Alaskan North Slope Oil: Limited Effects of Lifting Export Ban on Oil and
Shipping Industries and Consumers (Chapter Report, 07/01/1999,
GAO/RCED-99-191).

The law requires GAO to review energy production in Alaska and
California and the effects of lifting the ban on exporting Alaskan North
Slope oil. This report provides information on (1) Alaskan North Slope
and California crude oil prices and production and (2) refiners,
consumers, and the oil shipping industry on the U.S. west coast. GAO
discusses changes in Alaska and California production during the past
decade (1989 through 1998). GAO also discusses export-related
environmental issues related to lifting the export ban.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-99-191
     TITLE:  Alaskan North Slope Oil: Limited Effects of Lifting Export
	     Ban on Oil and Shipping Industries and Consumers
      DATE:  07/01/1999
   SUBJECT:  Domestic crude oil
	     Petroleum prices
	     Export regulation
	     Shipping industry
	     Petroleum products
	     Microeconomic analysis
	     Shipbuilding industry
IDENTIFIER:  California
	     Alaska
	     Alaskan North Slope Oil
	     Hawaii
	     Oregon
	     Washington

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO                Report
    to Congressional Committees July 1999          ALASKAN NORTH SLOPE
    OIL Limited Effects of Lifting Export Ban on Oil and Shipping
    Industries and Consumers GAO/RCED-99-191 United States General
    Accounting Office
    Resources, Community, and Washington, D.C. 20548
    Economic Development Division B-282694
    Letter July 1, 1999 Congressional Committees This report responds
    to the mandate in Public Law 104-58, title II, that GAO review
    Alaska and California energy production and the effects of lifting
    the ban on exporting Alaskan North Slope oil. As agreed with your
    offices, this report addresses the effects of lifting the export
    ban on (1) Alaskan North Slope and California crude oil prices and
    production and (2) refiners, consumers, and the oil shipping
    industry (including the tanker fleet, the tanker building
    industry, and the tanker repair industry) on the U.S. West Coast.
    To put the effects of lifting the ban in context, the report
    covers changes in Alaska and California production during the past
    decade (1989 through 1998).  This report also discusses export-
    related environmental issues related to lifting the export ban. We
    are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William M.
    Daley, Secretary of Commerce; the Honorable Bill Richardson,
    Secretary of Energy; the Honorable Bruce Babbitt, Secretary of
    Interior; and the Honorable Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of
    Transportation.  Copies will also be made available to others upon
    request. If you have any questions about this report, please
    contact me at (202) 512-3841.  Major contributors to this report
    are listed in appendix III. Susan D. Kladiva Associate Director,
    Energy, Resources, and Science Issues Letter United States General
    Accounting Office Washington, D.C. 20548 B-282694
    Letter List of Committees The Honorable Frank H. Murkowski
    Chairman The Honorable Jeff Bingaman Ranking Minority Member
    Committee on Energy and Natural Resources United States Senate The
    Honorable Don Young Chairman The Honorable George Miller Ranking
    Minority Member Committee on Resources House of Representatives
    The Honorable Tom Bliley Chairman The Honorable John D. Dingell
    Ranking Minority Member Committee on Commerce House of
    Representatives Letter          Page 2           GAO/RCED-99-191
    Alaskan North Slope Oil Executive Summary Purpose
    Over 12 billion barrels of crude oil have been produced on the
    Alaskan North Slope since oil was discovered there in 1968.
    Initially, U.S. tankers transported Alaskan North Slope oil to
    California and other U.S. refineries, partly because the Congress
    banned exporting such oil to foreign countries.  The ban, intended
    in part to reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil, was
    controversial from the beginning.  Advocates of lifting the ban
    argued that selling the oil in the world market would increase the
    demand for it.  Increased demand, in turn, was expected to
    increase the price and production of Alaska and California crude
    oil, thereby increasing the states' revenues.  Opponents argued
    that increased crude oil prices resulting from lifting the ban
    would reduce some refiners' profit margins and force some to
    become dependent on Alaskan North Slope oil because they would
    have no practical access to cheaper foreign oil.  Opponents also
    argued that lifting the ban would take business from the U.S.
    shipping industry because operators of oil tankers would use low-
    cost foreign tankers and crews to export Alaskan North Slope oil
    and have tankers repaired in low-cost foreign shipyards.
    Legislation enacted in 1995 allowed Alaskan North Slope oil to be
    exported (P.L. 104-58, title II).  That legislation also required
    GAO to review Alaska and California energy production and the
    effects of lifting the export ban. As agreed with the Senate
    Committee on Energy and Natural Resources and the House Committees
    on Resources and on Commerce, this report addresses the effects of
    lifting the export ban on (1) Alaskan North Slope and California
    crude oil prices and production and (2) refiners, consumers, and
    the Alaskan North Slope oil-shipping industry (including the
    tanker fleet, the tanker building industry, and the tanker repair
    industry) on the U.S. West Coast.  For the purpose of this report,
    the U.S. West Coast includes Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon,
    and Washington State.  To put the effects of lifting the ban in
    context, this report discusses changes in Alaska and California
    production during the past decade (1989 through 1998).  This
    report also discusses export-related environmental issues
    resulting from lifting the ban (see app. I). Background
    In 1968, billions of barrels of crude oil were discovered in
    Prudhoe Bay on the Alaskan North Slope, significantly affecting
    U.S. oil and oil-shipping industries.  Alaska became a major U.S.
    oil-producing state.  U.S. West Coast refiners retooled to
    efficiently process Alaskan North Slope oil, which accounted for
    about 43 percent of all crude oil that was refined on the West
    Coast in 1998.  New tankers were also built to transport the oil
    Letter    Page 3                                    GAO/RCED-99-
    191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Executive Summary from Valdez,
    Alaska, on Prince William Sound, to West Coast and other
    refineries.  The first commercial tanker carrying Alaskan North
    Slope oil left Valdez, Alaska, for the West Coast on August 1,
    1977.  The first commercial tanker exporting such oil left Valdez
    for Asia on May 31, 1996, approximately 6 months after the
    legislation lifting the ban was enacted.1 (See fig. 1.) Figure 1:
    Locations of Alaska Oil Fields and Tanker Routes From Valdez,
    Alaska, to Refineries That Received Alaskan North Slope Oil, 1977-
    98 Arctic Ocean Prudhoe Bay North Slope Brooks Mountains
    Arctic Circle Trans-Alaska Pipeline Cook Inlet
    Valdez Nikiski U.S.EastandGul ia
    f C As
    oa U                                     s
    U ii
    ts                                             .S .
    . S
    W wa
    a .                                               n
    es Ha                                             V
    d i                                               P
    t rg                                               u
    C i                                               e
    o n                                               r
    a t                                                  s o
    t Is                                                        R la
    ic n                                                        o d
    v s                                                        ia v
    Pa ia
    na C
    m a
    a pe Horn Source:  Alyeska Pipeline Service Company, BP-Amoco,
    Alaska Department of Natural Resources, and Energy Security:
    Impacts of Lifting Alaskan North Slope Oil Exports Ban (GAO/RCED-
    91-21, Nov. 8, 1990). 1The Nov. 28, 1995, legislation authorized
    the export of Alaskan North Slope oil unless the President found,
    within 5 months of the date of enactment, that exporting the oil
    was not in the national interest. Letter    Page 4
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Executive Summary GAO
    conducted statistical and economic analyses of crude oil price and
    production data, reviewed related studies, and obtained the views
    of federal, state, oil industry, shipping industry, and other
    officials to determine the effects of lifting the export ban.  To
    determine the effects of lifting the ban on oil prices, GAO
    developed a time-series model.  Because oil prices are influenced
    by many factors in addition to removing the ban, GAO controlled
    for these other factors by modeling the difference between the
    prices of West Coast oils and the prices of similar oils in other
    markets. Furthermore, where applicable, established economic
    concepts and theories were applied to predict the likely effects
    on Alaskan North Slope and California crude oil production in the
    future.  When important price, production, refining, and shipping
    data were unavailable because they were proprietary, GAO
    attempted, to the extent possible, to obtain such information from
    alternative sources.  However, because of proprietary data
    limitations, GAO was unable to determine the full effects of
    lifting the export ban on cost increases for refiners using
    Alaskan North Slope or comparable California oil or on the U.S.
    West Coast market in general. Results in Brief    Lifting the
    export ban raised the relative prices of Alaskan North Slope and
    comparable California oils between $.98 and $1.30 higher per
    barrel than they would have been had the ban not been lifted.2  To
    date, these price increases have not had an observable effect on
    Alaskan North Slope and California crude oil production.
    Nevertheless, future oil production should be higher than it would
    have been because higher crude oil prices have given producers an
    incentive to produce more oil.  According to projections by the
    Alaska Department of Revenue and to oil industry officials, new
    oil fields developed in Alaska since the ban was lifted are
    expected to increase Alaskan North Slope oil production by an
    average of 115,000 barrels per day for the next two decades.
    However, it was not possible for GAO to separate the effects of
    lifting the ban on expected production from the effects of broader
    oil market changes occurring at the same time.  For example,
    relatively high world oil prices in 1996 and 1997 encouraged oil
    producers to expand exploration and development activities, while
    low prices in 1998 caused producers to close wells and reduce
    development activities.  Moreover, this expected production
    increase will not reverse the decade-long decline of Alaska and
    California 2 The price of Alaskan North Slope and comparable
    California oils rose in comparison to selected, widely traded
    world oils commonly used as benchmarks for comparing oils and
    setting prices. Page 5
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Executive Summary oil
    production, which is expected to continue as aging oil fields
    become depleted. Lifting the export ban increased some refiners'
    costs but had limited effects on consumers and the oil-shipping
    industry on the West Coast.  While higher prices for Alaskan North
    Slope and comparable California oil increased the costs of some
    individual refiners using that oil, it was not possible to
    determine the extent of cost increases for those refiners or the
    West Coast market in general.  Despite higher crude oil prices for
    some refiners, no observed increases occurred in the prices of
    three important petroleum products used by consumers on the West
    Coast--gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel.  Lifting the ban has also
    had a minimal effect to date on most oil tanker operators that
    transport Alaskan North Slope oil, the U.S. shipbuilding industry,
    and the West Coast ship repair industry.  However, shipbuilding
    and ship repair industry officials on the West Coast are concerned
    that Alaskan North Slope oil tanker business may shift in the
    future to low-cost foreign shipyards. Principal Findings Lifting
    the Export Ban         Lifting the ban caused the relative prices
    of Alaskan North Slope and Increased Oil Prices and
    California oils with comparable characteristics to be between $.98
    and Should Increase Future Oil     $1.30 higher per barrel than
    they would have been had the ban not been 3 Production
    removed, according to GAO's analyses.   In addition, lifting the
    ban led to exports to Asia, which allowed oil companies to reduce
    their shipping costs for the oil that was exported because Asian
    ports are closer than the ports for the U.S. Gulf Coast and U.S.
