Department of Energy: Information on the Tritium Leak and Contractor
Dismissal at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (Letter Report, 11/04/97,
GAO/RCED-98-26).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the events surrounding
the leak of the radioactive element tritium from a research reactor at
the Brookhaven National Laboratory and the resulting termination of
Associated Universities, Inc., as the laboratory's contractor.

GAO noted that: (1) because Brookhaven employees did not aggressively
monitor its reactor's spent-fuel pool for leaks, years passed before
tritium contamination was discovered in the aquifer near the spent-fuel
pool; (2) reliance on incomplete tests of the water level in the
spent-fuel pool and on sample data from monitoring wells scattered about
the site led Brookhaven and Department of Energy (DOE) officials to give
low priority to a potential tritium leak; (3) even after laboratory and
DOE staff agreed with Suffolk County regulatory officials to install
monitoring wells near the reactor in 1994, Brookhaven officials
postponed their installation in favor of environmental, safety, and
health activities they considered more important; (4) once the wells
were installed and the high levels of tritium were discovered, the
laboratory reported that the spent-fuel pool could have been leaking for
as long as 12 years; (5) although the tritium poses little threat to the
public, the delay in installing the monitoring wells raised serious
concerns in the Long Island community about: (a) the laboratory's
ability to take seriously its responsibilities for environment and for
human health and safety; and (b) DOE's competence as an overseer of the
laboratory's activities; (6) the responsibility for failing to discover
Brookhaven's tritium leak has been acknowledged by laboratory managers,
and DOE admits it failed to properly oversee the laboratory's
operations; (7) DOE's on-site oversight office, the Brookhaven Group,
was directly responsible for Brookhaven's performance, but it failed to
hold the laboratory accountable for meeting all of its regulatory
commitments, especially its agreement to install monitoring wells; (8)
senior DOE leadership also shares responsibility because they failed to
put in place an effective system that encourages all parts of DOE to
work together to ensure that contractors meet their responsibilities for
environmental, safety and health issues; (9) DOE's latest strategic
plan, submitted in support of the Government Performance and Results Act
of 1993, offers an opportunity to focus attention on the need to address
DOE's management structure and accountability problems from a strategic
perspective; and (10) the Secretary of Energy's decision to terminate
Associated Universities' 50 years as the laboratory's contractor was
based, according to DOE's official statements, on the laboratory's loss
of the public's trust and DOE's own investigation, which concluded that
the laboratory had not kept pace with contemporary expectations for the
protection of the environment and human health and safety.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-98-26
     TITLE:  Department of Energy: Information on the Tritium Leak and 
             Contractor Dismissal at the Brookhaven National
             Laboratory
      DATE:  11/04/97
   SUBJECT:  Contract monitoring
             Contractor performance
             Hazardous substances
             Industrial wastes
             Radioactive wastes
             Water pollution
             Laboratories
             Pollution monitoring
             Contract termination
             GOCO

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1997

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - INFORMATION
ON THE TRITIUM LEAK AND CONTRACTOR
DISMISSAL AT THE BROOKHAVEN
NATIONAL LABORATORY

GAO/RCED-98-26

Department of Energy

(141073)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AUI - Associated Universities, Inc. 
  BNL - Brookhaven National Laboratory
  DOE - Department of Energy
  EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
  ES&H - environment, safety and health
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-276754

November 4, 1997

The Honorable F.  James Sensenbrenner, Jr.
Chairman
The Honorable George E.  Brown, Jr.
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Science
House of Representatives

As requested, we reviewed the events surrounding the leak of the
radioactive element tritium from a research reactor at the Brookhaven
National Laboratory (BNL) and the resulting termination of Associated
Universities, Inc.  (AUI), as the laboratory's contractor.\1 BNL is a
federally funded research facility located in Suffolk County, Long
Island, New York, that is owned by the Department of Energy (DOE). 
AUI is a not-for-profit corporation that has operated the laboratory
since it was created in 1947.  In January 1997, ground water samples
taken by BNL staff revealed concentrations of tritium that were twice
the allowable federal drinking water standards--some samples taken
later were 32 times the standard.  The tritium was found to be
leaking from the laboratory's High Flux Beam Reactor's spent-fuel
pool into the aquifer that provides drinking water for nearby Suffolk
County residents. 

DOE's and BNL's investigation of this incident concluded that the
tritium had been leaking for as long as 12 years without DOE's or
BNL's knowledge.  Installing wells that could have detected the leak
was first discussed by BNL engineers in 1993, but the wells were not
completed until 1996.  The resulting controversy about both BNL's
handling of the tritium leak and perceived lapses in DOE's oversight
led to the termination of AUI as the BNL contractor in May 1997.  In
response to DOE's investigation and other factors, you asked us to
further examine these issues.  As agreed with your offices, we

  -- identified the events leading up to discovery of the tritium
     leak,

  -- evaluated why these events occurred, and

  -- determined the reasons used by the Secretary of Energy to
     terminate DOE's contract with AUI. 


--------------------
\1 AUI's contract is terminated as of November 3, 1997, or until a
new contractor assumes responsibility for the laboratory. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

Because Brookhaven employees did not aggressively monitor its
reactor's spent-fuel pool for leaks, years passed before tritium
contamination was discovered in the aquifer near the spent-fuel pool. 
Reliance on incomplete tests of the water level in the spent-fuel
pool and on sample data from monitoring wells scattered about the
site led Brookhaven and DOE officials to give low priority to a
potential tritium leak.  Even after laboratory and DOE staff agreed
with Suffolk County regulatory officials to install monitoring wells
near the reactor in 1994, Brookhaven officials postponed their
installation in favor of environmental, safety, and health activities
they considered more important.  Once the wells were installed and
high levels of tritium were discovered, the laboratory reported that
the spent-fuel pool could have been leaking for as long as 12 years. 
Although the tritium poses little threat to the public,\2
Brookhaven's delay in installing the monitoring wells raised serious
concerns in the Long Island community about (1) the laboratory's
ability to take seriously its responsibilities for the environment
and for human health and safety and (2) DOE's competence as an
overseer of the laboratory's activities. 

