Aviation Safety: FAA Has Not Fully Implemented Weather-Related
Recommendations (Letter Report, 06/02/98, GAO/RCED-98-130).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the Federal Aviation
Administration's (FAA) efforts to implement the weather-related
recommendations made by the National Research Council (NRC) and FAA's
advisory committee, focusing on: (1) policy and leadership; (2)
interagency coordination; (3) meeting different types of users' needs
for weather information; and (4) the level of funding provided for
weather activities.

GAO noted that: (1) the panel of experts GAO convened concluded that FAA
had made limited progress in implementing the weather-related
recommendations made by NRC and FAA's advisory committee; (2) regarding
the first area of concern, policy and leadership, the reports concluded
that FAA is the agency best suited for leading federal aviation weather
efforts but that it had not accepted that role; (3) the NRC report
linked this criticism to the dispersal of responsibilities among several
FAA organizations; (4) the reports also concluded that FAA did not have
clear policy guidance to define its role in aviation weather activities;
(5) since 1995, FAA has attempted to address these twin concerns by
creating a new organization to direct aviation weather activities and by
issuing a policy that states that FAA takes the responsibility for
leading aviation weather activities; (6) GAO's expert panel concluded
that because FAA has not yet produced a plan to implement the new
policy, its actions did not go far enough to address the concerns that
the report originally raised; (7) with regard to the second concern,
interagency coordination, the reports questioned the adequacy of FAA's
efforts to coordinate aviation weather activities with other federal
agencies; (8) concerning the third area--FAA's efforts to meet the needs
all types of users --the reports concluded that FAA was not providing
consistent information or adequate training; (9) as evidence that it is
meeting the needs of all types of users, FAA cited a list of systems it
is developing to provide weather information to various users and a list
of the training courses it offers; (10) GAO's expert panel expressed
continuing concerns about whether the equipment FAA listed would form an
integrated system to serve all users; (11) panelists also raised
concerns about the training offered by FAA, stating that better training
could help reduce disparities in the abilities of air traffic
controllers to interpret weather information; (12) with respect to the
amount of funding FAA has allocated for aviation weather activities, the
reports raised questions about the low level of funding provided to
weather-related projects compared with other activities; and (13) GAO's
review of FAA's budget information for fiscal year (FY) 1990 through FY
1998 confirms that the agency has allocated less funding for aviation
weather during this period than for most other acquisition and research
priorities.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-98-130
     TITLE:  Aviation Safety: FAA Has Not Fully Implemented 
             Weather-Related Recommendations
      DATE:  06/02/98
   SUBJECT:  Transportation safety
             Aircraft accidents
             Weather forecasting
             Interagency relations
             Air traffic controllers
             Information systems
             Meteorological research
             Human resources training
IDENTIFIER:  FAA National Airspace System Plan
             NWS Automated Surface Observing System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Subcommittee on Technology, Committee on Science, House
of Representatives

June 1998

AVIATION SAFETY - FAA HAS NOT
FULLY IMPLEMENTED WEATHER-RELATED
RECOMMENDATIONS

GAO/RCED-98-130

Aviation Weather Recommendations

(348027)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ADAS - Automated Data Acquisition System
  AOPA - Aircraft Owners and Pilots Association
  ASOS - Automated Surface Observing System
  AWOS - Automated Weather Observing System
  ATA - Air Transport Association
  FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
  ITWS - Integrated Terminal Weather System
  LLWAS - Low Level Windshear Alert System
  NASDAC - National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center
  NEXRAD - Next Generation Radar
  NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
  NRC - National Research Council
  NTSB - National Transportation Safety Board
  NWS - National Weather Service
  OASIS - Operational and Supportability Implementation System
  OFCM - Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology
  RE&D - Research, Engineering and Development
  RVR - New Generation Runway Visual Range
  TDWR - Terminal Doppler Weather Radar
  WARP - Weather and Radar Processor
  WSP - Weather Systems Processor

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-278184

June 2, 1998

The Honorable Constance Morella
Chairwoman
The Honorable James Barcia
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Technology
Committee on Science
House of Representatives

The Honorable Bart Gordon
House of Representatives

In the last 10 years, icing, turbulence, dangerous winds, a lack of
visibility, and other weather conditions have been cited as a cause
or contributing factor in nearly a quarter of aviation accidents.\1
Even though aviation accident rates are dropping overall, the number
of accidents could go up in future years if the number of passenger
flights increases as expected.  To minimize the danger that hazardous
weather presents to the aviation system, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), in conjunction with other federal agencies,
collects and analyzes weather information and disseminates this
information to the users of the aviation system.  However, between
1995 and 1997, one report by the National Research Council (NRC) and
two reports by an FAA advisory committee cited problems in FAA's
management of its aviation weather activities, such as inadequate
interagency coordination and a lack of clarity about the agency's
role in aviation weather.\2 These reports also recommended steps FAA
could take to provide better weather information to aviation users. 

Concerned about FAA's efforts to reduce weather-related accidents,
you asked us to examine the actions FAA has taken to address the
recommendations raised by NRC and FAA's advisory committee.  In this
report, we discuss FAA's actions in four areas of concern raised by
the three reports:  (1) policy and leadership, (2) interagency
coordination, (3) meeting different types of users' needs for weather
information, and (4) the level of funding provided for weather
activities. 

To assist us in evaluating FAA's actions, we convened a panel of
experts who were members of NRC's committee or FAA's advisory
committee.  These experts were chosen to represent different users of
aviation weather information, such as airlines; air traffic
controllers; and commercial, military, and private pilots.  After
discussing FAA's responses to the recommendations in the four areas
of concern, the panel rated FAA's progress on each recommendation. 
Our methodology is discussed in more detail in appendix I. 


--------------------
\1 The National Transportation Safety Board, the official source of
information on airline accidents, defines accidents as events in
which individuals are killed or suffer serious injury, or the
aircraft is substantially damaged (49 C.F.R.  section 830.2). 

\2 Aviation Weather Services:  A Call for Federal Leadership and
Action, National Research Council, National Aviation Weather Services
Committee, (Washington, D.C.:  1995); Final Report of the Aviation
Weather Subcommittee, FAA Research, Engineering, and Development
Subcommittee, (Washington, D.C.:  Oct.  1995); and Subcommittee
Report of the NAS ATM R&D Panel to the RE&D Advisory Committee, FAA
Research, Engineering, and Development Subcommittee, (Washington,
D.C.:  Mar.  1997). 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The panel of experts we convened concluded that FAA had made limited
progress in implementing the weather-related recommendations made by
NRC and FAA's advisory committee.  Regarding the first area of
concern, policy and leadership, the reports concluded that FAA is the
agency best suited for leading federal aviation weather efforts but
that it had not accepted that role.  The NRC report linked this
criticism to the dispersal of responsibilities among several FAA
organizations.  The reports also concluded that FAA did not have
clear policy guidance to define its role in aviation weather
activities.  Since 1995, FAA has attempted to address these twin
concerns by creating a new organization to direct aviation weather
activities and by issuing a policy that states that FAA takes the
responsibility for leading aviation weather activities.  However, our
expert panel concluded that because FAA has not yet produced a plan
to implement the new policy, its actions did not go far enough to
address the concerns that the report originally raised. 

With regard to the second concern, interagency coordination, the
reports questioned the adequacy of FAA's efforts to coordinate
aviation weather activities with other federal agencies.  For
example, the reports found little evidence that the FAA officials
involved in weather-related research communicated with officials from
other agencies working in the same area.  In response, FAA has
increased the frequency of meetings between high-level FAA and
National Weather Service officials.  Our expert panel, however, did
not believe that the agency had presented sufficient evidence to show
that these meetings had led to improved coordination. 

Concerning the third area--FAA's efforts to meet the needs all types
of users (such as air traffic controllers, pilots, and dispatchers)
have for weather information--the reports concluded that FAA was not
providing consistent information or adequate training.  For example,
users currently get weather information from different systems, which
may not agree about current weather conditions.  As evidence that it
is meeting the needs of all types of users, FAA cited a list of
systems it is developing to provide weather information to various
users and a list of the training courses it offers.  Our expert
panel, however, expressed continuing concerns about whether the
equipment FAA listed would form an integrated system to serve all
users.  Panelists also raised concerns about the training offered by
FAA, stating that better training could help reduce disparities in
the abilities of air traffic controllers to interpret weather
information. 

