Department of Energy: Problems and Progress in Managing Plutonium
(Chapter Report, 04/17/1998, GAO/RCED-98-68).
When the Energy Department (DOE) ceased nuclear weapons production in
the late 1980s, much of its plutonium was either not in a suitable form
or not packaged for long-term storage. Moreover, since the late 1980s,
the United States has retired or dismantled many nuclear weapons,
creating the need to store thousands of plutonium nuclear weapons
components known as "pits." DOE now holds about 10,000 of these pits at
its Pantex Plant, near Amarillo, Texas, and the number continues to rise
as more nuclear weapons are retired and dismantled. Although DOE has
made some progress in stabilizing its plutonium, the agency is unlikely
to meet its May 2002 target date to have its plutonium that is not in
pits stabilized, packaged, and stored. The DOE sites with the majority
of this plutonium have experienced many delays and anticipate more in
meeting their implementation plan milestones. In addition to delays in
stabilizing and packaging its plutonium that is not in pits, DOE is now
storing about 10,000 pits in containers that both the agency and the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board believe are not suitable for
extended storage, thus risking worker exposure to plutonium.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-98-68
TITLE: Department of Energy: Problems and Progress in Managing
Plutonium
DATE: 04/17/1998
SUBJECT: Safety standards
Nuclear waste disposal
Environmental policies
Radioactive wastes
Nuclear facilities
Nuclear waste storage
Nuclear waste management
Atomic energy defense activities
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GAO/RCED-98-68
Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy and Power, Committee
on Commerce, House of Representatives
April 1998
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - PROBLEMS
AND PROGRESS IN MANAGING PLUTONIUM
GAO/RCED-98-68
DOE's Management of Plutonium
(141048)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOE - Department of Energy
GAO - General Accounting Office
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-279070
April 17, 1998
The Honorable Dan Schaefer
Chairman, Subcommittee on Energy
and Power
Committee on Commerce
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In response to your request, this report examines the status of the
Department of Energy's efforts to stabilize, package, and store its
plutonium, specifically (1) plutonium that is not in the form of
nuclear weapons components, or "pits," and (2) plutonium in pits.
As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days after the date of this letter. At that time, we will
provide copies of the report to the Secretary of Energy; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
Please call me on (202) 512-8021 if you or your staff have any
questions. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
II.
Sincerely yours,
Gary L. Jones
Associate Director, Energy,
Resources, and Science Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
Workers at Department of Energy (DOE) facilities must be protected
from plutonium because exposure to small quantities is dangerous to
human health, and if not safely contained and managed, plutonium can
be unstable and can even spontaneously ignite under certain
conditions. When DOE ceased nuclear weapons production in the late
1980s, much of its plutonium was either not in a suitable form or not
packaged for long-term storage. Furthermore, since the late 1980s,
the United States has retired and dismantled many nuclear weapons,
creating the need to store thousands of plutonium nuclear weapons
components known as "pits." DOE currently holds approximately 10,000
of these pits at its Pantex Plant, near Amarillo, Texas, and the
number continues to increase as additional nuclear weapons are
retired and dismantled.
Concerned about the adequacy of DOE's program to safely store
plutonium for the long term, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on
Energy and Power, House Committee on Commerce, asked GAO to review
DOE's management of its plutonium. Specifically, GAO was asked to
review DOE's efforts to stabilize, package, and store its plutonium,
including problems DOE has encountered or anticipates in
accomplishing these activities, specifically for (1) plutonium that
is not in the form of nuclear weapons components, or pits, and (2)
plutonium in the form of pits.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Plutonium is a man-made radioactive element produced by irradiating
uranium in nuclear reactors. The plutonium DOE possesses is in
several physical forms, including metals, oxides (fine powders),
residues and solutions (materials with a lower plutonium content), as
well as the roughly 10,000 pits. The spherical central core of a
nuclear weapon, a pit is compressed with high explosives to create a
nuclear explosion.
During the weapons production era, DOE continuously recycled its
plutonium to be made into pits for nuclear weapons. Since it had
never had to store plutonium for any prolonged time, when the
Department ceased its production of nuclear weapons, much of the
plutonium was not packaged adequately for long-term storage. As a
result, problems occurred at many of the sites throughout the
Department, such as plutonium that was packaged in contact with
plastic, which made the containers susceptible to leaks or
ruptures--possibly exposing the workers to the plutonium.
In 1994, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board\1 and DOE\2
identified environmental, safety, and health problems at the
Department's nuclear weapons facilities, including problems with how
its plutonium was packaged and stored. The Board then recommended
that DOE correct the identified problems within suggested time
frames. DOE responded with an implementation plan containing
milestones for corrective actions at specific DOE sites, including
stabilizing and packaging plutonium metals and oxides for long-term
storage by May 2002.
Stabilization includes activities such as brushing loose oxides from
the plutonium metals and heating plutonium oxides to a high
temperature to remove moisture and to reduce the potential for
dispersal. Once stabilized, plutonium metals and oxides are to be
packaged in approved, sealed double containers to isolate the
plutonium from the outside environment and to prevent its release.
These activities are guided by standards that DOE developed for the
long-term storage of plutonium metals and oxides and for the interim
storage of "plutonium-bearing solids," including residues. Because
pits are made of plutonium metal that is sealed inside a
nonradioactive metal shell, they were considered more stable and
safer and were specifically excluded from these standards.
In a January 1997 record of decision, DOE detailed its plan for the
disposition of much of the plutonium it is stabilizing, packaging,
and storing--that which is excess to national security requirements.
DOE plans to convert this plutonium through two disposition
technologies--(1) immobilizing it in glass or ceramic material and
(2) burning it as fuel in nuclear reactors--to make it unattractive
for use in nuclear weapons until it can ultimately be disposed of.\3
A small portion of DOE's pits will not be disposed of but instead
will be retained as strategic reserves, for use in weapons in the
future if necessary.
--------------------
\1 The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is an independent
agency created by the Congress in 1988 to oversee DOE's defense
nuclear facilities and to ensure that public health and safety are
protected.
\2 Plutonium Working Group Report on Environmental, Safety and Health
Vulnerabilities Associated With the Department's Plutonium Storage
(DOE/EH-0415, Nov. 1994).
\3 Some low-risk residues with low plutonium content do not have to
be converted through either technology as they can be disposed of in
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant when it becomes available.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
Although DOE has made some progress in stabilizing its plutonium, the
Department is unlikely to meet its May 2002 target date to have its
plutonium that is not in pits stabilized, packaged, and stored. The
DOE sites with the majority of this plutonium have experienced many
delays and anticipate more in meeting their implementation plan
milestones.\4 Various problems contribute to these delays, including
(1) changes from the technologies originally chosen to stabilize
plutonium residues at Rocky Flats to meet a security requirement; (2)
a suspension of plutonium stabilization operations because of safety
infractions at Hanford; (3) competing priorities for funding, staff,
and equipment at Los Alamos; and (4) delays in obtaining a system for
stabilizing and packaging plutonium at three sites. Given the
inherent dangers of plutonium, such delays result in continuing the
existing level of risk to workers' health and safety by delaying the
risk reduction that is achieved by stabilization and packaging
activities.\5 Delays can also result in increased costs. For
example, continuing operations for an additional year at one site
could increase costs by $20 million for the continued plutonium
stabilization and packaging activities at a facility there.
Moreover, because DOE has not yet finalized the criteria the
plutonium must meet to be acceptable for the disposition
technologies, it is unclear if current activities to stabilize,
package, and store the plutonium will be compatible with the means of
converting it for disposal.
In addition to its delays in stabilizing and packaging its plutonium
that is not in pits, DOE is currently storing approximately 10,000
pits in containers that both the Department and the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board believe are not suitable for extended
storage, thus risking workers' exposure to plutonium. DOE's
ineffective oversight and coordination of the 5-year, $50 million
project to design and develop a replacement container led to design
flaws that later had to be corrected and a container that was very
expensive to produce. DOE now plans to use this container to
repackage only about 5 percent of its pits--those considered to be
the highest risk. DOE is preparing a plan, which it intends to issue
in April 1998, to develop new containers and repackage the remaining
95 percent of the pits. While developing such a plan is a step in
the right direction, certain key elements--including the
identification of program responsibility and accountability, pit
repackaging and storage schedules, and a means to track progress
against those schedules--are not currently addressed. Furthermore,
because it will take years to complete the repackaging, DOE
laboratories and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board have
proposed that the Department conduct more aggressive pit monitoring
to address their safety concerns about the 10,000 pits in prolonged
storage in the unsuitable containers. However, without conducting an
analysis of the costs or benefits of the laboratories' recommendation
for increased monitoring, the Department decided not to change its
existing monitoring program, which formally examines about 30 pits
per year. DOE hopes that it can repackage the pits before enhanced
monitoring is necessary.
--------------------
\4 Five of the sites included in GAO's review--the Hanford Site,
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Los Alamos National
Laboratory, the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, and the
Savannah River Site--have inventories of plutonium that is not in
pits. A sixth site in our review, the Pantex Plant, stores only
plutonium pits.
\5 According to DOE officials, "It must be acknowledged that even
after stabilization and packaging, some small level of risk remains
associated with handling and storage of plutonium materials."
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
DOE IS UNLIKELY TO MEET ITS
COMMITMENT DATE FOR
STABILIZING, PACKAGING, AND
STORING PLUTONIUM THAT IS
NOT IN PITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Although the DOE sites are making progress in stabilizing their
plutonium and reducing the risk to workers' health and safety, the
Department is unlikely to meet the commitment made in its
implementation plan to stabilize and package its plutonium metals and
oxides for long-term storage (50 years) by May 2002. In the
meantime, according to agency officials, the sites are meeting DOE's
criteria for interim storage (5 to 20 years). However, the criteria
for interim storage do not provide the level of safety afforded by
DOE's standard for the long-term storage of plutonium. According to
DOE site officials and a Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
staff member, until the plutonium metals and oxides meet the standard
for long-term storage, there is a continuing risk to workers' health
and safety.
The five sites holding the majority of DOE's plutonium that is not in
pits have stabilized a portion of their plutonium, including some of
the higher-risk plutonium. For example, Rocky Flats and Savannah
River have repackaged their plutonium that was in contact with
plastic, thus reducing the risk to workers' health and safety.
However, the sites have experienced numerous delays in meeting
milestones. They also anticipate additional delays in the
future--the work for over half of the future milestones is either
already delayed or at risk of delay--and in some cases, the delay is
anticipated to be for a year or more beyond the original date.
DOE site officials estimate that Hanford will miss the May 2002 date
by 7 months, and Los Alamos may miss it by up to 3 years. These
delays in meeting DOE's final commitment date have not been formally
approved by DOE headquarters. Officials at the other three sites
plan to complete their activities by May 2002 despite the delays that
have occurred so far. However, the officials at Rocky Flats may be
overly optimistic because the work for half of its remaining
milestones is at risk of delay. Furthermore, the site has many of
the more unstable forms of plutonium, including residues and
solutions, but limited capability to process them.
According to DOE site officials, the delays in meeting the
implementation plan milestones are attributable to several factors.
