International Environment: Literature on the Effectiveness of
International Environmental Agreements (Staff Study, 05/01/1999,
GAO/RCED-99-148).
In December 1997, the United States and 37 other nations adopted the
Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change. They agreed in principle to significantly reduce their
future greenhouse gas emissions. The advice of and consent of the Senate
would be needed to commit the United States to the emissions reductions.
Whether the Senate should take that step has been widely debated, mainly
because the reductions could be costly to the U.S. economy and their
effectiveness in addressing the problem of global climate change has
been questioned. GAO convened a panel of experts in December 1998 to
discuss the issues surrounding the Kyoto Protocol. GAO also prepared a
background paper on ensuring compliance with international environmental
agreements. GAO is publishing that background paper as a staff study.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-99-148
TITLE: International Environment: Literature on the Effectiveness
of International Environmental Agreements
DATE: 05/01/1999
SUBJECT: Monitoring
International cooperation
Reporting requirements
International organizations
Air pollution control
Climate statistics
Data integrity
Environmental policies
Sanctions
International agreements
IDENTIFIER: Kyoto Protocol
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
UN Environment Programme
Multilateral Fund for the Montreal Protocol
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
Wild Fauna and Flora
******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a **
** GAO report. This text was extracted from a PDF file. **
** Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles, **
** headings, and bullets have not been preserved, and in some **
** cases heading text has been incorrectly merged into **
** body text in the adjacent column. Graphic images have **
** not been reproduced, but figure captions are included. **
** Tables are included, but column deliniations have not been **
** preserved. **
** **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed **
** document's contents. **
** **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO **
** Document Distribution Center. For further details, please **
** send an e-mail message to: **
** **
** **
** **
** with the message 'info' in the body. **
******************************************************************
United States General Accounting Office GAO Staff
Study May 1999 INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT Literature on
the Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements
GAO/RCED-99-148 Preface In December 1997, the United States and 37
other nations adopted the Kyoto Protocol to the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. In it, they agreed
in principle to significantly reduce their future greenhouse gas
emissions. To obligate the United States to the emissions
reductions, the advice and consent of the Senate would be needed.
Whether the Senate should take that step has been widely debated,
mainly because the reductions could be costly to the U.S. economy
and their effectiveness in addressing the problem of global
climate change has been questioned. Further fueling the debate is
the fact that many of the protocol's provisions, such as those for
reporting data on compliance activities as well as those for
monitoring and enforcing compliance, have not yet been fully
specified. As a result, signatory parties do not know the full
extent of what they will be required to do under the protocol, and
it is unclear whether all the parties will meet their obligations
for sharing the burden of the emissions reductions. During
meetings in November 1998, the parties set a deadline of December
31, 2000, for adopting the rules and procedures for compliance and
enforcement, and the parties continue to work on developing those
provisions. Ensuring compliance with environmental treaties is a
widely recognized problem. Experts in the area acknowledge the
need to better specify reporting, monitoring, and enforcement
mechanisms, but little agreement exists on how best to do so and
there is limited experience to point the way. There is consensus,
however, that now-while those provisions for the Kyoto Protocol
are being framed-is the time to explore these issues. To assist in
that effort, we convened a panel of experts in December 1998 to
discuss these issues, and we will issue a report on the results of
the expert panel later this year. To assist the panel, we prepared
a background paper on ensuring compliance with international
environmental agreements. We are publishing that background paper
as a staff study to provide a brief summary of the current
thinking on compliance issues for the Congress and other policy
makers who are considering the workability of the Kyoto Protocol.
Page 1 GAO/RCED-99-148
International Environment Preface For additional information,
please call (202) 512-6111. The major contributors to this study
are Karla Springer; William H. Roach, Jr.; David Marwick; John A.
Crossen; and Leslie Albin. David G. Wood Associate Director,
Environmental Protection Issues Page 2
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Page 3 GAO/RCED-
99-148 International Environment Contents Preface
1 Summary
6 Data Reporting
6 Monitoring
6 Enforcement
7 Chapter 1
9 Introduction Background
9 Objective, Scope, and Methodology
10 Chapter 2
12 National Data Often Data Are Critical to Determining
Compliance 12 Problems With Self-
Reported Data Exist 12 Do Not
Provide a The Quantity of Reported Data Has Improved, but
the Quality of 13 Basis for Assessing Data Is
Questionable Nations' Compliance Data Reporting Requirements
Under the Kyoto Protocol Are 14 Minimal With
Agreements Chapter 3
15 Monitoring of Monitoring Is Needed to Ensure
Compliance 15 Most International
Environmental Agreements Include Only 16
International Limited Monitoring Provisions
Environmental Experts Have Identified the Characteristics
Needed for Effective 18 Agreements Has Been
Monitoring The Kyoto Protocol Contains Some Monitoring Provisions
20 Limited Chapter 4
22 International Few International Environmental
Agreements Have Enforcement 22 Provisions, and
Existing Provisions Are Not Used Effectively Environmental
Secretariats Are Insufficiently Funded and Lack International
23 Agreements Are Jurisdiction to Enforce Agreements
Rarely Enforced International Organizations Lack
Jurisdiction to Enforce 24 Agreements
International Officials and Legal Scholars Suggest the Need for
25 Credible Enforcement Mechanisms Page 4
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Contents Bibliography
28 Abbreviations CITES Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora GAO General
Accounting Office OECD The Organisation for Economic Co-
Operation and Development UNEP United Nations Environment
Programme Page 5 GAO/RCED-99-
148 International Environment Summary Data Reporting Data on
the results of nations' activities undertaken to meet their
international environmental obligations are the basis of
determining whether each nation is in compliance with the
agreements to which it is a party. Historically, such data have
had problems, such as being incomplete or inaccurate. As a result,
it has often been difficult to determine whether nations are
meeting their obligations. For example, in 1996, we reported that
the data reported by nations to meet the requirements of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Framework
Convention) were often incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent.1
More recently, as a result of efforts to improve reporting, more
complete data are being reported. For example, it appears that the
financial assistance to developing countries provided through the
Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the Ozone Layer has
resulted in those nations reporting better data under that
protocol.2 However, according to experts, data quality generally
remains questionable. Currently, the Kyoto Protocol to the
Framework Convention (Kyoto Protocol) contains the same general
requirements and supplementary guidelines for data reporting as
the Framework Convention itself. The general requirements for the
Framework Convention include the requirement to submit annually a
national inventory of anthropogenic (manmade) emissions. The
details of methodology and the formats to be used to present the
data for those inventories-factors that would facilitate analysis,
understanding, and comparability of the data reported-are
contained in guidelines that provide considerable flexibility and
do not require parties to follow a specific procedure. Monitoring
Monitoring is the second element necessary to determine whether a
nation individually, and all nations collectively, are complying
with their international commitments. Generally, monitoring
includes the review and analysis of data and other information
that allow an assessment of the impact or the extent of progress
being made in meeting an agreement's stated goal or objective.
