA created another stage,
    known as early display configuration, because of concerns about
    operational problems at Ronald Reagan National Airport.  This new
    stage will be implemented prior to Stages 1 and 2.  The new stage
    replaces the current controller displays and monitoring equipment but
    will require the use of the existing computer system and software.
    It also provides an emergency back-up system.

    STARS replaced the Terminal Advanced Automation System segment of the
    Advanced Automation System project, which was terminated because of
    serious cost and schedule problems.  The terminal segment was
    estimated to cost about $810 million, and at the time of termination,
    FAA had sunk about $317 million into it.  The terminal segment's
    first-site implementation date was August 1997.  FAA did not
    establish a last-site implementation date.

          STARS' COST AND SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:13.2

    Table I.15 summarizes STARS' cost and schedule since 1996.

                                   Table I.15

                            STARS' Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                       Vendors: Raytheon Systems Company,
                              Marlborough, Mass.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1996          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $940.2        $940.2          None
    Cumulative F&E                                    $211.6
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1996          1998        Change
    Estimated first-site             Dec. 1998     Dec. 1998          None
     implementation--initial
     stage
    Estimated last-site              Feb. 2005     Feb. 2005          None
     implementation--final stage
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

          STARS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:13.3

    Although FAA has not officially changed the STARS' baseline that was
    approved in 1996, the baseline is in jeopardy of being breached
    because of unions' concerns surrounding human-factor and design
    issues, the refinement of requirements, and the interjection of a new
    project phase.  FAA estimates that these issues have the potential to
    increase the project's costs from $294 million to $410 million over
    the approved baseline.  FAA also estimates that the project's initial
    completion could be delayed by almost 2-1/2 years.  For future
    projects, cost overruns and schedule slippages in excess of 10
    percent of the cost and schedule baselines will require the
    Administrator of FAA to consider terminating the project under
    recently passed legislation.\32

    In addition to the issues cited above, the project has experienced
    other challenges related mainly to software testing.  While project
    officials stated that they have been able to absorb the cost
    increases within the existing baseline, additional risks could cause
    further cost increases and schedule delays.

    --------------------
    \32 Air Traffic Management System Performance Improvement Act of 1996
    (P.L.  104-264, Oct.  9, 1996).

             UNIONS' CONCERNS
    ---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13.3.1

    NATCA and the Professional Airways Systems Specialists are working to
    resolve 98 and 59 human-factor problems with STARS, respectively.  In
    September 1998, FAA estimated that the total cost for incorporating
    all human-factors issues into the final design of STARS would be $192
    million.  According to FAA, if the full scope of these issues is
    incorporated into the system's design, doing so would require the
    development of an additional 220,000 lines of software code and delay
    the deployment of the final design of the system to June 2001--an
    almost 2-1/2-year delay from the initial systems capability.

    For example, one of NATCA's human-factor concerns centered around a
    lack of sufficient details about an aircraft's position and movement,
    which could hamper controllers' ability to monitor traffic movement.
    The Professional Airways Systems Specialists' concerns centered
    mainly on a lack of standardization between the primary and backup
    STARS systems.  For example, technicians must use two different
    screens to monitor the integrity of both systems, and the visual
    warning alarms and color coding to denote problems in the systems
    were not standard.

    FAA could incur an additional cost of $116 million, if the agency
    addresses NATCA's concerns that the system's design include
    synchronization between the primary and backup systems.  If the
    primary system fails, synchronization would provide the backup with a
    smoother transition by enabling controllers to forego having to
    recalibrate information needed for controlling and separating
    aircraft.  Without synchronization, such system inefficiencies as
    slowing down traffic or increasing the separation between aircraft
    could occur.

             REQUIREMENTS REFINEMENT
    ---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13.3.2

    In order to promote competition among vendors who may have had
    commercial and nondevelopmental applications that could address FAA's
    needs, the STARS system specification was written at a high-level.
    Consequently, when FAA awarded the contract, it left the system's
    functional specifications open to interpretation.  As a result,
    according to FAA officials, considerable engineering was expended in
    an effort to clarify the system's requirements.  For example, the
    additional engineering effort caused software development to grow
    from an estimated 124,000 lines of software code to about 162,000
    lines of code because of more-detailed specifications on how STARS
    was expected to function.  The engineering effort also identified,
    among other things, the need to strengthen security and seismic
    requirements and add additional equipment.  FAA officials estimate
    the added cost for these requirements refinements to be about $56
    million.