Changes from the originally chosen technologies to stabilize
plutonium residues to meet a security requirement and a suspension of
plutonium stabilization operations due to safety infractions have
caused some of the more significant delays at Rocky Flats and
Hanford, respectively. Los Alamos officials cited competing
priorities for funding, staff, and equipment as the major cause of
their anticipated delay of up to 3 years for completing activities.
Furthermore, three sites are experiencing delays in obtaining a
plutonium stabilization and packaging system.
These delays not only continue the existing level of risk to workers
but also result in increased costs to DOE and taxpayers. For
example, Rocky Flats' unexpected need to use a new technology to
stabilize plutonium residues in salts is expected to cost an
additional $14.5 million, and Hanford's suspension of plutonium
stabilization activities and other delays will lead to an accelerated
work schedule of three shifts per day, 7 days per week, to make up
for lost time. According to a site official, if Hanford is required
to operate its plutonium stabilization and packaging facility for an
additional year, the cost will be an extra $20 million. In addition
to the costs for the continued operation of facilities, there are
other added costs for the continuation of other expensive activities,
such as providing safeguards and security, as long as plutonium
remains in the facilities.
In addition to problems in stabilizing, packaging, and storing
plutonium, it is unclear if DOE's long-term storage standard and
disposition criteria will be compatible. DOE is many years away from
implementing its January 1997 decision to dispose of much of its
plutonium, and the Department has not yet determined how the
plutonium must be processed and packaged to be ready for the
disposition technologies, which will be used to convert it to forms
less useful for nuclear weapons. In the absence of final disposition
criteria, the sites are proceeding to stabilize and package their
plutonium to meet the existing standards--especially DOE's standard
for long-term storage. However, several site officials expressed
concern that plutonium that is stabilized and packaged to meet the
long-term storage standard may not be compatible with DOE's final
disposition criteria, due out in June 1998, possibly necessitating
additional activities or processing steps and costs to ready the
plutonium for disposition. At present, the draft disposition
criteria, produced in July 1997, diverge from the current standard
for long-term storage in some significant ways. For example, the
draft disposition criteria would require information about the
plutonium--such as its processing history, likely impurities, and
physical condition--that is not currently required by the storage
standard. If this information is unavailable, the draft criteria
would require sampling of the plutonium that could be expensive and
time-consuming. The DOE headquarters organizations responsible for
the storage standards and the disposition criteria have begun to work
together to address the differences between the long-term storage
standard and draft disposition criteria. However, it is too early to
determine whether DOE's final disposition criteria will be compatible
with the existing long-term storage standard to avoid added
processing costs for the plutonium during disposition.
DOE'S STORAGE OF PLUTONIUM
PITS RISKS EXPOSURE TO
WORKERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Since the end of the Cold War, DOE has dismantled large numbers of
retired nuclear weapons and ceased recycling the plutonium pits from
these weapons and, for the first time, has had to store the pits for
a prolonged period of time. Because long-term storage had never been
required, DOE had no containers specifically designed for that
purpose. Beginning in 1989, DOE has stored its pits in a container
known as the AL-R8, which was designed to transport the pits.
However, since that time, both DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board have indicated that pits should not be stored in AL-R8
containers for extended periods. These containers are unsuitable for
prolonged storage because their liner absorbs moisture and chloride,
which could accelerate the pits' corrosion.\6 If corrosion causes a
pit to crack, the AL-R8 may not contain the plutonium, thus posing a
risk of workers' exposure. Despite this concern, about 10,000 pits
at DOE's Pantex Plant are stored in AL-R8 containers, and the number
continues to grow as additional weapons are retired and dismantled.
In an attempt to remedy this problem, in 1992 DOE began developing a
new container for both transporting and storing pits, known as the
AT400A container, which would replace the AL-R8. However, DOE did
not adequately oversee the project to coordinate the work of the
three DOE laboratories that were involved in designing and developing
different parts of the container, or involve Pantex--the ultimate
user of the container--in the design and development process. The
resulting design contained safety flaws, such as locating the
container's weld directly over the pit, which, along with a defective
safety system, could have allowed the welder to burn through the
container into the pit. DOE recognized that its failure to
adequately coordinate the work among the laboratories and Pantex
contributed to these problems. After 5 years and nearly $50 million
spent, DOE ultimately determined that the replacement container was
too expensive to use extensively. At about $8,000 per container, the
costs for the containers alone for the 10,000 pits being stored at
the Pantex Plant would have totaled approximately $80 million. As a
result, DOE has largely abandoned its plan to repackage its pits into
the AT400A and now intends to use this container to repackage only
about 5 percent of its pits--those considered to be the highest risk.
However, this decision left the Department with no formal plan or
schedules to repackage about 95 percent of its plutonium pits.
According to DOE officials, a "retrofit" to the AL-R8 container is
the most likely option for repackaging the remaining 95 percent of
the pits. Development efforts for a retrofit of the AL-R8 container
began in August 1997, and DOE is considering alternative designs
developed by two of the Department's laboratories and Pantex. DOE's
preliminary estimates of the costs to repackage 12,000 pits range
from $35.5 million to $59.4 million. Once DOE has settled on a
design and procured the containers, officials estimate that actually
removing the pits and repackaging them into the modified containers
could take from 4 to 7 years. Furthermore, DOE has yet to decide how
to store those pits deemed strategic reserves, which must be retained
for a longer time than the pits destined for disposal, and whether to
store them in different containers from those for the pits destined
for disposal.
DOE officials stated that the Department is developing a pit
repackaging and storage plan that it hopes to issue by April 1998.
As of February 1998, many sections of a preliminary draft of the plan
were only in brief outline form, so GAO was unable to determine if
the plan will adequately address the identified problems in storing
pits. For example, the draft did not contain schedules or cost
estimates for selecting a design, procuring the replacement
containers, or repackaging the pits, nor a means to track progress
against those schedules. Furthermore, although the draft described
the various organizations within DOE and its contractors involved
with repackaging and storing pits, the document did not define how
these organizations will interact and did not assign program
responsibility and accountability for overseeing all facets of the
program to ensure its success.
Because of the continuing threat of corrosion and the length of time
pits may be stored in AL-R8 containers, DOE laboratories and the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board have expressed concern about
the frequency of pit monitoring at Pantex--currently approximately 30
of the 10,000 pits are formally monitored per year.\7 Although the
laboratories have recommended a more aggressive program for
monitoring pits (covering about 2,000 pits per year), according to
DOE officials the Department has decided not to implement this
recommendation. DOE officials told us they had not conducted an
analysis of the costs or benefits of this enhanced monitoring
program, but they believed that the cost to implement it would be
"significant and perhaps prohibitive." These officials explained that
they hope to have the pits repackaged before enhanced monitoring is
necessary. However, some of the pits have already been in the
unsuitable containers for over 8 years, and it will be several more
years before the pits can be repackaged.
--------------------
\6 According to DOE and laboratory officials, some pits are more
susceptible to corrosion than others, depending on the metal used to
encase the pit.
\7 According to DOE, in recent years, some additional pits that have
been stored in AL-R8 containers have been visually inspected, which
has not detected corrosion-related damage to date. However, these
inspections are much less extensive than the testing and analyses
performed as part of the formal monitoring program.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy ensure the timely and
cost-effective resolution of the wide range of issues surrounding pit
storage, including ensuring that the plan being developed by the
Department addresses such key items as a clear definition of
responsibility and accountability for program activities; realistic
cost estimates and a program budget; and detailed schedules for
designing and developing replacement containers and repackaging the
pits, as well as a means to track progress against these schedules.
In addition, given the length of time pits will be stored in
unsuitable containers, GAO recommends that the Secretary, in
cooperation with the DOE laboratories and the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, conduct a thorough safety analysis of the
recommended enhanced pit monitoring program as well as other possible
monitoring options to identify the most appropriate and
cost-effective approach to ensure the specified safety concerns about
the prolonged storage of pits in the unsuitable containers are
resolved.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
GAO provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and
comment. The Department concurred with all but one part of one
recommendation. The Department concurred with GAO's recommendation
for the timely and cost-effective resolution of the issues
surrounding pit storage and agreed to include the recommended key
items in its Integrated Pit Storage Program Plan, due out in April
1998. In addition, DOE concurred with the portion of GAO's
recommendation calling for the Secretary to work closely with the DOE
laboratories and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to
address their concerns about the prolonged storage of pits in
unsuitable containers. The Department stated that it has worked with
the laboratories and the Board in the past to address concerns about
pit storage activities and will continue to do so. In contrast, DOE
raised concerns about GAO's recommendation that the Department
conduct a safety analysis of the enhanced pit monitoring program and
other possible monitoring options and requested that GAO clarify the
basis for this recommendation. DOE stated that it has "approved
safety analyses for operations at the Pantex Plant, which provide
coverage for pit storage activities." However, GAO's review of DOE's
safety analyses revealed that they were conducted before the
laboratories and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
identified safety problems of pits in prolonged storage in AL-R8
containers and the resultant need for increased monitoring.
Therefore, these problems were not addressed in these safety
analyses. In light of the prolonged storage of pits in the AL-R8
containers and the fact that safety concerns about these pits were
not addressed in DOE's safety analyses, GAO continues to recommend
that the Secretary conduct a thorough safety analysis of DOE's pit
monitoring options, including the enhanced monitoring program
recommended by the laboratories, to ensure that the specific concerns
raised are resolved.
In addition, DOE raised a general concern that GAO's report "does not
present complete and accurate information about many important DOE
initiatives to meet the challenges for managing plutonium. . . ."
GAO disagrees. The report describes initiatives that the Department
raised in its comments--the disposition program for excess plutonium
and that program's implications for plutonium storage; the revisions
to Los Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium stabilization program;
and the development of a plan for repackaging the pits out of the
AL-R8 containers, expected to be issued in April 1998. On the basis
of DOE's comments, GAO updated information on these initiatives and
added information on additional pit surveillance activities to the
report's discussion of pit monitoring issues. Furthermore, the
Department's comments on this report discussed an initiative to
revise its implementation plan for plutonium stabilization to
integrate nuclear materials management activities complexwide. This
initiative was not included in this report because Department
officials did not mention it in GAO's meetings with them in February;
the Department's comments on this report were the first indication
that such an initiative was formally under way.
The Department also provided a number of more detailed or technical
comments, and the report has been revised, where appropriate, to
reflect these specific comments. The Department's comments and GAO's
responses are presented in appendix I.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
The safe storage of plutonium has become increasingly important for
the Department of Energy (DOE) since it ceased producing nuclear
weapons in 1989. Although DOE no longer manufactures plutonium for
use in nuclear weapons, the plutonium it produced in the past by
irradiating uranium in nuclear reactors poses hazards to workers'
health and safety. The majority of DOE's plutonium inventory
(excluding reactor fuel, spent nuclear fuel, and special isotopes) is
stored at five sites that formerly developed or produced nuclear
weapons components or materials and a sixth facility where those
weapons are now dismantled.
Prior to 1989, DOE usually stored plutonium only temporarily because
the Department continually recycled it for use in nuclear weapons.
In 1994, both DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
identified problems with how the Department stored its plutonium. In
an effort to remediate these problems, DOE developed and began
implementing a plan to stabilize and package its plutonium that was
not in nuclear weapons components. Plutonium in nuclear weapons
components was excluded because it was considered to be relatively
safe and stable compared to other forms of plutonium. Although it
recently decided to dispose of the United States' excess plutonium
inventory, DOE is many years away from implementing this decision and
must safely store these materials in the interim.