    Virgin Islands, where some Alaskan North Slope oil was shipped
    before the ban was lifted.  However, lifting the ban has not led
    to a large volume of exports--only about 5 percent (60,000 barrels
    per day) of all Alaskan North Slope production has been exported
    to foreign countries since the ban was lifted.  Furthermore, oil
    production in Alaska and California has had no observable increase
    to date as a result of lifting the export ban. 3 In conducting
    these analyses, GAO selected three world oils that are commonly
    used as benchmarks for comparing oil prices or with
    characteristics (weight and sulfur content) comparable to Alaskan
    North Slope oil.  The lighter the weight and lower the sulfur
    content, the higher the quality of crude oil because it costs less
    to refine this oil. Page 6
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Executive Summary GAO
    believes future production should increase because the ban was
    lifted, although not enough to reverse the decade-long decline in
    oil production as aging oil fields become depleted.  Higher market
    prices and lower shipping costs have given oil producers more
    incentive to develop new oil fields.  Industry and government
    officials told us that the development of new Alaskan North Slope
    oil fields increased during the period after the export ban was
    removed.  These new fields are expected to average about 115,000
    barrels per day between 1999 and 2020.  Some oil officials
    attributed part of this increase to the effects of lifting the
    ban, while others said that these effects could not be separated
    from broader market conditions.  These officials cited high world
    oil prices in 1996 and 1997 as one of the factors that encouraged
    them to open new fields in Alaska.  Conversely, oil officials said
    that low oil prices in 1998 caused them to close California wells
    to avoid costly maintenance and to modify their plans for the
    future development of the Alaskan North Slope.  GAO could not
    separate the effects of lifting the ban on expected production
    from these broader market changes.  Nonetheless, while production
    is expected to increase, the increase will not reverse the overall
    long-term decline in Alaska and California oil production as aging
    oil fields become depleted.  Production in both states decreased
    almost every year from 1989 through 1998 and is expected to fall
    further in the future. The Effects of Lifting the Oil  Lifting the
    export ban generally had limited effects on refiners, consumers,
    Export Ban on Refiners,              and the shipping industry on
    the West Coast.  Higher market prices for Consumers, and the
    Alaskan North Slope and comparable California oils translate
    directly into Shipping Industry on the             higher costs
    for refiners buying these oils.  However, not all refiners were
    affected equally, as illustrated in the following hypothetical
    cases.  For West Coast Have Been                 refiners that
    used large volumes of Alaskan North Slope and comparable Generally
    Limited                    California oils, costs would have risen
    when the prices of these oils rose.  If the refiners bought only
    these oils at the market price, costs would have risen by exactly
    the amount the price increased as a result of lifting the ban--
    about $.98 to $1.30 per barrel.  For refiners that did not use
    significant quantities of these oils, cost would have been less
    affected by price increases.  Finally, for refiners that used
    mostly oil that came from their own companies' wells, information
    was not available to determine how price increases affected these
    companies' costs.  Because data on all refiners' crude oil
    purchases and internal transactions are proprietary, GAO Page 7
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Executive Summary could
    not determine the increase in refiners' costs that was due to
    higher Alaskan North Slope and California oil prices. Despite
    higher crude oil costs for some refiners, no observed increases
    occurred in West Coast consumer prices as a result of lifting the
    export ban.  GAO analyzed three important petroleum products used
    by consumers, which accounted for about 80 percent of the products
    produced by West Coast refiners, and found no significant
    increases in prices.  According to GAO's statistical and economic
    analyses, the prices of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel on the West
    Coast did not significantly change as a result of lifting the
    export ban.  Moreover, consumer groups and industry experts GAO
    contacted were unaware of any adverse effects on consumers from
    lifting the ban. To date, lifting the export ban has had limited
    effects on most oil tanker operators that transport Alaskan North
    Slope oil, the shipbuilding industry, and the ship repair
    industry.  The effect on tanker operators has been limited because
    most Alaskan North Slope oil--about 95 percent--has continued to
    be shipped to the U.S. West Coast.  Officials of charter shipping
    companies carrying the exported oil said that lifting the ban had
    benefited their business by slightly increasing the demand for
    tankers.  In 1996 and 1997, according to GAO's analysis, exports
    increased the demand for U.S. tankers by one or two and created an
    estimated 58 to 115 new U.S. crew jobs on tankers used to
    transport Alaskan North Slope oil.  This was because U.S.-
    registered tankers with U.S. crews used to export Alaskan North
    Slope oil to Asia replaced foreign-registered tankers with foreign
    crews carrying such oil to the U.S. Virgin Islands.4  These new
    jobs partially offset overall job losses in the fleet resulting
    from declines in Alaskan North Slope production during the past
    decade. The U.S. shipbuilding and ship repair industries also have
    experienced few effects.  According to oil industry officials,
    foreign-built tankers have not been used to export Alaskan North
    Slope oil, and U.S. shipbuilders have not lost orders for new
    tankers to foreign shipyards.  Although U.S. shipbuilders expected
    at least 10 new tanker orders in the 1990s, only 3 4 The 1995
    export legislation mandated that U.S.-documented (including U.S.-
    registered and -crewed) and U.S.-owned but not necessarily U.S.-
    built tankers be used to export Alaskan North Slope oil. Foreign-
    built tankers with foreign crews are permitted to carry such oil
    to the U.S. Virgin Islands under an exception in the Jones Act,
    which, along with several related trade laws, requires that any
    vessel transporting cargo between U.S. ports must be U.S.-built,
    U.S.-flagged (registered), U.S.-owned, and U.S.crewed. Page 8
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Executive Summary have
    materialized to date.  Thus, half of the Alaskan North Slope oil
    tanker fleet consists of older, single-hulled tankers built in the
    1970s or before.5 Furthermore, while exporting crude oil has given
    tanker fleet operators an added incentive to repair Alaskan North
    Slope oil tankers in low-cost Asian shipyards during export trips,
    there has not been a trend toward more foreign repairs since
    exports began, according to U.S. Customs' repair data. However,
    officials in the U.S. shipbuilding and West Coast ship repair
    industries said that they are concerned that business may shift in
    the future to foreign shipyards.  For example, West Coast tanker
    repair industry officials told us that a trend toward more foreign
    repairs could be beginning.  They cited as an example a U.S.
    charter shipping company that used a U.S. tanker to carry an
    export shipment of Alaskan North Slope oil to Korea and then had
    the tanker repaired in a Korean shipyard at a cost well below
    estimated prices for repair in a U.S. West Coast shipyard.
    Recommendations    This report makes no recommendations. Agency
    Comments    GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department
    of Energy, including its Energy Information Administration and
    Office of Policy, for review and comment.  GAO discussed the
    report with Energy Information Administration officials, including
    the Director, Petroleum Division, and Office of Policy staff.
    While the Department did not take a position on the findings
    presented in the report, it provided clarifying comments that GAO
    incorporated, where appropriate. 5 The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
    requires that all single-hulled tankers be phased out of operation
    by 2015, depending on the tanker age, and that all new tankers
    built be double-hulled to reduce the effects of oil spills in the
    event of an accident. Page 9
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Contents Executive
    Summary
    3 Chapter 1                      Alaskan North Slope Oil Discovery
    Was Largest in U.S. History               13 Introduction
    Alaskan North Slope Oil Discovery Changed the West Coast Oil
    Industry 14 Original Ban Was Debated and Ultimately Removed
    17 Objectives, Scope, and Methodology
    19 Chapter 2                      Prices of Some West Coast Oil
    Rose as a Result of Lifting the Ban           22 Lifting the
    Export Ban  Shipping Costs Are Lower for Exported Oil
    23 Improved Economic Conditions Have Had No Observable Effect on
    Increased Oil Prices             Oil Production to Date
    25 and Should Increase            Future Oil Production Should Be
    Higher as a Result of Lifting the Ban  25 Future Oil Production
    Despite Increases in Future Oil Production, the Long-Term
    Production Decline Will Continue
    27 State Oil Revenues Were Affected
    28 Chapter 3                     Some Refiners' Crude Oil
    Acquisition Costs Rose, but the Extent Is Effects of Lifting Oil
    Uncertain 30 Consumers Were Not Significantly Affected by Lifting
    the Export Ban         31 Export Ban on                  Exports
    Have Had a Limited Effect on Alaskan North Slope Oil Refiners,
    Consumers,             Shipping 31 and Oil Shipping Industry on
    the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited Appendixes
    Appendix I:   Lifting the Oil Export Ban Has Had Little Impact on
    the Alaskan Environment
    41 Appendix II:   Methodology for Estimating the Effect of Lifting
    the Alaskan Oil Export Ban On Crude and Petroleum Product Prices
    43 Appendix III:   GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments
    56 Tables                         Table 2.1:  Cost to Ship Alaskan
    North Slope Oil, by Destination, 1996 24 Table 3.1:  Destinations
    of Alaskan North Slope Oil Tankers and Volumes Carried, 1994-98
    33 Table II.1:  Results of Price Analysis for Alaskan North Slope
    (ANS) Oil  47 Page 10                                GAO/RCED-99-
    191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Contents Table II.2:  Results of
    Price Analysis for Line 63 (L63) Oil                     47 Table
    II.3:  Results of Price Analysis for Kern River (KERN) Oil
    48 Table II.4:  Results of Price Analysis for THUMS Oil
    49 Table II.5:  Analysis of Jet Fuel (JET) Prices
    50 Table II.6:  Analysis  of Diesel Prices
    50 Table II.7:  Analysis of Gasoline (GAS) Prices
    51 Figures    Figure 1:  Locations of Alaska Oil Fields and Tanker
    Routes From Valdez, Alaska, to Refineries That Received Alaskan
    North Slope Oil, 1977-98
    4 Figure 1.1:  Map of Showing Locations of Alaska Oil Fields 12
    Figure 1.2:  Percent of Oil Removed From Alaskan North Slope and
    Percent of Production Rights in Prudhoe Bay Oil Field, by Major
    Oil Company, in 1998
    14 Figure 1.3:  Shipping Routes for Alaskan North Slope Oil
    Tankers, 1989-98
    16 Figure 2.1:  New Fields Will Add to Daily Alaskan North Slope
    Oil Production 26 Figure 2.2:  Annual Alaska and California Crude
    Oil Production, 1989-98 28 Figure 3.1:  Number of Alaskan North
    Slope Tankers Scheduled to Be Phased Out, 1999-2015
    36 Figure 3.2:  Number of Overseas Repairs of Alaskan North Slope
    Tankers, 1989-98
    39 Figure II.1:  Proportion of Alaskan North Slope Oil Sold in the
    West Coast Market
    44 Figure II.2:  Alaskan North Slope Oil Destinations Other Than
    the West Coast
    45 Figure II.3:  ANS Wellhead Price Has Risen Compared With WTI
    52 Abbreviations ARCO             Atlantic Richfield Company BP-
    Amoco         British Petroleum-Amoco Page 11
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    Chapter 1 In January 1968, oil was discovered in Prudhoe Bay on
    Alaska's North Slope-an 88,000 square-mile frozen landmass
    extending from the foothills of the Brooks Mountain Range to the
    Arctic Ocean, as shown in figure 1.1. The Prudhoe Bay area,
    located about 250 miles north of the Arctic Circle and about 1,200
    miles south of the North Pole, had no local road system and was
    inaccessible by tanker most of the year because extremely cold
    temperatures freeze the nearby Arctic Ocean.  Consequently, oil
    companies began planning the construction of the Trans-Alaska
    Pipeline System-an 800-mile pipeline to transport oil from the
    frozen Alaskan North Slope to Valdez, on Alaska's Prince William
    Sound, for shipment to distant refineries.  The Congress approved
    pipeline construction in November 1973, and construction was
    completed in July 1977.  The first commercial tanker carrying
    Alaskan North Slope oil from Valdez left for the U.S. West Coast
    on August 1, 1977. Figure 1.1:  Map of Showing Locations of Alaska
    Oil Fields Arctic Ocean Prudhoe Bay National         North
    Petroleum                     Arctic Slope Reserve
    National Wildlife Refuge Brooks Mountains
    Arctic Circle Trans-Alaska Pipeline Cook Inlet
    Valdez Prince William Sound Source:  Alyeska Pipeline Service
    Company, BP-Amoco, and Alaska Department of Natural Resources.
    Page 12
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    Alaskan North Slope              Alaska contains huge quantities
    of crude oil.  The Prudhoe Bay discovery Oil Discovery Was
    was the largest in North America.  Oil companies estimate that the
    state had at least 41 billion barrels of oil in place at the time
    of the North Slope Largest in U.S. History discovery.  According
    to Alaska Department of Natural Resources data, updated May 1998,
    an estimated 19.5 billion barrels were extractable using today's
    technology and under prevailing economic conditions (commonly
    referred to as proven reserves). Of the 19.5 billion barrels of
    proven reserves, about 13.8 billion barrels have already been
    produced by 22 fields.  Thirteen Alaskan North Slope fields that
    contained an estimated 18.2 billion barrels of proven reserves
    have produced about 12.5 billion barrels.  Prudhoe Bay, the oldest
    and largest field on the Alaskan North Slope, accounted for about
    73 percent of those reserves and about 80 percent of total
    production.  The remaining proven reserves are contained in nine
    Cook Inlet fields that have already produced about 1.2 billion
    barrels.  Since 1978, the first full year of Alaskan North Slope
    oil production after the completion of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline,
    Alaska has accounted for between 14 and 25 percent of U.S. crude
    oil production and has ranked among the largest U.S. crude oil-
    producing states every year. The Alaska Department of Natural
    Resources' estimates, however, did not include all Alaska oil.
