International Environment: Literature on the Effectiveness of
International Environmental Agreements (Staff Study, 05/01/1999,
GAO/RCED-99-148).

In December 1997, the United States and 37 other nations adopted the
Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. They agreed in principle to significantly reduce their
future greenhouse gas emissions. The advice of and consent of the Senate
would be needed to commit the United States to the emissions reductions.
Whether the Senate should take that step has been widely debated, mainly
because the reductions could be costly to the U.S. economy and their
effectiveness in addressing the problem of global climate change has
been questioned. GAO convened a panel of experts in December 1998 to
discuss the issues surrounding the Kyoto Protocol. GAO also prepared a
background paper on ensuring compliance with international environmental
agreements. GAO is publishing that background paper as a staff study.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-99-148
     TITLE:  International Environment: Literature on the Effectiveness
	     of International Environmental Agreements
      DATE:  05/01/1999
   SUBJECT:  Monitoring
	     International cooperation
	     Reporting requirements
	     International organizations
	     Air pollution control
	     Climate statistics
	     Data integrity
	     Environmental policies
	     Sanctions
	     International agreements
IDENTIFIER:  Kyoto Protocol
	     United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
	     UN Environment Programme
	     Multilateral Fund for the Montreal Protocol
	     Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
	     Wild Fauna and Flora

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    United States General Accounting Office GAO                Staff
    Study May 1999           INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Literature on
    the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements
    GAO/RCED-99-148 Preface In December 1997, the United States and 37
    other nations adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United
    Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In it, they agreed
    in principle to significantly reduce their future greenhouse gas
    emissions. To obligate the United States to the emissions
    reductions, the advice and consent of the Senate would be needed.
    Whether the Senate should take that step has been widely debated,
    mainly because the reductions could be costly to the U.S. economy
    and their effectiveness in addressing the problem of global
    climate change has been questioned. Further fueling the debate is
    the fact that many of the protocol's provisions, such as those for
    reporting data on compliance activities as well as those for
    monitoring and enforcing compliance, have not yet been fully
    specified. As a result, signatory parties do not know the full
    extent of what they will be required to do under the protocol, and
    it is unclear whether all the parties will meet their obligations
    for sharing the burden of the emissions reductions. During
    meetings in November 1998, the parties set a deadline of December
    31, 2000, for adopting the rules and procedures for compliance and
    enforcement, and the parties continue to work on developing those
    provisions. Ensuring compliance with environmental treaties is a
    widely recognized problem. Experts in the area acknowledge the
    need to better specify reporting, monitoring, and enforcement
    mechanisms, but little agreement exists on how best to do so and
    there is limited experience to point the way. There is consensus,
    however, that now-while those provisions for the Kyoto Protocol
    are being framed-is the time to explore these issues. To assist in
    that effort, we convened a panel of experts in December 1998 to
    discuss these issues, and we will issue a report on the results of
    the expert panel later this year. To assist the panel, we prepared
    a background paper on ensuring compliance with international
    environmental agreements. We are publishing that background paper
    as a staff study to provide a brief summary of the current
    thinking on compliance issues for the Congress and other policy
    makers who are considering the workability of the Kyoto Protocol.
    Page 1                                 GAO/RCED-99-148
    International Environment Preface For additional information,
    please call (202) 512-6111. The major contributors to this study
    are Karla Springer; William H. Roach, Jr.; David Marwick; John A.
    Crossen; and Leslie Albin. David G. Wood Associate Director,
    Environmental Protection Issues Page 2
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Page 3       GAO/RCED-
    99-148 International Environment Contents Preface
    1 Summary
    6 Data Reporting
    6 Monitoring
    6 Enforcement
    7 Chapter 1
    9 Introduction           Background
    9 Objective, Scope, and Methodology
    10 Chapter 2
    12 National Data Often    Data Are Critical to Determining
    Compliance                                 12 Problems With Self-
    Reported Data Exist                                      12 Do Not
    Provide a       The Quantity of Reported Data Has Improved, but
    the Quality of              13 Basis for Assessing       Data Is
    Questionable Nations' Compliance    Data Reporting Requirements
    Under the Kyoto Protocol Are                    14 Minimal With
    Agreements Chapter 3
    15 Monitoring of          Monitoring Is Needed to Ensure
    Compliance                                   15 Most International
    Environmental Agreements Include Only                    16
    International             Limited Monitoring Provisions
    Environmental          Experts Have Identified the Characteristics
    Needed for Effective            18 Agreements Has Been
    Monitoring The Kyoto Protocol Contains Some Monitoring Provisions
    20 Limited Chapter 4
    22 International          Few International Environmental
    Agreements Have Enforcement                 22 Provisions, and
    Existing Provisions Are Not Used Effectively Environmental
    Secretariats Are Insufficiently Funded and Lack International
    23 Agreements Are            Jurisdiction to Enforce Agreements
    Rarely Enforced        International Organizations Lack
    Jurisdiction to Enforce                    24 Agreements
    International Officials and Legal Scholars Suggest the Need for
    25 Credible Enforcement Mechanisms Page 4
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Contents Bibliography
    28 Abbreviations CITES        Convention on International Trade in
    Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora GAO          General
    Accounting Office OECD         The Organisation for Economic Co-
    Operation and Development UNEP         United Nations Environment
    Programme Page 5                                    GAO/RCED-99-
    148 International Environment Summary Data Reporting    Data on
    the results of nations' activities undertaken to meet their
    international environmental obligations are the basis of
    determining whether each nation is in compliance with the
    agreements to which it is a party. Historically, such data have
    had problems, such as being incomplete or inaccurate. As a result,
    it has often been difficult to determine whether nations are
    meeting their obligations. For example, in 1996, we reported that
    the data reported by nations to meet the requirements of the
    United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Framework
    Convention) were often incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent.1
    More recently, as a result of efforts to improve reporting, more
    complete data are being reported. For example, it appears that the
    financial assistance to developing countries provided through the
    Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer has
    resulted in those nations reporting better data under that
    protocol.2 However, according to experts, data quality generally
    remains questionable. Currently, the Kyoto Protocol to the
    Framework Convention (Kyoto Protocol) contains the same general
    requirements and supplementary guidelines for data reporting as
    the Framework Convention itself. The general requirements for the
    Framework Convention include the requirement to submit annually a
    national inventory of anthropogenic (manmade) emissions. The
    details of methodology and the formats to be used to present the
    data for those inventories-factors that would facilitate analysis,
    understanding, and comparability of the data reported-are
    contained in guidelines that provide considerable flexibility and
    do not require parties to follow a specific procedure. Monitoring
    Monitoring is the second element necessary to determine whether a
    nation individually, and all nations collectively, are complying
    with their international commitments. Generally, monitoring
    includes the review and analysis of data and other information
    that allow an assessment of the impact or the extent of progress
    being made in meeting an agreement's stated goal or objective.
