Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement Limit FAA in
Identifying and Responding to Risks (Chapter Report, 02/27/98,
GAO/RCED-98-6).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the outcomes of: (1)
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) inspection process in fiscal
years (FY) 1990 through 1996 and how this process would be strengthened
to better assess and encourage compliance with aviation safety and
security regulations; and (2) FAA's enforcement process during this
period and how this process could be strengthened to better address
potential violations of aviation safety and security safety and security
regulations.

GAO noted that: (1) while there are no direct measures of the aviation
industry's compliance with aviation safety and security regulations, the
results of FAA's inspections provide both an indirect measure of the
industry's compliance and an early warning of potential safety and
security problems; (2) in FY 1990 through FY 1996, nearly 96 percent of
the 2 million inspections conducted by Flight Standards and Security
resulted in no reports of problems or violations; (3) GAO questions
whether this rate is a meaningful measure of the aviation industry's
compliance with regulations for several reasons; (4) many inspectors do
not report all problems or violations they observe; (5) many inspections
are not thorough or structured enough to detect many violations; (6)
FAA's inspection tracking systems do not distinguish major from minor
violations; (7) FAA's information on compliance in the aviation industry
is thus incomplete and of limited use in providing early warning of
potential risks and in targeting inspection resources to the greatest
risks; (8) during FY 1990 through FY 1996, FAA inspectors opened nearly
110,000 enforcement cases to follow up on reports of violations from
their inspections and from noninspection sources; (9) 45 percent of the
110,000 enforcement cases were initiated as a result of inspections
conducted by FAA; (10) FAA inspectors also followed up on reports of
violations from outside sources, which accounted for 41 percent of the
enforcement cases opened; (11) in the remaining 14 percent of the cases,
FAA inspectors followed up on violations reported by other FAA
personnel; (12) inspectors exercised discretion in opening enforcement
cases in response to reported problems and violations; not all reported
problems or violations resulted in enforcement cases; (13) the amount of
paperwork and the time needed to reenter inspection results in a
separate enforcement database also discouraged inspectors from opening
cases; (14) FAA resolved almost 121,000 enforcement cases during this
same period, using administrative actions (46 percent), legal actions
(34 percent), or no action (19 percent); (15) the resolution could not
be determined for 1 percent of the enforcement cases because of missing
data; (16) when resolving cases through legal action, FAA's legal staff
generally negotiated lower penalties than the agency's inspection staff
had recommended; and (17) the impact of FAA's enforcement is difficult
to asses because FAA has not followed up on the aviation industry's
implementation of corrective actions.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-98-6
     TITLE:  Aviation Safety: Weaknesses in Inspection and Enforcement 
             Limit FAA in Identifying and Responding to Risks
      DATE:  02/27/98
   SUBJECT:  Inspection
             Transportation safety
             Airline regulation
             Commercial aviation
             Air transportation operations
             Safety regulation
             Management information systems
             Airline industry
             Fines (penalties)

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

February 1998

AVIATION SAFETY - WEAKNESSES IN
INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT LIMIT
FAA IN IDENTIFYING AND RESPONDING
TO RISKS

GAO/RCED-98-6

FAA's Inspections and Enforcement

(341500)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AAIRS - Airport and Air Carrier Information Reporting System
  ASAP - Aviation Safety Action Program
  ASRP - Aviation Safety Reporting Program
  CASIS - Civil Aviation Security Information System
  DOT - Department of Transportation
  EIR - Enforcement Information Report
  EIS - Enforcement Information System
  FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
  FAR - Federal Aviation Regulation
  FOIA - Freedom of Information Act
  NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
  NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
  PTRS - Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem
  SAS - Statistical Analysis System
  SPAS - Safety Performance Analysis System

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-274166

February 27, 1998

The Honorable John McCain
Chairman, Committee on Commerce,
 Science, and Transportation
United States Senate

The Honorable Slade Gorton
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Commerce, Science,
 and Transportation
United States Senate

In response to your request, this report examines (1) the outcomes of
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) inspection process in
fiscal years 1990 through 1996 and how this process could be
strengthened to better assess and encourage compliance with aviation
safety and security regulations and (2) the outcomes of FAA's
enforcement process during this period and how this process could be
strengthened to better address potential violations of aviation
safety and security regulations.  This report contains
recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation for improving
FAA's enforcement of aviation safety and security regulations. 

As you requested, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier,
we plan no further distribution of this report until 30 days after
the date of this letter.  We will then send copies to the appropriate
congressional committees; the Secretary of Transportation; the
Administrator, FAA; the Director, Office of Management and Budget;
and other interested parties.  We will make copies available to
others upon request. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me at (202)
512-3650.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
VI. 

Gerald L.  Dillingham, Ph.D.
Associate Director,
 Transportation Issues


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates and monitors the
safety and security of air transportation and air commerce, an effort
supported by the aviation industry through training and
self-monitoring programs.  Both the agency and the industry have come
under increased scrutiny since the fatal crashes of ValuJet Flight
592 in May 1996 and TWA Flight 800 in July 1996.  The public has
demanded better government oversight of aviation safety and security,
and congressional hearings have focused on FAA's training of
inspectors, targeting of inspection resources, and use of enforcement
actions. 

The Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and its
Subcommittee on Aviation, which oversee FAA, asked GAO to respond to
the following two questions:  (1) What were the outcomes of FAA's
inspection process in fiscal years 1990 through 1996?  (2) What were
the outcomes of FAA's enforcement process during this period?  To
respond to these questions, GAO analyzed FAA's inspection and
enforcement data for fiscal years 1990 through 1996 and in February
and March 1997 conducted nationwide surveys of 600 safety inspectors
and 175 security special agents who perform inspections for FAA.  GAO
also interviewed safety and security inspectors in two FAA regions,
managers in all FAA programs that conduct inspections, and regional
counsels in all nine FAA regions. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

FAA's aviation safety and security programs provide for the initial
certification, periodic surveillance, and inspection of airlines,
airports, repair stations, and other aviation entities, as well as of
pilots and mechanics.  These inspections are intended not only to
detect actual violations but also to serve as part of an early
warning system for identifying potential systemwide threats to
aviation safety and security.  Safety inspections range from a visual
check by an individual FAA inspector of a pilot or an aircraft at the
gate (ramp inspection) or during a flight (en route inspection) to a
special in-depth inspection of an entity (airline) or a facility
(repair station) that may last a week or longer and involve a team of
inspectors.  Security inspections typically range from a daily
spot-check of an airport's security by a pair of inspectors to a
comprehensive annual inspection involving larger teams systematically
checking an airport's compliance with all applicable security
regulations and requirements.  When safety and security inspectors
identify violations, agencywide guidance requires that such
violations be investigated and appropriately addressed, and program
office guidance requires that violations be reported in their
respective program office's database for tracking the results of
inspections. 

FAA's enforcement program affords a range of options for responding
to violations of aviation safety and security regulations, from
providing training or issuing warning notices to imposing penalties,
such as fines or suspensions of operating certificates, called
certificate actions.  Although FAA has long depended on the
willingness of certificate holders to adhere to regulatory
requirements, it has, since 1990, increased its emphasis on gaining
compliance through cooperative rather than punitive means. 

At the end of fiscal year 1996, FAA had about 3,000 inspection staff
predominately based in the agency's nine regions.  These inspectors
worked in five FAA program offices with a budget of $535 million. 
Two of these offices followed up on reports of violations by opening
nearly 90 percent of the enforcement cases and were, therefore, the
focus of GAO's review:  The Flight Standards Service (Flight
Standards), which oversees aviation safety, had a budget of $322
million in fiscal year 1996, and the Office of Civil Aviation
Security (Security) had a budget of $67 million to oversee the
security of the nation's airports and air carriers and monitor the
transportation of hazardous materials by air.  When Flight Standards
inspectors find problems (which include but are not limited to
violations), they are required to enter their findings into a
database for tracking the results of inspections.  Security
inspectors, called special agents, are required to report violations
in one of two databases.  In addition to tracking the results of
inspections, these Flight Standards and Security databases track all
activities performed by inspectors.  Inspectors in both programs
generally choose whether to open enforcement cases.  FAA's field and
regional program offices decide whether to handle these cases through
administrative actions, such as warning notices; legal actions, such
as fines or suspensions of operating certificates; or no action.  If
legal actions are chosen, the cases are handled by FAA regional or
headquarters legal staff, who negotiate many of the final penalties. 

The aviation community shares the responsibility for ensuring
aviation safety and security.  Many airlines, repair stations, and
aviation companies conduct internal reviews and/or have quality
assurance programs to foster and monitor their own compliance with
FAA's regulations.  In addition, some airlines and pilots participate
in voluntary self-disclosure programs or partnership programs with
FAA to identify and correct violations without being penalized. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

While there are no direct measures of the aviation industry's
compliance with aviation safety and security regulations, the results
of FAA's inspections provide both an indirect measure of the
industry's compliance and an early warning of potential safety and
security problems.  In fiscal years 1990 through 1996, nearly 96
percent of the 2 million inspections conducted by Flight Standards
and Security resulted in no reports of problems or violations.  GAO
questions whether this rate is a meaningful measure of the aviation
industry's compliance with regulations for several reasons.  First,
many inspectors do not report all problems or violations they
observe.  In addition, many inspections are not thorough or
structured enough to detect many violations.  Finally, FAA's
inspection tracking systems do not distinguish major from minor
violations.  FAA's information on compliance in the aviation industry
is thus incomplete and of limited use in providing early warning of
potential risks and in targeting inspection resources to the greatest
risks. 

During fiscal years 1990 through 1996, FAA inspectors opened nearly
110,000 enforcement cases to follow up on reports of violations from
their inspections and from noninspection sources.  Forty-five percent
of the 110,000 enforcement cases were initiated as a result of
inspections conducted by FAA.  FAA inspectors also followed up on
reports of violations from outside sources, such as police reports
and public complaints, which accounted for 41 percent of the
enforcement cases opened.  In the remaining 14 percent of the cases,
FAA inspectors followed up on violations reported by other FAA
personnel, such as air traffic controllers who reported instances
when aircraft deviated from their assigned flight altitudes. 
Inspectors exercised discretion in opening enforcement cases in
response to reported problems and violations; not all reported
problems or violations resulted in enforcement cases.  When
compliance could be gained informally, for example, many inspectors
did not open cases.  The amount of paperwork and the time needed to
reenter inspection results in a separate enforcement database also
discouraged inspectors from opening cases. 

FAA resolved almost 121,000\1 enforcement cases during this same
period, using administrative actions (46 percent), legal actions (34
percent), or no action (19 percent).  The resolution could not be
determined for 1 percent of the enforcement cases because of missing
data.  When resolving cases through legal action, FAA's legal staff
generally negotiated lower penalties than the agency's inspection
staff had recommended, reducing fines in 80 percent of the civil
penalties closed and suspension days in 58 percent of the certificate
actions settled.  FAA legal staff told us that they do not have the
legal resources to litigate all cases and that penalties were lowered
for many reasons, including insufficient evidence to support certain
charges and precedents for lower penalties set in prior cases.  The
impact of FAA's enforcement actions on compliance is difficult to
assess because FAA has not followed up on the aviation industry's
implementation of corrective actions. 

In part because FAA's enforcement database, like FAA's inspection
databases, does not distinguish major from minor cases, FAA cannot
readily set risk-based priorities for resolving enforcement cases. 
Both the sequence and the time for processing enforcement cases often
depended on factors other than the cases' impact on aviation safety
and security.  In addition, workload, accused violators' requests for
additional information about their cases, and statutes of limitation
or other deadlines for initiating certain types of cases influenced
the sequence and the time for processing enforcement cases. 


--------------------
\1 The number of cases closed differed from the number of cases
opened because some cases were started before 1990. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      FAA'S INSPECTION ACTIVITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

Overall, during fiscal years 1990 through 1996, 96 percent of Flight
Standards' inspections and 91 percent of Security's inspections
resulted in no reports of problems or violations.  Both the
underreporting of observed problems or violations and the reliance on
unstructured inspections by individual inspectors may result in the
underreporting of problems or violations.  Despite guidance requiring
them to enter all observed problems or violations into their
respective office's inspection tracking system, 35 percent of the
Flight Standards inspectors and 32 percent of the Security inspectors
surveyed by GAO said that they reported half or fewer of the problems
or violations they observed during inspections in fiscal year 1996,
the year covered by the survey.  In some cases, FAA inspectors
interviewed did not agree on the agency's reporting requirements; in
other cases, inspectors did not report violations if compliance could
be achieved informally.  In addition, Flight Standards does not
specify minimum or key tasks to be accomplished during ramp and en
route inspections, even though DOT's Inspector General has issued
recommendations to this effect several times since 1992.  GAO's
recent review of repair stations\2

suggests that more intensive, structured team inspections identify
more safety problems than unstructured inspections by individual
inspectors.  Moreover, when Security began in fiscal year 1996 to
combine comprehensive inspections requiring the completion of
specified tasks with rigorous, unannounced tests of security
directives, the rate of violations found during its inspections more
than doubled, rising from 9 percent to 19 percent. 

The lack of distinction between major and minor violations in FAA's
inspection tracking systems, combined with incomplete information on
the frequency of violations, hampers FAA in using the results of its
inspections as an early warning system for identifying potential
threats to aviation safety and security, as well as in allocating its
inspection resources to the greatest potential threats.  GAO reported
10 years ago that FAA needed to develop criteria for targeting safety
inspections to airlines whose characteristics may indicate safety
problems, and in February 1995 and April 1996, GAO identified serious
problems with the quality of the data systems on which FAA's
targeting depends.  Although Flight Standards has developed a system
for targeting its inspections, this system relies on the database
whose accuracy is compromised by incomplete information.  Because of
these and other problems, inspectors are making limited use of this
system. 


--------------------
\2 Aviation Safety:  FAA Oversight of Repair Stations Needs
Improvement (GAO/RCED-98-21, Oct.  24, 1997). 


      FAA'S ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

In fiscal years 1990 through 1996, FAA's inspections generated the
largest percentage of violation reports that led to enforcement
cases, followed by sources outside FAA, and then other sources within
FAA.  Other noninspection activities conducted by air traffic
controllers and other FAA personnel can identify violations that
result in violation reports and may lead to enforcement actions. 
Sources outside FAA included, for example, the police (21 percent),
who filed reports when they arrested individuals carrying weapons
through airport security checkpoints or using drugs on
aviation-related jobs; the public (5 percent); and the aviation
industry (4 percent). 

Inspectors exercise discretion in opening enforcement cases.  In
fiscal years 1990 through 1996, Flight Standards opened about one
enforcement case for every four inspections that identified problems
(25,392 cases for 88,912 inspections with problems).  This number is
consistent with the fact that problems may but do not always include
regulatory violations.  It also reflects FAA's current emphasis on
gaining voluntary compliance rather than pursuing formal enforcement
cases.  In addition, inspectors may not initiate cases because of
burdensome paperwork and because prior cases were dropped or
recommended penalties were lowered.  For example, in response to our
survey, well over half of the Flight Standards inspectors (66
percent) and Security inspectors (58 percent) said they do not
initiate enforcement cases because doing so entails too much
paperwork, especially for minor violations.  In their view, the
paperwork is not worth the effort for many violations.  In addition,
because the enforcement database is not linked to the program
offices' inspection tracking systems, the results of inspections must
be entered manually a second time for violations that result in
enforcement cases.  In Security, the number of enforcement cases
opened (12,850) exceeded the number of inspections with reported
violations (11,052).  This difference reflects the fact that certain
types of violations can result in cases against more than one air
carrier.  For example, one violation at an airport security
checkpoint that serves several air carriers could lead to cases
against all of the carriers.  While the vast majority of Flight
Standards inspectors and Security inspectors rated their own efforts
at fostering compliance with the Federal Aviation Regulations in
fiscal year 1996 as successful, fewer than one-third of these
inspectors rated FAA's enforcement process as an excellent or good
method for fostering compliance. 

In resolving enforcement cases, FAA has increased its use of
administrative actions, such as warning notices, and reduced its
reliance on legal actions, such as fines and suspensions of operating
certificates.  Administrative actions, which closed 35 percent of
FAA's enforcement cases in fiscal years 1990 through 1992, accounted
for over half of the agency's enforcement actions closed in fiscal
years 1994 through 1996.  FAA's regions varied, sometimes
substantially, in their use of enforcement actions.  In fiscal year
1996, for example, Security used legal actions nearly two-thirds of
the time in one region and less than one-fourth of the time in
another region.  Department of Transportation (DOT) and FAA officials
attributed these differences broadly to differences in regional
enforcement philosophies or to variations in workload, the entities
overseen, and community standards and laws.  We were unable to verify
any specific links between these factors and the regional variations
in enforcement actions.  Such regional variations and the discretion
exercised by inspectors and legal staff were cited by airline
officials and private attorneys interviewed as contributing to
perceived inconsistencies in FAA's response to regulatory violations. 

FAA's legal staff frequently negotiated reductions in the penalties
recommended by the inspection staff for both civil penalty cases and
certificate actions.  Attorneys reduced the recommended fines in
about 80 percent of the 20,179 civil penalty cases closed during
fiscal years 1990 through 1996, arriving at a median final penalty of
25 cents for each dollar proposed by the inspection staff, including
dropping the fines altogether for one-third of the cases.  Attorneys
also reduced the recommended suspensions in 58 percent of the 11,658
certificate actions settled during the same period, accepting a
median suspension of 30 days instead of the median 60 days
recommended by inspectors.  In 27 percent of the certificate action
cases, they settled for no suspensions at all.  In addition, although
FAA assessed fines against all types of aviation operators, it
suspended the operating privileges of small operators and
individuals, but not of major or national air carriers.\3 The
regional counsels in FAA's nine regional offices offered a number of
reasons for the lower penalties, including insufficient evidence for
certain charges, precedents set in prior cases, limits on the
violator's ability to pay, and difficulties in calculating
appropriate penalties for multiple violations.  FAA's legal offices
also varied in the extent to which they reduced fines.  For example,
the median fine ranged from 13 cents to 50 cents on the recommended
penalty dollar for Flight Standards cases in fiscal year 1996. 

The order in which enforcement cases were processed was determined by
the regions, not by FAA headquarters.  Because FAA's enforcement
tracking system does not distinguish major from minor cases, it
provided little information on relative risk for the regions to use
in setting processing priorities.  The time taken to process
enforcement cases varied with the type of enforcement action taken: 
On average, administrative actions took 5 months while the average
time for legal actions ranged from 15 months to 3 years, depending on
the type of case.  In addition, factors other than risk--such as the
regions' enforcement caseload, the actions of violators, and various
deadlines for initiating cases--often dictated both the time and the
sequence for processing cases. 

Recent and proposed changes in FAA's enforcement processes could
reduce the time needed to resolve cases and help FAA target its
resources more effectively to the cases with the greatest potential
impact on safety and security.  For example, the use of warning
tickets, recently pilot-tested by Flight Standards in one region,
provided immediate feedback to violators on their noncompliance, and
the use of streamlined procedures for handling weapons cases, adopted
by Security in fiscal year 1995, has already reduced the processing
time for these legal cases to around 4 months, substantially down
from the average of a little over 2 years for other civil penalty
cases.  Refining and expanding the use of these procedures could help
FAA target its legal resources more effectively. 


--------------------
\3 Under its enforcement order, FAA can impose a fine instead of a
suspension when a disruption in service would have a substantial
adverse impact on the public interest that would not be outweighed by
safety considerations. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

To strengthen FAA's inspection and enforcement processes, GAO
recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FAA
Administrator to take several actions, including the following: 

  -- Revise FAA's order on compliance and enforcement to specify that
     FAA's inspection staff are required to report all observed
     problems and violations in their respective program office's
     database for tracking the results of inspections.

  -- Provide guidance to FAA's inspection staff on how to distinguish
     major from minor violations and to legal staff on how to
     identify major legal cases.

  -- Improve and integrate FAA's inspection and enforcement databases
     to (1) identify major violations and major legal cases; (2)
     target inspection and legal resources to the violations and
     enforcement cases with the greatest potential impact on aviation
     safety and security; and (3) link inspection and enforcement
     data so that violations can be tracked from their identification
     through their resolution. 