             NEW EARLY DISPLAY
             CONFIGURATION STAGE
    ---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13.3.3

    Because of the concerns about human-factors problems and delays in
    developing the initial system, FAA now anticipates that it may have
    to deploy the system's early display configuration to as many as 33
    additional TRACONs and to install automated radar terminal systems in
    new TRACONs that were scheduled to begin operation prior to June
    2001.  FAA believes that this early deployment of the system's
    displays solves one of its most immediate problems--the failure of
    displays in the existing system.  FAA estimates that the additional
    costs associated with these changes account for about $46 million of
    the cost growth.

             OTHER CHALLENGES
    ---------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:13.3.4

    Other challenges that could have an impact on the STARS project
    include FAA's software development problems related to the system's
    early display configuration and its initial system capability.  For
    example, software problems have pushed back the initial deployment of
    the early display configuration at Ronald Reagan National Airport
    from September 1998 to March 1999.  An additional deployment of
    software to make the system operationally ready is scheduled for July
    1999.  According to FAA, because of concerns about completing the
    development of software and resolving testing issues, a high
    probability exists that meeting both the March and July 1999 dates
    will not be achieved.  Technical problems with software are also
    affecting the development of the system's initial system capability
    software.  For example, Raytheon and FAA report software problems
    through their program trouble reports.  Two of the most worrisome
    program trouble reports are types 1 and 2.  Type 1 program trouble
    reports, if not corrected, could prevent the accomplishment of
    mission-essential capabilities.  Type 2 program trouble reports must
    be corrected before key site testing of software can proceed.  As of
    September 1998, the total number of open program trouble reports
    totaled nearly 570, and type 1 and 2 program trouble reports totaled
    8 and 231, respectively.

    FAA and Raytheon have mitigation efforts under way, including monthly
    reviews that involve software demonstrations and the weekly
    monitoring of the progress of software testing.  Also, according to
    project officials, they have been able to contain cost increases
    within the existing baseline by using planned baseline reserves and
    by eliminating, combining, and compressing certain tests.  These
    actions may cause further cost and schedule delays in the future.
    For example, we have reported that systems development without
    careful and thorough testing has proven to be imprudent and
    unproductive in many software development efforts.  The results from
    such shortcuts are systems that typically cost more, are of low
    quality, and are generally late.\33

    Finally, FAA has assured the Congress that it will not place a new
    system into service without first verifying that the system will not
    experience Year 2000 problems.  FAA is now in the process of
    assessing whether STARS will have a Year 2000 problem, and it plans
    to invest over $4 million to carry out Year 2000 assessment and
    testing activities.  While FAA's initial assessment results show the
    Year 2000 processing risks to be low to medium, officials are
    awaiting the results of final assessments, and tests needed to
    determine whether additional software changes may be needed.

       Figure I.7:  STARS

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

    --------------------
    \33 In Air Traffic Control:  Immature Software Acquisition Processes
    Increase FAA System Acquisition Risks (GAO/AIMD-97-47, Mar.  21,
    1997), we pointed out that the lack of a disciplined software
    development process has contributed to FAA's past problems to deliver
    systems capabilities on time and within budget.

       TERMINAL DOPPLER WEATHER RADAR
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:14

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:14.1

    The Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR) system will alert aircraft
    in the terminal area of hazardous weather conditions, such as
    microbursts, gust fronts, and precipitation.  The radar also will
    alert controllers of changing wind conditions, thereby permitting
    them to make timely runway changes.  (See fig.  I.8.) In November
    1988, FAA contracted with Raytheon to develop, produce, and install
    47 TDWR systems.

          CHANGES TO TDWR'S COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:14.2

    According to FAA officials, three factors have caused the cost of the
    project to increase by $71.3 million since November 1988.  First,
    FAA's failure to properly estimate the cost for installing TDWR
    systems caused the project's cost to increase by $30 million.
    Second, environmental reviews conducted by FAA at proposed sites
    identified environmental issues that caused the project's costs to
    increase by $26 million.  Finally, land acquisition problems
    necessitated that FAA and its contractor keep key project personnel
    longer than planned to field the systems.  This caused the project's
    cost to increase by $15.3 million.  The project's schedule delays are
    primarily due to land acquisition and environmental problems.  Table
    I.16 summarizes the changes to TDWR's cost and schedule since 1988.