    The estimates excluded Alaskan North Slope oil fields in various
    stages of development that had not produced measurable quantities
    of oil by 1998.  They also excluded the Alaska National Petroleum
    Reserve, the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, and undeveloped
    Outer Continental Shelf areas.  Oil analysts believe these areas
    contain billions of barrels of proven reserves.1 British
    Petroleum-Amoco Corporation (BP-Amoco), Atlantic Richfield Company
    (ARCO), and Exxon have controlling interests in most Alaskan North
    Slope oil production.  As shown in figure 1.2, in 1998 these three
    companies owned production rights for over 90 percent of the
    Prudhoe Bay field and accounted for over 90 percent of all the oil
    removed from the Alaskan North Slope.2  Fourteen other companies
    also had production 1 Alaska also has trillions of cubic feet of
    natural gas that Alaskan North Slope oil producers would like to
    commercialize.  The oil industry is exploring ways to convert the
    natural gas to liquid to be transported off the North Slope,
    possibly through traditional pipelines such as the Trans-Alaska
    Pipeline. 2 BP and Amoco merged in 1998.  In April 1999, BP-Amoco
    and ARCO confirmed plans to merge. Page 13
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    interests in the Alaskan North Slope in 1998, including companies
    owned by native Alaskan groups. Figure 1.2:  Percent of Oil
    Removed From Alaskan North Slope and Percent of Production Rights
    in Prudhoe Bay Oil Field, by Major Oil Company, in 1998 120%
    Percentage 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Oil removed       Prudhoe Bay
    Other Exxon ARCO BP-Amoco Source: Alaska Department of Natural
    Resources and Energy Security: Impacts of Lifting Alaskan North
    Slope Oil Exports Ban (GAO/RCED-91-21, Nov. 8, 1990) Alaskan North
    Slope               The addition of Alaskan North Slope oil
    production to the oil produced in Oil Discovery Changed
    California and other West Coast states meant that, for the first
    time, production on the U.S. West Coast was greater than West
    Coast refiners' the West Coast Oil                demand for crude
    oil.3  Consequently, oil producers in Alaska looked to other
    markets.  Figure 1.3 shows the historical shipping routes for
    Alaskan Industry                          North Slope oil and the
    location of potential refining markets.  This figure illustrates
    the principal difference between these potential markets- namely,
    the distance between these markets and the Port of Valdez. Page 14
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    Generally, shorter shipping distances translate into lower
    transportation costs and higher profits for oil producers,
    although other factors, such as tanker size, also affect costs.4
    The West Coast is the closest domestic market for Alaskan North
    Slope oil, and Asia is closer than most other U.S. markets, such
    as the U.S. Gulf Coast and U.S. Virgin Islands.  However, the
    Congress had banned the export of Alaskan North Slope oil.
    Therefore, Alaskan North Slope oil producers took oil not sold on
    the West Coast to more distant domestic markets. 3 For the purpose
    of this report, the West Coast includes Alaska, California,
    Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington State. 4 Because crew size and
    operating costs other than fuel are basically constant regardless
    of tanker size, the per-barrel cost to transport oil can be less
    for larger tankers than for smaller tankers. Page 15
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    Figure 1.3:  Shipping Routes for Alaskan North Slope Oil Tankers,
    1989-98 North Slope Prudhoe Bay Nikiski       Trans-Alaska
    Pipeline Valdez Asia                                         West
    Coast                                                East Coast
    Pipeline Hawaii Gulf Coast Puerto Rico U.S. Virgin Islands Trans-
    Panama Pipeline U.S. VirginIslandsviaCapeHorn Refinery Source:
    Energy Security: Impacts of Lifting Alaskan North Slope Oil
    Exports Ban (GAO/RCED-91-21, Nov. 8, 1990). Page 16
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    West Coast Refineries         The proximity to Valdez, along with
    the ban on exports, made the West Retooled to Process
    Coast the preferred destination for the sellers of Alaskan North
    Slope oil. Alaskan North Slope Oil       Because this oil's
    characteristics (weight and sulfur content) differed from those of
    foreign oil, refiners had to invest in additional refining
    equipment to handle the Alaskan North Slope oil.  After West Coast
    refiners retooled to efficiently process that oil, Alaskan North
    Slope oil took the place of much of the foreign oil that West
    Coast refiners had imported.  In 1998, Alaskan North Slope oil
    constituted about 43 percent of all crude oil refined on the West
    Coast. New Tankers Were Built to     The discovery of oil on the
    Alaskan North Slope, along with the export ban, Transport Alaskan
    North       also had an effect on the U.S. oil-shipping industry.
    U.S. shipyards built Slope Oil                     over 50 tankers
    in the 1970s and 1980s to carry crude oil from Valdez to distant
    refineries.  Until the Congress lifted the ban on exporting
    Alaskan North Slope oil, tankers transported the Alaskan North
    Slope oil to U.S. ports.  As a result, the tankers were required
    to comply with the Jones Act. The Jones Act, along with several
    related trade laws, require that any vessel transporting cargo
    between U.S. ports must be U.S.-built, U.S.-flagged (registered),
    U.S.-owned, and U.S.-crewed.  Under an exception in the Jones Act,
    foreign-built tankers were allowed to transport oil from Valdez to
    the U.S. Virgin Islands. Original Ban Was              The
    Congress banned exporting Alaskan North Slope oil when it
    authorized Debated and                   the construction of the
    Trans-Alaska Pipeline in 1973.  The legislation, which was enacted
    in the midst of the Arab oil embargo, amended the Ultimately
    Removed            Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 and restricted the
    export of U.S. oil transported over a federal right-of-way.
    Exports were allowed only if the President found that they would
    not diminish the quantity or quality of oil available to the
    United States and were in the national interest.  The Energy
    Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, the Export Administration Act
    of 1979, and various other laws provided additional restrictions
    on Alaskan North Slope oil exports.  These restrictions were
    intended, in part, to reduce U.S. dependency on foreign oil,
    ensure that Alaskan North Slope oil would be used to benefit U.S.
    citizens, and protect the U.S. economy from a drain of scarce
    resources. The export ban was controversial from its beginning,
    and the pros and cons of lifting it were debated in congressional
    hearings and in other discussions for years.  In addition, several
    studies addressed the likely effects of lifting Page 17
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    the ban.  At issue was who would benefit and who would not benefit
    from lifting the ban. Advocates of lifting the export ban argued
    that it created a surplus of Alaskan North Slope oil on the West
    Coast, in turn depressing price and production and limiting state
    governments' revenues.5  For example, the Department of Energy
    concluded in 1994 that lifting the ban on exporting Alaskan North
    Slope oil would (1) increase the price of the oil by expanding its
    markets, (2) increase Alaska and California revenues through
    increased royalties and taxes, and (3) generate new economic
    activity and employment in Alaska and California.6  Moreover,
    these benefits were expected to accrue without an increase in
    gasoline prices. Opponents argued that lifting the ban would have
    adverse consequences. For example, in a 1995 report prepared for
    the Coalition to Keep Alaska Oil, consultants agreed with the
    Department of Energy's 1994 conclusions that the price and
    production of Alaskan North Slope oil would increase.  But they
    also predicted that oil companies' export-related revenue and
    production gains would be small and of short duration because the
    West Coast would become dependent on foreign imports.7  The
    consultants also predicted that refiners that only refine crude
    oil and do not produce oil (commonly referred to as independent
    refiners) would become dependent on Alaskan North Slope oil
    because they would have no practical access to cheaper foreign oil
    and their profit margins would decrease.  Furthermore, the report
    stated, consumers' prices would increase because crude oil prices
    would be higher.  Finally, allowing companies to export oil on
    foreign-built tankers instead of more costly U.S.-built tankers
    was expected to hurt the U.S. shipping industry. In 1990, we
    reported that lifting the ban would likely increase the price of
    Alaskan North Slope oil. 8  We reported that some oil would likely
    be exported to Asia instead of being shipped to the U.S. East and
    Gulf Coasts, 5 States receive severance tax for oil extracted from
    the ground for consumption in other states, royalty revenue based
    on the value of oil, income tax, and property tax. 6 Exporting
    Alaskan North Slope Crude Oil: Benefits and Costs, Department of
    Energy (June 1994). 7 National Consequences of Exporting Alaska
    North Slope Oil, Wilson Gillette & Co., Petroleum Economics and
    Logistics Consultants (May 1995), prepared for the Coalition to
    Keep Alaska Oil-a Washington, D.C.-based group that opposed
    exporting Alaska oil. 8Alaskan Crude Oil Exports (GAO/T-RCED-90-
    59, Apr. 5, 1990) and Energy Security:  Impacts of Lifting Alaskan
    North Slope Oil Exports Ban (GAO/RCED-91-21, Nov. 8, 1990). Page
    18                                                GAO/RCED-99-191
    Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction the U.S. Virgin
    Islands, Puerto Rico, and possibly some U.S. West Coast ports
    because transportation costs to Asia were lower.  We also reported
    that lifting the ban would promote economic efficiency by
    increasing domestic oil production and allowing better use of
    refinery resources. Finally, we stated that lifting the ban would
    increase the decline in demand for U.S. tankers because Alaskan
    North Slope oil would be exported on foreign-flagged instead of
    U.S.-flagged tankers. In 1995, the Congress lifted the ban on
    exporting Alaskan North Slope oil (P.L. 104-58, title II).  The
    1995 act eliminated the export restrictions in the Mineral Leasing
    Act of 1920 and various other statutes and regulations. The act
    also requires that oil tankers transporting Alaskan North Slope
    oil to foreign destinations be U.S. documented (including U.S.-
    registered and U.S.-crewed) but not necessarily U.S.-built.
    According to the conference report accompanying the 1995
    legislation, the purpose of lifting the export ban was to allow
    Alaskan North Slope crude oil to compete with other crude oil in
    the world market under normal market conditions.  The first
    commercial tanker exporting Alaskan North Slope oil left Valdez
    for Asia on May 31, 1996, about 6 months after the ban was
    lifted.9 Objectives, Scope, and  The 1995 law required us to
    review Alaska and California energy Methodology
    production and the effects of lifting the ban on independent oil
    refiners, consumers, and shipbuilding and ship repair yards on the
    West Coast and Hawaii.  As agreed with the Senate Committee on
    Energy and Natural Resources and the House Committees on Resources
    and on Commerce, this report responds to that mandate and
    addresses the effects of lifting the export ban on (1) Alaskan
    North Slope and California crude oil prices and production and (2)
    refiners, consumers, and the oil-shipping industry (including the
    tanker fleet, the tanker building industry, and the tanker repair
    industry) on the U.S. West Coast.  To put the effects of lifting
    the ban in context, this report discusses changes in Alaska and
    California production during the past decade (1989 through 1998).
    This report also discusses export-related environmental issues
    resulting from lifting the ban (see app. I). To assess the effect
    of lifting the export ban on Alaskan North Slope and California
    crude oil prices and production, we collected and analyzed 9 The
    Nov. 28, 1995, legislation authorized the export of Alaskan North
    Slope oil unless the President found, within 5 months of the date
    of enactment, that exporting the oil was not in the national
    interest. Page 19
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    crude oil price and production data from the Department of Energy,
    the Alaska Departments of Natural Resources and of Revenue, the
    California Departments of Conservation and of Revenue, selected
    oil producers and refiners, the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company-
    the organization that operates the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System-
    and Platts Oil Prices Data Base as reported by Standard & Poor's
    DRI.  We also reviewed previous GAO reports, studies, and other
    available literature.  In addition, we interviewed federal, state,
    and oil industry officials to obtain their views on the effects of
    lifting the ban.  Furthermore, we conducted statistical analyses
    using oil-price data before and after the ban was lifted to
    determine how lifting the export ban had affected the prices of
    Alaskan North Slope and California oil.  A complete discussion of
    our statistical and economic analyses for determining the effects
    of lifting the export ban on Alaskan North Slope and California
    crude oil prices is in appendix II. To assess the effects of
    lifting the export ban on refiners, consumers, and the oil-
    shipping industry on the West Coast, we interviewed West Coast
    crude oil-refining officials, consumer groups, and oil-shipping
    industry officials to obtain their views on the effects of lifting
    the ban.  We also conducted statistical analyses of the effects of
    lifting the export ban on the prices of key petroleum products
    used by West Coast consumers.  These analyses were similar to
    those used to determine the effects of lifting the ban on oil
    prices.  Furthermore, to review the effects of oil exports on the
    U.S. oil-shipping industry, we talked to Alaskan North Slope oil
    industry officials, tanker fleet operators, shipbuilding and ship
    repair industry officials, maritime union representatives, state
    environmental groups, and state and federal officials.  We
    contacted federal agencies, including the U.S. Maritime
    Administration and U.S. Coast Guard within the Department of
    Transportation and the U.S. Customs Service.  We also interviewed
    state officials in Alaska, California, Oregon, and Washington
    State, and industry officials in these states (including officials
    with oil companies that refine oil in Hawaii) and in Washington,
    D.C.  From these officials, we obtained and analyzed selected data
    and records to understand trends in the Alaskan North Slope
    shipping, shipbuilding, and ship repair industries and to identify
    the impact of oil exports on these industries. In addition, where
    applicable, we applied established economic concepts and theories
    to predict the likely effects on Alaskan North Slope and
    California crude oil production in the future.  When important
    price, production, refining, and shipping data were unavailable
    because they were proprietary, we attempted, to the extent
    possible, to obtain such information from alternative sources.