Monitoring can be done to determine both procedural compliance and
effectiveness. Historically, monitoring activities focused on
whether nations implemented processes to transform their
international commitments into acceptable rules within their
domestic legal systems. However, because enacting domestic laws or
1Global Warming: Difficulties Assessing Countries' Progress
Stabilizing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GAO/RCED-96-188, Sept.
4, 1996). 2The Montreal Protocol, adopted in 1987, augments the
1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Page
6 GAO/RCED-99-148
International Environment Summary implementing policies does not
ensure that international commitments will be met, more emphasis
is now being placed on mechanisms that monitor effectiveness-that
is, whether intended outcomes are being achieved. Self-reported
information by the parties to an agreement is the basis for most
monitoring that is done. Although international environmental
agreements generally provide that the parties will submit periodic
reports, these reports have rarely been used for carrying out an
effective monitoring program. Recent studies attribute this to the
limited nature of the monitoring provisions included in most of
these agreements. The reason for the limited monitoring provisions
most frequently cited in the current literature is a concern about
compromising national sovereignty by allowing for monitoring by
outside parties, considered by some to be external policing.
Experts have identified several characteristics that should be
included in a comprehensive monitoring system. One such
characteristic is having specific authority and adequate resources
for carrying out the monitoring function. The monitoring
provisions contained in the Kyoto Protocol include some of these
characteristics; for example, that expert teams will review the
data reported by the parties. The United States proposed
additional provisions that it believes would better ensure the
effectiveness of the treaty in limiting greenhouse gases but that
were not included in the protocol. For example, the United States
proposed that comments be accepted from the public and other
observers on the accuracy of the data provided by the parties.
Enforcement Enforcement is the final element needed to ensure
that nations comply with their international environmental
obligations. Few agreements contain formal provisions for
enforcement, however, and the enforcement provisions that do exist
are used infrequently or inconsistently. For example, the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Convention's secretariat can adopt
proposals to enforce the convention's rules, but its power is
limited to areas where coastal nations do not have jurisdiction.
Secretariats and other international organizations-the groups
typically charged with overseeing these agreements-are often
ineffective at enforcement because they are inadequately funded
and are limited in their international jurisdiction. This is the
case with the United Nations Environmental Programme, established
to promote international cooperation on environmental protection
but constrained from doing so effectively, primarily by limited
resources. Page 7 GAO/RCED-99-148
International Environment Summary In recent years, several ways to
build credible enforcement mechanisms into international
environmental agreements have been suggested; however, there is no
consensus on how best to do that. While enforcement mechanisms for
the Kyoto Protocol have not been specified, according to the
action plan adopted by the parties in November 1998, they will be
developed by the end of 2000. Page 8
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 1 Introduction
Background The increased understanding of our environment and
the recognition that environmental problems do not stop at
national boundaries have resulted in global concern about the
future of our planet and an increasing number of international
agreements to address those concerns. Since 1972, when over 130
nations took part in the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, the number of multilateral international
environmental agreements has grown from fewer than 50 to more than
170. Developing an international environmental agreement involves
achieving a commitment among many nations with various levels of
industrial development, technical capabilities, resources, and
concern about an environmental problem. It is expected that the
parties to the agreement then implement it within their countries
by establishing the necessary laws, regulations, and
administrative systems. Adopting commitments and implementing
laws, however, do not necessarily lead to the changes in behavior
that help to solve the environmental problem the agreement is
attempting to address. Resources must also be provided to enforce
the laws enacted and to evaluate the progress made, making
adjustments, over time, as necessary. The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (Framework Convention) was signed by
154 nations, including the United States, in 1992. The Framework
Convention's objective was to stabilize greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent
dangerous anthropogenic (manmade) interference with the climate
system. Under the Framework Convention, both developed and
developing countries agreed, for example, to develop and submit
reports on their greenhouse gas emissions. In addition to the
general provisions agreed to by all countries, developed countries
agreed to report on their policies and measures with the aim of
returning their greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by the
year 2000. However, this goal was not binding on the developed
countries. The Framework Convention entered into force in 1994,
and the United States was one of the first nations to ratify it.
However, by 1995, the parties to the convention realized that
insufficient progress was being made toward its goals and thus
decided to begin negotiations on a legally binding protocol. In
December 1997, the parties reconvened in Kyoto, Japan, to finalize
binding measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The resultant
Kyoto Protocol to the Framework Convention established binding
emissions reductions for the period 2008 through 2012 for Page 9
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 1 Introduction
developed countries and laid the groundwork for additional
measures aimed at decreasing greenhouse gas emissions.3 A number
of important issues were not addressed at Kyoto: the role of
developing nations, the specifics of an emissions-trading program
(agreed to in principle), and procedures for determining, and
consequences for, noncompliance. Negotiations are continuing on
these issues, including provisions that might specify data-
reporting requirements, monitoring mechanisms, and enforcement
procedures. The Kyoto Protocol, initially adopted by 38 nations,
was open for signature by all nations until mid-March 1999. As of
that deadline, 84 nations, including the United States, had
signed, thereby affirming their commitment to work to meet the
protocol's ambitious goals. U.S. ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, is
uncertain at this time. The official representatives of all the
countries that have ratified the Framework Convention constitute
its Conference of the Parties. This body held its first session in
1995 and will continue to meet annually unless decided otherwise.
The Conference of the Parties is served by a secretariat, which
administers the agreement. Among other things, the secretariat
arranges for conference meetings, drafts official documents,
compiles and transmits reports submitted to it, assists the
parties in compiling and communicating information, coordinates
with the secretariats of other relevant international bodies, and
reports on its activities to the Conference of the Parties. The
secretariat is operationally independent of the United Nations,
but it is linked to the United Nations and its head is appointed
by the U.N. Secretary-General in consultation with the parties to
the Framework Convention. Objective, Scope, and The objective
of this study was to provide background information on Methodology
provisions that help ensure compliance with international
environmental agreements, namely data reporting, monitoring, and
enforcement. For the purposes of this study, we will use the
following definitions for those terms with respect to
international environmental agreements: * Reporting is providing
measurable data on activities undertaken in response to
international obligations. 3While the Kyoto Protocol specifies
that the emissions reductions are binding, the parties have yet to
specify the consequences of not reaching the reduction targets.