INADEQUATELY PACKAGED PLUTONIUM
POSES HAZARDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
Plutonium, a radioactive element, exists in several forms, including
metals, oxides, residues, and solutions. Plutonium metals are stable
if packaged correctly. The remainder of DOE's plutonium--oxides,
residues, and solutions--is in forms that are less stable.\1
Plutonium oxides are fine powders produced when plutonium metals
react with oxygen--during processing of plutonium for weapons or
other uses, or during storage. Plutonium residues are the
by-products of plutonium processing and generally contain plutonium
in concentrations of less than 10 percent. These residues include
plutonium mixed with other materials, such as impure plutonium metals
and oxides, ash, contaminated glass and metals, and other items.
Plutonium solutions are acidic and corrosive, making their containers
vulnerable to leakage. Most of DOE's plutonium is stored as metals
because during the production era, plutonium in other forms was
recycled and purified into metals to be used in pits for nuclear
warheads. A plutonium pit is a nuclear weapons component, made up of
a plutonium metal sphere encased in a nonradioactive metal shell,
which can be compressed by detonating high explosives inside a weapon
to create a nuclear explosion.
If not safely contained and managed, plutonium can be dangerous to
human health, even in small (microgram) quantities. Inhaling a large
dose of plutonium particles can cause lung injuries and death, while
exposure to a small dose creates a long-term risk of lung, liver, and
bone cancer. When the container or packaging (and the metal shell
for pits) fails to fully contain the plutonium, the potential for
exposure exists. Leakage from corroded containers or inadvertent
accumulations of plutonium dust in piping or duct work pose health
and safety hazards, especially in aging, poorly maintained, or
obsolete facilities. When DOE stopped producing nuclear weapons in
1989, much of its plutonium was either not in a suitable form, such
as plutonium in solutions, or was not packaged for long-term storage.
--------------------
\1 Plutonium may be considered unstable if it is (1) in a form that
could spontaneously ignite or oxidize, (2) mixed with hazardous or
corrosive materials, or (3) inadequately packaged.
THE MAJORITY OF DOE'S PLUTONIUM
IS LOCATED AT SIX SITES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
DOE's plutonium inventory is stored primarily at six sites. Five of
these sites formerly developed or produced nuclear materials or
weapons: the Hanford Site, in Washington; Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, in California; Los Alamos National Laboratory,
in New Mexico; the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site, in
Colorado; and the Savannah River Site, in South Carolina. The
remaining site, the Pantex Plant, in Texas, is predominantly a
nuclear weapons dismantlement site, where the majority of DOE's
plutonium pits are stored. Pantex does not store plutonium that is
not in pits. (See fig. 1.1.)
Figure 1.1: Sites Storing the
Majority of DOE's Plutonium
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: The figure considers plutonium in the form of metals, oxides,
residues, solutions, and pits.
Source: Produced by GAO using data provided by DOE.
The former weapons production sites have different amounts and forms
of plutonium not in pits. For example, the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site, with about 12.7 metric tons of this plutonium, has
the largest inventory of plutonium and many of the more unstable
forms, including residues, while the other four sites have different
amounts and forms of plutonium, as shown in table 1.1.
Table 1.1
Plutonium Inventory, by Form, at Five
DOE Sites With Plutonium Stabilization
Activities
(Metric tons)
Total
plutonium Plutonium Plutonium Plutonium Plutonium
Site inventory\a metals oxides residues solutions
------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------
Rocky Flats 12.7 6.5 1.6 4.5 0.1
Environmental
Technology Site
Hanford Site 3.5 0.8 2.0 0.4 0.3
Savannah River Site 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.1 0.3
Los Alamos National 2.5 1.2 0.0 1.3 0.0
Laboratory
Lawrence Livermore 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
National
Laboratory
=========================================================================================
Total 20.8 9.3 4.4 6.4 0.7
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Inventory amounts are as of 1994; any updated amounts would be
classified information. Amounts exclude spent nuclear fuel, reactor
fuel, and special isotopes of plutonium.
Source: DOE headquarters.
Even though the United States no longer manufactures new nuclear
weapons, some of DOE's plutonium is still needed to support the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile. The plutonium pits in DOE's custody that
are needed for national security purposes are stored primarily at the
Pantex Plant. As part of the U.S. nuclear strategic reserves, these
pits will be retained for an indeterminate amount of time, in case
the plutonium is ever needed for use in nuclear weapons.
DOE HAS DEVELOPED A PLAN TO
ADDRESS PROBLEMS WITH PLUTONIUM
THAT IS NOT IN PITS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
In 1994, both DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board\2
noted safety problems with DOE's storage of plutonium not in pits.
DOE subsequently developed an implementation plan to address these
safety problems by having much of this plutonium stabilized and
packaged for safe long-term storage by May 2002.
--------------------
\2 The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is an independent
agency created by the Congress in 1988 to oversee DOE's defense
nuclear facilities and to ensure that public health and safety are
protected.
DOE AND THE DEFENSE NUCLEAR
FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
IDENTIFIED PROBLEMS WITH
PLUTONIUM STORAGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.1
In March 1994, the Secretary of Energy requested that DOE's Office of
Environment, Safety and Health conduct a comprehensive assessment to
identify the risks of storing plutonium in DOE facilities and to
determine which were the most dangerous and urgent. The assessment,
which considered both plutonium not in pits and plutonium in pits,
identified such vulnerabilities as the degradation of plutonium
materials and packaging and weaknesses in facilities and
administrative controls.\3 These vulnerabilities are important
because they could cause inadvertent releases of plutonium, which
could expose workers.
In April 1994, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board issued a
report describing problems with plutonium storage safety at four of
the Department's sites with large inventories of plutonium.
Subsequently, in May 1994, the Board recommended that the Department
take action to safely store its plutonium. In this recommendation,
the Board expressed concern that the cessation of nuclear weapons
production had left plutonium in an unsafe state that should be
remediated. For example, when packaging the plutonium not in pits,
some sites used plastic inner liners, which could react with the
plutonium to form a buildup of hydrogen gas that could bulge and even
rupture the outer containers or cause the plutonium to spontaneously
ignite. The Board also identified specific materials, in the form of
plutonium residues, that it believed to be higher-risk because of
their unstable nature, uncertainty about what the plutonium was mixed
with, or the inappropriate packaging of the materials. According to
a Board staff member, the Board excluded plutonium in pits from its
recommendation because it believed that in the near term, storage
problems were not as severe for pits as for the other forms of
plutonium.
--------------------
\3 Plutonium Working Group Report on Environmental, Safety and Health
Vulnerabilities Associated With the Department's Plutonium Storage
(DOE/EH-0415, Nov. 1994).
DOE'S IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
SETS FORTH MILESTONES TO
STABILIZE AND PACKAGE
PLUTONIUM THAT IS NOT IN
PITS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.2
As required by statute, the Secretary of Energy prepared an
implementation plan responding to the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board's 1994 recommendation.\4 In that plan, DOE established
milestones for stabilizing and packaging its plutonium not in pits,
including metals, oxides, residues, and solutions.
Stabilizing plutonium not in pits includes such activities as
brushing loose oxides from the plutonium metals and heating plutonium
oxides to a high temperature to (1) remove any moisture that could
cause the buildup of gases that could burst the containers and (2)
make the oxides into larger particles to reduce the potential for
dispersal. Plutonium residues are typically stabilized by either
converting them into plutonium oxides through various processes or by
blending them with other materials for disposal at the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant when this facility becomes available.\5
Plutonium solutions are not appropriate for storage and have to be
processed into a solid form before the plutonium can be stored. DOE
requires that stabilized plutonium metals that are not in pits and
oxides be packaged in approved, sealed double containers to isolate
the plutonium from the outside environment and to prevent its
release.\6 In April 1997, we reported that DOE estimated that its
plutonium management activities, including stabilization and storage,
at eight sites across the complex would cost approximately $7.9
billion, in constant 1996 dollars, from fiscal year 1995 through
fiscal year 2002.\7,8 However, DOE does not specifically break out
its costs for stabilizing, packaging, and storing its plutonium from
that total.
--------------------
\4 The 1988 statute establishing the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board requires that DOE respond to any recommendation by the
Board that is accepted by the Secretary of Energy with a plan for
implementing the recommendation; 42 U.S.C., section 2286.
\5 For information concerning when the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
will be available, see Nuclear Waste: Uncertainties About Opening
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (GAO/RCED-96-146, July 16, 1996).
\6 Because plutonium pits are made of relatively stable plutonium
metals sealed inside nonradioactive metal casings that provide some
level of protection from the environment, pits do not require
stabilization activities.
\7 These eight sites are the six included in our review plus two
others--Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and
Argonne National Laboratory-West--excluded from this review because
the bulk of their plutonium is in the form of spent nuclear fuel or
reactor fuel.
\8 Department of Energy: Plutonium Needs, Costs, and Management
Programs (GAO/RCED-97-98, Apr. 17, 1997).
DOE'S DISPOSITION OF ITS EXCESS
PLUTONIUM IS STILL YEARS AWAY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
In January 1997, DOE formally decided how it would dispose of its
plutonium that is excess to national security requirements. The
Department plans to convert excess plutonium into forms that are
difficult to reuse in nuclear weapons and are suitable for permanent
disposal and to store the plutonium until the conversion can be
completed.\9
To convert its excess plutonium to other forms, DOE intends to pursue
a hybrid strategy: (1) burning the plutonium as fuel in power
reactors and (2) immobilizing it in glass or ceramic material. As
described in our April 1997 report, DOE's estimated cost to implement
its hybrid strategy would be approximately $2 billion, in constant
1996 dollars. This strategy, however, is subject to technical,
institutional, and cost uncertainties. For example, DOE has not yet
determined where the disposition facilities will be located or which
technology will be used for immobilization. DOE is currently
assessing the possible environmental impacts of several likely sites
where plutonium disposition activities may take place and plans to
have a final decision in late 1998 or early 1999.
While DOE's January 1997 record of decision on disposition strategies
focuses on converting the nation's excess plutonium to safer forms
for disposal, DOE must safely store its excess plutonium until
disposition facilities are built and available for converting the
plutonium. In April 1997, we reported that DOE anticipates
completing its conversion activities by 2023.
--------------------
\9 Record of Decision for the Storage and Disposition of
Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, Final Programmatic Environmental
Impact Statement, DOE (Jan. 14, 1997); 62 Fed. Reg. 3014 (1997).
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5
The Chairman of the Subcommittee on Energy and Power, House Committee
on Commerce, asked us to review DOE's efforts to stabilize, package,
and store its plutonium, including problems the Department has
encountered or anticipates in accomplishing these activities,
specifically for (1) plutonium that is not in the form of nuclear
weapons components, or pits, and (2) plutonium in the form of pits.