                                   Table I.16

                      Changes to TDWR's Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                       Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company,
                              Marlborough, Mass.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1988          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $322.2        $393.5        +$71.3
    Cumulative F&E                                    $382.8
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1988          1998     Change in
                                                                    years/
                                                                    months
    First-site implementation        Aug. 1993     July 1994    +11 months
    Estimated last-site              Aug. 1996     July 2001     +4 years,
     implementation                                              11 months
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------

          TDWR'S CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:14.3

    For the past 10 years, land acquisition and environmental problems
    have plagued the project.  These problems continue, causing increased
    delays to installation schedules and increased installation costs.
    As a result, FAA does not have much confidence in its last-site
    implementation date for completion of the project.  The project
    office is working toward implementing 45 of the 47 planned systems by
    December 1998.  The final two systems, scheduled for Chicago's Midway
    Airport and New York, remain in storage at FAA's Aeronautical Center
    in Oklahoma City.

    According to project officials, FAA's progress with Chicago-Midway
    had been stymied for 2 years by problems associated with buying land.
    As a last resort, FAA used condemnation procedures to reach closure
    on this matter.  In June 1998, FAA acquired the land for the
    Chicago-Midway TDWR installation.  Project officials anticipate that
    an operational system will be available at Chicago-Midway in the
    summer of 2000.

    Project officials stated that New York has experienced great
    difficulty in finding a suitable location for the TDWR.  Over a
    4-year period, proposed locations were rejected by both residents and
    local politicians on the grounds that the radar's electromagnetic
    radiation posed potential health problems.  Residents also rejected
    the radar itself as being inappropriate and unsightly for a
    residential community.  FAA's current preferred site is located on
    public land.  According to project officials, an extensive
    environmental impact study is being made of the site, which has
    prolonged the system's installation.  Project officials expect to
    receive the necessary environmental approvals by November 1998.
    Project officials also expect residents who oppose FAA's planned use
    of the site to initiate a court action.  Because of the expected
    court action, the last-site implementation date remains tentative and
    could be pushed back even further.

       Figure I.8:  TDWR

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       TERMINAL RADAR DIGITIZATION,
       REPLACEMENT, AND ESTABLISHMENT
       PROGRAM:  AIRPORT SURVEILLANCE
       RADAR-11 PROJECT
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:15

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:15.1

    The Terminal Radar Digitization, Replacement, and Establishment
    (TRDRE) program includes projects to replace and upgrade current
    surveillance radars.  The Air Route Surveillance Radar-11 (ASR-11)
    project is a primary and secondary surveillance radar system that
    will enable air traffic controllers to monitor aircraft approaching,
    departing, and passing through airport terminal areas.  (See fig.
    I.9.) ASR-11 will provide a more reliable replacement for aging
    analog ASR-7s and ASR-8s, and will also provide digitized radar data
    necessary for interfacing with new automation systems, such as STARS,
    planned to be used by terminal controllers.  FAA also plans to
    upgrade several ASR-8s with interim digitizers under a separate
    contract to ensure that the radars are available to meet STARS'
    implementation schedule.

    Through a contract managed by the Department of Defense, FAA is
    providing the Air Force with funding for the procurement of 112
    ASR-11 radars that are designated for use at midsize airports.
    Ninety-five systems will replace aging ASR-7/8s; 13 systems will be
    used for new establishments or the Department of Defense takeover
    sites; 2 will be mobile units; and 2 will be support systems.  Unlike
    the existing ASR-7/8s, ASR-11s are intended to be more reliable and
    easier to maintain.  They are also designed to provide more accurate
    weather and target information, less clutter, and fewer false targets
    on the controllers' displays.  The ASR-11 is a nondevelopmental item
    with modifications to approximately 15 percent of the system.  The
    most significant modifications are to the interface equipment.

