Indian Issues: Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's Additional Compensation Claim
for the Oahe Dam (Letter Report, 01/28/98, GAO/RCED-98-39).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed a private consultant's
economic analysis of compensation due to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe
for the construction of the Oahe dam on tribal lands.
GAO noted that: (1) the consultant's primary approach, which produced an
estimate of $300.7 million in additional compensation, relies on
questionable assumptions about the value of the tribe's losses in the
1950s; (2) the consultant's secondary approach, which produced an
estimate of $279.1 million, was used to support the primary approach;
(3) like the approach GAO proposed in 1991, it uses the tribe's 1954
request as a basis for calculating additional compensation; (4) however,
it provides a single figure for additional compensation, rather than a
range such as GAO proposed in 1991; (5) in addition, it includes an
amount for rehabilitation as well as an amount for damages, while the
primary approach provides only for damages; (6) neither of the
consultant's approaches includes an amount for administrative expenses;
(7) the extent to which the tribe should receive additional compensation
for damages--and whether the tribe should receive additional payments
for rehabilitation and administrative expenses--is a policy question for
Congress to decide; (8) to provide Congress with information for such
decision-making, GAO used its 1991 approach to calculate ranges for
damages ($32.3 million to $120.1 million), rehabilitation ($45.8 million
to $170.1 million), and administrative expenses ($0.1 million to $0.5
million); (9) specifically, for each of these factors, GAO subtracted
the amounts that the tribe received from the amounts that it requested
(or paid, in the case of administrative expenses) and multiplied the
resulting differences by the inflation rate, thereby obtaining the lower
value for each range; (10) similarly, GAO multiplied these differences
by the corporate bond rate to obtain the upper value for each range; and
(11) through this approach, GAO calculated separate ranges for Congress
to consider in deciding on the type and amount of any additional
payments.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-98-39
TITLE: Indian Issues: Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's Additional
Compensation Claim for the Oahe Dam
DATE: 01/28/98
SUBJECT: Native American claims
Compensation
Claims settlement
Dams
Evaluation methods
Indian lands
Consultants
Economic analysis
IDENTIFIER: Cheyenne River Sioux
Oahe Dam (SD)
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Honorable
Thomas Daschle, U.S. Senate
January 1998
INDIAN ISSUES - CHEYENNE RIVER
SIOUX TRIBE'S ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION CLAIM FOR THE OAHE
DAM
GAO/RCED-98-39
Additional Compensation for the Oahe Dam
(141066)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
FWS - U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
MRBI - Missouri River Basin Investigations Unit
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-278567
January 28, 1998
The Honorable Thomas Daschle
United States Senate
Dear Senator Daschle:
In 1948, the federal government began to construct the Oahe dam as a
flood control project on the Missouri River. The reservoir created
by the dam flooded over 100,000 acres of the Cheyenne River
Reservation. In 1954, the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe requested about
$23.5 million for damages (losses resulting from the government's
taking of the Indians' land) and general rehabilitation (funds for
improving the Indians' standard of living). Later that year, the
Congress authorized the payment of about $10.6 million to the tribe
for damages, rehabilitation, and administrative expenses related to
the settlement. In March 1993, the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Council unanimously passed a resolution stating that the tribe had
not received adequate compensation for the damages resulting from the
flood control project. The tribe hired a consultant to prepare a new
economic analysis of the damages, which was published in July 1994.\1
Other tribes also lost land to flood control projects on the Missouri
River and received compensation for damages from the federal
government, primarily during the 1950s. In the 1980s, these tribes
requested additional compensation on the grounds that the amounts
they originally received were not adequate. The tribes at two
reservations--Fort Berthold and Standing Rock--hired consultants to
prepare economic analyses supporting their requests for additional
compensation. We assessed the adequacy of these analyses in response
to a congressional request and, in May 1991, reported that the
analyses overstated the tribes' losses because they were based on
assumptions that could not be supported by historical evidence.\2 As
an alternative, we suggested that the Congress consider using the
tribes' requests for compensation at the time of the taking as a
starting point for calculating additional compensation.
Specifically, we suggested that the Congress consider a range of
additional compensation based on the present value of the difference
between the amount requested for each reservation and the amount
received. We did not consider whether additional compensation should
be provided or evaluate the adequacy of the compensation originally
appropriated by the Congress. We did, however, note that the tribes
may not have been willing sellers of their land at the amount of
compensation authorized by the Congress.
In 1992, the Congress enacted legislation acknowledging, first, that
the U.S. government did not justly compensate the tribes at Fort
Berthold and Standing Rock when it acquired their lands and, second,
that the tribes were entitled to additional financial compensation.
Accordingly, the legislation provided development trust funds for
these two reservations. A 1996 act provided a development fund for
another reservation, Crow Creek, and a 1997 Senate bill proposed such
a fund for a fourth reservation, Lower Brule. Anticipating the
introduction of legislation proposing additional compensation for the
Cheyenne River Sioux, you asked us to assess the new economic
analysis prepared by the consultant for the tribe.
The consultant used two approaches to estimate the amount of
additional compensation due to the Cheyenne River Sioux: The primary
approach recalculates the value of the tribe's losses, while the
secondary approach generally mirrors the alternative approach that we
proposed in our 1991 report.\3
Our assessment of the two approaches follows, together with our
suggestions for developing ranges of values under the second approach
and for separating the values for damages from the values for
rehabilitation.
--------------------
\1 Analysis of Economic Loss Resulting From Lands Taken From the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe for the Oahe Dam, The Robert McLaughlin
Company (Solen, N.Dak., July 1994).
\2 Indian Issues: Compensation Claims Analyses Overstate Economic
Losses (GAO/RCED-91-77, May 21, 1991).
\3 For both of these approaches, two factors need to be
considered--(1) the value in 1954 of any additional compensation that
may be deemed necessary and (2) the method that should be used to
adjust this amount to its value in 1996, accounting for inflation and
other factors.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The consultant's primary approach, which produced an estimate of
$300.7 million in additional compensation,\4 relies on questionable
assumptions about the value of the tribe's losses in the 1950s. For
example, the consultant assumed much higher timber harvest levels and
wildlife values than the federal government assumed at the time of
the taking. The consultant's secondary approach, which produced an
estimate of $279.1 million, was used to support the primary approach.
Like the approach we proposed in our 1991 report, it uses the tribe's
1954 request as a basis for calculating additional compensation.
