Air Traffic Control: Surveillance Radar Request for the Cherry Capital
Airport (Letter Report, 05/28/98, GAO/RCED-98-118).
Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed the benefit-cost
studies that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) conducted for the
Cherry Capital Airport in 1994, 1996, and 1997, focusing on: (1) FAA's
decisionmaking process for installing surveillance radars at airports;
(2) the factors, including costs, benefits, and air traffic projections,
that FAA considered when conducting the 1994, 1996, and 1997 studies;
(3) the impact, if any, that air traffic projections developed by other
sources would have had on the results of the 1997 study; (4) actions FAA
has taken to address safety concerns at the airport; and (5) FAA's plans
to replace surveillance radars at airports with fewer total air traffic
operations than the Cherry Capital Airport.
GAO noted that: (1) FAA uses a multifaceted process to determine which
airports should get surveillance radars; (2) this process includes
completing a benefit-cost study, assessing an airport's need for a
surveillance radar compared with the needs of other airports, and
determining the availability of radar equipment or funds to purchase
needed radar equipment; (3) in its 1994 benefit-cost study for the
Cherry Capital Airport, FAA officials overstated the projected air
traffic growth; (4) this overstated growth was the primary reason FAA
concluded that the airport met its cost-effectiveness criteria; (5)
moreover, in 1994, FAA officials did not follow the agency's
decisionmaking process and prematurely concluded that the Cherry Capital
Airport qualified for a surveillance radar; (6) when conducting the
1994, 1996, and 1997 benefit-cost studies, FAA considered the potential
efficiency and safety benefits; (7) with the higher growth rate used in
the 1994 study, the benefits exceeded the costs of installing a
surveillance radar, so the Cherry Capital Airport met FAA's
cost-effectiveness criteria; but with the lower growth rate used in the
1996 and 1997 studies, it did not qualify; (8) the air traffic
projections were the most critical factors influencing the results of
FAA's benefit-cost studies; (9) to address the safety concerns, FAA
installed an automated display and information system at the Cherry
Capital Airport in 1997; (10) while the controllers told GAO that the
equipment can help them better manage air traffic and improve safety,
they have difficulty using it because information on aircraft
identification and altitude is sometimes unreadable on the display
monitor; (11) beginning in 1999, FAA plans to replace the existing
surveillance radars installed in the 1960s and 1970s at 101 airports as
part of its efforts to modernize its air traffic control system; (12)
seventy-five of the 101 airports had fewer total air traffic operations
in 1996 than the Cherry Capital Airport did; (13) although FAA conducts
benefit-cost studies and uses air traffic operations as a basis for
determining the cost-effectiveness of installing surveillance radars at
airports, agency officials did not conduct similar studies to determine
whether it would be cost-effective to replace existing radars at the 101
airports or to prioritize the replacement of the radars; and (14) FAA
has no plans to undertake such efforts because agency officials believe
that it would be very difficult to discontinue radar operations at an
airport because of the public's perception that safety would be reduced.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-98-118
TITLE: Air Traffic Control: Surveillance Radar Request for the
Cherry Capital Airport
DATE: 05/28/98
SUBJECT: Airports
Air traffic control systems
Cost effectiveness analysis
Radar equipment
Transportation safety
Evaluation criteria
Information systems
IDENTIFIER: FAA Airport Surveillance Radar Program
FAA Terminal Automated Radar Display and Information System
Cherry Capital Airport (Traverse City, MI)
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
May 1998
AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL - SURVEILLANCE
RADAR REQUEST FOR THE CHERRY
CAPITAL AIRPORT
GAO/RCED-98-118
Air Traffic Control
(348046)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
ASR - airport surveillance radar
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
TARDIS - Terminal Automated Radar Display and Information System
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-278475
May 28, 1998
The Honorable Richard C. Shelby
Chairman
The Honorable Frank Lautenberg
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Transportation
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Chairman
The Honorable Martin Olav Sabo
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Transportation
and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives
In 1994, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) received requests
from Members of Congress, air traffic controllers, and local citizens
to install an airport surveillance radar at the Cherry Capital
Airport in Traverse City, Michigan, which is located in the upper
northwest corner of the state.\1 These groups anticipated that having
a radar located at the airport would help better manage air traffic
and, thus, improve safety and reduce aircraft delays. In response to
the requests, FAA assessed the benefits and costs of installing a
surveillance radar at the airport. Initially, in 1994, on the basis
of a benefit-cost study, the airport qualified for a radar; however,
the results of benefit-cost studies conducted in 1996 and 1997 showed
that the airport did not qualify for a radar, and therefore, it has
not received a radar to date.\2
As directed by the conferees on the Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriations Act for fiscal year 1998,\3 we
performed a detailed review of the benefit-cost studies that FAA
conducted for the Cherry Capital Airport in 1994, 1996, and 1997.