    However, because of proprietary Page 20
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 1 Introduction
    data limitations, we were unable to determine the full effects of
    lifting the export ban on cost increases for refiners using
    Alaskan North Slope or comparable California oil or on the U.S.
    West Coast market in general. We provided a draft of this report
    to the Department of Energy, including its Energy Information
    Administration and Office of Policy, for review and comment.  We
    discussed the report with Energy Information Administration
    officials, including the Director, Petroleum Division, and Office
    of Policy staff.  While the Department did not take a position on
    the findings presented in the report, it provided clarifying
    comments that we incorporated, where appropriate. We conducted our
    work from July 1998 through June 1999 in accordance with generally
    accepted government auditing standards. Page 21
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 2 Lifting the
    Export Ban Increased Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil
    Production
    Chapter 2 Lifting the export ban raised the prices of Alaskan
    North Slope and some California oils between $.98 and $1.30 higher
    per barrel than they would have been had the ban not been lifted.
    To date, these price increases have not had an observable effect
    on Alaskan North Slope and California crude oil production.
    Nevertheless, future oil production should be higher than it would
    have been had the ban not been lifted because higher crude oil
    prices have given producers an incentive to produce more oil.
    According to oil industry officials, new oil fields developed in
    Alaska since the ban was lifted are expected to increase Alaskan
    North Slope oil production by an average of 115,000 barrels per
    day for the next two decades.  However, we could not separate the
    effects of lifting the ban on expected production from the effects
    of broader oil market changes occurring at the same time. For
    example, relatively high world oil prices in 1996 and 1997
    encouraged oil producers to expand exploration and development,
    while low prices in 1998 caused producers to close wells and
    reduce development.  Moreover, this expected production increase
    will not reverse the decade-long decline of Alaska and California
    oil production, which is expected to continue as aging oil fields
    become depleted. Prices of Some West       While world oil prices
    have been volatile since the export ban was lifted, Coast Oil Rose
    as a       the price of Alaskan North Slope and some California
    oil sold in the West Coast market is higher than it would have
    been had the export ban not Result of Lifting the     been
    removed.  Allowing exports to Asia meant increased demand for Ban
    Alaskan North Slope oil and higher prices.  To determine the
    effect of lifting the ban on oil prices, we developed a time-
    series model.  Because oil prices are influenced by many factors
    other than removing the ban, we had to control for these other
    factors.  We did this by modeling the differences between the
    prices of West Coast oils and the prices of similar oils in other
    markets.  Our analysis indicates that the market price of Alaskan
    North Slope oil rose compared with the prices of three oils--Brent
    Blend, Nigerian Forcados, and West Texas Intermediate.1  The price
    increase for Alaskan North Slope oil relative to these three oils
    ranged from $0.98 to $1.30 per barrel. The effect of lifting the
    ban on California oil prices depends on the type of oil examined.
    Light-weight oil with a low sulfur content is higher quality 1
    Brent Blend and West Texas Intermediate oils are widely traded
    oils and are commonly used as benchmarks for the purpose of
    comparing other oils and for setting prices. Nigerian Forcados oil
    is similar in characteristics to Alaskan North Slope oil. Page 22
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 2 Lifting the
    Export Ban Increased Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil
    Production and more valuable than heavy oil with high sulfur
    content because high-quality oil costs less to refine into
    gasoline and other light petroleum products.  Alaskan North Slope
    oil is lighter weight and has a lower sulfur content than most
    California oils.  Our analysis indicates that the price of "Line
    63" oil in California, which is similar in quality to Alaskan
    North Slope oil, rose by $1.28 per barrel compared with the price
    of West Texas Intermediate oil as a result of lifting the ban.
    However, the effect of lifting the ban on the prices of two other
    Californian oils we examined (Kern River and THUMS) was
    insignificant.  These two oils are heavy in contrast with Alaskan
    North Slope and Line 63 oil, which may explain why their prices
    did not respond to the removal of the export ban in the same way.
    Appendix II explains the methodology we used to estimate these
    price increases as well as the economics explanation for why oil
    prices were expected to increase when the ban was lifted. Shipping
    Costs Are                Lifting the export ban also resulted in
    lower shipping costs for oil exported Lower for Exported Oil to
    Asia.  For example, total transportation cost in 1996 for oil sold
    in Asia was about $4.51 less per barrel than for oil sold on the
    U.S. Gulf Coast. Overall, shipping costs fell by at least $15
    million in 1996, $28 million in 1997, and $22 million in 1998 from
    what they would have been had oil not sold in the West Coast
    market continued to go to other domestic markets. Like higher oil
    prices, lower shipping costs improve oil companies' incentives to
    produce more oil. Table 2.1 shows the differences in length of
    tanker voyages, pipeline tariffs, and total transportation costs
    per barrel for oil shipped from Valdez, Alaska, to Asia and the
    U.S. Gulf Coast, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and the Mid-Continent in
    1996.2  As the table shows, an average tanker trip to Asia took 30
    days, while the average trip to the Gulf Coast took 41 days.  In
    the case of oil sold in the Gulf Coast and the Mid-Continent,
    shippers paid pipeline tariffs in addition to tanker costs.3 The
    additional pipeline tariff was approximately $0.82 per barrel for
    Gulf Coast shipments and $2.17 per barrel for Mid-Continent
    shipments.  U.S. Virgin Islands shipments went by 2 For the
    purposes of this report, the Mid-Continent includes Indiana,
    Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
    Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee,
    and Wisconsin. 3 Oil destined for the U.S. Gulf Coast was
    typically taken by tanker from Valdez, Alaska, to the Pacific side
    of Panama and then transported by pipeline to the Atlantic side of
    Panama, where it was reloaded onto tankers for the trip to its
    final destination, such as Louisiana.  Shipments to the Mid-
    Continent went from Valdez to Los Angeles and from there by
    pipeline to their final destinations. Page 23
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 2 Lifting the
    Export Ban Increased Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil
    Production tanker from Valdez around Cape Horn.  This route took
    an average of 84 days, or about twice as long as the next shorter
    route.  However, the shipping costs to the U.S. Virgin Islands
    were slightly lower than for the much shorter journey to Asia
    because the oil companies used larger foreign tankers with foreign
    crews to transport the oil to the U.S. Virgin Islands.4 Foreign
    tankers are much less costly to build, and operating costs for
    foreign-crewed vessels are lower than for U.S.-crewed vessels.
    Although the 1995 law does not prohibit exports on foreign-built
    tankers, all shipments of Alaskan North Slope oil other than to
    the U.S. Virgin Islands have gone on U.S.-crewed tankers.5  Table
    2.1 also shows the average costs for West Coast shipments in 1996.
    As the table shows, the West Coast is the lowest cost destination
    for Alaskan North Slope oil. Table 2.1:  Cost to Ship Alaskan
    North Slope Oil, by Destination, 1996 Pipeline tariff per
    Destination                         Tanker days
    barrel            Cost per barrel Asia
    30                    $0.00                        $2.64 Gulf
    Coast                                       41
    $0.82                        $7.15 Virgin Islands
    84                    $0.00                        $2.35 Mid-
    Continent                                    16
    $2.17                        $3.80 West Coast
    5-18a                     $0.00                        $1.63 Note.
    The cost figures are from 1996, the last year of sales to the Gulf
    Coast and the only year in which sales to Asia coincided with
    sales to the other destinations shown. a Shipments to Nikiski,
    Alaska, and Hawaii took 5 and 18 days, respectively.  Shipments to
    all other West Coast destinations took between 6 and 17 days.
    Sources:  BP-Amoco, U.S. Maritime Administration, and Alaska
    Department of Natural Resources. 4 To date, oil companies have
    used U.S.-built and U.S.-crewed tankers to export oil to Asia. 5
    One exporter told us that while shipping costs to the U.S. Virgin
    Islands were lower than to Asia, sales to Asia are still more
    profitable than sales to the U.S. Virgin Islands because the price
    paid by the Islands refiner was below the price paid in Asia.
    This exporter told us that its revenue minus shipping costs is
    between $1 and $2 per barrel higher for Asian sales than for sales
    to the U.S. Virgin Islands. Page 24
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 2 Lifting the
    Export Ban Increased Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil
    Production Improved Economic                 Higher market prices
    for Alaskan North Slope oil and lower shipping costs Conditions
    Have Had               for exported oil have given oil producers
    incentive to produce more crude oil.  To date, however, this
    incentive has not had an observable effect on No Observable Effect
    Alaskan North Slope or California crude oil production.  Oil
    industry on Oil Production to              officials told us that
    any effects on production would not occur Date
    immediately.  There is a lag between the time producers begin to
    receive higher prices for Alaskan North Slope oil and the time it
    takes for additional development activities to produce more oil.
    Future Oil Production  Oil companies began developing several new
    fields after the export ban Should Be Higher as a  was lifted, and
    production from these fields is projected to add significantly to
    future Alaskan North Slope production.  Figure 2.1 shows the
    expected Result of Lifting the             impact-starting in
    1999-of the development of new fields since the Ban
    export ban was lifted on production levels.  The bottom line in
    the figure shows the current projected production of fields that
    existed prior to the lifting of the export ban.  The top line
    shows the current projected production of all fields--including
    those that were developed and those for which development has been
    planned and approved-since the export ban was lifted.  The
    additional projected production between 1999 and 2020 from these
    new fields is about 115,000 barrels per day, on average.  Some oil
    industry officials told us that some of these new developments
    were in Page 25                                         GAO/RCED-
    99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 2 Lifting the Export Ban
    Increased Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil Production
    response to the removal of the export ban, while others said it
    was difficult to point to one factor to explain the change. Figure
    2.1:  New Fields Will Add to Daily Alaskan North Slope Oil
    Production 1400 Thousands of barrels per day 1200 1000 800 600 400
    200 0 1998     2000     2002     2004        2006    2008
    2010    2012    2014    2016    2018    2020 Years All Fields:
    1998 Forecast 1995 Fields: 1998 Forecast Source:  Alaskan
    Department of Revenue, Revenue Sources Book: Forecast and
    Historical Data, Fall 1995 and 1998. We found no evidence of a
    similar increase in oil production in California. Overall oil
    production in California has continued to decline in the years
    since the ban was lifted, and we did not observe an expansion of
    development activity.  While an increase in the market price of
    some California oils would be expected to lead to increased levels
    of production, none of the oil producers contacted said they had
    increased their production as a result of lifting the ban. We
    could not separate the effects of lifting the export ban on
    expected production increases from the effects of broader oil
    market changes Page 26
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 2 Lifting the
    Export Ban Increased Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil
    Production occurring at the same time.  Among the other factors
    positively affecting production decisions were generally high oil
    prices in 1996 and 1997 and improvements in oil exploration and
    recovery technology.  Higher oil prices encourage greater
    investment in production and exploration.  Average market prices
    for Alaskan North Slope oil in 1996 and 1997 were $17.74 and
    $20.90 per barrel, respectively, compared with $15.86 in 1998.
    Similarly, improved production and exploration technology has
    lowered production costs, providing greater incentive to produce
    more oil.  More recently, low oil prices in 1998 caused California
    oil producers to close some oil wells to avoid maintenance costs.