However, it provides a single figure for additional compensation,
rather than a range such as we proposed in our 1991 report. In
addition, it includes an amount for rehabilitation as well as an
amount for damages, while the primary approach provides only for
damages. Neither of the consultant's approaches includes an amount
for administrative expenses.\5
The extent to which the tribe should receive additional compensation
for damages--and whether the tribe should receive additional payments
for rehabilitation and administrative expenses--is a policy question
for the Congress to decide. To provide the Congress with information
for such decision-making, we used our 1991 approach to calculate
ranges for damages ($32.3 million to $120.1 million), rehabilitation
($45.8 million to $170.1 million), and administrative expenses ($0.1
million to $0.5 million). Specifically, for each of these factors,
we subtracted the amounts that the tribe received from the amounts
that it requested (or paid, in the case of administrative expenses)
and multiplied the resulting differences by the inflation rate,\6
thereby obtaining the lower value for each range. Similarly, we
multiplied these differences by the corporate bond rate\7 to obtain
the upper value for each range. Through this approach, we calculated
separate ranges for the Congress to consider in deciding on the type
and amount of any additional payments.
--------------------
\4 In 1996 dollars. All of the values in the "Results in Brief"
reflect 1996 values.
\5 Damages fall into two categories--direct and indirect. Direct
damages primarily include values for the land and improvements in the
taking area. Indirect damages include values for the loss of such
things as timber, wildlife, and wild products (fruits, berries, and
herbs) in the taking area. While compensation for damages was used
to cover losses resulting from the taking, funds for rehabilitation
were used to bring the Indians' standard of living closer to that of
their non-Indian neighbors through loans and welfare payments.
Administrative expenses include the costs incurred by the tribe in
negotiating a settlement with the federal government.
\6 The annual inflation rate (consumer price index for all items)
from 1955 through 1996.
\7 The annual average rate of interest earned on investments in Aaa
corporate bonds from 1955 through 1996.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
In implementing the Flood Control Act of 1944, the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers (Corps) constructed a number of dams on the Missouri
River in North Dakota and South Dakota. The construction of the Oahe
dam, located 6 miles northwest of Pierre, South Dakota, began on
September 16, 1948. President Kennedy officially dedicated the dam
on August 17, 1962. At the maximum water level of 205 feet, the
reservoir behind the dam stretches 231 miles from just northwest of
Pierre, South Dakota, to just south of Bismarck, North Dakota. See
figure 1 for a picture of the dam and appendix I for a map of the dam
and reservoir.
Figure 1: The Oahe Dam
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
The Cheyenne River Sioux lost 104,420 acres to flooding when the Oahe
reservoir was created. The Corps; the Department of the Interior,
through the Missouri River Basin Investigations Unit (MRBI);\8 and
the tribe each developed estimates of the damages caused by this
project. The Corps' estimate provided only for direct damages; that
is, it included values primarily for the land and improvements in the
taking area. MRBI's and the tribe's estimates provided for both
direct and indirect damages. The indirect damages included values
for the loss of such things as timber, wildlife, and wild products
(fruits, berries, and herbs) in the taking area. (See app. II for
more information on the Corps', MRBI's, and the tribe's damage
estimates.)
In 1952, the tribe developed a damage estimate for an initial
settlement proposal, which it revised upward in 1954. The 1952
proposal sought specific dollar amounts for direct damages, indirect
damages, and rehabilitation, as well as unspecified amounts for the
relocation and reestablishment of tribal members in the taking area
and for tribal administrative expenses related to the settlement,
among other things. The 1954 proposal requested $10,930,871 for
direct and indirect damages and $12,599,432 for rehabilitation.
Later that year, the Congress authorized a total payment of
$10,644,014 to the Cheyenne River Sioux, including (1) $5,384,014 for
the land, improvements, and all other claims related to the project
(direct and indirect damages); (2) $5,160,000 for the rehabilitation
of tribal members residing on the reservation and for the relocation
and reestablishment of tribal members living in the taking area; and
(3) $100,000 for tribal administrative expenses related to the
settlement.\9
Tribes at four other reservations affected by flood control projects
along the Missouri River incurred losses ranging from about 16,000
acres to over 150,000 acres. Primarily during the 1950s, these
tribes received some compensation for their losses. However,
starting in the 1980s they began requesting additional amounts
ranging from $27.5 million to $342.9 million. The Congress responded
to their requests by authorizing or proposing the establishment of
development trust funds for them. Specifically, in 1992, it
authorized a $149.2 million fund for the Fort Berthold Reservation
and a $90.6 million fund for the Standing Rock Reservation.\10 In
1996, it authorized a $27.5 million fund for the Crow Creek
Reservation.\11 A legislative proposal would establish a $39.3
million fund for the Lower Brule Reservation.\12 (See app. III for a
table summarizing information on these four reservations and Cheyenne
River.)
--------------------
\8 The Secretary of the Interior created this unit in 1945 to study
the impact of the various Missouri River flood control projects.
\9 P.L. 83-776, 68 Stat. 1191 (Sept. 3, 1954).
\10 P.L. 102-575, title XXXV, 106 Stat. 4731 (Oct. 30, 1992).
\11 P.L. 104-223, 110 Stat. 3026 (Oct. 1, 1996).
\12 S. 156, introduced on Jan. 21, 1997.
CONSULTANT'S PRIMARY APPROACH
IS BASED ON QUESTIONABLE
ASSUMPTIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Under his primary approach, the consultant recalculated the value of
the tribe's losses for lost timber, wildlife, wild products, and
agricultural production. He estimated that the total value of the
losses, as of January 1, 1955, was $19.4 million. After subtracting
the $5.4 million authorized as damage compensation for the tribe in
1954, the consultant applied the annual prime rate to adjust the
unpaid damages of $14.0 million to 1996 values, arriving at a total
claim for additional damage compensation of $300.7 million.\13 In
calculating this estimate, the consultant made a number of
questionable assumptions. Among the more important of these are the
(1) choice of a discount rate for valuing the tribe's future losses,
(2) estimate of timber harvest levels, (3) estimate of wildlife
resource values, and (4) estimate of the tribe's consumer
surplus--that is, the value to the tribe, above and beyond the market
value, of the resources that were lost in the taking.