          CHANGES TO ASR-11'S COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:15.2

    At the time the contract was awarded in August 1996, FAA had yet to
    determine the total number of ASR-11 systems that it would require or
    the total cost estimates of the project.  The agency had preliminary
    project cost estimates of $561.3 million for the purchase of 48
    ASR-11s and the upgrade of the ASR-8s with digitizers.  However,
    during 1997, FAA conducted an analysis that demonstrated that it
    would be more cost beneficial to replace all the ASR-8s with ASR-11s
    rather than upgrade them with digitizers.  As a result, in November
    1997, FAA approved an estimated $743.3 million for 112 ASR-11s.
    Also, included in this amount was more than $9 million to upgrade 10
    ASR-8s with interim digitizers.  As of September 1998, FAA had
    provided $70.4 million for the procurement of two preproduction units
    for the initial development of the automation interface, in-plant
    testing, five production units, and three ASR-8 interim digitizers.

    Factory testing of the ASR-11 began in October 1997, and, in
    September 1998, the installation of the ASR-11 at the Department of
    Defense's test site at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, was completed.
    Site preparation at FAA's test site at Stockton, California (the
    first of two FAA preproduction sites) has begun and is scheduled to
    be completed in December 1998.  First-site implementation at Stockton
    is scheduled for January 2000.  As of October 1998, the current
    last-site implementation date is scheduled for September 2005 at a
    presently undetermined location.  Table I.17 summarizes the changes
    to ASR-11's cost and schedule since 1996.

                                   Table I.17

                     Changes to ASR-11's Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                       Vendor: Raytheon Systems Company,
                              Marlborough, Mass.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1996          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $561.3        $743.3       +$182.0
    Cumulative F&E                                     $70.4
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1996          1998        Change
    Estimated first-site             Jan. 2000     Jan. 2000          None
     implementation
    Estimated last-site                    Not    Sept. 2005           N/A
     implementation                 determined
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    Legend

    N/A = not applicable

          ASR-11'S CHALLENGES AND
          RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:15.3

    ASR-11 faces risk if (1) unexpected environmental problems and bad
    weather occur, (2) the schedule for STARS continues to slip, and (3)
    the contractor's test and system modification development strategy
    for the project is not successful.

    First, seasonal constraints for site surveys and preparations and
    additional processing time related to environmental impact surveys
    could cause ASR-11's schedule to slip.  A risk mitigation strategy
    was employed to accomplish site surveys up to 2 years in advance of
    delivering systems and site designs up to 1 year in advance of
    delivering systems.

    Second, the ASR-11 deployment schedule is currently based on the need
    to have a digital signal available for STARS.  STARS requires a
    digital radar, but ASR-11 can be delivered and commissioned without
    STARS.  Although STARS' schedule is slipping, an operational need for
    ASR-11 still remains because the current ASR-7 and ASR-8 equipment is
    aging and needs to be replaced.  According to project officials, if
    STARS' schedule slips more than 1 year, FAA will likely reevaluate
    the ASR-11 deployment schedule on the basis of the condition of the
    current ASR-7 and ASR-8 equipment rather than on the basis of the
    STARS' schedule.

    Finally, the ASR-11 contractor's current strategy for testing
    requirements and developing system modifications could lead to delays
    in the project's baseline schedule.  The original strategy called for
    a test program that utilized previous test data and quick approval of
    test documentation from the Contract Data Requirements List.
    Currently, however, little previous test data have been used to
    verify specification requirements, and the test Contract Data
    Requirements Lists originally submitted by the contractor did not
    meet minimal requirements.  As a result, testing has been delayed.
    In April 1998, FAA implemented a streamlined test documentation
    development and approval process to facilitate better management of
    the testing process.

    In addition, contractor's delays have occurred in the completion of
    the development and integration of system modifications.  As a
    result, resources for the radar system have been dedicated to
    development activity rather than test activity.  This has caused
    additional delays in the test program.  The contractor has proposed
    double shifts for testing and parallel testing as a means of
    offsetting these delays.

       Figure I.9:  ASR-11 at Eglin
       Air Force Base, Florida

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       VOICE SWITCHING AND CONTROL
       SYSTEM
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:16

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:16.1

    The Voice Switching and Control System (VSCS) replaces existing
    communication systems at en route centers with an expandable, highly
    reliable system for both ground-to-ground and air-to-ground
    communication.  VSCS will also provide a communication capability for
    new en route center controller workstations.  (See fig.  I-10.) FAA
    is also installing the VSCS Training and Backup Switch (VTABS)--an
    emergency back-up communications system, should VSCS experience an
    equipment outage--at all en route centers.