    The low prices also caused Alaska oil producers to delay planned
    investments and development.  Oil company officials, government
    analysts, and industry experts told us that separating the effects
    of lifting the export ban from such other factors is difficult if
    not impossible. Despite Increases in              The expected
    increase in Alaskan North Slope oil production from lifting Future
    Oil Production,  the ban will not reverse the long-term decline in
    oil production in Alaska and California as aging oil fields in
    these states become depleted.  As the Long-Term
    shown in figure 2.2, crude oil production in both Alaska and
    California Production Decline                decreased almost
    every year from 1989 through 1998.  During that period, Will
    Continue                     Alaska production decreased by about
    35 percent, or about 696,000 barrels per day, primarily because
    increased production in new, relatively small oil fields did not
    offset decreased production in large aging fields.  New fields and
    fields that had been closed but were reopened during that period
    added about 236,000 barrels per day in 1998, which was less than
    the production decrease in the Prudhoe Bay field, the oldest and
    largest oil field on the Alaskan North Slope.  By 1998, the
    Prudhoe Bay field was about 74-percent depleted, and production
    was about half the 1989 level-about 713,000 barrels per day versus
    about 1.43 million barrels per day.  California production also
    decreased by about 9 percent during that period, or about 94,000
    barrels per day, because production in new fields did not offset
    Page 27                                         GAO/RCED-99-191
    Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 2 Lifting the Export Ban Increased
    Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil Production decreased
    production from aging fields.  Low oil prices in 1998 also
    discouraged California production. Figure 2.2:  Annual Alaska and
    California Crude Oil Production, 1989-98 2.5    Millions of
    barrels per day 2.0 1.5 1.0 0.5 0 1989      1990       1991
    1992    1993    1994    1995    1996    1997    1998 Years Alaska
    California Source: Alaska Department of Revenue and California
    Department of Conservation. State Oil Revenues     Alaska revenue
    rose because of the higher market prices and lower Were Affected
    shipping costs that resulted from lifting the export ban.
    Alaska's petroleum revenue comes from severance taxes, royalties,
    corporate income tax, property tax, and petroleum rent and lease
    bonuses.  Royalty, severance tax, and income tax revenue are based
    on the value of oil after excluding pipeline tariff and
    transportation costs.  In April 1998, the Alaska Department of
    Revenue estimated that the annual increase in revenue resulting
    from higher West Coast market prices for Alaskan North Slope oil
    was $40 million.  The officials also estimated that the annual
    increase in Page 28
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 2 Lifting the
    Export Ban Increased Oil Prices and Should Increase Future Oil
    Production revenue from lower shipping costs to Asia was $10
    million.  These effects were the direct result of lifting the
    export ban. California revenue comes from a share of federal
    royalties, income taxes, and property taxes.  California officials
    told us that they receive relatively little revenue from these
    sources.  Consequently, there was no significant change in revenue
    as a result of lifting the export ban. Page 29
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of
    Lifting Oil Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping
    Industry on the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited
    Chapter 3 Lifting the oil export ban has had limited effects on
    refiners, consumers, and the oil-shipping industry-including
    Alaskan North Slope fleet operators, shipbuilders, and tanker
    repair yards.  Higher market prices for Alaskan North Slope and
    some California oil increased some refiners' costs but had no or
    an unclear effect on other refiners' costs.  Despite higher crude
    oil costs for some refiners, West Coast consumers appear to have
    been unaffected by lifting the ban because the prices of important
    petroleum products they use have not increased.  There have also
    been minimal effects on the shipping industry to date, although
    shipbuilding and repair industry officials are concerned that
    business may shift in the future to low-cost foreign shipyards.
    Some Refiners' Crude  While higher prices for Alaskan North Slope
    and comparable California oil Oil Acquisition Costs
    increased the costs of some individual refiners, we could not
    determine the extent of the cost increase for these refiners or
    for the West Coast market Rose, but the Extent Is  in general.
    Proprietary data needed to make the determination were not
    Uncertain                        available.  The impact of rising
    costs on refiners depends on their ability to pass these costs on
    to consumers by raising the prices of the petroleum products they
    sell. Higher market prices for Alaskan North Slope and comparable
    California oil translate directly into higher costs for refiners
    buying this  oil on the market.  However, not all refiners are
    affected equally.  We looked at three hypothetical cases.  First,
    a refiner buying large volumes of Alaskan North Slope and
    comparable California oil would experience cost increases when the
    prices of such oil rise.  In the case in which a refiner buys
    nothing but this oil and always at the market price, costs would
    rise by exactly the amount the price increased as a result of
    lifting the ban-about $.98 to $1.30 per barrel on the basis of our
    analysis.  Second, the costs for a refiner buying little or no
    Alaskan North Slope or comparable California oil would be largely
    unaffected by increases in the market prices of this oil.
    Finally, for some refiners that refine mostly oil that comes from
    their own companies' wells, the effect of the increase in the
    market price of the oil they produce and refine is unclear because
    their oil is not sold in the market. Data on refiners' crude oil
    purchases and the prices paid are unavailable because they are
    proprietary.  Therefore, we could not determine the increase in
    refiners' costs because of higher Alaskan North Slope and
    California oil prices that resulted from lifting the ban.  Some
    refiners we contacted said they pay higher prices for this oil,
    some said they were Page 30
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of
    Lifting Oil Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping
    Industry on the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited unaffected,
    and others said it was analytically impossible to determine the
    effect.  However, none of the refiners shared specific cost data
    with us. The extent to which refiners can pass higher costs on to
    consumers determines how their profits are affected by increased
    crude oil prices. The ability of West Coast refiners to pass
    rising crude oil costs on to consumers may be constrained by
    competitive oil market conditions.  All refiners were not affected
    equally by increasing oil costs.  Therefore, those refiners whose
    costs increased the most may not be able to increase their product
    prices to fully recoup the costs without losing sales to those
    refiners whose costs did not rise by as much.  Increases in crude
    oil costs not passed on to consumers in the form of higher prices
    will reduce profit margins for refiners.  West Coast refiners we
    contacted did not reveal the extent to which they passed on
    increased acquisition costs for crude oil to consumers. Consumers
    Were Not         We analyzed the differences between the prices of
    West Coast petroleum Significantly Affected     products and the
    prices of the same products in other U.S. markets.  Our analysis
    indicates no significant changes in the prices of regular unleaded
    by Lifting the Export      gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel as a
    result of lifting the export ban.  In 1998, Ban
    these three products accounted for more than 80 percent of the
    total output of West Coast refineries, as well as the bulk of
    consumers' expenditures on petroleum products.  These products
    were chosen because they are good indicators of any potential
    change. Exports Have Had a         Lifting the oil export ban has
    had a limited effect on the Alaskan North Limited Effect on
    Slope oil tanker fleet, the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and the
    West Coast tanker repair industry.  Overall, most tankers carrying
    Alaskan North Slope Alaskan North Slope        oil continue to
    take the oil to the U.S. West Coast, and the demand for U.S. Oil
    Shipping               tankers to transport Alaskan North Slope
    oil has continued to decline, although exports have slightly
    offset the decline.  Foreign-built tankers have not been used to
    export Alaskan North Slope oil, and U.S. shipbuilders have not
    lost orders for new tankers to foreign shipyards. Furthermore,
    there has not been a trend toward more foreign repairs of Alaskan
    North Slope tankers since exports began.  Nevertheless, U.S. Page
    31                                            GAO/RCED-99-191
    Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of Lifting Oil Export
    Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping Industry on the West
    Coast Have Generally Been Limited shipbuilding and West Coast
    repair yard officials are concerned that they may lose future
    business to foreign shipyards in part because of oil exports.
    Effects on Tankers                 Lifting the oil export ban has
    not greatly altered the number and routes of Transporting Alaskan
    North  tankers used to transport Alaskan North Slope oil to date.
    While the 1995 Slope Oil Have Been Limited law that lifted the ban
    does not require companies to use U.S.-built tankers for export
    shipments, the fleet serving the Alaskan North Slope remains
    basically domestic, both in vessel registration and shipment
    destinations. Moreover, this fleet is almost entirely owned by, or
    under long-term-charter to, the major Alaskan North Slope oil
    producers.  The number of tankers used to transport Alaskan North
    Slope oil from Valdez has been decreasing steadily in the 1990s,
    as a result of the downward trend in Alaska oil production.  In
    1998, the Valdez fleet had 30 tankers, compared with over 50 in
    1990. Lifting the ban has not significantly altered Alaskan North
    Slope shipping operations.  Most of the oil produced continues to
    be shipped to West Coast refineries.  A small percentage-about 5
    percent-of the oil has been exported since the export ban was
    lifted.  The major oil producers in Alaska ship most of their oil
    to West Coast states, particularly Washington and California-to
    refineries around Puget Sound, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.  In
    1998, the average volume shipped to West Coast refineries was a
    little over one million barrels per day, carried by 30 tankers in
    465 shipments.  In comparison, only one major producer-BP-Amoco-
    has been a significant exporter.  Since exports began in May 1996,
    it has exported an average of about 60,000 barrels per day.  For
    example, in 1998, five different tankers chartered to BP-Amoco
    took a total of 20 shipments to Korea, China, Japan, and Taiwan.
    An Exxon tanker also took one shipment to Japan in 1997 and one in
    1998.  Recent trends in major destinations and volumes shipped are
    shown in table 3.1. (continued) Page 32
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of
    Lifting Oil Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping
    Industry on the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited Table 3.1:
    Destinations of Alaskan North Slope Oil Tankers and Volumes
    Carried, 1994-98 Thousands of barrels per day Destination
    1994          1995          1996         1997          1998
    California/Washington                      1,279         1,229
    1,205         1,113        1,026 Hawaii
    53            49            50           39                43
    Alaska                                        28            32
    34           36                26 U.S. Gulf Coast via Panama
    75            62            4a             00 U.S. Virgin Islandsb
    95            88            48            5a                0 Asia
    0            0           36a           68                53 Total
    1,530         1,460        1,377         1,261       1,149c a On a
    full-year basis; for the partial year during which oil was
    shipped, per-day volume was higher. b All shipments were made on
    foreign-flagged tankers. c  Does not add due to rounding. Source:
    U.S. Maritime Administration. As shown in table 3.1, the volume of
    oil shipped to Washington/California and Hawaii has decreased
    gradually in recent years, while the volume shipped to Alaska
    increased from 1994 through 1997, then decreased in 1998.  At the
    same time, the volume shipped to the U.S. Gulf Coast via Panama
    and to the U.S. Virgin Islands around Cape Horn fell to zero after
    the export ban was lifted.  According to federal maritime and
    industry officials, both the U.S. Gulf Coast and U.S. Virgin
    Islands destinations were declining even without the influence of
    exports because, compared with U.S. West Coast destinations, they
    involve high shipping costs, especially the shipments to the U.S.
    Gulf Coast.  Some officials said that export shipments in effect
    replaced the trade with the U.S. Virgin Islands and accelerated
    its end. Exports have affected some tanker operators more than
    others.  Officials of ARCO and Exxon, which have subsidiaries that
    own and operate tankers in the Alaskan North Slope trade, said
    that because they have made few, if any, export shipments, lifting
    the export ban has had little or no effect on their Alaskan North
    Slope tanker fleets.  However, officials of BP-Amoco (which is not
    a U.S.-owned corporation and therefore is not permitted to own
    tankers engaged in the U.S. domestic trade) said that exports to
    Asia allow the company to lower its transportation costs and thus
    provide an important new market.  In addition, officials of the
    charter shipping companies that carried exports for BP-Amoco said
    that the export legislation benefited their business.  These
    officials said that exports have Page 33
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of
    Lifting Oil Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping
    Industry on the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited slightly
    increased the demand for U.S. tankers to carry Alaskan North Slope
    oil.  According to officials of two companies, because of exports,
    a few of their tankers that might otherwise have been unused were
    active in the Alaskan North Slope fleet.  Our analysis confirmed
    that while overall fleet size continues to decrease, exports may
    have slightly increased the demand for U.S. tankers in the Alaskan
    North Slope trade in 1996 and 1997. Exports have led to the
    disappearance of foreign-registered tankers from the Alaskan North
    Slope fleet and may therefore have caused an increase in jobs for
    U.S.-tanker crews.  Foreign tankers with foreign crews carried
    Alaskan North Slope oil from Valdez to the U.S. Virgin Islands
    under a long-standing exception in the Jones Act.  As shown in
    table 3.1, before the ban was lifted, oil was shipped from Valdez
    around Cape Horn to refineries in the U.S. Virgin Islands.