The responsibility for failing to discover Brookhaven's tritium leak
has been acknowledged by laboratory managers, and DOE admits it
failed to properly oversee the laboratory's operations.  Brookhaven
officials repeatedly treated the need for installing monitoring wells
that would have detected the tritium leak as a low priority despite
public concern and the laboratory's agreement to follow local
environmental regulations.  DOE's on-site oversight office, the
Brookhaven Group, was directly responsible for Brookhaven's
performance, but it failed to hold the laboratory accountable for
meeting all of its regulatory commitments, especially its agreement
to install monitoring wells.  Senior DOE leadership also shares
responsibility because they failed to put in place an effective
system that encourages all parts of DOE to work together to ensure
that contractors meet their responsibilities on environment, safety
and health issues.  Unclear responsibilities for environment, safety
and health matters is a problem that has been tolerated by DOE
management for years.  However, DOE's efforts under way to address
these issues are encouraging.  DOE's latest strategic plan, submitted
in support of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993,
offers an opportunity to focus attention on the need to address DOE's
management structure and accountability problems from a strategic
perspective. 

The Secretary of Energy's decision to terminate Associated
Universities' 50 years as the laboratory's contractor was based,
according to DOE's official statements, on the laboratory's loss of
the public's trust and DOE's own investigation, which concluded that
the laboratory had not kept pace with contemporary expectations for
the protection of the environment and human health and safety.  On
the basis of our interviews with senior DOE leaders, including the
Secretary, the Secretary appeared to rely heavily on information on
Associated Universities' performance provided by his key staff, which
included the Director of the Office of Energy Research, the Director
of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology, and the
Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health.  These
officials expressed frustration with Associated Universities'
performance and also with DOE's evaluation process, which they told
us did not appear to reflect actual performance at the laboratory. 


--------------------
\2 Because tritium decays rapidly, environmental experts (including
the Environmental Protection Agency) have concluded that by the time
the leak reaches the laboratory's boundary, its concentration will be
below federal drinking water standards. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

BNL conducts basic and applied research in a multitude of scientific
disciplines, including experimental and theoretical physics,
medicine, chemistry, biology, and the environment.  BNL's fiscal year
1996 budget was about $410 million.  It employs about 3,200 people,
including 900 scientists and engineers.  As the operating contractor
for BNL, AUI is responsible for day-to-day activities at the
laboratory.  Originally founded by nine universities, AUI has
operated as a separate not-for-profit corporation since 1986. 

DOE's Brookhaven Group and DOE's Chicago Operations Office managed
BNL for the Department.  DOE's Office of Energy Research is the
principal headquarters' organization responsible for BNL-wide
programs, infrastructure, and environment, safety and health (ES&H). 
However, other DOE program offices, including the Office of Nuclear
Energy and the Office of Environmental Management, have significant
responsibilities for activities at BNL, as does the Office of
Environment, Safety and Health, which also monitors and evaluates the
laboratory's activities. 

At the local level, the Suffolk County Health Department is
responsible for ensuring that BNL and private industries operating
within the county do not contaminate the underground aquifer that
provides the only source of drinking water for its 1.3 million
residents.  As a consequence of local citizens' sensitivity to
possible contamination of the aquifer, the county has developed
regulations that require underground tanks that contain potential
contaminants to be lined to prevent the tanks from leaking.  In 1987,
after local hearings on chemical and radioactive releases at the
laboratory, officials representing the county health department, DOE,
and BNL signed an agreement that the laboratory would meet the
county's requirements and would strive to minimize contamination of
the aquifer.  The agreement also allowed county health department
officials access to BNL to inspect facilities and to identify tanks
and other facilities that did not adhere to the county's
requirements. 

The laboratory's High Flux Beam Reactor is the larger of the
laboratory's two research reactors and is regulated by and must
conform to standards that DOE and the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) establish.\3 Although its main purpose is to produce neutrons
for scientific experiments, the reactor's cooling water becomes
contaminated with the radioactive element tritium during operations. 
Tritium has many uses in medicine and biological research and is
commonly used in self-illuminating wrist watches and exit signs. 
However, tritium is a health concern if ingested or absorbed into the
body in large quantities.  The reactor's 68,000-gallon spent-fuel
pool has high concentrations of tritium stemming from the reactor's
operations.  Built in the early 1960s, the reactor's spent-fuel pool
is made of concrete but does not have a secondary containment, such
as a stainless steel liner, to protect against possible leaks.  Newer
reactor fuel pools must have secondary containment systems to protect
against such leaks. 

In January 1997, the laboratory's analysis of water samples taken
near the reactor revealed concentrations of tritium that greatly
exceeded EPA's drinking water standards (some samples taken later
were 32 times the standard).  Laboratory officials attributed the
leak to the reactor's spent-fuel pool.  Although the tritium posed
little threat to the public, a firestorm of public concern erupted
because

  -- BNL had delayed until 1996 installing monitoring wells near the
     reactor despite a 1994 agreement by laboratory staff with
     Suffolk County officials to do so, and

  -- BNL officials reported that the tritium had probably been
     leaking for at least 12 years without the laboratory's or DOE's
     knowledge. 

Shortly after the tritium levels were made public, DOE's Office of
Oversight, which reports to the Assistant Secretary for Environment,
Safety and Health, launched an investigation of the incident.  On
February 14, 1997, it released a report highly critical of both BNL's
actions and DOE's oversight performance.  A second report was issued
in April 1997.\4 In addition, the Attorney General of New York State
issued a report on October 16, 1997, which was critical of BNL's and
DOE's environmental performance.\5 The Attorney General recommended
that BNL's reactor remain idle until significant improvements are
made in the laboratory's and DOE's environmental management
practices. 


   Figure 1:  Timeline of the
   Tritium Leak Events

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\3 BNL also operates the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor. 

\4 Interim Report on the Oversight of Groundwater Tritium Plume
Recovery Activities at the Brookhaven National Laboratory.  Office of
Oversight, Office of Environment, Safety and Health, Dept.  of Energy
(Feb.  14, 1997).  Integrated Safety Management Evaluation of the
Brookhaven National Laboratory, Office of Oversight, Office of
Environment, Safety and Health, U.S.  Dept.  of Energy (Apr.  1997). 

\5 Vacco, Dennis C., Brookhaven National Laboratory:  At the
Crossroads (Oct.  16, 1997). 


   EVENTS LEADING TO THE DISCOVERY
   OF TRITIUM IN BNL'S GROUNDWATER
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The series of events that led to the discovery of a tritium leak
started in the mid-1980s when rising levels of tritium were first
detected in groundwater on BNL.  The key events are as follows:\6

  -- Higher than expected levels of tritium were first discovered in
     a drinking water well about 500 feet from the reactor in 1986. 
     BNL officials at the time reasoned that the tritium came from
     local sewer lines and did not suspect the reactor's spent-fuel
     pool as a source.  Sewer lines were a known source of tritium. 
     Tritium originated from condensation that forms inside the
     reactor building and eventually reached the laboratory's sewer
     system.  No further samples were taken from this well, which was
     closed because of high levels of other nonradioactive
     contaminants. 