    Monitoring can be done to determine both procedural compliance and
    effectiveness. Historically, monitoring activities focused on
    whether nations implemented processes to transform their
    international commitments into acceptable rules within their
    domestic legal systems. However, because enacting domestic laws or
    1Global Warming: Difficulties Assessing Countries' Progress
    Stabilizing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GAO/RCED-96-188, Sept.
    4, 1996). 2The Montreal Protocol, adopted in 1987, augments the
    1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Page
    6                                            GAO/RCED-99-148
    International Environment Summary implementing policies does not
    ensure that international commitments will be met, more emphasis
    is now being placed on mechanisms that monitor effectiveness-that
    is, whether intended outcomes are being achieved. Self-reported
    information by the parties to an agreement is the basis for most
    monitoring that is done. Although international environmental
    agreements generally provide that the parties will submit periodic
    reports, these reports have rarely been used for carrying out an
    effective monitoring program. Recent studies attribute this to the
    limited nature of the monitoring provisions included in most of
    these agreements. The reason for the limited monitoring provisions
    most frequently cited in the current literature is a concern about
    compromising national sovereignty by allowing for monitoring by
    outside parties, considered by some to be external policing.
    Experts have identified several characteristics that should be
    included in a comprehensive monitoring system. One such
    characteristic is having specific authority and adequate resources
    for carrying out the monitoring function. The monitoring
    provisions contained in the Kyoto Protocol include some of these
    characteristics; for example, that expert teams will review the
    data reported by the parties. The United States proposed
    additional provisions that it believes would better ensure the
    effectiveness of the treaty in limiting greenhouse gases but that
    were not included in the protocol. For example, the United States
    proposed that comments be accepted from the public and other
    observers on the accuracy of the data provided by the parties.
    Enforcement    Enforcement is the final element needed to ensure
    that nations comply with their international environmental
    obligations. Few agreements contain formal provisions for
    enforcement, however, and the enforcement provisions that do exist
    are used infrequently or inconsistently. For example, the
    Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention's secretariat can adopt
    proposals to enforce the convention's rules, but its power is
    limited to areas where coastal nations do not have jurisdiction.
    Secretariats and other international organizations-the groups
    typically charged with overseeing these agreements-are often
    ineffective at enforcement because they are inadequately funded
    and are limited in their international jurisdiction. This is the
    case with the United Nations Environmental Programme, established
    to promote international cooperation on environmental protection
    but constrained from doing so effectively, primarily by limited
    resources. Page 7                                 GAO/RCED-99-148
    International Environment Summary In recent years, several ways to
    build credible enforcement mechanisms into international
    environmental agreements have been suggested; however, there is no
    consensus on how best to do that. While enforcement mechanisms for
    the Kyoto Protocol have not been specified, according to the
    action plan adopted by the parties in November 1998, they will be
    developed by the end of 2000. Page 8
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 1 Introduction
    Background      The increased understanding of our environment and
    the recognition that environmental problems do not stop at
    national boundaries have resulted in global concern about the
    future of our planet and an increasing number of international
    agreements to address those concerns. Since 1972, when over 130
    nations took part in the United Nations Conference on the Human
    Environment, the number of multilateral international
    environmental agreements has grown from fewer than 50 to more than
    170. Developing an international environmental agreement involves
    achieving a commitment among many nations with various levels of
    industrial development, technical capabilities, resources, and
    concern about an environmental problem. It is expected that the
    parties to the agreement then implement it within their countries
    by establishing the necessary laws, regulations, and
    administrative systems. Adopting commitments and implementing
    laws, however, do not necessarily lead to the changes in behavior
    that help to solve the environmental problem the agreement is
    attempting to address. Resources must also be provided to enforce
    the laws enacted and to evaluate the progress made, making
    adjustments, over time, as necessary. The United Nations Framework
    Convention on Climate Change (Framework Convention) was signed by
    154 nations, including the United States, in 1992. The Framework
    Convention's objective was to stabilize greenhouse gas
    concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
    dangerous anthropogenic (manmade) interference with the climate
    system. Under the Framework Convention, both developed and
    developing countries agreed, for example, to develop and submit
    reports on their greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to the
    general provisions agreed to by all countries, developed countries
    agreed to report on their policies and measures with the aim of
    returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the
    year 2000. However, this goal was not binding on the developed
    countries. The Framework Convention entered into force in 1994,
    and the United States was one of the first nations to ratify it.