Those provisions are scheduled to be complete by year-end 2000.
Page 10 GAO/RCED-99-
148 International Environment Chapter 1 Introduction * Monitoring
is the review and analysis of the data and other information that
allows assessment of the impact or extent of progress being made
in meeting the agreement's stated goal or objective. * Enforcement
is a strategy adopted by the parties to an agreement that
establishes consequences for a party's noncompliance with its
obligations under the agreement. In examining how to improve
nations' compliance with their international environmental
obligations, we are taking a "results-oriented" approach. That is,
we will explore those aspects of reporting, monitoring, and
enforcement that are designed to ensure that signatory nations'
actions result in achieving the Framework Convention's objectives.
We surveyed our past reports and other relevant literature on the
subject and summarized the results of our analysis. (See the
bibliography for a list of the works we included in this effort.)
The information presented in this study draws on information
provided by a number of authors. We tended to cite those authors
who provided specific examples to illustrate the points made. We
did not attempt to verify the accuracy of the information
presented in the literature. Our expert panelists, including an
official from the Department of State, reviewed a draft of this
study, and we incorporated their comments where appropriate. Susan
R. Fletcher, Senior International Environmental Policy Analyst,
Congressional Research Service, also contributed to this study. We
performed our work from July 1998 through May 1999. Page 11
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 2 National Data
Often Do Not Provide a Basis for Assessing Nations' Compliance
With Agreements Data on the activities that nations are
undertaking to meet their international environmental obligations
are the basis of determining whether each nation is in compliance
with the agreement to which it is a party. Historically, such data
have had problems, such as being incomplete or inaccurate. As a
result, it has often been difficult to determine whether nations
are meeting their obligations. More recently, efforts to improve
reporting rates have resulted in more complete data on nations'
compliance activities. However, data quality remains questionable.
Currently, the Kyoto Protocol's requirements for data reporting
consist of general requirements and supplemental guidelines. These
guidelines provide the parties with considerable flexibility. Data
Are Critical to Data on the activities that nations undertake
to respond to their Determining international
environmental obligations are the basis of evaluating whether
nations have fulfilled those obligations. The data form the first
Compliance step in the evaluation process by
providing measurable information on the results of nations'
activities. Once the activities have been measured, the data can
be verified for accuracy, compared with the performance criteria,
and otherwise examined to conclude whether a nation has achieved
the agreed-to results. To be useful, the data must meet a number
of criteria, including completeness, accuracy, understandability,
uniformity, and timeliness. Problems With The data on
nations' activities typically result from a requirement in most
Self-Reported Data international environmental agreements
that each nation report on its own behavior. Our studies and those
by others have shown that national data Exist
reports have many problems. For example, in 1996 we examined the
progress of the United States and other signatory nations in
meeting the goal of the Framework Convention to reduce greenhouse
gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2000. The Framework Convention
requires signatory nations to adopt policies and measures to limit
greenhouse gases and to submit detailed plans showing how each
will help emissions return to 1990 levels. We reported, however,
that the nations' self-reported emissions data were often
incomplete, unreliable, and inconsistent.4 For example, as of
February 1996, some data on 1990 emissions levels were available
for only 29 of the 36 parties to the Framework Convention.5 The
data were incomplete largely because the Framework Convention's
reporting 4Global Warming: Difficulties Assessing Countries'
Progress Stabilizing Emissions of Greenhouse Gases, p. 2. 5The
United States and other countries signed the Framework Convention
in 1992. Page 12
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 2 National Data
Often Do Not Provide a Basis for Assessing Nations' Compliance
With Agreements requirements were not specific and were developed
only after some nations had submitted their reports. Consequently,
the nations' progress in meeting the convention's goals could not
be fully assessed. According to experts, ambiguity in the language
of international environmental agreements frequently contributes
to these types of data problems. In its October 1998 report on
monitoring and reporting under the Kyoto Protocol, the
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development reported
further that, after two full rounds of national reporting under
the Framework Convention, a number of important gaps in reporting
were apparent: data were missing, parties submitted their reports
late, and information about how the data were prepared was
lacking.6 The Quantity of Problems with self-reported data
have long been recognized, and in Reported Data Has response,
some international environmental agreements have begun including
provisions to improve reporting rates. One way to improve data
Improved, but the reporting is through financial assistance to
developing nations that lack Quality of Data Is the
administrative capacity to fulfill their reporting requirements.
For example, the Montreal Protocol on Substances That Deplete the
Ozone Questionable Layer (Montreal Protocol) has a
multilateral fund designed to boost developing nations' activities
to comply with the protocol's provisions.7 The fund pays for
projects in developing nations that gather baseline data and build
the administrative capacity to report the data. According to
experts, this financial assistance to developing nations has
resulted in better self-reporting of certain data under the
Montreal Protocol. These improvements notwithstanding, the poor
quality of self-reported data continues to be a problem under
international environmental agreements. Experts familiar with
numerous studies of the issue have noted that the data continue to
be difficult to compare and their accuracy is often low or
unknown.8 6Jan Corfee Morlot, Monitoring, Reporting and Review of
National Performance Under the Kyoto Protocol, OECD Information
Paper (Paris, France: Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and
Development, 1998), pp. 5, 29. 7The Montreal Protocol, adopted in
1987, augments the 1985 Vienna Convention for the Protection of
the Ozone Layer. 8International Institute for Applied Systems
Analysis, The Implementation and Effectiveness of International
Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice, eds., David G.
Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff (Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1998), pp. 111, 678-80. Page 13
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 2 National Data
Often Do Not Provide a Basis for Assessing Nations' Compliance
With Agreements Data Reporting The Kyoto Protocol
incorporated the general reporting requirements and Requirements
Under supplemental guidelines of the Framework Convention.
Parties are required to submit to the secretariat a national
inventory of anthropogenic the Kyoto Protocol emissions of
greenhouse gases, a general description of steps taken or to Are
Minimal be taken to implement the protocol, and any
other information that the party considers relevant. In addition
to these requirements, the parties adopted guidelines that
recommend methodologies for the parties to use in gathering their
inventory data, the level of detail to include in the reports, and
presentation formats to follow. The guidelines were developed to
help ensure that the national reports are consistent and
comparable; however, they provide considerable flexibility and do
not require parties to follow a specific procedure. In addition,
the protocol currently does not specify any penalties for not
meeting the general requirements or following the guidelines.