  -- In 1987, DOE and BNL officials signed an agreement with Suffolk
     County which stated that the laboratory would conform to the
     environmental provisions of the county's sanitary code and
     allowed county officials to inspect BNL property for the first
     time. 

  -- In 1988, Suffolk County, which was registering BNL's underground
     tanks for eventual regulatory compliance, told the laboratory
     that it wanted the reactor's spent-fuel pool listed as a tank. 
     In 1989, BNL disagreed with the county's position.  To allay the
     county's concerns, BNL said that the pool did not leak because
     it had successfully passed a leak test in 1989.  BNL also said
     that two monitoring wells that were installed in 1989 near the
     reactor did not indicate any leaking from the reactor's
     spent-fuel pool.  Although BNL officials later told us that the
     leak test was not accurate and that the two monitoring wells
     they installed earlier were in the wrong location to detect the
     tritium contamination,\7 BNL officials relied on these data as
     the basis for their confidence that the spent-fuel pool did not
     leak. 

During the late 1980s, the laboratory was coming under increasing
environmental scrutiny.  A 1988 DOE environmental survey reported
weaknesses in BNL's groundwater monitoring program and noted that
local citizens were concerned about groundwater contamination at the
laboratory.  In 1989, the EPA listed BNL as a Superfund site because
of an old landfill problem.  New York State had listed BNL as a state
Superfund site 3 years earlier.  In 1990, a special DOE headquarters
inspection concluded that BNL did not have an adequate groundwater
monitoring program. 

By 1993, BNL had begun discussing the need for additional monitoring
wells near the reactor. 

  -- In 1993, a BNL reactor official discussed with other BNL staff
     the need for additional monitoring wells near the reactor.  This
     discussion was prompted by a Nuclear Regulatory Commission
     information bulletin that emphasized the need to monitor
     potential leaks from old equipment. 

  -- Using BNL's data as support, a 1993 DOE report noted that the
     spent-fuel pool was not leaking.\8 The report also noted,
     however, that there was no reliable means of determining if the
     spent-fuel pool was leaking. 

  -- In early 1994, a BNL engineer proposed that monitoring wells--at
     a total cost of $15,000 to $30,000--be drilled near the reactor,
     citing the reason as "good management practice." The proposal
     was given a low priority by a team of BNL and DOE officials that
     reviewed environment, safety and health proposals.  The well
     proposal did not rank sufficiently high, compared with other
     ES&H proposals, to receive funding.  BNL officials continued to
     believe that the spent-fuel pool was not leaking. 

  -- By late 1994, Suffolk County advised the laboratory that, under
     its regulations, the spent-fuel pool must be upgraded or
     abandoned.  County officials told us that their demand on the
     laboratory to upgrade the spent-fuel pool was part of a general
     effort to upgrade all tanks that were still out of compliance
     with their sanitary code.  The officials told us that they did
     not suspect that the spent-fuel pool was leaking.  However, in
     their November quarterly meeting with Suffolk County, BNL and
     DOE staff agreed to install monitoring wells.  The agreement was
     made at the staff level with no apparent senior management
     involvement in, or knowledge of, the agreement. 

In late 1994, plans were begun for installing the monitoring wells. 
However, because of a subsequent budget cut, the wells were not
funded.  In early 1996, the wells were again approved for funding and
were installed that July.  The first samples from the new wells were
taken in October and results returned in December.  Additional
samples were taken that month and were returned in January 1997.  The
additional samples reflected tritium levels far exceeding EPA's
drinking water standards.  Further testing showed that an underground
tritium "plume" of about 2,200 feet in length was coming from the
reactor's spent-fuel pool and had been developing for at least 12
years.  On the basis of a new leak test, the pool was estimated to
have been leaking from 6 to 9 gallons of tritium-contaminated water
per day.  The four previous leak tests in 1989, 1994, 1995, and 1996
had used less sophisticated measurement techniques that failed to
show the leak. 


--------------------
\6 The events discussed below are drawn from DOE's Office of
Oversight reports, internal laboratory documents, and from our
interviews with current laboratory, DOE, and Suffolk County
officials. 

\7 These two wells were not intended to detect contamination from the
reactor; they were installed as part of a broader effort to improve
the laboratory's groundwater monitoring program. 

\8 Spent Fuel Working Group Report, Office of Environment, Safety and
Health, Dept.  of Energy (Nov.  1993). 


   SENIOR OFFICIALS AT ALL LEVELS
   ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DELAYS
   IN DISCOVERING THE TRITIUM LEAK
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Responsibility for the conditions at BNL is shared among BNL, the
Chicago Operations Office, the Brookhaven Group, and DOE headquarters
managers.  BNL treated the potential for a tritium leak as a low
priority in the face of growing environmental concerns from the
public and failed to follow through on its own commitments made by
laboratory staff to local regulatory officials.  DOE's Brookhaven
Group, which had line accountability over BNL activities, failed to
hold the laboratory accountable for meeting its agreements with local
authorities.  Finally, DOE headquarters shares responsibility for
perpetuating a management structure with unclear responsibility for
achieving ES&H objectives. 


      BNL TREATED THE REACTOR'S
      SPENT-FUEL POOL AS A LOW
      PRIORITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

BNL officials told us they assigned a low priority to drilling the
monitoring wells that could have detected the tritium leak because
they believed that there was no urgency to the task.  In reaching
this conclusion, laboratory officials relied heavily on leak rate
tests conducted by in-house personnel during 1989, 1994, 1995, and
1996 which indicated that the spent-fuel pool was not leaking.  BNL
officials acknowledge, in retrospect, that these tests were not
carefully conducted because laboratory staff failed to accurately
measure the spent-fuel pool's evaporation rate.  Tests conducted
after the tritium leak was discovered more accurately accounted for
evaporation rates and concluded that the pool was leaking 6 to 9
gallons per day. 

The officials who conducted the pool leak tests, who were part of the
laboratory's reactor division, told us that they believed the tests
were accurate because repeated tests produced the same results. 
Staff from the laboratory's safety and environmental protection
division told us they did not question the reactor division's tests
because of a high regard for its work. 