    Several foreign-registered, foreign-crewed tankers made these
    trips.  According to our analysis, lifting the ban caused these
    foreign tankers and crews to be replaced by U.S.-crewed tankers
    going to Asia.  Tankers carrying Alaskan North Slope oil from
    Valdez to Asia to date have been U.S.-documented (including U.S.-
    registered and U.S.-crewed) and U.S.-owned, as required by the
    1995 legislation that lifted the export ban.  As a result of this
    change in destinations, the equivalent of one or two additional
    U.S. tankers were used to carry Alaskan North Slope oil in 1996
    and 1997, creating an estimated 58 to 115 U.S. tanker crew jobs.1
    These jobs partially offset the overall decrease in U.S. tanker
    crew jobs in the Alaskan North Slope trade during the past decade
    caused by declining crude oil production and fleet size. Effects
    on U.S. Shipbuilding  To date, lifting the oil export ban has also
    had a limited effect on the U.S. Have Been Limited
    shipbuilding industry.  Demand for new tankers for the Alaskan
    North Slope trade-either U.S. or foreign-built-appears to be
    minimal at present and driven primarily by factors other than
    exports.  Since the export ban was lifted, Alaskan North Slope
    tanker operators have had the option of exporting oil in foreign-
    built tankers, but to date they have not done so. Likewise, U.S.
    shipyards have not lost orders for new Alaskan North Slope export
    tankers to foreign shipyards.  Although several U.S. shipyards are
    equipped to build Alaskan North Slope tankers, no U.S. shipyard
    has delivered one since 1987.  According to industry officials,
    U.S. shipbuilders have been at a price disadvantage in the world
    commercial shipbuilding 1 Based on U.S. Maritime Administration
    estimates of 25 billets per tanker and 2.3 crew members per
    billet. Page 34
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of
    Lifting Oil Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping
    Industry on the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited market
    because of, among other reasons, higher costs and less-modern
    production methods. U.S. shipbuilders and other industry officials
    expected 10 or more new orders in the 1990s for tankers to serve
    the Alaskan North Slope.  These expectations resulted in part from
    the enactment of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, in response to the
    Exxon Valdez accident.2  The act mandated, among other things, the
    phaseout of single-hulled tankers and the transition to double-
    hulled tankers by 2015, in order to reduce the effects of oil
    spills in the event of accidents.  However, only three orders have
    materialized so far.  All three orders were from ARCO for tankers
    to be built by Avondale, Inc., of Louisiana, and to be delivered
    between 2000 and 2002.  Additionally, a proposed order from BP-
    Amoco for three tankers to be built by the National Steel and
    Shipbuilding Company, of San Diego, was deferred indefinitely in
    October 1998.  According to industry officials, factors in the
    lack of orders to date include falling oil prices in 1998 and
    their effect on Alaskan North Slope planning and development, as
    well as the price of new tankers-in some cases up to three times
    as much in U.S. shipyards compared with overseas yards. Despite
    the lack of tanker demand to date, there could be some demand for
    new Alaskan North Slope tankers in the next decade, according to
    shipbuilding and oil company officials.  As shown in figure 3.1,
    under Oil Pollution Act of 1990 requirements, 26 Alaskan North
    Slope tankers are due to be phased out of the fleet by 2015. 2On
    Mar. 24, 1989, the Exxon Valdez ran aground on a reef, spilling
    about 11 million gallons of Alaskan North Slope crude oil into
    Prince William Sound. Page 35
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of
    Lifting Oil Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping
    Industry on the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited Figure 3.1:
    Number of Alaskan North Slope Tankers Scheduled to Be Phased Out,
    1999-2015 4.0    Number of tankers 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 1999     2000
    2001    2002    2003    2004    2005    2006    2007     2008
    2009     2010    2011    2012    2013    2014    2015 Years
    Source:  U.S. Maritime Administration. As shown in figure 3.1, 19
    tankers serving the Alaskan North Slope are to be phased out by
    the end of 2006.  Some of these tankers, but not all, would need
    to be replaced, assuming that Alaskan North Slope production
    continues to decline.  Oil companies would have replacement
    alternatives to new U.S.-built tankers, including (1) extending
    the life of existing tankers by converting the hulls and (2) using
    existing or new foreign-built tankers for exports.  Oil company
    officials told us that their needs for future U.S. tankers will
    depend on various oil industry and market factors. Although
    introducing foreign-built tankers into the Alaskan North Slope
    Page 36                                              GAO/RCED-99-
    191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of Lifting Oil
    Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping Industry on
    the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited trade to carry exports
    is an option, oil company officials told us they have no plans to
    do so in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, officials in the
    U.S. shipbuilding industry said they are concerned about losing
    future Alaskan North Slope tanker orders to overseas shipyards, in
    part because of exports.  They contend that the export option
    gives oil companies an added incentive to further postpone orders
    for new U.S.-built tankers.  According to these shipbuilding
    officials, foreign-built tankers to export Alaskan North Slope oil
    are a possibility within a few years, if not immediately.  If so,
    jobs in U.S. shipyards could be affected.  According to company
    officials, each tanker order postponed or lost to a foreign
    competitor costs about 1,000 U.S. shipyard jobs for the 18 months
    it takes to construct a tanker. In addition, postponed tanker
    orders contribute to the aging of the Alaskan North Slope fleet,
    with a potential impact on fleet safety.  Because no new tankers
    have entered the fleet since 1987, half of the fleet consists of
    single-hulled tankers built in the 1970s or before.  Even though
    the oldest tankers have been phased out of service, the phaseout
    has been so gradual that, on average, the remaining fleet has
    gotten older.  The average age of the fleet has increased since
    the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 was passed- from about 16 years old
    in 1990 to 21 years old in 1998.3 Effects on West Coast        The
    ability to export Alaskan North Slope oil has given tanker
    operators an Tanker Repair Yards Have     added incentive to
    repair tankers overseas rather than on the West Coast Been Limited
    because they can reduce costs by combining oil shipments to Asia
    with less expensive Asian repairs.  However, since the export ban
    was lifted, there has not been a trend toward more overseas
    repairs.  Tankers serving the Alaskan North Slope undergo major,
    scheduled "drydock" repairs about twice every 5 years at a cost of
    $1 million to over $10 million each.  A drydock repair can take a
    tanker out of service for several weeks.  Exact information on the
    number of Alaskan North Slope tanker repairs for recent years was
    unavailable.  However, according to data supplied by industry
    officials, and on the basis of recent fleet size, we estimate that
    3 The 1990 fleet included four tankers rebuilt in 1983 or earlier
    and the 1998 fleet included three such tankers. Page 37
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of
    Lifting Oil Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping
    Industry on the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited about 10 to
    15 such repairs have occurred annually for tankers serving the
    Alaskan North Slope in recent years. On average, repairs have been
    decreasing in the 1990s at a rate that is commensurate with the
    decline in Alaskan North Slope production and fleet size.  Three
    West Coast repair yards, in California, Oregon, and Washington
    State, compete with several Asian yards for the Alaskan North
    Slope tanker repair business.  These West Coast yards are situated
    near Alaskan North Slope shipping lanes and destinations.
    However, according to industry officials, the U.S. repair yards
    are at a competitive disadvantage because Asian yards may charge
    less than half of what a U.S. yard would charge for a comparable
    tanker repair. Combining an oil shipment to Asia with a less
    expensive Asian repair allows tanker operators to avoid the extra
    cost of going without oil cargo to Asia for a repair.  Overseas
    repairs of U.S. ships are subject to U.S. Customs duties of 50
    percent of certain repair costs levied on the vessel operator.
    According to U.S. Customs and shipping industry data, overseas
    repairs of Alaskan North Slope tankers have not increased
    significantly since the ban was lifted, as shown in figure 3.2.
    Page 38                                            GAO/RCED-99-191
    Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of Lifting Oil Export
    Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping Industry on the West
    Coast Have Generally Been Limited Figure 3.2:  Number of Overseas
    Repairs of Alaskan North Slope Tankers, 1989-98 8    Number of
    repairs 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 1989     1990        1991    1992    1993
    1994     1995    1996    1997    1998 Years Source:  U.S. Customs
    Service. As shown in figure 3.2, overseas repairs of Alaskan North
    Slope tankers have averaged between three and four a year.  No
    significant trend toward more overseas repairs has developed since
    exports began.  Of the nine total overseas repairs since 1996,
    seven involved the tankers of one oil company that has
    historically repaired its tankers overseas and has not been an
    exporter of Alaskan North Slope oil. Officials of the West Coast
    tanker repair industry said that their recent experience raised
    concerns that a trend toward more foreign repairs of Alaskan North
    Slope tankers could be beginning to develop, with exports as a
    contributing factor.  They cited two foreign repairs of Alaskan
    North Slope tankers in Asia in 1998.  In one of these cases, a
    tanker that transported crude oil to Korea underwent a scheduled
    drydock repair in a Korean shipyard before returning to the United
    States.  According to West Coast repair industry officials, this
    case illustrates how exports may be Page 39
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Chapter 3 Effects of
    Lifting Oil Export Ban on Refiners, Consumers, and Oil Shipping
    Industry on the West Coast Have Generally Been Limited starting to
    harm the West Coast ship repair industry.   In the other case, the
    tanker went without cargo to Singapore for a scheduled drydock
    repair. According to operators involved in the two cases, a major
    factor in having repairs done overseas was the significantly lower
    cost in Asian repair yards compared with U.S. West Coast yards,
    even when U.S. Customs duties are added and even without carrying
    cargo, as in the latter case.  According to West Coast repair
    industry officials, the two lost repairs represented several
    million dollars in business and potential lack of employment for
    over 500 workers a day for each repair. Page 40
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix I Lifting the
    Oil Export Ban Has Had Little Impact on the Alaskan Environment
    Appendix I According to our discussions with Alaskan North Slope
    oil industry officials, state of Alaska officials, and
    environmental groups, lifting the export ban has had little effect
    on the Alaskan environment to date.  Their opinions are based in
    part on the fact that export shipments from 1996 to 1998 were more
    limited than projected by some analysts.  Export shipments have
    not resulted in the use of larger tankers or new, potentially more
    hazardous shipping routes to Asia and have not significantly
    increased the risks of invading nonindigenous marine species, such
    as plankton and other organisms, into Alaskan waters. Prior to
    lifting the oil export ban, according to some projections, exports
    of 200,000 barrels of oil per day or more were to be carried in
    Alaskan North Slope tankers that were of larger than average size-
    vessels with a capacity of 200,000 deadweight tons or more.1  In
    addition, some environmentalists foresaw the use of new,
    potentially more hazardous shipping routes to Asia along the
    Aleutian Islands coast instead of in deep water.  However, this
    projected new tanker traffic has not materialized.  There have
    been a relatively small number of export shipments to date-a total
    of 21 in 1998, for example--and existing tankers have been used.
    In addition, export tankers have been avoiding near-Aleutian
    routes in favor of already existing routes for which contingency
    planning and spill response teams are already in place.
    Furthermore, officials for the oil industry, Aleyska Pipeline
    Service Company (the organization that operates the Trans-Alaska
    Pipeline System), and U.S. Coast Guard said that they have not
    changed their operations as a result of the ban's being lifted.
    Rather, any changes made resulted from the Exxon Valdez accident
    in 1989.  The existing routes involve escorted transits out of
    Prince William Sound into deeper ocean, where tankers then head
    toward the U.S. mainland, Hawaii, or Asia. Nonindigenous marine
    species may come to Alaska in a tanker's ballast water, which is
    routinely exchanged (taken on board and/or discharged from the
    vessel) either in port or under way, in order to maintain vessel
    stability.  Potentially invasive species include plankton,
    crustaceans, and other organisms that could disturb the local
    marine ecology.  However, the export-related invasion of Asian
    marine species does not appear to be a significant problem to
    date.  Alaska officials and two representatives of an
    environmental group told us that this is an issue in Alaska, but
    not necessarily because of Alaskan North Slope oil exports.
    According to oil company officials, the operators of export
    tankers have added a second 1 Deadweight tons are a measure of a
    ship's cargo capacity. Page 41
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix I Lifting the
    Oil Export Ban Has Had Little Impact on the Alaskan Environment
    mid-ocean ballast water exchange while under way toward Valdez in
    addition to the one exchange required by federal law-the National
    Invasive Species Act of 1996.  They said this step helps to avoid
    the invasion of nonindigenous species.  In addition, according to
    an interim report commissioned by the Regional Citizens' Advisory
    Council of Prince William Sound, species in ballast water from
    Asia may not as readily occur or survive in Alaskan waters as
    species from Washington and California ports.2   A final report on
    this matter is due to be issued later in 1999. 2Biological
    Invasion of Cold-Water Coastal Ecosystems:  Ballast Mediated
    Introduction in Port Valdez/Prince William Sound, Alaska-1998
    Progress Report, Dec. 3, 1998, for Regional Citizens' Advisory
    Council of Prince William Sound. Page 42
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices
    Appendix II This appendix provides details on the statistical
    analysis we used to explain and estimate how lifting the ban on
    Alaskan oil exports has affected crude oil and petroleum product
    prices on the U.S. West Coast.  We conducted statistical analyses
    using data on oil prices before and after the ban was lifted to
    determine whether the effects on price predicted by previous
    studies were borne out.  We used a similar analysis to determine
    what effect the ban's lifting had on the prices charged for
    gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel on the West Coast. In summary, our
    statistical analysis indicates that lifting the export ban led to
    relative prices for Alaskan crude oil and for comparable
    California crude oil that were higher than they would have been
    had the ban remained in force.  However, lifting the ban had no
    statistically significant effect on the prices of gasoline,
    diesel, or jet fuel.  These results are consistent with
    predictions of earlier studies.  In addition, we found that sales
    of Alaskan crude oil destined for the U.S. Virgin Islands and the
    U.S. Gulf Coast ended and sales to the Mid-Continent fell abruptly
    once exports became a feasible alternative.  Relatedly, we found
    that the proportion of Alaskan oil sold on the West Coast has
    risen over time as Alaskan and California production have fallen.