According to the work plan adopted by the parties in November
1998, those are to be developed by the end of 2000. Page 14
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited Monitoring
is necessary to determine whether a nation individually, and all
nations collectively, are complying with their international
environmental obligations. Until recently, international
environmental agreements had few established formal mechanisms for
monitoring. Periodic reporting by the parties was the primary
monitoring mechanism included in such agreements; however,
effective use of the reports for carrying out the monitoring
function has been limited. Experts have suggested several
characteristics that should be included in a comprehensive
monitoring system. The Kyoto Protocol has specified some basic
provisions for monitoring. The United States proposed additional
provisions that might better ensure the effectiveness of the
agreement to limit greenhouse gases, but these provisions have not
as yet been included in the protocol. Monitoring Is Needed
The monitoring done under international environmental agreements
to Ensure Compliance includes the review and analysis of reported
data and other information that allow assessment of the impact or
extent of progress being made in meeting a stated goal or
objective, such as implementing an agreement's provisions.
Monitoring can also include independent verification that involves
determining whether the reported data or other information
accurately reflects the existing situation or condition.
Verification can be done through performing on-site inspections,
obtaining information from another source, or doing an independent
analysis and reaching the same conclusion as the original
assessment. Monitoring can determine both procedural compliance
and effectiveness-that is, whether intended outcomes are being
achieved. Historically, most monitoring activities have focused on
whether nations have implemented processes to transform their
international obligations into acceptable rules within their
domestic legal systems. However, the implementation of domestic
policy or laws that conform to an agreement, commonly referred to
as compliance, does not ensure that the agreement's goals or
objectives will be achieved. Meeting the goals of international
environmental agreements generally requires influencing the
behavior not only of governments but also of a large number of
firms, individuals, agencies, and other entities that do not
necessarily change their behavior simply because governments have
signed an agreement. Thus, influencing the behavior of these
entities often entails a complex process of forming and adjusting
domestic policy to conform to the standards contained in an
agreement. Page 15 GAO/RCED-99-148
International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of International
Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited According to experts,
international law is filled with examples of agreements that have
had high formal levels of compliance but have had only limited
influence on the behavior of the regulated entities. For example,
from the inception of the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling in 1946 until the early 1960s, the level of
compliance with its catch quotas was nearly perfect. This was
because those quotas were set very high and did not require the
parties to decrease their catches.9 Determining whether the goals
and objectives are being met requires going beyond implementation
to evaluate effectiveness. Thus, effectiveness is the extent to
which international agreements lead to changes in behavior that
help to solve environmental problems. Recently, more attention has
been given to whether performance targets-such as emission targets
like those specified in the Kyoto Protocol-have been met.
International environmental agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol
can involve a substantial economic investment by countries that
are serious about implementation. In addition, because of the
large number of entities within each country that may have to
change their behavior if the objectives of the agreement are to be
achieved, extensive monitoring over large geographic areas may be
required, making the monitoring function itself costly.
Particularly where the costs of implementation are high, parties
to international agreements may be reluctant to implement the
measures needed to ensure that commitments are met unless they are
confident that others will do the same. In these cases, having
mechanisms included in the agreements to monitor when and how
parties are implementing these measures can help to build
confidence that agreements are, in fact, being put into practice.
Most International Until recently, international
environmental agreements have contained Environmental
few substantive mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation. Although
several agreements have provided for periodic reporting by the
parties, Agreements Include these reports have
rarely been used to carry out an effective monitoring Only Limited
program. Recent studies provide some possible reasons for the
limited nature of monitoring. One possible reason is the concept
of state Monitoring Provisions sovereignty, which has resulted in
nations not being willing to accept external scrutiny. One author
pointed out, for example, that nations find it difficult to
relinquish some of their sovereign authority to an international
9Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental
Commitments, p. 7. Page 16
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited
organization.10 For this reason, nations have been allowed to
monitor or report on their own compliance and thus avoid any
potential sovereignty questions that could result from external
monitoring. However, at least partly because of the problems of
low reporting rates and quality of reported data as discussed in
the previous chapter, the effectiveness of such self-monitoring
provisions is questionable. Another possible reason is that
international environmental agreements generally do not provide
specific authority or adequate resources to carry out an effective
monitoring function. As we pointed out in our 1992 report on the
monitoring of international environmental agreements, generally
the role of the treaty secretariats established by the parties is
to help implement agreements by collecting and distributing
information and providing some technical assistance.11 We further
stated, however, that although most of the secretariats had
distributed lists of nonreporting parties at various times to
generate peer pressure to stimulate compliance with reporting
provisions, they had not been given the authority to monitor the
agreements through verifying the information parties reported or
independently assessing compliance. In addition, of the eight
major international environmental agreements reviewed in that
report, only one-the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES), ratified by
112 countries-granted its secretariat specific authority and
established a formal mechanism for assessing compliance. Under
this agreement, the secretariat analyzes the data it receives and
publishes reports detailing violations. In the case of
particularly egregious violations, the secretariat may also
recommend that parties cease trading with the particular party
found to be in noncompliance. With respect to funding, we also
stated in our 1992 report that secretariats generally had limited
and unstable funding. We showed that the secretariats of the eight
agreements we reviewed were small organizations, with staffs of 4
to 20 people and annual budgets of less than $1 million to $3
million in 1990. We pointed out that each secretariat was funded
by voluntary contributions from parties and/or by resources
apportioned by a related parent organization, which in many cases
also operate largely on financial contributions from member
nations. For 10Andrew Watson Samaan, "Enforcement of International
Environmental Treaties: An Analysis," Fordham Environmental Law
Journal, Vol. 5 (Fall 1993), p. 278. 11International Environment:
International Agreements Are Not Well Monitored (GAO/RCED-92-43,
Jan. 27, 1992), pp. 28-33. Page 17
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited example,
CITES had a staff of 18 and funding of about $2.5 million in 1990.
The secretariat's officials told us that parties had never
approved a budget with sufficient funds to cover all of the
activities needed to implement the agreement. In addition to its
administration duties and assessing the compliance of its 112
member nations, this secretariat also conducted studies to help
determine whether certain species should be protected under CITES
and provided certain technical assistance. Among other possible
reasons for the lack of monitoring provisions is that the nature
of the agreement or the environmental problem being addressed does
not require the need for detailed monitoring provisions. In some
cases, agreements may not require parties to change their
behavior, and thus monitoring for compliance is not required. The
high catch quotas established by the International Convention for
the Regulation of Whaling between 1946 and the early 1960s, cited
earlier in this chapter, are an example of such an agreement.