However, the laboratory's own investigation of the tritium leak
concluded that the laboratory's safety and environmental protection
division should have placed more emphasis on assessing potential risk
and should have questioned the reactor division on the accuracy of
the test results.\9

BNL officials also relied on well-sampling results to reinforce their
position that the spent-fuel pool was not leaking, but these samples
did not provide adequate coverage of the area surrounding the reactor
where the spent-fuel pool was located.  BNL officials relied on two
wells that were installed southeast (in the general direction of the
underground water flow) of the reactor in 1989.  They were part of a
group of 51 wells installed throughout the laboratory site in
response to a need to improve BNL's groundwater monitoring program. 
BNL used the results from the two monitoring wells near the reactor
as further evidence that the spent-fuel pool was not leaking because
water samples from these wells did not identify the tritium leak. 
Laboratory officials told us, in retrospect, that they erred in using
the results from these wells, which were not in the correct location
to detect the tritium leak.  They also told us that their
understanding of the hydrology at the site at the time led them to
believe that the wells would adequately monitor the groundwater flow. 


--------------------
\9 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Environmental, Safety, and
Health Decision Making at Brookhaven National Laboratory, Brookhaven
National Laboratory (Apr.  29, 1997). 


      DOE'S AND BNL'S ACTIONS IN
      CONNECTION WITH THE
      COMMUNITY'S CONCERNS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

The intensity of the public's outcry following the announcement of
the tritium leak was substantial, suggesting a lack of appreciation
on the part of BNL in gauging the public's concern for environmental
and public safety matters.  Several factors suggest that the public's
reaction could have been better anticipated.  For example, Long
Island residents have long been concerned with the quality of their
drinking water and the potential harmful effects from
laboratory-generated pollution.  The county had been extensively
monitoring for laboratory pollutants in the groundwater for years,
and for tritium since 1979.  Furthermore, DOE had been paying nearby
residents' costs to switch from private wells to public water
systems, a policy stemming in part from past groundwater chemical
contamination coming from the laboratory and from other industrial
sources. 

DOE's Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and Health; the
Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and
the Director of the Office of Energy Research all told us of their
dissatisfaction with BNL's and the Brookhaven Group's inability to
develop effective ways to maintain the public's trust.  DOE's Office
of Oversight officials, who have conducted reviews of many different
DOE facilities--including three other laboratories--told us that
compared to other DOE facilities, BNL was relatively slow in
developing mechanisms to gauge changes in the public's attitude
toward the laboratory.  For example, DOE and BNL had not established
a publicly accepted citizen advisory committee, such as DOE has done
with some of its environmental restoration sites, and had not
developed an effective strategy for anticipating the public's
concerns. 


      DOE AND BNL DID NOT
      AGGRESSIVELY OVERSEE THEIR
      ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND
      HEALTH COMMITMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

The Brookhaven Group did not aggressively monitor the laboratory's
efforts to comply with an agreement made by laboratory staff to
Suffolk County to install monitoring wells near the reactor.  More
rigorous attention to this agreement could have led to monitoring
wells being installed more promptly.  In their November 1994 meeting
with Suffolk County officials, DOE and BNL staff agreed to install
monitoring wells near the reactor.  The agreement was made in
response to Suffolk County's concern about the laboratory's progress
in upgrading its many underground tanks (upgrading underground tanks
was an important feature of the county's 1987 agreement with DOE and
BNL).  This agreement was summarized in the minutes from the November
1994 meeting.  The proposal to install the wells was reported in
subsequent BNL project schedules, which were reviewed by BNL and DOE
management. 

The informality of the agreement to install monitoring wells made at
the November meeting with Suffolk County officials had several
important consequences.  DOE and laboratory staff told us they did
not track the laboratory's progress toward installing the wells. 
Also, because the agreements were made at the staff level and were
documented only by informal notes, senior laboratory officials and
DOE managers told us they were not aware that an agreement had been
made.  Thus, these managers lacked the information they needed to (1)
gauge the relative importance of the staff's recommendations to
install the wells and (2) use this information to adjust funding
priorities, such as reallocating funding among laboratory programs. 

Also, DOE has never completely reviewed the laboratory's progress in
complying with the county's sanitary code, nor does it document its
activities associated with county compliance issues.  DOE has had a
policy in place since 1994 that requires its staff to be accountable
for "diligent follow-up and timely results from the commitments they
make."\10 While DOE's fiscal year 1994 and 1995 performance
appraisals of BNL noted laboratory progress toward complying with the
county's sanitary code, they noted that more progress was needed. 
DOE headquarters, the Chicago Operations Office, and the Brookhaven
Group conducted 48 evaluations of environment, safety and health
related issues during fiscal years 1994 through 1996.  However, the
deputy manager of the Brookhaven Group told us that his office had
never evaluated the laboratory's compliance with the county's
requirements. 


--------------------
\10 Public Participation, Dept.  of Energy (DOE P 1210.1, July 29,
1994). 


      DOE'S MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE
      PROVIDED UNCLEAR
      ACCOUNTABILITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.4

Although the Brookhaven Group was directly accountable for BNL during
the time the tritium leak went unnoticed, weaknesses in how
environment, safety and health activities are budgeted and managed
makes accountability unclear.  There is no central budget for ES&H
activities nor is responsibility clearly established for achieving
ES&H goals.  These weaknesses are the direct responsibility of DOE's
senior leadership. 

Many different headquarters program offices are responsible for
environment, safety and health, and ground water monitoring
activities: 

  -- The Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology has primary
     headquarters responsibility for operating the reactor. 

  -- The Office of Energy Research funds operations and scientific
     research at the reactor; it also provides most of the funds
     spent at the site and operates and maintains infrastructure and
     general environmental compliance activities, such as groundwater
     monitoring. 

  -- The Office of Environmental Management also conducts groundwater
     monitoring as part of the site's cleanup activities; funds
     provided by this office are earmarked for its programs only. 

The varying responsibilities of these headquarters offices
contributes to an unclear pattern of funding at the laboratory level. 
For example, the monitoring wells could have been funded by BNL's (1)
reactor division, which operates and maintains the reactor; (2)
safety and environmental protection division, which manages an ES&H
account derived from overhead funds; or (3) plant engineering
division, which has an ES&H budget account.  Plant engineering
actually funded the monitoring wells because the reactor division
staff did not believe it was their responsibility to pay for the
wells--they wanted the safety and environmental protection division
to pay for them. 

DOE's complex organizational structure prevented effective
accountability over the Brookhaven Group.  As shown in figure 2, the
Brookhaven Group was part of the Chicago Operations Office.  Chicago
reports to the Associate Deputy Secretary for Field Management, who
is responsible to the Deputy Secretary.  However, Energy Research is
the "lead" program office at BNL and has direct responsibility over
laboratory program activities, including environment, safety and
health requirements.  Yet this office reports to the Under Secretary,
which is in a different chain of command.  Completely outside of
these chains of command is the Office of Environment, Safety and
Health, which is an independent oversight office that has no direct
line authority over the Brookhaven Group. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE noted that the Office of
Energy Research was only responsible for ES&H oversight of those
activities at BNL that it directly funded.  Further, DOE commented
that while the Office of Energy Research funded the reactor, the
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology had principal
headquarters responsibility for ES&H and that both the Chicago
Operations Office and the Brookhaven Group had the primary role for
ensuring ES&H performance.  We believe that DOE's comments further
illustrate the unclear accountability for ES&H at BNL. 

