Federal Wildfire Activities: Current Strategy and Issues Needing
Attention (Letter Report, 08/13/1999, GAO/RCED-99-233).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed how the Forest Service
and the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) manage their wildfire programs,
focusing on the: (1) process the Forest Service and BLM use to determine
the amount of funds needed to prepare for fighting fires; (2) roles and
responsibilities of the National Interagency Fire Center in mobilizing
firefighting resources; and (3) types of agreements reached among
federal, state, and local firefighting organizations.

GAO noted that: (1) the Forest Service and BLM use the same process to
develop their wildfire preparedness budgets; (2) this includes the use
of a model that determines, on the basis of historical data such as fire
activity, weather, and suppression costs, the most efficient funding
level for a firefighting organization; (3) the most efficient funding
level is based on a calculation that minimizes fire suppression costs
and the loss of natural resources on the lands; (4) for fiscal years
1996 through 1999, the agencies received about 85 percent of the
wildfire preparedness funds they estimated they would need; (5) while
the National Interagency Fire Center does not play a role in determining
where firefighting resources should be located before a fire season
begins, it is the nation's logistical support center for controlling and
extinguishing wildfires; (6) as such, it coordinates the mobilization of
firefighting supplies, equipment, and personnel at the federal,
regional, and local levels; (7) as local and regional firefighting
resources are depleted during a fire season, regional geographic
coordination centers located throughout the United States obtain
additional firefighting personnel and equipment through the National
Interagency Coordination Center at the Fire Center; (8) to provide
mutual support in suppressing wildfires, the Forest Service and BLM have
entered into numerous agreements and other types of cooperative efforts
with other federal, state, and local firefighting organizations; (9)
while no single type of agreement appears to be better than another,
agency officials agreed that without these agreements and other types of
cooperative efforts, it would be virtually impossible for any
firefighting organization, including the Forest Service and BLM, to
manage its firefighting program; (10) several issues could affect the
agencies' ability to manage their firefighting programs in the future;
(11) the agencies' firefighting workforce is shrinking because some
workers are no longer willing to take on firefighting as a collateral
duty while employees with expertise in fire management are nearing
retirement age; (12) the Forest Service and BLM are implementing a new
radio technology but are purchasing different radio systems that may not
be able to communicate with each other or with the systems used by other
firefighting organizations; (13) the Forest Service is using an outdated
test to measure the physical fitness of its firefighters; and (14)
although it plans to use the same up-to-date physical fitness test that
BLM uses, when it will do so is uncertain.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-99-233
     TITLE:  Federal Wildfire Activities: Current Strategy and Issues
	     Needing Attention
      DATE:  08/13/1999
   SUBJECT:  Fire fighters
	     Interagency relations
	     Medical examinations
	     Performance measures
	     Emergency preparedness
	     Federal/state relations
IDENTIFIER:  BLM National Fire Management Analysis	  System

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Cover
================================================================ COVER

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Forests and Forest Health,
Committee on Resources, House of Representatives

August 1999

FEDERAL WILDFIRE ACTIVITIES -
CURRENT STRATEGY AND ISSUES
NEEDING ATTENTION

GAO/RCED-99-233

Federal Wildfire Activities

(141271)

Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  BLM - Bureau of Land Management
  NFMAS - National Fire Management Analysis System

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER

B-283039

August 13, 1999

The Honorable Helen Chenoweth
Chairman, Subcommittee on Forests
 and Forest Health
Committee on Resources
House of Representatives

Dear Madam Chairman: 

Each year, wildfires on federal lands consume millions of acres of
forests, grasslands, and desert areas.  Wildfires also threaten human
lives and property on state and private lands adjacent to federal
lands.  In 1998, more than 81,000 fires consumed over 2.3 million
acres of land.  To manage fires on federal lands, the Forest Service,
within the Department of Agriculture, and the Bureau of Land
Management, within the Department of the Interior, spend hundreds of
millions of dollars annually on preparing for and controlling
wildfires.  These agencies rely, in part, on the National Interagency
Fire Center to carry out their fire management responsibilities. 

Concerned about the rising costs of preparing for and controlling
wildfires, you asked us to provide information on how the Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management manage their wildfire
programs.  Specifically, this report provides information on (1) the
process the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management use to
determine the amount of funds needed to prepare for fighting fires;
(2) the roles and responsibilities of the National Interagency Fire
Center in mobilizing firefighting resources; and (3) the types of
agreements reached among federal, state, and local firefighting
organizations.  We also looked at several issues that could affect
the agencies' ability to manage their firefighting programs in the
future. 

   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management use the same
process to develop their wildfire preparedness budgets.  This
includes the use of a model that determines, on the basis of
historical data such as fire activity, weather, and suppression
costs, the most efficient funding level for a firefighting
organization.  The most efficient funding level is based on a
calculation that minimizes fire suppression costs and the loss of
natural resources on the lands.  For fiscal years 1996 through 1999,
the agencies received about 85 percent of the wildfire preparedness
funds they estimated they would need. 

While the National Interagency Fire Center does not play a role in
determining where firefighting resources should be located before a
fire season begins, it is the nation's logistical support center for
controlling and extinguishing wildfires.  As such, it coordinates the
mobilization of firefighting supplies, equipment, and personnel at
the federal, regional, and local levels.  As local and regional
firefighting resources are depleted during a fire season, regional
geographic coordination centers located throughout the United States
obtain additional firefighting personnel and equipment through the
National Interagency Coordination Center at the Fire Center. 

To provide mutual support in suppressing wildfires, the Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management have entered into numerous
agreements and other types of cooperative efforts with other federal,
state, and local firefighting organizations.  While no single type of
agreement appears to be better than another, agency officials agreed
that without these agreements and other types of cooperative efforts,
it would be virtually impossible for any firefighting organization,
including the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management, to
manage its firefighting program. 

Several issues could affect the agencies' ability to manage their
firefighting programs in the future.  First, the agencies'
firefighting workforce is shrinking because some workers are no
longer willing to take on firefighting as a collateral duty while
employees with expertise in fire management are nearing retirement
age.  Second, the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management are
implementing a new radio technology but are purchasing different
radio systems that may not be able to communicate with each other or
with the systems used by other firefighting organizations.  Finally,
the Forest Service is using an outdated test to measure the physical
fitness of its firefighters.  Although it plans to use the same
up-to-date physical fitness test that the Bureau of Land Management
uses, when it will do so is uncertain.  We are making recommendations
to address these issues. 

   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

The Forest Service manages about 192 million acres of land in 155
national forests and grasslands, and the Bureau of Land Management
(BLM) manages about 264 million acres of land.  While the national
forests are located nationwide, BLM lands are generally located in
the 11 contiguous western states and Alaska.  Much of this federal
acreage is susceptible to potentially catastrophic wildfires,
particularly where the natural vegetation has been altered by past
uses of the land and a century of fire suppression.  The Forest
Service estimates that 39 million acres on national forests in the
western states are at high risk of catastrophic wildfire. 

Planning for and suppressing fires involves determining how much
funding is needed to initiate prompt and effective actions to control
fires.  Wildfire preparedness funds are used to place firefighting
resources, before each fire season begins, in locations where they
can most effectively respond to fires that may occur.  Wildfire
preparedness activities are actions, including planning and
purchasing, that are taken before the onset of a fire season.  Fire
suppression activities include actions taken to control and
extinguish wildfires, including those involving the use of
firefighting personnel and equipment. 

The federal land management agencies maintain and operate the
National Interagency Fire Center at Boise, Idaho.\1 The Center
provides firefighting support by mobilizing and coordinating the
movement of firefighting resources for both wildfires and prescribed
fires when local capabilities are depleted and when local agencies
request assistance. 