Finally, with respect to the amount of funding FAA has allocated for
aviation weather activities, the reports raised questions about the
low level of funding provided to weather-related projects compared
with other activities.  Our review of FAA's budget information for
fiscal year 1990 through fiscal 1998 confirms that the agency has
allocated less funding for aviation weather during this period than
for most other acquisition and research priorities.  FAA officials
attribute this funding history, in part, to an emphasis on
higher-priority issues, such as security and the replacement of air
traffic control equipment.  Several panelists raised concerns that
without more consistent funding, multiyear research efforts on
aviation weather problems might not be funded to their conclusion. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Aviation weather refers to any type of weather that can affect the
operation of an aircraft--anything from a brief delay in departure
because of low visibility to a catastrophic accident during flight. 
For example, in March 1992, a USAir flight crashed during takeoff
from La Guardia Airport in New York City, killing 27 people and
injuring 21 others.  Icing was identified as one of the factors that
contributed to that accident.  According to data from the National
Transportation Safety Board and FAA, about 24 percent of all aviation
accidents in fiscal year 1987 through fiscal year 1996 were
weather-related.  During the same period, about 35 percent of
aviation fatalities occurred in weather-related accidents.  About 88
percent of these accidents involved small private aircraft. 
Weather-related aviation accidents were most often caused by winds,
poor visibility, or turbulence.  Figure 1 shows all the types of
weather events cited in aviation accidents over this period. 

   Figure 1:  Distribution of
   7,966 Weather Factors Cited in
   5,286 Weather-Related
   Accidents, Fiscal Years 1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  Density altitude refers to less dense air that adversely
affects an aircraft's performance, most often on takeoff.  This
condition typically occurs at higher altitudes; heat and humidity
also contribute to its effect. 

Multiple weather factors may be cited in an accident investigation. 

Because of rounding, the sum of percentages exceeds 100. 

Source:  Analysis by FAA's National Aviation Safety Data Analysis
Center of accident investigations completed by the National
Transportation Safety Board. 

Weather need not cause an accident to have an effect on aviation. 
FAA estimates that 72 percent of all delays over 15 minutes can be
attributed to weather.  These delays add to the cost of flying,
either for passengers whose travel plans are disrupted or for
airlines, which can incur additional fuel, servicing, and crew costs. 
The Air Transport Association estimates that delays cost airlines and
passengers about $4 billion in 1996.  (App.  II provides more
detailed information on weather-related accidents and delays.)

FAA is responsible for maintaining the safety of the national
airspace system.  Because of the impact of weather on aviation, FAA
has spent more than $1.4 billion in facilities and equipment funds
since fiscal year 1982 to develop and purchase weather-related
systems and equipment.  In future years, FAA expects to spend another
$440 million on those systems already in development.  FAA believes
that its purchases of improved weather systems will help it meet the
President's stated goal of reducing fatal aviation accidents by 80
percent within 10 years.  For example, FAA has purchased more than
500 automated surface observing system (ASOS) units, which use a
series of instruments to automatically measure such meteorological
data as wind speed and direction, temperature, and barometric
pressure near airports.  FAA is also buying systems, like the
integrated terminal weather system (ITWS), that will collect and
analyze weather data from ASOS, radars, and other systems, and
display them for use by air traffic controllers and supervisors.  FAA
relays the data provided by such systems, as well as information
provided by the National Weather Service (NWS) and private vendors,
to pilots through automated systems or direct voice communications
from air traffic controllers.  FAA also uses weather information when
deciding how to handle air traffic, such as which runway to use at an
airport. 

In addition, since fiscal year 1982, FAA has spent almost $169
million of its total funding of $3.3 billion for research,
engineering, and development on research related to aviation weather. 
FAA's research has looked into ways to improve radars and other
weather sensors, to detect and avoid turbulence, and to support the
early development of some of the systems it has purchased or plans to
purchase.  Much of this research is conducted under contract by
several universities and federally funded laboratories, including the
National Center for Atmospheric Research, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA) Flight Systems and National
Severe Storms Laboratories, NWS' Aviation Weather Center and National
Center for Environment Prediction, and the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's Lincoln Laboratories. 

Several other federal agencies also collect and disseminate aviation
weather information, as well as conduct aviation weather research. 
NWS, which is part of NOAA in the Department of Commerce, is
responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating weather
information in general and has worked with FAA on joint projects such
as ASOS and an advanced national weather radar system.  NWS also
provides meteorologists for some of FAA's air traffic control
centers.  Other agencies with related aviation weather
responsibilities include the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, which conducts basic research on weather-related
topics, and the Department of Defense, which provides aviation
weather information to military pilots and command officers.  The
Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology (OFCM), which is
also part of NOAA, was created to coordinate the meteorological
services and research for all federal agencies.  However, the office
does not have the authority to direct the weather operations of other
federal agencies. 

Over the past 3 years, several reports have raised concerns about the
quality of the weather information available to the aviation
community.  In 1995, NRC, examining the roles and missions of the
agencies involved in aviation weather, found that FAA, NWS, and the
other agencies involved did not coordinate their activities.  NRC
called upon FAA to take the lead in federal aviation weather efforts. 
At the same time, a subcommittee of FAA's RE&D Advisory Committee
that was examining the adequacy of FAA's aviation weather research
found a number of problems.\3 This subcommittee reported that FAA
needed to improve its aviation weather research as well as its
delivery of weather information to system users, such as pilots,
controllers, and dispatchers.  Finally, FAA's advisory committee
released a report in 1997 on research related to the national
airspace system.  This report found that FAA's efforts on aviation
weather were unfocused and that the agency had not clearly defined
its role in providing aviation weather information. 

We contacted the members of the NRC aviation weather committee and
the FAA advisory committee that addressed weather issues and asked
for their assistance in our efforts to follow up on their
recommendations that were specifically addressed to FAA.  In
obtaining their assistance, we asked all of the committee members, in
a survey, to identify the highest-priority recommendations.  The
highest-rated recommendations address three general topics:  policy
and leadership, interagency coordination, and efforts to address
users' needs.  We chose an expert panel from among those who answered
our survey, with members representing the various users of aviation
weather information, such as airline representatives, commercial and
private pilots, and air traffic controllers.  The panel reviewed the
information we had gathered on FAA's actions to implement the eight
recommendations and rated FAA's general progress on each
recommendation on a 5-point scale, from very poor to excellent.  The
panelists were also asked to indicate whether FAA's actions were
sufficient to address the recommendation and whether FAA had taken
these actions in a timely manner.  In discussing the recommendations,
the panelists repeatedly raised concerns about FAA's funding of
weather activities, a fourth area of concern that was mentioned in
the original reports. 


--------------------
\3 Under authority granted by the Aviation Safety Research Act of
1988, as amended (49 U.S.C.  section 44508), FAA established the RE&D
Advisory Committee to obtain advice and recommendations from an
outside, balanced representative group of aviation-oriented
organizations, associations, and academic interests. 


   EXPERTS FOUND THAT FAA'S
   EFFORTS TO EXERCISE LEADERSHIP
   IN AVIATION WEATHER FELL SHORT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

NRC and FAA's RE&D Advisory Committee found that FAA did not exercise
leadership for aviation weather services, partly because it lacked a
clear policy on weather and partly because of organizational
inefficiencies.  FAA has attempted to address these criticisms by
creating an aviation weather directorate and issuing a policy on
weather.  However, members of our expert panel did not think these
actions went far enough to address the previously identified
weaknesses, generally rating FAA's progress in this area as poor. 


      REPORTS CRITICIZED FAA'S
      LACK OF LEADERSHIP AND
      INTERNAL COORDINATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

Reports by NRC and FAA's RE&D Advisory Committee criticized FAA for
failing to exercise leadership on aviation weather issues.  For
example, NRC found that "vigorous leadership within the federal
government .  .  .  [is] needed to build consensus and coordinate the
overall effort to optimize aviation weather services and related
research." It concluded that FAA was the agency best able to exercise
that leadership because of its aviation expertise and legal
authority.  All three reports also criticized FAA for not developing
a policy to define its role and priorities in aviation weather and
recommended that FAA provide a clear policy statement on its role in
providing aviation weather services. 

For example, NRC noted that under FAA's policies, pilots have the
primary responsibility for keeping their aircraft away from hazardous
weather, while air traffic controllers are principally responsible
for separating aircraft from one another, thus avoiding collisions. 
The report found that FAA's guidance required controllers to remain
aware of current weather conditions and relay information on
hazardous weather to pilots, but it did not allow controllers to
direct aircraft away from hazardous weather, as they direct aircraft
away from other aircraft.  NRC concluded that FAA should develop
procedures that allow controllers to take a more active role in
separating aircraft from hazardous weather, especially when they have
more accurate weather information than the pilot.  The 1995 advisory
committee report reached similar conclusions.  The 1997 advisory
committee report concluded that even though the definition of
hazardous weather is highly dependent upon the capabilities of the
individual aircraft and flight crew, FAA's mission should include the
responsibility for transmitting weather information to pilots and
dispatchers in order to improve the separation of aircraft from
hazardous weather and to increase collaboration between pilots and
air traffic controllers. 