To review DOE's management of its plutonium that is not in pits
(excluding reactor fuel, spent nuclear fuel, and special isotopes),
we obtained and analyzed DOE's 1994 plutonium vulnerability
assessment, its plutonium storage standards, and its implementation
plan for stabilizing and packaging the plutonium. We identified
progress in meeting milestones in the plan by interviewing officials
and gathering and analyzing data from the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board, DOE headquarters, and the DOE sites that maintain the
majority of DOE's plutonium not in pits. These sites are the Hanford
Site, near Richland, Washington; Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory, in Livermore, California; Los Alamos National Laboratory,
in Los Alamos, New Mexico; the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology
Site, near Denver, Colorado; and the Savannah River Site, near Aiken,
South Carolina.
To review DOE's management of its plutonium pits, we reviewed and
analyzed DOE's 1994 plutonium vulnerability assessment and reviewed
and analyzed the subsequent Pantex Corrective Action Plan. We also
interviewed officials and gathered and analyzed data from the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, DOE headquarters, DOE's Albuquerque
Operations Office, Los Alamos National Laboratory, and the Pantex
Plant, near Amarillo, Texas.
The Department of Energy provided written comments on a draft of this
report. These comments are presented and evaluated at the end of
chapters 2 and 3. The full text of the Department's comments is
provided in appendix I. We conducted our review from May 1997
through February 1998 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
DOE IS UNLIKELY TO MEET ITS
COMMITMENT DATE FOR STABILIZING,
PACKAGING, AND STORING ITS
PLUTONIUM THAT IS NOT IN PITS
============================================================ Chapter 2
DOE's activities to stabilize, package, and store its plutonium not
in pits are primarily guided by two DOE standards governing plutonium
storage and the Department's implementation plan, which commits the
Department to stabilize and package its plutonium metals and oxides
for long-term storage by May 2002. While the five DOE sites with the
majority of the plutonium not in pits have made progress in
stabilizing their plutonium, all have had delays in meeting
implementation plan milestones, including some critical ones for
higher-risk plutonium, and the sites anticipate more delays. Various
problems contribute to these delays in meeting milestones, including
(1) changes from the technologies originally chosen by Rocky Flats to
stabilize plutonium to meet a security requirement; (2) a suspension
of plutonium stabilization operations due to safety problems at
Hanford; (3) competing priorities for funding, staff, and equipment
at Los Alamos; and (4) delays in obtaining a system for stabilizing
and packaging plutonium at three sites. Missing these milestones
will result in some sites' not having all of their plutonium metals
and oxides stabilized and packaged by May 2002. Given the inherent
dangers of plutonium, such delays result in a continuing risk to
workers' health and safety and increased costs. Although DOE is
planning to dispose of its excess plutonium, it has yet to develop
final disposition criteria. As a result, it is unknown whether
current activities to stabilize and package plutonium for long-term
storage will be compatible with the activities required for the
disposition of this plutonium.
DOE'S STABILIZATION, PACKAGING,
AND STORAGE ACTIVITIES ARE
DRIVEN BY ITS STANDARDS AND
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
DOE's activities to stabilize, package, and store its plutonium not
in pits are based primarily on three DOE documents: (1) Criteria for
Preparing and Packaging Plutonium Metals and Oxides for Long-Term
Storage, dated September 1996 (DOE Standard 3013); (2) Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1 Implementation
Plan, dated February 1995; and (3) Criteria for Interim Safe Storage
of Plutonium-Bearing Solid Materials, dated November 1995.\1 DOE
Standard 3013 establishes safety criteria for packaging plutonium
metals and stabilized plutonium oxides for long-term storage. This
standard prescribes the form the plutonium must be in and processes
for stabilization. For example, Standard 3013 requires that
plutonium oxides be stabilized by heating them in air to a very high
temperature--approximately 950 degrees celsius or higher--for at
least 2 hours. The standard also contains requirements for plutonium
packaging and for inspection, surveillance, documentation, and
quality assurance and control. According to DOE Standard 3013,
plutonium that is stabilized and packaged to meet this requirement
should be safe for storage for at least 50 years.
DOE's implementation plan established milestones to address the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's 1994 recommendation to the
Secretary of Energy for the safe storage of the Department's nuclear
materials, including plutonium not in pits. In its implementation
plan, DOE agreed to have all of its plutonium metals and oxides
stabilized and packaged to meet DOE Standard 3013 by May 2002.\2
Until their plutonium metals and oxides meet Standard 3013, officials
at the five sites that we visited stated that they are meeting DOE's
criteria for interim storage. Issued in November 1995, the interim
storage criteria--for storage from 5 to 20 years--define an
acceptable interim state for plutonium residues until they are
converted to oxides and meet Standard 3013 or are shipped to the
Waste Isolation Pilot Plant. To provide flexibility to address the
broad range of materials and differences among facilities, the
interim storage criteria are very general in nature and allow for a
variety of approaches. However, the criteria are less stringent than
Standard 3013 and do not provide the level of storage safety afforded
by the standard. According to DOE site officials and a Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board staff member, until the plutonium
metals and oxides meet Standard 3013, there is a continuing risk to
workers' health and safety.
--------------------
\1 Plutonium in pits was specifically excluded from these standards
because pits are "sealed" and considered to be safer.
\2 Although the implementation plan also applied to plutonium
residues and solutions, they are handled differently from metals and
oxides. Residues need to be either converted to oxides and then
stabilized and packaged for long-term storage by May 2002 or disposed
of at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico when this
facility becomes available. Plutonium-bearing solutions are not
appropriate for storage and have to be processed to a solid form,
usually an oxide, which is then subject to Standard 3013.
DOE IS FACING DELAYS IN
STABILIZING AND PACKAGING ITS
PLUTONIUM NOT IN PITS FOR
LONG-TERM STORAGE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
The five sites we reviewed have made progress in stabilizing their
plutonium. According to DOE officials, plutonium stabilization
activities have focused on getting the plutonium into safer forms or
packaging to reduce the risk to workers' health and safety. For
example, Rocky Flats has drained plutonium solutions from 15 tanks
and processed many of these solutions into solid forms, thus reducing
the risk. In addition, Rocky Flats and Savannah River have
repackaged all of their plutonium that was in direct contact with
plastic--a condition that is dangerous because the plastic can react
with the plutonium to form a buildup of gas that can cause the
containers to rupture and possibly ignite spontaneously if exposed to
air.
But due to the numerous past and anticipated future delays at the
various sites, it seems unlikely that DOE will meet its May 2002 date
for stabilizing, packaging, and storing its plutonium that is not in
pits. DOE established 98 milestones for its plutonium stabilization
and packaging activities at the five sites we visited, ranging from 9
milestones at Lawrence Livermore to 37 at Rocky Flats. Half of these
(49 of 98) mark activities that have been completed at the five
sites. These milestones focused on two primary areas: (1)
preliminary activities required for subsequent stabilization
activities, such as preparing environmental impact statements, and
(2) stabilizing higher-risk plutonium, such as plutonium in contact
with plastic. Of the remaining 49 milestones, 59 percent have
already been delayed or are at risk of delay. These remaining
milestones include activities for completing the stabilization and
packaging to ready plutonium metals and oxides for long-term storage.
All five sites have identified milestones that are at risk of delay,
and over 40 percent of these delays are expected to be for 1 year or
more from the original due dates in the implementation plan.
Notwithstanding the risk of potential delays, DOE officials at three
of the sites believe they will meet the May 2002 commitment date, but
officials at two of the sites told us they will not. Officials at
Rocky Flats, Savannah River, and Lawrence Livermore stated that they
plan to have their plutonium metals and oxides stabilized and
packaged for long-term storage by May 2002. On the other hand,
officials at Hanford and Los Alamos told us that they currently
anticipate missing the May 2002 date, although these delays to the
Department's commitment date have not been approved by DOE
headquarters. Hanford officials estimate that their completion date
will slip by 7 months because of the suspension of the site's
plutonium stabilization activities at one facility there. According
to Los Alamos officials, their site is planning to delay completing
its activities for up to 3 years beyond May 2002. Table 2.1 shows,
for the five DOE sites, the status of the implementation plan
milestones for stabilizing and packaging plutonium not in pits.
Table 2.1
Status of Implementation Plan Milestones
for Plutonium Stabilization and
Packaging at DOE Sites
Milestones whose
activities have been
completed Remaining milestones
---------------------- ----------------------
Projected
Original Met on Expected At risk completion
Site milestones time Delayed on time of delay (Date)
--------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ------------
Rocky Flats 37 14 5 9 9 On time
Environmental (May 2002)
Technology
Site
Hanford Site 22 7 1 7 7 Delayed by 7
months
(Dec 2002)
Savannah River 17 6 3 2 6 On time
Site (May 2002)
Los Alamos 13 10 1 0 2 Delayed up
National to 3 years
Laboratory (May 2005)
Lawrence 9 1 1 2 5 On time
Livermore (May 2002)
National
Laboratory
=========================================================================================
Total 98 38 11 20 29
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Based on data provided by DOE.
As shown in table 2.1, all five sites have identified milestones that
are at risk of delay, but these milestones and the sites' plans for
them vary. For example, although Los Alamos has identified only two
milestones at risk of delay, one of these milestones is the ultimate
completion of its stabilization and packaging activities. Los Alamos
is anticipating up to a 3-year delay beyond May 2002 because of its
competing priorities for funding, staff, and equipment. On the other
hand, while Lawrence Livermore has seven remaining milestones--five
of which are at risk of delay--officials from this site told us that
because they have a very small inventory of plutonium to stabilize
and repackage, they anticipate meeting the May 2002 date.
Although Rocky Flats officials told us that they plan to meet May
2002, we believe the site may have difficulty meeting this commitment
because of the many delays it has already experienced and the
additional milestones it anticipates missing in the future. Site
officials explained that there may be alternatives to stabilizing
plutonium on-site--including shipping some to other sites for
stabilization. They also believe that they can achieve higher
efficiencies than they originally expected from their new plutonium
stabilization and packaging system in readying the metals and oxides
for storage. However, many obstacles would have to be overcome to
allow the shipment of unstabilized plutonium to other sites,
including determining the receiving sites' future storage
capabilities and obtaining approval for shipments. Also, the site's
new stabilization and packaging system has not yet been installed or
fully tested, and any possible efficiencies in the new system have
not been proven. Furthermore, Rocky Flats possesses the most
plutonium among the five sites and many of the more unstable residues
and solutions, but only limited capability to process these
materials.
THE CAUSES AND IMPACTS OF
DELAYS VARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
Delays that have occurred or are anticipated in meeting
implementation plan milestones are attributable to several factors.
For example, unanticipated changes from the technologies originally
chosen to stabilize some of the plutonium residues have impeded
progress at Rocky Flats, as has the suspension of plutonium
stabilization activities at Hanford. In another case, as described,
Los Alamos officials cited competing priorities for funding, staff,
and equipment as an impediment. Furthermore, three sites are
experiencing delays in obtaining a system for stabilizing and
packaging their plutonium. These delays result in a continued risk
to workers' health and safety and increased costs to DOE and
taxpayers.
CHANGES FROM THE
TECHNOLOGIES ORIGINALLY
CHOSEN HAVE CAUSED SOME
DELAYS AT ROCKY FLATS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1
According to DOE officials, unanticipated changes from the
technologies originally chosen to stabilize two types of Rocky Flats'
plutonium residues have contributed to delays in meeting two of its
milestones. Originally, Rocky Flats officials thought that all of
the site's residues would be exempted from meeting a DOE security
requirement specifying the level of plutonium content acceptable so
that the materials will not have to be guarded at the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant. In July 1996, DOE headquarters officials informed Rocky
Flats that it had to either comply with this requirement or qualify
for a variance. Shortly thereafter, Rocky Flats requested but was
subsequently denied a variance for some of its plutonium residues.