   Figure 2:  DOE's Organizational
   Units Relating to BNL

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

DOE's unclear lines of authority with respect to ES&H matters is not
a new issue.  A 1993 DOE ES&H assessment team concluded in its review
that headquarters program offices (Energy Research; Nuclear Energy,
Science and Technology; and Environmental Management) ".  .  .  do
not integrate their efforts in resolving common ES&H issues .  .  . 
.  Managers and staff are not clearly held accountable to ensure that
ES&H programs are appropriately developed and are implemented in a
formal and rigorous manner."\11 In its April 1997 report on BNL,
DOE's Office of Environment, Safety and Health made similar
observations, concluding that there is confusion in DOE headquarters
about roles, responsibilities, and authorities, especially in
connection with multiprogram laboratories.\12 The report cited a lack
of clarity about the responsibility for ensuring the protection of
workers and the environment in the operation of BNL. 

DOE's management structure problems are long-standing: 

  -- In its September 1997 report, DOE's Laboratory Operations Board
     cited inefficiencies that resulted from DOE's complicated
     management structure in both headquarters and the field and
     recommended that DOE undertake a "major effort" to rationalize
     and simplify its headquarters and field management structure to
     create a more effective line management. 

  -- In October 9, 1997, testimony before the Congress, DOE's
     Inspector General cited confusion in DOE's management structure
     and recommended that DOE establish more direct lines of
     accountability for managing the national laboratories. 

  -- A May 1995 DOE internal paper, prepared as part of the
     Department's Strategic Alignment Initiative, concluded that the
     lack of clear roles and responsibilities between headquarters
     and field units reduces authority, creates confusion and
     overlapping guidance, and reduces the linkage between
     performance and accountability. 

We reported on unclear roles and responsibilities between
headquarters and field offices in our 1993 report on DOE management
issues.\13 In that report, we cited examples from DOE officials on
accountability confusion caused by DOE's management structure. 

The DOE Office of Oversight's report on BNL also noted a recent
headquarters policy change that could further prevent field offices,
such as the Brookhaven Group, from providing effective oversight of
its contractors.  The Office said that DOE should reconsider its
direction, under contract reform, to reduce the oversight of
contractors' environment, safety and health performance.  The report
also noted that while DOE's new policy is to rely more on
"performance metrics," such an approach does not serve as an
effective mechanism to monitor the contractor's day-to-day
environment, safety and health performance. 


--------------------
\11 Environment, Safety and Health Progress Assessment of the
Brookhaven National Laboratory, U.S.  Dept.  of Energy (Feb.  1993). 

\12 Integrated Safety Management of the Brookhaven National
Laboratory, Office of Oversight, Office of Environment, Safety and
Health, U.S.  Dept.  of Energy (Apr.  1997). 

\13 Department of Energy:  Management Problems Require a Long-Term
Commitment to Change (GAO/RCED-93-72, Aug.  31, 1993). 


      WEAKNESSES IN CONTRACTOR
      EVALUATION PROCESS WEAKENED
      DOE'S ABILITY TO OVERSEE
      ACTIVITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.5

DOE headquarters, the Chicago Operations Office and the Brookhaven
Group all share responsibility for ensuring that the evaluation
criteria used in AUI's contract reflect agreed-upon departmental
priorities.  DOE's performance measures for AUI did not reflect the
priority that DOE espouses for ES&H, a condition which has further
impacts on the ability of its Brookhaven Group to hold the contractor
accountable for high standards of ES&H performance.  Specifically,
only 7.5 percent of DOE's performance evaluation criteria addressed
BNL's ES&H activities in its 1996 contract.  For its 1994 and 1995
annual appraisals of laboratory activities, ES&H criteria were not
specifically identified, but were part of the "Environmental
Compliance" and "Reactor Safety" rating elements, and were relatively
minor aspects of each year's evaluation.  DOE consistently rated
AUI's performance on these ES&H related issues either "Good" or
"Excellent." "Outstanding" was the highest available score. 

Prior to 1996, AUI was not rated on public trust issues.  For its
1996 performance contract, an element called "Communications and
Trust" was added, along with "Environment, Safety and Health." The
communications and trust element was given a 7.5 percent weight in
the AUI evaluation criteria.  AUI rated itself "Excellent" in both
categories, but these scores were overridden by DOE to reflect
"marginal" performance.\14

DOE's Office of Oversight report noted that measurable ES&H
performance elements are not incorporated into BNL managers' annual
performance appraisals, nor are ES&H roles clearly delineated.  The
report also noted that some senior BNL line managers are focusing
almost exclusively on scientific programs and are not being held
accountable for ES&H.  When we asked to examine the appraisals for
BNL's senior manager responsible for making ES&H decisions, we were
advised that these appraisals were not formally documented. 


--------------------
\14 Performance criteria and self-assessments by the contractor were
made part of AUI's performance contract for the first time in 1996. 


      DOE'S ACTIONS TO IMPROVE
      OVERSIGHT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.6

DOE acknowledges its management structure weaknesses.  After the
tritium leak was discovered in January, the Secretary eliminated the
Chicago Operations Office from the reporting chain, having the
Brookhaven Group report directly to headquarters.  Also, DOE
headquarters was heavily involved in technical decisions surrounding
the tritium remediation activities and in responding to public
concerns.  In July 1997, DOE completed its action plan for addressing
issues relating to the tritium leak.\15 Its planned steps include

  -- better descriptions of environment, safety and health roles and
     responsibilities in DOE headquarters and field offices,

  -- establishing a corporate budget process for ES&H, and

  -- strengthening the Office of Energy Research's focus on ES&H as
     part of its lead responsibility to oversee BNL. 

DOE's action plan also has measures for changing the ES&H "culture"
at BNL and expanding community outreach.  The plan proposes several
other initiatives, such as a Headquarters-Brookhaven Management
Council, chaired by the Director of the Office of Energy Research, to
better coordinate activities at the laboratory and to ensure that DOE
has a site-wide perspective on ES&H funding at the laboratory and
other facilities.  In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE
provided additional details on their action plan and other corrective
actions they have taken.  See appendix I for DOE's letter. 