NRC and FAA's advisory committee also cited weaknesses in FAA's
internal organization as a reason for the agency's not taking a
leadership role in weather issues.  For example, NRC found that no
single office within FAA had the authority and responsibility for
setting priorities for aviation weather.  The 1997 advisory committee
report found that six offices within FAA were responsible for setting
priorities for aviation weather research.  According to FAA's Manager
for Weather Research, prior to 1995, these offices did not set
priorities to ensure that the most important research projects
received funding.  Instead, this official stated, FAA set its
research priorities by reviewing the requests submitted by the
national laboratories and contractors to the several offices with
responsibility for aviation weather.  These offices did not
coordinate their efforts internally but submitted their requests
separately to FAA's Office of Research and Acquisitions.  As a
result, NRC and FAA's advisory committee found that aviation weather
research was hampered by a lack of coordination, funding, and
priority setting.  To address this problem, NRC recommended that FAA
appoint an official to serve as the single focal point with
responsibility for providing effective internal and external
coordination of aviation weather activities. 


      FAA ISSUED A WEATHER POLICY
      AND CREATED NEW
      ORGANIZATIONS FOR WEATHER
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

FAA took several actions to address concerns about its leadership
role in aviation weather.  First, in response to concerns about how
it organized its aviation weather activities, FAA made several
organizational changes to consolidate these activities.  In October
1995, FAA created an aviation weather directorate, which is intended
to serve as the federal government's focal point for determining
aviation weather requirements, policies, and plans.  The directorate
was intended to fulfill the aviation weather responsibilities
previously carried out by several organizations within FAA.  The
directorate is responsible for setting requirements for, and
developing programs and policies on, aviation weather.  In February
1996, FAA created a program to coordinate its research efforts on
improving weather observations, warnings, and forecasts.  The weather
research program is organized into eight product development teams
that focus on topics such as turbulence and visibility.  According to
program officials, the program oversees the research conducted by the
national laboratories and universities and sets priorities for
requests to conduct research on aviation weather. 

Second, in response to congressional direction,\4 in April 1996, FAA
began implementing a new acquisition management system designed to
provide for more timely and cost-effective acquisitions for the
entire agency.  Under this system, FAA operates five integrated
product teams, which are responsible for the research, development,
acquisition, and installation of all new equipment within their area
of expertise.  To carry out these tasks, each team includes staff
with various areas of expertise, such as systems engineers, lawyers,
contract specialists, and representatives of the organizations
responsible for the operation and maintenance of the systems
acquired.  In the past, according to FAA officials, the
responsibility for the acquisition of such systems would be carried
out sequentially through various FAA offices, depending on whether
the systems were being designed, purchased, or deployed.  Now, one
team is responsible for all three of those activities.  Two of these
teams deal with weather systems:  one with weather processor systems
and one with weather sensors.  The weather processor team, for
example, develops and acquires systems such as ITWS, which takes data
from various sensors and displays the data for users. 

In addition, since the NRC and advisory committee reports were
issued, FAA has worked with other federal agencies involved in
aviation weather to develop the National Aviation Weather Strategic
Plan, which was published in April 1997 and is intended to lay out a
vision of how to reduce the number of weather-related aviation
accidents and delays.  According to FAA's Director of Aviation
Weather, plans to implement the interagency strategic plan and FAA's
aviation weather policy are still under development, and to date, no
policies or regulations of FAA's have been amended to reflect the new
weather policy. 

Finally, in September 1997, the Administrator of FAA issued an
aviation weather policy in which FAA accepted responsibility for
taking the lead in aviation weather services.  According to this
policy statement, FAA will (1) work closely with the federal agencies
concerned with aviation weather; (2) take the lead in developing a
plan to meet stated national goals concerning aviation weather; and
(3) ensure that the needs of FAA and the aviation community are being
addressed and that research, development, and acquisition are focused
to improve the safety of the air traffic system. 


--------------------
\4 Section 348 of the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996 (P.L.  104-50, Nov.  15, 1995)
directed FAA to develop and implement a new acquisition management
system. 


      PANELISTS CONCLUDED THAT FAA
      HAD MADE LIMITED PROGRESS IN
      DEFINING POLICY AND
      EXERCISING LEADERSHIP
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3

Three of the recommendations our January 1998 expert panel reviewed
addressed FAA's lack of leadership on aviation weather issues.  These
recommendations included two by the RE&D Advisory Committee in 1997. 
One recommendation called for FAA to see weather as a safety issue,
not just a delay issue.  The committee also recommended that FAA
issue a "clear and cohesive policy statement regarding the agency's
important role" in aviation weather, including the need to separate
aircraft from hazardous weather.  In the third recommendation, NRC
called for FAA to see weather as an important part of all of its
operations.\5

Several members of our expert panel applauded FAA for issuing a
policy on weather, calling the policy "a step in the right
direction." One panelist also stated, "I don't think that you can
take a snapshot right now and evaluate where FAA is because .  .  . 
[this] is a long-term program." However, panelists also questioned
whether the changes cited by FAA demonstrate that it has taken the
lead for federal aviation activities.  Specifically, several
panelists expressed concern that FAA had not developed a plan to
implement the new policy.  For example, one panelist stated, "I .  . 
.  think that meetings and policy statements and all that are .  .  . 
just a first step.  .  .  .  [Y]ou have to .  .  .  look at what has
occurred." Another added, "I think the intent of the committee .  . 
.  was to suggest that if you come out with a policy statement that
you would .  .  .  take some action to put some teeth into it."

Several panelists were also concerned that FAA did not believe that a
policy on separating aircraft from hazardous weather was necessary,
as the advisory committee had recommended.  According to one
panelist, the responsibility for controllers to provide weather
information to pilots is implicit and ambiguous, "but if that
[policy] was articulated, then [it would] provide a basis for saying
that controllers need better weather information to actually provide
that service."

We asked the panelists to rate FAA's overall progress on a 5-point
scale.\6 In rating the recommendations dealing with policy and
leadership, most panelists saw FAA's progress in treating weather as
a safety issue as fair.  However, most panelists also thought that
FAA had made poor progress in establishing a weather policy that
addresses the role of controllers in providing weather information
and in seeing weather as an important part of its operations.  In
addition, most of the panelists indicated that FAA's actions on these
three recommendations were neither timely nor sufficient. 


--------------------
\5 The panelists also discussed a recommendation made by NRC that FAA
take immediate action rather than wait for the creation of an air
traffic corporation.  This recommendation was originally made when
consideration was being given to awarding some of FAA's air traffic
control functions to an independent organization.  In response to
this recommendation, FAA stated that such proposals are no longer
being considered.  While many panelists recognized that the
establishment of a private corporation is no longer a current issue,
some speculated that the respondents may have rated this
recommendation highly anyway because they focused on its first part,
which called on FAA to take swift action to improve aviation weather
services.  Most panelists thought FAA's progress on this matter had
been fair. 

\6 The scale was 1 = very poor, 2 = poor, 3 = fair, 4 = good, 5 =
excellent.  The results of each ballot are included in app.  VI. 


   EXPERTS QUESTIONED FAA'S
   EFFORTS TO COORDINATE WITH
   OTHER FEDERAL AGENCIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

NRC and FAA's RE&D Advisory Committee raised concerns about FAA's
coordination with other federal agencies involved in aviation
weather, especially in the area of research.  FAA stated that it has
increased its coordination with NWS as well as with multiagency
working groups.  Members of our expert panel commented, however, that
they did not see any evidence that the increased number of meetings
was having an impact on the agencies' aviation weather efforts.  As a
result, they generally rated FAA's progress in this area as poor. 


      REPORTS CITED INADEQUATE
      COORDINATION WITH THE
      WEATHER SERVICE AND OTHER
      FEDERAL AGENCIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

Two of the three reports by NRC and the advisory committee found that
FAA did not effectively coordinate its aviation weather
responsibilities with other agencies involved in weather.  Inadequate
interagency coordination was especially apparent in research and
development.  For example, in 1995, NRC found little communication
between FAA and NWS and was unable to identify any interagency
coordination for research and development.  It also found that the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration was not included in
FAA's long-range planning for aviation weather.  NRC recommended that
FAA and NWS establish more formal coordination procedures.  NRC and
one advisory committee also criticized FAA for not implementing a
1977 memorandum of agreement with NWS, under which FAA was to provide
NWS with a list of FAA's requirements for aviation weather services
and research. 


      FAA HAS INCREASED
      COORDINATION WITH OTHER
      FEDERAL AGENCIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

FAA, NWS, and Department of Defense officials we spoke with agreed
with NRC's assessment that FAA's coordination on aviation weather
activities had been limited.  However, they also pointed out that FAA
has taken a number of steps to increase its coordination with the
other federal agencies engaged in weather activities.  For example,
FAA points to its work with OFCM, NWS, and other agencies on the
National Aviation Weather Strategic Plan.  FAA and the other agencies
are continuing to work together to develop procedures to implement
the goals outlined in the plan.  According to FAA's Director of
Aviation Weather, these procedures will be published in May or June
1998. 