    However, by 1995, the parties to the convention realized that
    insufficient progress was being made toward its goals and thus
    decided to begin negotiations on a legally binding protocol. In
    December 1997, the parties reconvened in Kyoto, Japan, to finalize
    binding measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The resultant
    Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention established binding
    emissions reductions for the period 2008 through 2012 for Page 9
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 1 Introduction
    developed countries and laid the groundwork for additional
    measures aimed at decreasing greenhouse gas emissions.3 A number
    of important issues were not addressed at Kyoto: the role of
    developing nations, the specifics of an emissions-trading program
    (agreed to in principle), and procedures for determining, and
    consequences for, noncompliance. Negotiations are continuing on
    these issues, including provisions that might specify data-
    reporting requirements, monitoring mechanisms, and enforcement
    procedures. The Kyoto Protocol, initially adopted by 38 nations,
    was open for signature by all nations until mid-March 1999. As of
    that deadline, 84 nations, including the United States, had
    signed, thereby affirming their commitment to work to meet the
    protocol's ambitious goals. U.S. ratification of the Kyoto
    Protocol, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, is
    uncertain at this time. The official representatives of all the
    countries that have ratified the Framework Convention constitute
    its Conference of the Parties. This body held its first session in
    1995 and will continue to meet annually unless decided otherwise.
    The Conference of the Parties is served by a secretariat, which
    administers the agreement. Among other things, the secretariat
    arranges for conference meetings, drafts official documents,
    compiles and transmits reports submitted to it, assists the
    parties in compiling and communicating information, coordinates
    with the secretariats of other relevant international bodies, and
    reports on its activities to the Conference of the Parties. The
    secretariat is operationally independent of the United Nations,
    but it is linked to the United Nations and its head is appointed
    by the U.N. Secretary-General in consultation with the parties to
    the Framework Convention. Objective, Scope, and      The objective
    of this study was to provide background information on Methodology
    provisions that help ensure compliance with international
    environmental agreements, namely data reporting, monitoring, and
    enforcement. For the purposes of this study, we will use the
    following definitions for those terms with respect to
    international environmental agreements: * Reporting is providing
    measurable data on activities undertaken in response to
    international obligations. 3While the Kyoto Protocol specifies
    that the emissions reductions are binding, the parties have yet to
    specify the consequences of not reaching the reduction targets.
    Those provisions are scheduled to be complete by year-end 2000.
    Page 10                                             GAO/RCED-99-
    148 International Environment Chapter 1 Introduction * Monitoring
    is the review and analysis of the data and other information that
    allows assessment of the impact or extent of progress being made
    in meeting the agreement's stated goal or objective. * Enforcement
    is a strategy adopted by the parties to an agreement that
    establishes consequences for a party's noncompliance with its
    obligations under the agreement. In examining how to improve
    nations' compliance with their international environmental
    obligations, we are taking a "results-oriented" approach. That is,
    we will explore those aspects of reporting, monitoring, and
    enforcement that are designed to ensure that signatory nations'
    actions result in achieving the Framework Convention's objectives.
    We surveyed our past reports and other relevant literature on the
    subject and summarized the results of our analysis. (See the
    bibliography for a list of the works we included in this effort.)
    The information presented in this study draws on information
    provided by a number of authors. We tended to cite those authors
    who provided specific examples to illustrate the points made. We
    did not attempt to verify the accuracy of the information
    presented in the literature. Our expert panelists, including an
    official from the Department of State, reviewed a draft of this
    study, and we incorporated their comments where appropriate. Susan
    R. Fletcher, Senior International Environmental Policy Analyst,
    Congressional Research Service, also contributed to this study. We
    performed our work from July 1998 through May 1999. Page 11
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 2 National Data
    Often Do Not Provide a Basis for Assessing Nations' Compliance
    With Agreements Data on the activities that nations are
    undertaking to meet their international environmental obligations
    are the basis of determining whether each nation is in compliance
    with the agreement to which it is a party. Historically, such data
    have had problems, such as being incomplete or inaccurate. As a
    result, it has often been difficult to determine whether nations
    are meeting their obligations. More recently, efforts to improve
    reporting rates have resulted in more complete data on nations'
    compliance activities. However, data quality remains questionable.