--------------------
\15 DOE Action Plan for Improved Management of Brookhaven National
Laboratory, U.S.  Dept.  of Energy (July 1997). 


   THE DECISION TO TERMINATE AUI
   WAS BASED ON PERFORMANCE AND
   LOSS OF THE COMMUNITY'S TRUST
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

The Secretary of Energy took full responsibility for his decision to
terminate DOE's contract with AUI as BNL's contractor.  Although the
Secretary has said that he received much technical and legal advice
on his decision, he stressed that he ultimately terminated AUI for
its lax environmental monitoring efforts and its breach of the trust
and confidence of the Long Island community surrounding BNL.  Figure
3 shows the chronology of events leading to the termination of AUI's
contract. 

   Figure 3:  Timeline of the
   Termination of the AUI Contract

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)



   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


      EARLY DISCUSSIONS OF AUI'S
      PERFORMANCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

The Secretary became involved in discussions of AUI with his senior
staff as soon as he assumed office in mid-March of 1997.  By this
time, DOE had already shifted responsibility for remediating the
tritium leak from the Chicago Operations Office and its Brookhaven
Group to DOE's Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety and
Health, and officials were discussing the future of AUI.  The
Secretary told us that widely publicized criticism of AUI and DOE by
elected officials did not influence his decision to terminate AUI's
contract.  Rather, he said he was moved by a growing frustration with
AUI's technical competence when dealing with the tritium incident and
with its public-relations consequences.  All of the senior DOE
participants we interviewed said that while the tritium leak itself
posed no serious health hazard, the public's perception of the way
AUI managed the problem undermined the community's confidence in the
laboratory. 


      THE DOE OFFICE OF
      OVERSIGHT'S REPORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

The Assistant Secretary for ES&H dispatched her Office of Oversight
to examine the tritium situation in late January 1997.  The results
of this examination were a major influence on the Secretary's
decision to terminate AUI's contract.  The Office's Interim Report
released on February 14, 1997, concluded that BNL "did not rigorously
analyze the potential for [tritium] releases from the [reactor] and
was somewhat overconfident in the control of effluent from [the
reactor]." Many decisions were made "within lower levels of the BNL
organization," and "senior managers were not sufficiently involved in
the decision processes and may not have had all the information
necessary to make good decisions about the priority of .  .  . 
monitoring [the reactor's spent-fuel pool]."

The Interim Report noted that both BNL's internal communications and
communications among BNL, the Chicago Operations Office, and the
Brookhaven Group "were not as effective as they should have been."
Senior managers were not sufficiently involved in decisions and
lacked necessary information, while both BNL and DOE showed
"weaknesses" in their approach to such issues as management,
planning, and priority setting.  The Office of Oversight issued its
second report on BNL in April 1997.\16 This report discussed the
underlying causes of the tritium contamination. 


--------------------
\16 Integrated Safety Management Evaluation of the Brookhaven
National Laboratory, Office of Oversight, Office of Environment,
Safety and Health, U.S.  Dept.  of Energy (Apr.  1997). 


      LOSS OF THE PUBLIC'S TRUST
      WAS THE DOMINANT FACTOR IN
      THE SECRETARY'S DECISION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

A major influence on the firing decision was the loss of the Long
Island community's trust in BNL.  Following the Interim Report's
release, the Suffolk County Legislature held a public hearing on
February 20, 1997, that further attracted press and public attention
to the tritium contamination issue.  The Assistant Secretary for ES&H
told the hearing that, ultimately, BNL leadership was responsible for
the tritium-leak problems,\17 although DOE itself had "made
mistakes." Several Long Island residents expressed outrage at the way
BNL had handled and publicized the incident.  The Assistant Secretary
for ES&H and the Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science
and Technology both told us that they were increasingly frustrated by
AUI's unresponsive dealings with the public, a complaint later
emphasized by the Secretary. 

Even before the Energy Secretary was sworn in on March 13, 1997,
senior DOE officials were raising the possibility that AUI's contract
might be terminated as a result of the tritium leak and its
consequences.  From late January 1997 on, the principal senior staff
associated with the termination decision--the Assistant Secretary for
Environment, Safety and Health, the Director of the Office of Energy
Research, and the Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science
and Technology had all concluded that AUI's leadership was unable to
deal effectively with the complaints and demands for decisive action
from the local community. 


--------------------
\17 Suffolk County Legislature.  Public Hearing.  Brookhaven National
Laboratory.  February 20, 1997.  Transcript, pp.  58-59. 


      AN OPTIONS PAPER GUIDED THE
      THINKING OF THE SENIOR STAFF
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.4

The DOE General Counsel's Office prepared a 10-page "options paper"
during April although no signatures or dates appear on the copy
provided to us.  This memorandum, which DOE officials say fairly
reflects the topics discussed by the Secretary and his senior staff,
posed three general actions with several variations.  The three main
options were to (1) recompete the contract before its 1999 expiration
date; (2) terminate the contract wholly or partially and select a new
contractor; and (3) leave AUI in place but aggressively oversee its
management.  According to the Secretary's senior advisors, DOE had
the choice between terminating the contract for "cause" or for
"convenience" and decided on the latter to avoid a possible legal
challenge by AUI over performance criteria.  Until fiscal year 1996,
AUI's annual performance appraisals had consistently reflected high
ratings for its management of BNL, and its standards and conduct of
environment, safety, and health matters, although rated lower, were
"Good" or "Excellent." And as late as April 1997, DOE had concluded
that although "continued attention is needed," current "DOE and BNL
approaches to tritium contamination source resolution and remediation
have been aggressive and appropriate."

But on Thursday, April 24, 1997, the Secretary held a final meeting
with his senior staff to discuss their options for dealing with the
AUI contract.  They considered termination and its possible timing,
noting that by postponing the actual firing for 6 months, DOE could
avoid paying BNL employees severance pay.  In commenting on a draft
of this report, DOE said that by giving less than 6 months notice,
there might be an obligation by DOE to pay BNL employees severance
pay even in the almost certain event that they experienced no break
in their employment at BNL when a new contract was awarded.  The
group reached no conclusion, and a day or two later, the Secretary
decided on his own to terminate the contract. 