Specifically, this report discusses (1) FAA's decision-making process
for installing surveillance radars at airports; (2) the factors,
including costs, benefits, and air traffic projections, that FAA
considered when conducting the 1994, 1996, and 1997 studies; (3) the
impact, if any, that air traffic projections developed by other
sources would have had on the results of the 1997 study; (4) actions
FAA has taken to address safety concerns at the airport; and (5)
FAA's plans to replace surveillance radars at airports with fewer
total air traffic operations than the Cherry Capital Airport.
--------------------
\1 Air traffic controllers working for FAA use airport surveillance
radars to separate and control aircraft approaching and departing
airports within a 60-mile radius. In the rest of this report,
airport surveillance radars are referred to simply as surveillance
radars.
\2 FAA conducted three benefit-cost studies: (1) What we refer to as
the 1994 study included air traffic projections that began in 1994;
this study was issued in March 1994. (2) What we refer to as the
1996 study included projections that began in 1996; it was issued in
March 1997. (3) What we refer to as the 1997 study included
projections that began in 1997; it was issued in October 1997.
\3 House Conference Report No. 105-313 (October 7, 1997), p. 44.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
FAA uses a multifaceted process to determine which airports should
get surveillance radars. This process includes completing a
benefit-cost study, assessing an airport's need for a surveillance
radar compared with the needs of other airports, and determining the
availability of radar equipment or funds to purchase the needed radar
equipment. In its 1994 benefit-cost study for the Cherry Capital
Airport, FAA officials overstated the projected air traffic growth;
this overstated growth was the primary reason FAA concluded that the
airport met its cost-effectiveness criteria. Moreover, in 1994, FAA
officials did not follow the agency's decision-making process and
prematurely concluded that the Cherry Capital Airport qualified for a
surveillance radar. Specifically, FAA headquarters and regional
officials did not assess the airport's needs relative to the needs of
other airports or consider the radar coverage already provided by a
nearby long-range surveillance radar. According to FAA officials, if
they had considered other airports' needs and the existing radar
coverage when conducting the 1994 study, as required by the agency's
process, the Cherry Capital Airport would not have been considered
qualified for a surveillance radar. In addition, the officials told
us that installing a surveillance radar at the Cherry Capital Airport
would not improve safety and would only duplicate existing radar
coverage.
When conducting the 1994, 1996, and 1997 benefit-cost studies, FAA
considered the potential efficiency and safety benefits (such as
travelers' time saved because of the reduced delays to aircraft and
the lives saved because of the reduced risks of midair and terrain
collisions), estimated equipment and annual operating costs, and
projected air traffic operations (takeoffs and landings). Although
FAA considered the appropriate factors when conducting the studies,
different equipment and operating costs and different air traffic
projections were included in the studies. FAA officials could not
explain or provide documentation that showed why there were
differences among the costs included in the 1994 and 1996 studies.
Documentation was available, however, for the 1997 study. In
projecting annual air traffic, FAA officials estimated a 4.2-percent
average annual growth rate in the 1994 study and about a 1-percent
growth rate in the 1996 and 1997 studies. With the higher growth
rate used in the 1994 study, the benefits exceeded the costs of
installing a surveillance radar, so the Cherry Capital Airport met
FAA's cost-effectiveness criteria; but with the lower growth rate
used in the 1996 and 1997 studies, it did not qualify. FAA officials
were unable to explain how the projections in the 1994 study were
developed. In all three studies, the projections overstated actual
air traffic thus far, particularly the 1994 study. For example, the
123,957 actual air traffic operations reported for 1997 were
considerably less than the 152,000 operations projected in the 1994
study, the 130,078 projected in the 1996 study, and the 130,318
projected in the 1997 study.