    Currently, the Kyoto Protocol's requirements for data reporting
    consist of general requirements and supplemental guidelines. These
    guidelines provide the parties with considerable flexibility. Data
    Are Critical to    Data on the activities that nations undertake
    to respond to their Determining             international
    environmental obligations are the basis of evaluating whether
    nations have fulfilled those obligations. The data form the first
    Compliance              step in the evaluation process by
    providing measurable information on the results of nations'
    activities. Once the activities have been measured, the data can
    be verified for accuracy, compared with the performance criteria,
    and otherwise examined to conclude whether a nation has achieved
    the agreed-to results. To be useful, the data must meet a number
    of criteria, including completeness, accuracy, understandability,
    uniformity, and timeliness. Problems With           The data on
    nations' activities typically result from a requirement in most
    Self-Reported Data      international environmental agreements
    that each nation report on its own behavior. Our studies and those
    by others have shown that national data Exist
    reports have many problems. For example, in 1996 we examined the
    progress of the United States and other signatory nations in
    meeting the goal of the Framework Convention to reduce greenhouse
    gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The Framework Convention
    requires signatory nations to adopt policies and measures to limit
    greenhouse gases and to submit detailed plans showing how each
    will help emissions return to 1990 levels. We reported, however,
    that the nations' self-reported emissions data were often
    incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent.4 For example, as of
    February 1996, some data on 1990 emissions levels were available
    for only 29 of the 36 parties to the Framework Convention.5 The
    data were incomplete largely because the Framework Convention's
    reporting 4Global Warming: Difficulties Assessing Countries'
    Progress Stabilizing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases, p. 2. 5The
    United States and other countries signed the Framework Convention
    in 1992. Page 12
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 2 National Data
    Often Do Not Provide a Basis for Assessing Nations' Compliance
    With Agreements requirements were not specific and were developed
    only after some nations had submitted their reports. Consequently,
    the nations' progress in meeting the convention's goals could not
    be fully assessed. According to experts, ambiguity in the language
    of international environmental agreements frequently contributes
    to these types of data problems. In its October 1998 report on
    monitoring and reporting under the Kyoto Protocol, the
    Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development reported
    further that, after two full rounds of national reporting under
    the Framework Convention, a number of important gaps in reporting
    were apparent: data were missing, parties submitted their reports
    late, and information about how the data were prepared was
    lacking.6 The Quantity of       Problems with self-reported data
    have long been recognized, and in Reported Data Has     response,
    some international environmental agreements have begun including
    provisions to improve reporting rates. One way to improve data
    Improved, but the     reporting is through financial assistance to
    developing nations that lack Quality of Data Is    the
    administrative capacity to fulfill their reporting requirements.
    For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
    Ozone Questionable          Layer (Montreal Protocol) has a
    multilateral fund designed to boost developing nations' activities
    to comply with the protocol's provisions.7 The fund pays for
    projects in developing nations that gather baseline data and build
    the administrative capacity to report the data. According to
    experts, this financial assistance to developing nations has
    resulted in better self-reporting of certain data under the
    Montreal Protocol. These improvements notwithstanding, the poor
    quality of self-reported data continues to be a problem under
    international environmental agreements. Experts familiar with
    numerous studies of the issue have noted that the data continue to
    be difficult to compare and their accuracy is often low or
    unknown.8 6Jan Corfee Morlot, Monitoring, Reporting and Review of
    National Performance Under the Kyoto Protocol, OECD Information
    Paper (Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
    Development, 1998), pp. 5, 29. 7The Montreal Protocol, adopted in
    1987, augments the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of
    the Ozone Layer. 8International Institute for Applied Systems
    Analysis, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International
    Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice, eds., David G.
    Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff (Cambridge, Mass.:
    MIT Press, 1998), pp. 111, 678-80. Page 13
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 2 National Data
    Often Do Not Provide a Basis for Assessing Nations' Compliance
    With Agreements Data Reporting        The Kyoto Protocol
    incorporated the general reporting requirements and Requirements
    Under    supplemental guidelines of the Framework Convention.
    Parties are required to submit to the secretariat a national
    inventory of anthropogenic the Kyoto Protocol    emissions of
    greenhouse gases, a general description of steps taken or to Are
    Minimal           be taken to implement the protocol, and any
    other information that the party considers relevant. In addition
    to these requirements, the parties adopted guidelines that
    recommend methodologies for the parties to use in gathering their
    inventory data, the level of detail to include in the reports, and
    presentation formats to follow. The guidelines were developed to
    help ensure that the national reports are consistent and
    comparable; however, they provide considerable flexibility and do
    not require parties to follow a specific procedure. In addition,
    the protocol currently does not specify any penalties for not
    meeting the general requirements or following the guidelines.
    According to the work plan adopted by the parties in November
    1998, those are to be developed by the end of 2000. Page 14
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
    International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited Monitoring
    is necessary to determine whether a nation individually, and all
    nations collectively, are complying with their international
    environmental obligations. Until recently, international
    environmental agreements had few established formal mechanisms for
    monitoring. Periodic reporting by the parties was the primary
    monitoring mechanism included in such agreements; however,
    effective use of the reports for carrying out the monitoring
    function has been limited. Experts have suggested several
    characteristics that should be included in a comprehensive
    monitoring system. The Kyoto Protocol has specified some basic
    provisions for monitoring. The United States proposed additional
    provisions that might better ensure the effectiveness of the
    agreement to limit greenhouse gases, but these provisions have not
    as yet been included in the protocol. Monitoring Is Needed
    The monitoring done under international environmental agreements
    to Ensure Compliance includes the review and analysis of reported
    data and other information that allow assessment of the impact or
    extent of progress being made in meeting a stated goal or
    objective, such as implementing an agreement's provisions.
    Monitoring can also include independent verification that involves
    determining whether the reported data or other information
    accurately reflects the existing situation or condition.
    Verification can be done through performing on-site inspections,
    obtaining information from another source, or doing an independent
    analysis and reaching the same conclusion as the original
    assessment. Monitoring can determine both procedural compliance
    and effectiveness-that is, whether intended outcomes are being
    achieved. Historically, most monitoring activities have focused on
    whether nations have implemented processes to transform their
    international obligations into acceptable rules within their
    domestic legal systems. However, the implementation of domestic
    policy or laws that conform to an agreement, commonly referred to
    as compliance, does not ensure that the agreement's goals or
    objectives will be achieved. Meeting the goals of international
    environmental agreements generally requires influencing the
    behavior not only of governments but also of a large number of
    firms, individuals, agencies, and other entities that do not
    necessarily change their behavior simply because governments have
    signed an agreement. Thus, influencing the behavior of these
    entities often entails a complex process of forming and adjusting
    domestic policy to conform to the standards contained in an
    agreement. Page 15                                GAO/RCED-99-148
    International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of International
    Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited According to experts,
    international law is filled with examples of agreements that have
    had high formal levels of compliance but have had only limited
    influence on the behavior of the regulated entities. For example,
    from the inception of the International Convention for the
    Regulation of Whaling in 1946 until the early 1960s, the level of
    compliance with its catch quotas was nearly perfect. This was
    because those quotas were set very high and did not require the
    parties to decrease their catches.9 Determining whether the goals
    and objectives are being met requires going beyond implementation
    to evaluate effectiveness. Thus, effectiveness is the extent to
    which international agreements lead to changes in behavior that
    help to solve environmental problems. Recently, more attention has
    been given to whether performance targets-such as emission targets
    like those specified in the Kyoto Protocol-have been met.