Recent studies, however, indicate that more frequently now than in
the past, international environmental agreements are requiring
regular reporting by the parties and reviews of these reports and,
in some cases, include mechanisms for verification. Experts Have
Experts have identified three factors that should be included in
an Identified the agreement to establish effective
monitoring and verification. First, they have suggested that
authority and responsibility for carrying out the Characteristics
monitoring function need to be specified and that adequate
resources need Needed for Effective to be provided. According
to one expert, successive rounds of subjecting data to a
monitoring process generally provide an incentive for parties to
Monitoring improve the quality of reported data.12
Next, some experts have suggested that specific criteria and
standard monitoring techniques need to be established to ensure
their perceived legitimacy. Many experts believe that ambiguity or
vagueness of treaty language, obligations, and requirements makes
implementing international commitments and judging compliance
difficult. Studies have shown that how an international agreement
is constructed-the exact commitment, its scope, clarity, and
application-can be critical to its success. Furthermore, as stated
by one expert, implementation experiences of nations often vary
because of differences in their interpretation of the
commitments.13 As a result, some experts have suggested that
agreements should include a review process with specific review
and evaluation procedures. One study 12Implementation and
Effectiveness of International Environmental Commitments, p. 680.
13Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental
Commitments, p. 659. Page 18
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited also
suggests that guidance on the nature of the reviews should be
clear and the review function should be overseen by the
secretariat to ensure its neutrality and consistency.14 Another
study, prepared for EPA's Office of Policy, stated that monitoring
procedures need to be carefully considered. The study stated that
the procedures developed must be credible but not overly
bureaucratic. In addition, according to the study, strict rules
lead to complex procedures, increasing the cost of compliance and
reducing an agreement's cost-effectiveness; conversely, if the
rules are too loose, then the parties can manipulate the
results.15 Finally, experts have suggested that the monitoring
function should be transparent and provide for participation and
comments by interested parties. Making both the information and
the methodologies that were used to compile that information
widely available and permitting participation in the policy
process are basic tenets of modern governance. The right to have
access to such information on the environment is a recent
development in international law. Public dissemination of
information about parties' progress can play a key role in the
implementation of environmental agreements. Specifically, the
information serves to assure each party that others are sharing
the burden of implementation as agreed, which is particularly
important in light of the high costs and the effects on
international competitiveness that may result from implementing an
agreement. Our 1992 report suggested, for example, that when the
costs of implementing an agreement are high, nations might be more
willing to open up their actions for review to ensure that
implementation is equitable and that all parties are honoring
their commitments. In addition, the sharing of information allows
not only a comparison of the experiences of the nations reviewed
but also an assessment of what is working and what opportunities
exist to adjust goals or procedures, as needed. According to some
experts, participants should include not only environmental and
public interest nongovernmental organizations but also the target
groups that must change their behavior if an agreement's goals are
going to be met. Worker and employer representation is a feature,
for example, of the International Labor Organization, a
specialized agency of the United Nations that coordinates the
development and implementation of more than 160 international
labor conventions intended to safeguard 14Monitoring, Reporting,
and Review of National Performance Under the Kyoto Protocol, pp.
27-28. 15Edward Vine and Jayant Sathaye, The Monitoring,
Evaluation, Reporting, and Verification of Climate Change
Mitigation Projects: Discussion of Issues and Methodologies and
Review of Existing Protocols and Guidelines (Berkeley, Calif.:
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Dec. 1997), p. ii. Page 19
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited workers'
rights and ensure safe workplaces. This organization requires its
member nations to regularly submit reports to the worker and
employer representatives for comments, which are subsequently
reviewed by an independent body appointed by the organization.
According to one expert, target group participation would also
provide better information on the range of possible policy
options, technical feasibility, and costs and benefits.16 The
Kyoto Protocol The Kyoto Protocol contains various
monitoring provisions. Among other Contains Some
things, expert teams are to review the information in national
reports submitted by the parties. Other provisions-suggested by
the United Monitoring Provisions States to strengthen monitoring-
were not incorporated into the protocol. The monitoring provisions
in the protocol state that information contained in the parties'
national reports is to be reviewed by teams of experts nominated
by the parties and by intergovernmental organizations. The teams
are to conduct the reviews by following guidelines and relevant
decisions provided by the Conference of the Parties. According to
the protocol, the review process will provide a thorough and
comprehensive technical assessment of all aspects of the
protocol's implementation by a party. The protocol further states
that the review teams will prepare a report to the Conference of
the Parties that assesses the implementation of the commitments
and identifies any potential problems in, and factors influencing,
the fulfillment of commitments. Under the protocol, the
secretariat will coordinate the review teams, circulate the teams'
reports to all parties to the Framework Convention, and identify
questions about parties' implementation indicated by the reports
for further consideration by the Conference of the Parties. In
addition to establishing the guidelines for the reviews, the
Conference of the Parties will consider the reports of the expert
review teams along with the information submitted by the parties
and those implementation questions identified by the secretariat.
Prior to the development of the Kyoto Protocol, the United States
proposed provisions for the Framework Convention's monitoring
process. Although the protocol included many of these features,
among them the use of independent review teams and the
establishment of guidelines for the review process by the
Conference of the Parties, it omitted several others. First, the
U.S. proposal explicitly provided that the review teams
16Implementation and Effectiveness of International Environmental
Commitments, p. 666. Page 20
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 3 Monitoring of
International Environmental Agreements Has Been Limited would
assess both the progress of implementation and the effectiveness
of meeting the protocol's goals. The proposal provided for
assessing the effectiveness of the compliance and enforcement
programs established as well as the individual measures reported.
Second, the U.S. proposal included specific mechanisms that would
allow observers and the public to provide comments and
supplemental data to facilitate and improve the reviews. Adopting
these specific suggestions would increase the transparency of the
process and help to provide assurance that the actions being taken
will achieve the Kyoto Protocol's objectives. Although these
specific suggestions were not incorporated into the monitoring
provisions of the protocol, it is possible that when the
guidelines for the review process are established, they will
include additional portions of the U.S. proposal. Page 21
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced Enforcement is the
final element needed to help ensure that nations comply with their
international environmental obligations. Few agreements contain
formal provisions for enforcement, however, and the enforcement
provisions that do exist are used infrequently or inconsistently.