This report includes other recommendations to improve the usefulness
of FAA's databases and the coordination of FAA's inspection and
enforcement efforts. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

DOT expressed concern about the report's negative portrayal of FAA's
efforts to oversee compliance with the Federal Aviation Regulations. 
(See app.  VI.) DOT attributed GAO's conclusions to the use of
inappropriate performance measures and selectivity in reporting
survey results.  DOT suggested that the safety record of air carriers
transporting passengers and GAO's survey data on inspectors'
assessments of their own success in fostering compliance would be
better measures of the industry's compliance than inspection results. 
DOT further objected to the report's focus on systems for tracking
FAA's inspection and enforcement activity as a means of evaluating
the effectiveness of the oversight system.  DOT stated that analysis
of data in these tracking systems is but one tool at its disposal for
assessing risk.  Although DOT did not comment explicitly on GAO's
recommendations, DOT agreed that actions can be taken that will
further strengthen its inspection programs, improve compliance with
applicable requirements, and strengthen its analytical capability. 
DOT added that some actions have already been completed and other
actions are under way to make improvements, such as expediting the
processing of cases through the use of warning tickets and
streamlined procedures for Security weapons cases. 

GAO's report offers a balanced portrayal of FAA's enforcement
activities by presenting all of the relevant information developed in
the course of GAO's review and identifying many actions in progress
to improve the agency's existing systems and procedures.  GAO's
methodology is appropriate.  The report is based on nationwide
surveys of inspectors and complex analyses of FAA's inspection and
enforcement data undertaken after extensive coordination with
cognizant FAA legal and program officials.  GAO placed the resulting
data in context through interviews with inspectors about their
workload, their reporting of violations, and the factors they weigh
in deciding whether to initiate enforcement cases.  Interviews with
regional counsels added perspective on the constraints faced in
handling and settling cases.  The report describes serious weaknesses
in FAA's processes for detecting and addressing the industry's
violations of aviation regulations.  These weaknesses hinder FAA in
reliably using inspection data to identify and correct safety and
security problems.  As the report states, there are no direct
measures of the industry's compliance with safety and security
regulations.  Given the relatively rare occurrence of fatal air
carrier crashes, GAO believes that inspection results and other
indicators of safety problems are appropriate indirect measures of
the industry's compliance with the regulations that can provide early
warning of potential safety risks and some sense of the industry's
compliance with the regulations.  As air traffic increases in the
next decade, FAA's inspections and other indicators will be critical
to improving safety and avoiding the increase in fatal crashes that
is projected if the current crash rate continues.  As requested by
DOT, GAO incorporated into the report survey data showing that the
vast majority of inspectors rated their own efforts in fostering
compliance with the regulations as moderately or very successful. 
GAO also included related data showing that over two-thirds of the
inspectors surveyed rated FAA's enforcement process as no better than
fair as a method of fostering compliance.  GAO concurs with DOT's
assertion that inspection tracking systems are but one tool for
assessing risk; however, underreporting by inspection staff and other
inaccuracies in the tracking systems impair the reliability of these
systems for understanding historical and current trends, assessing
systemwide risks, and allocating FAA's resources to best address
these and other potential risks. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulates and monitors the
safety and security of air transportation and air commerce.  The
aviation industry shares responsibility for the safety of air
passengers.  FAA performs inspections to ensure compliance with the
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) and may take enforcement actions
against violators.  Inspections, through their identification and
resolution of violations, can also serve as part of an early warning
system of potential safety and security issues that may be much
broader than individual violations.  The aviation industry supports
FAA's efforts through training and self-monitoring programs.  Both
the agency and the industry have come under closer scrutiny since the
fatal crashes of ValuJet Flight 592 in May 1996 and TWA Flight 800 in
July 1996.  The public has demanded better government oversight of
aviation safety and security, and congressional hearings have focused
on FAA's training of inspectors, targeting of inspection resources,
and use of enforcement actions. 

Concerns about FAA's inspection and enforcement efforts are not new. 
Over the last decade, we have reported that FAA needs to target its
inspection resources to the areas posing the greatest potential risks
to aviation safety and that FAA inspectors have not consistently
reported the results of their inspections, conducted complete
inspections, and ensured that identified violations are corrected.\1
Similarly, since 1992, the Department of Transportation's (DOT)
Inspector General has criticized the quality of FAA's inspections and
identified inconsistencies in FAA's use of enforcement actions. 
Although FAA has initiated improvements in both its inspection and
enforcement programs, problems remain.  In response to these ongoing
concerns, this report discusses FAA's efforts to improve its
inspection and enforcement efforts. 


--------------------
\1 GAO's products on inspections and enforcement are listed at the
end of this report. 


   FAA HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY
   FOR AVIATION SAFETY AND
   SECURITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

To promote the aviation industry's compliance with the Federal
Aviation Regulations, FAA performs inspections and takes enforcement
actions in response to violations.  The agency has increasingly
relied on cooperation with the industry, through self-disclosure and
partnership programs.  To improve compliance, inspections and
enforcement actions remain central to FAA's efforts.  Inspection
staff in FAA's program offices conduct inspections, report
violations, and may initiate enforcement cases.  The program offices
in FAA's nine regions usually decide what type of enforcement actions
to initiate, while the legal offices evaluate whether a violation has
occurred and, if so, initiate appropriate legal action and negotiate
sanctions. 


      GUIDANCE SETS FORTH FAA'S
      COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
      RESPONSIBILITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

FAA Order 2150.3A, the agencywide compliance and enforcement program
handbook, sets forth the responsibilities of FAA personnel and
provides them with guidance on carrying out the enforcement program. 
The order identifies common violations, assigns responsibility to the
inspection staff for initially recommending appropriate corrective
actions when violations are found, and contains a table of
recommended sanctions to promote national consistency.  The table
provides ranges of sanctions for single inadvertent violations of
particular regulations (e.g., a suspension ranging from 15 to 60 days
for a pilot found operating an aircraft without a medical
certificate).  In addition to FAA Order 2150.3A, each of FAA's
program offices has internal guidance for its staff--such as
handbooks, memos, and directives--that provides further information
on handling and processing violations. 


      PROGRAM OFFICE STAFF HAVE A
      CENTRAL ROLE IN DETECTING
      VIOLATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

Inspection staff in five program offices--the Flight Standards
Service (Flight Standards), Office of Civil Aviation Security
(Security), Aircraft Certification Service (Aircraft Certification),
Office of Airport Safety and Standards (Airport Safety), and Office
of Aviation Medicine (Aviation Medicine)--perform inspections.  In
addition, FAA's Air Traffic Control personnel refer regulatory
violations to the other program offices for enforcement action.\2 The
purpose of these inspections is to detect violations so that threats
to safety and security can be corrected and to deter violations
through the possibility that they will be discovered and prosecuted. 
Table 1.1 summarizes the inspection responsibilities of FAA's five
program offices. 



                               Table 1.1
                
                  Inspection Responsibilities of FAA's
                            Program Offices

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                                             Number of
                                                            inspection
                                                 Budget,        staff,
                                             fiscal year   fiscal year
Program office          Responsibilities            1996          1996
----------------------  ------------------  ------------  ------------
Flight Standards        Inspectors monitor
                         the compliance of
                         over 13,000
                         certificate              $321.7         2,637
                         holders\a 8,000
                         designees,\b
                         622,000
                         certificated
                         pilots, and
                         534,000 nonpilots
                         (mechanics,
                         repairmen, etc.)
Security                Inspectors oversee
                         security at 501
                         airports and 432          $67.3           243
                         U.S. and foreign
                         air carriers, as
                         well as monitor
                         the
                         transportation of
                         hazardous
                         materials.
Aircraft Certification  Inspectors monitor
                         manufacturers'
                         procedures to             $76.3           156
                         ensure compliance
                         with standards
                         for new aircraft
                         and air parts.
Airports                Inspectors ensure
                         that FAA-
                         approved airports
                         and airfields are         $41.5            49
                         inspected daily
                         by airport
                         officials for
                         possible
                         violations of
                         standards
                         pertaining to
                         maintenance,
                         transportation,
                         and various
                         hazards.
Aviation Medicine       Inspectors oversee
                         the development
                         and
                         implementation of         $27.8            48
                         employee drug and
                         alcohol testing
                         programs for over
                         5,500 aviation
                         industry
                         employers.
======================================================================
Total                                             $534.6         3,133
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Includes air operators (air carriers, air taxis, etc.) and air
agencies (schools and repair stations). 

\b Designees are authorized by FAA to act as its representatives in
examining, inspecting, and testing persons and aircraft for the
purpose of issuing airman and aircraft certificates.  Designated
private pilot examiners, for example, can accept applications for
flight tests, conduct those tests, and issue temporary operating
certificates to pilots. 

Source:  FAA's program offices. 

Of the over 3,000 inspection staff in fiscal year 1996, over 90
percent were assigned to Flight Standards and Security, the program
offices whose activities were the primary subject of our review. 
Flight Standards inspectors oversee aviation safety by conducting
visual checks of aircraft parked at the gate, called ramp
inspections; visual checks of pilots or other crew members in flight,
called en route inspections; and routine inspections of airlines,
repair stations, or other aviation facilities.  Typically, these
types of inspections are performed by individual inspectors, although
teams may be assigned to large, complex facilities.  In addition,
Flight Standards inspectors may conduct special in-depth inspections
at facilities selected through national or regional inspection
programs or by local program offices.  These inspections are usually
performed by teams of inspectors.  Inspection staff in Security, who
are referred to as special agents, oversee aviation security by
conducting comprehensive or supplemental inspections of airports and
air carrier stations (e.g., ticket counters, passenger security check
points) and by monitoring the transportation of hazardous materials. 
Comprehensive inspections, used to update or profile operations,
review the compliance of airports or air carriers with all relevant
federal regulations and approved security program requirements. 
Supplemental inspections, used to follow up on instances of
noncompliance identified during comprehensive inspections or
unplanned activities (e.g., visits to airports), review compliance
with one or more regulations or program requirements.  In addition,
Security inspectors conduct security directive tests, which are
unannounced, structured assessments of compliance with security
directives, which are requirements established in response to a
specific threat, such as a terrorist threat against a particular
airline.  Security inspectors also conduct hazardous materials
inspections of all U.S.  air carriers and foreign carriers serving
the United States to ensure that all regulations governing the
shipping of such hazardous materials as flammable and combustible
liquids are being followed.  Typically, Security inspectors perform
inspections in pairs, but comprehensive inspections are usually done
by larger teams. 


--------------------
\2 Although air traffic controllers do not perform inspections or
initiate enforcement cases, they may detect violations while
directing the operation of the nation's air traffic system. 


      PROGRAM OFFICE GUIDANCE
      REQUIRES INSPECTION STAFF TO
      REPORT VIOLATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3

When inspectors identify violations, FAA Order 2150.3A does not
specify that they must enter their findings into their program
office's database for tracking the results of inspections.  The order
simply states that "every apparent or alleged violation must be
investigated and appropriately addressed." However, program office
guidance for both Flight Standards and Security requires that
observed violations be entered into their respective databases for
tracking the results of inspections.  For example, Security's 1996
National Assessment Program Guidance says that when "personnel become
aware of a violation of the FAR or any approved security program .  . 
.  a finding (violation) must be created" in Security's database, the
Airport/Air Carrier Information Reporting System (AAIRS).  This
requirement "will ensure that we are capturing as much information
about problem areas as possible" and applies even when matters "are
handled by agents with 'on the spot' correction."

Different program offices have different procedures for tracking
inspection findings.  In Flight Standards, inspectors enter one or
more comment codes in their Program Tracking and Reporting Subsystem
(PTRS)--"U" for unacceptable or "P" for a potential problem--to
record problems in compliance with aviation safety regulations or
safe operating practices.  These problems may, but do not always,
include violations of aviation safety regulations.  Security
inspectors report problems in AAIRS or in Security's Civil Aviation
Security Information System (CASIS) either as violations (instances
of noncompliance with regulations or security directives) or as
observations (problems that may affect security but are not
technically violations).\3 CASIS was used to record all security
violations until fiscal year 1996 and is still used to track the
results of hazardous materials inspections; AAIRS has been used since
1996 to track the results of airport, air carrier, and screening
checkpoint inspections.  (See table 1.2.)



                               Table 1.2
                
                   Databases for Tracking Inspections

                                          Inspection tracking
Program office                            databases
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
Flight Standards                          Program Tracking and
                                          Reporting Subsystem (PTRS)
                                          contains data on all
                                          activities performed by
                                          inspectors, as well as the
                                          results of inspections of
                                          airlines, aircraft, repair
                                          stations, and other
                                          entities.\a

Security                                  Civil Aviation Security
                                          Information System (CASIS)
                                          was used until 1996 to track
                                          all security inspections and
                                          is still used to track
                                          hazardous materials
                                          inspections.

                                          Airport/Air Carrier
                                          Information Reporting System
                                          (AAIRS) has been used since
                                          1996 to track inspections of
                                          airports and air carrier
                                          stations.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Flight Standards' activities cover the certification of airmen,
aircraft, and companies.  During any of these activities, a violation
may be found. 

Source:  Database documentation from Flight Standards and Security. 


--------------------
\3 For example, if the position of an X-ray monitor results in glare
on the screen, making it difficult for the screener to read, the
Security inspector may suggest that the monitor be repositioned and
note his recommendation as an observation.  Security directives are
documents issued by FAA to air carriers regulated under an approved
FAA security program that mandate certain security measures over a
finite period of time. 


      INSPECTION STAFF MAY OPEN
      ENFORCEMENT CASES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.4

FAA's guidance on opening enforcement cases gives wide latitude to
the agency's inspection staff.  Since neither FAA Order 2150.3A nor
any program office guidance specifies that a case must be initiated
in response to a violation, the decision to open a case is
discretionary and reflects the judgment of an individual inspector. 

To initiate an enforcement case for a violation found during an
inspection or reported to a program office through another means,
such as a police report or a public complaint, an inspector first
enters information about the violation into a separate database, the
Enforcement Information System (EIS), which generates a case number. 
This system contains detailed information on the status and
resolution of each enforcement case and allows field, regional, and
headquarters staff to enter and retrieve data.  The inspector next
investigates the enforcement case, gathering and analyzing relevant
facts, evidence, and documents.  On the basis of this investigation,
the inspector recommends a specific enforcement action.  However, if
the investigation produces insufficient evidence, the case will be
closed and labeled as "no action."


      PROGRAM AND LEGAL OFFICES
      RESOLVE ENFORCEMENT CASES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.5

If an inspector's investigation indicates that a violation has been
committed, the field program office may pursue the case as an
administrative action or refer the case for legal action.  Later, if
the evidence proves insufficient to warrant further action, the case
will be labeled no action. 


         ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.5.1

FAA uses administrative actions, which are either warning notices or
letters of correction, to resolve minor violations.  A warning notice
identifies the incident and the regulation violated, states that the
matter does not merit legal action, and requests future compliance. 
A letter of correction serves the same purpose as a warning notice
but documents the corrective actions that the violator has taken or
agreed to take.  Administrative actions may not be used, for example,
to resolve willful violations, cases of criminal conduct, or
situations involving a lack of qualifications.  Administrative
actions do not result in findings of violation. 


         LEGAL ACTIONS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.5.2

Legal actions are FAA's strongest enforcement option.  They include
revocations or suspensions of certificates, civil penalties (fines),
consent orders, and other actions, such as aircraft seizures or
cease-and-desist orders.  Legal actions vary in severity and may be
used against individuals or against aviation entities.  Although most
cases are handled by legal staff in the regions, some are processed
in headquarters.  Orders amending, modifying, suspending, or revoking
certificates and orders assessing civil penalties result in findings
of violation.  Findings of violation also may be made by federal
courts or may be contained in other orders.  Figure 1.1 shows the
processing of cases from their initiation through their resolution. 

   Figure 1.1:  Inspection Process
   and Steps for Initiating and
   Resolving Enforcement Cases

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

\a Cases that are not initiated within the required time frames may
be closed with no action. 

\b Airmen include pilots, mechanics, flight engineers, and repairmen. 

Source:  Based on FAA Order 2150.3A and documents provided by FAA's
Office of Chief Counsel. 

Legal actions include certificate actions, civil penalties (fines),
and potential criminal penalties. 

  -- The certificate action is FAA's primary legal enforcement action
     against an individual certificate holder (e.g., pilot, mechanic,
     flight engineer).  A suspension for a fixed period of time is
     used to deter further violations.  For remedial purposes, a
     certificate can be revoked or it can be suspended for an
     indefinite period of time.  When a certificate has been revoked,
     the former certificate holder loses the privileges of the
     certificate.  When a certificate has been suspended, it may be
     reinstated after the certificate holder demonstrates that he or
     she is qualified to hold the certificate.  For example, a
     revocation is appropriate when a certificate holder does not
     have the training or the skills to hold the certificate or lacks
     sufficient care, judgment, and responsibility.  A suspension is
     issued temporarily until the holder can demonstrate that he or
     she is qualified to hold the certificate.  When FAA determines
     that the public interest and safety require the immediate
     suspension or revocation of an operator's certificate, it can
     issue an emergency order to revoke or suspend a certificate.

  -- A civil penalty (fine) is also an option for FAA against an
     individual or an entity such as an air carrier, repair station,
     or airport that fails to comply with the applicable aviation
     safety or security regulations.  FAA may administratively assess
     a fine of $50,000 or less and may refer a case with a larger
     proposed fine to the appropriate U.S.  attorney's office for
     prosecution.

  -- Potential criminal penalties are referred by FAA to DOT's Office
     of Inspector General or to the appropriate law enforcement
     agency. 


         ADJUDICATION AND APPEAL
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.5.3

Legal actions are adjudicated and may be appealed.  The avenue of
appeal depends on the type and amount of the penalty.  The type of
penalty also determines the time limit for initiating the case.  This
limit is calculated from the date of violation until the date FAA
initiates legal action.  (See table 1.3.)



                               Table 1.3
                
                    Adjudication and Appeal of FAA's
                           Enforcement Cases


Proposed                      Time          Adjudicating  Appeal
sanction                      period        body          options
----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
Certificate action\a          6 months\b    National      Full NTSB,
                                            Transportati  federal
                                            on Safety     courts
                                            Board (NTSB)
                                            judge

Civil penalty ($50,000 or     6 months\b    National      Full NTSB,
less) against airmen\c                      Transportati  federal
                                            on Safety     courts
                                            Board (NTSB)
                                            judge

Civil penalty\                2 years       Department    FAA
($50,000 or less and                        of            Administrato
hazardous materials cases)                  Transportati  r (or
                                            on's (DOT)    designee),
                                            administrati  federal
                                            ve law judge  courts


Civil penalty                 5 years       Federal       Federal
(more than $50,000)                         courts        courts
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Board may modify revocation to civil penalty. 

\b NTSB's 6-month time period is based on an NTSB rule; the time
periods for civil penalties are statutory. 

\c Airmen include pilots, mechanics, flight engineers, and repairmen. 

Source:  FAA Order 2150.3A. 


   INDUSTRY SUPPORTS FAA'S EFFORTS
   TO ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

FAA relies on the aviation industry to support its efforts to
encourage and monitor regulatory compliance.  The industry has a
vested interest in aviation safety and security.  In addition, under
title 49 of the U.S.  Code, the aviation industry shares FAA's
responsibility for the safety of air passengers.  Specifically, the
airlines are responsible for operating their aircraft safely,
aircraft manufacturers are responsible for designing and building
aircraft that meet FAA's regulations, and airports are responsible
for providing a safe operating environment.  To carry out their
aviation safety responsibilities, some regulated entities have their
own training programs, internal reviews, and/or quality assurance
programs.  In addition, the industry works with FAA to achieve
compliance through voluntary self-disclosure and partnership
programs. 


      THE AVIATION INDUSTRY
      MONITORS ITS OWN COMPLIANCE
      THROUGH SELF-DISCLOSURE AND
      PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.1

Through voluntary self-disclosure and partnership programs, the
aviation industry provides FAA with the results of its internal
monitoring and takes steps to correct and prevent violations of the
Federal Aviation Regulations.  In exchange, FAA generally agrees not
to take legal action in response to reported unintentional
violations.  The oldest self-disclosure program, the Aviation Safety
Reporting Program (ASRP), was established in April 1975 for pilots
and is administered by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA).  Under the Voluntary Disclosure Program
instituted in March 1990, FAA agrees not to impose a fine when a
certificate holder promptly discloses a violation to FAA and takes
immediate action to prevent its repetition. 