    International environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol
    can involve a substantial economic investment by countries that
    are serious about implementation. In addition, because of the
    large number of entities within each country that may have to
    change their behavior if the objectives of the agreement are to be
    achieved, extensive monitoring over large geographic areas may be
    required, making the monitoring function itself costly.
    Particularly where the costs of implementation are high, parties
    to international agreements may be reluctant to implement the
    measures needed to ensure that commitments are met unless they are
    confident that others will do the same. In these cases, having
    mechanisms included in the agreements to monitor when and how
    parties are implementing these measures can help to build
    confidence that agreements are, in fact, being put into practice.
    Most International               Until recently, international
    environmental agreements have contained Environmental
    few substantive mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. Although
    several agreements have provided for periodic reporting by the
    parties, Agreements Include               these reports have
    rarely been used to carry out an effective monitoring Only Limited
    program. Recent studies provide some possible reasons for the
    limited nature of monitoring. One possible reason is the concept
    of state Monitoring Provisions sovereignty, which has resulted in
    nations not being willing to accept external scrutiny. One author
    pointed out, for example, that nations find it difficult to
    relinquish some of their sovereign authority to an international
    9Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental
    Commitments, p. 7. Page 16
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
    International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited
    organization.10 For this reason, nations have been allowed to
    monitor or report on their own compliance and thus avoid any
    potential sovereignty questions that could result from external
    monitoring. However, at least partly because of the problems of
    low reporting rates and quality of reported data as discussed in
    the previous chapter, the effectiveness of such self-monitoring
    provisions is questionable. Another possible reason is that
    international environmental agreements generally do not provide
    specific authority or adequate resources to carry out an effective
    monitoring function. As we pointed out in our 1992 report on the
    monitoring of international environmental agreements, generally
    the role of the treaty secretariats established by the parties is
    to help implement agreements by collecting and distributing
    information and providing some technical assistance.11 We further
    stated, however, that although most of the secretariats had
    distributed lists of nonreporting parties at various times to
    generate peer pressure to stimulate compliance with reporting
    provisions, they had not been given the authority to monitor the
    agreements through verifying the information parties reported or
    independently assessing compliance. In addition, of the eight
    major international environmental agreements reviewed in that
    report, only one-the Convention on International Trade in
    Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), ratified by
    112 countries-granted its secretariat specific authority and
    established a formal mechanism for assessing compliance. Under
    this agreement, the secretariat analyzes the data it receives and
    publishes reports detailing violations. In the case of
    particularly egregious violations, the secretariat may also
    recommend that parties cease trading with the particular party
    found to be in noncompliance. With respect to funding, we also
    stated in our 1992 report that secretariats generally had limited
    and unstable funding. We showed that the secretariats of the eight
    agreements we reviewed were small organizations, with staffs of 4
    to 20 people and annual budgets of less than $1 million to $3
    million in 1990. We pointed out that each secretariat was funded
    by voluntary contributions from parties and/or by resources
    apportioned by a related parent organization, which in many cases
    also operate largely on financial contributions from member
    nations. For 10Andrew Watson Samaan, "Enforcement of International
    Environmental Treaties: An Analysis," Fordham Environmental Law
    Journal, Vol. 5 (Fall 1993), p. 278. 11International Environment:
    International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored (GAO/RCED-92-43,
    Jan. 27, 1992), pp. 28-33. Page 17
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
    International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited example,
    CITES had a staff of 18 and funding of about $2.5 million in 1990.
    The secretariat's officials told us that parties had never
    approved a budget with sufficient funds to cover all of the
    activities needed to implement the agreement. In addition to its
    administration duties and assessing the compliance of its 112
    member nations, this secretariat also conducted studies to help
    determine whether certain species should be protected under CITES
    and provided certain technical assistance. Among other possible
    reasons for the lack of monitoring provisions is that the nature
    of the agreement or the environmental problem being addressed does
    not require the need for detailed monitoring provisions. In some
    cases, agreements may not require parties to change their
    behavior, and thus monitoring for compliance is not required. The
    high catch quotas established by the International Convention for
    the Regulation of Whaling between 1946 and the early 1960s, cited
    earlier in this chapter, are an example of such an agreement.