      THE DECISION TO TERMINATE
      THE AUI CONTRACT WAS MADE BY
      THE SECRETARY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.5

On Thursday, May 1, 1997, the Secretary arrived at BNL and met with
senior scientists, telling them about his decision to terminate AUI's
contract and assuring them that he was not dissatisfied with their
work but with the management of the laboratory.  The Secretary said
he based the decision on internal oversight reports and the
unacceptable disintegration of the public's trust in the laboratory's
management.  Announcing his decision that day, he said, "I am sending
a message to Long Island--and to our facilities nationwide--that I
will take appropriate action to rebuild trust and to make
environment, safety and health a priority."\18

On May 16, 1997, DOE informed AUI that it would invoke an "override"
provision of their contract and rate BNL's performance for fiscal
year 1996 as "marginal" for operations.  The Brookhaven Group's
manager, who is the Contract Officer, attributed the lower rating to
"significant events" that caused him to "look beyond mere mechanical
application" of the annual rating procedure.  Specific complaints
included BNL's failure to "establish clear environmental, safety and
health priorities .  .  ." and "honor [the] commitment to install
groundwater monitoring wells around the High Flux Beam Reactor .  . 
.  within [the] agreed-to time .  .  .  ."

AUI's President vigorously protested this decision in a May 23, 1997,
letter, complaining that "there is no public risk associated with the
tritium plume." The letter also cited examples to remind DOE's
Brookhaven Group that BNL had set priorities for its ES&H work.  The
Group's May 29 reply to a May 20, 1997, AUI letter protesting the
rating stated that the "Department's decision was informed in part by
numerous discussions between DOE senior managers and AUI management
that occurred between January 1997 and the date of the Secretary's
decision." The AUI President complained to the Group again in a June
9, 1997, letter stating that "AUI was not given the opportunity to
discuss the initiatives and corrective actions that were underway."
AUI had contended that it had been misled because "there were no
discussions .  .  .  that the Department was considering immediate
termination and recompetition of the contract." Indeed,

     "The Department's approval of the interim management team three
     days prior to its precipitous termination action led me to
     conclude that our corrective actions were appropriate and
     effective and that we were making substantial progress in
     improving Safety Management and the relationships with the
     community."\19


--------------------
\18 "Secretary Pena Terminates Brookhaven Contract.  Pena Says Step
Necessary to Build Public Trust." DOE Press Release (R-97-032, May 1,
1997). 

\19 AUI had proposed an interim team to DOE for managing the
laboratory and was awaiting DOE's approval.  AUI's laboratory
director had previously announced his retirement. 


   OBSERVATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Brookhaven officials consistently assigned low priority to the
possibility of tritium contamination, despite public concern that the
laboratory's operations might pollute Long Island's sole-source
aquifer.  BNL officials also gave inadequate attention to honoring
local environmental regulations.  DOE's resident oversight office,
the Brookhaven Group, had direct responsibility for the laboratory's
ES&H performance but failed to hold BNL officials accountable for
meeting all regulatory commitments.  Senior DOE leadership also
failed by not creating an effective management and accountability
system that would ensure that all offices of DOE and its contractors
met their ES&H responsibilities. 

DOE's planned actions for correcting oversight and management
problems at BNL are promising steps that address many of the
laboratory's current conditions.  One of the most important planned
actions is to clarify roles and responsibilities of all the
organizations with accountability over BNL--especially the Office of
Energy Research, the site's "landlord." Our concern is that role and
responsibility weaknesses raised by DOE and summarized in this report
reflect fundamental problems that have long characterized the
Department's administration of all its national laboratories, not
just BNL.  For, despite many calls for improvement by internal and
external groups, DOE leadership has so far been unable to develop an
effective structure that can hold its laboratory contractors
accountable for meeting all important departmental goals and
objectives. 

One hope for clarifying DOE's roles and responsibilities may be found
in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (Results Act),
which offers DOE the opportunity to raise these issues to a strategic
level.  DOE's September 1997 Strategic Plan proposes success measures
to "clarify ES&H roles and responsibilities" and to "annually monitor
and report on ES&H expenditures and improve related internal
controls." DOE's Strategic Plan is an integral part of the activities
required to support the Results Act.  GAO has been evaluating
agencies' strategic plans and has been working with the Congress to
help ensure that plans meet the Results Act requirements. 


   AGENCY AND CONTRACTOR COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and Associated
Universities, Inc., for review and comment.  DOE generally agreed
with our summary of the events surrounding the tritium leak.  DOE
also commented that we accurately stated that a major reason for the
termination of Associated Universities' contract was the Long Island
community's loss of confidence in Associated Universities.  However,
DOE said that we failed to discuss the other factors that contributed
to the loss of public confidence in relation to the Secretary's
decision to terminate the contract.  DOE cites, for example, that
past groundwater contamination by the laboratory was already a
substantial environmental and community relations issue and that our
report should have acknowledged this as a factor in the senior
managers' recommendations to the Secretary on the issue of
terminating the contract.  We believe that our report adequately
reflects that the community's concerns about the laboratory's past
environmental contamination were raised in the community's
conversations with the Secretary.  Specifically, our report states
that the Secretary ultimately terminated Associated Universities for
its lax environmental monitoring efforts and its breach of the trust
and confidence of the Long Island community.  Also, as suggested by
DOE, we clarified our report by including references to DOE's final
Office of Oversight report. 

DOE also described in more detail specific corrective actions it took
after identifying its tritium leak and the broader steps it intends
to take to improve management and oversight.  Furthermore, DOE
provided more details on its action plan, which was developed to
address problems at both BNL and DOE.  We added language in the
report directing the reader's attention to these discussions. 

Associated Universities generally agreed with our summary of the
events surrounding the tritium leak.  Associated Universities also
pointed out that from February 1997 until the time of the Secretary's
decision and beyond, DOE senior managers were responsible for the
decisions made at BNL, not the BNL staff or Associated Universities. 
We made changes in the report to reflect this point.  Associated
Universities further stated its belief that, in matters affecting
Associated Universities, the Secretary was poorly advised by his
senior managers and that attempts to reach the Secretary to discuss
his decision to terminate Associated Universities' contract were
unsuccessful. 

Associated Universities took exception to the draft report's
statement that BNL officials gave inadequate attention to honoring
local environmental regulations.  We did not intend to imply that
Associated Universities failed to honor all local environmental
regulations.  However, as our report discusses, BNL and DOE staff
agreed with Suffolk County to install monitoring wells but delayed
their installation in favor of higher priority projects.  Senior
laboratory and DOE officials told us they were unaware of the
agreement made by their staff to install these wells and the wells
were not funded until much later.  Both the laboratory and DOE were
involved in several of the discussions about the decision to install
monitoring wells, and we believe both must share the responsibility. 
Associated Universities also provided clarifying and technical
comments, which we have incorporated as appropriate. 

Appendixes I and II include the full text of DOE's and Associated
Universities' respective comments and our response. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :7.1

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 15 days after the date of this letter.  At that time, we will
send copies to the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the
Brookhaven National Laboratory, and the Director, Office of
Management and Budget.  We will make copies available to other
interested parties on request. 