In particular, Rocky Flats had originally planned to have one type of
plutonium residue (graphite fines) stabilized by May 1997. However,
since the process it had originally chosen would not meet the
security requirement, Rocky Flats selected a different process for
stabilizing graphite fines--switching from heating them at a high
temperature (calcination) to immobilizing them in molten glass
(vitrification). To accommodate this change, the site plans to spend
an additional $300,000 and will not have its graphite fines
stabilized until September 1998--a delay of 16 months from the
original milestone.
In addition, Rocky Flats had originally planned to have the majority
of its plutonium salt residues stabilized by May 1997 using an
available technology. According to a DOE official, as with the
situation with graphite fines, Rocky Flats thought these salts would
be exempted from the security requirement specifying the allowable
plutonium content. However, for some of these salt residues, the
site did not receive a variance, and since the process it had
originally chosen would not comply with this requirement, a different
technology--a distillation process to separate the salts from the
plutonium--was chosen. To accommodate this change, the site plans to
spend an additional $14.5 million and does not expect to complete the
work for this milestone until January 1999--a 20-month delay from the
original date in the implementation plan.
A SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS
HAS CAUSED DELAYS AT HANFORD
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2
Since December 1996, the Hanford Site's stabilization activities have
been suspended owing to the shutdown of one of its facilities for
safety infractions. The DOE contractor managing this facility failed
to comply with operating regulations concerning the safe handling of
nuclear materials--leading to the suspension of plutonium
stabilization operations at this facility. In order to resume
operations, the facility must pass a review by DOE. Hanford
officials expect to resume stabilization activities at the plant in
March 1998, at the earliest. In addition to the suspension of
stabilization activities, because of budget cutbacks Hanford expects
delays in installing its new plutonium stabilization and packaging
system. To make up for these delays, Hanford officials told us that
when this new system becomes operational, they plan to go from a
5-day-per-week, three-shift-per-day work schedule to a
7-day-per-week, three-shift-per-day schedule. This increase would
last about 3 years--beginning late in 2000, when the site's plutonium
stabilization and packaging system is planned to become fully
operational, and continuing into December 2002, when Hanford
officials plan to have all of the site's plutonium metals and oxides
stabilized and packaged for long-term storage. Hanford officials
were unable to estimate the likely costs of the approximately 2-year
expanded work schedule, and given the site's budget constraints, they
were unsure whether funds for this work schedule would be available.
In commenting on a draft of this report, the Department stated that
questions remain about how plutonium stabilization work will be
prioritized by the site. The Department believes that if the risk is
determined to be high enough, funds will be provided.
COMPETING PRIORITIES HAVE
ALSO CAUSED DELAYS AT LOS
ALAMOS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3
According to Los Alamos officials, competing priorities for site
funding, staff, and equipment have caused delays there. These
officials stated that the site may not have its plutonium stabilized
and packaged for long-term storage by May 2002 and plans to delay its
completion date by up to 3 years--possibly until 2005. According to
site officials, an assessment it conducted in mid-1997 shows a
marginal increase in risk due to the delay. According to site
officials, the site's stabilization program lost momentum because of
budget reallocations in fiscal year 1997, and they expect additional
funding reallocations for fiscal year 1998. In commenting on our
draft report, the Department clarified that as DOE reduces the
overall size of its weapons complex, missions and programs considered
still vital to national defense are being relocated and consolidated
at the Department's remaining operational sites. Los Alamos has
become the new site for some of these relocated missions and
programs. Plutonium stabilization activities must compete with these
defense missions and programs for financial resources, personnel, and
facilities at the site, and this competition will likely continue in
the future as Los Alamos continues to expand its weapons-related
mission.\3 However, DOE further commented, "Remediation efforts will
continue at Los Alamos, and the Department is reviewing proposals to
hire additional personnel and add additional equipment to continue
this work in an effective and efficient manner."
--------------------
\3 Los Alamos is managed by the DOE organization that manages nuclear
weapons development (the Office of Defense Programs)--unlike most
sites with stabilization activities, which are managed by the DOE
organization focusing on environmental management and cleanup
activities (the Office of Environmental Management).
DELAYS EXIST IN OBTAINING A
PLUTONIUM STABILIZATION AND
PACKAGING SYSTEM AT THREE
SITES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.4
Four of the five sites we visited--Rocky Flats, Hanford, Lawrence
Livermore, and Savannah River--plan to procure and install a new
plutonium stabilization and packaging system for their metals and
oxides to meet DOE's long-term storage standard.\4 The sites will
have variations of this system, with costs ranging from nearly $1.9
million for a manual packaging system at Lawrence Livermore to $28.9
million for the prototype automated version of the stabilization and
packaging system at Rocky Flats.
Three sites have identified milestones that are at risk because of
delays in procuring this new system. Rocky Flats and Hanford
anticipate delays ranging from 6 to 18 months in having their
stabilization and packaging systems operational--contributing to
difficulties in meeting the May 2002 date. The third site that is
experiencing delays in using this system is Lawrence Livermore;
however, this site is purchasing a manual packaging unit, has only a
small quantity of plutonium to package, and anticipates meeting the
May 2002 commitment date.
--------------------
\4 Los Alamos is the only site not planning to procure this system.
Instead, the site plans to use its own processing and packaging
equipment to meet the standard.
DELAYS RESULT IN CONTINUING
RISK TO WORKERS AND COST
INCREASES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.5
DOE's plutonium stabilization and packaging activities are focused on
getting the Department's plutonium that is not in pits into safe
long-term storage. Due to the nature of plutonium, if it is not
stabilized and stored properly for the long term, it could become
airborne--thereby exposing workers to it. As described, plutonium
can be dangerous to human health, even in small quantities, and site
officials acknowledge that any delays in stabilizing, packaging, and
storing the plutonium result in continuing the existing level of risk
to workers' health and safety by delaying the risk reduction that is
achieved by those activities.
Delays also result in increased costs. For example, according to a
Hanford official, continuing plutonium stabilization and packaging
operations at the site would cost $20 million per year, at current
costs. While Savannah River anticipates meeting the May 2002 date,
it anticipates an intermediate delay that will result in the
continued operation of one of its processing facilities for an extra
year, at a cost of $16 million. Delays also prevent DOE from
achieving cost reductions from deactivating sites or facilities, as
safeguards and security must be provided as long as plutonium or
other nuclear materials remain there.
IT IS UNCLEAR IF THE
DISPOSITION CRITERIA WILL BE
COMPATIBLE WITH THE LONG-TERM
STORAGE STANDARD
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
As noted earlier in chapter 1, the Department plans to convert the
nation's excess plutonium through two technologies--burning the
plutonium in reactors and immobilizing it in glass or ceramics--to
make it difficult to reuse in nuclear weapons and suitable for
permanent disposal.\5 Until DOE has developed and built facilities
for both of these options, it plans to store the excess plutonium at
several DOE sites.
Although DOE announced its decision to dispose of the excess
plutonium, it has not finalized the criteria the plutonium must meet
to be acceptable for disposition.\6
According to a DOE official, at the time the decision was announced,
in January 1997, the two disposition technologies were not mature
enough for disposition criteria to be developed. Since then, DOE
produced a draft of the disposition criteria in July 1997, and final
criteria are expected in June 1998.
Without final disposition criteria available, the sites are
proceeding to stabilize and package their plutonium that is not in
pits according to the existing storage standards--especially DOE
Standard 3013. However, DOE Standard 3013 for long-term storage and
the draft criteria for disposition vary in some significant ways,
which could result in additional activities or processing steps and
increased costs. For example, according to DOE, the draft
disposition criteria would require the sites to provide historical
information on how the plutonium was processed, what impurities are
likely to be included with it, and what the physical condition of the
plutonium is. However, under Standard 3013, the sites are not
currently required to retain this information with the plutonium. If
the necessary information was not available, the draft criteria for
disposition would require the sites to sample their plutonium to
gather it. Sampling of the plutonium is not required by Standard
3013 and, as described in the draft disposition criteria, would
require additional and potentially expensive equipment and activities
by the sites prior to shipping the plutonium to the disposition
facilities. The additional equipment and activities would add to the
cost and time required for disposing of the plutonium. According to
officials from both the Office of Environmental Management and the
Office of Fissile Materials Disposition--the DOE headquarters
organizations responsible for stabilization, packaging, and storage
activities and for disposition activities, respectively--there has
been some coordination between the two organizations to attempt to
resolve differences between DOE Standard 3013 and the draft
disposition criteria.
However, in a December 8, 1997, letter to the Secretary of Energy,
the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board cited
problems with DOE headquarters' integration of stabilization and
disposition and concluded that these problems had contributed to
delays in meeting implementation plan milestones and unacceptable
postponement of stabilizing materials, along with significantly
greater budget requirements. Specifically, the letter noted that
there was no organization with crosscutting authority and resources
within the Department to integrate stabilization and disposition
activities across the DOE complex. To remedy this problem, the Board
suggested that DOE designate a lead officer with primary
responsibility for the program as a whole. According to a Board
staff member, DOE has not responded to the December 8, 1997, letter.
In addition to the Board's concerns, several site officials told us
that they are concerned about whether plutonium that is stabilized
and packaged to meet the standard for long-term storage will be
compatible with DOE's final disposition criteria. Several site
officials also stated that the DOE headquarters organizations
responsible for these two activities need to work out differences
between the long-term storage and disposition requirements to
preclude additional activities or processing steps, which would add
to the cost and time required. One contractor official told us that
if the bridge between stabilization and disposition were fully
understood, complications with disposition could be avoided.
--------------------
\5 Some low-risk residues with low plutonium content do not have to
be converted through either technology as they can be disposed of in
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant when it becomes available.
\6 The disposition criteria will apply to both plutonium in pits and
not in pits (excluding residues and solutions with low plutonium
content). According to DOE officials, because pits are made of
high-grade metals, the method for their disposition is fairly well
defined at this point. However, uncertainty remains for plutonium
that is not in pits.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
DOE is taking important steps to reduce the dangers of plutonium that
is not in pits by beginning to stabilize and package it for long-term
storage. For example, the sites have stabilized the majority of the
higher-risk residues to reduce the risk to workers' health and
safety. However, given its history of delays and the anticipated
future delays in meeting many of its milestones, DOE is unlikely to
meet its commitment to stabilize, package, and store its plutonium
metals and oxides by May 2002. Delaying these activities will result
in continuing health and safety risks to workers and increased costs
at DOE facilities.