    VSCS was designed to provide the communication capabilities for the
    new Initial Sector Suite System workstations under the Advanced
    Automation System program.  By the time that the VSCS contract was
    awarded in December 1991 to the Harris Corporation, FAA had spent 5
    years in developing prototypes and had incurred cost growth of around
    $1 billion.\34 The contract required Harris to deliver 23 VSCS
    systems--21 for en route centers and 2 support systems.  FAA's plans
    called for VSCS to be installed with the current equipment and with
    the new controller workstations.  During the initial development, the
    cost of the VSCS project increased by $53.1 million to approximately
    $1.45 billion--costs associated primarily with FAA's decision in 1994
    to cancel the Initial Sector Suite System component of the Advanced
    Automation System and replace it with the DSR project.  The
    restructuring resulted in the need for additional equipment and
    testing and the extension of contractor and project personnel longer
    than planned to field VSCS equipment with DSR equipment.  FAA has
    also added new functionality requirements to the project.  Harris
    developed and installed the system in the existing en route
    controller work stations in February 1997--5 months ahead of schedule
    established at the time of contract award.

    Harris is reinstalling the controller interface equipment into the en
    route DSR controller workstations.  First- and last-site
    implementation dates for this phase are the same as those for
    DSR--October 1998 and May 2000, respectively.

    --------------------
    \34 According to project officials, the primary reason for this
    growth was the inability of commercially available products to
    effectively and accurately manage air traffic control communications
    functions.

          CHANGES TO VSCS' COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:16.2

    Since the schedule for transferring VSCS to the DSR console is the
    same as that for the DSR project, the agency is projecting a
    1-1/2-month slip in first-site implementation from October to
    December 1998.  Table I.18 summarizes the changes to VSCS' cost and
    schedule since 1994.

                                   Table I.18

                       Changes to VSCS' Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                     Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne,
                                     Fla.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1994          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                    $1,452.9      $1,452.9          None
    Cumulative F&E                                  $1,388.9
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                            1994\a          1998     Change in
                                                                    months
    Estimated first-site             Oct. 1998     Dec. 1998   +1.5 months
     Implementation
    Estimated last-site               May 2000      May 2000          None
     implementation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a Schedule is for activities that coincide with the schedule for the
    DSR project.

          VSCS' CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:16.3

    Harris has completed software development for the primary system to
    be fielded with the new DSR controller workstations.  According to
    the project manager, the project has not encountered any technical
    problems and is not expected to incur any major schedule slips.

    Meanwhile, FAA is in the process of installing VTABS at all en route
    centers.  By the end of 1998, FAA expects to have VTABS equipment
    installed at 10 en route centers, the FAA Technical Center, and the
    FAA Academy.  FAA plans to have VTABS installed at the remaining en
    route centers and in Alaska by November 1999.

    In fiscal year 1998, FAA reprogrammed $22 million of the $45.4
    million appropriated for VSCS to support the Host replacement
    project.  This reprogramming action forced the project office to
    defer, until at least 2001, the replacement of Tandem computers used
    by VSCS in its operating system.  The project office views this
    computer replacement as critical because Tandem will not certify the
    existing computers as Year 2000 compliant.  Currently, FAA and its
    contractor are conducting tests to determine if there is a Year 2000
    problem.  Tests to date have uncovered only minor problems for which
    FAA has identified solutions.

    According to the VSCS project manager, although no significant Year
    2000 problems have been identified with the Tandem computer, the
    computer and its operating system are several generations old.  FAA's
    current software licensing and hardware maintenance agreements have
    expired for FAA's Technical Center and FAA's Academy systems, greatly
    increasing the monthly licensing and maintenance fees.  Software
    licensing agreements for the operational systems will begin to expire
    in 2003 and will have similar program effects.  On the basis of the
    fees that Tandem charges FAA for the obsolete operating systems at
    FAA's Technical Center, it is conceivable that the fees that Tandem
    will charge for the obsolete operating systems for the operational
    sites for one year could exceed the cost to replace the Tandem
    computers.  FAA currently has efforts under way to restore funding
    for the Tandem computer replacement project in fiscal year 1999 to
    ensure that the computers are replaced before the license agreement
    expires for the operational system.

       Figure I.10:  VSCS Display
       Module

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       Source:  FAA.

       (See figure in printed
       edition.)