    Recent studies, however, indicate that more frequently now than in
    the past, international environmental agreements are requiring
    regular reporting by the parties and reviews of these reports and,
    in some cases, include mechanisms for verification. Experts Have
    Experts have identified three factors that should be included in
    an Identified the          agreement to establish effective
    monitoring and verification. First, they have suggested that
    authority and responsibility for carrying out the Characteristics
    monitoring function need to be specified and that adequate
    resources need Needed for Effective    to be provided. According
    to one expert, successive rounds of subjecting data to a
    monitoring process generally provide an incentive for parties to
    Monitoring              improve the quality of reported data.12
    Next, some experts have suggested that specific criteria and
    standard monitoring techniques need to be established to ensure
    their perceived legitimacy. Many experts believe that ambiguity or
    vagueness of treaty language, obligations, and requirements makes
    implementing international commitments and judging compliance
    difficult. Studies have shown that how an international agreement
    is constructed-the exact commitment, its scope, clarity, and
    application-can be critical to its success. Furthermore, as stated
    by one expert, implementation experiences of nations often vary
    because of differences in their interpretation of the
    commitments.13 As a result, some experts have suggested that
    agreements should include a review process with specific review
    and evaluation procedures. One study 12Implementation and
    Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments, p. 680.
    13Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental
    Commitments, p. 659. Page 18
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
    International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited also
    suggests that guidance on the nature of the reviews should be
    clear and the review function should be overseen by the
    secretariat to ensure its neutrality and consistency.14 Another
    study, prepared for EPA's Office of Policy, stated that monitoring
    procedures need to be carefully considered. The study stated that
    the procedures developed must be credible but not overly
    bureaucratic. In addition, according to the study, strict rules
    lead to complex procedures, increasing the cost of compliance and
    reducing an agreement's cost-effectiveness; conversely, if the
    rules are too loose, then the parties can manipulate the
    results.15 Finally, experts have suggested that the monitoring
    function should be transparent and provide for participation and
    comments by interested parties. Making both the information and
    the methodologies that were used to compile that information
    widely available and permitting participation in the policy
    process are basic tenets of modern governance. The right to have
    access to such information on the environment is a recent
    development in international law. Public dissemination of
    information about parties' progress can play a key role in the
    implementation of environmental agreements. Specifically, the
    information serves to assure each party that others are sharing
    the burden of implementation as agreed, which is particularly
    important in light of the high costs and the effects on
    international competitiveness that may result from implementing an
    agreement. Our 1992 report suggested, for example, that when the
    costs of implementing an agreement are high, nations might be more
    willing to open up their actions for review to ensure that
    implementation is equitable and that all parties are honoring
    their commitments. In addition, the sharing of information allows
    not only a comparison of the experiences of the nations reviewed
    but also an assessment of what is working and what opportunities
    exist to adjust goals or procedures, as needed. According to some
    experts, participants should include not only environmental and
    public interest nongovernmental organizations but also the target
    groups that must change their behavior if an agreement's goals are
    going to be met. Worker and employer representation is a feature,
    for example, of the International Labor Organization, a
    specialized agency of the United Nations that coordinates the
    development and implementation of more than 160 international
    labor conventions intended to safeguard 14Monitoring, Reporting,
    and Review of National Performance Under the Kyoto Protocol, pp.
    27-28. 15Edward Vine and Jayant Sathaye, The Monitoring,
    Evaluation, Reporting, and Verification of Climate Change
    Mitigation Projects: Discussion of Issues and Methodologies and
    Review of Existing Protocols and Guidelines (Berkeley, Calif.:
    Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Dec. 1997), p. ii. Page 19
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
    International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited workers'
    rights and ensure safe workplaces. This organization requires its
    member nations to regularly submit reports to the worker and
    employer representatives for comments, which are subsequently
    reviewed by an independent body appointed by the organization.
    According to one expert, target group participation would also
    provide better information on the range of possible policy
    options, technical feasibility, and costs and benefits.16 The
    Kyoto Protocol              The Kyoto Protocol contains various
    monitoring provisions. Among other Contains Some
    things, expert teams are to review the information in national
    reports submitted by the parties. Other provisions-suggested by
    the United Monitoring Provisions States to strengthen monitoring-
    were not incorporated into the protocol. The monitoring provisions
    in the protocol state that information contained in the parties'
    national reports is to be reviewed by teams of experts nominated
    by the parties and by intergovernmental organizations. The teams
    are to conduct the reviews by following guidelines and relevant
    decisions provided by the Conference of the Parties. According to
    the protocol, the review process will provide a thorough and
    comprehensive technical assessment of all aspects of the
    protocol's implementation by a party. The protocol further states
    that the review teams will prepare a report to the Conference of
    the Parties that assesses the implementation of the commitments
    and identifies any potential problems in, and factors influencing,
    the fulfillment of commitments. Under the protocol, the
    secretariat will coordinate the review teams, circulate the teams'
    reports to all parties to the Framework Convention, and identify
    questions about parties' implementation indicated by the reports
    for further consideration by the Conference of the Parties. In
    addition to establishing the guidelines for the reviews, the
    Conference of the Parties will consider the reports of the expert
    review teams along with the information submitted by the parties
    and those implementation questions identified by the secretariat.
    Prior to the development of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States
    proposed provisions for the Framework Convention's monitoring
    process. Although the protocol included many of these features,
    among them the use of independent review teams and the
    establishment of guidelines for the review process by the
    Conference of the Parties, it omitted several others. First, the
    U.S. proposal explicitly provided that the review teams
    16Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental
    Commitments, p. 666. Page 20
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
    International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited would
    assess both the progress of implementation and the effectiveness
    of meeting the protocol's goals. The proposal provided for
    assessing the effectiveness of the compliance and enforcement
    programs established as well as the individual measures reported.
    Second, the U.S. proposal included specific mechanisms that would
    allow observers and the public to provide comments and
    supplemental data to facilitate and improve the reviews. Adopting
    these specific suggestions would increase the transparency of the
    process and help to provide assurance that the actions being taken
    will achieve the Kyoto Protocol's objectives. Although these
    specific suggestions were not incorporated into the monitoring
    provisions of the protocol, it is possible that when the
    guidelines for the review process are established, they will
    include additional portions of the U.S. proposal. Page 21
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
    Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced Enforcement is the
    final element needed to help ensure that nations comply with their
    international environmental obligations. Few agreements contain
    formal provisions for enforcement, however, and the enforcement
    provisions that do exist are used infrequently or inconsistently.