--------------------
\1 The agencies that occupy the Fire Center include BLM, the Forest
Service, the National Park Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service,
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the National Weather Service, the
Office of Aircraft Services, and BLM's national law enforcement
office. 

   LOCATION OF FIREFIGHTING
   RESOURCES DEPENDS ON BUDGETS
   RECEIVED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The Forest Service and BLM use the same analytical process to
determine the level of wildfire preparedness funds they need before
the start of a wildfire season.  Appropriations for wildfire
preparedness have generally been lower than the amounts determined to
be needed by the budget planning process for each agencyï¿½by about 15
percent for fiscal years 1996 through 1999.  Even though the Forest
Service and BLM have received less wildfire preparedness funding than
needed according to their budget planning processes, the agencies'
initial efforts to control fires have been over 90 percent
successful.\2

--------------------
\2 A measure of the effectiveness of a firefighting program is
whether the initial efforts to control a fire succeed in putting it
out.  Generally, if a fire is not controlled within the first 24
hours, more extensive firefighting efforts, in terms of personnel and
equipment, may be needed. 

      FOREST SERVICE AND BLM USE
      THE SAME PROCESS TO BUDGET
      FOR WILDFIRE PREPAREDNESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

The Forest Service and BLM use the National Fire Management Analysis
System, which includes a computer model, to develop their wildfire
preparedness budget requests.\3 The model is designed to determine,
on the basis of historical data such as fire activity, weather, and
suppression costs, the most efficient funding level for a
firefighting organization.  The most efficient funding level is based
on a calculation that will minimize fire suppression costs and the
loss of natural resources on the lands. 

Before determining the most efficient funding level, fire personnel
who are preparing the analyses calibrate the computer model to ensure
that once the data are entered and run in the model, the results will
replicate actual fire history within 5 percent.  According to Forest
Service and BLM officials we spoke with, calibrating the model is a
critical step in the National Fire Management Analysis System process
because it ensures that the data going into the model are accurate
and reliable. 

To ensure the integrity of the analysis process, Forest Service
regional and BLM national officials certify the national forests' and
BLM field offices' National Fire Management Analysis System analyses. 
In certifying the analyses, Forest Service and BLM officials verify
that consistent and reliable data are used in the model and that the
data are consistent across forest and regional office boundaries. 
Forest Service and BLM officials we spoke with stated that the
certification process is useful for ensuring that the National Fire
Management Analysis System process is being implemented properly and
that all units are on a level playing field through having their data
and process independently reviewed. 

After determining the most efficient funding level, the national
forests and BLM field offices develop operational plans to show how
they plan to allocate the amounts determined to be needed by the
budget planning process to such firefighting resources as personnel,
supplies, and equipment.  Then, when the national forests and BLM
field offices receive their annual funding for wildfire preparedness,
they revise their operational plans for the year to reflect the funds
actually received.  With these funds, the national forests and BLM
field offices decide what firefighting resources will be positioned
before the start of the fire season and where these resources will be
located.  From year to year, the physical location of firefighting
resources generally does not change.  What does change with the
available funding are the numbers and types of firefighting personnel
and equipment that are positioned at these locations and the length
of time they are stationed there. 

Appendix I contains more detailed information on the National Fire
Management Analysis System and the wildfire preparedness budget
process. 

--------------------
\3 While we did not evaluate the computer model and how it works, the
Forest Service has used it since 1980 and BLM since 1986.  Agency
officials believe that the process has resulted in a consistent
procedure for evaluating the probable effectiveness and efficiency of
fire programs. 

      FUNDING FOR WILDFIRE
      PREPAREDNESS FALLS SHORT OF
      IDENTIFIED NEEDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

Neither the Forest Service nor BLM received as much funding for
wildfire preparedness activities as determined to be needed by the
budget planning process for fiscal years 1996 through 1999.  As shown
in figure 1, the agencies consistently received, on average, about 15
percent less than the amount of funds determined to be needed by the
budget planning process during these 4 fiscal years.  The figure also
shows that the differences between the amounts determined to be
needed by the budget planning process and the amounts received by
both agencies have generally increased during the 4 fiscal years. 

   Figure 1:  Wildfire
   Preparedness Funds Determined
   to be Needed by the Budget
   Planning Process and Received
   by the Forest Service and BLM,
   Fiscal Years 1996 through 1999

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from the Forest Service and BLM. 

Once the national forests and BLM field offices receive their
appropriations for wildfire preparedness, they take measures to
ensure that the funds received are used most effectively in support
of their firefighting responsibilities.  The operational plans, which
the national forests and BLM field offices prepared using the results
of their National Fire Management Analysis System analyses, are
reviewed to determine what firefighting resources can be funded. 
Because the level of funding received has been less than the level of
funds determined to be needed by the budget planning process, the
national forests and BLM field offices have taken measures to
compensate for the reduced funding.  For example, they have (1)
removed fire engines from service, (2) not fully staffed fire
engines, (3) reduced the time that fire engines were on-call from 7
days per week to 5 days per week, (4) not hired seasonal firefighters
and/or hired seasonal firefighters for less than the entire fire
season, and (5) placed employees on involuntary unpaid leave or
temporarily transferred them to other work locations.  According to
Forest Service and BLM officials, these examples show that the
ability of the national forests and BLM field offices to fight fires
is diminished when they do not receive as much funding for wildfire
preparedness as determined to be needed by the budget planning
process. 

Neither Forest Service nor BLM officials we spoke with could provide
examples of fires that have burned out of control because the funding
for wildfire preparedness was insufficient.  However, Forest Service
and BLM officials identified examples of equipment and items that
were not purchased because of limited funds.  For example, the Forest
Service and BLM each contract for one large airplane for the fire
season to transport firefighters and equipment throughout the country
as needed.  In 1998, BLM had to discontinue its contract because of
rising costs and the Forest Service may have to do the same in 2000. 
BLM officials also cited instances in which a lack of funds has
delayed the replacement of fire engines at the end of their useful
life or the purchase of new engines identified as needed. 

The Forest Service and BLM have an additional tool at their disposal
to improve their initial efforts to control firesï¿½severity funding. 
The agencies receive two types of appropriations for wildfire
activitiesï¿½preparedness funds and suppression funds.  Preparedness
funds are used for activities undertaken before the onset of
wildfires.  Suppression funds are used for actions taken to control
and extinguish wildfires, including those involving the use of
firefighting personnel and equipment.  When the Forest Service and
BLM approve severity requests, funds from the suppression
appropriation are used in an emergency mode to supplement
preparedness resources.  Typical uses of severity funds include

  -- temporarily increasing firefighter staffing,

  -- prepositioning firefighting resources in areas of abnormally
     high fire danger, and/or

  -- increasing the availability of aircraft. 

In fiscal year 1998, the Forest Service used about $11.4 million in
severity funding, primarily to help put out the fires that occurred
in Florida.  For the same period, BLM used about $1.8 million in
severity funding. 

   NATIONAL INTERAGENCY FIRE
   CENTER HAS MULTIPLE
   RESPONSIBILITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

The ability to use resources from federal, state, and local
firefighting agencies is crucial to the success of any firefighting
program.  The National Interagency Fire Center (Fire Center) is the
nation's primary logistical support center for mobilizing
firefighting resources.  Although not involved in positioning
firefighting resources before the start of a fire season, the Fire
Center doesï¿½depending on the extent to which local and regional
firefighting organizations suppress firesï¿½take an active role in
coordinating the mobilization of firefighting resources from anywhere
in the country to help control or extinguish fires.  As part of its
support function, the Fire Center establishes standard firefighting
and training standards and conducts both pre-and post-fire-season
evaluations of the types and numbers of firefighting resources that
were available and actually mobilized.  Appendix II shows the
organization of the National Interagency Fire Center. 