--------------------
\13 The consultant used the annual prime rate to adjust the unpaid
damages from 1955 through 1993. His report, issued in July 1994,
projected additional compensation to 1996. For 1994 through 1996, he
used the 6-percent prime rate from 1993. Using the actual annual
prime rates for 1994 (7.15 percent), 1995 (8.83 percent), and 1996
(8.27 percent) would produce an estimate of $318.8 million in
additional compensation.
CONSULTANT USED A
QUESTIONABLE DISCOUNT RATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Historical information available on the damage estimates prepared in
the 1950s raises questions about the discount rate used by the
consultant. To value the future annual income lost to the tribe
because of the taking, he selected the 1955 prime interest rate of
2.79 percent (net of inflation) as the discount rate. The discount
rate is used to determine the present value of a stream of annual
income. A key question in evaluating the consultant's selection of a
discount rate is whether it accurately reflects the discount rate
that the tribe would have used in the 1950s. Historical documents
indicate that the tribe and MRBI used a 4-percent discount rate.\14
Moreover, the tribe requested that its settlement draw interest at 5
percent. This information suggests that the tribe's discount rate
was higher than the prime rate assumed by the consultant.
As the discount rate increases, the value of future earnings
decreases. For example, the consultant estimated the value of the
tribe's lost annual agricultural production as of January 1955 at
$193,194. Assuming that this annual loss would continue in
perpetuity, the consultant used a 2.79-percent discount rate to
calculate a present value of $6,924,516 for the tribe's total
agricultural production losses. If the consultant had used a
4-percent discount rate, the same annual loss of $193,194 would have
had a present value of $4,829,850--a reduction of $2,094,666, or
about 30 percent. Similarly, if the consultant had applied the
4-percent discount rate to his entire analysis (losses for timber,
wildlife, wild products, and agricultural production), he would have
arrived at a total damage estimate of $13.5 million in 1955--a figure
that is about 30 percent lower than his total damage estimate of
$19.4 million.
--------------------
\14 The context in which the 4-percent discount rate is used
indicates that it is real--that is, net of inflation. For example,
to calculate the value of timber products forgone, MRBI capitalized
the annual use value of timber products at 4 percent. Implicit in
this calculation is an assumption that the annual use value is
constant over time (i.e., real). To ensure that the capitalization
calculation is consistent, the discount rate must also be real.
CONSULTANT USED QUESTIONABLE
TIMBER HARVEST LEVELS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
The consultant did not adequately justify the harvest levels for
timber that he used in his damage calculations. His total damage
estimate for timber exceeded both the tribe's and MRBI's estimates.
Specifically, for different timber resources (e.g., logs, poles,
posts, and cordwood), he used harvest levels that exceeded, by 12 to
199 percent, the sustainable levels calculated by MRBI.
The tribe developed two timber estimates--one in 1952 for $900,000
and the other in 1954 for $2,444,125. Because we were unable to find
any detailed calculations showing how the tribe arrived at these
estimates, we cannot compare the tribe's methodology with MRBI's or
the consultant's.
MRBI based its timber damage estimate on sustainable harvest
levels--that is, on the harvest levels that could be maintained in
perpetuity, taking into account the growth rate for new trees. MRBI
used sustainable levels rather than actual levels--which, on average,
had significantly exceeded sustainable levels from 1942 through
1951--because it assumed that the same losses would occur every year
in perpetuity. The Cheyenne River Reservation's timber resources
could not have supported the use of higher harvest levels in
perpetuity; if harvesting had continued at recent levels, the
reservation would quickly have run out of trees. MRBI's total damage
estimate for timber was $689,625.
In developing his damage estimate for timber, the consultant did not
use MRBI's sustainable harvest levels. For example, in calculating
the damage estimate for cordwood, he assumed that 400 households
would each need 11.3 cords of wood annually, or a total of 4,520
cords per year, for heating and cooking. Since the tribe lost 90
percent of its timber as a result of the taking, he calculated an
annual loss for cordwood of 4,068 cords. However, he did not present
any evidence that the timber supply in the taking area could sustain
this level of harvesting in perpetuity. Table 1 compares MRBI's
sustainable harvest levels with the consultant's harvest levels. The
consultant's total damage estimate for timber was $3,507,204.
Table 1
Timber Harvest Levels
MRBI's
sustainable Consultant's
annual annual
harvest harvest
Timber resources levels levels Difference
---------------------------- ------------ ------------ ------------
Logs (#) 900 1,080 20%
Poles (#) 3,000 3,360 12%
Posts (#) 6,000 8,340 39%
Cordwood (cords) 1,359 4,068 199%
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior and the consultant's
analysis.
CONSULTANT USED QUESTIONABLE
VALUES FOR WILDLIFE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
The consultant did not adequately justify the values for wildlife
that he used in his calculations. His total damage estimate for
wildlife exceeded both the tribe's and MRBI's estimates.
In both its 1952 and 1954 settlement proposals, the tribe presented a
combined damage estimate for wildlife and wild product
losses--$1,857,000 in 1952 and $1,857,500 in 1954. Because we were
unable to find any detailed calculations showing how the tribe
arrived at these estimates, we cannot compare the tribe's methodology
with MRBI's or the consultant's. Nor can we separate the tribe's
values for wildlife and wild products, as MRBI and the consultant
separated theirs.
As a starting point for developing a damage estimate for wildlife in
1954, MRBI used a 1951 U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) report,
which derived values for wildlife from sportsmen's expenditures for
hunting. Essentially, this report equated the values of various game
animals with the average amounts spent by hunters (e.g., for lodging,
transportation, and equipment) to acquire these animals. MRBI
concluded as follows:
"The value of game to the Indian people undoubtedly is less than
the amount sportsmen spend for hunting game. Reservation
Indians probably are more skilled hunters than the average
sportsmen, use less costly equipment, and no hotel bills or long
distance travel are incident to their hunting activities.
Sportsmen's expenditures therefor are not considered a sound
basis for arriving at the value of game to Indians. The loss to
Indians from the destruction of wildlife is taken to be the
value to them of the annual wildlife harvest which they obtain.
This value may be measured by the additional amounts which the
Indians will have to pay for food to replace that previously
supplied by the destroyed wildlife resources."\15
MRBI's values were about 50 percent lower than the FWS report's
values for big game (deer) and about 70 percent lower for upland game
(e.g., pheasants, rabbits, and squirrels). MRBI did not change the
report's values for fur-bearing animals (e.g., mink, beaver, and
muskrat). MRBI's total damage estimate for wildlife was $915,000;
for both wildlife and wild products, it was $1,056,750.