In addition, FAA and NWS have increased the frequency of their
meetings to address aviation weather concerns.  While FAA could
document only one such meeting in 1995, it identified four meetings
between the two agencies in both 1996 and 1997.  Some of these
meetings have been attended by high-level officials--FAA's Director
for Air Traffic Requirements and NWS' Deputy Assistant Administrator
for Operations. 

FAA officials also believe that the agency's joint activities with
NWS are further evidence of improved coordination.  They cited, for
example, the joint funding of aviation weather research and
participation in management councils for two jointly developed
weather systems. 

Finally, FAA and the Department of Defense have arranged for a
military officer to be detailed to FAA as a military adviser for
aviation weather requirements.  This position, currently staffed by
an Air Force lieutenant colonel, is intended to provide FAA with
advice on planning, implementing, and monitoring FAA's weather
programs, including training, certifying, and integrating related
weather programs operated by FAA and the Department of Defense. 


      PANELISTS RATED FAA'S
      PROGRESS ON COORDINATION AS
      POOR
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.3

Two of the recommendations our panelists reviewed addressed NRC's
concerns about coordination.  One recommendation called upon FAA and
NWS to reestablish "high-level liaisons" to be responsible for
defining and coordinating aviation weather research, development, and
operations.  NRC also recommended that FAA and NOAA work together to
ensure that aviation weather research and development are "closely
coupled" to the agencies' short-term operational needs. 

In discussing FAA's implementation of these two recommendations, our
panelists emphasized the importance of coordination among the federal
agencies.  One panelist, for example, stated that while a number of
agencies are involved in aviation weather research, they are not
working to leverage their resources or coordinate their research
projects.  Another panelist commented that OFCM has not been an
effective forum for coordination because it does not have any
authority over other agencies. 

While the panelists believed that FAA had taken steps to improve its
coordination, they questioned whether the agency had gone as far as
the recommendations intended.  For example, one panelist stated,
"[A]bsolutely, the dialogue between the FAA and NWS has improved. 
But .  .  .  it would be very difficult for it not to improve because
there was no dialogue [previously]." This panelist also noted that
the meetings that have occurred do not appear to have contributed
substantially to the development of a list of FAA's requirements for
aviation weather services and research, as required by the 1977
memorandum of agreement.\7 On the topic of coordinating research with
operational needs, several panelists praised the weather research
projects FAA was pursuing.  However, panelists also raised concerns
about the extent of coordination among the agencies' research
programs. 

Several panelists cited the lack of communication between FAA's air
traffic controllers and NWS' forecasters as an example of weaknesses
in coordination at the operational level.  According to the
panelists, even when controllers and forecasters are in the same
room, communication is limited.  In regional centers, one panelist
noted, few controllers use the forecasts provided by NWS
meteorologists because they would have to leave their radar display
and go to another part of the room to get the information. 

Most panelists rated FAA's progress in implementing the
recommendations on coordination as poor.  The panelists also
indicated that FAA's actions on these recommendations were neither
timely nor sufficient. 


--------------------
\7 On Jan.  28, 1998, the week after our panel met, FAA sent a letter
to NWS outlining its requirements for aviation weather.  However, the
letter primarily describes actions FAA needs to take to develop a
list of requirements for NWS, rather than the requirements
themselves. 


   EXPERTS SAW FAA'S EFFORTS TO
   MEET ALL USERS' NEEDS FOR
   WEATHER INFORMATION AS POOR
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

In the reports by NRC and FAA's RE&D Advisory Committee, experts also
raised concerns that FAA was not providing enough consistent weather
information and training to aviation users, such as pilots,
dispatchers, and air traffic controllers.  FAA responded that it is
developing or deploying systems to meet the needs of all users, as
well as instituting a number of training courses.  However, several
panelists questioned whether the systems and training courses FAA
cited adequately provide the type of information and training that
system users have determined is necessary. 


      PREVIOUS REPORTS FOUND THAT
      FAA DID NOT ADEQUATELY
      ADDRESS THE WEATHER NEEDS OF
      AVIATION SYSTEM USERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

Each of the three reports raised concerns about the lack of attention
paid to the needs of all users of the aviation system.  According to
NRC, one of FAA's goals is to provide consistent weather information
to all types of users.  However, NRC found that "pilots, controllers,
and dispatchers often obtain weather information from different
sources that may not agree about the location, duration, or severity
of adverse weather." For example, a controller's radar screen may not
show clouds that a pilot can see out the window or on a cockpit
weather radar screen.  In addition, some of the weather information
given to pilots covers broad geographic areas, making it hard for
them to determine if they will experience hazardous weather during
their flight.  According to NRC, the needs of various aviation system
users were well known, but the federal government had not acted
adequately to address these concerns.  Similarly, the 1997 advisory
committee report found that while the needs of users may vary because
of such factors as the capabilities of the pilot or aircraft, "for
safety and efficiency, all participants--controller, pilots, and
dispatchers--should have consistent, timely, and common knowledge of
the weather situation."

NRC cited FAA's experience with the automated weather observing
system known as ASOS to illustrate the impact of inadequately
considering user needs in developing a weather system.  Although FAA
worked with NWS on the development of ASOS, some aviation users
complained that the system as deployed did not meet their needs. 
Specifically, ASOS was designed to replace human weather observers. 
However, while a human observer can look at weather conditions over a
broad area, ASOS can measure weather conditions only directly
overhead.  As a result, several aviation groups commented that ASOS
provided unrepresentative observations when weather conditions were
patchy or changing rapidly.  Such inaccurate observations could cause
pilots to avoid an airport when it is safe to land but ASOS reports
unsafe weather or could cause pilots to attempt to land at an airport
when unsafe conditions are not reported.\8 Because ASOS' observations
cannot substitute for the completeness of human observations, FAA is
still employing human weather observers.  NRC cited ASOS as an
example of FAA's failure to "serve as an effective intermediary
between the NWS and aviation system users."

Both NRC and the advisory committee also cited the need for all users
to receive adequate training and observed that they were not
currently receiving such training.  They cited weaknesses in the
weather training provided to pilots and controllers that undermine
their ability to use available weather information to their maximum
advantage.  "Training offers great potential for near-term reductions
in weather-related accidents," NRC concluded.  Similarly, the
advisory committee reported in 1995, "The Administrator should set
policies for [pilots' and controllers'] training and certification
that will lead to enhanced understanding and decision-making
regarding weather, taking into account the many significant
forthcoming changes in the National Airspace System."


--------------------
\8 We raised similar concerns in Weather Forecasting:  Unmet Needs
and Unknown Costs Warrant Reassessment of Observing System Plans
(GAO/AIMD-95-81, Apr.  21, 1995). 


      FAA IS DEVELOPING AVIATION
      WEATHER SYSTEMS AND TRAINING
      FOR VARIOUS USERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

FAA weather officials cited the various aviation weather systems it
is developing and deploying as evidence that it is meeting the needs
of all aviation users.  Table 1 lists the intended users and the
implementation schedule for each system cited by FAA. 



                                Table 1
                
                 FAA Aviation Weather Systems, Intended
                  Users, and Implementation Schedules

                                                    Implementation
Project                         Intended users      schedule
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
Integrated Terminal Weather     Controllers,        Prototypes in
System (ITWS)                   terminal            use;
                                personnel,          deployment
                                dispatchers         scheduled for
                                                    2000-05

Low Level Windshear Alert       Pilots and          Fully deployed by
System (LLWAS) Network          controllers         2001
Expansion

Terminal Doppler Weather Radar  Pilots and          Currently deployed
(TDWR)                          controllers         at 45 sites

New Generation Runway Visual    Controllers         Deployment
Range (RVR)                                         ongoing; currently
                                                    deployed at 250
                                                    facilities

Automated Weather Observing     Pilots and          Fully deployed in
System/Automated Surface        controllers         1997
Observing System (AWOS/ASOS)
Data Acquisition System (ADAS)

Weather Systems Processor       Controllers         Full production by
(WSP)                                               2001

ASOS/AWOS                       Controllers,        Federal AWOS
                                dispatchers,        completed; ASOS
                                meteorologists,     fully deployed by
                                pilots              1999

WARP (Weather and Radar         Controllers,        Acquisition
Processor)                      meteorologists      ongoing

NEXRAD (Next Generation Radar)  Controllers,        Fully deployed;
                                dispatchers,        enhancements
                                meteorologists,     ongoing
                                pilots

OASIS (Operational and          Controllers,        Deployment begins
Supportability Implementation   pilots              1999
System)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  In commenting on a draft of this report, FAA requested that
this table include information on several weather systems (ASOS/AWOS,
WARP, NEXRAD, OASIS) that were not included in the original list FAA
provided for our expert panel.  FAA also requested that several of
the existing items be amended to reflect additional users:  TDWR,
dispatchers and meteorologists; and ADAS, dispatchers,
meteorologists, and pilots. 