Our review was performed from June through October 1997 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.  See appendix
III for a description of our scope and methodology. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
call me on (202) 512-3841.  Major contributors to this report are
listed in appendix IV. 

Victor S.  Rezendes
Director, Energy, Resources,
 and Science Issues




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
============================================================== Letter 

in DOE's letter refer
to a draft of this
report.  We have
indicated page number
changes only for
those comments that
we discuss in detail. 



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Energy's letter
dated October 30, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

1.  We believe our report accurately reflects the reasons for the
Secretary's decisions.  Our report discusses the community's concerns
about the laboratory's past environmental contamination and points
out that these concerns were raised in the community's conversations
with the Secretary.  Specifically, our report states that the
Secretary ultimately terminated Associated Universities for its lax
environmental monitoring efforts and its breach of the trust and
confidence of the Long Island community. 

2.  We have made changes to the report as appropriate in response to
DOE's comments. 

3.  We believe our wording accurately reflects the conditions
discussed.  DOE's own investigation of the tritium leak sharply
criticized the management structure and the associated unclear
accountability throughout the Department's chain of command. 

4.  The source of this statement is the transcript for the public
hearing held by the Suffolk County Legislature on February 20, 1997,
pp.  58-59. 

5.  The source of this comment is the Integrated Safety Management
Evaluation of the Brookhaven National Laboratory, Office of
Oversight, Office of Environment, Safety and Health, U.S.  Dept.  of
Energy (Apr.  1997); "Summary Assessment" of the "Status of Actions
to Remediate the HFBR Tritium Plume," p.  13. 

6.  While we appreciate the reasons behind the termination of this
particular contract, weaknesses in DOE's management structure
persist.  Terminating a contract, while "sending a signal" that
"contractors will be held accountable" does not correct the
Department's unclear management structure. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM ASSOCIATED
UNIVERSITIES, INC. 
============================================================== Letter 

in AUI's letter refer
to a draft of this
report.  We have
indicated page number
changes only for
those comments that
we discuss in detail.



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on the Associated Universities
letter dated October 27, 1997. 


   GAO COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

1.  We have made changes to the report, as appropriate, in response
to AUI's comments. 

2.  We did not intend to imply that Associated Universities failed to
honor all local environmental regulations.  However, as our report
discusses, BNL and DOE staff agreed with Suffolk County to install
monitoring wells but delayed their installation in favor of higher
priority projects. 

3.  We believe our wording accurately reflects the events discussed. 
We did not evaluate the laboratory's compliance with other
underground tanks. 

4.  We believe our wording accurately reflects the events discussed. 
EPA officials have advised us that while the tritium contamination
poses little or no threat today, its long- term consequences are not
certain. 

5.  We believe our wording accurately reflects the events discussed. 
BNL's January 20, 1989, memorandum rejecting the county's position
does not indicate DOE's involvement. 

6.  We believe our wording accurately reflects the events discussed. 
The "broad agreement" mentioned by AUI was made in 1987.  The
paragraph in our report describes events that occurred in 1994. 

7.  As we stated in our report, the "Excellent" rating mentioned by
DOE prior to February 1997 referred to AUI's self-assessment. 


SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
========================================================= Appendix III

To identify the events and decisions leading up to the discovery of
the tritium leak at Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL) and the
causes of these events, we began our work by reviewing three major
studies completed by the Department of Energy (DOE) and BNL.  These
included the DOE Office of Oversight's February 1997 interim report
on the tritium recovery efforts at the laboratory, the Office's April
1997 final report on BNL, and the laboratory's April 1997 report on
environment, safety, and health decision-making.  To improve our
understanding of the matters discussed in these reports, we (1)
interviewed the authors and staff of each study, (2) obtained and
reviewed documents and studies discussed in the reports, and (3)
discussed the results of the studies with officials from the numerous
organizations involved in the tritium situation.  For example, within
DOE we interviewed Office of Environment, Safety and Health officials
who had evaluated the tritium recovery effort and safety management
processes at the laboratory; the Chicago Operations Office manager
and staff who were responsible for overseeing activities of DOE's
local Brookhaven office (the Brookhaven Group) during the early
1990s; and officials of DOE's Brookhaven Group who administered DOE's
contract with AUI and who reviewed the laboratory's reactor, ES&H,
and groundwater monitoring programs.  At Associated Universities,
Inc.  (AUI), we interviewed the president, the former and the current
laboratory director, and the vice president responsible for ES&H
activities.  We supplemented the information obtained during these
meetings by interviewing the BNL associate director and staff
responsible for operating the High Flux Beam Reactor and its
spent-fuel pool and for implementing groundwater monitoring and other
ES&H programs at the site.  We also interviewed officials from other
organizations who regulate aspects of the laboratory's environmental
efforts or its compliance with local environmental laws.  These
included officials from the Region II office of the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Suffolk County Department of
Health Services, and the state of New York's Office of the Attorney
General. 

To determine the reasons used by DOE to terminate its contract with
AUI, we reviewed the Department's press release and the public
statements made by DOE's Secretary and other officials concerning the
termination decision.  We then interviewed the Secretary of Energy to
obtain his perspective on the decision and the options that he
considered to improve the laboratory's performance.  We also
interviewed DOE's Assistant Secretary for ES&H, the Director of the
Office Energy Research, and the Director of the Office of Nuclear
Energy, Science and Technology.  These were the senior departmental
managers responsible for laboratory activities.  We also interviewed
the Department's Deputy Assistant Secretary for Procurement and
Assistance Administration, and DOE's manager of the Brookhaven Group
to determine the information that these officials provided to the
Secretary concerning AUI's performance and the options available to
address the tritium situation.  We supplemented this information by
reviewing DOE's evaluations of AUI's performance prepared for fiscal
years 1991 through 1996 and a DOE memorandum that summarized the
options presented to the Secretary for dealing with AUI. 

Throughout our work, we verified the accuracy of key information by
obtaining supporting documentation and by questioning apparent
inconsistencies or gaps in the information presented.  However, as
agreed with the Committee's staff, we did not use investigative
techniques or authorities to verify that officials we interviewed
provided us with all documents relevant to the tritium leak and the
termination of the AUI contract. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV

Gary Boss, Project Director
Michael E.  Gilbert, Project Manager
Robert P.  Lilly, Deputy Project Manager
William Lanouette, Senior Evaluator
Duane Fitzgerald, Technical Advisor
Jackie Goff, Senior Attorney


*** End of document. ***