The consultant also used the 1951 FWS report as a starting point for
estimating wildlife damages. However, instead of developing
alternative values, he assumed that the sportsmen's expenditures
accurately reflected the losses to the tribe. After adjusting the
report's values for inflation and other factors, he arrived at a
damage estimate of $5,677,168 for wildlife as of January 1955. The
consultant did not provide support for his assumption that the
sportsmen's expenditures accurately reflected the value of wildlife
to the tribe. For both wildlife and wild products, the consultant's
total damage estimate of $8,941,433 is about five times higher than
the tribe's final estimate ($1,857,500) and about nine times higher
than MRBI's estimate ($1,056,750).
--------------------
\15 Damage to Indians of Five Reservations from Three Missouri River
Reservoirs in North Dakota and South Dakota, U.S. Department of the
Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, MRBI Report No. 138 (Billings,
Mont., Apr. 1954), p. 77.
CONSULTANT USED A
QUESTIONABLE CONSUMER
SURPLUS ESTIMATE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.4
The consultant did not provide convincing evidence to support his
assumption of a 40-percent consumer surplus for the tribe. Consumer
surplus is a monetary measure of the benefits, in excess of the
market value, that consumers derive from using a particular good.
After determining annual damage estimates for timber, wildlife, and
wild products, the consultant increased these estimates by 40 percent
to account for consumer surplus. A key question in evaluating the
consultant's adjustment for consumer surplus is whether it accurately
reflects the tribe's consumer surplus in the 1950s. In his report,
the consultant acknowledges that information is not available to
determine the tribe's true consumer surplus in the 1950s. Therefore,
to approximate it, he used information from a 1985 report on the
consumer surplus associated with sportsmen's hunting and fishing
trips in North Dakota.\16
However, the consultant presented no evidence that this estimate
reasonably approximates the tribe's consumer surplus associated with
timber, wildlife, and wild products in 1954.
--------------------
\16 Randall S. Anderson, Jay A. Leitch, and Cliff R. Fegert,
Guidelines for Economic Evaluation of Public Sector Water Resource
Projects, Department of Agricultural Economics, North Dakota State
University, Agricultural Economics Report No. 201 (Fargo, N.Dak.,
May 1985), p. 28.
SECONDARY APPROACH RELIES ON
TRIBE'S 1954 REQUEST
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
The consultant's secondary approach, which relies on the tribe's 1954
request for compensation, is generally consistent with the
alternative approach we proposed in our 1991 report except that it
provides a single figure rather than a range for additional
compensation. In addition, it includes an amount for rehabilitation
as well as for damages.
CONSULTANT DEVELOPED A
SINGLE ESTIMATE RATHER THAN
A RANGE FOR ADDITIONAL
COMPENSATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
In our 1991 report, we suggested that, for Fort Berthold and Standing
Rock, the Congress consider a range of additional compensation based
on the present value of the difference between the amount that each
tribe requested and the amount that it received. In calculating the
present value, we used two different interest rates--the inflation
rate and the corporate bond rate--which produced a range of
additional compensation. The consultant generally followed our 1991
approach in calculating his second estimate for the Cheyenne River
Sioux tribe except that he developed a single figure, using the prime
rate, rather than a range. Specifically, he subtracted the $10.5
million authorized in 1954 (excluding administrative expenses) from
the tribe's $23.5 million settlement proposal and, using the prime
rate, adjusted the $13.0 million difference to its 1996 value,
thereby arriving at a second estimate of $279.1 million.\17
--------------------
\17 The consultant used the same rates in his primary and secondary
approaches to adjust his estimates to 1996 values--the annual prime
rate from 1955 through 1993 and a flat 6 percent for 1994 through
1996. Using the annual prime rates for 1994 (7.15 percent), 1995
(8.83 percent), and 1996 (8.27 percent) would produce an estimate of
$295.9 million in additional compensation.
CONSULTANT'S ESTIMATE
INCLUDED AN AMOUNT FOR
REHABILITATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
In contrast to the consultant's primary approach, which calculates an
amount only for damages, the secondary approach covers both damages
and rehabilitation. Because the tribe's $23.5 million settlement
proposal in 1954 included $10.9 million for damages and $12.6 million
for rehabilitation, the secondary approach calculates additional
compensation for both damages and rehabilitation. If the
consultant's secondary approach were adjusted to exclude
rehabilitation, his estimate, for damages only, would be $119.2
million (in 1996 dollars). With this adjustment, the secondary
approach would include the same factors as the primary approach.
However, the adjusted second estimate of $119.2 million would no
longer support the first estimate of $300.7 million.
OUR ANALYSIS CALCULATES
SEPARATE RANGES FOR DAMAGES,
REHABILITATION, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
To provide the Congress with more detailed information for deciding
on an appropriate amount for additional payment, we calculated
separate ranges for damages, rehabilitation, and administrative
expenses, using the categories of payment authorized for the Cheyenne
River Sioux tribe in 1954 (see table 2). According to both the tribe
and the consultant, the payment that the tribe received for
rehabilitation was not damage compensation for the taking of its
land. Instead, it was provided more generally to raise the tribe's
standard of living--that is, to establish the Indians economically on
an equal footing with their non-Indian neighbors. For example,
rehabilitation funds were used to provide business loans, educational
loans, and welfare payments.
The additional payment ranges shown in table 2 reflect the present
value, under alternative investment options, of the additional
payment that the tribe might have received in 1954. The inflation
rate, which produced the lower value, indicates how much the tribe
would need today to equal the purchasing power of a payment received
in 1954. The corporate bond rate, which produced the upper value,
indicates how much the tribe might have earned by investing the same
additional payment in bonds issued by the private sector.
Table 2
Additional Payment Ranges
Additional payment range
(in 1996 dollars)
------------------------------
Low end High end
Tribe's 1954 Payment (inflation (corporate
Type of payment request received Difference rate\a) bond rate\b)
--------------- ------------ ------------ ------------ -------------- --------------
Damages $10,930,871 $5,384,014 $5,546,857 $32,311,863 $120,117,856
Rehabilitation and relocation and reestablishment
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Rehabilitation 12,599,432 4,743,374\c 7,856,058 45,763,550 170,123,882
Relocation and Unspecified\ 416,626\c 0\e 0\e 0\e
reestablishmen d
t
Administrative 119,802\f 97,580\g 22,222 129,449 481,220
expenses
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The annual inflation rate (consumer price index for all items)
from 1955 through 1996.