Aviation Safety Action programs (ASAP) serve as alternatives to legal
enforcement for correcting unintentional safety violations and
identifying potential safety hazards.  Panels consisting of airline,
union, and FAA representatives review incidents to identify the
causes of problems.  Three air carriers--USAir (recently renamed US
Airways), Alaska Airlines, and American Airlines--have participated
in ASAP programs.  USAir's Altitude Awareness Program, which was
designed to eliminate unauthorized deviations in altitude by USAir
flight crews, started in 1990 and ended in 1992.\4 Alaska Airlines'
6-month Altitude Awareness Program focused pilots' attention on the
same issue, from August 1994 through February 1995.  The ongoing
American Airlines' Safety Action Program, which began in 1994,
encourages pilots to enter all types of potential flight safety
problems into American's data system even when unintentional
violations may have occurred. 


--------------------
\4 Voluntary self-reporting by the airline's pilots and mechanics
continues through an informal partnership with FAA. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The Chairmen of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation and its Subcommittee on Aviation asked us to provide
them with a descriptive analysis of FAA's enforcement program as a
means of achieving compliance with aviation safety and security
regulations by answering the following questions: 

  -- What were the outcomes of FAA's inspection process during fiscal
     years 1990 through 1996?

  -- What were the outcomes of FAA's enforcement process during this
     period? 

To perform our review, we gathered quantitative and qualitative
information for fiscal years 1990 through 1996 from the following
sources: 

  -- Data from FAA's databases.  To determine the number and types of
     inspections, we analyzed data from FAA's PTRS database for
     Flight Standards and CASIS and AAIRS databases for Security.  We
     also obtained inspection data from other FAA program offices. 
     To establish the source of enforcement cases by program office
     and the source of violation reports, as well as the number of
     cases initiated, the types of resolutions, the time required for
     resolution, and regional differences, we analyzed FAA's EIS
     database.

  -- Mail surveys.  We conducted two nationwide mail surveys of
     Flight Standards inspectors and Security inspectors in February
     and March 1997.  The surveys measured, for fiscal year 1996,
     their perceptions of the enforcement process, the extent to
     which they reported observed violations in their respective
     tracking systems, their reasons for not initiating enforcement
     cases in response to violations, and their reactions to
     suggested improvements to the enforcement process.  We limited
     our surveys to these two FAA program offices because they
     conducted the most inspections and initiated about 90 percent of
     the enforcement cases in fiscal years 1990 through 1996.

  -- Interviews.  We obtained information on the enforcement process
     through interviews with headquarters managers in all FAA program
     offices that initiate enforcement cases.  We also interviewed
     the regional counsels involved in enforcement in each of FAA's
     nine regional legal offices and in headquarters, asking them
     about their workload, process for ranking cases, and perceptions
     of the enforcement process.  In addition, we interviewed program
     office staff and reviewed program guidance to gain an overview
     of the types of inspections performed and the violations found. 
     Finally, we interviewed National Transportation Safety Board
     officials to obtain their views on the process for adjudicating
     FAA's legal enforcement cases.

  -- Case studies.  To gain an in-depth understanding of how FAA
     identifies and reports violations and processes enforcement
     cases, we selected two regions (Great Lakes and Southwest) for
     case studies.  In these regions--which had moderate and higher
     levels of enforcement activity, respectively--we conducted
     in-person interviews with Flight Standards inspectors and
     Security inspectors, as well as with field and division
     managers.  We also reviewed case files in both regions to
     ascertain how different types of legal cases were resolved, what
     factors delayed cases, and why penalties were modified.

  -- Literature and document review.  To understand FAA's enforcement
     process, we conducted a comprehensive review of the literature
     on aviation enforcement, applicable aviation enforcement
     regulations, and official FAA documents. 

Chapter 2 describes FAA's inspection activities, including the
numbers of inspections and the percentage of inspections that
identified problems or violations.  Chapter 3 provides information on
the types of enforcement actions and penalties used.  Appendix I
provides information on the design and implementation of our surveys
of FAA's inspection staff and on the database analyses we performed
for our review.  Appendix II presents data on modifications to
recommended penalties and on the time taken to process enforcement
actions in fiscal years 1990 through 1996.  Appendix III provides
data on regional variations in FAA's inspections and enforcement
actions.  Tabulated copies of the Flight Standards and Security
surveys appear in appendixes IV and V, respectively.  Appendix VI
lists major contributors to this report.  A list of our related
reports and testimonies is included at the end of this report. 

We conducted our work from July 1996 through November 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


FAA'S INSPECTION ACTIVITIES
============================================================ Chapter 2

While there are no direct measures of the aviation industry's
compliance with aviation safety and security regulations, the results
of FAA's inspections provide both an indirect measure of the
industry's compliance and an early warning of potential safety and
security problems.  FAA conducted over 2 million aviation inspections
in fiscal years 1990 through 1996.  Although the agency performed
fewer inspections during the latter half of this period, it completed
a much larger proportion of required inspections (those identified as
minimum and mandatory).  Nevertheless, nearly 96 percent of the
inspections conducted by Flight Standards and Security resulted in no
reports of problems or violations.  This percentage understates the
actual incidence of problems or violations because many inspection
staff do not consistently report observed violations and many
inspections are not sufficiently thorough or structured to detect
many violations.  Additionally, FAA's inspection tracking systems do
not distinguish major from minor violations.  As a result, FAA cannot
readily identify high-risk areas and allocate its inspection and
enforcement resources accordingly, and the agency's ability to use
the inspection program to serve as an early warning system is
compromised.  Our review identified several ways to strengthen the
inspection process to better assess and encourage the aviation
industry's compliance. 


   THE NUMBER OF INSPECTIONS BEGAN
   TO DECLINE IN FISCAL YEAR 1993
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

During fiscal years 1990 through 1996, FAA conducted a total of
2,244,130 inspections.  Of these, Flight Standards performed
2,105,440, or 93.8 percent, and Security performed 127,376, or 5.7
percent.  Of the inspections performed by Flight Standards, 511,339
(24 percent) were ramp inspections and another 246,935 (12 percent)
were en route inspections.  By comparison, in-depth inspections were
rare; for example, in fiscal years 1993 through 1996, Flight
Standards conducted 428 such inspections.  In Security, two-thirds of
the inspections (84,148) checked air carrier stations' compliance
with security regulations and directives, while the remainder tested
airport security or compliance with regulations for transporting
hazardous materials by air.  Of the Security inspections conducted in
fiscal year 1996, 64 percent were supplemental inspections, 25
percent were comprehensive inspections, and the remaining 11 percent
were supplemental assessments to test compliance with security
directives. 

The number of inspections conducted has fluctuated as much as 43
percent.  While FAA conducted 292,888 inspections in fiscal year
1990, the number dropped to a low of 264,288 in fiscal year 1991
before rising to a high of 378,220 in fiscal year 1993. 
Subsequently, the number of inspections performed declined by about
24 percent to 287,909 in fiscal year 1996.  For inspections conducted
by Flight Standards, the number of inspections then decreased by 23
percent, from a peak of over 352,500 inspections in fiscal year 1992
to about 271,000 inspections in fiscal year 1996.  The number of
Security inspections also fluctuated by as much as 65 percent. 
Security conducted 17,728 inspections in fiscal year 1990 and peaked
at just under 26,400 inspections in fiscal year 1993.  The number of
Security inspections subsequently decreased by 65 percent to fewer
than 9,400 inspections in fiscal year 1995.  In fiscal year 1996, the
number of Security inspections increased to just over 12,900--about
half the 1993 level and still well below the 1990 level.  Figure 2.1
summarizes the number of inspections conducted, by program office.  A
discussion of the reasons for the fluctuations in the numbers of
inspections follows. 

   Figure 2.1:  Number of
   Inspections Conducted, by
   Program Office, Fiscal Years
   1990-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Aviation Medicine did not begin conducting inspections until
fiscal year 1991.  FAA did not provide inspection data for Airports
and Aircraft Certification for fiscal years 1990 through 1993 because
these data were not readily available. 

Source:  FAA program offices and GAO's analysis of PTRS data. 

According to the manager of the Evaluation and Analysis Branch in
Flight Standards, the number of Flight Standards inspections
increased in 1992 after a May 1992 Inspector General's report
criticized FAA for not completing required safety inspections.\1

The report noted that, in fiscal year 1989, FAA did not complete
about 23,000 required inspections, while it completed 225,000
discretionary inspections.  In response to the report, the manager of
the Evaluation and Analysis Branch said, Flight Standards management
tracked and emphasized the completion of inspections, especially
required inspections.  Additionally, FAA reduced the number of
required inspections, from 103,000 in fiscal year 1990 to about
46,300 in fiscal year 1996.  He explained that the number of required
inspections had previously been set high at 35 percent of an
inspector's workload.  He said that FAA lowered the number of
required inspections to give local offices more control in targeting
inspections to aviation entities that required more oversight.  For
fiscal years 1993 through 1996, FAA completed all but 18 of 139,151
required inspections. 

The decline since 1993 in the number of Flight Standards inspections
is also attributable to staffing changes, according to FAA. 
Specifically, many experienced inspectors left the agency, and new
inspectors, hired both to replace them and to fill 738 new positions
authorized by the Congress in fiscal years 1995 through 1997,\2 have
not yet been fully trained.  At the end of this 3-year period, FAA
expects to have hired nearly 1,000 new inspectors.  As a result,
about one-third of Flight Standards' inspection workforce will
consist of recent hires.  According to FAA, an inspector needs 2 to 4
years of training and experience to become fully effective.  When the
new inspectors are fully trained and can perform inspections
independently--and the experienced inspectors can move from providing
on-the-job training to performing inspections--the number of safety
inspections can be expected to increase, according to Flight
Standards' acting manager.  In addition, he noted, many inspectors
who usually perform frequent, routine inspections have recently been
assigned to special intensive inspections and have therefore
performed fewer inspections. 

In Security, staffing decreases have contributed to a reduction in
the number of inspections conducted.  Although Security's staffing
remained relatively stable at about 1,000 in the early 1990s, it fell
sharply in 1994 and 1995, when the government offered financial
incentives for early retirement, according to the Director of the
Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations.  Then, he said,
Security's staffing remained at about 725 until after the 1996
crashes of ValuJet Flight 592 and TWA Flight 800, when the Congress
authorized the hiring of 118 additional Security inspectors in fiscal
year 1997 to focus on the transportation of hazardous materials. 
According to the Director of the Office of Civil Aviation Security
Operations, more hazardous materials inspections can be expected
after these inspectors have been hired and trained. 

Changes in Security's inspection procedures also resulted in fewer
inspections.  Starting in fiscal year 1995, Security moved to improve
its inspections by requiring more rigorous, comprehensive security
inspections of airports and air carrier stations.  Security adopted
the new procedures and established the AAIRS inspection tracking
system to promote consistency in inspections and to increase its
ability to track problems and analyze trends.  In addition, Security
began inspecting airports annually instead of quarterly. 


--------------------
\1 Audit of Aviation Inspection Program:  Federal Aviation
Administration, DOT, Office of Inspector General (R6-FA-2-084, May
29, 1992). 

\2 P.L.  103-331, Sept.  30, 1994; P.L.  104-50, Nov.  15, 1995; P.L. 
104-205, Sept.  30, 1996. 


   FEW INSPECTIONS IDENTIFIED
   PROBLEMS OR VIOLATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Nearly 96 percent of the inspections conducted by Flight Standards
and Security in fiscal years 1990 through 1996 resulted in no
findings of problems or violations.  The rate of regulatory
violations is probably higher than the reported rate because problems
and violations are underreported.  In addition, inspections do not
detect all instances of noncompliance and test only a small fraction
of the industry's operations. 

Flight Standards inspectors reported no problems for 96 percent of
the inspections they conducted.  During fiscal years 1990 through
1996, the percentage of Flight Standards inspections with
problems--findings coded "U" (unsatisfactory) or "P" (potential
problem)--varied from 1 to 6 percent across the types of operators
and certificate holders that FAA inspected most frequently.  (See
table 2.1.)



                               Table 2.1
                
                     Percentage of Flight Standards
                 Inspections With Reported Problems, by
                     Operator or Certificate Holder
                    Inspected, Fiscal Years 1990-96

                                                            Percentage
                                               Number of            of
                                             inspections   inspections
                                 Number of          with          with
Type of operator (FAR part)    inspections      problems      problems
----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
Air carrier (121)                  826,723        47,969            6%
Commuter (135)                     689,307        24,870            4%
General aviation (91)              171,237         4,450            3%
Repair station (145)               127,221         4,584            4%
Pilot schools (141)                 83,801         2,971            4%
Certification\a (65)                59,727           369            1%
Designated representatives          43,551           601            1%
 (183)\b
Other                              103,873         3,098            3%
======================================================================
Total                            2,105,440        88,912            4%
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Includes FAA's oversight of individuals with inspection
authorizations who certify airmen or nonairmen. 

\b Includes FAA's oversight of designated manufacturing and
airworthiness representatives, pilot examiners, maintenance
inspectors, medical examiners, technical personnel examiners, and
engineering representatives. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of PTRS data. 

Security inspectors recorded no violations for 91 percent of their
inspections.  For Security, the percentage of inspections with
violations varied more widely across the different types of entities
inspected than for Flight Standards.  Airport security inspections
consistently generated the highest percentage of violation reports,
averaging 22 percent compared with 8 percent for air carrier station
and hazardous materials inspections.  According to the Director of
the Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations, the emphasis on
controlling points of access may have led to more airport
inspections, and the numerous points of access at many larger
airports increase the likelihood that violations will be found during
airport inspections.  He noted that a number of new procedures being
conducted by air carriers, including profiling passengers and
screening their baggage, will probably increase the chances that
violations will be found during air carrier inspections.  (See table
2.2.)



                               Table 2.2
                
                Percentage of Security Inspections With
                Reported Violations, Fiscal Years 1990-
                                   96

                                                            Percentage
                                               Number of            of
                              Total number   inspections   inspections
Type of                                 of          with          with
inspection                     inspections    violations    violations
----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
U.S. airport                         8,121         1,799           22%
Air carrier station                 84,148         6,343            8%
Hazardous materials                 35,107         2,910            8%
======================================================================
All Security inspections           127,376        11,052            9%
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Fiscal year 1995 data on airports and air carrier stations
were not available from CASIS. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from AAIRS and CASIS. 

The percentage of inspections with reported problems or violations
varied, sometimes substantially, among FAA's regional offices.  For
example, the rate of reported violations for hazardous materials
inspections ranged from 5 percent in the Northwest Mountain and
Central regions to 50 percent in the Southern region in fiscal year
1996 (see table III.2).  The Director of the Office of Civil Aviation
Security Operations, suggested that the regional differences in the
rate of reported violations for hazardous materials inspections may
be attributable to differences in (1) the level of knowledge of the
regulations and the compliance disposition of shippers and forwarders
and, to a lesser extent, of carriers located in those regions and (2)
the volume of hazardous materials handled through those airports.  We
were unable to validate this explanation or to link such regional
differences more directly to possible differences in workload or the
types of entities located in these regions.  The identification of
regional differences in the rate of reported violations is most
useful as a basis for discussions by headquarters and regional
program office staff to better understand the reasons for these
differences, to exchange information on effective ways to detect
hazardous materials violations, and to promote consistency in FAA's
response to violations of federal security regulations. 


   OBSERVED VIOLATIONS ARE NOT
   CONSISTENTLY REPORTED IN
   INSPECTION TRACKING SYSTEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Despite guidance requiring the entry of problems or violations into
their respective program office's databases for tracking the results
of inspections, inspectors do not consistently report violations. 
Many of those we interviewed and surveyed volunteered that they
handle many violations informally and, if compliance can be achieved
on the spot, may not enter violations into their tracking system. 

Underreporting is not new:  Previous GAO reports and those of DOT's
Inspector General have noted that inspectors did not report all
violations.\3 Seventy percent of the Flight Standards inspectors and
78 percent of the Security inspectors we surveyed said they did not
enter all of the violations they found into their respective
inspection tracking system in fiscal year 1996, the year covered by
our survey.  Thirty percent of the Flight Standards inspectors and 22
percent of the Security inspectors said they entered all or virtually
all of the violations they observed (96 to 100 percent).  Of the
inspectors surveyed, 5 percent of the Flight Standards inspectors and
7 percent of the Security inspectors said they did not enter any
violations at all.  (See table 2.3.)



                               Table 2.3
                
                 Reporting of Violations in Inspection
                 Tracking Systems, by Type of Inspector

                                     Percentage of       Percentage of
                                  Flight Standards            Security
Proportion of violations              inspectors\a        inspectors\a
reported                                  (number)            (number)
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
All or almost all (96-100%)               30 (128)             22 (21)
More than half (51-95%)                   36 (152)             46 (45)
Half or less (1-50%)                      30 (127)             25 (24)
None (0%)                                   5 (20)               7 (7)
======================================================================
Total                                    100 (427)            100 (97)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. 

Source:  GAO's surveys of Flight Standards inspectors and Security
inspectors. 

The FAA inspection staff we interviewed held differing views on FAA's
reporting requirements.  Some believed that their program office's
guidance requires them to enter violations into their inspection
tracking system, while others maintained that the shift in FAA's
enforcement philosophy has made entering violations unnecessary if
compliance can be achieved informally.  One operations inspector told
us that he and other inspectors handle less serious violations, such
as recordkeeping violations, informally because they do not have
enough time to enter the violations into PTRS.  He believed, however,
that he is required to enter every violation into PTRS.  According to
the Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification,
underreporting of violations undermines the agency's ability to
monitor compliance and target inspection and enforcement resources
effectively. 


--------------------
\3 Aviation Safety:  Problems Persist in FAA's Inspection Program
(GAO/RCED-92-14, Nov.  20, 1991); Aviation Safety:  Needed
Improvements in FAA's Airline Inspection Program Are Underway
(GAO/RCED-87-62, May 19, 1987); Federal Aviation Administration: 
Audit of Aviation Inspection Program DOT, Office of Inspector General
(R6-FA-2-084). 


   RATE OF DETECTION IS LOWER FOR
   ROUTINE INSPECTIONS THAN FOR
   INSPECTIONS USING STRUCTURED
   PROTOCOLS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

The type and rigor of inspections can affect the percentage that
identify problems or violations.  Recent reviews of FAA's inspection
programs suggest that FAA detects more problems or violations through
rigorous, structured inspections than through routine inspections. 
In 1995, for example, Security developed new protocols for
comprehensive inspections, which specified the tasks that teams must
complete before such inspections can be counted as complete.  After
Security fully implemented these new protocols in fiscal year 1996,
the average rate of reported violations more than doubled, from 9
percent for the 7-year period to 19 percent for fiscal year 1996, and
the rates for inspections of airports, air carrier stations, and
hazardous materials increased.  The number of inspections with
reported violations was also more than 27 percent higher than for any
previous year, largely because more violations were found during
inspections of air carrier stations.  In addition, in fiscal year
1996, the percentage of reported violations was higher for
comprehensive inspections and structured tests of compliance with
security directives than for routine supplemental inspections. 
Specifically, 28 percent of the comprehensive inspections and 39
percent of the structured tests identified violations, compared with
13 percent of the supplemental inspections. 

Security managers said that inspectors' use of the new inspection
protocols resulted in more systematic, comprehensive, and consistent
inspections.  They also noted that Security followed up on its
efforts, reviewing both the implementation of the new protocols and
the new AAIRS inspection reports after 6 months.  Security then
provided additional guidance to inspectors, stressing the importance
of reporting all violations and of differentiating clearly between
violations and observations.  Because the guidance was issued late in
fiscal year 1996, insufficient data were available to determine the
effect of the follow-up reviews and guidance on inspectors' reporting
practices.  Other possible reasons for the increase in the percentage
of reported violations, according to the Director of the Office of
Civil Aviation Security Operations, include Security's aggressive
testing of compliance with security directives, which started in
November 1995, and Security's extension of hazardous materials
inspections from large air carriers to smaller carriers and freight
forwarders, whose rates of noncompliance are often higher. 