Source:  FAA. 

FAA and NWS are also currently working to enhance ASOS to address
some of the concerns raised by aviation users.  Regarding training,
officials at FAA's Academy provided materials describing the
weather-related courses taught at the Academy and through
computer-based instruction.  While some of the computer-based courses
offer an overview of weather topics, most of the Academy's courses
provide training on how to use systems like those identified in table
1.\9


--------------------
\9 In its comments on a draft of this report, FAA officials stated
that the Academy is in process of developing an expanded basic
weather course for air traffic controllers and that universities that
provide controller training also provide training on weather. 


      PANELISTS RATED FAA'S
      ACTIONS ON MEETING USER
      NEEDS AS VERY POOR
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

The final two recommendations the panel considered focused on meeting
the needs of aviation system users.  NRC called for FAA to focus on
addressing users' urgent unmet needs, such as the improved
communication of weather information, improved observations and
forecasts, and a "comprehensive training program." In 1997, the
advisory committee recommended that FAA support "a weather
architecture, which includes the appropriate elements and interfaces
needed to disseminate critical weather information to ALL aviation
users, supported by adequate funding and priorities."

The panelists were most critical of FAA's actions to date in this
area.  Speaking about providing improved weather information to
users, one panelist said, "You can get better information on the
[Internet] than you can in the [FAA] system." Another panelist
questioned who would benefit from the systems FAA is developing,
saying, "The systems are designed to get the information to people on
the ground, but, quite frankly, one of the key individuals who needs
that information is the captain of the airline, who is up at 39,000
feet." Similarly, several panelists expressed concern that FAA had
not integrated the systems that it provides to different aviation
weather users.  According to one panelist, "There was not, and is not
yet, a coherent information architecture to distribute the weather
information."

On the issue of training, the panelists agreed that the courses FAA
identified did not fully respond to the recommendation.  According to
one panelist, "The recommendation is a comprehensive national plan. 
This is just a hodgepodge." Another panelist noted, "[Pilots] have a
mandated 4, 5, 6 hours of security training every year for something
that, fortunately, one out of a million .  .  .  person[s] will
encounter, and we have nothing, or relatively nothing, on weather,
which is something that they will encounter every day in every one of
their flights." The panelists also raised concerns about the adequacy
of the weather training provided to air traffic controllers, noting
that there is often a disparity among controllers' abilities to
interpret weather information. 

Overall, most panelists rated FAA's progress in meeting users' unmet
needs as very poor.  The panel rated FAA's efforts to develop
aviation weather systems to support all users as poor.  The panelists
did not believe that FAA's actions on these recommendations were
either timely or sufficient. 


   REPORTS AND PANELISTS
   QUESTIONED FAA'S COMMITMENT TO
   FUNDING WEATHER ACTIVITIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

Each of the three reports also raised concerns about the amount of
funding FAA has provided for weather activities.  NRC, for example,
found that while funding levels for activities such as training and
research were small compared with the cost of acquiring aviation
weather systems, the lack of funding for such activities could
adversely affect system deployment.  The RE&D Advisory Committee also
stated in 1995 that, because of the low priority given to weather
activities, "weather-related programs are inconsistently funded,
causing less than acceptable performance." Finally, in 1997, the
advisory committee found that "as a result of the present budget
environment, the FAA management has decided to give weather programs
a lower priority than other system areas, thereby causing
cancellations or significant delays to critical weather efforts."

The reports discussed several instances that raised questions about
FAA's commitment to funding aviation weather projects that meet
users' needs.  For example, FAA eliminated funding for the Advanced
Weather Products Generator, a system designed to provide weather
information to pilots and other external aviation users.  According
to NRC, this decision represented a "lack of focus on pilots' needs."
The 1997 advisory committee report called FAA's plans to consolidate
weather data using systems like ITWS logical but questioned FAA's
commitment to fund such projects over the long term. 

Our review of FAA's budget data confirms the committees' findings and
the panelists' concerns about the relative importance FAA places on
weather funding.  FAA has a number of major activity areas linked to
its mission and management goals.  Although aviation weather is a
prominent factor in aviation accidents, FAA's spending for research
and acquisitions related to weather has been lower than spending for
most other agency research and acquisition activities.  For example,
from fiscal year 1990 through fiscal year 1998, aviation weather
research accounted for 4 percent of the funds allocated to all types
of FAA research.  Spending on weather activities was lower than
spending on all but three other areas--airport technology,
environment and energy, and research and development partnerships--as
figure 2 shows.  FAA spent 8 percent of its research funds on weather
in fiscal year 1990 but only 1 percent in fiscal years 1994 and 1995. 
In fiscal year 1998, FAA plans to spend 8 percent of its research
funds on weather-related projects. 

   Figure 2:  FAA's Research,
   Engineering, and Development
   Funding by Program Area, Fiscal
   Years 1990-98 (Dollars in
   millions)

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Since fiscal year 1993, the Congress has allowed FAA to use
facilities and equipment funds for development activities that were
previously paid for with RE&D funds. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of FAA's data. 

Similarly, funding for the acquisition of aviation weather systems
was lower (eighth out of eight areas) than for all other program
areas for fiscal years 1990 through 1998, as figure 3 shows.  Over
this period, acquisitions for aviation weather accounted for 5
percent of all spending for facilities and equipment, varying from a
high of 8 percent in fiscal year 1990 to a low of 4 percent in fiscal
years 1993 and 1997.  In fiscal year 1998, FAA plans to spend nearly
5 percent of its facilities and equipment funds on weather-related
projects. 

   Figure 3:  FAA's Facilities and
   Equipment Funding by Program
   Area, Fiscal Years 1990-98
   (Dollars in millions)

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Since fiscal year 1993, the Congress has allowed FAA to use
facilities and equipment funds for development activities that were
previously paid for with RE&D funds. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of FAA's data. 

Finally, during the last 3 fiscal years, FAA has requested less
funding for aviation weather than the Congress has provided.  Table 2
shows the amount of funding FAA requested for aviation weather
research and acquisitions and the amount that the Congress provided. 



                                Table 2
                
                   Funding Requested and Provided for
                     Aviation Weather Research and
                   Acquisitions, Fiscal Years 1996-98

                         (Dollars in millions)

                          Research    Research  Acquisitio  Acquisitio
                             funds       funds     n funds     n funds
Fiscal year              requested    provided   requested    provided
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
1996                          $6.5        $6.5       $65.2       $87.7
1997                           6.4        13.0        84.2        88.4
1998                           4.0        15.3        82.2        88.7
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  FAA. 

Even though FAA's management has acknowledged the increasing value of
weather research, it is still difficult for aviation weather to get
funding, according to FAA's Manager for Aviation Weather Research. 
In addition, this official stated that neither FAA's request nor the
recent level of appropriations has been enough to support an adequate
weather research program.  He estimated that FAA's planned aviation
weather research for the next 5 to 7 years would cost $15 million to
$18 million per year.  Another FAA official pointed out that other
competing demands, such as security programs, continue to have a
higher priority. 

Several factors may account for the lower funding levels given to
aviation weather.  First, according to FAA's Director of Aviation
Weather and FAA's Manager for Weather Research, without a central
office, aviation weather did not have a funding advocate when
decisions were being made on the allocation of resources.  In
addition, these officials said, some of the FAA leadership, until
recently, did not believe that weather was a contributing factor in
safety and in delays and therefore did not consider it a high
priority. 

Finally, FAA does not assign weather information a high priority in
its architecture plans for the national airspace system.  FAA
categorizes its information needs according to three classifications: 
critical, essential, and routine, with critical being the highest
priority.  Critical information is information that if lost would
prevent the national air system from exercising safe separation and
control over aircraft.  Essential information is information that if
lost would reduce the capability of the national air system to
exercise safe separation and control over aircraft.  Since FAA does
not believe most aviation weather systems fall into the critical
category, it classifies them as essential.  Because weather
information is not considered critical, aviation weather systems are
often among the first areas cut, FAA officials told us. 

Several panelists commented that the level of funding FAA was
providing for research projects was not adequate, potentially
jeopardizing multiyear research projects.  While some panelists
stated that FAA could be reducing its funding requests deliberately
because it believed that the Congress would restore funding, others
raised the possibility that the low funding requests reflect the fact
that FAA continues to make weather issues a lower priority. 