       WEATHER AND RADAR PROCESSOR
    -------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:17

          BACKGROUND
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:17.1

    The Weather and Radar Processor (WARP) is an automated processing and
    display system that will acquire, process, and disseminate Next
    Generation Weather Radar data to air traffic personnel at 21 en route
    centers and one each at the Air Traffic Control System Command Center
    and the FAA Technical Center.  Meteorologists will receive the data
    at their workstation; area supervisors, via WARP briefing terminals;
    and en route controllers, via the situation displays provided by DSR.
    WARP is being acquired in three stages and will replace the current
    Meteorological Weather Processor system.  Stage 0 is an early
    deployment of a commercial off-the-shelf system that will replace and
    improve the functionality of the current system that experienced many
    problems in the past.  Stage 1/2 is the core of the project, where
    interfaces with DSR, several Next Generation Weather Radar
    products--such as precipitation detection at multiple levels--and
    other current systems will be developed.  The latter part of this
    stage is intended to improve the interface with Next Generation
    Weather Radar products and allow for other improvements, such as
    providing the controller with the ability to request and reply to
    data.  FAA plans to implement Stage 3 in the future to provide WARP
    with critical operational changes.  This stage will also allow WARP
    to interface with other systems now being developed, such as ATM/Free
    Flight Phase 1, ITWS, OASIS, and Oceanic Automation Program.

          CHANGES TO WARP'S COST AND
          SCHEDULE
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:17.2

    Stage 0 has been completed.  The project met all its milestones on or
    ahead of schedule for this stage since the contract was signed in
    July 1996.  For example, the first operational readiness
    demonstration for Stage 0 was met 2 months ahead of schedule in July
    1997, and the last demonstration was met 5 months ahead of schedule.

    Also, in 1997, both preliminary and critical design reviews for Stage
    1/2 were achieved months ahead of schedule.  According to an FAA
    Office of Aviation Research official, a working group was also
    initiated during preliminary design review to address any
    human-factor questions that might be raised in the project's early
    stages.  However, first- and last-site implementation for Stage 1/2
    have slipped 5 months each because of Year 2000 testing requirements;
    a slip in the Next Generation Weather Radar certification testing
    schedule; an anticipated delay in operational test and evaluation
    because of the unavailability of the DSR interface; and an additional
    requirement to develop initial weather telecommunications
    capabilities.  Currently, Stage 1/2 is in full-scale development, and
    three limited production systems for Stage 1/2 have been procured.
    Cost estimates for the project have remained constant since the
    contract's award.  Stage 3 was originally scheduled to get started in
    1999.  Stage 3 is not considered part of the project schedule's
    official baseline.  Table I.19 summarizes the changes to WARP's cost
    and schedule since 1996.

                                   Table I.19

                      Changes to WARP's Cost and Schedule

                              (Dollars in millions

                     Vendor: Harris Corporation, Melbourne,
                                     Fla.)

                                                                 Change in
    Financial information                 1996          1998       dollars
    ----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
    Total F&E cost                      $125.6        $125.6          None
    Cumulative F&E                                     $57.7
     appropriations through
     fiscal year 1998
    ======================================================================
    Schedule                              1996          1998     Change in
                                                                    months
    Estimated first-site          Sept. 1999\a   Feb. 2000\a    + 5 months
     implementation
    Estimated last-site            Feb. 2000\a   July 2000\a    + 5 months
     implementation
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a Represents Stage 1/2.

          WARP'S CHALLENGES AND RISKS
    ------------------------------------------------------ Appendix I:17.3

    According to an FAA project official, three of the four issues that
    caused the 5-month slip in the project's first- and last-site
    implementation have been mitigated.  The required development of
    initial weather telecommunications capabilities--the fourth issue--is
    an ongoing effort but should not cause further slips in the project's
    first- and last-site implementation.