Recent analyses of Flight Standards inspections also suggest that
rigorous team inspections identified more violations than routine
inspections.  At least some of these violations were systemic
problems that could have been, but were not, observed during routine
inspections.  In April 1996, DOT's Office of Inspector General
presented testimony that fewer than 1 percent of the 34,581 ramp
inspections conducted in fiscal year 1995 identified problems that
resulted in enforcement actions.  The testimony contrasted this low
rate of findings and enforcement actions with the results of 105
in-depth inspections of commercial operators that used more
structured, standardized inspection procedures; disclosed nearly
2,300 findings; and resulted in the suspension of operations by four
commercial operators.\4 Reiterating a recommendation first made in
1992 but not yet adopted, the Inspector General called on Flight
Standards to identify the tasks required for each type of inspection
to ensure completeness and consistency.\5 The Office of Inspector
General suggested that FAA might be able to reduce the number of ramp
inspections and improve the effectiveness of the inspection program
by adopting a more structured methodology and by using inspectors who
did not inspect the same operators day after day.  The testimony
concluded that FAA has the ability to do more realistic, unannounced,
in-depth inspections and that such inspections would probably
identify more violations and result in more enforcement cases. 

Our recent review of FAA's oversight of repair stations also found
that the standardization of inspection tasks through the use of
checklists or other job aids is important in conducting effective
inspections.\6 Specifically, the use of such aids provides assurance
that all areas have been adequately covered and that a repair station
complies with the applicable regulations.  While FAA does not require
the use of a checklist for routine surveillance, teams are more
likely than individual inspectors to use checklists or other job
aids.  According to FAA headquarters officials, such lists are
provided to teams to encourage the development of good work processes
by each inspector without removing the flexibility required to
evaluate a repair station's compliance.  In our view, the use of a
checklist or other job aids would not diminish an inspector's
flexibility during inspections but would help to ensure that
comprehensive inspections are being performed.  At a minimum, the use
of such tools would remind inspectors to check the most
safety-critical elements of a repair station or other aviation
facility. 

Our review of repair stations also noted that individual inspectors
generally identify far fewer deficiencies than teams do.  Teams
conducting 19 in-depth inspections of repair stations in fiscal years
1993 through 1996 identified a total of 347 deficiencies, only 15 (4
percent) of which had been identified and reported by individual
inspectors in the 12 to 18 months preceding the in-depth inspections. 
Often, the deficiencies identified in the special inspections but not
in the regular inspections were significant.  For example, an
inspection team found that a repair station was not segregating new
and serviceable parts from those that were not serviceable.  We
concluded that although surveillance by a single inspector may be
adequate for smaller or more specialized repair stations, it is less
effective for large, complex facilities, where team inspections have
identified more deficiencies.  In addition, we concluded that team
inspections were more independent, comprehensive, focused, and
standardized than inspections conducted by a single inspector. 
Because the problems found during in-depth Flight Standards
inspections are not recorded as "U"s or "P"s in PTRS, we could not
readily compare the percentage of deficiencies reported for special
inspections and for other types of inspections. 

Security's experience with the new inspection protocols supports our
observations and those of DOT's Inspector General that Flight
Standards could benefit from the use of more structured team
inspections.  While certain types of security violations, such as the
failure to display proper identification, may be easier to identify
and document than violations by mechanics that may not be readily
visible during inspections, more structured Flight Standards
inspections could identify more violations.  Both the Acting Deputy
Manager of the Flight Standards Service and the Director of the
Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations cautioned, however, that
the types of inspections conducted should not be driven only by the
percentage of violations detected.  They stressed the importance of
routine surveillance and some spot inspections in their inspection
programs.  In addition, in commenting on this report, DOT noted that
Sandia National Laboratory recently completed an evaluation of Flight
Standards' inspection and surveillance program in an effort to move
toward the use of more systematized oversight, team inspections, and
performance measures in evaluating the aviation industry's compliance
with safety requirements. 


--------------------
\4 The in-depth inspections were conducted as part of the National
Aviation Safety Inspection Program.  Statement of the Assistant
Inspector General for Auditing, Office of Inspector General, U.S. 
Dept.  of Transportation Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management and the District of Columbia, U.S.  Senate
(Apr.  30, 1996). 

\5 Federal Aviation Administration:  Audit of Aviation Inspection
Program, DOT, Office of Inspector General (R6-FA-2-084, May 29,
1992). 

\6 These special inspections included National Aviation Safety
Inspection Program inspections and Regional Aviation Inspection
Program inspections.  Special inspections are performed by teams of
inspectors that are independent of the district offices that have
oversight responsibility for the carriers or facilities being
inspected.  Aviation Safety:  FAA Oversight of Repair Stations Needs
Improvement (GAO/RCED-98-21, Oct.  24, 1997). 


   INSPECTION TRACKING SYSTEMS DO
   NOT DISTINGUISH MAJOR FROM
   MINOR VIOLATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

FAA's databases for tracking inspections identify safety and security
violations by indicating which parts of the Federal Aviation
Regulations were violated.  Thus, they generally indicate the number
and type, but not the seriousness, of reported violations.  According
to inspectors we interviewed, the tracking systems quantify the
numbers of violations but do not reflect their relative seriousness. 
Because the tracking systems do not allow FAA to distinguish major
from minor violations, the agency cannot use the results of its
inspections as an early warning system to identify the greatest
potential risks to aviation safety and security and to target its
inspections to addressing these risks. 

Ten years ago, we reported that FAA needed to develop criteria for
targeting safety inspections to airlines whose characteristics may
indicate safety problems.  In February 1995, we reported that FAA had
developed a system for targeting Flight Standards inspections--the
Safety Performance Analysis System (SPAS).  However, as we reported
then and in April 1996, the quality of the data on which this system
depends is problematic.  The data, which come from many FAA
databases, including PTRS, are incomplete, in large part because of
underreporting.  Furthermore, according to the inspectors we
interviewed for this report, SPAS does not distinguish major from
minor violations.  SPAS is, therefore, of limited use in setting
risk-based priorities for inspections.  For these and other reasons,
none of the 14 inspectors we interviewed was using SPAS in the field
to identify airlines with potential safety problems and to target
their inspections accordingly. 

In commenting on our draft report, DOT noted that while the
historical information on inspection results in the inspection
databases provides one indicator of risk, FAA also considers the
level of risk and the extent of the public's exposure to it in
allocating inspection resources.  For example, DOT said that the
Office of Civil Aviation Security analyzes risks to the aviation
system on the basis of the system's vulnerabilities and uses threat
analysis to deploy its inspection resources.  DOT's response also
stressed the importance of the training, knowledge, and judgment of
its inspector workforce in overseeing the aviation industry's
compliance.  We concur that inspection results are only one of many
factors appropriately considered in allocating FAA's inspection
resources.  While we agree that the expertise and diligence of
inspectors are critical elements in the oversight process, the
underreporting of problems and violations detected during inspections
jeopardizes the reliability of analytical tools that inspectors rely
on, in part, in forming their judgments about the industry's
compliance.  In addition, the lack of agency guidance on which
violations are major and have the greatest potential impact on safety
leaves inspectors wide latitude in exercising judgment about how to
handle violations.  Such latitude and the exercise of discretion by
inspectors and legal staff were cited by airline officials and
private attorneys we interviewed as contributing to perceived
inconsistencies in FAA's response to regulatory violations. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6

Although FAA inspectors conduct thousands of inspections annually,
not all problems or violations they observe are entered into their
respective program office's tracking system.  In addition, Flight
Standards allocates a large portion of FAA's inspection resources for
unstructured inspections by individuals that typically produce few
reports of problems.  Finally, FAA's inspection tracking systems do
not distinguish major from minor violations.  For all of these
reasons, FAA's information on compliance in the aviation industry is
incomplete.  Incomplete information compromises the accuracy of key
databases available to FAA for identifying trends in violations and
for targeting its resources to the greatest potential threats to
aviation safety and security.  In addition, FAA cannot readily use
the results of its inspections as an early warning system. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:7

To strengthen FAA's inspection process to provide more complete and
accurate information on potential problems in aviation safety and
security--so that information can provide early warning of potential
risks and serve as a basis for allocating the agency's inspection
resources--we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct
the FAA Administrator to take the following actions: 

  -- Revise FAA Order 2150.3A to require that FAA's inspection staff
     report all observed problems and violations in their respective
     program office's tracking system.

  -- Develop guidance for inspectors to distinguish major from minor
     violations, improve FAA's inspection databases to incorporate
     these distinctions, and develop a plan for focusing FAA's
     resources on the violations with the greatest potential impact
     on aviation safety and security. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:8

In written comments on our report, DOT suggested that the safety
record of air carriers transporting passengers would be a better
measure of the aviation industry's compliance with regulations than
inspection results.  As we state in the report, there are no direct
measures of the industry's compliance with safety and security
regulations.  Given the relatively rare occurrence of fatal air
carrier crashes, we believe that inspection results and other
indicators of safety problems are appropriate indirect measures of
the industry's compliance with regulations that can provide early
warning of potential safety risks and some sense of the industry's
compliance with regulations.  As air traffic increases in the next
decade, FAA's inspections and other indicators will be critical to
improving safety and avoiding the increase in fatal crashes that is
projected if the current crash rate continues.  In addition, DOT's
response stressed the technical training and experience of FAA's
inspection workforce and the judgment inspectors are expected to
exercise on the basis of that expertise.  While this report does not
address FAA's training of inspectors, we have issued reports on the
need for more technical training to enable inspectors to stay abreast
of changing technologies and work assignments (see the list of
related GAO products at the end of this report). 

In response to DOT's comments, this chapter incorporates additional
information on FAA's recent efforts to help systematize Flight
Standards' inspection processes and on the factors FAA uses in
assessing potential risk and in allocating the agency's resources,
including the level of risk and the extent of the public's exposure
to it.  DOT also mentioned efforts by FAA and U.S.  airlines to
implement Flight Operational Quality Assurance programs in
cooperation with the industry.  We recently reported extensively on
these programs, which use flight data to detect technical flaws,
unsafe practices, or conditions outside of operating procedures early
enough to allow timely intervention to avert accidents or
incidents.\7 In addition, we revised the report's wording where
appropriate to respond to technical and legal comments provided
separately by FAA.  Although DOT did not comment explicitly on GAO's
recommendations, DOT agreed that actions can be taken that will
further strengthen its inspection programs, improve compliance with
applicable requirements, and strengthen its analytical capability. 
DOT added that some actions have already been completed and others
are under way.  For example, more structured procedures are already
in use for Security inspections, and evaluations were recently
completed to help standardize Flight Standards inspections. 


--------------------
\7 See Aviation Safety:  Efforts to Implement Flight Operational
Quality Assurance Programs (GAO/RCED-98-10, Dec.  2, 1997). 


FAA'S ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
============================================================ Chapter 3

During fiscal years 1990 through 1996, FAA opened 109,866 enforcement
cases in response to reported violations of aviation safety and
security regulations.  FAA's inspections generated the largest
percentage of reports that led to enforcement cases, followed by
sources outside FAA, and then other sources within FAA.  Inspectors
exercised discretion in opening enforcement cases in response to
reported problems and violations.  According to the inspection staff
we surveyed, several factors discourage the opening of cases,
including FAA's emphasis on compliance over enforcement, burdensome
administrative tasks, and the outcomes of prior enforcement cases. 

During the 7-year period of our review, FAA closed almost 121,000
enforcement cases,\1 using administrative action, legal action, and
no action.  Over this period, it increased its reliance on
administrative action while decreasing its use of legal action.  When
FAA did use legal action, it typically lowered the penalties
recommended by its inspection staff.  In addition, it used different
types of penalties to resolve cases against different types of
aviation operators.  For example, it used certificate actions, which
can close down an operation, against small operators and individuals,
but not against major or national air carriers.  FAA's regional
offices also varied in their handling of enforcement cases, sometimes
substantially.  DOT and FAA officials attributed these differences
broadly to differences in regional enforcement philosophy or to
variations in workload, the airlines or airports overseen, and
community standards and laws. 

Our review showed that both the sequence and the time for processing
enforcement cases often depended on factors other than the cases'
impact on aviation safety and security.  In part because its
enforcement database, like its inspection databases, does not
distinguish major from minor cases, FAA cannot readily set risk-based
priorities for resolving enforcement cases. 


--------------------
\1 During the period we reviewed, the number of cases closed differed
from the number of cases opened because some cases were opened before
1990. 


   INSPECTIONS WERE THE LARGEST
   SINGLE SOURCE OF REPORTED
   VIOLATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

In fiscal years 1990 through 1996, FAA's inspections generated 48,346
(45 percent) of the reports of aviation safety and security
violations that led to the opening of 109,866 enforcement cases. 
Other FAA sources, such as air traffic controllers, accounted for 14
percent of these reports, while outside sources--including state and
local governments, the public, and the aviation industry--accounted
for the remaining 41 percent.  Violations identified by other FAA and
outside sources are transferred to FAA's five program offices for
investigation and processing.  Figure 3.1 illustrates the sources and
disposition of reports for fiscal year 1996, a year whose data were
typical of the 7-year period reviewed.  For example, in fiscal year
1996, sources other than inspections generated 49 percent of the
violation reports that led to enforcement cases during that year,
compared with 55 percent for the entire period of our review. 

   Figure.  3.1:  Sources of
   Enforcement Cases in Fiscal
   Year 1996

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's analysis of EIS data. 

Noninspection activities conducted by air traffic controllers and
other FAA personnel can identify violations that result in violation
reports and may lead to enforcement actions.  FAA inspectors and all
other staff who observe violations in areas that they are not
responsible for investigating refer these violations to staff in the
responsible program offices for investigation and, if appropriate,
enforcement action.  In fiscal year 1996, for example, Air Traffic
referred 1,131 such reports to Flight Standards.  The reported
violations included deviations by pilots from their assigned
altitudes that were observed by air traffic controllers.  Inspectors
said that the information provided by air traffic controllers and
other FAA sources is generally sufficient to initiate and process
enforcement cases.  According to inspectors and program managers with
whom we spoke, the violation transfer process generally works well
within FAA. 

Reports from sources outside FAA provided the basis for about 41
percent of the enforcement cases opened during the 7-year period we
reviewed.  Nonindustry sources, such as police reports and public
complaints, accounted for 37 of the 41 percent.  State and local
governments--usually police called in to make arrests when weapons
were detected at airport screening checkpoints--accounted for about
one-fifth of the violation reports during this period.  For example,
violation reports from the police were the basis for 38 percent of
the over 6,850 enforcement cases that Security initiated in fiscal
year 1996.  Security inspectors said that the information provided by
the police is generally sufficient to initiate and process
enforcement cases.  In contrast, inspectors said that public
complaints, which generated 5 percent of the violation reports that
resulted in enforcement cases, sometimes do not provide specific
information, such as the names and addresses of violators or aircraft
numbers, needed to pursue cases.  Public complaints and tips have,
however, provided valuable leads.  Recently, for example, a
whistleblower's complaints led FAA to uncover an air carrier's
falsification of flight and training records.  In April 1997, FAA
revoked the carrier's operating certificate.  Reports of violations
that were voluntarily self-disclosed by industry sources generated 4
percent of the enforcement cases opened during fiscal years 1990
through 1996. 


         THE AVIATION INDUSTRY'S
         VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS HAVE
         GROWN IN IMPORTANCE, BUT
         FAA HAS NOT EVALUATED
         THEIR EFFECTIVENESS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:1.0.1

FAA has increased its reliance on the aviation industry's voluntary
programs and is planning to expand its use of partnership programs. 
The number of violations reported through both types of programs has
grown, from under 1 percent of the violations that led to enforcement
cases in fiscal year 1990 to nearly 6 percent in fiscal year 1996. 
In January 1997, FAA announced that it would make Aviation Safety
Action programs available to air carriers and to repair stations, and
it published policies and procedures for establishing a 2-year
demonstration program.  FAA's expansion of the use of partnership
programs is consistent with the recommendations of the White House
Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, which was formed in
response to the crash of TWA Flight 800.  The Commission endorsed the
partnership approach and, in February 1997, called for extending it
to airport security. 

FAA and airline officials interviewed for this report varied in their
views on whether and to what extent the agency should expand its use
of partnership programs.  Supporters said that such programs yield
important safety information that would probably not surface through
inspections, given the limited number of FAA inspectors.  The FAA
inspector and American Airlines official who oversee this airline's
partnership program both said that the few FAA inspectors responsible
for overseeing American Airlines had the potential to detect only a
few of the problems reported through its partnership program.  The
participants in FAA's pilot partnership programs also attributed
improvements to the programs.  For example, safety officials from one
airline cited corrections to the procedures used by ground and flight
crews after new deicing equipment was installed at the Pittsburgh
International Airport; these corrections responded to concerns
identified through the partnership program.  Other FAA and airline
officials stressed the need for caution in expanding partnership
programs to other aviation entities and to employees such as baggage
handlers and security screeners.  Some FAA officials questioned
whether the partnership programs are being monitored closely enough
to deter repeat violations. 

In testifying on the challenges to implementing the White House
Commission's recommendations, we cautioned that important
considerations for partnership programs include how to determine
which aviation entities are best suited to such partnership programs,
how to monitor them, how to make effective use of the data they
offer, and how to standardize and share such information across the
aviation industry to maximize improvements in aviation safety.\2
Because it is still too early in the process, FAA has not yet
formally evaluated the existing partnership programs to determine
whether they are working as intended or should be revised.  FAA
recognized the need to monitor partnership programs in its updated
study on compliance and enforcement.\3


--------------------
\2 Aviation Safety and Security:  Challenges to Implementing the
Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security (GAO/T-RCED-97-90, Mar.  5, 1997). 

\3 Compliance and Enforcement Review, Report Update, FAA (May 1,
1997). 


   INSPECTION STAFF EXERCISE
   DISCRETION IN OPENING
   ENFORCEMENT CASES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

Even when inspectors record problems or violations in their program
office's inspection tracking system, they do not necessarily open
enforcement cases.  Neither FAA Order 2150.3A nor FAA's program
office guidance generally requires them to do so.  Instead, FAA's
guidance generally allows room for inspectors to exercise discretion
in initiating enforcement cases.  DOT's response to our draft report
stressed that FAA's inspection workforce is technically trained and
experienced and is expected to exercise judgment based on expertise
to select appropriate methods to achieve compliance.  As discussed
below, the judgment and discretion exercised by Flight Standards
inspectors in determining whether to initiate enforcement cases in
response to reported problems and violations appears to be greater
than that exercised by Security inspectors.  The exercise of
discretion supported by DOT and allowed for in FAA's guidance may,
however, contribute to perceived inconsistencies in FAA's response to
regulatory violations. 

In fiscal years 1990 through 1996, the rate of initiating enforcement
cases was much lower for Flight Standards than for Security.  In
Flight Standards, about one in four of the problems reported in PTRS
became an enforcement case.  Flight Standards conducted over 2.1
million inspections, reported problems for just under 89,000 (4
percent), and opened enforcement cases on the basis of 25,392 of its
inspections with problems.  Not all problems coded with a "U" or a
"P" in the comment section of PTRS are violations of aviation safety
regulations.  According to the Acting Manager of the Flight Standards
Service, some problems are not violations and may be resolved without
an enforcement action.  For example, an inspector may recommend
additional training to correct a problem. 

In contrast, the number of enforcement cases based on Security
inspections exceeded the number of inspections with violations
reported in AAIRS or CASIS in fiscal years 1990 through 1996.  This
was possible because a single violation found during an inspection of
an air carrier station--the most common type of Security
inspection--can result in cases against all of the carriers that
share responsibility for that station.  For example, if several
carriers hire a contractor to screen passengers at an airport
security checkpoint and the contractor fails to detect a concealed
weapon during an inspection, FAA could open enforcement cases against
all of the carriers.  During the 7-year period we reviewed, Security
conducted nearly 127,400 inspections, reported violations for 11,052
(9 percent), and opened 12,850 enforcement cases on the basis of
these reports.  In fiscal year 1996, the percentage of inspections
with reported violations increased to 19 percent, more than double
the 9 percent reported in fiscal years 1990 through 1996.  The
Director of the Office of Civil Aviation Security Operations said
that the percentage of enforcement cases opened in response to
violations should be high because Security emphasizes the reporting
of violations and requires that enforcement cases be opened for all
violations of security directives.  (See fig.  3.2.)