   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

Owing to the significant impact of hazardous weather on aviation
safety and efficiency, improving the weather information available to
all users of the aviation system should be one of FAA's top
priorities.  However, a panel of experts presented with information
on FAA's actions to improve its management of aviation weather
concluded that FAA had done a poor job in addressing the most
significant concerns raised by previous reports.  While the panelists
recognized that FAA had taken certain steps, such as issuing a policy
to define its role in aviation weather and increasing coordination
with NWS, many questioned FAA's commitment to implementing permanent
changes resulting from these actions. 

On the basis of the panel's discussion and the information we
gathered, we agree that FAA has addressed some of the concerns raised
in previous reports.  However, FAA's responses also demonstrate that
some of the issues raised by the three reports have not been fully
addressed.  For example, FAA indicated that issuing a policy defining
its staff's role in separating aircraft from hazardous weather is not
necessary--a key function if the weather information it collects is
to improve safety.  Furthermore, two conditions--weather
information's being classified as a lower priority than other types
of air traffic information and the lack of training for FAA staff on
how to use weather information--indicate that despite the new policy,
weather continues to be a lower priority for FAA than its traditional
function of separating aircraft from other aircraft.  The
implementation plan FAA proposes to issue later this year provides
the agency with an opportunity to respond to these continuing
concerns with stronger evidence of its commitment to weather issues. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

We provided FAA with a draft of this report for its review and
comment.  We met with FAA officials, including FAA's Director for
Aviation Weather, to obtain FAA's comments.  FAA commented that the
draft report accurately reflected the condition of the organization,
and it agreed that corrective actions are needed.  FAA also suggested
that we add some information on several points, including the
findings from the advisory committee's 1997 report on separating
aircraft from hazardous weather and additional actions FAA had taken
regarding coordination, training, and deploying aviation weather
systems.  We added information to the report, where appropriate, to
reflect these suggestions. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1

We performed our review from August 1997 through April 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Our scope and methodology are discussed further in appendix I.  We
are providing copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Transportation; and the Administrator,
FAA.  We will also make copies available to others upon request. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202)
512-3650.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
VII. 

Gerald L.  Dillingham
Associate Director,
 Transportation Issues


SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I

At the request of the Chairwoman and Ranking Minority Member of the
Subcommittee on Technology, House Committee on Science, we agreed to
review the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) progress in
addressing recommendations made by outside experts on FAA's
management of aviation weather.  To address this topic, we first
reviewed the reports on aviation weather management prepared by the
National Research Council and FAA's Research, Engineering, and
Development Advisory Committee.  We also interviewed officials and
reviewed policy, budget, and planning documents at FAA's
headquarters, the Orlando International Airport control tower, the
National Weather Service, and the Office of the Federal Coordinator
for Meteorology.  Our discussions with agencies other than FAA
focused on their joint efforts with FAA and were not designed to
evaluate the agencies' individual aviation weather activities. 

We also worked with the members of the committees that wrote the
three reports.  First, we sent a survey to each member of the
committees that listed each of the recommendations made by those
reports and asked the respondents to rate their importance.  The
survey form and results are included in appendix III.  We received
responses from 28 of the 35 committee members surveyed. 

The seven recommendations most highly rated by the respondents dealt
with the general topics of policy and leadership, coordination, and
efforts to address user needs.  One of the recommendations chosen by
the respondents addressed coordination of research.  To ensure that
the panel adequately addressed concerns about coordination raised in
the previous reports and the original request, we added the
second-highest rated recommendation dealing with coordination,
resulting in a final total of eight recommendations.  We then asked
officials responsible for FAA's weather activities to provide
evidence of the actions FAA had taken to address these eight
high-priority recommendations.  FAA provided written responses and
some supporting material to support its actions to address each of
the eight recommendations.  The full text of each of the
recommendations, FAA's response, and selected supporting material are
presented in appendix IV. 

Finally, we convened an expert panel of individuals who had answered
our survey, judgmentally selecting a subset of eight individuals who
represented various users and providers of aviation weather
information.  The names and affiliations of the panel members are
listed in appendix V.  We held an all-day meeting with the
seven-member panel (one invitee was unable to attend but provided
written comments) at our offices in Washington, D.C.  For each of the
eight high-priority recommendations, we presented the panelists with
FAA's response, supporting material submitted by the agency, and any
other information about FAA's actions that we had identified during
our previous work.  We asked for their comments on (1) the original
intent of the recommendation, (2) any other actions FAA had taken to
address the recommendation, and (3) the adequacy of FAA's response. 
At the end of each discussion, we asked the panelists to rate, using
an anonymous ballot, FAA's progress in addressing each
recommendation.  The panelists were given the option of rating FAA's
overall response as very poor, poor, fair, good, or excellent.  They
were also asked if FAA's actions were consistent with the intent of
the recommendations, sufficient, and timely.  The results of these
ballots are included in appendix VI.  We recorded and transcribed the
meeting to ensure that we accurately captured the panel members'
statements. 

As also requested, we are providing information on the effect of
weather on aviation accidents and delays.  (See app.  II.) To
determine the impact of weather on aviation accidents and delays, we
worked with FAA's National Aviation Safety Data Analysis Center to
analyze data from the National Transportation Safety Board's accident
database and FAA's Operations Network.  We did not independently
verify the reliability of the computer-based data provided by FAA,
because they are not material to our findings. 


DATA ON WEATHER-RELATED ACCIDENTS
AND DELAYS
========================================================== Appendix II

Many factors contribute to aviation accidents\1 and delays.  Weather
has a significant role in these occurrences.  Data from the National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) show that weather is a cause or
contributing factor in almost one-quarter of accidents and more than
one-third of all injuries and fatalities.  According to FAA data for
55 airports, weather caused almost three-quarters of all delays. 


--------------------
\1 The National Transportation Safety Board, the official source of
information on airline accidents, defines accidents as events in
which individuals are killed or suffer serious injury, or the
aircraft is substantially damaged. 


   ACCIDENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1

On August 2, 1985, a Delta Airlines' Lockheed L-1011 with 165 persons
aboard crashed after encountering severe weather conditions on its
approach to the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport:  135 persons
died, and 28 were injured.  Although NTSB concluded that the accident
was the fault of the pilot, procedures, and training, the following
weather conditions were cited as contributing factors:  thunderstorm,
lightning, rain, windshear, wind, and downdraft. 

Of the 23,383 accidents from 1987 through 1996, NTSB had completed
investigations of 22,489 accidents as of March 1, 1998.  For its
completed investigations, NTSB determined that weather was a cause or
contributing factor in 5,286 or about 24 percent, of the accidents. 
See table II.1. 



                               Table II.1
                
                   All Accidents and Weather-Related
                      Accidents, by Year, 1987-96

                                              Weather-         Percent
                                               related        weather-
Year                     All accidents       accidents         related
----------------------  --------------  --------------  --------------
1987                             2,654             660            24.9
1988                             2,522             726            28.8
1989                             2,383             678            28.5
1990                             2,343             538            23.0
1991                             2,291             468            20.4
1992                             2,179             500            22.9
1993                             2,138             447            20.9
1994                             2,076             388            18.7
1995                             2,133             463            21.7
1996                             1,770             418            23.6
======================================================================
Total                           22,489           5,286            23.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  Analysis by FAA's National Aviation Safety Data Analysis
Center (NASDAC), Office of System Safety of completed NTSB accident
investigations. 

Of the 5,287 aircraft involved in the 5,286 weather-related accidents
that occurred in 1987 through 1996 for which NTSB had completed
investigations, 4,669, or about 88 percent, involved general aviation
aircraft, and 73, or about 1 percent, involved air carriers.  See
figure II.1 for an analysis of accidents by type of aviation. 

   Figure II.1:  Distribution of
   5,287 Aircraft Involved in
   5,286 Weather-Related
   Accidents, by Type of Aviation

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  Air carrier refers to operations conducted under the Federal
Aviation Regulation, part 121; Commuter--part 135; Other--parts 91D,
105, 125, 129, 133, 137, and unknown; General aviation--part 91. 

Multiple aircraft may be involved in an accident. 

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 

Of the 19,426 general aviation accidents and 240 air carrier
accidents that occurred in 1987 through 1996 for which NTSB had
completed investigations, weather-related accidents accounted for 24
percent of all the general aviation accidents and about 30 percent of
all the air carrier accidents.  Wind/windshear was the most frequent
cause or contributing factor cited in weather-related general
aviation accidents.  According to the Aircraft Owners and Pilots
Association (AOPA), the most common problem in wind-related general
aviation accidents is the loss of control of the aircraft while
landing because of crosswinds, gusts, and tailwinds.  This experience
results in damage to the aircraft, usually with no injuries. 
Turbulence was the most frequent cause or factor cited in
weather-related air carrier accidents.  Turbulence-related accidents
typically involve injuries to unbelted flight crew or passengers
during the cruise phase of the flight.  See figures II.2 and II.3. 