    Prior Studies Found              Several analyses by the
    Department of Energy, GAO, and the private sector That the Ban
    Resulted  found that West Coast prices of Alaskan oil were lower
    as a result of banning exports of this oil.1  These studies
    concluded that this ban resulted in Lower Oil Prices
    in an abundance of crude oil relative to refining demand on the
    West Coast, leading to lower crude oil prices there.  The studies
    contend that lifting the export ban would result in Alaskan oil
    being sold in Asian markets, causing its price to rise on the West
    Coast.  Because California oil is also refined on the West Coast,
    higher Alaskan prices would tend to increase refiners' demand for
    California oil, pushing up its price as well.  The effects of
    lifting the ban on oil production, refining costs, and consumer
    prices were also predicted in these studies.  For example, higher
    oil prices were expected to encourage more oil production while
    also leading to higher costs for refiners buying that oil and
    possibly higher prices for consumer petroleum products. 1Exporting
    Alaskan North Slope Crude Oil: Benefits and Costs, U.S. Department
    of Energy (June 1994), Alaskan Crude Oil Exports (GAO/T-RCED-90-
    59, Apr. 5, 1990) , and Samuel A. Van Vactor, Time to End the
    Alaskan Oil Export Ban, Policy Analysis, May 18, 1995, No. 227.
    Page 43                                               GAO/RCED-99-
    191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology for
    Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices Alaskan Oil Is No Longer
    Sales of Alaskan oil to the U.S. Gulf Coast ended about 5 months
    before the Sold in the U.S. Gulf Coast     first exports to Asia,
    and sales to the U.S. Virgin Islands ended about 8 and U. S.
    Virgin Islands        months later.  Sales to the Mid-Continent
    states dropped off abruptly when the ban was lifted.  Before the
    ban was lifted, total sales to these markets were falling as
    Alaskan oil production fell from its peak in 1988.   Whether the
    lifting of the ban, rather than falling production, caused the
    cessation of sales to the Gulf Coast and Virgin Islands is
    unclear.  However the abrupt drop in sales to the Gulf Coast,
    Virgin Islands, and Mid-Continent states coincided with the ban's
    removal. Figures II.1 and II.2 illustrate the observations listed
    above.  As production has fallen, the proportion sold to West
    Coast refiners has risen, and sales to alternative markets have
    declined.  Finally, since the ban was lifted, some sales to these
    other markets have been replaced by Asian sales. Figure II.1:
    Proportion of Alaskan North Slope Oil Sold in the West Coast
    Market 120% Proportion of oil 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% 1994
    1995       1996            1997             1998 Years Alaskan
    North Slope oil sold in other markets Alaskan North Slope oil sold
    in West Coast Source: U.S. Maritime Administration Vessel Loading
    and Destination reports. Page 44
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices Figure II.2:  Alaskan North
    Slope Oil Destinations Other Than the West Coast 30 Millions of
    barrels of Alaskan North Slope oil 25 20 15 10 5 0 1996
    1997                  1998 Years Asia Mid-Continent Virgin Islands
    Note: The 1996 figures for Asia are for May 31 through December
    31, corresponding to the period in 1996 during which oil was
    exported to Asia. Source: U.S. Maritime Administration Vessel
    Loading and Destination reports. Statistical Analysis
    As predicted by the studies described above and as we found in our
    Indicates That Lifting           analyses of the prices of oil
    before and after the ban was lifted, the price of Alaskan North
    Slope oil has risen relative to other oil as a result of lifting
    the Ban Resulted in              the export ban.  We also found
    that the price of a comparable blend of Higher Prices for
    California oil--Line 63--rose as a result of lifting the ban.
    Alaskan and                      To determine the effect of
    lifting the ban on oil prices, we developed a Comparable
    California  time-series model.  Because oil prices are influenced
    by many factors other Oil                              than
    removing the ban, we had to control for these other factors.  We
    did this by modeling the differentials between the prices of West
    Coast oil and the prices of similar oil in other markets.
    Modeling the price differentials Page 45
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices between two crude oils is a way
    to control for all the factors that affect the two oils similarly-
    such as changes in global supply and demand-while capturing
    changes in the local markets of the two oils that affect only one
    of the oils.  To control for local factors affecting the prices of
    individual comparison oils, we examined three price differentials
    for Alaskan North Slope (ANS) oil and three for Line 63 (L63).
    The comparison oils, making up the other part of the differentials
    are Brent Blend (BB), Nigerian Forcados (FOR), and West Texas
    Intermediate (WTI).  For each of the six differentials, the price
    differential is defined as the price of the comparison oil minus
    the price of the West Coast oil-be it Alaskan North Slope or Line
    63 oils.  We used daily spot price data as reported in Platts Oil
    Prices Data Base.  The data series we used run from January 8,
    1992 ,through December 4, 1998, and are in nominal dollar terms.2
    To compare the price differential before and after the export ban
    was lifted, we included in the regression a dummy variable to
    indicate when the ban was removed.  Diagnostic tests indicated
    that the price differential series was auto-regressive of order
    one.  Therefore, we included a lagged price differential as a
    regressor.  Diagnostic tests also revealed that the residuals were
    auto-regressive conditionally heteroskedastic.  To correct for
    this, we included a GARCH(1,1) component to the regression.3  The
    estimated form of the equation of the price differential is =   +
    -1 +                + t DIFF                          t DIFF
    t EXPORT                t , where DIFF is the difference between
    the prices of the comparison and West Coast oils; EXPORT is a
    dummy variable to indicate the removal of the ban;  ,  , and   are
    parameters to be estimated; and   is a random error term.4  The
    subscript t denotes time.  The parameter   does not measure the
    marginal effect of lifting the ban on the price differential
    because of the auto-regressive property of the model.5  The
    results of maximum likelihood estimation are shown in tables II.1
    and II.2. 2 We used daily spot price data rather than constructing
    weekly or monthly averages of this data because we wanted to
    examine prices that reflect actual transactions.  It is possible
    that using weekly or monthly averages would change the results of
    the statistical analysis but we did not explore this approach. 3
    The details of the diagnostic tests and the choice of the final
    form of the regression model are discussed in detail below. 4 The
    dummy variable takes on the value of unity for dates on or after
    May 28, 1996, and is otherwise equal to zero. Page 46
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices Table II.1:  Results of Price
    Analysis for Alaskan North Slope (ANS) Oil Coefficients
    WTI-ANS                   BB-ANS                 FOR-ANS CONSTANT
    0.037*                  0.019*                      0.022* (0.003)
    (0.005)                  (0.006) DIFFt-1
    0.986*                  0.976*                      0.982* (0.002)
    (0.003)                  (0.003) EXPORT
    -0.018*                  -0.024*                     -0.02*
    (0.004)                  (0.007)                  (0.008) -
    1.295                    0.979                     1.102 Adj. R-
    Squared                                      0.976
    0.946                     0.952 Note:  Standard errors are in
    parentheses.  An asterisk denotes significance at the 5-percent
    level. The long-term increase in the relative price of Alaskan
    North Slope oil relative to the three comparison oils ranges from
    $0.98 to $1.30 as shown in the -  cells.  All coefficient
    estimates are significant at the 5-percent level. Table II.2:
    Results of Price Analysis for Line 63 (L63) Oil Coefficients
    WTI-L63                   BB-L63                 FOR-L63 CONSTANT
    0.051*                   0.017*                      0.025*
    (0.007)                   (0.008)                  (0.009) DIFF
    0.986*                   0.987*                      0.986* t-1
    (0.003)                   (0.003)                  (0.003) EXPORT
    -0.018*                   -0.005                      -0.012
    (0.006)                   (0.009)                     (0.01) -
    1 . 2 8 2aa Adj. R-Squared
    0.975                    0.956                      0.959 a Not
    applicable.  The export coefficient was not significant, so we did
    not calculate the   value. Note:  Standard errors are in
    parentheses.  An asterisk denotes significance at the 5-percent
    level. 5 The auto-regressive structure of the model requires that
    the long-run impact of lifting the ban be calculated as follows: =
    1 1- where   is the long-term effect of lifting the ban on the
    differential, and   and   are as defined above. The negative of
    can be interpreted as the increase in the price of the West Coast
    oil relative to the comparison oil.  These values are listed in
    tables II.1 and II.2 for the cases in which the EXPORT variable
    was statistically significant. Page 47
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices The price of Line 63 oil rises
    significantly compared with West Texas Intermediate but does not
    rise significantly compared with either Brent Blend or Nigerian
    Forcados.  In the latter two cases, the direction of change is the
    same and the order of magnitude of   is similar to the significant
    case. However, because the coefficients are not statistically
    significant, we did not calculate the long-term effect. No Effect
    Found on the         We conducted a similar analysis using the
    prices of two heavy California Prices of California Heavy
    oils-Kern River and THUMS-and found no significant changes when
    the Crude Oils                     export ban was lifted.  We used
    daily spot price data as reported in Platts Oil Prices Data Base.
    The data series we used run from January 8, 1992, through December
    4, 1998, and are in nominal dollar terms.  We compared the prices
    of these two oils to the prices of Duri, Indonesia (DU); Shengli,
    China (SH); and West Texas Intermediate oils.  West Texas
    Intermediate was chosen to provide some consistency between these
    and the previous regression results.6  The other two oils were
    chosen because, like Kern River and THUMS, they are heavy oils and
    therefore their prices should be expected to be affected similarly
    by global market conditions.  The regression results follow. Kern
    River oil shows no significant change in price compared to any of
    the comparison oils, as shown in table II.3. Table II.3:  Results
    of Price Analysis for Kern River (KERN) Oil Coefficients
    WTI-KERN                  SH-KERN                 DU-KERN CONSTANT
    0.186*                   0.048*                 0.0574* (0.041)
    (0.013)                  (0.014) DIFFt-1
    0.969*                   0.984*                     0.982* (0.006)
    (0.004)                  (0.004) EXPORT
    -0.013                    0.002                     -0.001 (0.019)
    (0.012)                  (0.013) -
    aaa Adj. R-Squared                                     0.917
    0.958                     0.952 aNot applicable.  The export
    coefficient was not significant, so we did not calculate the
    value. 6 In the case of the WTI-Kern and WTI-THUMS differential
    models, we also ran regressions that included a world "light-
    heavy" differential (specifically, Brent Blend and Duri,
    Indonesia) to control for structural changes in the light-heavy
    differential in the mid-1990s. Adding this term in the regression
    did not change the significance of the EXPORT coefficient, so we
    do not report these results. Letter         Page 48
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices Note:  Standard errors are in
    parentheses.  An asterisk denotes significance at the 5-percent
    level. As with the Kern River results, there was no significant
    change in the price of THUMS relative to any comparison oil, as
    shown in table II.4. Table II.4:  Results of Price Analysis for
    THUMS Oil Coefficients                              WTI-THUMS
    SH-THUMS                 DU-THUMS CONSTANT
    0.144*                  0.027*                      0.031* (0.033)
    (0.01)                      (0.011) DIFFt-1
    0.97*                 0.986*                      0.986* (0.006)
    (0.004)                      (0.004) EXPORT
    -0.016                  -0.005                      -0.009 (0.018)
    (0.011)                      (0.012) -
    aa a Adj. R-Squared                                    0.913
    0.956                        0.95 aNot applicable.  The export
    coefficient was not significant so we did not calculate the
    value. Note:  Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk
    denotes significance at the 5-percent level. Statistical Analysis
    Our analysis of prices of three key consumer products-gasoline,
    diesel Indicates No Effect on the     fuel, and jet fuel-indicated
    that lifting the ban had no statistically Prices of Petroleum
    significant effect on them.  Because higher crude oil prices
    translate Products                       directly into higher
    refiner costs for refiners, it would not be unusual to find that
    some of the increase in costs was passed on to consumers in the
    form of higher prices for petroleum products.  However, refiners
    whose costs rose as a result of removing the ban may not have been
    able to pass these costs on to consumers because of competition
    from imported final products or from other West Coast refiners
    whose costs did not rise. To determine the effect on petroleum
    prices of removing the ban, we conducted an analysis of petroleum
    prices that was similar to the crude oil price analysis described
    above. We used daily spot price data as reported in Platts Oil
    Prices Data Base.  The data series we used run from January 8,
    1992, through December 4, 1998, and are in nominal dollar terms.