   32.eps> Figure 3.2:  Numbers of
   Inspections, Inspections With
   Problems or Violations
   Reported, and Enforcement Cases
   Opened in Fiscal Years 1990-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  GAO's analysis of data
   from EIS provided by FAA.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Because the percentage of inspections with reported problems or
violations was substantially higher for Security than for Flight
Standards, Security's contribution to FAA's enforcement caseload was
disproportionately high.  Flight Standards, which conducted 94
percent of FAA's inspections, initiated over 53,600 enforcement
cases, or just under half of FAA's enforcement workload during fiscal
years 1990 through 1996.  Security, which conducted about 2 percent
of FAA's inspections and has about 10 percent as many inspection
staff as Flight Standards, initiated about 41 percent of FAA's
enforcement cases. 


   SEVERAL FACTORS DISCOURAGE THE
   OPENING OF ENFORCEMENT CASES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

Our surveys of 600 Flight Standards inspectors and 175 Security
inspectors included questions about their overall perceptions of
their own success in fostering compliance with the Federal Aviation
Regulations and FAA's enforcement process as a method for fostering
compliance.  The surveys also included questions to determine what
factors influence the opening of enforcement cases.  We also
discussed these questions in interviews with inspectors. 


      FOSTERING COMPLIANCE WITH
      THE FEDERAL AVIATION
      REGULATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1

Inspectors rated their own efforts as significantly more successful
than the agency's enforcement process in fostering compliance with
the Federal Aviation Regulations.  Specifically, 81 percent of the
Flight Standards inspectors and 67 percent of the Security inspectors
surveyed rated their own efforts in fostering compliance with the
regulations in fiscal year 1996 as moderately or very successful.  In
contrast, over two-thirds of each group of inspectors surveyed rated
FAA's enforcement process as no better than fair as a method of
fostering compliance, and 31 percent of the Flight Standards
inspectors and 37 percent of the Security inspectors rated the
enforcement process as a poor or very poor method of fostering
compliance. 


      EMPHASIS ON GAINING
      COMPLIANCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2

The two reasons most frequently cited by inspectors for not opening
enforcement cases stemmed from changes in FAA's enforcement
philosophy.  Nine out of 10 Flight Standards inspectors (89 percent)
and Security inspectors (86 percent) cited the belief that compliance
is more important in the long run than enforcement.  Similarly, 9 out
of 10 believe gaining immediate compliance is more important than
taking enforcement action.  (See fig.  3.3.)

   Figure 3.3:  Reasons for Not
   Initiating Enforcement Cases in
   Response to Violations

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's surveys of Flight Standards inspectors and Security
inspectors. 


      IMPACT OF VIOLATIONS ON
      AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.3

The impact of violations on aviation safety and security was also a
factor in whether enforcement cases were initiated.  In response to
our survey, two-thirds of the Flight Standards inspectors (63
percent) and Security inspectors (67 percent) said they do not always
initiate enforcement cases because they want to save enforcement for
situations that endanger public safety.  In interviews, inspectors
said they often do not report, or initiate a case for, a violation
that does not present an immediate threat to safety and can readily
be corrected.  In 1992, DOT's Inspector General also reported that
inspectors in four district offices said they did not initiate
enforcement cases for such problems. 

In responding to our surveys, inspectors linked a violation's impact
on safety with two other factors in determining whether to initiate
an enforcement case--the violator's attitude and the violator's prior
enforcement history.  All three of these factors are ones that FAA
Order 2150.3A suggests be considered in deciding whether to use
administrative or legal action to resolve a violation.  Specifically,
when a violation represents an immediate threat to safety, the
violator shows an uncooperative attitude, and the violation is a
repeat offense, 9 out of 10 of Flight Standards inspectors (93
percent) and Security inspectors (96 percent) said they would be very
likely to initiate an enforcement case.  Our analysis shows that none
of the three factors is more likely to result in an enforcement case
than the other two.  The inspector is most likely to pursue
enforcement if at least two of the three factors are present.  If
only one of the three factors is present, inspectors are less likely
to pursue enforcement.  If none of the three factors is present, most
Flight Standards inspectors (62 percent) and Security inspectors (75
percent) are unlikely to open enforcement cases. 


      BURDENSOME ADMINISTRATIVE
      TASKS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.4

The amount of paperwork involved in enforcement cases also deters
their initiation.  In response to our survey, well over half of the
Flight Standards inspectors (66 percent) and Security inspectors (58
percent) said they do not initiate enforcement cases because doing so
entails too much paperwork, especially for minor violations.  In
their view, the paperwork is not worth the effort for many
violations. 

In interviews, inspectors also elaborated on their concerns about the
amount of paperwork.  One inspector emphasized that the time spent on
paperwork is time taken away from his primary job of providing
on-site inspections.  Another inspector saw a trade-off between
monitoring and inspections, on the one hand, and paperwork, on the
other.  Believing that his time was better spent on monitoring and
inspections, he often chose not to report violations in his program
office's inspection tracking system if he could achieve compliance on
the spot. 

A 1995 FAA study identified the burdensome administrative tasks
associated with using EIS as particular obstacles to the opening of
enforcement cases.  Because EIS is not linked to the program offices'
inspection tracking systems, the results of inspections must be
entered manually a second time for violations that result in
enforcement cases.  In addition, EIS is outdated and difficult to
use.  As a result, according to the study, "data entry does not occur
in a timely manner." Furthermore, the gaps between the program
offices' inspection tracking systems and EIS make the status of
reported violations and enforcement cases difficult for inspectors to
track.  The study contained recommendations for making EIS more user
friendly and determined that the cost of streamlining several
enforcement processes and creating interfaces to transfer information
automatically from the program offices' inspection tracking systems
to EIS would be around $2.8 million.  The study concluded that the
savings from these changes, which would eliminate the need to enter
the same data twice and would increase the system's accuracy, would
pay for the changes in a little over a year.  Flight Standards, which
is responsible for financing and maintaining EIS, did not implement
the changes because, according to the Acting Manager of the Flight
Standards Service, other projects received higher priorities for
funding. 


      OUTCOMES OF LEGAL CASES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.5

Finally, the outcomes of legal cases were cited as a major reason for
not opening enforcement cases.  Well over half of the Flight
Standards inspectors (66 percent) and Security inspectors (59
percent) we surveyed said they do not initiate enforcement cases
because the region's legal staff are likely to drop the cases or
reduce the penalties recommended by the inspection staff.\4 About the
same number of Flight Standards inspectors (63 percent) and Security
inspectors (59 percent) said they do not initiate cases because
resolution takes too long.  In interviews, inspectors stressed that
they prefer to achieve compliance on the spot, if possible, rather
than rely on a lengthy and uncertain enforcement process.  A number
of the program managers we interviewed also expressed these same
concerns. 


--------------------
\4 For the reasons cited by FAA legal staff for dropping cases or
reducing penalties, see page 58. 


   FAA IS RESOLVING MORE CASES
   THROUGH ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

In fiscal years 1990 through 1996, FAA closed an average of nearly
17,400 enforcement cases per year, resolving 46 percent through
administrative actions, 34 percent through legal actions, and 19
percent through no action.\5 FAA's use of administrative actions
increased from 35 percent in fiscal years 1990 through 1992 to 49
percent in fiscal year 1993, the peak year for both the number of
inspections conducted and the number of enforcement cases closed. 
From fiscal year 1994 through fiscal year 1996, FAA resolved more
than 50 percent of its cases each year through administrative
actions.  (See fig.  3.3.) This increased reliance on administrative
actions reflects FAA's emphasis, since 1990, on using alternatives to
legal enforcement and on cooperating with the aviation industry to
achieve compliance. 

   Figure 3.4:  Options Used to
   Resolve Enforcement Cases,
   Fiscal Years 1990-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  In EIS, the 121,757 cases reported as closed and the 55,665
cases reported as resolved through administrative actions are
slightly understated because one program office, Airports, does not
report its administrative actions in EIS.  As a result, FAA cannot
track its full enforcement workload or determine the full extent of
its reliance on administrative actions.  According to the Manager of
the Airport Safety and Operations Division, Airports does not report
its administrative actions in EIS because the system is cumbersome,
outdated, and difficult to use.  Airports provided available data
showing that it processed 872 administrative actions in fiscal years
1994 through 1996. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 

It is difficult to assess whether compliance or corrective action is
being achieved through the increased use of administrative actions or
through any type of FAA enforcement action.  We, the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and DOT's Inspector General have
identified follow-up to ensure the completion of corrective action as
a problem for FAA.  In November 1991, for example, we reported that
FAA inspectors had identified 9,115 problems that were, or had the
potential to be, in noncompliance with either regulations or other
safe operating practices but that FAA headquarters did not know how
many of these problems had been corrected because inspectors were not
required to account for the disposition of identified problems.  In
September 1989, NTSB reported that poor flight crew discipline and
coordination contributed to a Delta Air Lines accident involving 14
fatalities and 26 serious injuries.  According to NTSB, FAA
inspectors had consistently observed these deficiencies but had not
then required corrective actions.  NTSB cited the lack of
sufficiently aggressive action by FAA in ensuring the correction of
these deficiencies as a contributing cause of the accident.  In
addition, in May 1992, DOT's Inspector General reported that
inspectors did not properly follow up on deficiencies identified
during ramp inspections and that, in two district offices, airlines
had not properly corrected deficiencies.  Finally, in September 1996,
we reported that although FAA generally concurred with the
recommendations of GAO, NTSB, and DOT's Inspector General, its
tracking systems showed corrective actions as completed before safety
initiatives had been completed to fully resolve the safety problems
that gave rise to the recommendations.  Because of these
long-standing problems with follow-up, it is difficult to determine
whether FAA's administrative or legal actions have achieved
compliance or corrective action. 


--------------------
\5 The resolution could not be determined for 1 percent of the
enforcement cases because of missing data. 


   LEGAL STAFF REDUCED PENALTIES
   RECOMMENDED BY INSPECTION STAFF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

In closing cases in fiscal years 1990 through 1996, attorneys in the
regions and in headquarters routinely reduced the penalties
recommended by inspectors.  Specifically, they reduced the fines in
79 percent of the 20,179 civil penalty cases settled during these 7
years, settling for a median fine of 25 cents on the proposed penalty
dollar.  In one-third of the civil penalty cases, they settled for no
fine at all.  (See table II.1.) The attorneys also reduced the
recommended suspensions in 58 percent of the 11,658 certificate
actions settled during fiscal years 1990 through 1996, accepting a
median suspension of 30 days instead of the median 60 days
recommended by inspectors.  In 27 percent of the certificate action
cases, they settled for no suspension at all.  (See table II.2.)
Officials cited a number of reasons for these reductions in
penalties. 

The percentage of cases with reductions in recommended penalties was
lower for certificate actions than for civil penalty cases because,
according to the Acting Director of the Flight Standards Service, the
violations that result in certificate actions often involve errors in
flight operations and are generally viewed as serious.  The
recommended penalties are therefore more likely to be sustained. 
Furthermore, as FAA has made administrative options available for
handling cases against general aviation pilots, the number of
certificate actions has declined.  Now, when cases are handled as
certificate actions, the recommended penalties are more likely to be
sustained than in the past. 

The nine regional counsels we interviewed offered several reasons for
deciding to settle cases for less than the inspection staff had
recommended.  One regional counsel said that FAA does not have the
legal resources to try all cases.  Other regional counsels said that
the original evidence may not be strong enough to sustain a good
case, mitigating evidence may emerge, and limits on the violator's
ability to pay or other circumstances may warrant reducing the
original penalty.  In addition, according to several regional
counsels, U.S.  attorneys have been reluctant to pursue or have
allowed aviation cases under their jurisdiction (those with penalties
over $50,000) to sit.\6 Finally, the regional counsels raised
questions about the appropriateness of the penalties initially
recommended by FAA's inspection staff.  They said, for example, that
inspectors sometimes have difficulty calculating appropriate
penalties for multiple infractions from the table of sanctions in FAA
Order 2150.3A, which presents ranges of penalties for single
infractions.  In addition, the regional counsels said that the
penalties suggested in the order's guidance on sanctions are often
higher than the penalties awarded in court, particularly by NTSB
judges.  As a result, they said, they often need to lower the
recommended penalties.  Our analysis showed, however, that the
penalties initially recommended by the legal staff were similar to
those recommended by the inspection staff and that the reductions in
penalties generally occurred after the legal staff's review--that is,
in the course of preparing cases, negotiating settlements, or
resolving cases in court. 

Our review of 33 files from cases closed in the Great Lakes region in
fiscal year 1996 and in the Southwest region in fiscal year 1995
confirmed many of the reasons cited by the regional counsels for
reducing penalties.  Civil penalty cases showed reductions because
violators were unable to pay or because adjustments were needed to
bring the penalties in line with those recently awarded in similar
court cases.  FAA also reduced penalties in accordance with its new
procedures for expediting the resolution of certain Security weapons
cases.  Finally, FAA dropped some cases after determining that they
were not appropriate to pursue. 

Frustration over the legal staff's handling of enforcement cases
surfaced repeatedly in the comments of inspectors and program
managers, both in interviews and in responses to our surveys.  About
three-quarters of the inspection staff surveyed favored requiring the
legal staff to obtain their concurrence on changes to recommended
penalties.  In addition, several inspectors reported being
discouraged when, after spending many hours preparing cases, the
cases were dropped or the penalties lowered.  As one inspector said,
"legal [is likely to] water [the case] down, delay it for an
embarrassingly long time, or simply drop it altogether." Another
inspector added that it "is very damaging to the inspector in the
field when the violator is expecting to get some kind of penalty for
his actions and then all of a sudden they are [off] scott free."\7

The inspectors we interviewed were also frustrated by the lack of
feedback from legal staff on the status of their cases and on the
reasons why recommended penalties were reduced.  Several reported
losing track of their cases once the cases went to the regional legal
offices.  To correct perceived problems in communication, at least
four-fifths of the inspection staff responding to our survey favored
increasing coordination with the legal staff, encouraging direct
contact between the legal staff and the inspection staff for advice,
and improving feedback to the inspectors on the outcomes of legal
cases. 

FAA is revising the table of sanctions in FAA Order 2150.3A, which
may indirectly improve communication between the agency's inspection
and legal staff on modifying recommended penalties.  A preamble to
the draft revised table explains the appropriate reasons for imposing
or revising penalties.  FAA's draft revision also attempts to align
the suggested penalties more closely with the penalties resulting
from recent court decisions.  This draft revision should help
inspectors recommend penalties that are more likely to be sustained
in negotiations or in court.  However, the draft revision provides
general guidance rather than the specific feedback on the disposition
and resolution of individual cases sought by inspectors. 


--------------------
\6 49 U.S.C.  46107 (b) and 49 U.S.C.  46301 (d) (4). 

\7 To prevent inspectors from becoming frustrated with lowered
penalties, two of the Flight Standards district offices in FAA's
Alaska region are now forwarding cases to the region's legal office
without recommending penalties, leaving their determination up to the
attorneys.  According to the regional counsel, this approach helps to
focus the inspectors on preparing their cases and to keep them from
becoming emotionally fixated on the penalties. 


   PENALTIES VARIED FOR DIFFERENT
   TYPES OF OPERATORS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

According to a number of inspectors, FAA regional counsels, and
private attorneys we interviewed, FAA treats major air carriers more
favorably than smaller operators during the enforcement process.  To
evaluate these claims, we analyzed the civil penalties and
certificate actions taken in fiscal years 1990 through 1996 against
(1) major air carriers (those with annual operating revenues of more
than $1 billion),\8 (2) national air carriers (those with annual
operating revenues of $100 million to $1 billion),\9 (3) other
smaller commercial operators (those who hold an operating certificate
from FAA and have a four-letter code indicating the type of
certificate), and (4) individuals (for example, pilots or mechanics
who hold an operating certificate from FAA but do not have a
four-letter code or individuals who are arrested for trying to carry
weapons through security screening checkpoints). 

Our analysis showed that FAA handles enforcement cases against major
and national air carriers differently from those against other
commercial operators and individuals.  In the cases closed during
fiscal years 1990 through 1996, FAA consistently used civil penalties
(fines) against all categories of operators but certificate actions
(suspensions or revocations) only against other commercial operators
and individuals.  Specifically, the agency suspended or revoked the
certificates of 52 commercial operators and more than 11,600
individuals.  Under Order 2150.3A, FAA may use a civil penalty
against a certificate holder when it determines that the disruption
in service caused by a certificate action--which can close an
operation--would have a substantial adverse impact on the public
interest and that this impact would not be outweighed by safety
considerations.  For example, according to the order, FAA may take a
certificate action against an individual certificate holder and a
civil penalty action against an air carrier as warranted.  In effect,
according to FAA's Deputy Chief Counsel, carriers that provide a
significant portion of the air service or sole service to certain
destinations receive civil penalties instead of certificate actions
when violations occur. 

According to several private aviation attorneys we interviewed, FAA
sometimes handles cases against national carriers and other smaller
operators by allowing them to "voluntarily" surrender their operating
certificates rather than face emergency revocations of the
certificates.\10 Questioning whether the types of alleged violations
warranted potential emergency action, one attorney suggested that the
threat of emergency action might be a way for FAA to avoid the due
process that would be required for a nonemergency certificate action
or for a civil penalty case.  This attorney noted that in an
emergency case, no independent person evaluates the facts and
judgments made by FAA before it determines to revoke or suspend the
certificate, whereas, in a civil penalty case or nonemergency
certificate action, such due process rights are afforded.  Another
attorney also questioned whether major carriers were being allowed to
continue operating after committing similar types of violations for
which they were not penalized by FAA.  According to the regional
counsel for FAA's Enforcement Division, FAA has allowed carriers to
voluntarily cease operations so that they can correct problems and
return to compliance.  He characterized this approach as less harsh
than revoking a carrier's certificate--an approach that could have
more serious, long-term economic consequences for the carrier because
it must reapply to begin operations after its certificate has been
revoked. 

While FAA limited its use of certificate actions to other commercial
operators and individuals in fiscal years 1990 through 1996, it
imposed fines on violators in all four categories.  Although FAA
reduced the recommended fines in about 80 percent of the cases
against violators in all four categories during this 7-year period,
it settled for a median fine of around 30 cents on the recommended
penalty dollar in cases against major air carriers, national
carriers, and individuals while settling for a median fine of 9 cents
on the dollar in cases against other commercial operators.  (See
table II.3.) In fiscal year 1993, FAA experienced a significant
increase in its enforcement caseload and a corresponding decrease in
the amounts for which it settled.  In this year, when FAA had 104
cases against national carriers, it assessed them a median fine of
12.4 cents on the dollar, compared with a median fine of 99.6 cents
on the dollar in fiscal year 1990 when it had 33 cases against these
carriers.  In fiscal year 1996, FAA reduced about 80 percent of the
fines against all types of operators and settled for a median of 50
cents on the dollar in cases against major carriers, national
carriers, and individuals, while settling for a median fine of 25
cents on the dollar in cases against other commercial operators.  The
recommended fines averaged about $17,000 for major air carriers,
$35,600 for national air carriers, $14,400 for other commercial
operators, and $6,000 for individuals in fiscal year 1996. 


--------------------
\8 As of December 1996, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics
listed the following as major air carriers:  Alaska, America West,
American, Continental, Delta, Federal Express, Northwest, Southwest,
Trans World, United, United Parcel, and USAir. 

\9 The Bureau listed the following as national air carriers as of
December 1996:  Air Transport, Air Wisconsin, Aloha, American
International, American Trans Air, Arrow, Atlantic Southeast, Atlas,
Business Express, Carnival, Continental Express, Continental
Micronesia, DHL Airways, Emery, Evergreen, Executive, Hawaiian,
Horizon Air, Kiwi, Markair, Mesa, Midwest Express, Polar Air, Reno,
Rich, Simmons, Southern Air, Sun Country, Tower, Trans States, USAir
Shuttle, ValuJet, and World. 

\10 FAA's use of emergency revocation orders is the subject of
proposed legislation to require FAA to show just cause for bringing
an emergency revocation action against a certificate holder.  S. 
842, proposed on June 5, 1997, and H.R.  1846, proposed on June 10,
1997, also have procedures for expedited appeals by airmen and
require that NTSB hear the arguments for such appeals within 48 hours
and decide if a true emergency exists within 5 days. 