      NATIONAL INTERAGENCY FIRE
      CENTER SUPPORTS MULTIPLE
      OPERATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

The Fire Center is the national headquarters for managing BLM's
firefighting program.  In addition, managers from each of the other
four federal land management agencies, including the Forest Service,
and representatives from state fire management organizations are
represented at the Fire Center.  To make the firefighting task more
efficient and cost-effective, agency managers at the Fire Center work
together to coordinate and support the mobilization of their
firefighting supplies, equipment, and personnel. 

The Fire Center, which is located on BLM land, is jointly funded and
operated by the federal agencies that occupy space at the Fire
Center.  The federal agencies, for fiscal years 1996 through 1999,
will have paid BLM more than $1.3 million, with the Forest Service
paying about $442,600, or almost 34 percent, of this amount. 

To help with fire suppression efforts, the Fire Center maintains two
types of caches, or warehouses, of firefighting radios, equipment,
and supplies: 

  -- The National Incident Radio Support Cache is jointly operated by
     the departments of the Interior and Agriculture.  This is the
     only totally compatible national radio cache of its kind in a
     single location.  The cache contains 7,000 hand-held radios, as
     well as a variety of other communications equipment, such as
     telephones and microwave radio stations. 

  -- The equipment and supply cache, which is 1 of the 11 national
     caches, is the largest federal cache of firefighting equipment
     and supplies.  Operated by BLM, the cache sends equipment and
     supplies to the other caches, operated by both BLM and the
     Forest Service, throughout the nation. 

In addition, several other functions are housed at the Fire Center
that play an important role in fire management.  For example, the
Remote Automatic Weather Stations provide up-to-date weather data
from about 775 weather stations.  The Automatic Lightning Detection
System aids agencies in pinpointing the location of lightning strikes
and thus identifying sites where new fires may occur.  Through the
Fire Center, agencies can request infrared mapping of burning areas
to aid in firefighting and aerial mapping to aid in natural resource
management activities. 

      AGENCIES FOLLOW AN
      ESTABLISHED PROCESS FOR
      MOBILIZING FIREFIGHTING
      RESOURCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

Fires are attacked using three levels of management
responsibilityï¿½local, regional, and national.  Generally, efforts to
control and extinguish a fire are handled initially by the local
agency responsible for protecting an area from fire, whether that
area is administered by a national forest, a BLM field office, or a
state land management agency.  Numerous federal, state, and local
firefighting resources, including engines, ground crews, and air
tankers carrying retardant, can be used to initially control and
extinguish a fire.  Various local agencies may work together, sharing
personnel and equipment, to fight new fires as well as those that
escape initial suppression efforts.  If a fire grows to the point
where local firefighting personnel and equipment are not sufficient
to suppress the fireï¿½usually when 65 percent of all available
firefighting resources have been committed to ongoing firesï¿½the local
agency contacts its geographic area coordination center.  There are
11 such centersï¿½9 of which are located west of the Mississippi
Riverï¿½as shown in figure 2. 

   Figure 2:  Location of the 11
   Geographic Area Coordination
   Centers

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  National Interagency Fire Center. 

Each geographic area coordination center is responsible for locating
additional firefighters, equipment, and supplies within the
geographic area and dispatching the resources to the local fire
protection agencies that requested assistance.  For example, in the
Northwest Geographic Area Coordination Centerï¿½consisting of the
states of Oregon and Washington--46 local firefighting resource
centers are available to dispatch firefighting resources to any of
the other local resource centers in the geographic area that request
assistance.  In addition, each geographic area coordination center
can contract with private suppliers for additional firefighting
resources if federally provided firefighting resources are not
available. 

During a busy fire season, wildfires may deplete the capacity of the
local and geographic area coordination center personnel to provide
the firefighting resources requested by the local firefighting
agencies.  When this happens, the geographic area coordination center
orders additional resources through the National Interagency
Coordination Center at the Fire Center.  The National Interagency
Coordination Center locates the closest available firefighting
resourcesï¿½no matter what agency they are affiliated with or where
they are locatedï¿½and dispatches them to the local agency requesting
resources.  Besides dispatching firefighting resources, the National
Interagency Coordination Center gathers, analyzes, and reports
information to all federal and state land management agencies about
specific wildfire incidents and the overall fire situation.  (App. 
III describes and illustrates the process for ordering wildland
firefighting supplies and resources.)

When the national fire situation becomes severe and the National
Interagency Coordination Center has trouble finding firefighting
resources available for mobilization, the Fire Center's Multi-agency
Coordination Group is activated.\4 The role of the this group is to
identifyï¿½on the basis of information provided by the National
Interagency Coordination Centerï¿½national or interagency issues
related to the current fire situation.  In addition, when
firefighting resources are scarce and there are competing demands for
the resources, the Multi-agency Coordination Group sets priorities
for the National Interagency Coordination Center's mobilization of
firefighting resources. 

--------------------
\4 The Multi-agency Coordination Group consists of the directors of
the agencies housed at the Fire Center.  In addition, depending on
the severity of the situation, a representative from the General
Services Administration, a military liaison, and a state forester
will be added to the Multi-agency Coordination Group. 

      NATIONAL WILDFIRE
      COORDINATING GROUP
      ESTABLISHES FIREFIGHTING
      STANDARDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

The National Wildfire Coordinating Group\5 is responsible for
ensuring that consistent firefighting practices, standards, and
training programs are developed for all federal firefighting
organizations.  State and local firefighting organizations follow
their own firefighting practices, standards, and training programs,
which have been accepted by both the Forest Service and BLM.  Before
federal, state, and local firefighting resources can be mobilized,
they must comply with accepted firefighting practices, standards, and
training programs.  Forest Service and BLM officials told us that to
respond efficiently, effectively, and safely to fires, federal,
state, and local firefighting resources must be usable
interchangeably.  They said that without accepted firefighting
practices, standards, and training programs, attempts to use federal,
state, and local firefighters interchangeably would not only make it
difficult to successfully manage fires, but could also put
firefighters at risk of being injured or killed. 

--------------------
\5 The National Wildfire Coordinating Group was formed in Mar.  1976
as an umbrella organization to facilitate the development of
practices, standards, and training throughout the wildland fire
community.  Representatives are drawn from the Forest Service, BLM,
the Fish and Wildlife Service, the National Park Service, the Bureau
of Indian Affairs, the National Association of State Foresters, and
the Federal Emergency Management Agency's U.S.  Fire Administration. 

      EFFORTS TO IMPROVE
      MOBILIZATION OF FIREFIGHTING
      RESOURCES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4

The Forest Service and BLM conduct local, regional, and national
pre-fire-season readiness reviews to determine the preparedness
levels of each national forest, including its ranger districts, and
each BLM field office.  The readiness reviews evaluate such factors
as the preparedness levels of fire engines, dispatch centers, and
fire crews.  Readiness reviews also determine whether firefighters
have received the proper training and have met physical fitness
requirements. 

The Forest Service and BLM also conduct post-fire-season reviews to
evaluate, among other things, how the firefighting resource
mobilization system provided by the Fire Center contributed to the
agencies' fire suppression efforts and what improvements need to be
made before the next fire season.  For example, at the conclusion of
the 1998 fire season, coordinators from the 11 geographic
coordination centers and the National Interagency Coordination Center
reviewed the impact on the Fire Center's firefighting mobilization
system once the southeastern states activated their state compact\6
firefighting mobilization system during the 1998 Florida wildfires. 