As stabilization, packaging, and storage activities progress to meet
DOE Standard 3013 for long-term storage, the Department is also
moving toward the disposition of excess plutonium. The headquarters
organizations responsible for these two sets of activities--the
Office of Environmental Management and the Office of Fissile
Materials Disposition--have coordinated some, but the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board has recently cited problems with the
integration of these activities across the DOE complex. Furthermore,
several site officials have suggested that the two organizations need
to work out any differences between the final disposition criteria
(due out in June 1998) and DOE Standard 3013 to avoid unnecessary
rework and costs.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6
In overall comments concerning its stabilization program, the
Department stated that the program has now moved into a phase that
requires extensive integration among deactivation programs,
disposition programs and active weapons programs. Furthermore, the
implementation of several policy decisions--including polices
regarding stewardship of the nuclear weapons stockpile, the
disposition of "weapons-usable" fissile materials, and accelerated
cleanup--has required the Department to reevaluate many of its
stabilization plans, "to define a technically and managerially sound
path forward." According to the Department, activities have been
initiated to produce a fully integrated and optimized revision to the
implementation plan for plutonium stabilization, complex wide. The
Department is proposing a two-path approach to formally revise its
commitment in the implementation plan: (1) as soon as possible,
forward known changes and decision paths to the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board and (2) by the end of December 1998, submit
an integrated revision of the implementation plan to DOE management
and the Board for approval.
We agree with the Department's commitment to define a technically and
managerially sound path in revising its implementation plan.
Furthermore, as reflected in our conclusions, we support the
Department's stated intent to integrate its plutonium management
across the complex. However, based on its comments, the Department
appears to be totally reassessing its existing implementation plan in
light of the opportunities for this integration and departmental
policy decisions about such as stewardship of the stockpile and
accelerated cleanup. Until the Department's complexwide plan is
complete--scheduled for the end of December 1998--we cannot speculate
on the impact in terms of costs; timeframes for completing plutonium
stabilization, packaging, and storage activities; or the risk to the
workers.
DOE further commented that the statement "The Department is unlikely
to meet its May 2002 target date . . ." does not convey the fact
that a large percentage of the stabilization work will be done by May
2002, even if that milestone for final repackaging of the plutonium
is missed at some sites. While we agree that much of the
stabilization work could be done by May 2002, we cannot project with
any degree of certainty the actual extent to which it will be
completed. Furthermore, while stabilization is a critical step in
this process, the risk reduction to workers anticipated by the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's 1994 recommendation and the
Department's implementation plan will not be fully achieved until the
plutonium is packaged for safe long-term storage. While some sites
are currently projecting that they will have all of their
stabilization and packaging activities completed by May 2002, others
are anticipating delays. Therefore, DOE as a whole is unlikely to
meet the May 2002 target date.
In addition to the overall comments cited above, the Department
provided a number of more detailed or technical comments, and the
report has been revised as appropriate to reflect these specific
comments. The Department's comments and our responses are presented
in appendix I.
DOE'S STORAGE OF PITS RISKS
WORKERS' EXPOSURE TO PLUTONIUM
============================================================ Chapter 3
Since the end of the Cold War, DOE has retired and dismantled large
numbers of nuclear weapons and curtailed recycling the plutonium into
new nuclear weapons. As a result, the Department has had to store
the plutonium pits for prolonged periods of time. However, because
extended storage had never been required, DOE had no containers
specifically designed for that purpose. Since 1989, DOE has stored
pits in a type of container known as the AL-R8, which was designed to
transport pits. However, since that time, both DOE and the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board have indicated that pits should not
be stored in these containers for an extended period. These
containers are unsuitable for extended storage because moisture
absorbed by their cushioning liner could accelerate some pits'
corrosion, increasing the possibility that a pit will crack. Should
that occur, the container may not contain the plutonium, thus risking
workers' exposure to it. To remedy this safety problem, DOE spent
nearly $50 million over 5 years to develop a replacement container,
but because each container will cost about $8,000, the Department
plans to use the new container to repackage only about 5 percent of
its pits.
Currently, DOE has no formal plan or schedules to repackage the
remaining 95 percent of its pits. However, DOE is evaluating options
for another replacement container and intends to choose a design and
have a repackaging plan by April 1998. As of February 1998, only a
preliminary draft of the plan was available--much of it only in
outline format--so we were unable to determine if it will adequately
address the outstanding issues in storing pits. In the meantime,
about 10,000 pits at DOE's Pantex Plant have been stored in the AL-R8
containers, posing a risk to workers' health and safety, and DOE has
only preliminary estimates of what it will cost to resolve this
problem. Moreover, as DOE continues to dismantle weapons, the number
of pits stored in these containers continues to grow. Although the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and DOE laboratories have
criticized the limited monitoring program for the pits stored for an
extended period in AL-R8 containers at Pantex, the Department has
decided not to implement the aggressive monitoring program
recommended by the laboratories to maintain safety.
STORAGE OF PITS POSES RISK TO
WORKERS' HEALTH AND SAFETY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Since the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet
Union, the United States has entered into international agreements
and established national policy to retire and dismantle thousands of
nuclear weapons. As it removed pits from these weapons, DOE no
longer recycled the plutonium for use in manufacturing new weapons,
but, for the first time, had to store these pits for a prolonged
period. However, DOE had no containers specifically designed for
that purpose. As a result, in 1989, when DOE started storing
increasing numbers of pits, the Department decided to store them in
existing AL-R8 containers, which were designed for transporting the
pits. According to the DOE official responsible for overseeing the
storage of pits, in 1989 the Department may have assumed that because
the AL-R8 containers had been certified to transport pits and met
requirements to withstand various accident scenarios, they could also
be used to store the pits.\1 The basis for this assumption, however,
is unclear, and DOE officials were unable to provide any analysis
supporting the 1989 decision.
An AL-R8 container consists of an outer steel drum with a clamped
(but unsealed) lid. Inside this steel drum, the pit is secured on a
metal frame and surrounded by a fibrous cushioning liner. Normally,
pits are placed into AL-R8 containers after they have been removed
from retired nuclear weapons during the dismantlement process at
Pantex. See figure 3.1 for an illustration of an AL-R8 container.
Figure 3.1: Side View of a Pit
in an AL-R8 Container
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO's adaptation of an illustration from DOE.
In 1990, the AL-R8 container was decertified for transportation
because it could not meet updated shipping requirements, such as
crush and leak tests. Within 1 year, DOE's Albuquerque Operations
Office sent a letter to Pantex and Rocky Flats directing that the
AL-R8 not be used to transport pits off-site but allowing the
continued use of the container for storing them. However, DOE was
unable to provide documentation or related analysis explaining the
basis of this decision. According to DOE officials, in 1992 the
Department decided that the AL-R8 containers were the best it had
available at that time for storing pits. However, again, DOE had no
technical analysis to determine whether these containers were
adequate for storing pits for an extended period of time.
Using the AL-R8 container for storing pits poses a risk to workers'
health and safety. A DOE study and, more recently, DOE laboratory
officials have expressed concerns about the continued use of the
AL-R8 container to store pits. DOE's 1994 vulnerability assessment
noted that "being unsealed, the AL-R8 container does not keep out
airborne contaminants and would not totally contain plutonium
released from a failed pit."\2 In 1995, DOE's Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore national laboratories--the two laboratories that had
designed the pits--jointly recommended that all pits be removed from
the AL-R8s as soon as possible because of potential problems with
corrosion resulting from moisture and chloride absorbed by the
containers' cushioning liner. According to the laboratories, the
moisture and chloride can accelerate the pits' aging process, which
could lead to a pit's cracking and the release of plutonium, thereby
potentially exposing workers at Pantex. DOE and laboratory officials
have also expressed concern over the aging of the pits and the
extended period that some have been stored in the AL-R8 containers.
Some of DOE's pits are over 36 years old, and some have been stored
in these containers for over 8 years.
--------------------
\1 DOE officials also explained that, at that time, the Department
intended to use the AL-R8 containers to store pits until plutonium
recycling resumed. A final decision that plutonium recycling would
not resume was made in January 1992.
\2 When DOE identified these problems, it had approximately 6,300
pits stored in AL-R8s and has since placed about 3,700 additional
pits into them.
DOE HAS LARGELY ABANDONED ITS
CONTAINER REPLACEMENT PLAN
BECAUSE OF COST
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
In late 1992, after the AL-R8 was decertified for transportation, DOE
began a project to replace the container and, in 1993, clarified that
this replacement container--known as the AT400A--had to be designed
for both the transportation and storage of pits. Although it
subsequently invested a great deal of time and nearly $50 million in
this effort, DOE recently decided to use the AT400A to repackage only
about 5 percent of its pits. At this time, DOE has no formal plan or
schedules for repackaging approximately 95 percent of the pits.
However, according to DOE officials, while a formal decision has not
yet been made, the Department is developing a plan, which it intends
to issue in April 1998. DOE officials believe that a "retrofit" of
the AL-R8 is the most likely option and that it will be several more
years before all the pits currently stored in the AL-R8 containers
can be repackaged.
DOE HAS HAD LITTLE SUCCESS
IN DEVELOPING A REPLACEMENT
CONTAINER
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
In late 1992, after the AL-R8 failed to meet new transportation
standards, the Department undertook a project to design a replacement
container, called the AT400A. In addition to being used for
transporting pits, DOE decided that the container had to also be able
to store them for at least 20 years. However, DOE has not been
successful in developing a cost-effective container that provides
safe long-term storage and can also be used to transport pits.
According to some DOE officials, to be cost-effective, a
transportation container must be reusable. In contrast, a storage
container, as illustrated by the problems with the AL-R8, needs to be
sealed to keep out moisture and to keep the plutonium contained in
the event that the pit would crack. Nonetheless, DOE attempted to
design and develop a container that could be used for both purposes.
After investing a great deal of time and nearly $50 million to design
and develop the replacement container,\3 DOE found that it is not
cost-effective for extensive use in either capacity. According to
DOE officials, at a cost of about $8,000 per container (largely due
to transportation requirements), the AT400A is not cost-effective for
use as a storage container (the containers alone for 10,000 pits
would cost about $80 million). Furthermore, according to DOE
officials, the AT400A is not cost-effective for multiple shipments
between sites because it is designed to be welded shut for storage
purposes and therefore is not reusable.\4
The AT400A container consists of an outer stainless steel container
that surrounds an inner, sealed container, within which a pit is
secured by a metal fixture. Unlike the case with the AL-R8
container, the pit inside an AT400A is in a sealed environment and is
not directly in contact with the cushioning material that could
absorb moisture. Figure 3.2 shows an AT400A container.
Figure 3.2: Side View of a Pit
in an AT400A Container
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO's adaptation of an illustration from DOE.
In addition to problems with developing a cost-effective dual-purpose
design, DOE did not provide effective oversight or coordinate the
work of its laboratories and Pantex in developing the AT400A
container. DOE tasked three of its national laboratories to work on
various aspects of the project: Sandia National Laboratory developed
the container and the system to weld it shut, while Los Alamos and
Lawrence Livermore national laboratories jointly developed the
fixture to hold the pit inside the container. However, DOE did not
ensure that the work of the laboratories was adequately coordinated
and did not adequately involve Pantex safety experts in the design
and development process. As a result, according to DOE and Pantex
officials, after the design phase was complete, Pantex safety experts
had to compensate for design flaws, which included a defective safety
system and a weld directly over the pit, which could have allowed the
welder to burn through the container into the pit. To resolve these
major design problems, Pantex needed to commit additional time and
expense. DOE project officials acknowledge that the Department did
not adequately manage the development of the AT400A container and
that design flaws occurred because of a lack of good coordination and
communication among the four sites.
--------------------
\3 The figure includes the estimated costs for establishing
repackaging facilities and equipment for the AT400A at Pantex.