Because the air traffic projections were the most critical factors
influencing the results of FAA's benefit-cost studies, we obtained a
set of air traffic projections developed in 1996 and used by two
consulting firms for studies conducted for the Michigan Department of
Transportation and the Northwest Regional Airport Commission. The
projections used by the firms were based on a higher annual rate of
growth for air traffic and a higher baseline of air traffic
operations than FAA's projections. When we substituted the firms'
projections in the 1997 study, it resulted in the benefits exceeding
the costs and in the Cherry Capital Airport's meeting FAA's
cost-effectiveness criteria. However, we found that FAA's air
traffic projections were a more appropriate basis for its decision on
whether to install a surveillance radar at the airport.
To address the safety concerns, FAA installed an automated display
and information system at the Cherry Capital Airport in 1997 to help
controllers locate and identify aircraft approaching and departing
the airport. While the controllers told us that the equipment can
help them better manage air traffic and improve safety, they have
difficulty using it because information on aircraft identification
and altitude is sometimes unreadable on the display monitor.
According to FAA headquarters and regional officials, this problem
does not affect safety at the airport because, unlike a surveillance
radar, this additional equipment is only intended to be used as a
visual aid and not to control or separate aircraft. Air traffic
controllers at the Minneapolis Air Route Traffic Control Center are
responsible for providing radar control and separation services to
aircraft approaching the airport until control of the aircraft is
switched to the Cherry Capital controllers.
Beginning in 1999, FAA plans to replace the existing surveillance
radars installed in the 1960s and 1970s at 101 airports as part of
its efforts to modernize its air traffic control system.
Seventy-five of the 101 airports had fewer total air traffic
operations in 1996 than the Cherry Capital Airport did. In other
words, FAA will spend over $375 million to purchase replacement
radars for airports that have had low levels of air traffic. This
cost does not include the additional expenditures for any auxiliary
equipment and infrastructure modifications required for effective
operation of the radars. Although FAA conducts benefit-cost studies
and uses air traffic operations as a basis for determining the
cost-effectiveness of installing surveillance radars at airports,
agency officials did not conduct similar studies to determine whether
it would be cost-effective to replace existing radars at the 101
airports or to prioritize the replacement of the radars. FAA
officials agreed that conducting these studies would be useful.
However, they have no plans to undertake such efforts because agency
officials believe that it would be very difficult to discontinue
radar operations at an airport because of the public's perception
that safety would be reduced.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Surveillance radars allow air traffic controllers to manage aircraft
operating in the airspace around airports and to expedite the flow of
air traffic into and out of airports by reducing the separation
between aircraft. Currently, radar coverage for the Cherry Capital
Airport is provided by a long-range surveillance radar in Empire,
Michigan, 20 miles away from the airport.\4 Although the radar is
located near the Cherry Capital Airport, its signals are transmitted
over 300 miles away to the Air Route Traffic Control Center in
Minneapolis, where the controllers there are responsible for using
instrument flight or radar rules to control the aircraft approaching
and departing the airport outside a 5-mile radius of the airport.
Controllers at the Cherry Capital Airport use visual flight rules or
visual procedures to manage aircraft within the 5-mile radius during
the normal tower operating hours from 7 a.m. to 10 p.m. However,
aircraft are allowed to take off and land at the airport when the
tower is closed.
FAA conducted a study in 1994 to assess the benefits and costs of
installing a surveillance radar at the airport. The results showed
that the potential benefits of installing a radar exceeded the costs.
Therefore, FAA concluded that the airport qualified for a radar.
Because no radar was available and funds were unavailable to purchase
a new radar, FAA added the airport to a waiting list of other
qualifying airports. At the request of Members of Congress, FAA
conducted another benefit-cost study in 1996 to determine whether the
airport still qualified for a radar. The results of that study
showed that the costs exceeded the benefits, thereby disqualifying
the airport for a radar, and FAA removed the airport from its waiting
list of qualifying airports. At our request, FAA conducted another
benefit-cost study in 1997 to determine whether the airport qualified
for a surveillance radar. That study's results also showed that the
costs exceeded the benefits and that the airport did not qualify for
a radar.