   REGIONS VARIED IN THEIR
   HANDLING OF ENFORCEMENT CASES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:7

FAA's regional offices varied in their handling of enforcement cases,
in some instances substantially.  While some variation in the types
of enforcement options used and in the extent of the reductions in
penalties could reasonably be anticipated, given the differences in
the types of aviation entities monitored and the types of cases
pursued, some of these regional variations were substantial and could
not be explained by FAA officials.  Such variations include the
following: 

  -- Regional variations in the types of enforcement actions taken,
     respectively, by Flight Standards and Security were pronounced. 
     In fiscal year 1996, for example, the use of administrative
     actions to close Security cases ranged from a low of 33 percent
     in the Central region to a high of 70 percent in the Western
     Pacific region, while the use of legal actions ranged from a low
     of 23 percent in the Eastern region to a high of 65 percent in
     the Central region.  (See table III.5.)

  -- The extent to which penalties were reduced varied substantially
     from region to region.  In fiscal year 1996, for example, the
     New England region settled for the lowest median penalty (13
     cents on the dollar), while five other regions settled for the
     highest median penalty (50 cents on the dollar).  (See table
     III.7.)

  -- For all four categories of aviation operators, FAA's regions
     varied both in the percentage of cases with reductions in the
     recommended penalties and in the extent of these reductions. 
     For example, in civil penalty cases against national carriers
     closed in fiscal years 1990 through 1996, the New England and
     Alaska regions settled for a median penalty of zero dollars,
     while the Northwest Mountain region settled for a median penalty
     of 67 cents on the recommended penalty dollar.  (See table
     III.11.)

Appendix III presents the regional data for each of our analyses. 

DOT officials suggested that regional differences in FAA's use of
enforcement actions were broadly attributable to variations in
workload, the entities overseen, and community standards and laws. 
The Department's response specifically cited differences in the size
of the region, the number of major airports or airlines managed in
the region, and such unique factors as the level and types of
activities and local laws.  DOT's response also cited, for example,
the need for inspectors to consider community norms and laws and the
level of activity at a given airport or other entity and to use
judgment in determining the appropriate level of action necessary to
achieve compliance.  In interviews and written comments, FAA
officials also attributed regional differences in the use of
enforcement actions to differences in enforcement philosophy among
FAA's regions.  These explanations were too broad to permit any
verification of specific links between these factors and the regional
variations in enforcement actions.  Such regional variations and the
discretion exercised by inspectors and legal staff were cited by
airline officials and private attorneys interviewed as contributing
to perceived inconsistencies in FAA's response to regulatory
violations. 


   SEVERAL FACTORS AFFECT
   PROCESSING PRIORITIES AND TIME
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:8

FAA's regional program and legal offices set their own priorities for
processing enforcement cases.  FAA has not established national
guidance for ranking enforcement cases because, according to FAA
officials, regional priority-setting allows for flexibility in
handling cases.  Emergency certificate revocation cases are usually
addressed first--often within 24 hours--followed by cases that must
be initiated within certain time limits. 

While delegating the responsibility for setting enforcement
priorities to the regions provides them with flexibility, it does not
necessarily allow FAA headquarters to target the agency's resources
to the greatest risks nationwide.  The regional counsel for the
Eastern region stressed the importance of such targeting, which is
practiced by major police departments and by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to address serious crime.  FAA currently has no way to
set national enforcement priorities, as its September 1996 internal
study, called the 90-Day Safety Review, recognized: 

There is currently no enforcement plan of action which prioritizes
violations discovered by inspectors that will allow the FAA to most
effectively apply investigative and legal resources.  This leads to a
wide range of violations that may not have a significant safety
impact and may require more legal resources to prosecute than are
available.  At the same time, prosecution of these violations may
detract resources from fully investigating or prosecuting more
complex cases or cases which have a greater safety impact. 

The study recommended that FAA develop a strategy for targeting its
inspection and legal resources to the areas with the most major
safety violations and cases.  As discussed below, FAA has formed a
workgroup to develop a strategy for identifying major cases. 

EIS does not contain the information that FAA needs to systematically
rank enforcement cases and to set risk-based processing priorities
among them.  Although it contains basic information on violators, the
types of violations committed, and the status and resolution of
cases, it does not distinguish major from minor cases--just as PTRS,
AAIRS, and CASIS do not distinguish major from minor violations. 

An FAA workgroup has begun to develop agencywide guidance for
identifying major cases.  The workgroup, which includes program and
legal staff, produced a draft statement on major cases in March 1997
that is undergoing internal review.  The draft statement acknowledges
the potential variation in the impact of different violations on
aviation safety or security, stresses the need to identify serious
violations, and supports the development of a program to help direct
the agency's inspection and legal resources to major cases.  The
statement proposed the development of an annual targeted enforcement
plan under which areas would be targeted for enhanced surveillance
and prompt handling by legal staff.  The areas would be developed by
both program office and legal staff through analyses of safety and
security data and trends.  Such analyses could, however, be
undermined by incomplete information resulting from the
underreporting of violations and the performance of incomplete
inspections.  While the plan would identify major cases nationally,
it would leave room to emphasize regional problems and issues.  The
workgroup's efforts, though just beginning, could assist FAA in
deploying its resources to the cases with the greatest potential
impact on aviation safety and security. 

During fiscal years 1990 through 1996, the time taken to resolve
individual cases ranged from less than 1 month to almost 23 years. 
(See table II.4.) The average time varied with the type of action
taken; overall, cases closed with administrative actions averaged 5
months while cases closed with no action averaged 16 months.  In
general, legal actions took longer:  Certificate actions averaged 15
months, civil penalty cases averaged a little over 2 years, and
consent orders averaged nearly 3 years to negotiate.\11

The only legal cases that took less time were certain weapons case,
which Security processed using streamlined procedures introduced in
fiscal year 1995.  In fiscal years 1995 and 1996, these cases
averaged under 4 months--less time than administrative actions. 

From region to region, the average time taken to process all types of
enforcement actions varied widely.  For example, the average time for
processing certificate actions ranged from 6 months in the Alaska
region to 24 months in the New England region; one certificate action
took FAA headquarters more than 5 years to process.  (See table
III.13.)

In fiscal year 1996, FAA closed 16,169 enforcement cases, resolving
80 percent in less than 1 year.  However, 833 cases took 3 years or
longer.  (See table 3.1.)



                               Table 3.1
                
                  Processing Time for Cases Closed in
                            Fiscal Year 1996

                                                     Percentage of all
Processing time                    Number of cases             cases\a
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
Less than 1 year                            12,946                80.1
From 1 year up to 3 years                    2,390                14.8
From 3 years up to 6 years                     606                 3.7
From 6 years up to 24 years                    227                 1.4
======================================================================
Total                                       16,169                 100
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Percentages may not add to 100 because of rounding. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 

Besides the type of enforcement action taken, several factors--some
of which were outside FAA's control--affected the time for processing
cases.  Some of these factors also influenced processing priorities. 


--------------------
\11 Consent orders include both global settlements of civil penalty
cases and consent orders negotiated when carriers voluntarily cease
operations. 


         ENFORCEMENT AND
         NONENFORCEMENT CASELOAD
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:8.0.1

Historically, FAA's enforcement caseload has influenced the time
required to resolve cases, and increases in the number of cases have
generally slowed their processing.  For example, when the number of
consent orders grew from 10 in fiscal year 1991 to 189 in fiscal year
1995, the average processing time increased from 17 months to 55
months.  A few of the regional counsels we interviewed acknowledged
that their enforcement workload has decreased somewhat with FAA's
increased use of administrative actions, self-disclosure programs,
and remedial training--all of which have shifted responsibilities
from the legal to the program offices.  However, some regional
counsels in FAA's regions expressed concern that their workload might
significantly increase and that they might not have enough attorneys
to deal with the potential influx of new cases that is likely to
result from the hiring of the 738 Flight Standards inspectors. 

FAA's legal offices have nonenforcement responsibilities that
influence both the number of enforcement cases they can handle and
the priority they can give to them.  According to FAA's regional
counsels, enforcement cases represent from 40 to 80 percent of the
legal workload, depending on the region, and all of the attorneys
work on enforcement cases only part of the time.  Some regional
counsels noted that their nonenforcement caseload has grown
significantly to include environmental issues, procurement matters,
and contract disputes.  Furthermore, some types of nonenforcement
cases, such as Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, have
mandatory time frames that require prompt handling even though such
cases may not have much impact on FAA's aviation safety and security
missions. 


         ACTIONS OF ACCUSED
         VIOLATORS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:8.0.2

The time needed to resolve legal enforcement cases can also be
lengthened by the actions of accused violators.  According to
inspection staff and regional counsels, by requesting informal
conferences, copies of information, prolonged negotiations, and
appeals--all of which are within their rights--accused violators can
increase the time needed to resolve cases and thus influence FAA's
processing priorities.  Several private aviation attorneys confirmed
that they attempt to delay cases.  These attorneys believe that the
longer a case is delayed, the more FAA is likely to settle for less
and the judge is likely to award a lower penalty.  An attorney for
one major carrier also said that the airline's policy is to "delay as
long as possible" and that the airline waits to settle until just
before the hearing date to take full advantage of the time value of
money.  FAA's enforcement procedural guidelines are set forth in
regulations and allow for requests of records, informal meetings, and
hearings in order to provide due process for the accused. 


         LEGAL REQUIREMENTS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:8.0.3

Deadlines for initiating cases and other statutes of limitation can
affect processing priorities.  Efforts to finish processing cases
before they "go stale"\12 and can no longer be prosecuted sometimes
push cases with less impact on aviation safety and security ahead of
those with more impact.  Such time limits may apply to both
certificate actions and civil penalty cases, as discussed in chapter
1 (see table 1.3).  Stale cases posed more of a problem for FAA in
the past than they do today.  Both in the mid-1980s, after the air
traffic controllers' strike, and in August 1992, when the agency was
faced with "an unacceptable backlog of open cases," FAA dropped
thousands of cases that were no longer legally prosecutable or had no
deterrent value.  By contrast, in fiscal year 1996, at least 166
cases went stale and were closed with no action.  These cases
represented about 3 percent of the enforcement cases handled by FAA's
legal staff during that year.\13

To determine why cases go stale, we interviewed the regional counsels
in all nine FAA regions and legal staff from headquarters, as well as
program managers and inspectors from the nine regions.  While the
legal staff cited deficiencies in the evidence developed and in the
investigative skills displayed by the inspection staff, the
inspection staff considered the legal staff's requests for
information excessive and maintained that the attorneys were
reluctant to try cases.  FAA's legal staff said they need to
prosecute cases they believe they can win because, if they lose, FAA
may be liable for the violators' legal fees under the Equal Access to
Justice Act.  In addition, FAA's legal staff cited the reluctance of
U.S.  attorneys to pursue aviation safety cases and the competing
demands of nonenforcement responsibilities as further reasons why
cases go stale.  Finally, legal staff identified NTSB's 6-month rule
for initiating the certificate actions it adjudicates as a factor in
cases going stale. 

Several regional counsels maintained that U.S.  attorneys have been
reluctant to pursue or have allowed aviation safety cases under their
jurisdiction--that is, cases with penalties over $50,000--to sit.\14
Our review did not determine how frequently U.S.  attorneys have
declined to pursue such cases or how often such cases have gone
stale.  Neither did it assess the impact of these cases on aviation
safety and security. 

Under NTSB's rule, an allegation against an individual airman,
mechanic, or other certificate holder generally must be dismissed
after 6 months if the individual's qualifications are not at issue. 
According to both inspection and legal staff, the rule does not allow
enough time to investigate cases, especially those involving
maintenance violations, which may take several months to discover. 
Several regional counsels said that the rule allows significantly
less time for processing than comparable federal statutes of
limitation.  According to several regional counsels, the 6-month time
limit encourages FAA to process affected cases ahead of cases with
more impact on safety or security and longer statutes of limitation. 
In addition, they said, FAA has not bothered processing cases when it
has learned of violations close to or after the 6-month date,
regardless of the safety concerns raised.  Of the 166 cases that went
stale in fiscal year 1996, 21 (about 13 percent) were certificate
actions that fell under NTSB's 6-month rule. 

We discussed the 6-month rule with NTSB's Deputy General Counsel, who
explained that the time limit, which has existed for decades, is
designed to protect both the alleged violator and FAA from the
erosion of evidence that can occur over time.  According to the
Deputy General Counsel, when FAA learns of a violation more than 6
months after it has occurred, FAA is responsible for demonstrating
that the agency has expedited the investigation and processing of the
case.  He said that this requirement has been in place since 1981 but
that he could not recall an instance in which FAA had provided
specific examples of what it had done to expedite such cases.  To
seek a change in the rule, he said, FAA would probably need to
initiate a petition for a rulemaking change, which would then undergo
formal public notice and comment.  He added that FAA would be
responsible for demonstrating why the 6-month limit should be
extended. 


--------------------
\12 A case is said to be stale if the alleged violator is not
notified of the violation within the prescribed time, which is
calculated from the date of the violation to the date that FAA sends
the violator a notice of proposed certificate action.  The time
depends on the type of violation, the identity of the violator, the
type of penalty, and/or the amount of the proposed penalty.  (See
table 1.3.)

\13 Of the 2,476 cases closed with no action, 166 (7 percent) were
closed because they had gone stale.  The reason for closing another
143 cases with no action could not readily be determined; hence,
these cases may or may not have gone stale.  For 118 of the stale
cases, the violations occurred in fiscal year 1994 or more recently;
for 7 cases, the violations dated from the 1980s. 

\14 49 U.S.C.  46107 (a) and 49 U.S.C.  46301 (d) (4). 


      RECENT ACTIONS COULD
      EXPEDITE PROCESSING AND
      IMPROVE PRIORITY-SETTING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:8.1

Recent and proposed changes in FAA's enforcement processes could
reduce the time needed to resolve cases and help FAA target its
resources more effectively to those with the greatest potential
impact on safety and security.  The use of warning tickets, recently
pilot-tested by Flight Standards in one region, and the use of
streamlined procedures for handling weapons cases, adopted by
Security in fiscal year 1995, have already reduced processing time. 


         WARNING TICKETS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:8.1.1

In June 1996, Flight Standards initiated a 4-month pilot program to
test the use of tickets, or warning notices, in FAA's Anchorage
Flight Standards District Office.  Under this program, an inspector
issues a ticket on the spot to a violator who claims to have no prior
violations.  The draft FAA report evaluating the ticket program
indicated that using tickets expedited the recording and processing
of violations, increased the number of violations reported by
participating inspectors, and was well received by both inspectors
and violators.  According to participating inspectors and ticket
recipients, the tickets reduced workload, raised safety awareness,
and deterred noncompliance.  The regional counsel in the Northwest
Mountain region said that ticketing was designed to reduce the
enforcement process to an appropriate size for minor violations.  He
also said that inspectors liked tickets because using them saved time
and violators liked them because they eliminated the uncertainty and
worry that could last for months with administrative actions.  The
Anchorage Flight Standards District Office has finished evaluating
the pilot ticket program and hopes to implement the program
regionwide once it has been reviewed and approved by FAA management. 

Using warning tickets could expedite FAA's handling of administrative
actions for simple, straightforward minor violations.  Like
administrative actions, tickets are appropriate for violations that
do not have a serious impact on safety or security, are not willful
or deliberate, and are committed by individuals without a prior
history of violations.  Tickets could provide immediate feedback on
and document the nature of a violation without involving a monetary
fine or a finding of violation.  While administrative actions take
about 4 months to process and close out, tickets could be issued
immediately, recorded in FAA's inspection and enforcement tracking
systems, and closed out.  More than four-fifths of the Flight
Standards inspectors and Security inspectors we surveyed favored the
use of warning tickets for minor violations.  In addition, over
three-quarters of the inspectors favored the use of tickets with
fines for minor violations. 


         STREAMLINED PROCEDURES
         FOR WEAPONS CASES
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 3:8.1.2

To expedite its handling of certain weapons cases, Security offered
to reduce the fines of those who paid their fine within 30 days of
receiving their notice of violation.  These undisputed cases were
against individuals who violated FAA's regulations by carrying
weapons through screening checkpoints or onto aircraft.  According to
the Security managers we interviewed, about 90 percent of the
violators accept the offer, in part because the arresting officer's
case file and witnesses' statements usually present clear-cut
evidence against the violator.  In addition, the reduced fine and
opportunity to clear the record create incentives for violators to
settle promptly.  Security inspectors also like the procedures
because they take less time and involve less paperwork than legal
enforcement procedures. 

Security's streamlined procedures for handling weapons cases against
individuals have reduced the time needed to process these legal
actions to about as much time as is needed for administrative
actions--4 months in fiscal year 1996.  Security officials made two
suggestions for further streamlining the processing of weapons cases. 
First, a field office manager suggested that Security inspectors
prepare only the initial part of the case paperwork instead of the
entire legal case before issuing a notice of violation, since most
violators accept FAA's offer of a reduced fine in exchange for prompt
payment.  Later, if the violator rejected FAA's offer, the rest of
the legal paperwork could be completed.  Second, a regional counsel
suggested that, when FAA's offer is accepted, the authority to issue
the order assessing a civil penalty be delegated from the regional
legal office to the regional Security office.  If a violator did not
pay within 30 days, the case could then be transferred to the legal
office. 

Security's streamlined procedures for handling weapons cases could be
extended to other types of Security violations.  Of the Security
inspectors responding to our survey, 66 percent favored applying the
process to certain hazardous materials cases, 90 percent to airport
violations, and 87 percent to air carrier violations.  Like weapons
violations, many hazardous materials violations are inadvertent.  For
example, someone may mail a flammable can of hair spray without
knowing that it presents a potential hazard if transported by
aircraft.  Furthermore, both types of cases are often clear-cut and
uncontested.  Several Security inspectors we interviewed suggested
that the streamlined process could readily be applied to such
inadvertent hazardous materials violations. 

The streamlined process might also be applied to certain safety
violations handled by Flight Standards.  Specifically, legal cases
against individuals arising from inadvertent actions that are serious
enough to warrant a finding of violation and a fine might be
candidates for this approach.  However, the idea of offering lower
fines for uncontested violations met with less universal support from
Flight Standards inspectors than from Security inspectors, perhaps
because they have not had the experience with this program that
Security inspectors have had.  Still, 53 percent of the Flight
Standards inspectors responding to our survey favored the idea. 
Several FAA workgroups are currently reviewing ways to further
streamline Security's weapons cases and are considering the
applicability of this process to other types of Security and Flight
Standards cases. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:9

The disconnect between FAA's inspection and enforcement tracking
systems not only discourages the opening of enforcement cases but
also hinders the systematic tracking of a violation from its
identification during an inspection through its resolution as an
enforcement case.  Furthermore, the lack of distinction between major
and minor cases in FAA's enforcement tracking system hampers the
targeting of enforcement resources to the cases with the greatest
potential impact on aviation safety and security.  Newly developed
guidance on identifying major cases could assist FAA in setting
risk-based priorities for allocating its enforcement resources.  In
addition, extending the use of warning tickets and other streamlined
procedures for minor, uncomplicated cases could expedite the
enforcement process and free resources for major cases with an
important impact on aviation safety or security. 

Linking FAA's inspection and enforcement tracking systems could
streamline FAA's enforcement processes and help to provide inspectors
with the information they seek on the status of cases they have
initiated.  Feedback from FAA's legal staff, particularly on their
reasons for altering the penalties recommended by the inspection
staff, could supplement this information and enhance the inspection
staff's interest in reporting all violations. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:10

To strengthen FAA's enforcement process and the agency's capacity to
better encourage and monitor compliance with aviation safety and
security regulations, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation direct the FAA Administrator to take the following
actions: 

  -- Take steps to improve the usefulness of FAA's databases for
     identifying and targeting enforcement resources to the most
     serious aviation safety and security problems by (1) updating
     the cost estimates to directly link FAA's inspection and
     enforcement tracking systems and moving forward on this
     initiative if it would prove cost-effective and could streamline
     the enforcement process and (2) developing a process for
     distinguishing major from minor enforcement cases and for
     focusing FAA's resources on the cases with the greatest
     potential impact on aviation safety and security.