    MODERNIZATION PROJECTS COMPLETED
    THROUGH AUGUST 1998
    ========================================================== Appendix II

                                      (Dollars in millions)

                                                                    Total reported facilities
    Project (project number)                    Completion date            and equipment cost
    -----------------------------  ----------------------------  ----------------------------
    Automated Radar Terminal                               1983                           0\a
     System (ARTS) IIIA Assembler
     (22-02)
    ARTS II Displays (22-07)                               1984                         $ 3.6
    Radar Remote Weather Display                           1984                           0\a
     System (23-10)
    Interim Voice Response System                          1985                           0\a
     (23-06)
    Geostationary Operational                              1985                           1.9
     Environmental Satellite
     Recorders (23-11)
    En Route Automation (21-01)                            1986                           2.3
    ARTS IIIA Memory (22-04)                               1986                           8.6
    Additional ARTS IIIA at FAA                            1986                           4.7
     Technical Center (22-05)
    ARTS II Interfacility                                  1986                           0\a
     Interface (22-08)
    Consolidated Notice to Airmen                          1986                           0\a
     System (23-03)
    Radar Microwave Link Trunking                          1986                           8.2
     (25-01)
    Teletypewriter Replacement                             1986                           5.1
     (25-09)
    Nonradar Approach (21-14)                              1987                           1.6
    Air Traffic Control Tower                              1987                           1.5
     Closures (22-14)
    Air/Ground Communications                              1987                          60.6
     Equipment Modernization (24-
     01)
    Airport Telecommunications                             1987                           4.2
     (25-05)
    Data System Specialist                                 1987                          32.0
     Support (51-20)
    Host Computer (21-07)\b                                1988                         290.7
    Altitude Reporting Mode of                             1988                           0\a
     Secondary Radar (Mode-C)
     (21-10)
    Enhanced Target Generator                              1988                           0\a
     Displays (ARTS III) (22-03)
    Nondirectional Beacon (24-                             1988                          23.8
     04)
    National Airspace Data                                 1988                          17.0
     Interchange Network IA (25-
     06)
    Aircraft Fleet Conversion                              1988                          68.6
     (26-11)
    Enhanced Terminal Conflict                             1989                           0.4
     Alert (22-01)
    Automatic Terminal                                     1989                          11.2
     Information Service
     Recorders (22-10)
    High-Altitude En Route Flight                          1989                           6.3
     Advisory Service (23-07)
    Hazardous In Flight Weather                            1989                           7.3
     Advisory Service (23-08)
    Instrument Landing System                              1989                          69.6
     (24-06)
    Power Conditioning Systems                             1989                          21.5
     for ARTS III (26-06)
    TPX-42 Replacement (22-17)                             1990                          40.0
    Flight Data Entry and Print-                           1991                          18.8
     Out Devices (21-02)
    En Route Automated Radar                               1991                           2.8
     Tracking System Enhancements
     (21-04)
    Offshore Flight Data                                   1991                           1.0
     Processing System (21-16)
    Sustain New York Terminal                              1991                          95.4
     Radar Approach Control
     (TRACON) (22-18)
    Computer-Based Instruction                             1991                          10.4
     (26-02)
    National Radio Communication                           1991                          82.7
     System (26-14)
    Direct Access Radar Channel                            1992                          45.0
     System (21-03)
    Air Traffic Control Tower/                             1992                         391.4
     TRACON Modernization (22-
     13)\c
    Communications Facilities                              1992                          16.8
     Consolidation/Network (24-
     02)
    National Airspace Data                                 1992                          42.4
     Interchange Network II (25-
     07)
    Power System (26-07)                                   1992                          71.5
    Modernization of Unmanned FAA                          1992                          85.7
     Buildings and Equipment (26-
     08)
    Aircraft and Related                                   1992                          68.9
     Equipment (26-12)
    National Airspace System                               1992                           9.4
     Spectrum Engineering (26-
     15)
    System Support Lab (26-17)                             1992                          31.5
    General Support Lab (26-18)                            1992                          25.6
    ARTS IIA Enhancements (22-                             1993                          12.9
     06)
    Area Control Facilities (21-                           1993                           9.6
     15)
    Data Multiplexing Network                              1993                          34.0
     (25-02)
    Radar Microwave Link                                   1993                         268.4
     Replacement and Expansion
     (25-03)\d
    Large Airport Cable Loop                               1993                          20.3
     Systems (26-05)
    Interfacility Data Transfer                            1994                           1.8
     System for Edwards Air Force