On the basis of the results of their evaluation, the coordinators
agreed that the activation of the state compact firefighting
mobilization system resulted in the implementation of a second
firefighting mobilization system and the mobilization of duplicate
firefighting resources.  The coordinators also agreed on a need to
investigate the feasibility of combining the state compact
mobilization system with the Fire Center's wildfire mobilization
system.  Consequently, the coordinators are now drafting an issue
paper that outlines each of the state compacts, explains how they can
complement the Fire Center's firefighting mobilization system, and
discusses how the Fire Center's mobilization system can be modified
to incorporate the positive features of the state compact
firefighting mobilization system. 

--------------------
\6 Before the Fire Center was established, states in the eastern
portion of the nation entered into ï¿½compactsï¿½ that allow for the
movement of firefighting resources between states. 

   TYPES OF COORDINATION
   AGREEMENTS VARY BUT APPEAR TO
   BE WORKING WELL
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

To provide for mutual support in managing fires, the Forest Service
and BLM have entered into numerous and varied coordination agreements
with other federal, state, and local firefighting organizations
throughout the nation.  The coordination agreements start at the
national level between federal agencies and cascade down to state and
local firefighting organizations.  The coordination agreements define
the fire management responsibilities of the signatories and provide
that local firefighting personnel and organizations will meet
identified physical fitness and equipment standards. 

The Forest Service and BLM recognize that coordination agreements are
vital to implementing the objectives of their fire management
programs and ensuring that the duties and procedures of each federal,
state, and local firefighting organization are defined and
understood.  The Forest Service and BLM were, at the time of our
audit work, reviewing their coordination agreements with the local
firefighting organizations to ensure that the agreements provided for
the discussion of applicable fire operations standards.  The Forest
Service and BLM were reviewing the local coordination agreements
after a wildfire in which two fatalities occurred.  Specifically, two
firefighters from a rural fire district in Idaho were killed in 1995
when a wildfire they were helping to extinguish on BLM lands consumed
their stalled fire engine.  BLM did not have a coordination agreement
with the rural fire district.  In a subsequent legal decision, BLM
was found to be partiallyï¿½35 percentï¿½responsible for the two deaths
because it had not fulfilled its responsibility to instruct the rural
firefighters about fire operations, such as the nature of the fire,
fuel conditions, and weather. 

We found that each of the three geographic regions we visited during
our review had coordination agreements.  However, each of the regions
had different types of agreements: 

  -- The Pacific Northwest has a Master Cooperative Fire Protection
     Agreement between the five federal land management agencies and
     the states of Washington and Oregon.  While the agreement
     establishes consistency in wildfire management policies and
     procedures, as well as fiscal relationships and
     responsibilities, the Forest Service and BLM still enter into
     separate cooperative agreements with local firefighting
     organizations.  For example, on the Central Oregon Fire
     Management System, two national forests and one BLM field office
     entered into separate agreements with 12 counties and 34 rural
     fire districts. 

  -- In Arizona, the Forest Service, BLM, and the state have entered
     into the Joint Powers Agreement.  Under this agreement, Arizona
     enters into separate agreements with each of the 200 rural fire
     districts in the state and certifies that the rural fire
     districts comply with firefighting standards, such as those for
     physical fitness and equipment maintenance.  The Joint Powers
     Agreement eliminates the need for the Forest Service and BLM to
     enter into cooperative agreements with individual rural fire
     districts in Arizona. 

  -- In the southeast, the Forest Service does not have either a
     master or an umbrella cooperative agreement with the states.\7
     Each national forest enters into cooperative agreements with
     state and local firefighting organizations as needed.  In
     addition, the states have entered into ï¿½compactsï¿½ that provide
     for moving firefighters and equipment across state lines when
     needed.  For example, 10 southeastern states are party to the
     Southeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, which
     allows for, among other things, mutual aid in fighting forest
     fires among the states that are party to the compact, as well as
     with states that are party to other regional compacts. 

Our review of these different types of coordination agreements and
discussions with federal and state firefighting officials suggest
that no one single type of coordination agreement or coordination
process is better than another.  Forest Service, BLM, and state
officials told us that, except for an occasional disagreement over
the reimbursement of firefighting costs, their coordination
agreements and processes are working well and they do not see a need
for changes.  The officials universally agreed that it would be
virtually impossible for them to manage their firefighting programs
without the coordination agreements. 

--------------------
\7 Because BLM lands are generally located in the 11 contiguous
western states, BLM does not play a role in fire-related activities
in the southeast.  The Department of the Interior's National Park
Service and Fish and Wildlife Service have lands in the southeast and
interact with the Forest Service on fire-related activities. 

   SEVERAL ISSUES COULD AFFECT THE
   MANAGEMENT OF THE FEDERAL
   WILDFIRE FIGHTING PROGRAM
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

We identified several issues that could affect the Forest Service's
and BLM's ability to manage their firefighting programs in the
future.  First, the federal firefighting workforce is shrinking
because some Forest Service and BLM employees no longer choose to
become qualified to fight fires as a collateral duty, as they did in
the past.  With fewer firefighters, not as many Forest Service and
BLM fire crews will be available to fight fires.  Second, the Forest
Service and BLM are implementing new radio technology, but each
agency has taken a different approach to implementation.  Forest
Service and BLM officials in the field are concerned that this could
compromise communications and firefighters' safety.  Third, the
agencies are currently using two different tests to determine whether
firefighters are physically fit to fight fires.  While the Forest
Service plans to begin using the test that BLM uses, it has not
determined when it will implement the change. 

      FIREFIGHTING WORKFORCE IS
      SHRINKING BECAUSE OF
      ATTRITION AND COMPETING
      DEMANDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

The firefighting workforces of both the Forest Service and BLM are
shrinking, leaving fewer firefighters to handle the workload. 
According to both Forest Service and BLM officials, the firefighter
workforce is getting smaller because many workers whose primary job
responsibilities are not fire related are not interested in becoming
qualified to fight fires as a collateral duty.  Also, according to
both Forest Service and BLM officials, the firefighting workforce is
getting older and nearing retirement age.  If these firefighters are
not replaced, the agencies may not have enough qualified individuals
to fill critical fire management positions.  This situation could
have a direct impact on firefighters' safety. 

According to Forest Service and BLM officials, there are several
reasons why some employees no longer become qualified to fight fires
as a collateral duty.  First, staff who do not fight fires as a
primary duty--such as resource specialists--are committed to carrying
out their primary job duties and do not want to spend time fighting
fires.  Second, many families have dual careers, and the additional
income they would earn from fighting fires would not, in their view,
offset the inconvenience and expense involved in, for example,
rearranging their schedules and providing for additional child care. 
Third, family values have changed to the extent that many employees
today are unwilling to abandon family commitments to fight fires. 
Finally, for many employees, the rate of overtime pay while fighting
fires is less than the regular base salary rate. 

While not requiring staff to become qualified to fight fires, the
Forest Service does encourage all of its employees to do so.  For
example, in a June 1998 memorandum, the Forest Service's Deputy Chief
for State and Private Forestry said that all employees should be
encouraged to become active in the fire organization and should be
offered training in firefighting duties.  While this memorandum does
not require all Forest Service employees to become qualified to fight
fires, it does note that all employees have roles and
responsibilities during fire emergencies and that firefighting is the
most visible activity of the Forest Service.  In a July 1998
memorandum, the Chief of the Forest Service reinforced the message
that all employees should become fire qualified.  The Chief also
stated that resource program targets are not a justifiable reason for
keeping qualified firefighters from fighting fires and that
allowances must be made to meet fire suppression requests. 

Having fewer firefighters and other staff could be especially
difficult for national forests and BLM field offices that rely on
agency personnel to fight fires rather than hiring seasonal
firefighters.  For example, one Forest Service region we visited
relies entirely on its firefighters and other fire-qualified staff to
control fires; it does not hire seasonal firefighters.  Because of
the decrease in firefighters and other staff, this region is now
contemplating hiring seasonal firefighters.  Other locations told us
that they were using contract firefighting crews to make up for the
shortfall in firefighters on large fires.  Using contract
firefighting crews on large fires is an option, but contractors must
still be managed by agency personnel because contractors cannot
replace top-level Forest Service and BLM managers on firefighting
crews. 