\b The annual average rate of interest earned on investments in Aaa
corporate bonds from 1955 through 1996.
\c The compensation law (P.L. 83-776) authorized a consolidated
payment of $5,160,000 for the rehabilitation of all tribal members
residing on the reservation and the relocation and reestablishment of
tribal members living in the taking area. The breakout shown in the
table is based on an MRBI report (No. 166, part III) that details
how the tribe spent the $5,160,000 payment.
\d During the negotiations, the tribe requested an unspecified amount
to cover the cost of relocating and reestablishing tribal members
living in the taking area.
\e The tribe received a consolidated payment of $5,160,000 for the
rehabilitation of all tribal members residing on the reservation and
the relocation and reestablishment of tribal members living in the
taking area. Since the tribe was free to spend as much money as
necessary to relocate and reestablish tribal members living in the
taking area, we assumed that the difference between what it requested
and what it received was zero.
\f During the negotiations, the tribe requested an unspecified amount
to cover its administrative expenses. After the negotiations were
concluded, the tribe submitted a claim for $119,802 in administrative
expenses.
\g P.L. 83-776 authorized up to $100,000 for the tribe's
administrative expenses, including attorneys' fees, which were
limited to $50,000. The tribe submitted a claim for $119,802 in
administrative expenses--$47,580 in expenses and $72,222 in
attorneys' fees. Because attorneys' fees were limited to $50,000,
the tribe received a total of $97,580 for its administrative expenses
under P.L. 85-274, 71 Stat. 598-599 (Sept. 2, 1957).
Source: National Archives and GAO.
The need for and amount of any additional payment to the tribe for
any of the items shown in table 2 is a policy question for the
Congress to decide. It is important to note, however, that the
amounts presented in this report for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe
cannot readily be compared with the amounts previously paid to the
other tribes. First, the damage to each reservation was unique,
depending on the acreage lost, the number of tribal members living in
the taking area, and the value of the resources located in the taking
area. Second, the additional amounts for Fort Berthold and Standing
Rock were based on 1990 values.
CONSULTANT'S COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
We provided a draft copy of this report to the consultant for his
review and comment. He responded that he had found nothing in the
draft report that would cause him to change his damage estimate for
the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe. In commenting on our review of his
primary approach, the consultant generally reiterated the information
contained in his 1994 report. He had no comments on our review of
his secondary approach. Since the consultant provided no new
information in response to the questions raised in our draft report
about his two approaches, we continue to believe that these questions
are valid, and we made no changes to the report. The consultant's
comments and our specific responses appear in appendix IV.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1
We conducted our review from April 1997 through November 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A
detailed discussion of our scope and methodology is contained in
appendix V.
We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional
committees, the Secretary of the Interior, and other interested
parties. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
Please call me at (202) 512-3841 if you or your staff have any
questions about this report. Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix VI.
Sincerely yours,
Barry T. Hill
Associate Director, Energy,
Resources, and Science Issues
MAP OF THE OAHE DAM AND RESERVOIR
=========================================================== Appendix I
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO's adaptation of map provided by the Corps of Engineers.
SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR
CHEYENNE RIVER
========================================================== Appendix II
In 1950, the Congress laid out a framework for the negotiation and
ratification of a settlement agreement with the Cheyenne River Sioux
tribe for the land taken from its reservation for the Oahe
reservoir.\1 As part of the negotiations, the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers (Corps); the Department of the Interior, through the
Missouri River Basin Investigations Unit (MRBI); and the tribe each
developed estimates of the damages to be caused by the loss of
104,420 acres of the Cheyenne River Reservation. However, in 1952,
the Corps, MRBI, and the tribe could not reach a settlement
agreement. As provided in section 5 of the negotiation framework, in
the event that a settlement agreement could not be reached, the
various positions were to be presented to the Congress for final
determination. In 1954, the Congress authorized the payment of about
$10.6 million to the tribe for damages, rehabilitation, and
administrative expenses related to the settlement.
--------------------
\1 P.L. 81-870, 64 Stat. 1093 (Sept. 30, 1950).
NO SETTLEMENT WAS NEGOTIATED IN
1952
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Shortly after the Congress enacted the negotiation framework, the
Corps contracted with Gerald T. Hart and Associates of Denver,
Colorado, for an appraisal of direct damages (for the land,
improvements, severance damages, and standing timber in the taking
area). This appraisal, commonly referred to as the Hart appraisal,
was presented to the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council on or about
November 15, 1951. The tribe's negotiating committee immediately
found a number of errors in the appraisal. These problems were the
main topic of discussion during the negotiation conferences held in
January, May, and August 1952.
The tribe and MRBI each developed an initial estimate of direct
damages for the August 1952 negotiation conference. Both of these
initial estimates were revised for the final negotiation conference
in November 1952. At the final negotiation conference, the direct
damage estimates were as follows: $1,605,410 under the Hart
appraisal; $2,053,117 under MRBI's estimate; and $2,614,779 under the
tribe's estimate. The parties did not settle on an amount for direct
damages. The final offer from the Corps was $2 million, and the
final offer from the tribe was $2.5 million. Since no agreement was
reached on an amount for direct damages, the negotiations ended
without any discussion of other settlement issues, such as the
appropriate amounts for indirect damages and for the relocation and
reestablishment of tribal members living in the taking area.
During the negotiations in November 1952, the tribe presented its
first complete settlement proposal, which sought payments for direct
damages ($2,614,779), indirect damages ($6,771,467), and
rehabilitation ($12,289,432).\2
--------------------
\2 The tribe also requested further appropriations of unspecified
amounts for (1) the relocation and reestablishment of Indian
cemeteries, tribal monuments, and shrines within the taking area; (2)
the relocation and reconstruction of infrastructure within the taking
area including, but not limited to, facilities of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, such as the Cheyenne River Agency, schools,
hospitals, service building, employees' quarters, roads, and bridges;
(3) the relocation and reestablishment of tribal members living
within the area to be flooded; and (4) the tribe's administrative
expenses related to the settlement.
THE CONGRESS AUTHORIZED
PAYMENTS FOR DAMAGES,
REHABILITATION, AND
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
After the negotiations broke down in November 1952, identical bills
were introduced in the House (H.R. 2233) and Senate (S. 695) to
provide a settlement for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe. The
payments proposed in the two bills, as they were originally
introduced on January 29, 1953, were identical to the payments
requested by the tribe in its November 1952 settlement proposal.