\4 DOE has been using a reusable container--designated as the FL
container--that was certified in 1991 and recertified in 1997 for
transporting pits. DOE does not plan to use these containers for
long-term storage because there are only about 292 of them in service
at this time; they are very expensive at about $10,000 each; and they
were designed for transporting pits, not storing them.
DOE HAS ABANDONED ITS
ORIGINAL REPACKAGING PLAN
BUT HAS YET TO DEVELOP A NEW
ONE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
DOE's 1994 plutonium vulnerability assessment first identified
problems with using the AL-R8 container for storing pits, but the
Department has yet to resolve these problems. In June 1995, DOE
developed a corrective action plan, and even though the AT400A
container was then only under development, the Department regarded it
as the container that would correct all the problems with the AL-R8
and developed schedules to repackage all the pits at the Pantex Plant
into the new container by 2006.\5 However, after determining that the
cost to use the new container to repackage all of the pits was
prohibitive, DOE decided to use the AT400A for only about 5 percent
of the pits--those it considered to be at higher risk of cracking.\6
Thus, DOE has essentially abandoned its initial plan and, as of
January 1998, had not developed a formal plan and schedules to
repackage the remaining 95 percent of the plutonium pits stored in
AL-R8 containers.\7
According to DOE officials, the Department is developing a plan for
repackaging these pits, which it intends to issue in April 1998, and
begin repackaging in late 1998. However, in a preliminary draft of
the plan provided by officials in February 1998, many sections were
in only a cursory outline form, so we were unable to determine if the
plan will be adequate to ensure the problems in storing pits will be
addressed. For example, at that time, the draft did not contain
schedules or cost estimates for selecting a design, procuring the
containers, or repackaging the pits. Furthermore, this draft
included a listing of the numerous entities involved with repackaging
and storage--within various organizations of the Department and its
contractors--however, it did not define how these entities will
interact or how their efforts will be coordinated, nor did it clearly
delineate program responsibility and accountability for overseeing
the various facets of the pit repackaging and storage program to
ensure its success.
DOE is developing a repackaging alternative that officials believe
will be more cost-effective and will allow quicker repackaging than
using the AT400A. As they describe it, this alternative will
probably involve a retrofit of the original AL-R8 container by
removing the pit from it, sealing the pit inside an inner container,
and placing that inner container back into the AL-R8 outer container.
DOE is currently reviewing alternative designs developed by Lawrence
Livermore, Sandia, and Pantex and plans to have a decision by April
1998. The Department's preliminary estimates of the costs to
repackage 12,000 pits into retrofitted AL-R8 containers range from
$35.5 million to $59.4 million.\8
These estimates are based on the cost to purchase the containers
(ranging from $20.5 million to $40.4 million), as well as start-up
costs (from $1.2 million to $1.6 million) and operating costs (from
$13.8 million to $17.4 million) for repackaging the pits. DOE
officials estimate that, at the earliest, the repackaging could begin
around the end of 1998. Given the number of pits to be repackaged
and competing demands on equipment and facilities at Pantex,\9 they
estimate that it may take from 4 to 7 years to complete repackaging
once the process begins. Thus, the potential exists for the
unsuitable AL-R8 containers to be used for storing pits for up to 16
years.\10
--------------------
\5 Repackaging schedules also included projections for additional
pits from the dismantling of additional weapons, for a total of about
14,000 pits.
\6 A pit of this design cracked in November 1992 during a weapon's
disassembly. Repackaging of these pits into AT400As, which was
originally scheduled to begin by December 1995, started in a limited
fashion in late August 1997, according to the DOE official
responsible for oversight of the repackaging operation. This
official indicated that as of January 1998, only 20 of these pits had
been repackaged.
\7 This percentage includes the pits from weapons already dismantled
at Pantex as well as those from weapons awaiting dismantlement.
\8 These estimates are in fiscal year 1998 dollars and exclude
Pantex's overhead costs.
\9 Various activities at Pantex, including weapons dismantlement and
pit repackaging, share some common equipment and facilities and must
compete for these shared resources, according to DOE officials.
\10 This includes the use of AL-R8s for pit storage since 1989, about
1 year to develop the retrofit, and 4 to 7 years to complete
repackaging.
ADDITIONAL DECISIONS ARE NEEDED
TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS IN STORING
PITS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
DOE has yet to make several critical decisions concerning pit storage
in the future. First, according to DOE officials, pits that are
being retained as strategic reserves for possible future use in
nuclear weapons will require longer storage than pits that are excess
to national security needs and that will eventually be disposed of.
Currently, DOE officials expect the AL-R8 retrofit to safely store
pits for approximately 20 to 25 years. However, the Department has
not decided if it will store the strategic reserve pits in the AT400A
container or the retrofit of the AL-R8 container or if it will
develop another container for lengthier storage. According to DOE
officials, the Department is evaluating this issue, and they expect a
decision by April 1998.
Second, because the threat of corrosion increases the longer that
pits remain in the existing AL-R8 containers, DOE laboratories have
recommended that the containers not be used for storing pits and that
the Department implement an aggressive monitoring program to help
ensure the pits are safely stored until they are repackaged.
Specifically, in August 1995 Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore
national laboratories recommended that if DOE continues to store pits
in AL-R8 containers for longer than 10 years,\11 it should implement
an aggressive monitoring program to examine 20 percent of the pits
each year. With about 10,000 pits in storage now, monitoring 2,000
pits per year is a sizable increase over the current 30 pits per year
that DOE now formally monitors.\12
According to DOE and Pantex officials, implementing the monitoring
program recommended by the laboratories would likely require
constructing additional facilities, procuring additional equipment,
and hiring and training additional staff. Although they had not
conducted analyses of the costs or benefits of the enhanced
monitoring program and were unable to provide a cost estimate, DOE
officials told us that they believed the cost of implementing this
program would be "significant and perhaps prohibitive." They also
thought the program would increase workers' exposure to radiation
from frequent handling and moving of the pits. Because the officials
hope to have the pits repackaged before this type of aggressive
monitoring becomes necessary, they have decided not to implement such
a program. Nonetheless, as explained, some pits have already been
stored in AL-R8 containers for over 8 years, and it will be several
more years before all the pits can be repackaged. Although the
Department has decided against the enhanced monitoring of its pits
while they remain in the existing AL-R8 containers, DOE officials
point out that they plan to conduct a visual examination and to check
for contamination as each pit is repackaged.
In its November 1997 report, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board also criticized DOE's monitoring program of pits stored in
AL-R8 containers at Pantex.\13 In its report, the Board concluded
that DOE's current program to monitor the condition of these pits was
insufficient because the number of pits currently monitored each year
(approximately 30) was small compared to the thousands of pits stored
there. The Board also noted that the variety of pits would require
additional monitoring work to gather an adequate amount of data for
an informed judgment about each type of pit. According to a Board
staff member, monitoring the safety of the pits is most critical
while they remain in the existing AL-R8 containers--once the pits
have been repackaged into containers more suitable for extended
storage, monitoring will be less important. To date, DOE has not
responded to the Board's report nor addressed the Board's conclusion
that the current monitoring program is insufficient to determine the
condition of the pits stored at Pantex.
--------------------
\11 The laboratories recommend that the aggressive monitoring begin
after 5 years' storage for strategic reserve pits to ensure
reliability for future use in weapons and about 10 years' storage for
excess pits to ensure storage safety.
\12 According to DOE officials, in recent years, additional pits have
been visually inspected. For example, from May 1997 through February
1998 approximately 550 pits that had been stored in AL-R8 containers
at Rocky Flats were visually inspected when they were transferred to
Pantex, prior to being repackaged into AL-R8 containers. According
to the officials, to date, these visual inspections have not detected
anomalies. However, such inspections are much less extensive than
the testing and analysis performed as part of the formal monitoring
program. Furthermore, the pits that were visually inspected were not
representative of the universe of pits at Pantex and were selected on
an exception basis--when warranted by other factors, such as the
transfer to Pantex, which required their repackaging--rather than
selected randomly at regular intervals.
\13 Review of the Safety of Storing Plutonium Pits at the Pantex
Plant (DNFSB/TECH-18, Nov. 25, 1997).
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
Since 1989, DOE has stored its pits in containers that are not
suitable for extended storage. The Department has not effectively
managed its problems in storing pits, developed a cost-effective
replacement container to repackage the pits, or performed adequate
monitoring to ensure the pits are safe. DOE currently lacks a plan
and schedules to repackage 95 percent of its pits, and workers'
health and safety have been placed at risk; the problem will continue
to grow as DOE continues to retire and dismantle nuclear weapons and
place additional pits into AL-R8 containers. Responsibility for
addressing the issue of safely storing pits has been decentralized,
with the involvement of various DOE organizations and
contractor-managed laboratories and sites. While DOE officials have
told us they are developing a plan for repackaging pits, there is
currently only a preliminary draft, and it is too early to determine
if the plan will adequately address the outstanding issues. However,
at this time, certain key elements are not addressed, including
comprehensive cost estimates and program budgeting; a clear
delineation of program responsibility and accountability; and
schedules for repackaging and storage and a system for tracking
progress in meeting these schedules.
Finally, the Department has not thoroughly analyzed or resolved the
concerns raised by its own laboratories and the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board about monitoring the safety of pits while
they remain in unsuitable AL-R8 containers. Although DOE did not
conduct analyses and therefore had no estimate of the costs and
benefits of an enhanced monitoring program, the Department
nonetheless decided not to implement such a program. However, even
under optimal circumstances, it will be many years before DOE can
repackage all of its plutonium pits into safer containers, and
therefore pits will continue to be stored in the unsuitable AL-R8
containers well past the time recommended by the laboratories to
begin aggressive monitoring. Furthermore, the history of delays in
DOE's program for repackaging pits lends added significance to the
need for ensuring their safety while they continue to be stored in
AL-R8 containers.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy ensure the timely and
cost-effective resolution of the wide range of issues surrounding pit
storage, including ensuring that the plan being developed by the
Department addresses such key items as a clear definition of
responsibility and accountability for program activities; realistic
cost estimates and a program budget; and detailed schedules for
designing and developing replacement containers and repackaging the
pits, as well as a means to track progress against these schedules.
In addition, given the length of time pits will be stored in
unsuitable containers, we recommend that the Secretary, in
cooperation with the DOE laboratories and the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board, conduct a thorough safety analysis of the
recommended enhanced pit monitoring program as well as other possible
monitoring options to identify the most appropriate and
cost-effective approach to ensure the specified safety concerns about
the prolonged storage of pits in the unsuitable containers are
resolved.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6
In its comments on our draft report, DOE concurred with all but one
part of one of our recommendations. The Department concurred with
our recommendation for the timely and cost-effective resolution of
the issues surrounding pit storage and agreed to include the
recommended key items in its Integrated Pit Storage Program Plan,
which it expects to issue in April 1998. In addition, the Department
concurred with the portion of our recommendation calling for the
Secretary to work closely with the DOE laboratories and the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to identify the most appropriate and
cost-effective approach to address their concerns about the prolonged
storage of pits in unsuitable containers. The Department stated that
it has worked with the laboratories and the Board in the past to
address concerns about storage activities at Pantex and will continue
to do so. In contrast, DOE raised concerns about our recommendation
that the Department conduct a safety analysis of the enhanced pit
monitoring program as well as other possible monitoring options,
stating the Department has "approved safety analyses for operations
at the Pantex Plant, which provide coverage for pit storage
activities." The Department further requested that we clarify our
basis for this recommendation. Our review of DOE's safety analyses
for Pantex's operations revealed that these analyses were conducted
before the DOE laboratories and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board identified the safety problems of pits in prolonged storage in
AL-R8 containers and the resultant need for increased monitoring.