     Base Radar Approach Control
     (35-20)
    Visual Navaids (24-09)                                 1994                         137.7
    Acquisition of Flight Service                          1994                          79.7
     Facilities (26-10)
    Interim Support Plan\e (46-                            1994                         362.9
     30)
    Tower Integration Program                              1994                          11.2
     (42-20)
    Radar Pedestal Vibration                               1994                           5.0
     Analysis (44-43)
    Low-Level Wind Shear Alert                             1994                          47.2
     System (23-12)
    Human Resource Management                              1994                           7.3
     (56-22)
    Brite Radar Indicator Tower                            1994                          64.5
     Equipment (22-16)
    Approach Lighting System                               1994                         121.9
     Improvement Program (24-10)
    Central Weather Processor                              1994                          81.1
     (23-02)
    General Support (26-16)\f                              1994                         824.0
    National Implementation of                             1994                           4.6
     the "Imaging" Aid for
     Dependent Converging Runway
     Approaches (62-24)
    Integrated Communications                              1995                          98.3
     Switching System (23-13)
    System Engineering and                                 1995                         759.3
     Integration Contract (26-
     13)
    National Airspace Data                                 1995                          23.7
     Interchange Network II
     Continuation (35-07)
    ARTS IIIA Peripheral Adapter                           1995                           5.9
     Module Modernization (52-
     21)
    Instrument Landing System and                          1995                          13.1
     Visual Navaids Engineering
     and Sparing (44-24)
    Air Traffic Control Tower/                             1995                          13.1
     TRACON Establishment (32-
     13)
    Flight Service Automation                              1995                         313.7
     System (23-01)
    Multichannel Voice Recorders                           1996                          40.2
     (22-11)
    Weather Message Switching                              1996                          32.5
     Center Replacement (23-04)
    Computer Aided Engineering                             1996                           3.7
     Graphics Enhancements (56-
     25)
    Oceanic Display and Planning                           1996                          36.8
     System (21-05)
    Integrated Communications                              1996                          10.6
     Switching System Logistics
     Support (43-14)
    Maintenance Control Center                             1996                          47.9
     (26-04)
    Long-Range Navigation-C                                1996                          51.9
     (LORAN-C) Systems (24-17)
    ARTS IIA Interface with Mode-                          1996                           0\a
     S/Airport Surveillance
     Radar-9 (22-09)
    Replacement of Controllers                             1996                           5.1
     Chairs (42-24)
    ARTS IIIA-Expand Capacity and                          1997                         109.8
     Provide Mode-C Intruder
     Capability (32-20)
    Display Channel Complex                                1997                          61.3
     Rehost (A-01)
    Digital Bright Radar                                   1998                          24.2
     Indicator Tower Equipment
     (32-16)
    Civil Aviation Registry                                1998                          34.4
     Modernization (56-24)
    FAA Telecommunications (45-                            1998                          16.1
     21)
    Precision Automated Tracking                           1998                           3.3
     System (56-16)
    National Airspace Integrated                           1998                          27.6
     Logistic Support (56-58)
    Long Range Radar Radome                                1998                          39.5
     Replacement (44-42)
    Computer Resources Nucleus                             1998                         158.1
     (56-28)
    =========================================================================================
    Total                                                                            $5,714.2
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \a The cost of this project was covered under another facilities and
    equipment project.

    \b Installed at en route centers to allow processing of existing air
    traffic control software on new equipment.

    \c Project comprised a variety of tower and terminal replacement and
    modernization projects.  Project was continued in the Capital
    Investment Plan under projects 42-13 and 42-14.

    \d Also known as the Radio Communications Link project, it was
    designed to convert aging "special purpose" Radar Microwave Link
    System into a "general purpose" system for data, voice, and radar
    communications among en route centers and other major FAA facilities.

    \e Project was activated to sustain and upgrade air traffic control
    operations and acquire eight terminal radars awaiting the full
    implementation of the Advanced Automation System.

    \f Project comprised a variety of diverse support projects and has
    been continued in the Capital Investment Plan under Continued General
    Support (46-16).

    Source:  FAA.  We did not independently verify the schedule and cost
    information.

    MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
    ========================================================= Appendix III

    RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
    DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
    D.C.

    John H.  Anderson, Jr.
    Gregory P.  Carroll
    Beverly Norwood Dulaney
    David B.  Goldstein
    Peter G.  Maristch
    Belva M.  Martin
    John T.  Noto
    Earl P.  Williams, Jr.

    ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
    MANAGEMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
    D.C.

    Colleen M.  Phillips

    *** End of document. ***