    Limited funding and international jurisdiction are two of the
    reasons that the enforcement of international environmental
    agreements has not been effective. International organizations,
    such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), often
    lack the jurisdiction to enforce their decisions. In recent years,
    ways to build credible enforcement mechanisms into international
    environmental agreements have been suggested, but no consensus
    exists on how best to do that. To date, enforcement provisions
    have not been specified for the Kyoto Protocol, even though the
    emissions targets are supposed to be binding on the parties. In
    designing those provisions to be effective, a number of issues,
    such as the funding of an enforcement authority, international
    jurisdiction problems, and penalties, should be taken into
    consideration. At the fourth Conference of the Parties in Buenos
    Aires in November 1998, a work plan to complete the enforcement
    provisions by year-end 2000 was agreed to. Few International
    Few international environmental agreements contain enforcement
    Environmental          provisions; it is generally thought that if
    stringent provisions were included, fewer nations would
    participate and treaty obligations would be Agreements Have
    weaker. Instead, the enforcement of compliance with treaty
    obligations Enforcement            generally depends on peer or
    public pressure on nations. Even when agreements do include
    enforcement provisions, resource constraints and Provisions, and
    other factors may limit their effectiveness. Existing Provisions
    Are Not Used           For example, according to one expert, the
    Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
    Resources was established to Effectively            function as
    the primary conservation organization for the southern Atlantic
    Ocean. However, the secretariat for the commission is limited in
    its enforcement capacity in two key respects. First, the agreement
    has no specific enforcement procedures-the only enforcement
    mechanism at the secretariat's disposal is its ability to
    publicize nations' noncompliance. Second, according to the
    agreement, the secretariat's decisions must have the support of a
    consensus of the members, thus effectively giving any member the
    right to veto any proposed enforcement measures against it. Page
    22                                GAO/RCED-99-148 International
    Environment Chapter 4 International Environmental Agreements Are
    Rarely Enforced Although some international environmental
    agreements contain enforcement provisions, these provisions are
    used infrequently or ineffectively. For example, the Northwest
    Atlantic Fisheries Convention, which applies to all waters of the
    northwest Atlantic Ocean, has the authority to establish and
    allocate fishing quotas for all convention members. The
    convention's Fisheries Commission, which is the body responsible
    for managing the convention's resources, can adopt proposals for
    the enforcement of the convention's rules. However, the commission
    has jurisdiction only in the area that is beyond the coastal
    nations' 200-mile economic zone; thus, the commission has no
    jurisdiction over some of the most productive fishing areas. In
    addition, the convention allows any member of the agreement to
    exempt itself from any enforcement proposal by the commission by
    lodging an objection. The convention also allows members to choose
    not to be bound by the commission's rules already in force.
    Finally, although the convention allows members to board and
    inspect the vessels of other member nations, only the nation under
    whose flag a vessel is operating can prosecute and sanction a
    vessel's owner for violations. Nations are often reluctant to
    penalize their own vessels. As one study of the convention's 1993
    records showed, of 49 vessels charged with offenses, only 6 were
    prosecuted.17 Finally, as several experts have pointed out, the
    ambiguity of the language and definitions in international
    environmental agreements makes enforcement of their provisions
    problematic because it is difficult to determine whether a nation
    has met its obligations. Consequently, secretariats spend their
    time and resources dealing with contested actions by member
    nations rather than enforcing compliance and bringing pressure on
    acknowledged violators. Secretariats Are         According to one
    expert, the secretariats for international environmental
    Insufficiently Funded    agreements are in the logical position to
    enforce compliance with treaty obligations.18 However, most
    secretariats do not have enforcement and Lack
    authority. Those that do have the authority may be limited in
    their International            enforcement ability for two
    reasons. First, because their funding is limited or unstable, as
    discussed earlier, they often lack the institutional capacity
    Jurisdiction to          to fulfill all of their responsibilities.
    Second, the secretariats lack the Enforce Agreements
    international jurisdiction that is needed to carry out
    enforcement. Therefore, secretariats have no means of forcing
    member nations to abide 17David S. Ardia, "Does the Emperor Have
    No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the
    Marine Environment," Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol.
    19 (Winter 1998), pp. 531-3. 18"Does the Emperor Have No
    Clothes?," p. 512. Page 23
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
    Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced by the rules
    established by the agreements. As a result, secretariats rarely
    act as enforcers. Secretariat officials stress that they have
    neither the resources nor the authority to perform enforcement and
    that they, instead, view themselves as information clearinghouses
    and facilitators. International         No centralized regulatory
    body has jurisdiction or enforcement authority Organizations Lack
    for international environmental agreements. As a result, the
    effectiveness of international agreements depends almost entirely
    on voluntary Jurisdiction to       compliance. Enforce Agreements
    According to experts, the United Nations General Assembly, in
    1972, established UNEP with a governing council and secretariat to
    promote international cooperation on environmental protection and
    to coordinate environmental action within the United Nations.