(See table II.2.)
In May 1954, the House and Senate held joint hearings on the
settlement legislation. Just before the hearings, MRBI issued its
complete damage estimate\3 and the tribe issued its revised
settlement proposal.\4 Tables II.1 and II.2 provide a breakdown of
MRBI's and the tribe's estimates.
Table II.1
MRBI's Damage Estimate, April 1954
Type of damages Estimate
---------------------------------------- ----------------------------
Direct damages $2,053,117
Indirect damages
Relocation and reestablishment 1,531,051
Timber (net) 608,137
Wildlife 915,000
Wild products 141,750
Increase for irrigable land 19,370
Other damages, mostly intangibles 1,753,235
======================================================================
Total damages $7,021,660
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior.
Table II.2
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe's Settlement
Proposals
Tribe's original Tribe's revised
settlement settlement
proposal, Nov. proposal, Spring
Type of payment requested 1952 1954
------------------------------ ------------------ ------------------
Direct damages $2,614,779 $2,614,779
Indirect damages
Grazing revenue 4,014,467 4,014,467
Timber 900,000 2,444,125
Wildlife and wild 1,857,000 1,857,500
products
======================================================================
Subtotal $9,386,246 $10,930,871
Rehabilitation 12,289,432 12,599,432
======================================================================
Total $21,675,678 $23,530,303
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source: Files at the National Archives for the Bureau of Indian
Affairs' Cheyenne River Agency and S. 695.
On July 23, 1954, the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs
reported H.R. 2233 to the full House with the reduced payments shown
in table II.3. The House approved H.R. 2233 on August 3, 1954.
Table II.3
Terms of the Final Compensation Bill
Compared With MRBI's and the Tribe's
Estimates
Tribe's
revised P.L. 83-
MRBI's settlement H.R. 2233, 776,
damage proposal, passed enacted
Type of payment estimate, Spring Aug. Sept.
requested/authorized April 1954 1954 1954\a 1954\a
---------------------- ---------- ---------- ---------- ----------
Direct damages $2,053,117 $2,614,779 $2,614,779 $2,250,000
\b \b
Indirect damages 3,437,492 8,316,092 3,973,076 3,134,014\
b
======================================================================
Subtotal $5,490,609 $10,930,87 $6,587,855 $5,384,014
1
Rehabilitation/ 1,531,051\ 12,599,432 6,044,500 5,160,000
relocation and d
reestablishment\c
======================================================================
Total $7,021,660 $23,530,30 $12,632,35 $10,544,01
3 5 4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a H.R. 2233, as passed by the House and as enacted, authorized
further appropriations of unspecified amounts for (1) the relocation
and reestablishment of Indian cemeteries, tribal monuments, and
shrines and (2) the relocation and reconstruction of infrastructure
within the taking area. The funding for the relocation and
reestablishment of tribal members living in the taking area was
combined with the funding for rehabilitation. Both versions of the
bill also authorized the appropriation of up to $100,000 for tribal
administrative expenses. This amount is not included in the table.
\b MRBI's damage estimate was based on 1951 land values. The payment
amount authorized by the Congress was based on an adjusted MRBI
value. Specifically, MRBI's estimate was adjusted to account for a
4-percent increase in land values since 1951, $100,000 was added for
any possible errors or omissions, and the resulting figure was
rounded to $2,250,000. Coincidentally, the final payment authorized
for direct damages was exactly between the tribe's final offer of
$2.5 million and the Corps' final offer of $2 million, both made in
November 1952. The public law does not specifically identify amounts
for "direct" and "indirect damages" but does specify that the
$2,250,000 was to be distributed by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal
Council "in accordance with the revised appraisal" of MRBI. The
figure for indirect damages is obtained by subtracting this amount
from the total of $5,384,014, which the law states was to be "in
final and complete settlement of all claims, rights, and demands" of
the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe arising out of the construction of the
Oahe project.
\c The amounts for tribal rehabilitation and for the relocation and
reestablishment of tribal members living in the taking area were
handled differently in the various estimates. MRBI's damage estimate
included an amount for the relocation and reestablishment of tribal
members living in the taking area but not for rehabilitation. The
tribe's estimate included an amount for rehabilitation but not for
the relocation and reestablishment of tribal member living in the
taking area. (The tribe asked the U.S. government to pay for the
relocation and reestablishment of tribal members living in the taking
area but did not estimate the cost.) H.R. 2233, as passed by the
House and as enacted, provided one lump sum payment to cover both
tribal rehabilitation and the relocation and reestablishment of
tribal members living in the taking area.
\d In MRBI's estimate, this amount was included under indirect
damages. This table shows the amount for relocation and
reestablishment separately because it was grouped together with an
amount for rehabilitation in the compensation bill. MRBI did not
estimate an amount for rehabilitation because its estimate covered
only damages caused by the taking.
Source: U.S. Department of the Interior and congressional files at
the National Archives for H.R. 2233 and S. 695.
The version of the bill reported by the Senate Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs reduced the nonadministrative payments even
further, to $10,544,014, which was also the amount enacted into law,
as shown in table II.3. The tribe had supported the House's version
of the bill largely because it provided 100 percent of the amount
that the tribe had requested for direct damages. The tribe did not
support the final version of the bill and asked President Eisenhower
to veto it. The President signed the bill on September 3, 1954.
To become effective, the agreements contained in the law had to be
ratified by at least three-quarters of the adult members of the
Cheyenne River Sioux tribe. The tribe ratified the bill in early
1955. The bill became effective on April 6, 1955, by a proclamation
of the Secretary of the Interior based on the tribe's ratification.
Figure II.1 presents some of the key steps in the legislation and in
the Cheyenne River settlement negotiations between 1944 and 1962.
Figure II.2 depicts the dismantled town of Cheyenne River in 1960,
before it was flooded by the Oahe reservoir.
Figure II.1: Key Steps in the
Legislation and Settlement
Negotiations
(See figure in printed
edition.)
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Figure II.2: Dismantled Town
of Cheyenne River
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.
--------------------
\3 Damage to Indians of Five Reservations from Three Missouri River
Reservoirs in North Dakota and South Dakota, U.S. Department of the
Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, MRBI Report No. 138 (Billings,
Mont., Apr. 1954).
\4 Memorial to the 83rd Congress in Regard to Oahe Project South
Dakota S. 695 and H.R. 2233, Negotiating Committee of the Cheyenne
River Sioux Tribal Council (Spring 1954).