Therefore, these specific issues were not addressed in DOE's safety
analyses. While DOE's analyses considered the AL-R8s as the baseline
containers for storing pits, they did not include a detailed
evaluation showing that these containers were safe for extended
storage. Therefore, we continue to recommend, in light of the
prolonged storage of pits in the AL-R8 containers and the fact that
safety concerns about these pits were not addressed in DOE's safety
analyses, that the Secretary conduct a thorough safety analysis of
the Department's pit monitoring options, including the enhanced
monitoring program recommended by the laboratories, to ensure that
the specific concerns raised are resolved.
In addition, the Department raised a general concern that our report
"does not present complete and accurate information about many
important DOE initiatives to meet the challenges for managing
plutonium in an environmentally safe and reliable manner which
protects workers as well as the general population." We disagree.
Our report describes initiatives that the Department raised in its
comments--the disposition program for excess plutonium and that
program's implications for plutonium storage; the revisions to Los
Alamos National Laboratory's plutonium stabilization program; and the
development of a plan for repackaging the pits out of the AL-R8
containers, expected to be issued in April 1998. On the basis of
DOE's comments, we updated information on these initiatives and added
information on additional pit surveillance activities to the report's
discussion of pit monitoring issues. Furthermore, the Department's
comments on our report discussed an initiative to revise its
implementation plan for plutonium stabilization to integrate nuclear
materials management activities complexwide. This initiative was not
included in our report because Department officials did not mention
it in our meetings with them in February; the Department's comments
on this report were the first indication that such an initiative was
formally under way.
In its comments, the Department noted that the final disposition
plans for surplus plutonium and ongoing nonproliferation initiatives
(i.e., bilateral and trilateral inspection agreements) are examples
of the types of issues that have made it difficult to develop storage
containers for pits. While we recognize that there are many outside
factors that have affected and will continue to affect DOE's
management of its pits, we do not believe that these factors should
have prevented the Department from resolving its pit storage
problems. We note that despite the factors cited, the Department
invested 5 years and nearly $50 million to develop a replacement
container for the AL-R8, although this replacement container was
ultimately determined to be too expensive.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
============================================================ Chapter 3
(See figure in printed edition.)
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The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Energy's letter
dated March 18, 1998.
1. To address the Department's comment concerning the transfer of
national defense missions to Los Alamos, we added the following to
our report: "In commenting on our draft report, the Department
clarified that as DOE reduces the overall size of its weapons
complex, missions and programs considered still vital to national
defense are being relocated and consolidated at the Department's
remaining operational sites. Los Alamos has become the new site for
some of these relocated missions and programs." The remainder of this
comment provides information on the Department's redefinition of the
scope of plutonium remediation efforts at Los Alamos. However, this
information generally supports rather than contradicts the
information contained in our report that competing priorities,
between national defense work and other activities, have caused
delays in Los Alamos' ability to meet its implementation plan
milestone to have its plutonium stabilized and packaged for long-term
storage. Therefore we made no additional changes to the report.
2. The Department has not defined "short-term storage" nor provided
evidence that the AL-R8 containers are safe for any length of
storage. However, to address this comment, we limited our use of the
term "unsuitable" to discussions of the use of AL-R8 containers for
extended or prolonged storage of pits. We also added footnote 6 in
the "Executive Summary," which states that, "According to DOE and
laboratory officials, some pits are more susceptible to corrosion
than others, depending on the metal used to encase the pit."
3. To respond to this comment concerning the Department's formal pit
monitoring efforts and other inspections of its pits, we revised the
report to read, 30 pits are "formally" monitored per year.
Furthermore, on the basis of this comment and additional information
provided by the Department, we added footnotes to the report that
provide additional information on visual inspections of pits
transferred from Rocky Flats to Pantex. In its comments, DOE states
that, in addition to the formal monitoring effort, "several more
[pits] are handled regularly in other routine activities" and that
these activities "require visual checks and radiation swipes which
would detect the concerns referred to in this report." However, since
these statements were not supported by the information provided by
the Department, we did not revise the report. The information
provided supported only that additional pits have been visually
inspected on specific occasions but did not support a systematic
program of visual inspection. The additional visual inspections
cited were due to extraordinary events (such as the pits' transfer to
Pantex from Rocky Flats); they were not presented as a regular
occurrence or as a planned addition to the formal monitoring program.
We note that visual inspections are much less extensive than the
testing and analysis performed as part of the formal monitoring
program, and the officials did not provide information that these
inspections would be able to detect the problems cited. Therefore,
we do not believe that the visual inspections that have been
conducted take the place of formal monitoring or negate our
recommendation that the Department carefully analyze the need for
enhanced monitoring to resolve safety concerns raised by the
laboratories and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board.
4. The Department's development of a repackaging plan for the pits
at Pantex is discussed in detail in chapter 3 of our report. This
discussion includes the selection of a replacement container, the
time frame for repackaging, and the Department's preliminary cost
estimates. However, we revised the report to include the range "from
4 to 7 years" for repackaging the pits. Furthermore, on the basis of
additional information provided by the Department, we revised the
report to reflect DOE's most recent preliminary cost estimates for
repackaging 12,000 pits and included a footnote to reflect that these
estimates are in fiscal year 1998 dollars and exclude Pantex's
overhead costs.
5. We address this comment regarding external factors influencing
pit storage activities under the heading "Agency Comments and Our
Evaluation" at the end of chapter 3.
6. Although we requested documentation or other information to
support the comment that "longer than previously expected processing
times . . . have also contributed to delays in meeting
implementation plan milestones," the additional information provided
by the Department did not do so. Therefore, no revision was made to
the report.
7. See comment 1 above for information added to the report to
address DOE's comment concerning the relocation of programs from
other sites in the DOE weapons complex to Los Alamos. We also
revised the report to reflect the Department's position that
remediation efforts will continue at Los Alamos, and that the
Department is reviewing proposals for additional personnel and
equipment.
8. We did not revise the report to reflect DOE's comment on the
distinction between the 1995 recommendation by the laboratories and
the 1997 "Pit Storage Specification." As discussed in our report, the
1995 recommendation by the laboratories concerns the need for
increased monitoring of the pits while they remain in the existing
AL-R8 containers. The 1997 "Pit Storage Specification" will apply to
pits as they are repackaged out of the AL-R8 containers. According
to DOE and laboratory officials, pits currently packaged in AL-R8
containers cannot comply with this specification. Furthermore, the
1997 specification does not negate the laboratories' 1995
recommendation for increased pit monitoring. Rather, the
specification states, "Increased sampling may be required if . . .
aspects of this specification are not met"--which is exactly the case
while the pits remain in AL-R8 containers.
9. The development of the AT400A container is discussed in our
report. No changes were made to the report because the Department
did not provide support for the suggestion that the work on the
AT400A was the reason the AL-R8 was not viewed as an extended storage
container.
10. On the basis of additional information provided by the
Department, we revised the footnote to describe the 1997
recertification of the FL containers for transportation, revised the
number of FL containers in service at this time, and included two
additional reasons the Department provided for not using these
containers for long-term storage: They are very expensive, at
approximately $10,000 per container; and they were designed for
transporting pits not storing them.
11. We did not revise the footnote concerning the pit that cracked
because the Department did not provide additional support for the
statement that this occurred "due to extreme conditions experienced
during the disassembly process, which far exceed storage conditions."
12. These general comments concerning the integration of
stabilization activities with other departmental activities and the
revision of the implementation plan are addressed under the heading
"Agency Comments and Our Evaluation" at the end of chapter 2.
13. This comment concerning the stabilization work that may be done
by May 2002 is addressed in the "Agency Comments and Our Evaluation"
section of chapter 2.
14. We added a footnote to the report quoting DOE's point that "It
must be acknowledged that even after stabilization and packaging,
some small level of risk remains associated with handling and storage
of plutonium materials." In addition, we revised the report to
clarify that delays result in continuing the existing level of risk
to workers' health and safety by delaying the risk reduction that is
achieved by stabilization and packaging activities.
15. We revised the report to clarify that the interim storage
criteria do not provide the level of safety afforded by DOE Standard
3013 and explicitly attributed the comments about the continuing risk
to workers' health and safety to DOE site officials and a Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board staff member.
16. We did not revise the report because the Department did not
provide support for the statement that the "safety significance" of
the delay at Hanford is "manageable."
17. To reflect this information about future funding at Hanford, we
added the following to the report: "In commenting on a draft of this
report, the Department stated that questions remain about how
plutonium stabilization work will be prioritized by the site. The
Department believes that if the risk is determined to be high enough,
funds will be provided."
18. We added a footnote to the report that reads, "Some low-risk
residues with low plutonium content do not have to be converted
through either technology as they can be disposed of in the Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant when it becomes available." In addition, we
revised a later footnote to reflect this information.
19. We revised the report to read, "DOE is currently assessing the
possible environmental impacts of several likely sites where
plutonium disposition activities may take place and plans to have a
final decision in late 1998 or early 1999." We further revised the
report to indicate that there are technical, institutional, and cost
uncertainties and that the uncertainties cited are examples, not an
all-inclusive list.
20. The Department comments that a more recent draft of the
disposition criteria, dated December 1997, has been issued. However,
we were not able to include the details of this draft because it was
not available at the time of our review.
21. We revised the report to remove the issue of stabilization
temperatures because the Office of Fissile Materials Disposition is
planning to address this issue through an additional processing step.
However, there are still issues to be resolved regarding differences
between the draft disposition criteria and the current standard for
plutonium storage. Therefore, on the basis of DOE's comments, we
included examples of the differences between the information that
would be required by the draft disposition criteria and the
information currently required by DOE Standard 3013 for long-term
storage. Finally, we did not revise the report to address the effort
by the Office of Environmental Management to develop a new standard,
as this initiative is still in its preliminary stages.
22. The statements about delays in meeting implementation plan
milestones are not our conclusions, but the comments of the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (and are cited as such in the
report). Therefore, we did not revise the report.
23. On the basis of further discussions with DOE officials, we
revised the report to read, "Workers at Department of Energy (DOE)
facilities must be protected from plutonium because exposure to small
quantities is dangerous to human health, and if not safely contained
and managed, plutonium can be unstable and can even spontaneously
ignite under certain conditions."
24. In further discussions with DOE officials, they stated that
these comments were informational and that the Department did not
require any change to the report.
25. We revised the report on the basis of a further discussion with
DOE officials concerning the dangers of plutonium. During this
discussion, the officials agreed that the Department's concerns would
be addressed if we deleted the word "extremely" from the report.
26. We revised the report as suggested, changing the referenced date
to "1997."
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
Lisa P. Gardner
Ronald J. Guthrie
Christopher M. Pacheco
Victor S. Rezendes
John H. Skeen, III
Pamela J. Timmerman
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