   Figure II:2:  Distribution of
   7,044 Weather Factors Cited in
   4,669 Weather-Related General
   Aviation Accidents, 1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Notes:  Density altitude refers to less dense air that adversely
impacts aircraft performance, most often on takeoff.  This condition
typically occurs at higher altitudes; heat and humidity also
contribute to its effect. 

Multiple weather factors may be cited in an accident investigation. 

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 

   Figure II.3:  Distribution of
   84 Weather Factors Cited in 73
   Weather-Related Air Carrier
   Accidents, 1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Multiple weather factors may be cited in an accident
investigation. 

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 


   INJURIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2

On January 17, 1996, an American Airlines' Airbus A-300 with 268
persons aboard, en route from Miami, Florida, to San Juan, Puerto
Rico, encountered severe turbulence.  Although the captain had turned
on the "fasten seat belt" sign, 20 passengers were injured, 3 of them
seriously.  NTSB determined that turbulence and noncompliance with
the seat belt sign were the cause of the injuries.  NTSB also
determined that American Airlines' failure to issue a hazardous
weather advisory to the flight crew was a contributing factor. 

In the more than 22,000 accidents that occurred between 1987 and 1996
for which NTSB had completed its investigation, 12,415 injuries were
recorded.  NTSB determined that weather was a cause or contributing
factor in 3,199, or about 26 percent, of the injuries in these
accidents.  See table II.2. 



                               Table II.2
                
                    All Injuries and Weather-Related
                       Injuries, by Year, 1987-96

                                              Weather-         Percent
                                               related        weather-
Year                      All injuries        injuries         related
----------------------  --------------  --------------  --------------
1987                             1,402             406            29.0
1988                             1,551             428            27.6
1989                             1,416             390            27.5
1990                             1,347             431            32.0
1991                             1,235             281            22.8
1992                             1,076             275            25.6
1993                             1,302             237            18.2
1994                             1,135             272            24.0
1995                             1,092             273            25.0
1996                               859             206            24.0
======================================================================
Total                           12,415           3,199            25.8
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 

Of the 3,199 weather-related injuries that occurred in 1987 through
1996, 2,345, or about 73 percent, involved general aviation aircraft,
while 372, or about 12 percent, involved air carriers.  See figure
II.4 for an analysis by type of aviation. 

   Figure II.4:  Distribution of
   3,199 Weather-Related Injuries,
   by Type of Aviation, 1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 

Of 2,345 general aviation injuries and 372 air carrier injuries that
occurred between 1987 and 1996 for which NTSB had completed accident
investigations, weather-related injuries accounted for about 25
percent of all general aviation injuries and about 28 percent of all
air carrier injuries.  Wind/windshear was the most frequent cause or
contributing factor cited in general aviation accidents with
injuries.  Turbulence was the most frequent cause or factor cited in
air carrier accidents with injuries.  See figures II.5 and II.6. 

   Figure II.5:  Distribution of
   3,463 Weather Factors Cited for
   2,345 Weather-Related General
   Aviation Injuries, 1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Multiple weather factors may be cited in an accident
investigation. 

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 

   Figure II.6:  Distribution of
   419 Weather Factors Cited for
   372 Weather-Related Air Carrier
   Injuries, 1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Multiple weather factors may be cited in an accident
investigation. 

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 


   FATALITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:3

On March 22, 1992, a USAir Fokker F-28 stalled on takeoff from La
Guardia International Airport and became partially inverted and
submerged in the bay.  Of the 51 persons on board, 27 died and 21
were injured.  NTSB determined that the accident was caused by
USAir's and FAA's failure to provide the flight crew with adequate
procedures as well as the flight crew's failure to confirm that the
wings were free of ice.  NTSB determined that icing conditions was
one of several other factors that contributed to the accident. 

In the more than 22,000 accidents that occurred between 1987 and 1996
for which NTSB had completed its investigation, 8,791 fatalities were
recorded.  NTSB determined that weather was a cause or contributing
factor in 3,043, or about 35 percent, of the deaths in these
accidents.  See table II.3. 



                               Table II.3
                
                   All Fatalities and Weather-Related
                      Fatalities, by Year, 1987-96

                                              Weather-         Percent
                                               related        weather-
Year                    All fatalities      fatalities         related
----------------------  --------------  --------------  --------------
1987                             1,171             356            30.4
1988                               883             393            44.5
1989                             1,024             371            36.2
1990                               911             378            41.5
1991                               946             278            29.4
1992                               960             364            37.9
1993                               784             276            35.2
1994                               910             236            25.9
1995                               760             244            32.1
1996                               442             147            33.3
======================================================================
Total                            8,791           3,043            34.6
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 

Of the 3,043 weather-related fatalities that occurred in 1987 through
1996, about 2,493, or about 82 percent, involved general aviation
aircraft, while 40, or about 1 percent, involved air carriers.  See
figure II.7 for an analysis by type of aviation. 

   Figure II.7:  Distribution of
   3,043 Weather-Related
   Fatalities by Type of Aviation,
   1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 

Of the 7,064 general aviation fatalities and 570 air carrier
fatalities that occurred between 1987 and 1996 for which NTSB has
completed accident investigations, weather-related fatalities
accounted for about 35 percent of all general aviation fatalities and
7 percent of all air carrier fatalities.  Low visibility/ceiling was
the most frequent cause or contributing factor cited in fatal general
aviation accidents.  According to AOPA, flying under visual flight
rules into deteriorating weather conditions and dark nights is the
most frequent cause of fatal general aviation accidents.  Icing was
the most frequent cause or factor cited in fatal air carrier
accidents.  However, because only six weather-related air carrier
accidents involved fatalities, no conclusions can be drawn from this
small number of occurrences.  See figures II.8 and II.9. 

   Figure II.8:  Distribution of
   4,883 Weather Factors Cited for
   2,493 Weather-Related General
   Aviation Fatalities, 1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  Multiple weather factors may be cited in an accident
investigation. 

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 

   Figure II.9:  Distribution of
   40 Weather Factors Cited for 40
   Weather-Related Air Carrier
   Fatalities, 1987-96

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  NASDAC's analysis of completed NTSB accident investigations. 


   DELAYS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:4

According to the Air Transport Association (ATA), flight delays of 1
minute or more cost airlines and passengers more than $3 billion each
year.  See table II.4 for the costs of delays to U.S.  major and
national carriers and passengers in 1993 through 1996. 



                               Table II.4
                
                  Total Aviation Delay Costs, 1993-96

                         (Dollars in millions)

Costs                   1993        1994        1995        1996
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Aircraft operating      $1,502      $1,427      $1,380      $1,571
costs\a

Ground costs            800         810         825         840

Costs to passengers     1,000       1,400       1,300       1,500

Total                   $3,302      $3,637      $3,505      $3,911
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  ATA does not estimate which percentage of total delay costs
are related to weather. 

\a Aircraft operating costs include the flight deck crew, fuel,
maintenance, equipment charges, cabin crew, and food. 

Source:  ATA. 

In 1993 through 1997, according to FAA, more than 1.2 million flights
were delayed for at least 15 minutes at the 55 airports connected to
the Air Traffic Operations Network.\2 Of these flights, about
922,000, or 72 percent, were delayed for weather-related reasons. 
See table II.5 for a summary of delays by primary cause in 1993
through 1997. 



                               Table II.5
                
                Delays Over 15 Minutes, by Cause, 1993-
                                   97

                          1993      1994      1995      1996      1997
--------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------
======================================================================
Total flights          275,751   247,719   236,794   271,509   245,452
 delayed

Primary Cause
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Weather                  71.8%     74.5%     72.4%     74.0%     68.0%
Volume                   21.6%     19.3%     18.5%     18.5%     22.2%
Runway                    2.9%      2.3%      2.8%      2.9%      3.3%
Equipment                 1.7%      1.6%      2.7%      2.2%      2.6%
Other                     2.0%      2.3%      3.6%      2.5%      3.9%
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  FAA Air Traffic Operations Network. 



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III

--------------------
\2 FAA's network tracks delays that are at least 15 minutes in
duration. 