The firefighting workforce is also shrinking because many older
employees who are qualified to fight fires are unwilling to do so for
several reasons.  Some older employees have difficulty keeping up
with the physical demands of firefighting, while other employees no
longer derive satisfaction from fighting fires.  Additionally, the
Fair Labor Standards Act has created a pay equity issue for some
older employees.  Under this act, when employees are assigned to a
fire, they are classified as being in either an exempt position (such
as a supervisor) or a nonexempt position (such as a truck driver). 
Under the act, personnel in nonexempt positions are compensated for
overtime work at 150 percent of their normal base pay.  But for
personnel in exempt positions, compensation for overtime work is
capped at step 1 of the federal General Salary Level 10ï¿½about $16.50
per hour.  According to Forest Service and BLM officials, it is
routine for personnel with great responsibilities in exempt
positions, such as incident commanders, to be paid less than truck
drivers.  The disparity in overtime compensation discourages the
participation of more experienced employees in firefighting
activities. 

Officials from the Forest Service and BLM told us that the aging
federal firefighting workforce is of increasing concern because fewer
qualified personnel are available from the two agencies, not only to
function as firefighters but also to fill critical fire management
positions when wildfires continue to burn for an extended period of
time before being controlled.  According to agency officials, without
a cadre of qualified personnel with the expertise to fill fire
management positions, the ability of the Forest Service and BLM to
manage their firefighting programs could be diminished. 

Forest Service and BLM employees whose primary job responsibility is
firefighting are eligible to retire at the age of 50 and are required
to retire at the age of 55.  Many employees in fire management
positions are either at or near retirement age.  For example, the
Forest Service has 53 ï¿½hot shotï¿½ crews throughout the nation.  Hot
shot crews consist of 20 specially trained firefighters and are used
to attack fires when they first start and to suppress large fires in
the most critical and highest-risk areas.  On average, the
superintendents of these hot shot crews are almost 43 years old, and
they range in age from 29 to 54 years.  Similarly, the BLM employees
qualified to be commanders of either a Type I or Type II incident
management team are, on average, 53 and 51 years old, respectively. 
These teams are dispatched, at the national level, to fires that have
escaped initial efforts to control them when local agencies need
additional help.  The teams consist of 9 to 27 members, including the
incident commander, who is responsible for the day-to-day management
of a fire, a fire behavior specialist, and a comptroller.  A Type I
team differs from a Type II team in that it has more experience in
managing large fires.  Given the average age of the Forest Service's
hot shot superintendents and BLM's incident commanders, employees are
either eligible to retire now or will be eligible to retire in 7
years. 

Developing a cadre of qualified fire management personnel could take
many years, since an individual must receive approximately 600 hours
of training to become a Type II incident commander and approximately
100 more hours, or 700 hours of training, to become a Type I incident
commander.  To gain the training and experience required to function
successfully at the Type II level takes from 17 to 22 years and at
the Type I level from 20 to 25 years.  We were told that, because
qualified personnel are lacking, Forest Service and BLM locations
must request that the geographic area coordination centers provide
qualified personnel to perform critical fire management functions
sooner and more often than in the past. 

      LACK OF STANDARDIZED RADIO
      TECHNOLOGIES IS A SAFETY
      ISSUE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.2

By January 2005, all federal land management agencies are required by
the National Telecommunications and Information Administration to
change their radio systems from wideband to narrowband.\8 The
Department of the Interior decided that its agencies, including BLM,
would purchase narrowband digital radios because, according to BLM
officials, narrowband digital radios have capabilities over and above
those of narrowband analog radios.  For example, the digital radios
can receive and transmit data while the analog radios cannot.  The
Forest Service, however, decided that it would purchase narrowband
analog radios while it studies the merits of narrowband digital
radios.  The agency made this decision because narrowband digital
radios are about twice as expensive as narrowband analog radios and
narrowband digital technology is still being developed. 

According to national forest and BLM field officials we spoke with,
changing from wideband to narrowband radios could compromise
firefighters' safety in several ways.  First, these officials said,
narrowband analog radios are not completely compatible with
narrowband digital radios, meaning that after the conversion, Forest
Service and BLM firefighters may find it difficult to communicate
with each other.  Second, state and rural firefighters may still be
using wideband radios.  The officials we spoke with believe that
narrowband radios cannot communicate with wideband radios, meaning
that federal firefighters may not be able to communicate with state
and rural firefighters unless they use two independent radio systems. 
According to the Forest Service and BLM field officials we spoke
with, if the agencies do not use standardized radios, firefighters'
safety will be compromised.  They said that the issue is critical for
state and local firefighters, who may not be able to convert their
radio systems to narrowband technology for several years because of
the costs involved. 

Forest Service and BLM headquarters officials we spoke with disagreed
that narrowband analog and narrowband digital radios will not be
compatible.  According to these officials, simply changing the
frequency setting on narrowband digital radios will make them
compatible with narrowband analog radios. 

Forest Service headquarters officials told us that ï¿½Project-25ï¿½--a
short name for a series of standards supported by the
telecommunications industry and federal agencies with a public safety
mission, such as the Forest Service and BLM--is one of several
digital modes of radio operations that will work in narrowband and
wideband radio frequencies.  According to the Forest Service
officials, Project-25 equipment will ensure that after the conversion
to narrowband technology, all parties--federal, state, and
local--will be able to communicate with each other.  However,
manufacturers are just beginning to finalize the development of
Project-25 equipment, whose production is expected to start in the
summer or fall of 1999.  This equipment is expected to cost two to
three times as much as similar analog equipment.  Also, the hardware
needed to connect remotely located base radio stations to other
broadcast sites has not yet been designed. 

According to Forest Service and BLM officials, the National
Interagency Fire Center in Boise, Idaho, has purchased narrowband
radios and plans to test their use at fires this summer to verify the
accuracy of the information provided by the manufacturers on the
radios' capabilities.  The results of this testing will be made
available to all wildland firefighting agencies. 

Forest Service and BLM headquarters officials made several other
points about the radio issue.  First, they said that state and local
firefighters may continue to use wideband radios for many years.  As
is currently the case, state and local firefighting offices will need
to ensure that communication plans identify what radio frequencies
will be used for fires managed by the Forest Service and BLM.  The
plans should not only specify the frequencies to be used but also
indicate whether wideband or narrowband radios will be used.  Second,
Forest Service and BLM officials stated that they have been
discussing how best to manage the shortage of qualified
telecommunications specialists because each agency must have
qualified personnel to design, develop, and maintain the increasingly
complex radio systems. 

Forest Service and BLM field and headquarters officials differ in
their opinions about the compatibility of narrowband digital and
narrowband analog radios.  They also differ as to whether narrowband
radios can communicate with the wideband radios most commonly used by
state and local firefighting organizations.  If the radio systems
cannot communicate with one another, firefighters' safety could be
compromised.  Forest Service and BLM officials have begun discussing
an agreement, to be effective in 2003, under which both agencies
would purchase only narrowband digital radios.  Such an agreement
would resolve the issue of compatibility between the Forest Service
and BLM but still would not address the ability of narrowband radios
to communicate with the wideband radios used by state and local
firefighting organizations. 

--------------------
\8 These agencies primarily use very high frequency radio
transmissions for wildland fire operations, incident command
operations, and aviation operations.  Radio narrowbanding is the
subdividing of existing radio channels into smaller segments in order
to create more radio frequencies. 