FIVE RESERVATIONS AFFECTED BY
MISSOURI RIVER FLOOD CONTROL
PROJECTS
========================================================= Appendix III
Original payment Additional
authorized compensation\a
(year(s) (year
Reservation Dam(s) Acreage lost authorized) authorized)
----------------- ---------------- ---------------- ---------------- ----------------
Fort Berthold Garrison 152,360 $12,605,625\b $149.2
(1947 and 1949) million\c
(1992)
Cheyenne River Oahe 104,420 10,644,014\d \e
(1954)
Standing Rock Oahe 55,994 12,346,553\f 90.6 million\g
(1958) (1992)
Lower Brule Fort Randall 22,296\h 4,345,988\i 39.3 million\j
and (1958 and 1962) (Proposed in
Big Bend 1997)
Crow Creek Fort Randall 15,597\k 5,937,614\l 27.5 million\m
and (1958 and 1962) (1996)
Big Bend
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The dollar amounts shown in the table are not comparable. The
original payments authorized and the additional compensation
authorized are not comparable across the five reservations or with
each other. First, the damage to each reservation was unique,
depending on the acreage lost, the number of tribal members living in
the taking area, and the value of the resources located in the taking
area. Second, the dollar amounts shown in the table cover a 50-year
period, from 1947 to 1997, and they have not been converted to
constant-year dollars. Finally, the payments include amounts for
different factors. For example, the original payment to Fort
Berthold includes an amount for the relocation and reestablishment of
Indian cemeteries, tribal monuments, and shrines. The other
reservations did not receive direct monetary compensation for this
purpose; instead, the expenses to relocate cemeteries, tribal
monuments, and shrines were paid directly by the U.S. government.
The payment to Fort Berthold does not include an amount for
rehabilitation, as do the payments to the other four reservations.
\a The Congress has provided additional compensation in the form of
development trust funds. The amounts shown in the table represent
the size of the trust funds. The tribes are prohibited from spending
any of the principal in the trust funds; they can spend only the
interest earned.
\b P.L. 80-296, 61 Stat. 686 (July 31, 1947), authorized $5,105,625
for the payment of direct damages and the relocation and
reestablishment of tribal members living in the taking area. This
act was modified by P.L. 81-437, 63 Stat. 1026 (Oct. 29, 1949),
which provided that the relocation and reestablishment of Indian
cemeteries, tribal monuments, and shrines would also be paid out of
the $5,105,625. P.L. 81-437 also provided an additional $7,500,000
for all other claims. No amount for rehabilitation was included in
the Fort Berthold settlement.
\c P.L. 102-575, title XXXV, 106 Stat. 4731 (Oct. 30, 1992).
\d P.L. 83-776, 68 Stat. 1191 (Sept. 3, 1954), authorized the
following payments:
$2,250,000 for direct damages,
$3,134,014 for indirect damages,
$5,160,000 for rehabilitation and relocation and reestablishment,
and
$100,000 for tribal administrative expenses related to the
settlement.
The public law does not specifically identify amounts for "direct"
and "indirect damages" but does specify that the $2,250,000 was to be
distributed by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council "in accordance
with the revised appraisal" of MRBI. The figure for indirect damages
is obtained by subtracting this amount from the total of $5,384,014,
which the law states was to be "in final and complete settlement of
all claims, rights, and demands" of the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe
arising out of the construction of the Oahe project.
\e Additional compensation for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe is the
topic of this report. On the basis of the consultant's analysis, the
tribe is requesting about $300 million in additional compensation.
\f P.L. 85-915, 72 Stat. 1762 (Sept. 2, 1958), authorized the
following payments:
$1,952,040 for direct damages,
$3,299,513 for all other claims,
$6,960,000 for rehabilitation and relocation and reestablishment,
and
$135,000 for tribal administrative expenses related to the
settlement.
\g P.L. 102-575, title XXXV, 106 Stat. 4731 (Oct. 30, 1992).
\h Fort Randall - 7,997 acres, Big Bend - 14,299 acres.
\i P.L. 85-923, 72 Stat. 1773 (Sept. 2, 1958), authorized the
payment of up to $976,523 for land acquired for the Fort Randall Dam
and of $100,000 for tribal administrative expenses. P.L. 87-734, 76
Stat. 698 (Oct. 3, 1962), authorized the following payments related
to the Big Bend Dam:
up to $825,000 for direct damages;
up to $400,715 for all other claims, including relocation expenses
not to exceed $247,325;
$1,968,750 for rehabilitation; and
$75,000 for tribal administrative expenses related to the
settlement.
\j Proposed in S. 156, introduced Jan. 21, 1997.
\k Fort Randall - 9,418 acres, Big Bend - 6,179 acres.
\l P.L. 85-916, 72 Stat. 1766 (Sept. 2, 1958), authorized the
payment of up to $1,395,811.94 for land acquired for the Fort Randall
Dam and of $100,000 for tribal administrative expenses. P.L.
87-735, 76 Stat. 704 (Oct. 3, 1962), authorized the following
payments related to the Big Bend Dam:
up to $355,000 for direct damages;
up to $209,302 for all other claims, including relocation expenses
not to exceed $77,550;
$3,802,500 for rehabilitation; and
$75,000 for tribal administrative expenses related to the
settlement.
\m P.L. 104-223, 110 Stat. 3026 (Oct. 1, 1996).
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
COMMENTS FROM THE CHEYENNE RIVER
CONSULTANT
========================================================= Appendix III
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are our comments on the Cheyenne River consultant's
letter dated December 29, 1997.
GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix III:1
1. Section 1 of the settlement act (P.L. 83-776) stipulated that to
become effective, the agreements contained in the law had to be
ratified by at least three-quarters of the adult members of the
Cheyenne River Sioux tribe. The voting was not limited to male
tribal members. According to the voting results certified by the
tribe and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, as of February 4, 1955, over
three-quarters of the adult tribal members (1,847 out of 2,375, or
77.8 percent) had voted to approve the settlement act. Only 152
members voted to disapprove the settlement, and the remaining 376
ballots were incomplete or were not returned.
2. In response to this comment on our 1991 report by the consultant
for Fort Berthold, we stated the following.