RESULTS OF SURVEY OF MEMBERS OF
NRC AND FAA'S RESEARCH,
ENGINEERING, AND DEVELOPMENT
COMMITTEES
========================================================== Appendix II



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
FAA'S RESPONSE TO GAO'S QUESTIONS
ON AVIATION WEATHER
========================================================== Appendix II



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


MEMBERS OF AVIATION WEATHER EXPERT
PANEL
=========================================================== Appendix V

Dr.  John Dutton
Dean, College of Earth and Mineral Sciences
Pennsylvania State University
Vice Chairman, NRC Aviation Weather Services Committee\1

Dr.  John Hansman
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
FAA RE&D Advisory Committee Member

Brig.  Gen.  Albert Kaehn (U.S.  Air Force, retired)
Former Commander, Air Weather Service
Chairman, NRC Aviation Weather Services Committee

Brig.  Gen.  John Kelly, Jr.  (U.S.  Air Force, retired)
Former Commander, Air Weather Service
FAA RE&D Advisory Committee Member\2

Mr.  Bruce Landsberg
Executive Director, AOPA Air Safety Foundation
FAA RE&D Advisory Committee Member

Mr.  Robert Massey
Chairman, Air Line Pilots Association Weather Committee
NRC Aviation Weather Services Committee Member

Mr.  William Sears
Director of Air Traffic Capacity and Meteorology
Air Transport Association of America
(Representing Jack Ryan, FAA RE&D Advisory Committee Member)

Mr.  Terry Shell
Air Traffic Systems Requirements Representative
National Air Traffic Controllers Association


--------------------
\1 Dr.  Dutton was unable to attend the panel meeting. 

\2 General Kelly was appointed Director of the National Weather
Service on Feb.  19, 1998. 


PANELISTS' RATINGS OF FAA'S
OVERALL PROGRESS IN ADDRESSING
EIGHT HIGHLY RATED RECOMMENDATIONS
========================================================== Appendix VI

As discussed in appendix I, we convened an expert panel to evaluate
FAA's progress in implementing eight recommendations rated highly by
respondents to our August 1997 survey.  For each of the eight
recommendations, the panelists were

  -- presented with the recommendation and offered the opportunity to
     comment on its intent;

  -- presented with FAA's response and supporting documentation,\1 as
     well as other evidence of FAA's activities that we identified
     during our review and given the opportunity to add any other FAA
     activities of which they were aware; and

  -- given a period of time to discuss the evidence presented. 

After the discussion, the panelists were asked to individually rate
FAA's overall progress using the following question: 

Considering FAA's actions and progress made, and any other factors
you feel are relevant, what is your overall rating of FAA's response
to this recommendation? 

1.  ___ Very Poor
2.  ___ Poor
3.  ___ Fair
4.  ___ Good
5.  ___ Excellent

The panelists answers are presented in table V.1. 



                                    Table V.1
                     
                     Expert Panel's Ratings of FAA's Overall
                           Progress in Addressing Eight
                                 Recommendations

Panelist                                      1   2   3   4   5   6   7     Mean
-------------------------------------------  --  --  --  --  --  --  --  -------
Recommendations related to policy and leadership
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation 1: The FAA Administrator       1   2   3   1   2   3   2      2.0
 should provide a clear and cohesive policy
 statement regarding the agency's important
 role in the provision of aviation weather
 services. The statement should reflect the
 need for further definition of the
 capability and responsibility of
 controllers and pilots in the issue of
 separating aircraft from hazardous
 weather.
Recommendation 2: The policy statement and    2   2   2   3   3   3   3      2.6
 strategic plans should consider hazardous
 weather information as an aviation safety
 issue, as well as a capacity one.
Recommendation 3: The FAA should              4   3   3   4   3   3   3      3.3
 expeditiously improve aviation weather
 services rather than delay action while
 the federal government decides whether to
 establish an air traffic services
 corporation to provide some or all of the
 functions currently provided by the FAA.
Recommendation 4: The FAA should view         2   1   2   2   2   2   2      1.9
 meteorology as a significant component of
 every area of its responsibility in which
 weather could affect safety or efficiency.

Recommendations related to interagency coordination
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation 5: The FAA and NWS should      2   2   3   2   2   3   2      2.3
 re-establish the practice of assigning
 high-level liaisons who are formally
 tasked with defining and coordinating
 aviation weather requirements for
 research, development, and operations
 between the FAA and NOAA/NWS.
Recommendation 6: The FAA and NOAA should     3   2   2   4   2   2   2      2.4
 ensure that aviation weather research and
 development are closely coupled to
 operational components of these agencies
 so that new concepts and new ideas can be
 swiftly integrated into ongoing
 operations.

Recommendations related to efforts to address user needs
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recommendation 7: The FAA should support a    1   2   2   2   2   2   2      1.9
 weather architecture which includes the
 appropriate elements and interfaces needed
 to disseminate critical weather
 information to ALL aviation users,
 supported by adequate funding and
 priorities.
Recommendation 8: Near-term efforts by the    1   1   2   1   1   2   2      1.4
 FAA and NWS to improve the effectiveness
 of aviation weather services should focus
 on the urgent, unmet needs of aviation
 weather users, which include the
 following:

 --a comprehensive national training
 program to improve the practical
 meteorological skills of users and
 providers of aviation weather services;

 --advanced weather products that are
 relevant, timely, accurate, and easy to
 comprehend (e.g., graphically displayed);

 --ground-to-air communications and cockpit
 display systems for en route dissemination
 of advanced weather products; and

 --weather observations and forecasts that
 offer improved temporal, geographic, and
 altitude-specific resolution.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Additionally, the panelists were asked to answer three more specific
questions about FAA's efforts to address each recommendation.  They
were the following: 

  -- Have FAA's actions been consistent with the intention of the
     recommendation? 

  -- Have FAA's actions been sufficient to address the
     recommendation?  and

  -- Has FAA made timely progress in implementing actions to respond
     to this recommendation? 

For each of these questions, the panelists were given the choice of
five responses: 

1.  ___ Definitely no

2.  ___ Possibly no

3.  ___ Uncertain

4.  ___ Possibly yes

5.  ___ Definitely yes

The panelists' responses are shown in table V.2. 



                               Table V.2
                
                Expert Panel's Ratings of Whether FAA's
                    Actions Were Consistent with the
                    Intention of the Recommendations

Panelist                 1     2     3     4     5     6     7    Mean
--------------------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ------
Recommendations related to policy and leadership
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1                        1     1     4     1     2     4     2     2.1
2                        1     4     4     4     4     4     4     3.6
3                        4     4     4     5     3     3     4     3.9
4                        1     2     4     2     2     4     1     2.3

Recommendations related to interagency coordination
----------------------------------------------------------------------
5                        2     4     4     2     4     4     2     3.1
6                        3     3     4     4     2     3     3     3.1

Recommendations related to efforts to address user needs
----------------------------------------------------------------------
7                        1     1     2     2     1     4     2     1.9
8                        1     1     2     1     1     1     1     1.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------


                               Table V.3
                
                Expert Panel's Ratings of Whether FAA's
                        Actions Were Sufficient

Panelist                 1     2     3     4     5     6     7    Mean
--------------------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ------
Recommendations related to policy and leadership
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1                        1     1     2     1     1     2     1     1.3
2                        1     3     4     3     2     2     3     2.6
3                        4     4     4     5     2     3     4     3.7
4                        1     2     2     1     1     1     1     1.3

Recommendations related to interagency coordination
----------------------------------------------------------------------
5                        1     1     1     1     1     1     2     1.1
6                        2     2     3     4     1     2     2     2.3

Recommendations related to efforts to address user needs
----------------------------------------------------------------------
7                        1     1     1     2     1     1     1     1.1
8                        1     1     1     1     1     1     1     1.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------


                               Table V.4
                
                Expert Panel's Ratings of Whether FAA's
                          Actions Were Timely

Panelist                 1     2     3     4     5     6     7    Mean
--------------------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ------
Recommendations related to policy and leadership
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1                        2     3     2     1     3     2     1     2.0
2                        1     1     4     4     3     1     2     2.3
3                        4     4     3     5     3     3     3     3.6
4                        2     1     2     2     1     2     1     1.6

Recommendations related to interagency coordination
----------------------------------------------------------------------
5                        1     2     1     1     2     1     1     1.3
6                        3     2     2     4     2     2     2     2.4

Recommendations related to efforts to address user needs
----------------------------------------------------------------------
7                        1     2     1     1     1     1     1     1.1
8                        1     1     1     2     1     1     1     1.1
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, after reviewing the ratings assigned to the recommendations,
the panel was asked to rate FAA on its general progress in addressing
all eight recommendations. 



                               Table V.5
                
                    Experts' Rating on FAA's General
                    Progress in Addressing the Eight
                            Recommendations

Panelist                 1     2     3     4     5     6     7    Mean
--------------------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ------
Summary rating of        1     2     2     2     2     2     2     1.9
 FAA's progress in
 implementing all
 eight
 recommendations
----------------------------------------------------------------------

--------------------
\1 Copies of FAA's responses and supporting material were mailed to
the panelists before the meeting. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix VII

RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C. 

Alice G.  Feldesman
Steven C.  Martin
Lynn M.  Musser
Thomas F.  Noone
Marnie Shaul
Carol Herrnstadt Shulman
James R.  Sweetman, Jr.
Robert E.  White
Mario Zavala

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Mindi G.  Weisenbloom


*** End of document. ***