--------------------
\4 Air traffic controllers use the long-range surveillance radar to
control aircraft in terminal areas and to separate and control air
traffic en route between airports.
FAA'S DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
FOR INSTALLING SURVEILLANCE
RADARS AT AIRPORTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
FAA uses a multifaceted process to determine which airports should
get surveillance radars. (See fig. 1.) First, FAA officials at the
airport identify an operational need--such as the need to reduce
delays to aircraft taking off and landing and the risks of midair and
terrain collisions--that they believe a surveillance radar would
satisfy. They then submit a written request to the appropriate FAA
regional office.
Figure 1: FAA's Process for
Determining Which Airports
Without Radars May Be Eligible
for Surveillance Radars
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Second, FAA regional officials review the request to determine
whether an operational need exists, assess the airport's need
relative to those of other airports in the region, and prioritize all
airports within the region that have valid radar needs. If regional
officials determine that a need exists, the request is forwarded to
FAA headquarters. They also include an estimate of the equipment and
annual operating costs in the region's annual budget. If they
determine that an operational need does not exist, the airport is no
longer considered a potential candidate for a surveillance radar.
Third, FAA headquarters officials use the agency's Investment
Criteria for Airport Surveillance Radar, dated May 1983, to determine
whether an airport identified by the regional officials as a
candidate for a radar meets FAA's cost-effectiveness criteria.
Specifically, the officials conduct a detailed study using
site-specific air traffic data, along with estimated equipment and
operating costs, to assess the potential benefits and costs for
installing a radar at the airport. If the benefits exceed the costs,
further consideration is given to the request. If the costs exceed
the benefits--that is, if the benefit-cost ratio is less than
1.0--the airport is no longer considered a potential candidate for a
surveillance radar.
Fourth, FAA headquarters officials validate the operational needs by
considering, among other things, the level of air traffic operations
at the airport and the complexity of its airspace compared with those
of other airports nationwide. If the officials conclude that a radar
is needed, the request is approved. If FAA headquarters cannot
validate the operational needs, the airport is no longer considered a
potential candidate for a surveillance radar.
Finally, if a radar is available from another airport where an
upgraded radar has been installed, or if funds are available to
purchase a new radar, the radar is acquired and installed at the
airport. Otherwise, the airport is placed on a waiting list. Once
radars or funds become available, however, FAA must determine whether
the airports on the waiting list still meet its cost-effectiveness
criteria by using the latest air traffic operations data. Airports
that do not meet the criteria are no longer considered candidates for
a surveillance radar.
In addition to the radar requests initiated by FAA airport and
regional officials, the Congress may mandate that a surveillance
radar be installed at an airport.\5 If the Congress designates funds
with the mandate, the request does not have to follow FAA's
decision-making process. If the Congress does not designate funds,
however, the request must follow the process, according to FAA
headquarters officials. The Congress has mandated that FAA install
surveillance radars at eight airports. These airports are included
in appendix I.
Although FAA's decision-making process was in place in 1994, agency
officials did not follow it before concluding that the Cherry Capital
Airport qualified for a radar. For example, after conducting the
1994 benefit-cost study and determining that the airport met FAA's
cost-effectiveness criteria, agency officials prematurely concluded
that Cherry Capital qualified for a radar. They did not assess the
airport's operational needs relative to the needs of other airports
or consider the radar coverage already provided by the long-range
surveillance radar nearby in Empire, Michigan. According to FAA
officials, if these factors had been considered, the Cherry Capital
Airport would not have qualified for a surveillance radar.
The officials also told us that even if the airport had a
benefit-cost ratio of 1.0 or greater, it still would not get a
surveillance radar because other airports have greater operational
needs and the airport already receives better radar coverage than
many airports that have surveillance radars on site. They added that
if a radar was installed at the airport, its signal would most likely
be transmitted to another air traffic control facility where other
controllers would be responsible for controlling aircraft approaching
and departing the Cherry Capital Airport, an arrangement similar to
the present one at the airport.
--------------------
\5 For this report, FAA references to Congressional mandates are
referring to committee and conference reports directing FAA to
install radars at particular airports.