      SIMILAR PHYSICAL FITNESS
      TESTS NEED TO BE USED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.3

Wildland firefighters require a high level of physical fitness to
safely perform physically demanding work in difficult conditions. 
All wildland firefighters must meet the minimum fitness standards for
the type of firefighting duty assigned to them.  Tests of the
physical fitness standards are designed to simulate the physical
demands that a firefighter encounters while fighting a fire and to
determine whether the firefighter is physically capable of handling
these demands. 

Currently, the Forest Service and BLM have the same physical
standards but use different methods for determining the physical
fitness of their firefighters.  BLM requires that its firefighters
pass the ï¿½work capacity test.ï¿½ This test is used to qualify
individuals for three levels of wildland firefighting dutyï¿½arduous,
moderate, and light.  The work capacity test measures aerobic
capacity, muscular strength, and muscular endurance.  Testing
wildland firefighters for work capacity is important for personal
safety and health, coworkers' safety, and efficient operations.  For
each of the three levels of wildland firefighting duties, the testing
is different.  For example, to qualify for arduous duty, each
firefighter must walk a 3-mile course in 45 minutes or less while
carrying a 45-pound pack. 

The Forest Service formerly used the work capacity test to measure
physical fitness but stopped doing so after an employee died while
taking the test in January 1999.  Since that time, the Forest Service
has used the ï¿½step testï¿½ to determine the physical fitness of its
firefighters.  After a 5-minute step test, the firefighter's pulse is
measured and should not exceed a specified rate based on the
firefighter's age.  The step test is not as demanding or
representative as the work capacity test, and, according to Forest
Service officials, the results of the step test can be affected by
outside factors, such as the use of products containing caffeine or
nicotine. 

The work capacity test more typically simulates the actual physical
demands placed on firefighters because it requires the firefighters
to walk specific distances within specific times while carrying
varying amounts of weight to simulate carrying firefighting tools. 
Before taking the work capacity test, BLM employees must complete a
physical screening questionnaire designed to identify risk factors
such as age, a history of heart problems, and high blood pressure. 
Depending on their responses to the questionnaire, employees may be
required to take a physical exam, including an electrocardiogram,
before taking the work capacity test.  According to a BLM official,
this screening for the work capacity test will save lives.  For
example, the screening has already identified one firefighter with a
potentially significant medical problem. 

A Board of Review is looking into the events surrounding the death of
the Forest Service employee while taking the work capacity test and
plans to issue its findings in the next few months.  According to a
Forest Service headquarters official, when the board issues its
findings, it will specify what measures the Forest Service must take
to reinstate the use of the work capacity test.  This official stated
that the measures would include the type of screening procedure the
Forest Service must use before administering the work capacity test. 

   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

Ensuring the success of future firefighting efforts will be difficult
for the Forest Service and BLM unless they take steps to rebuild
their firefighting ranks.  Employees, for various reasons, no longer
consider firefighting a collateral duty, which has thinned the
firefighting ranks.  Regardless of the reasons for the thinning,
actions are needed to ensure that a sufficient number of qualified
staff will be available to fill fire management positions.  The
federal firefighting workforce is also getting older, leaving fewer
qualified personnel available to control fires when they first start
and to contain those that burn out of control for a long time. 
Efforts to rebuild the firefighting workforce need to begin
immediately because it takes many years for staff to gain the
experience necessary to function as high-level fire managers, such as
incident commanders. 

Communications among firefighters and between dispatch centers and
firefighters are critical to firefighters' safety.  As new radio
systems are deployed, they must be capable of communicating with
federal, state, and local firefighting organizations.  The Forest
Service and BLM maintain that through Project-25, communications in
the future will not be a problem.  However, Project-25 equipment will
not go into production until the summer or fall of 1999; some
equipment, such as the hardware needed for base radio stations, has
not yet been developed; and Project-25 equipment is expensive.  Given
the cost and uncertainty of the Project-25 equipment and the concerns
of the national forest and BLM field officials we spoke with, steps
need to be taken to resolve the issues surrounding the conversion to
new radio technologies so that firefighters do not lose the ability
to communicate with one another. 

Forest Service and BLM officials agree that the work capacity test is
the best testing method to ensure that firefighters are physically
capable of handling the demands of firefighting.  While the Forest
Service plans to resume using the work capacity test, it is unclear
when it will do so.  To ensure that firefighters are physically fit,
the Forest Service should issue policy guidance on how it will
implement the work capacity test as soon as the Board of Review
publishes its results.  This policy guidance should include a
screening process similar to that used by BLM. 

   RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

To ensure that firefighting resources are adequate to protect federal
lands and the public from the catastrophic effects of fires, we
recommend that the Chief of the Forest Service and the Secretary of
the Interior work together to develop a combined strategy to rebuild
their firefighting workforce.  In developing this strategy, they
should consider ways to increase their firefighting resources, from
using contract firefighting crews to requiring that all employees
become qualified, in some manner, to contribute to fighting fires. 

Given the uncertainties surrounding the conversion to narrowband
radio technology, we recommend that the Chief of the Forest Service
and the Secretary of the Interior develop a strategy for converting
to narrowband radio technology that ensures radio communications
between firefighters will not be affected by the conversion.  This
strategy should be communicated to all firefighters.  If Project-25
equipment will solve the communication problems between narrowband
radio technologies and between narrowband and wideband radio
technologies, we further recommend that the Chief and the Secretary
delay the purchase of Project-25 equipment until the equipment has
been fully developed and tested. 

To ensure that firefighters' safety is not compromised by inadequate
physical fitness tests, we recommend that the Chief of the Forest
Service issue policy direction on how the work capacity test will be
administered as soon as he receives the results of the Board of
Review's investigation into a firefighter's death last January.  In
developing the agency's policy on how to administer the work capacity
test, the Chief of the Forest Service should consider using BLM's
screening process. 

   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

We provided the Forest Service and the Bureau of Land Management with
a draft of this report for review and comment.  The Forest Service
commented that it generally concurred with the findings and
recommendations and provided us certain technical clarifications that
we incorporated in this report.  The Bureau of Land Management had no
comments other than certain technical clarifications that we also
incorporated in this report. 

---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :9.1

We are sending copies of this report to appropriate congressional
committees; the Honorable Dan Glickman, Secretary of Agriculture; the
Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of the Interior; the Honorable
Mike Dombeck, Chief, Forest Service; the Honorable Tom Fry, Acting
Director, Bureau of Land Management; and the Honorable Jacob Lew,
Director, Office of Management and Budget.  We will make copies
available to others upon request. 

We conducted our work from January 1999 through July 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix IV provides details on our scope and methodology. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
call me on (206) 287-4810.  Key contributors to this report were
Robert Arthur, June Foster, Linda Harmon, and John Kalmar, Jr. 

Sincerely yours,

James K.  Meissner
Associate Director, Energy,
 Resources, and Science Issues

NATIONAL FIRE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS
SYSTEM AND WILDFIRE PREPAREDNESS
BUDGET PROCESS
=========================================================== Appendix I

The National Fire Management Analysis System (NFMAS) was originally
developed in response to a 1978 congressional directive that the
Forest Service conduct an economic benefit-cost analysis of its fire
program and use that process to support future national fire budget
requests.  The Forest Service implemented NFMAS in 1980, and the
Bureau of Land Management (BLM) adopted it in 1986 as its basis for
fire planning. 

NFMAS includes a computerized model that uses scenarios of how fires
would initially be controlled and historical informationï¿½including
data on fire severity, weather, and firefighting costs--to identify
the most efficient level of funding for a firefighting organization. 
This level of funding is the one at which the costs to control and
extinguish fires and the loss of natural resources are minimized. 
Wildfire preparedness budgets developed by national forests and BLM
field offices using NFMAS are aggregated with Forest Service regional
preparedness budgets and BLM state office budgets and submitted to
the their respective national offices for inclusion in the Forest
Service's and the Department of the Interior's annual budget
requests.  Once the Congress appropriates funds for wildfire
preparedness, the appropriations received are allocated from the
national offices through the Forest Service regional offices and BLM
state offices to the national forests and BLM field offices. 