". . . concerning the use of a zero or negative rate of
discount by tribes on the Wind River and Flathead reservations,
we note that, in deriving an estimate of the value of their
land, the Fort Berthold tribes used a 4-percent capitalization
rate.\1 Thus, the possibility that the tribes would have used a
capitalization rate of zero or less is questionable."\2
3. The earliest instance we found of the tribe's using a 4-percent
discount rate was in November 1952, when the tribe used that rate in
calculating the damage estimate used in the settlement contract it
proposed at the final negotiation conference in Washington, D.C. The
tribe's entire seven-member negotiating committee was present, as was
the tribe's attorney, Mr. Case. According to the tribe's minutes of
the conference, after presenting a breakdown of the tribe's damage
estimate, the Chairman for the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe requested
that Mr. Case discuss how the damage estimate was calculated. After
Mr. Case had finished, the Chairman also explained how the tribal
negotiators had arrived at their damage estimate. The earliest
instance we found of MRBI's use of a 4-percent discount rate was in
April 1954, when MRBI calculated damages for the Cheyenne River
Reservation, almost a year and a half after the tribe used this rate.
4. We recognize that the tribe was under duress to reach a final
settlement, but in developing its damage estimates, the tribe appears
to have been free to ask for as much money as it believed it was
entitled to. The tribe increased its damage estimate between 1952
and 1954.
5. Using the inflation rate to calculate the low end of the
additional payment range does provide the Congress with meaningful
information to consider in determining possible payments for the
tribe. How dollar values are adjusted from 1954 to 1996 depends on
what assumption is made about how the tribe would have used the
additional funds if it had received them in 1954. The low-end
calculation, using the inflation rate, is based on the assumption
that the tribe would have spent the money instead of investing it.
Therefore, information on the payment that the tribe would need today
to maintain its 1954 purchasing power is relevant.
According to MRBI, the tribe spent nearly all of its original $10.5
million payment in less than 5 years. MRBI reported that as of June
30, 1960, the tribe had $1.06 million of its settlement funds
remaining on deposit in the U.S. Treasury. The settlement funds
were not appropriated until late 1955, and through June 30, 1960,
they had earned $859,062 in interest.
6. We believe that taking into account the tribe's consumer surplus
can be an important component of this type of economic analysis.
However, as we point out and as the consultant acknowledged in his
report, the lack of historical information makes it impossible to
determine the tribe's consumer surplus for timber products, wildlife,
and wild products in the 1950s. Therefore, assigning a value for
these losses using contemporary information is arbitrary. Because of
the difficulties in trying to recalculate the tribe's losses after
more than 40 years, we believe that the estimates prepared in the
1950s provide a better basis for addressing the issue of additional
compensation than contemporary estimates based on insupportable
assumptions.
7. MRBI Report No. 117, dated June 1951, did report the results of
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) report issued in January
1951. However, MRBI Report No. 117 did not "utilize" that
information to establish values for the wildlife losses at Cheyenne
River. The report that contained MRBI's complete evaluation of the
damages to the Cheyenne River Sioux tribe was MRBI Report No. 138,
dated April 1954. MRBI Report No. 138 also contained the results of
the FWS report, as did MRBI Report No. 117. MRBI Report No. 138
used the FWS report in evaluating the wildlife losses the tribe would
sustain. In doing so, MRBI concluded that FWS' method of valuing
wildlife losses, based on sportsmen's expenditures for hunting, was
not appropriate for determining the tribe's wildlife losses.
MRBI Report No. 138 found that the sportsmen's expenditure values
used by FWS overstated the tribe's losses because the Indian people
were more efficient hunters and therefore gathered wildlife at less
cost than sportsmen. Moreover, the MRBI report concluded that since
the wildlife were primarily used as food, determining the replacement
cost for the lost food supply would be an appropriate method for
valuing the tribe's wildlife losses. These assumptions are
reasonable in our view.
8. The consultant did not offer any evidence that the timber harvest
levels used in his analysis could be sustained in perpetuity.
Although he reiterated his concerns about how the volume of timber in
the taking area was determined, he did not provide any information on
how the overall timber volume should be adjusted. Instead, he set
aside the government's sustainable yield levels, thereby assuming, in
effect, that the tribe had an infinite supply of timber that it could
consume at recent harvest levels in perpetuity. We believe that this
assumption is questionable and that the damage estimate for timber
products should be based on sustainable yield levels.
--------------------
\1 Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Indian Affairs of the
Committee on Public Lands, House of Representatives, Eighty-First
Congress, First Session, on H.J. Res. 33 (Apr. 29 and 30, May 2
and 3, 1949), p. 47.
\2 Indian Issues: Compensation Claims Analyses Overstate Economic
Losses (GAO/RCED-91-77, May 21, 1991), p. 26.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix V
In response to Senator Daschle's request we assessed the consultant's
two approaches for calculating additional compensation for the
Cheyenne River Sioux tribe for damages caused by the taking of
104,420 acres of their reservation for the Oahe reservoir. As
agreed, we did not address the question of whether additional
compensation should be provided or evaluate the adequacy of the
original compensation amount appropriated by the Congress.
We conducted audit work primarily at the National Archives in
Washington, D.C., and College Park, Maryland. We met with officials
from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers at the Oahe Project Office in
Pierre, South Dakota, and toured the Oahe dam and project facilities.
We also met with Cheyenne River Sioux tribal officials in Eagle
Butte, South Dakota, and with the tribe's consultant in Bismarck,
North Dakota, to obtain their views on past and current damage
estimates.
In reviewing the consultant's primary approach, we compared his
approach and methodology to (1) standard economic principles and (2)
the approach and methodology used in the 1950s by the tribe and MRBI
in calculating their damage estimates. To obtain information on the
estimates prepared by the tribe in 1952 and 1954, we reviewed Bureau
of Indian Affairs files and congressional files at the National
Archives. Specifically, at the National Archives we reviewed the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribal Council's minutes from the late 1940s
through the late 1950s and the tribe's minutes and the Bureau's
minutes covering the settlement negotiations in 1952. We obtained
information on MRBI's damage estimates from MRBI reports in the
Department of the Interior's library in Washington, D.C.
In reviewing the consultant's secondary approach, we evaluated his
application of the approach we proposed in our 1991 report. We
obtained documents on the legislative history of the compensation
bill (P.L. 83-776) and the tribe's 1954 damage estimate from the
National Archives.
Our review was performed from April 1997 through November 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix VI
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Charles W. Bausell, Jr.
Timothy J. Guinane
James Hunt
Jeffery Malcolm
*** End of document. ***