  -- Require legal staff to inform inspectors periodically of the
     status of cases and to explain why penalties are reduced. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:11

In its written comments, DOT suggested that we include in the body of
our report data from our surveys on self-assessments by inspectors of
their efforts to foster compliance with the Federal Aviation
Regulations.  We incorporated into the report survey data showing
that the vast majority of inspectors rated their own efforts to
foster compliance with the regulations as moderately or very
successful.  We also included related data showing that over
two-thirds of the inspectors surveyed rated FAA's enforcement process
as no better than fair as a method of fostering compliance.  Our
report noted that FAA's regional offices varied in their handling of
enforcement cases, in some instances substantially.  DOT attributed
these regional variations broadly to differences in regional
enforcement philosophy or to variations in workload, the airlines or
airports overseen, and community standards and laws.  These
explanations were too broad to permit any verification of specific
links between these factors and the regional variations in
enforcement actions.  We also added DOT's reasons for relying on
inspectors' judgment and discretion in determining appropriate
methods of achieving compliance.  DOT identified a number of actions
that have already been taken or are under way to improve the
effectiveness of its compliance and enforcement program.  Many of
these efforts, such as plans to identify and prioritize major cases,
as well as the use of warning tickets and streamlined procedures to
expedite the processing of Security weapons cases, are discussed in
this report.  We also revised the report's wording where appropriate
to respond to technical and legal comments provided separately by
FAA.  Although DOT did not comment explicitly on GAO's
recommendations, DOT agreed that actions can be taken that will
further strengthen its inspection programs, improve compliance with
applicable requirements, and strengthen its analytical capability. 


METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I

This appendix provides additional technical information on our
surveys of FAA's inspection staff and on the database analyses we
performed for our review of FAA's enforcement. 


   SURVEYS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

To examine FAA's initial processing of enforcement cases, we surveyed
the two largest program offices with responsibility for
inspections--inspectors within the Flight Standards Service (Flight
Standards) and special agents within the Office of Civil Aviation
Security (Security).  We mailed our surveys to two random samples of
employees (Flight Standards inspectors and Security inspectors)
classified in FAA's personnel databases as working in these jobs. 
The surveys asked respondents for their opinions on their own
performance in conducting surveillance, the reasons why some
violations do not result in enforcement cases, and improvements that
might be considered for the enforcement process.  Our response rates
for the two surveys were 89 percent for Flight Standards inspectors
and 86 percent for Security inspectors.  The responses to the two
surveys are summarized in appendixes II and III of this report. 

FAA provided two databases that included 2,368 Flight Standards
inspectors and 348 Security inspectors.  From these, we drew two
random samples--one of 600 Flight Standards inspectors and the other
of 175 Security inspectors.  These sample sizes were originally
designed to provide sampling errors of no more than 5 percent at the
95-percent confidence level.  For the Security inspectors, we based
the size of our sample on Security's statement that 243 inspectors
conducted inspections in fiscal year 1996.  However, the database
supplied by Security for mailing purposes included 348 inspectors who
were involved in inspections at the time the database was created. 
Our sampling errors, based on the true population of 348, are
therefore somewhat higher than 5 percent for some estimates. 

Since we used samples (called probability samples) to develop our
estimates, each estimate has a measurable precision, or sampling
error, which may be expressed as a plus/minus figure.  A sampling
error indicates how closely we can reproduce from a sample the
results that we would obtain if we were to take a complete count of
the universe using the same measurement methods.  By adding the
sampling error to and subtracting it from the estimate, we can
develop upper and lower bounds for each estimate.  This range is
called a confidence interval.  Sampling errors and confidence
intervals are stated at a certain confidence level--in this case, 95
percent.  For example, a confidence interval, at the 95-percent
confidence level, means that in 95 out of 100 instances, the sampling
procedure we used would produce a confidence interval containing the
universe value we are estimating. 

Tables I.1 and I.2 describe the sampling errors for our two surveys. 



                               Table I.1
                
                Sampling Errors for Selected Percentages
                     of Flight Standards Inspectors

Percentage                                              Sampling error
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
5                                                                ï¿½ 1.8
10                                                               ï¿½ 2.4
20                                                               ï¿½ 3.2
30                                                               ï¿½ 3.7
40                                                               ï¿½ 4.0
50                                                               ï¿½ 4.1
60                                                               ï¿½ 4.0
70                                                               ï¿½ 3.7
80                                                               ï¿½ 3.2
90                                                               ï¿½ 2.4
95                                                               ï¿½ 1.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Sampling errors are calculated for the 95-percent confidence
level using the finite population correction factor and 438 cases,
the smallest number of valid cases for questions with finite
categories.  The sampling errors for questions with more cases are
smaller than those reported here. 



                               Table I.2
                
                Sampling Errors for Selected Percentages
                         of Security Inspectors

                                  Sampling error\a    Sampling error\a
Percentage                                 (N=114)             (N=100)
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
5                                            ï¿½ 2.8               ï¿½ 3.0
10                                           ï¿½ 3.9               ï¿½ 4.2
20                                           ï¿½ 5.2               ï¿½ 5.6
30                                           ï¿½ 6.0               ï¿½ 6.4
40                                           ï¿½ 6.4               ï¿½ 6.8
50                                           ï¿½ 6.5               ï¿½ 6.9
60                                           ï¿½ 6.4               ï¿½ 6.8
70                                           ï¿½ 6.0               ï¿½ 6.4
80                                           ï¿½ 5.2               ï¿½ 5.6
90                                           ï¿½ 3.9               ï¿½ 4.2
95                                           ï¿½ 2.8               ï¿½ 3.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Sampling errors are calculated for the 95-percent confidence level
using the finite population correction factor.  The sampling errors
based on 114 cases are representative of most questions in the
survey.  The sampling errors based on 100 cases are a conservative
representation of the sampling errors for percentages reported in the
body of the report, which do not include nonresponsive answers such
as "no basis to judge." Question 7n, however, was answered by only 89
of the 114 respondents; the sampling errors for it range from ï¿½ 3.2
for 5 percent to ï¿½ 7.2 for 40 percent. 

We designed two questionnaires for our two surveys, one for Flight
Standards inspectors and one for Security inspectors.  While the
wording for many of the questions was identical, some questions were
modified to reflect differences in the employees' jobs.  Questions on
potential improvements to FAA's enforcement process also differed for
the two surveys.  (See apps.  IV and V for the exact wording of the
questions.) We conducted 35 pretests of our surveys in three of FAA's
nine regions, 24 with Flight Standards inspectors and 11 with
Security inspectors.  In each pretest, a single employee filled out
the questionnaire in the presence of two GAO observers.  Then, the
employee was interviewed by the observers to ensure that (1) the
questions were readable and clear, (2) the terms were precise, (3)
the survey did not place an undue burden on FAA employees that would
discourage participation, and (4) the survey appeared independent and
unbiased in its point of view.  The final survey was revised to
reflect the results of the pretests. 

In addition to pretesting the surveys, we obtained reviews of our
questionnaires from Flight Standards and Security managers in
Washington, D.C.  We also received comments from a survey research
psychologist at FAA's Training and Organizational Research Laboratory
in Oklahoma City and from officials of the union representing the FAA
inspectors we surveyed.  We incorporated comments from these reviews
as appropriate. 

During pretesting, it became evident that we needed procedures to
protect the privacy of the respondents and to guarantee the complete
anonymity of all survey responses.  To guarantee privacy, we mailed
every survey to the home address of the respondent.  To guarantee
anonymity, we retained no means of identifying the respondent on the
survey booklet or the return envelope.  This procedure prevented us
from knowing the identity of any respondent for the surveys returned
to us.  The use of a separate return postcard for follow-up purposes
allowed us to track which respondents did and did not mail back their
survey response. 

To increase the rate of response to our survey, we mailed a
prenotification letter to the respondents 1 week before we mailed the
survey itself on February 7, 1997.  We also used three mailings after
the survey, including (1) a reminder postcard 1 week after mailing
the survey, (2) a reminder letter to nonrespondents 18 days after
mailing the survey, and (3) a replacement survey to nonrespondents 4
weeks after mailing the survey.  We received the last survey included
in our analysis on March 28, 1997. 

We received responses to our survey from 536 Flight Standards
inspectors and 151 Security inspectors, for response rates of 89
percent and 86 percent, respectively.  Of those responding, 474
Flight Standards inspectors and 114 Security inspectors were
conducting inspections during fiscal year 1996.  Only these
respondents completed our survey, and only their responses are
included in the results presented in this report.  Table I.3
summarizes the survey returns. 



                               Table I.3
                
                       Summary of Survey Returns

                                         Inspectors surveyed
                                --------------------------------------
                                  Flight Standards            Security
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
Population size                              2,368                 243
Total sample size                              600                 175
Surveys returned\a                             536                 151
Eligible                                       474                 114
Not eligible                                    62                  37
Surveys not returned                            66                  24
Undeliverable                                    4                   4
No response\b                                   62                  20
Response rate\c                                89%                 86%
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Does not include surveys that were returned but not filled out. 

\b Includes surveys returned blank, surveys received after our
deadline, and surveys not received. 

\c Equals the number of surveys returned divided by the number
mailed. 


   DATABASE ANALYSES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2

A significant part of our review has involved obtaining and analyzing
data from the databases maintained by FAA's program offices to track
their inspections and from the agencywide database--the Enforcement
Information System (EIS)--maintained by Flight Standards to track all
enforcement cases.  Because about 90 percent of FAA's enforcement
cases are initiated by Flight Standards or Security, detailed
analyses focus on entries for these two program offices.  While
Security analyzed the data from its Airport/Air Carrier Information
Reporting System (AAIRS) and Civil Aviation Security Information
System (CASIS), we analyzed the data from Flight Standards' Program
Tracking and Reporting Subsystem (PTRS) and EIS. 

While we were unable to independently verify the accuracy of all the
data FAA provided, we did undertake a number of validation procedures
to ensure the quality of the data.  First, we performed extensive
checks of the internal consistency of the databases FAA provided.  In
several cases, we uncovered blank fields and coding errors.  We
discussed the resolution of these discrepancies with FAA database
personnel.  In addition, we reviewed available information from
internal FAA studies on EIS and other databases, as well as
inaccuracies in the data noted in prior reports by GAO and by the
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Inspector General, in evaluating
the reliability of the data we used. 

Before performing our analyses, we met with FAA database and program
office specialists responsible for these databases and discussed the
proposed analyses, the specific database fields needed to conduct the
analyses, and any unusual features of the databases.  We consulted
periodically with these specialists to resolve the handling of blank
fields and other problematic data entries.  After completing our
preliminary analyses, we documented our procedures in a detailed
memorandum to responsible managers in Flight Standards, Security, and
the Office of Chief Counsel.  We received written confirmation from
each manager that the analyses had been properly performed using the
appropriate data fields.  In June 1997, we met again with FAA
officials from the two program offices and the Office of Chief
Counsel to discuss the results of our surveys and database analyses
and to obtain their insights on the resulting findings. 


      PROGRAM TRACKING AND
      REPORTING SUBSYSTEM
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1

The PTRS data we analyzed represented the results of all completed
inspections that were not canceled or terminated and were
surveillance inspections for operations, maintenance, or avionics or
for the more intensive National, Regional, or Office Aviation Safety
Inspection Program inspections.  We used these data to determine the
number of flight-related inspections conducted by FAA overall and by
each FAA region, the number of these inspections in which inspectors
noted a problem or a violation, and the types of operations and air
carriers inspected.  While performing our analyses, we determined
that the data tapes supplied to us by FAA did not include any
information for the Western Pacific region for fiscal year 1991.  FAA
was unable to supply the missing data by our April 1, 1997, deadline. 
Hence, the PTRS data we analyzed for fiscal year 1991 understate the
number of inspections and "P" and "U" codes entered by inspectors
because they do not include the data for the Western Pacific region. 
We estimate that the missing data account for only about 2 percent of
the total inspections performed by Flight Standards in fiscal years
1990 through 1996.  Therefore, the absence of these data does not
affect the report's findings for all FAA regions and program offices
for the 7-year period reviewed. 


      ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION
      SYSTEM
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.2

We performed a number of analyses of EIS data to determine the types
of enforcement actions used to resolve cases, the time taken to
resolve cases, and the reductions made in penalties initially
recommended by inspectors. 


      TYPES OF ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
      USED TO RESOLVE CASES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.3

We used these data to determine the number and types of cases opened
in fiscal years 1990 through 1996.  We also analyzed the types of
violations associated with the cases opened during this period.  For
enforcement cases closed from fiscal years 1990 through 1996, we
analyzed trends in the numbers of cases closed and trends in the
enforcement actions used to close them (administrative actions, no
action, and various types of legal actions).  We also analyzed
differences in the use of these enforcement actions by region and by
program office (Flight Standards and Security), as well as any
regional differences in their use by these program offices. 


      TIME TAKEN TO RESOLVE CASES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.4

We performed a number of analyses to determine the time taken to
process cases from the date of the violation to the date of closure. 
For cases closed from fiscal years 1990 through 1996, we determined
the average and median time taken to adjudicate cases.  We analyzed
overall trends in the time taken to process cases and to complete
each enforcement action (administrative actions, no action, civil
penalties, certificate actions, consent orders, and other legal
actions).  We also performed analyses to determine the impact of
Security's streamlined procedures for handling weapons cases on the
time taken to process civil penalty cases.  We analyzed the
processing time for each enforcement action by program office (Flight
Standards, Security, and other FAA program offices) to determine
whether the type of violation affects the processing time.  We also
examined the cases closed with no action in fiscal year 1996 to
determine how many and what types of cases had "gone stale" by
exceeding the relevant statutes of limitation for processing or
NTSB's 6-month rule.  For the stale cases, we also determined which
legal offices processed the cases and which types of cases were
involved. 


      REDUCTIONS MADE IN
      RECOMMENDED PENALTIES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.5

We conducted a series of analyses to determine whether FAA modifies
the penalties recommended by inspectors when cases are initiated.  We
determined the average, median, and total monetary and nonmonetary
penalties associated with various types of cases and violators. 
Because the average settlement can be affected greatly by the outcome
of one or more cases with large recommended penalties, we also
computed the median settlement, which more closely reflects the
outcome of typical cases.  The median is the number representing the
point dividing the upper half of the responses from the lower half. 
We separately analyzed the civil penalty cases in which the initial
and final penalties were expressed in dollars (fines) and the
certificate action cases in which the initial and final penalties
were expressed in days (suspensions or revocations).  We also
analyzed regional variations in the percentage of penalties modified
and in the percentage of the original penalty assessed in the final
action.  After discussions with FAA, we deleted consolidated
cases--in which FAA accepts a reduced fine to settle a series of
cases with an airline or other entity--from our analysis of civil
penalty cases.  In EIS, the entire fine may be applied to the lead
case--and may exceed the recommended fine for that case--while no
fine may appear for the remaining cases.  The overall effect of
removing consolidated cases from our analysis is to decrease the
percentage of cases with modified penalties.  Because we used the
median dollar amount to measure the extent to which penalties were
modified, the exclusion of the consolidated cases has no effect on
our finding. 

We also analyzed whether penalties against certain types of violators
were handled differently from those against other types of violators
or individuals in fiscal years 1990 through 1996.  We used
definitions from the Bureau of Transportation Statistics to
categorize violators as major air carriers (annual revenues of more
than $1 billion) or national air carriers (annual revenues of $100
million to $1 billion).  We categorized the remaining violators as
other commercial operators with FAA codes and individuals, such as
private pilots, passengers who interfere with flight operations, or
people who are caught with weapons at airport screening checkpoints. 
We analyzed (1) the types of penalties used for these four categories
(major air carriers, national air carriers, other commercial
operators, and individuals); (2) the percentage of penalties that
were modified for each group; and (3) the percentage of the
recommended fines and suspensions that were assessed in the final
action.  Additionally, we determined the extent of regional variation
in the modification of penalties for each of the four categories. 


   CASE STUDIES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3

To gain a better understanding of the complex enforcement process, we
also reviewed 33 enforcement cases from the Great Lakes and Southwest
regions.  In the Great Lakes region, we focused our work on
understanding the different types of case outcomes--administrative
actions, no action, civil penalties, and certificate actions.  We
asked Flight Standards and Security managers and inspection staff to
suggest recently closed cases that they felt had resulted in
efficient processing and appropriate resolutions.  We also asked them
to suggest cases whose processing or outcomes presented concerns.  We
asked them to include cases with each type of resolution in both
groups. 

In the Southwest region, we focused our work on cases with reduced
penalties to learn more about why reductions occur.  To select
specific cases for review, we analyzed EIS data to identify cases
that were closed in fiscal year 1995 and had reduced penalties. 
Because FAA had not provided us with EIS data for fiscal year 1996
before we visited the Southwest region, we selected cases with
reduced sanctions from fiscal year 1995 data.  From among these
cases, we selected those with civil penalties as follows: 

  -- all cases (9) with initial recommended penalties of over
     $100,000;

  -- 5 cases with initial recommended penalties of $10,000 to
     $100,000;

  -- 3 cases with initial recommended penalties of $7,500, $5,000,
     and $2,500; and

  -- 1 case with an initial recommended penalty of $500. 

Similarly, we selected certificate actions as follows: 

  -- all cases (12) with initial recommended suspensions of 180 or
     more days,

  -- 2 cases with initial recommended suspensions of 90 days, and

  -- 2 cases with initial recommended suspensions of 30 days. 

Not all requested cases were available for our review:  Some files
were in use, some cases against individuals had been expunged after 2
years as FAA requires, and some cases had been initiated in the
region but processed by legal staff in FAA headquarters.  In all, we
reviewed 12 cases closed in the Great Lakes region in fiscal year
1996 and 21 cases closed in the Southwest region in fiscal year 1995. 


PENALTY MODIFICATIONS AND TIME
FRAMES FOR ENFORCEMENT CASES,
FISCAL YEARS 1990-96
========================================================== Appendix II



                                        Table II.1
                         
                         Reductions in Recommended Fines, Fiscal
                                      Years 1990-96

                         Percentage                                                Median
            Number of      of cases   Recommended                              settlement
                civil          with          fine   Actual fine    Percentage    in cents
Fiscal        penalty    reductions   (dollars in   (dollars in  reduction in      on the
year            cases      in fines     millions)     millions)          fine      dollar
---------  ----------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ----------
1990            1,367            72          $5.7          $1.9            68       $0.30
1991            2,979            75         $14.0          $3.5            75       $0.30
1992            3,359            77         $21.5          $5.9            73       $0.25
1993\a          4,621            86         $33.8          $7.1            79       $0.10
1994            2,721            77         $20.2          $5.8            71       $0.24
1995            2,739            77         $23.7          $8.0            66       $0.50
1996            2,393            79         $22.2          $7.5            66       $0.50
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a FAA's enforcement workload peaked during this year.  From fiscal
year 1990 through fiscal year 1993, the number of inspections
increased and the number of civil penalty cases tripled while the
staffing levels in FAA's legal offices remained unchanged. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                        Table II.2
                         
                             Reductions in Certificate Action
                            Suspensions, Fiscal Years 1990-96

                         Percentage
                           of cases         Total
                               with   recommended  Total actual    Percentage
            Number of    reductions    suspension    suspension  reduction in      Median
Fiscal     certificat            in      days (in      days (in    suspension  suspension
year        e actions   suspensions    thousands)    thousands)          days        days
---------  ----------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ----------
1990            2,095            58           144            83            42    30 of 60
1991            1,622            66           117            58            50    30 of 60
1992            1,836            63           136            72            47    30 of 60
1993            2,175            57           154            86            44    30 of 60
1994            1,541            54           114            64            44    30 of 60
1995            1,198            54            94            56            40    30 of 60
1996            1,191            50           100            64            36    30 of 60
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                        Table II.3
                         
                         Reductions in Recommended Fines, by Type
                            of Operator, Fiscal Years 1990-96

                         Percentage         Total                                  Median
                           of cases   recommended  Total actual                settlement
                               with         fines         fines    Percentage    in cents
Type of     Number of    reductions   (dollars in   (dollars in  reduction in      on the
operator        cases      in fines     millions)     millions)         fines      dollar
---------  ----------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ------------  ----------
Major air       1,586            85         $23.8          $9.0            62       $0.33
 carrier
National          506            83         $12.1          $3.1            74       $0.35
 air
 carrier
Other           2,595            84         $41.7          $8.2            80       $0.09
 commerci
 al
 operator
Individua      15,486            77         $63.4         $19.3            70       $0.27
 l\a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a In fiscal year 1995, FAA introduced streamlined procedures for
handling certain weapons violations, reducing fines by half in
exchange for payment within 30 days.  At FAA's request, we examined
the impact of these procedures on the reductions in recommended fines
against individuals in fiscal years 1995 and 1996.  Our analysis
showed that because streamlined weapons cases accounted for only 12
percent of the cases against individuals during these 2 years, the
reductions in penalties for these cases had little impact on the
reductions in penalties assessed in all cases against individuals. 
In fiscal year 1996, for example, individuals were assessed an
average fine of 26 cents on the recommended penalty dollar when the
weapons cases are excluded, compared with 27 cents on the dollar when
the weapons cases are included. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                               Table II.4
                
                 Time Taken to Process Various Types of
                Enforcement Actions, Fiscal Years 1990-
                                   96

                            (Time in months)

                                       Average      Median     Maximum
                         Number of  processing  processing  processing
Type of action               cases        time        time        time
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Administrative              55,612           5           2         132
No action                   23,241          16           7         256
Certificate action          18,589          15          10         291
Civil penalty               20,029          26          20         272
Consent order                  525          36          32          89
Other                        2,552          20           9         132
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 


REGIONAL VARIATION IN FAA'S
ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AND THEIR
OUTCOMES
========================================================= Appendix III



                              Table III.1
                
                     Percentage of Flight Standards
                 Inspections With Reported Problems, by
                        Office, Fiscal Year 1996

                                                            Percentage
                                               Number of            of
                                             inspections   inspections
                                             with one or   with one or
                                 Number of          more          more
Office                         inspections      problems      problems
----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
Region
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                              12,153           529             4
Central                             20,559           596             3
Eastern                             36,150         3,432             9
Great Lakes                         40,859         2,564             6
New England                         13,094         1,001             8
Northwest Mountain                  24,768         2,009             8
Southern                            48,015         1,790             4
Southwest                           33,251         1,069             3
Western Pacific                     41,552         1,642             4

Other
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical Center                    180             1             1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO's analysis of data from PTRS. 