Limited funding and international jurisdiction are two of the
reasons that the enforcement of international environmental
agreements has not been effective. International organizations,
such as the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), often
lack the jurisdiction to enforce their decisions. In recent years,
ways to build credible enforcement mechanisms into international
environmental agreements have been suggested, but no consensus
exists on how best to do that. To date, enforcement provisions
have not been specified for the Kyoto Protocol, even though the
emissions targets are supposed to be binding on the parties. In
designing those provisions to be effective, a number of issues,
such as the funding of an enforcement authority, international
jurisdiction problems, and penalties, should be taken into
consideration. At the fourth Conference of the Parties in Buenos
Aires in November 1998, a work plan to complete the enforcement
provisions by year-end 2000 was agreed to. Few International
Few international environmental agreements contain enforcement
Environmental provisions; it is generally thought that if
stringent provisions were included, fewer nations would
participate and treaty obligations would be Agreements Have
weaker. Instead, the enforcement of compliance with treaty
obligations Enforcement generally depends on peer or
public pressure on nations. Even when agreements do include
enforcement provisions, resource constraints and Provisions, and
other factors may limit their effectiveness. Existing Provisions
Are Not Used For example, according to one expert, the
Commission on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources was established to Effectively function as
the primary conservation organization for the southern Atlantic
Ocean. However, the secretariat for the commission is limited in
its enforcement capacity in two key respects. First, the agreement
has no specific enforcement procedures-the only enforcement
mechanism at the secretariat's disposal is its ability to
publicize nations' noncompliance. Second, according to the
agreement, the secretariat's decisions must have the support of a
consensus of the members, thus effectively giving any member the
right to veto any proposed enforcement measures against it. Page
22 GAO/RCED-99-148 International
Environment Chapter 4 International Environmental Agreements Are
Rarely Enforced Although some international environmental
agreements contain enforcement provisions, these provisions are
used infrequently or ineffectively. For example, the Northwest
Atlantic Fisheries Convention, which applies to all waters of the
northwest Atlantic Ocean, has the authority to establish and
allocate fishing quotas for all convention members. The
convention's Fisheries Commission, which is the body responsible
for managing the convention's resources, can adopt proposals for
the enforcement of the convention's rules. However, the commission
has jurisdiction only in the area that is beyond the coastal
nations' 200-mile economic zone; thus, the commission has no
jurisdiction over some of the most productive fishing areas. In
addition, the convention allows any member of the agreement to
exempt itself from any enforcement proposal by the commission by
lodging an objection. The convention also allows members to choose
not to be bound by the commission's rules already in force.
Finally, although the convention allows members to board and
inspect the vessels of other member nations, only the nation under
whose flag a vessel is operating can prosecute and sanction a
vessel's owner for violations. Nations are often reluctant to
penalize their own vessels. As one study of the convention's 1993
records showed, of 49 vessels charged with offenses, only 6 were
prosecuted.17 Finally, as several experts have pointed out, the
ambiguity of the language and definitions in international
environmental agreements makes enforcement of their provisions
problematic because it is difficult to determine whether a nation
has met its obligations. Consequently, secretariats spend their
time and resources dealing with contested actions by member
nations rather than enforcing compliance and bringing pressure on
acknowledged violators. Secretariats Are According to one
expert, the secretariats for international environmental
Insufficiently Funded agreements are in the logical position to
enforce compliance with treaty obligations.18 However, most
secretariats do not have enforcement and Lack
authority. Those that do have the authority may be limited in
their International enforcement ability for two
reasons. First, because their funding is limited or unstable, as
discussed earlier, they often lack the institutional capacity
Jurisdiction to to fulfill all of their responsibilities.
Second, the secretariats lack the Enforce Agreements
international jurisdiction that is needed to carry out
enforcement. Therefore, secretariats have no means of forcing
member nations to abide 17David S. Ardia, "Does the Emperor Have
No Clothes? Enforcement of International Laws Protecting the
Marine Environment," Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol.
19 (Winter 1998), pp. 531-3. 18"Does the Emperor Have No
Clothes?," p. 512. Page 23
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced by the rules
established by the agreements. As a result, secretariats rarely
act as enforcers. Secretariat officials stress that they have
neither the resources nor the authority to perform enforcement and
that they, instead, view themselves as information clearinghouses
and facilitators. International No centralized regulatory
body has jurisdiction or enforcement authority Organizations Lack
for international environmental agreements. As a result, the
effectiveness of international agreements depends almost entirely
on voluntary Jurisdiction to compliance. Enforce Agreements
According to experts, the United Nations General Assembly, in
1972, established UNEP with a governing council and secretariat to
promote international cooperation on environmental protection and
to coordinate environmental action within the United Nations.
However, UNEP is relatively small, limited by personnel and
financial constraints. It does not have the ability to create
binding international law and must rely on member nations to
implement and comply with its enforcement policies. In the
assessment of many observers, UNEP has generally not been an
effective oversight and enforcement institution because of its
limited formal powers. In addition, UNEP's funding has been
criticized as inadequate because its primary source is voluntary
contributions to its Environment Fund. In 1993, the UNEP Governing
Council acknowledged these limitations when it shifted its focus
from environmental monitoring to helping developing countries use
environmentally sound technologies. Without an organization to
enforce international environmental agreements, compliance depends
on the willingness of nations to abide by the provisions and
enforce compliance among their citizens. When complying with a
particular provision or commitment becomes contrary to a nation's
interests-for either sociopolitical or economic reasons-it is less
likely that the nation will enforce compliance. In addition, many
countries, particularly developing countries, lack the financial
and technological capacity to meaningfully enforce environmental
regulations.19 19"Enforcement of International Environmental
Treaties," p. 273; and "Does the Emperor Have No Clothes?," pp.