    We compared West Coast prices of regular unleaded gas, diesel
    fuel, and jet fuel with prices of these same products in other
    markets.  The time series of the petroleum product price
    differentials and the crude oil price differentials behaved
    similarly, making the same model structure appropriate.  Our
    analysis revealed no statistically significant change in West
    Coast petroleum product prices that was not explained by similar
    Page 49                                                GAO/RCED-
    99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology for
    Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices changes in the prices of these
    products in other markets.  Specifically, we did not find any
    change in the prices at the time the ban was lifted, indicated by
    the absence of a statistically significant estimated   coefficient
    for the export dummy variable.  The results of our regressions are
    listed in tables II.5 through II.7. Table II.5:  Analysis of Jet
    Fuel (JET) Prices Coefficients
    LA-CHIJET                        SF-CHIJET CONSTANT
    0.622*                               0.581* (0.079)
    (0.081) DIFFt-1
    0.965*                               0.966* (0.005)
    (0.005) EXPORT
    -0.027                                -0.02 (0.043)
    (0.045) -
    aa Adj. R-Squared
    0.922                               0.921 a Not applicable.  The
    export coefficient was not significant, so we did not calculate
    the   value. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk
    denotes significance at the 5-percent level. Lifting the ban had
    no significant effect on the prices of jet fuel in Los Angeles
    (LA) or San Francisco (SF) when compared with the price of jet
    fuel in Chicago (CHI). Table II.6:  Analysis  of Diesel Prices
    Coefficients
    SF-GULFDIESEL CONSTANT
    0.417* (0.083) DIFFt-1
    0.972* (0.005) EXPORT
    0.028 (0.051) -
    a Adj. R-Squared
    0.941 a Not applicable.  The export coefficient was not
    significant, so we did not calculate the   value. Note: Standard
    errors are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes significance at the
    5-percent level. Diesel fuel prices in San Francisco were also
    unaffected by lifting the export ban when compared with diesel
    prices in the Gulf Coast (GULF). Page 50
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices Table II.7:  Analysis of
    Gasoline (GAS) Prices Coefficients
    LA-GULFGAS                       SF-GULFGAS CONSTANT
    0.236*                               0.101* (0.029)
    (0.031) DIFFt-1
    0.961*                               0.969* (0.004)
    (0.005) EXPORT
    -0.011                               0.044 (0.054)
    (0.06) -
    aa Adj. R-Squared
    0.934                                0.94 a Not applicable.  The
    export coefficient was not significant, so we did not calculate
    the   value. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk
    denotes significance at the 5 percent level. Again, there was no
    significant change in the West Coast prices of regular unleaded
    gasoline as a result of lifting the export ban. Further Evidence
    of an       Higher market prices for Alaskan North Slope oil and
    lower shipping costs Increase in the Price of     mean higher
    revenues for producers of this oil.  The impact of lifting the
    Alaskan North Slope Oil      ban on Alaskan North Slope producers'
    revenues net of transportation costs can be seen in figure II.3.
    This figure shows the prices received at the "wellhead" for two
    oils-West Texas Intermediate and Alaskan North Slope-as  well as
    the difference between their respective prices.  These so-called
    wellhead prices reflect the revenue the producer receives net of
    transportation and shipping costs.  Rising market prices for
    Alaskan North Page 51
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices Slope oil and falling shipping
    costs both contribute to the shrinking of the gap between the two
    oils' wellhead prices. Figure II.3:  ANS Wellhead Price Has Risen
    Compared With WTI 25    Dollars per barrel 20 15 10 5 0 1994
    1995                 1996                 1997
    1998 Years WTI wellhead price ANS wellhead price WTI-ANS
    differential Source:  GAO's analyses of Energy Information
    Administration data. Tests for Stationarity and     To ensure that
    we estimated the correct model of the price differentials, we
    Diagnostics: Development       checked for stationarity of the
    price differential time series and did some of the Correct
    Statistical     standard diagnostic testing.  These tests helped
    us to develop the final form Model                          of the
    model and give us confidence that the results of the estimations
    are not spurious.  A detailed description of the development of
    the model follows.7 7 The process described for choosing the
    correct statistical model was followed for each oil price
    differential and for each petroleum price differential. Page 52
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices We chose a period of study of
    January 8, 1992, through December 4, 1998, and used daily spot
    prices as reported by Platts Oil Prices Data Base.  This period
    was chosen in order to encompass the removal of the export ban
    with sufficient time on either side of this event.  An arithmetic
    mean of the low and high spot prices was used for the analysis.
    All tests for stationarity and diagnostics were performed on data
    prior to May 28, 1996. The simplest model of the price
    differential is a standard ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
    of the price differential on a constant term with a dummy variable
    to pick up the effect of lifting the export ban.  Test statistics
    derived from an OLS regression of a time series will not be
    reliable if the time series is not stationary.8  Therefore, the
    first step is to test for stationarity of the series of price
    differentials. To test for stationarity, we used the Augmented
    Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test. First, we estimate the following
    equation using OLS: PDt =   + PDt 1 +                     t j PDt
    j + -      -              -         t j=1 where PD is the
    difference between the prices of the comparison oil and Alaskan
    North Slope oil;   is the difference operator;  ,  , and   are
    parameters to be estimated; and   is a random error term.  The
    subscript t denotes time.  The number of lags of PD (denoted by  )
    is chosen by starting with a large number of lags and sequentially
    dropping the statistically insignificant lags from the highest lag
    down.  Lags greater than have a statistically insignificant effect
    on the regressand. A test for nonstationarity amounts to a test of
    the null hypothesis that   is equal to zero.  If   is equal to
    zero, the time series PD  has a unit root and t will behave
    analogously to a random walk, which is nonstationary.
    Alternatively, if   is negative and statistically significant,
    then the time series (expressed as deviations from the mean) will
    converge to zero in response to shocks.  Using the period prior to
    the lifting of the export ban, the ADF test rejects the null
    hypothesis of nonstationarity at the 5-percent 8 A time series is
    stationary if its mean, variance, and autocovariances are
    independent of time and nonstationary otherwise.  If the price
    differential we model is stationary, then we would expect to see
    that the mean of the differential is unchanging over time except
    when it changes in response to an event, such as the removal of
    the export ban. Page 53
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices level.9  We also performed the
    Phillips-Perron test and were able to reject nonstationarity at
    the 5-percent level. Results of these tests indicate that standard
    regression techniques are appropriate for modeling the price
    differentials.  Next, we performed some diagnostic tests to
    determine whether lagged values of the differential affect current
    values.  More specifically, we checked the order of the model by
    examining the correlogram and partial correlogram.  The
    correlogram showed a steady decline in the size of the
    coefficients after the first lag of the dependent variable,
    suggesting an auto-regressive order 1 (AR(1)) process.  The
    partial correlogram revealed a strong partial correlation between
    PDt  and PDt-1 but very small partial correlations for PDt  and
    PDt-k for k>1.  This further indicated an AR(1) process.  Next, we
    estimate the AR(1) model using OLS: PD =               - + t
    k PDt k         t We performed some diagnostic tests of the
    residuals of the regression. Specifically, we tested for
    autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH) using a
    Lagrange Multiplier test.  ARCH residuals have the characteristic
    that high values of the estimated residuals bunch together
    temporally.  ARCH residuals are quite common in time series
    analysis of economic variables.  The Lagrange Multiplier test
    allows us to reject at the 1-percent level the null hypothesis
    that the residuals are not ARCH. We re-estimate the model using
    the maximum likelihood method and including a GARCH(1,1) component
    to correct for the ARCH residuals.10 This is the most standard
    version of this type of model.  The correlogram and partial
    correlogram of the residuals of the new specification reveal no
    further ARCH terms.11 Finally, we estimate the model over the
    entire time period, including the dummy variable for exports.  The
    model was estimated using the entire sample and adding an
    indicator variable for dates after the export ban was 9 We used
    the period before the ban was lifted to test for stationarity
    because if we had included the lifting of the ban and the period
    following that event, then the differential might change as a
    result of lifting the ban.  This, in turn, could cause us to
    incorrectly conclude that the time series is nonstationary. 10The
    GARCH(1,1) estimation includes an auto-regressive term and a
    moving-average term to correct for the existence of ARCH
    residuals.  The price differential and variance equations are
    estimated simultaneously. Page 54
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix II Methodology
    for Estimating the Effect of Lifting the Alaskan Oil Export Ban on
    Crude and Petroleum Product Prices lifted.  (We used May 28,
    1996.)  The equation is estimated using maximum likelihood methods
    and including a GARCH(1,1) component to correct for ARCH
    residuals.  The final price differential model is PD =   +
    -1 +    + t            PDt           t       t . 11To further
    ensure that the price differential model did not have a unit root
    or was otherwise misspecified, we performed a test for model
    specification developed by Davidson, Godfrey, and MacKinnon
    (1985). This is equivalent to the Plosser-Schwert-White (1982)
    differencing test.  The test statistics for the Davidson, Godfrey,
    and MacKinnon test do not allow us to reject the null hypothesis
    that the differenced and undifferenced models result in identical
    parameter estimates.  This is strong evidence that our original
    model is properly specified. Page 55
    GAO/RCED-99-191  Alaskan North Slope Oil Appendix III GAO Contacts
    and Staff Acknowledgments
    Append Iix II GAO Contacts              Daniel Haas (202) 512-9828
    Acknowledgments           In addition to the above, Charles
    Bausell, Dave Brack, Rodney Conti, Byron S. Galloway, Sterling
    Leibenguth, and Frank Rusco made key contributions to this report.
    (141229)        Letter    Page 56
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    Address Correction Requested PAGE 59    GAO/XXXX-98-??? NAME OF
    DOCUMENT Contents Table 2.1:  Cost to Ship Alaskan North Slope
    Oil, by Destination, 1996 24 Table 3.1:  Destinations of Alaskan
    North Slope Oil Tankers and Volumes Carried, 1994-98
    32 Table II.1:  Results of Price Analysis for Alaskan North Slope
    (ANS) Oil  47 Table II.2:  Results of Price Analysis for Line 63
    (L63) Oil                47 Table II.3:  Results of Price Analysis
    for Kern River (KERN) Oil            48 Table II.4:  Results of
    Price Analysis for THUMS Oil                        49 Table II.5:
    Analysis of Jet Fuel (JET) Prices                              50
    Table II.6:  Analysis  of Diesel Prices
    50 Table II.7:  Analysis of Gasoline (GAS) Prices
    51 Page 60
    GAO/XXXX ????? Contents Page 61     GAO/XXXX ????? Contents Figure
    1:  Locations of Alaska Oil Fields and Tanker Routes From Valdez,
    Alaska, to Refineries That Received Alaskan North Slope Oil, 1977-
    98  4 Figure 1.1:  Locations of Alaska Oil Fields
    12 Figure 1.2:  Percent of Oil Removed From Alaskan North Slope
    and Percent of Production Rights in Prudhoe Bay Oil Field, by Oil
    Major Company, in 1998 14 Figure 1.3:  Shipping Routes for Alaskan
    North Slope Oil Tankers, 1989-98 16 Figure 2.1:  New Fields Will
    Add to Daily Alaskan North Slope Oil Production 26 Figure 2.2:
    Annual Alaska and California Crude Oil Production, 1989-98  28
    Figure 3.1:  Number of Alaskan North Slope Tankers Scheduled to Be
    Phased Out, 1999-2015
    36 Figure 3.2:  Number of Overseas Repairs of Alaskan North Slope
    Tankers, 1989-98 39 Figure II.1:  Proportion of Alaskan North
    Slope Oil Sold in the West Coast Market 44 Figure II.2:  Alaskan
    North Slope Oil Destinations Other Than the West Coast 45 Figure
    II.3:  ANS Wellhead Price Has Risen Compared With WTI
    52 Page 62
    GAO/XXXX ?????

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