                              Table III.2
                
                Percentage of Security Inspections With
                    Reported Violations, by Type of
                 Inspection and by Region, Fiscal Year
                                  1996

                                                            Percentage
                                               Number of            of
                                             inspections   inspections
                                             with one or   with one or
                                 Number of          more          more
Type of inspection/region      inspections    violations    violations
----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
Airport
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                                  46             1             2
Central                                 78             6             8
Eastern                                155            40            26
Great Lakes                            126            14            11
New England                             21             1             5
Northwest Mountain                     131             8             6
Southern                               123            43            35
Southwest                               92            14            15
Western Pacific                        108            18            17
======================================================================
Total                                  880           145            16

Air carrier
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                                 130            10             8
Central                                745            44             6
Eastern                              1,369           197            14
Great Lakes                            904           104            12
New England                            165            12             7
Northwest Mountain                     797            73             9
Southern                             1,276           199            16
Southwest                              864           100            12
Western Pacific                      1,588           172            11
======================================================================
Total                                7,930           922            12

Hazardous materials
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                                 464            80            17
Central                                136             7             5
Eastern                                180            15             8
European                                40             2             5
Great Lakes                            384           117            30
New England                             57            12            21
Northwest Mountain                     332            16             5
Southern                               400           201            50
Southwest                              292            23             8
Western Pacific                        401            37             9
======================================================================
Total                                2,686           510            19
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO's analysis of data from AAIRS and CASIS. 



                                       Table III.3
                         
                           Types of Enforcement Actions Used to
                                  Close Cases, by Office

                      Percentage of cases in which type of enforcement action was used
-----------------  ----------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Administrative            No action                 Legal
                   ----------------------  ----------------------  ----------------------
                       Fiscal                  Fiscal                  Fiscal
                        years      Fiscal       years      Fiscal       years      Fiscal
Office                1990-96   year 1996     1990-96   year 1996     1990-96   year 1996
-----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                     53          62          18          15          29          23
Central                    42          45          17          14          41          40
Eastern                    48          60          21          17          31          23
Great Lakes                45          50          26          16          29          33
New England                44          52          22          22          34          26
Northwest                  47          54          16          16          36          30
 Mountain
Southern                   36          46          21          17          42          36
Southwest                  50          49          18          17          32          33
Western Pacific            50          60          18          15          31          25

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical               19          18          12           8          62          65
 Center
Europe                     55          83          27          14          18           3
Headquarters               55          53          42          44           3           3
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                       Table III.4
                         
                           Types of Enforcement Actions Used to
                         Close Flight Standards Cases, by Office,
                                     Fiscal Year 1996

                            Percentage of cases in which type of enforcement action was
                                                        used
                           --------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Legal
                                                 ----------------------------------------
                Number of  Administra        No  Certificat     Civil   Consent
Office              cases        tive    action    e action   Penalty     order     Other
-------------  ----------  ----------  --------  ----------  --------  --------  --------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                300          64        13          15         7        \a         0
Central               355          31        25          25        17        \a         1
Eastern             1,063          58        19           9        11         0         3
Great Lakes           784          49        16          14         9        11         1
New England           244          44        30          15         9         1        \a
Northwest             708          47        24          15        11         1         1
 Mountain
Southern            1,317          46        22          17        13         0         2
Southwest           1,242          55        22           9         8         3         2
Western             1,013          46        21          16        15         0         2
 Pacific

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical           \a          \a        \a          \a        \a        \a        \a
 Center
European                3          33        33          \a        \a        \a        33
Headquarters           \a          \a        \a          \a        \a        \a        \a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  An additional 990 self-disclosure cases were handled by Flight
Standards in fiscal year 1996.  Self-disclosure cases are grouped
together, not by the region processing the case. 

\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                       Table III.5
                         
                           Types of Enforcement Actions Used to
                         Close Security Cases, by Office, Fiscal
                                        Year 1996

                            Percentage of cases in which type of enforcement action was
                                                        used
                           --------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                  Legal
                                                 ----------------------------------------
                           Administra
                Number of        tive        No  Certificat     Civil   Consent
Office              cases      action    action    e action   penalty     order     Other
-------------  ----------  ----------  --------  ----------  --------  --------  --------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                122          42        11           3        43        \a         0
Central               213          33         2          27        38        \a         0
Eastern               549          66        11           9        14        \a         0
Great Lakes           464          41        19           9        32        \a        \a
New England            86          43        15           1        41        \a        \a
Northwest             563          43         8          10        39        \a         0
 Mountain
Southern              811          35        12          10        41        \a         1
Southwest             783          38        11           4        45        \a         1
Western             1,362          70        11           5        14        \a         0
 Pacific

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical        1,029          18         8          63         2        \a        \a
 Center\
European               32          88        13          \a        \a        \a        \a
Headquarters           \a          \a        \a          \a        \a        \a        \a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                       Table III.6
                         
                          Percentage of Civil Penalty Cases With
                           Reductions in Recommended Fines, by
                               Office, Fiscal Years 1990-96

                                       Fiscal year
           --------------------------------------------------------------------
Office         1990      1991      1992      1993      1994      1995      1996   Average
---------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska           75        76        70        70        81        60        72        72
Central          65        68        74        80        75        73        82        74
Eastern          77        81        80        84        86        77        85        81
Great            66        76        75        88        82        82        86        81
 Lakes
New              80        78        79        84        89        81        83        82
 England
Northwest        71        75        68        77        64        76        81        73
 Mountain
Southern         78        71        80        86        69        70        72        76
Southwest        57        61        73        90        81        84        82        80
Western          78        83        84        89        85        79        69        83
 Pacific

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronauti        \a       100        75       100        88        86        92        86
 cal
 Center
European        100        80        70        78        83       100       100        83
Headquart         0        \a       100       100       100       100       100        99
 ers
=========================================================================================
All              72        75        77        86        77        77        79        79
 offices
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                       Table III.7
                         
                           Median Fines Negotiated, by Office,
                                   Fiscal Years 1990-96

                              (Fines in median cents on the
                               recommended penalty dollar)

                                                 Fiscal year
                     --------------------------------------------------------------------
Office                   1990      1991      1992      1993      1994      1995      1996
-------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                  $0.26     $0.40     $0.25     $0.27     $0.27     $0.53     $0.27
Central                 $0.50     $0.50     $0.40     $0.20     $0.25     $0.43     $0.50
Eastern                 $0.00     $0.10     $0.35     $0.10     $0.18     $0.50     $0.44
Great Lakes             $0.32     $0.25     $0.45     $0.00     $0.08     $0.50     $0.40
New England             $0.13     $0.23     $0.40     $0.00     $0.00     $0.00     $0.13
Northwest Mountain      $0.50     $0.40     $0.50     $0.28     $0.60     $0.50     $0.50
Southern                $0.27     $0.30     $0.20     $0.17     $0.25     $0.33     $0.50
Southwest               $0.75     $0.50     $0.20     $0.00     $0.20     $0.50     $0.50
Western Pacific         $0.17     $0.14     $0.20     $0.10     $0.16     $0.19     $0.50

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical Center        \a     $0.15     $0.15     $0.28     $0.00     $0.18     $0.00
European                $0.00     $0.00     $0.00     $0.00     $0.00     $0.31     $0.00
Headquarters            $1.00        \a     $0.00     $0.00     $0.00     $0.00     $0.00
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                       Table III.8
                         
                          Percentage of Certificate Actions With
                          Reductions in Recommended Suspensions,
                             by Office, Fiscal Years 1990-96

                                              Fiscal year
                         ------------------------------------------------------
Office                     1990    1991    1992    1993    1994    1995    1996   Average
-----------------------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  ------  --------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                       49      65      48      47      54      50      63        53
Central                      51      62      60      62      57      49      48        56
Eastern                      72      81      78      74      68      70      60        74
Great Lakes                  59      79      65      79      71      71      64        71
New England                  49      50      70      60      61      67      73        61
Northwest Mountain           51      63      52      50      54      55      57        54
Southern                     58      63      68      75      69      69      68        66
Southwest                    54      55      57      68      56      49      45        56
Western Pacific              56      64      61      61      61      60      67        61

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical Center          \a      27      59      35      36      39      34        40
European                     50      \a     100     100     100       a     100        88
Headquarters                 50      \a      \a      \a      \a      \a      \a        50
=========================================================================================
All offices                  58      66      63      57      54      54      50        58
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                       Table III.9
                         
                            Median Suspensions Negotiated, by
                               Office, Fiscal Years 1990-96

                                  (Suspensions in days)

                      Median negotiated suspension compared with recommended suspension
                                               for fiscal year
                     --------------------------------------------------------------------
Office                   1990      1991      1992      1993      1994      1995      1996
-------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska               10 of 10   5 of 10  10 of 10  10 of 10   7 of 10   9 of 10   6 of 10
Central               7 of 10   7 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   7 of 10  10 of 10  10 of 10
Eastern               5 of 10   1 of 10   3 of 10   3 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   7 of 10
Great Lakes           5 of 10   3 of 10   5 of 10   0 of 10   0 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10
New England          10 of 10   9 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10
Northwest Mountain    8 of 10   6 of 10   8 of 10   9 of 10   8 of 10   7 of 10   8 of 10
Southern              7 of 10   5 of 10   3 of 10   2 of 10   3 of 10   3 of 10   5 of 10
Southwest             7 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   2 of 10   7 of 10  10 of 10  10 of 10
Western Pacific       7 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10   5 of 10

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical Center        \a  10 of 10   5 of 10  10 of 10  10 of 10  10 of 10  10 of 10
European              8 of 10        \a   0 of 10   0 of 10   0 of 10        \a   0 of 10
Headquarters          8 of 10        \a        \a        \a        \a        \a        \a
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                              Table III.10
                
                 Percentage of Civil Penalty Cases With
                  Reductions in Recommended Fines for
                Different Types of Operators, by Office,
                          Fiscal Years 1990-96

                                       Type of operator
                        ----------------------------------------------
                                      National       Other
                         Major air         air  commercial
Office                     carrier     carrier    operator  Individual
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Region
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                          87          83          83          68
Central                         92          88          83          69
Eastern                         86          85          85          79
Great Lakes                     88          94          88          79
New England                     88          87          86          79
Northwest Mountain              76          71          71          73
Southern                        82          84          81          75
Southwest                       85          92          85          79
Western Pacific                 85          81          85          82

Other
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical Center             \a          \a          \a          86
European                        92          71         100          79
Headquarters                    \a         100          99         100
======================================================================
Total                           85          83          84          77
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                       Table III.11
                         
                         Fines Negotiated for Different Types of
                         Operators, by Office, Fiscal Years 1990-
                                            96

                            (Fines in cents on the recommended
                                     penalty dollar)

                                          Type of operator
           ------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  National air      Other commercial
           Major air carrier        carrier             operator           Individual
           ------------------  ------------------  ------------------  ------------------
             Median   Average    Median   Average    Median   Average    Median   Average
Office         fine      fine      fine      fine      fine      fine      fine      fine
---------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska        $0.46     $0.61     $0.00     $0.25     $0.25     $0.45     $0.40     $0.36
Central       $0.38     $0.35     $0.41     $0.20     $0.40     $0.27     $0.40     $0.25
Eastern       $0.30     $0.78     $0.56     $0.46     $0.16     $0.12     $0.20     $0.35
Great         $0.00     $0.45     $0.10     $0.12     $0.00     $0.14     $0.24     $0.37
 Lakes
New           $0.28     $0.22     $0.00     $0.03     $0.00     $0.34     $0.10     $0.27
 England
Northwest     $0.67     $0.50     $0.67     $0.51     $0.50     $0.27     $0.50     $0.57
 Mountain
Southern      $0.40     $0.26     $0.06     $0.15     $0.02     $0.36     $0.25     $0.24
Southwest     $0.33     $0.42     $0.40     $0.36     $0.00     $0.13     $0.33     $0.20
Western       $0.24     $0.22     $0.18     $0.13     $0.10     $0.14     $0.20     $0.29
 Pacific

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronauti        \a        \a        \a        \a        \a        \a     $0.05     $0.10
 cal
 Center
European      $0.00     $0.11     $0.00     $0.30     $0.22     $0.05     $0.00     $0.19
Headquart        \a        \a     $0.00     $0.00     $0.00     $0.01     $0.00     $0.04
 ers
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                              Table III.12
                
                  Suspensions Negotiated for Different
                 Types of Operators, by Office, Fiscal
                             Years 1990-96

                         (Suspensions in days)

                                       Type of operator
                        ----------------------------------------------
                           Other commercial
                               operator               Individual
                        ----------------------  ----------------------
                         Negotiated compared     Negotiated compared
                           with recommended        with recommended
                              suspension              suspension
                        ----------------------  ----------------------
Office                      Median     Average      Median     Average
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Region
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                     0 of 10     0 of 10     7 of 10     6 of 10
Central                    9 of 10     9 of 10     7 of 10     6 of 10
Eastern                    0 of 10     0 of 10     4 of 10     4 of 10
Great Lakes                0 of 10     3 of 10     3 of 10     4 of 10
New England                     \a          \a     5 of 10     6 of 10
Northwest Mountain         6 of 10     5 of 10     8 of 10     6 of 10
Southern                   0 of 10     2 of 10     5 of 10     5 of 10
Southwest                  0 of 10     5 of 10     5 of 10     5 of 10
Western Pacific            0 of 10     4 of 10     5 of 10     6 of 10

Other
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical Center             \a          \a    10 of 10     7 of 10
European                   0 of 10     0 of 10     0 of 10     2 of 10
Headquarters                    \a          \a     8 of 10     8 of 10
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  No major air carrier or national air carrier received a
suspension or revocation during the 7-year period. 

\a Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 



                                       Table III.13
                         
                            Time Taken to Process Enforcement
                          Actions, by Office, Fiscal Years 1990-
                                            96

                                     (Time in months)

                                         Type of enforcement action
                   ----------------------------------------------------------------------
                   Administra
                         tive              Certificat       Civil     Consent
Office                 action   No action    e action     penalty       order     Other\a
-----------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Region
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Alaska                      2           7           6          16          \b           6
Central                     2           5           8          14          \b           9
Eastern                    11          23          14          19           4          36
Great Lakes                 4          16          12          21          33          12
New England                 5          23          24          23          52          12
Northwest                   4           5          23          12           8           5
 Mountain
Southern                    4          13          18          16          11          30
Southwest                   3           9          14          12           8          10
Western Pacific             4          12          16          28          11          10

Other
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aeronautical                4          19           7          17          \b          \b
 Center
European                    9          26          \b          \b          \b          88
Headquarters                7           8          66          21          \b          \b
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Includes criminal sanctions, cease and desist orders, aircraft
seizures, and other penalties. 

\b Not applicable. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of data from EIS. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
SURVEY OF FAA INSPECTORS
========================================================= Appendix III



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



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(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix V
SURVEY OF FAA SECURITY SPECIAL
AGENTS
========================================================= Appendix III



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(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix VI
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION
========================================================= Appendix III



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INDIVIDUALS WHO REVIEWED GAO'S
DRAFT REPORT ON FAA'S INSPECTION
AND ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM
========================================================= Appendix VII

Dr.  Arnold Barnett
Professor
Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Stephen Michael Ketyer
Attorney at Law
Maplewood, New Jersey

Marshall S.  Filler
Senior Partner
Filler, Weller, & Tello, P.C.
Alexandria, Virginia

Kenneth P.  Quinn
Partner
Winthrop, Stimson, and Putnam
Washington, D.C. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
======================================================== Appendix VIII

RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C. 

John H.  Anderson, Jr.
Monique C.  Austin
Bonnie Beckett-Hoffmann
Elizabeth R.  Eisenstadt
Fran A.  Featherston
Curtis L.  Groves
Thomas A.  Kai
Julian L.  King

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

David K.  Hooper





RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1

Human Factors:  FAA's Guidance and Oversight of Pilot Crew Resource
Management Training Can Be Improved (GAO/RCED-98-7, Nov.  24, 1997). 

Aviation Safety:  Efforts to Implement Flight Operational Quality
Assurance Programs (GAO/RCED-98-10, Dec.  10, 1997). 

Aviation Safety:  FAA Oversight of Repair Stations Needs Improvement
(GAO/RCED-98-21, Oct.  24, 1997). 

Aviation Safety and Security:  Challenges to Implementing the
Recommendations of the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and
Security (GAO/T-RCED-97-90, Mar.  5, 1997). 

Aviation Safety:  New Airlines Illustrate Long-Standing Problems in
FAA's Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-97-2, Oct.  17, 1996). 

Aviation Safety:  Targeting and Training of FAA's Safety Inspector
Workforce (GAO/T-RCED-96-26, Apr.  30, 1996). 

Aviation Safety:  Data Problems Threaten FAA Strides on Safety
Analysis System (GAO/AIMD-95-27, Feb.  8, 1995). 

FAA Technical Training (GAO/RCED-94-296R, Sept.  26, 1994). 

Aviation Safety:  FAA and the State Department Can Better Manage
Foreign Enforcement Cases (GAO/RCED-94-87, Mar.  17, 1994). 

Aviation Safety:  Progress on FAA Safety Indicators Program Slow and
Challenges Remain (GAO/IMTEC-92-57, Aug.  31, 1992). 

Aviation Safety:  FAA Needs to More Aggressively Manage Its
Inspection Program (GAO/T-RCED-92-25, Feb.  6, 1992). 

Aviation Safety:  Problems Persist in FAA's Inspection Program
(GAO/RCED-92-14, Nov.  20, 1991). 

Aviation Safety:  Emergency Revocation Orders of Air Carrier
Certificates (GAO/RCED-92-10, Oct.  17, 1991). 

Aviation Safety:  FAA's Safety Inspection Management System Lacks
Adequate Oversight (GAO/RCED-90-36, Nov.  13, 1989). 

Aviation Training:  FAA Aviation Safety Inspectors Are Not Receiving
Needed Training (GAO/RCED-89-168, Sept.  14, 1989). 

Aviation Safety:  FAA Needs to More Aggressively Manage Its
Inspection Program (GAO/T-RCED-92-25, Feb.  6, 1992). 

Aviation Safety:  Needed Improvements in FAA's Airline Inspection
Program Are Underway (GAO/RCED-87-62, May 19, 1987). 


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