505, 510, 512-3, 523-4. Page 24
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced International
Officials In recent years, ideas about how to enhance
enforcement of international and Legal Scholars
environmental agreements have emerged. Two multilateral documents
and one country report have set forth enforcement proposals for
protecting Suggest the Need for the international
environment. Academic theories provide additional Credible
Enforcement recommendations. However, there is little agreement on
how to improve the enforcement of agreements, and, currently, the
Kyoto Protocol does Mechanisms not include
provisions for enforcement. The following are some recent
proposals for enhancing enforcement. The World Commission. In
1987, a group of legal experts of the World Commission on the
Environment and Development proposed the creation of a centralized
organizational structure, a Commission for the Environment, to
oversee international environmental agreements and to hear
nations' complaints about violations.20 A United Nations High
Commissioner would head the commission, hear complaints about
violations, and issue reports on the violations. (This plan for a
high commissioner and a commission empowered to hear complaints
and issue reports mirrors the strategy used by the United Nations
human rights and refugee organizations.) Although this proposal
contained a draft convention, as well as General Principles on
Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development, the
international community has not adopted it. Most likely this is
because the document had no binding force and was not issued by an
official United Nations organization. The Hague Declaration. The
Declaration of the Hague on the environment, issued in 1989 by an
international conference of government policy makers, scientists,
and environmentalists focused on climate change, called for a "new
institutional authority" to combat global warming. The authority
would be created within the United Nations system and would have
decision-making and enforcement powers. The declaration was not
specific on the form that the authority should take, nor did it
propose any type of design. Citing the Hague declaration as a step
in the right direction, one legal expert has suggested that the
1974 Convention on the Protection of the Environment, which is a
general treaty that addresses the environment as a whole, could be
used as a model. This 1974 convention created a right of action
against a nation for anyone who is affected by environmentally
harmful activities in that nation and requires each party to the
agreement to establish a special authority to safeguard general
environmental interests. The expert believes that the convention
could be used as a model for future conventions that address
environmental issues because it would allow nations to protest any
activity that has been proven 20"Enforcement of International
Environmental Treaties," p. 274. Page 25
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced harmful to the common
environment. This would eliminate diplomatic, political, and
economic pressures against the protesting nations.21 The Soviet
Initiative. A third recommendation, made by the former Soviet
Union,22 would create a cadre of what one author called "green
troops"-modeled after the peacekeeping and peacemaking efforts of
the United Nations. The proposal would also create and staff
centers responsible for collecting and analyzing environmental
data, deploying the troops to the scenes of environmental
disasters, conducting inspections, verifying treaty compliance
through on-site inspections, and assessing damage. Academic
Proposals. Academic thinking on how to best incorporate
enforcement mechanisms into treaties falls into three schools of
thought. * One group stresses that there is a need for a central
authority to coordinate efforts and maintain a steady flow of
information on the global environment. The central authority would
also set and enforce rules.23 * A second group stresses a process
of interaction and cooperation among the parties involved. They
believe that most treaty violations are not premeditated or
deliberate but are instead caused by the ambiguity and
indeterminacy of the treaty language, the domestic limitations of
the parties' abilities to carry out their responsibilities, and
the time constraints imposed by treaties on the participants.
Therefore, the best way to ensure compliance is not the threat of
punishment but a process of interaction and cooperation among the
parties involved, including improved dispute resolution, technical
and financial assistance, and oversight and public
participation.24 * A third group notes that inducing nations to
participate in collective deliberation and exposing them to new
information could produce a shift in their domestic environmental
policies. This group expects that the nations will change their
environmental activities as they are exposed to the potential
benefits of international environmental cooperation. They believe
the nature of the commitments should be as unthreatening as
21"Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties," p. 279.
22The Soviet proposal was cited in Thomas M. Franck, "Soviet
Initiatives: U.S. Responses-New Opportunities for Reviving the
United Nations Systems," American Journal of International Law,
Vol. 83 (1989), p. 531. 23"Does the Emperor Have No Clothes?," p.
544 and "Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties," pp.
279-80. 24George W. Downs, "Enforcement and the Evolution of
Cooperation; A Symposium on Implementation, Compliance, and
Effectiveness," Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 19
(Winter 1998), pp. 328-35. Page 26
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Chapter 4 International
Environmental Agreements Are Rarely Enforced possible and consist
of few, if any, specific performance targets or timetables,
emphasizing dispute resolution and negotiated compliance
management techniques to the exclusion of more coercive
enforcement mechanisms.25 25"Enforcement and the Evolution of
Cooperation," pp. 336-43. Page 27
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Bibliography Alvarez,
Jose. "Foreword: Why Nations Behave; A Symposium on
Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness." Michigan Journal
of International Law, Vol. 19 (Winter 1998), pp. 303-17. Anderson,
J. W., Richard Morgenstern, and Michael Toman. "At Buenos Aires
and Beyond." Resources (Winter 1999), pp. 6-10. Ardia, David S.
"Does the Emperor Have No Clothes? Enforcement of International
Laws Protecting the Marine Environment; A Symposium on
Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness." Michigan Journal of
International Law, Vol. 19 (Winter 1998), pp. 497-567. Bakke, Lila
F. "Wrap-Up Plenary: What's Next on Implementation, Compliance,
and Effectiveness?" American Society of International Law
Proceedings, Vol. 91 (Apr. 9-12, 1997), pp. 504-18. Barrett,
Scott. "Economic Incentives and Enforcement Are Crucial to a
Climate Treaty." Perspectives on Policy: Do International
Environmental Agreements Really Work? Washington, D.C.: Resources
for the Future, Dec. 1997. Bell, Ruth Greenspan. "Developing a
Culture of Compliance in the International Environmental Regime."
Environmental Law Reporter, Vol. 27 (Aug. 1997), pp. 10402-12. -.
"Signing a Climate Treaty Is the Easy Part; Implementing and
Enforcing Agreed-Upon Actions Pose Many Challenges." Perspectives
on Policy: Do International Environmental Agreements Really Work?
Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Dec. 1997. Benedick,
Richard. "The U.N. Approach to Climate Change: Where Has It Gone
Wrong?" Perspectives on Policy: Do International Environmental
Agreements Really Work? Washington, D.C.: Resources for the
Future, Dec. 1997. Danish, Kyle. "The New Sovereignty: Compliance
With International Regulatory Agreements." Virginia Journal of
International Law, Vol. 37 (1997), pp. 789-810. Downs, George W.
"Enforcement and the Evolution of Cooperation; A Symposium on
Implementation, Compliance, and Effectiveness." Michigan Journal
of International Law, Vol. 19 (Winter 1998), pp. 319-44. Page 28
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Bibliography Gavouneli,
Maria. "Compliance With International Environmental Treaties: The
Empirical Evidence." American Society of International Law
Proceedings, Vol. 91 (1997), pp. 234-58. Goldberg, Donald M.,
Glenn Wiser, Stephen J. Porter, and Nuno LaCastra. "Building a
Compliance Regime Under the Kyoto Protocol." Washington, D.C.:
Center for International Environmental Law, Dec. 1998. Hahn,
Robert W., and Robert N. Stavins. "Thoughts on Designing an
International Greenhouse Gas Trading System." Conference
presentation at Climate Change Policy: The Road to Buenos Aires,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Sept.
14, 1998. International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis.
The Implementation and Effectiveness of International
Environmental Commitments: Theory and Practice. Eds., David G.
Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff. Cambridge, Mass.:
MIT Press, 1998. Jacobson, Harold K. "Afterword: Conceptual,
Methodological, and Substantive Issues Entwined in Studying
Compliance; A Symposium on Implementation, Compliance and
Effectiveness." Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 19
(Winter 1998), pp. 569-79. Jones, Timothy T. "Implementation of
the Montreal Protocol: Barriers, Constraints and Opportunities."
Environmental Lawyer, Vol. 3 (1997), pp. 813-58. Kerr, Suzi.
"Enforcing Compliance: The Allocation of Liability in
International GHG Emissions Trading and the Clean Development
Mechanism." Climate Issue Brief, No. 15. Washington, D.C.:
Resources for the Future, Oct. 1998. La Rovere, Emilio Lebro. "The
Key Issue Left Unresolved in Kyoto: Penalties for Non-Compliance."
Perspectives on Policy: How Workable Is the Kyoto Protocol for
Developing Countries? Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future,
July 1998. Moomaw, William R. "International Environmental Policy
and the Softening of Sovereignty." Fletcher Forum of World
Affairs, Vol. 21 (Fall 1997), pp. 7-15. Page 29
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Bibliography Morlot, Jan
Corfee. Monitoring, Reporting and Review of National Performance
Under the Kyoto Protocol. OECD Information Paper. Paris, France:
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 1998.
Narain, Sunita. "Rising Above the World of Post-Kyoto Politics."
Perspectives on Policy: How Workable Is the Kyoto Protocol for
Developing Countries? Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future,
July 1998. O'Connell, Mary Ellen. "Enforcement and the Success of
International Environmental Law." Global Legal Studies Journal,
Vol. 3 (1995), pp. 47-64. Romano, Cesare P. R. "A Proposal to
Enhance the Effectiveness of International Environmental Law: The
International Environmental Ombudsman." Earth Summit Watch
Programs, New York University Law School, Clinic on International
Environmental Law, Spring 1997. Samaan, Andrew Watson.
"Enforcement of International Environmental Treaties: An
Analysis." Fordham University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 5
(Fall 1993), pp. 261-83. Scott, Gary L., Geoffrey M. Reynolds, and
Anthony D. Lott. "Success and Failure Components of Global
Environmental Cooperation: The Making of International
Environmental Law." International Law Students Association Journal
of International and Comparative Law, Vol. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 23-
59. Shogren, Jason. "Benefits and Costs of Kyoto." Conference
presentation at Climate Change Policy: The Road to Buenos Aires,
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, Sept.
14, 1998. United Nations. Declaration of the Hague. Concluded at
the Hague, Mar. 11, 1989. U.N. Doc. A/44/340-E/1989/120 Annex
(1989) 28 I.L.M. 1308 (1989). -. Framework Convention on Climate
Change. Concluded at Rio de Janeiro, May 29, 1992. Reprinted in 31
I.L.M. 849 (1992) (also at http://www.unfccc.de/). -. Kyoto
Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. Conference of the Parties, Third Session, Concluded at
Page 30 GAO/RCED-99-148
International Environment Bibliography Kyoto, Dec. 10, 1997.
FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1 (also at http://www.unfccc.de/). U.S.
Department of State. The Buenos Aires Climate Change Conference
(fact sheet). Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and
Scientific Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 1998. -. Fact Sheet on
Supplemental United States' Climate Change Proposals. Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.
Washington, D.C.: June 1997. -. The Kyoto Protocol on Climate
Change (fact sheet). Bureau of Oceans and International
Environmental and Scientific Affairs. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 15,
1998. -. 1997 Submission of the United States of America Under the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Bureau of
Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs.
Washington, D.C.: July 1997. U.S. General Accounting Office,
Climate Change: Information on the U.S. Initiative on Joint
Implementation (GAO/RCED-98-154, June 29, 1998). -. Global
Warming: Difficulties Assessing Countries' Progress Stabilizing
Emissions of Greenhouse Gases (GAO/RCED-96-188, Sept. 4, 1996). -.
International Environment: International Agreements Are Not Well
Monitored (GAO/RCED-92-43, Jan. 27, 1992). -. International
Environment: Operations of the Montreal Protocol Multilateral Fund
(GAO/T-RCED-97-218, July 30, 1997). -. International Environment:
Strengthening the Implementation of Environmental Agreements
(GAO/RCED-92-188, Aug. 24, 1992). Vine, Edward, and Jayant
Sathaye. The Monitoring, Evaluation, Reporting, and Verification
of Climate Change Mitigation Projects: Discussion of Issues and
Methodologies and Review of Existing Protocols and Guidelines.
Berkeley, Calif.: Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Dec.
1997. Page 31 GAO/RCED-99-148
International Environment Bibliography Visek, Richard C.
"Implementation and Enforcement of EC Environmental Law."
Georgetown International Environmental Law Review, Vol. 7 (Fall
1995), pp. 377-419. Wiener, Jonathan Baert. "Designing Markets for
International Greenhouse Gas Control." Climate Issue Brief, No. 6.
Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, Oct. 1997. Youel,
Kathryn S. "Theme Plenary Session: Implementation, Compliance and
Effectiveness." American Society of International Law Proceedings,
Vol. 91 (Apr. 9-12, 1997), pp. 50-73. Zhong, Ma, Yoshitaka Nitta,
and Michael Toman. "International Cooperation for Reducing
Greenhouse Gas Emissions: From Theory to Practice Through
Technology Transfer." Summary of a China/Japan/U.S. Joint Project.
Beijing Environment and Development Institute, Central Research
Institute for the Electric Power Industry, and Resources for the
Future, Dec. 1997. (160475) Page 32
GAO/RCED-99-148 International Environment Ordering Information The
first copy of each GAO report and testimony is free. Additional
copies are $2 each. Orders should be sent to the following
address, accompanied by a check or money order made out to the
Superintendent of Documents, when necessary. VISA and MasterCard
credit cards are accepted, also. Orders for 100 or more copies to
be mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. Orders by
mail: U.S. General Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC
20013 or visit: Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts.
NW) U.S. General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also
be placed by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (202)
512-6061, or TDD (202) 512-2537. Each day, GAO issues a list of
newly available reports and testimony. To receive facsimile
copies of the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please
call (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone. A recorded menu will
provide information on how to obtain these lists. For information
on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET, send an e-mail
message with "info" in the body to: [email protected] or visit
GAO's World Wide Web Home Page at: http://www.gao.gov PRINTED ON
RECYCLED PAPER United States General Accounting Office
Bulk Rate Washington, D.C. 20548-0001 Postage & Fees Paid GAO
Permit No. G100 Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300
Address Correction Requested
*** End of document. ***