    However, UNEP is relatively small, limited by personnel and
    financial constraints. It does not have the ability to create
    binding international law and must rely on member nations to
    implement and comply with its enforcement policies. In the
    assessment of many observers, UNEP has generally not been an
    effective oversight and enforcement institution because of its
    limited formal powers. In addition, UNEP's funding has been
    criticized as inadequate because its primary source is voluntary
    contributions to its Environment Fund. In 1993, the UNEP Governing
    Council acknowledged these limitations when it shifted its focus
    from environmental monitoring to helping developing countries use
    environmentally sound technologies. Without an organization to
    enforce international environmental agreements, compliance depends
    on the willingness of nations to abide by the provisions and
    enforce compliance among their citizens. When complying with a
    particular provision or commitment becomes contrary to a nation's
    interests-for either sociopolitical or economic reasons-it is less
    likely that the nation will enforce compliance. In addition, many
    countries, particularly developing countries, lack the financial
    and technological capacity to meaningfully enforce environmental
    regulations.19 19"Enforcement of International Environmental
    Treaties," p. 273; and "Does the Emperor Have No Clothes?," pp.
    505, 510, 512-3, 523-4. Page 24
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
    Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced International
    Officials        In recent years, ideas about how to enhance
    enforcement of international and Legal Scholars
    environmental agreements have emerged. Two multilateral documents
    and one country report have set forth enforcement proposals for
    protecting Suggest the Need for           the international
    environment. Academic theories provide additional Credible
    Enforcement recommendations. However, there is little agreement on
    how to improve the enforcement of agreements, and, currently, the
    Kyoto Protocol does Mechanisms                     not include
    provisions for enforcement. The following are some recent
    proposals for enhancing enforcement. The World Commission. In
    1987, a group of legal experts of the World Commission on the
    Environment and Development proposed the creation of a centralized
    organizational structure, a Commission for the Environment, to
    oversee international environmental agreements and to hear
    nations' complaints about violations.20 A United Nations High
    Commissioner would head the commission, hear complaints about
    violations, and issue reports on the violations. (This plan for a
    high commissioner and a commission empowered to hear complaints
    and issue reports mirrors the strategy used by the United Nations
    human rights and refugee organizations.) Although this proposal
    contained a draft convention, as well as General Principles on
    Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, the
    international community has not adopted it. Most likely this is
    because the document had no binding force and was not issued by an
    official United Nations organization. The Hague Declaration. The
    Declaration of the Hague on the environment, issued in 1989 by an
    international conference of government policy makers, scientists,
    and environmentalists focused on climate change, called for a "new
    institutional authority" to combat global warming. The authority
    would be created within the United Nations system and would have
    decision-making and enforcement powers. The declaration was not
    specific on the form that the authority should take, nor did it
    propose any type of design. Citing the Hague declaration as a step
    in the right direction, one legal expert has suggested that the
    1974 Convention on the Protection of the Environment, which is a
    general treaty that addresses the environment as a whole, could be
    used as a model. This 1974 convention created a right of action
    against a nation for anyone who is affected by environmentally
    harmful activities in that nation and requires each party to the
    agreement to establish a special authority to safeguard general
    environmental interests. The expert believes that the convention
    could be used as a model for future conventions that address
    environmental issues because it would allow nations to protest any
    activity that has been proven 20"Enforcement of International
    Environmental Treaties," p. 274. Page 25
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
    Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced harmful to the common
    environment. This would eliminate diplomatic, political, and
    economic pressures against the protesting nations.21 The Soviet
    Initiative. A third recommendation, made by the former Soviet
    Union,22 would create a cadre of what one author called "green
    troops"-modeled after the peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts of
    the United Nations. The proposal would also create and staff
    centers responsible for collecting and analyzing environmental
    data, deploying the troops to the scenes of environmental
    disasters, conducting inspections, verifying treaty compliance
    through on-site inspections, and assessing damage. Academic
    Proposals. Academic thinking on how to best incorporate
    enforcement mechanisms into treaties falls into three schools of
    thought. * One group stresses that there is a need for a central
    authority to coordinate efforts and maintain a steady flow of
    information on the global environment. The central authority would
    also set and enforce rules.23 * A second group stresses a process
    of interaction and cooperation among the parties involved. They
    believe that most treaty violations are not premeditated or
    deliberate but are instead caused by the ambiguity and
    indeterminacy of the treaty language, the domestic limitations of
    the parties' abilities to carry out their responsibilities, and
    the time constraints imposed by treaties on the participants.
    Therefore, the best way to ensure compliance is not the threat of
    punishment but a process of interaction and cooperation among the
    parties involved, including improved dispute resolution, technical
    and financial assistance, and oversight and public
    participation.24 * A third group notes that inducing nations to
    participate in collective deliberation and exposing them to new
    information could produce a shift in their domestic environmental
    policies. This group expects that the nations will change their
    environmental activities as they are exposed to the potential
    benefits of international environmental cooperation. They believe
    the nature of the commitments should be as unthreatening as
    21"Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties," p. 279.
    22The Soviet proposal was cited in Thomas M. Franck, "Soviet
    Initiatives: U.S. Responses-New Opportunities for Reviving the
    United Nations Systems," American Journal of International Law,
    Vol. 83 (1989), p. 531. 23"Does the Emperor Have No Clothes?," p.
    544 and "Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties," pp.
    279-80. 24George W. Downs, "Enforcement and the Evolution of
    Cooperation; A Symposium on Implementation, Compliance, and
    Effectiveness," Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 19
    (Winter 1998), pp. 328-35. Page 26
    GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
    Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced possible and consist
    of few, if any, specific performance targets or timetables,
    emphasizing dispute resolution and negotiated compliance
    management techniques to the exclusion of more coercive
    enforcement mechanisms.25 25"Enforcement and the Evolution of
    Cooperation," pp. 336-43. Page 27
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