   NATIONAL FIRE MANAGEMENT
   ANALYSIS SYSTEM PROCESS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

Each national forest and BLM field office conducts a NFMAS analysis. 
A new NFMAS analysis is required every 5 years, although an analysis
can be updated in various instances, such as when national forests
are combined.  In the years when the NFMAS analysis is not performed,
wildfire preparedness budget requests are developed by applying an
inflation factor to the prior year's budget request.  In preparing
the NFMAS analysis, each of the units develops fire management zones
or areas of like natural resources and fire history.  The fire
management zones are also based on management objectives for the land
contained in the units' resource management plans.  The fire
management zones are further divided into representative locations
that have similar management objectives, similar fire histories, and
similar methods of fire attack.  Within the fire management zones,
natural, cultural, and other resources are valued by resource
specialists for inclusion in the NFMAS model. 

Once the fire management zones are defined, historical data are
compiled on fire history, acres burned, and past methods of
controlling fires.  From these data, a representative location is
defined where a fire could occur and the resources are identified
that would be available to fight the fire.  Then the NFMAS model is
run.  This initial analysis is then calibrated to ensure that once
the data are entered and run in the model, they will replicate fire
history within 5 percent of actual occurrences.  The BLM and Forest
Service officials we spoke with said that calibrating the model is a
critical step in the NFMAS process because it ensures that the data
going into the model are accurate and reliable. 

Once the model is calibrated, it is run with current firefighting
resources at current budget levels.  After this initial run, the
model is run at incrementally higher firefighting resource and budget
levels to see whether efficiencies would be gained at higher levels. 
Similarly, the model is run at incrementally lower firefighting
resource and budget levels to see how efficiencies would be affected. 

In each of these analyses, the most efficient level is determined. 
The NFMAS analysis produces a U-shaped curve on a graph where the
vertical axis is the net value change in resources while the
horizontal axis is the preparedness budget request.  The most
efficient level is basically at the bottom of the curve.  If the
bottom of the curve meets the management objectives of the national
forest or the BLM field office, then that becomes the most efficient
level.  The most efficient level may be to the right or left of the
bottom of the curve, especially when the curves are relatively flat
rather than U-shaped. 

To ensure the integrity of the NFMAS analysis process, Forest Service
regional and BLM national fire management staff certify the national
forests' and BLM field offices' NFMAS analyses.  In certifying the
analyses, agency officials verify that consistent and reliable data
were used in the model and that the data are consistent across forest
and field office boundaries.  In 1998, all BLM field and state
offices performed new NFMAS analyses.  The BLM field office NFMAS
submissions, in support of the fiscal year 2000 preparedness budget
request, were certified by the BLM state offices.  Officials from the
Boise BLM office certified the NFMAS process at the state offices. 
Similarly, all national forests we visited had their NFMAS process
certified.  These certifications for the forests we visited took
place at various times, from 6 years ago at three of the forests to
1999 for the Coronado National Forest.  Both Forest Service and BLM
officials we spoke with said that the certification process is useful
for ensuring that the NFMAS process is being implemented properly and
that all units are on a level playing field through having their data
and process independently reviewed. 

The NFMAS analyses form the basis of the national forests' and BLM
field offices' annual operational plans.  These operational plans are
based on the most efficient level of funding and describe how the
funds are to be distributed at the national forests or BLM field
offices.  They describe what firefighting resources (personnel and
equipment) will be funded, where they will be located, and how long
they will be positioned at these locations. 

The most efficient funding levels for individual national forests and
BLM field offices are aggregated and become part of the Forest
Service's and BLM's annual budget requests.  For the Forest Service,
each of the regions aggregates the most efficient level of funding
for each of its forests, adds its own preparedness budget request,
and submits the total to Forest Service headquarters.  Forest Service
headquarters then adds its budget request, and this becomes the
annual wildfire preparedness budget request that is included in the
Forest Service's annual budget request. 

For BLM, each state office aggregates the budget requests of all the
field offices in the state, adds the most efficient level of funding
for the state office, and submits the total to the BLM fire staff in
Boise.  The BLM Boise staff aggregate the state office submissions,
add the Boise office's budget request for preparedness, and submit
the data to headquarters for inclusion in the Department of the
Interior's annual budget request.\1

--------------------
\1 The other Department of the Interior land management agenciesï¿½the
National Park Service, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Fish and
Wildlife Serviceï¿½each develop wildfire preparedness and suppression
requests.  Their requests, along with BLM's, are consolidated and
submitted to the Department of the Interior by BLM.  Funds are
appropriated to BLM and are made available to the other three
Department of the Interior agencies. 

   WILDFIRE PREPAREDNESS BUDGET
   ALLOCATION PROCESS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

The wildfire preparedness funds appropriated by the Congress have
been historically about 15 percent less than those identified as
needed by the Forest Service and BLM through the budget planning
process.  According to Forest Service and BLM officials, the Congress
appropriates smaller amounts than those determined to be needed
through the budget planning process because it is willing to accept
the risk that some wildfires will be less severe than indicated
through the budget planning process. 

Wildfire preparedness funds appropriated by the Congress are
allocated to the Forest Service and BLM for distribution to the
national forests and BLM field offices.  When the wildfire
preparedness allocations are received, Forest Service headquarters
and BLM national staff remove the funding for their operations as
well as the funding for nationally shared firefighting resources,
such as aircraft, smokejumpers, and hot shot crews.  These shared
resources are typically included in the budget for one of the
agencies but are available for the use of all federal firefighting
agencies when suppressing wildfires.  For example, BLM funds the
equipment cache in Boise, but equipment and supplies from the cache
are available to all federal firefighting agencies.  Similarly, the
Forest Service funds the contracts for catering and shower facilities
at wildfires, but these services are available to all federal
wildfire fighting agencies when needed. 

Forest Service and BLM officials allocate the remaining funds to
their regional and state offices, respectively.  The Forest Service
uses a benefit-cost model to allocate the remaining wildfire
preparedness funds to its regions.  BLM, in allocating the remaining
wildfire preparedness funds to the state offices, generally reduces
each state's request for funds by the overall percentage reduction in
the most efficient level received from the Congress. 

From the wildfire preparedness allocations they receive, Forest
Service regional and BLM state officials take out funds to pay for
their respective operations, including any amounts they need for
national shared resources.  The remaining wildfire preparedness funds
are then allocated to the national forests and BLM field offices. 
According to Forest Service regional and BLM state officials we spoke
with, allocations to the national forests and BLM field offices are
made on the basis of their NFMAS analyses, and all see their requests
for funding reduced by the same percentage.  Exceptions are made,
however, when the funds available to a national forest or BLM field
office are so limited that wildfire preparedness operations would be
severely restricted.  In this case, a small unit may receive close to
the most efficient level of funding it requested while a larger unit
may have its funds reduced because, given its size, it can withstand
a budget cut.  When allocating wildfire preparedness funds to the
national forests and BLM field offices, Forest Service regional and
BLM state officials recommend to the units how they should allocate
their funds.  According to national forest and BLM field officials,
these recommendations are generally followed. 

Once the national forests and BLM field offices receive their
wildfire preparedness funding, they adjust their annual operational
plans to reflect the funds actually received.  These plans are
monitored by Forest Service regional and BLM state officials to
ensure that the funds received are spent as planned. 

ORGANIZATION OF THE WILDLAND
FIREFIGHTING COMMUNITY
========================================================== Appendix II

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

The National Interagency Fire Center is a 55-acre site located in
Boise, Idaho.  It has a firefighting training base and facilities
that house the fire management personnel of the five federal land
management agencies and of the National Weather Service, as well as
representatives from the National Association of State Foresters. 
The National Interagency Fire Center also houses the National
Incident Radio Support and the Equipment and Supply caches. 

The National Interagency Coordination Center is called upon when any
of the 11 geographic area coordination centers cannot fill orders for
equipment and supplies within its area.  The National Interagency
Coordination Center dispatches crews, overhead personnel, aircraft,
supplies, and services across the nation, regardless of an agency's
affiliation, using the ï¿½closest forcesï¿½ and ï¿½total mobilityï¿½
concepts.  Because the National Interagency Coordination Center is an
ï¿½all-riskï¿½ coordination center, it also provides support in response
to other emergencies, such as floods, hurricanes, and earthquakes. 

The National Wildfire Coordination Group is an umbrella organization
that includes representatives from the five federal land management
agencies and the National Association of State Foresters.  The
National Wildfire Coordination Group is responsible for ensuring that
consistent firefighting practices, standards, and training programs
are developed for federal firefighting organizations. 

The Multi-agency Coordination Group includes the five federal land
management fire directors and, when needed, a representative from the
General Services Administration, a military liaison, and a state
forester.  The Multi-agency Coordination Group identifies national or
interagency fire situation issues and sets priorities for allocating
scarce firefighting resources. 

The National Incident Radio Support Cache is the only totally
compatible national radio cache of its kind in a single location. 
The cache contains about 7,000 hand-held radios, as well as a variety
of other communications equipment, such as telephones, satellites,
repeaters, and microwave stations. 

The Equipment and Supply Cache is the largest federal warehouse of
firefighting equipment and supplies in the United States.  The
warehouse serves as a primary source of supply for all wildland
firefighting agencies in Utah, Nevada, southern Idaho, and western
Wyoming. 

The 11 geographic area coordination centers are located primarily
west of the Missippi River.  If a wildland fire grows too big for
local personnel and equipment to fight it, the responsible agency
contacts the nearest geographic area coordination center for help. 
The nearest center will locate and dispatch additional firefighting
personnel, equipment, and supplies throughout the geographic area. 

PROCESS FOR ORDERING WILDLAND
FIREFIGHTING SUPPLIES AND
RESOURCES
========================================================= Appendix III

The process for ordering wildland firefighting supplies and resources
begins at the incident.  Orders from incidents are placed with the
local dispatch office.  Orders it cannot fill are placed with the
nearest geographic area coordination center, which will mobilize
resources from within its boundaries.  As these resources are
depleted, requests are passed on to the National Interagency
Coordination Center.  For the most part, the National Interagency
Coordination Center coordinates the movement of all resources across
the boundaries of geographic areas.  Figure III.1 demonstrates the
flow of orders for resources and supplies to an incident. 

   Figure III.1:  Flow of
   Firefighting Supplies and
   Resources

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
========================================================== Appendix IV

In response to a request from the Chairman, Subcommittee on Forests
and Forest Health, House Committee on Resources, we examined (1) the
process the Department of Agriculture's Forest Service and the
Department of the Interior's Bureau of Land Management (BLM) use to
determine the amount of funds needed to prepare for fighting fires;
(2) the roles and responsibilities of the National Interagency Fire
Center in mobilizing firefighting resources; and (3) the types of
agreements reached among federal, state, and local firefighting
organizations.  We also looked at several issues that could affect
the agencies' ability to manage their firefighting programs in the
future. 

To examine the process the Forest Service and BLM use to determine
the funds needed to prepare for fighting fires, we reviewed the steps
each agency takes to develop requests for wildfire preparedness
funding.  Our review was limited to the process used; we did not
review the operation of the computerized model used to develop
wildfire preparedness funding requests or the validity of the model. 
We interviewed and obtained wildfire preparedness funding
documentation from Forest Service and BLM headquarters officials in
Washington, D.C., and Boise, Idaho.  In addition, we interviewed, and
obtained documentation on wildfire preparedness funding from Forest
Service officials at two regional offices and six national forests
and BLM officials at one state office and five field offices.  We
also obtained similar data from officials at the consolidated fire
management office in the Pacific Northwest.  This office has combined
the Forest Service regional and BLM state office functions for fire
management in the Pacific Northwest. 

Our selection of Forest Service regional offices and BLM state
offices was based on several factors.  We selected the Pacific
Northwest because the fire operations of the Forest Service and BLM
are combined and the agencies are operating under a new master
cooperative agreement.  In addition, the Pacific Northwest has large
fire budgets and active fire seasons.  We selected the Southwestern
Region because it also has large fire budgets and active fire
seasons.  The Southern Region of the Forest Service was selected to
extend the geographic coverage of our work.  We selected national
forests and BLM field offices that were physically close to one
another to facilitate data gathering. 

Because we visited a limited number of Forest Service and BLM sites
and these sites were not scientifically selected, the wildfire
preparedness funding information we obtained may not always be
representative of other units in the two agencies.  The two Forest
Service regional offices from which we obtained wildfire preparedness
funding information are located in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and
Atlanta, Georgia.  We visited six national forests--the Coronado and
Tonto in Arizona; the Fremont, Ochoco, and Malheur in Oregon; and the
Chattahoochee/Oconee in Georgia.  We visited the BLM state office in
Phoenix, Arizona.  We also visited five BLM field offices--the
Phoenix and Safford offices in Arizona and the Lakeview, Burns, and
Prineville offices in Oregon. 

We also visited the consolidated Forest Service and BLM fire
management office in Portland, Oregon.  The consolidated fire
management office, which contains the fire management staffs for both
the Forest Service's Pacific Northwest Region and BLM's Oregon State
Office, has responsibility for managing fires in the Pacific
Northwest. 

To determine the roles and responsibilities of the National
Interagency Fire Center in mobilizing firefighting resources during a
fire season, we interviewed and obtained mobilization documentation
from Forest Service and BLM officials during our visit to the
National Interagency Fire Center, which is located in Boise, Idaho. 
In addition, to obtain a better understanding of how the National
Interagency Fire Center coordinates with the 11 regional geographic
area coordination centers located throughout the country for
mobilizing firefighting resources, we interviewed Forest Service and
BLM officials from the National Interagency Fire Center's National
Interagency Coordination Center and Multi-agency Coordination Group. 
We also visited two of the geographic area coordination centers--the
Northwest Area Coordination Center in Portland, Oregon, and the
Southern Area Coordination Center in Chamblee, Georgia--to interview
agency officials. 

To determine the types of coordination agreements reached among
federal, state, and local firefighting organizations for providing
mutual fire suppression assistance, we obtained from the Forest
Service, BLM, and state officials copies of the various coordination
agreements in use at each of the locations we visited.  Specifically,
we obtained and reviewed the Master Cooperative Fire Protection
Agreement for the Pacific Northwest, the Joint Powers Agreement for
Arizona, and the local individual agreements for the Forest Service
and BLM locations visited in Oregon.  We also obtained a copy of the
Southeastern Interstate Forest Fire Protection Compact, which is an
agreement among 10 southeastern states to provide mutual support
during forest fires.  We interviewed Forest Service and BLM officials
at each location visited to learn about the characteristics of the
various agreements.  We discussed with the officials the attributes
of the various coordination agreements to determine the reasons for
the agreements, how well the agreements were working, and what was
being done to improve the agreements.  We also talked about how well
the agreements are working with Georgia and Arizona state fire
officials and the representative of the Association of State
Foresters at the National Interagency Fire Center. 

Our review was conducted from January 1999 through July 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government accounting standards. 

*** End of document. ***