FACTORS FAA CONSIDERED WHEN
CONDUCTING BENEFIT-COST STUDIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
In accordance with its decision-making process, FAA used its
investment criteria to identify the factors to consider when
conducting the 1994, 1996, and 1997 benefit-cost studies for the
Cherry Capital Airport. The officials calculated benefit-cost ratios
of 1.66 in 1994, 0.68 in 1996, and 0.78 in 1997, which resulted in
the airport meeting FAA's cost-effectiveness criteria in 1994, but
not in 1996 and 1997. We found that an overstatement of air traffic
growth was the primary reason the airport met the investment criteria
in 1994.
FAA officials considered the potential efficiency and safety
benefits, estimated the equipment and annual operating costs, and
projected air traffic operations when conducting the benefit-cost
studies. To calculate the efficiency and safety benefits of
installing a surveillance radar, FAA considered travelers' time saved
because of the potential reductions in the delays to aircraft and the
lives saved and injuries avoided because of the reductions in the
risks of midair and terrain collisions.\6 To compute the benefits
represented by reduced delays to aircraft and collision risks, FAA
used projections of air traffic operations at the airport, the
average time required for aircraft takeoffs and landings, and the
percentage of time that weather conditions at the airport would
require controllers to use radar to manage the air traffic. To
compute the equipment and annual operating costs, FAA estimated the
costs for the acquisition and installation of the radar and the
annual costs for controller and support staff salaries, training,
utilities, and for maintenance. The benefits and the annual
operations and maintenance costs were estimated over a 15-year period
and discounted to the present time using the discount rate published
by the Office of Management and Budget.
FAA used both national and site-specific data to compute the benefits
and costs. For example, the values for travelers' time saved, lives
saved, and injuries avoided were national data published annually by
the Department of Transportation. The estimated costs for acquiring
the radar were FAA's purchase price for the surveillance radar plus
other necessary equipment and personnel training costs. The
projections of air traffic operations were specific to the Cherry
Capital Airport.
Although the results of benefit-cost studies depend on several
factors, FAA officials told us that the projections of air traffic
operations--particularly aircraft operations controlled by instrument
flight or radar rules--were the most critical factors because they
affect the level of benefits that would be achieved as a result of
having a surveillance radar at the airport. They commented that
there was a direct correlation between the projections of air traffic
operations and the benefits--as air traffic increases, so do the
potential for delays to aircraft and the risks of collision, and,
thus, the benefits of installing a radar at the airport also
increase. In particular, we found that FAA's criteria give more
weight to aircraft, such as air carriers and commuter aircraft, that
carry the largest number of passengers because the higher the number
of passengers, the greater the potential efficiency and safety
benefits to be achieved from saving travelers' time and avoiding
collisions that could cause injuries and deaths. Therefore,
according to FAA headquarters officials, the potential efficiency and
safety benefits calculated for having a surveillance radar at the
Cherry Capital Airport, which is mainly a general aviation airport,
would be less than those calculated for airports that service a
larger number of commercial air carriers and commuter aircraft.
--------------------
\6 FAA counts delays to aircraft as the number of times takeoffs are
postponed 15 minutes or longer beyond scheduled departures at a given
airport.
EQUIPMENT AND OPERATING
COSTS DIFFERED IN THE
BENEFIT-COST STUDIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
FAA considered the installation of the same type of surveillance
radar in all three of its studies on the Cherry Capital Airport. We
found, however, that the estimated equipment costs in the 1997 study
were over $8 million higher than the costs included in the other
studies. Specifically, the equipment costs in the 1994 and 1996
studies totaled about $12.9 million and $13.5 million, respectively;
whereas, the equipment costs totaled $22 million in the 1997 study.
In contrast, the annual operating costs in the 1994 and 1996 studies
totaled $611,000 and $677,000, respectively, compared with $167,000
in the 1997 study. FAA could not explain why such significant
differences existed in the cost figures or provide documentation to
support the costs included in the 1994 and 1996 studies. They did,
however, provide support for the costs included in the 1997 study.
FAA headquarters officials speculated that the costs differed because
the 1994 and 1996 studies only included the costs for a surveillance
radar and not the costs for the necessary auxiliary equipment.
AIR TRAFFIC PROJECTIONS
DIFFERED IN THE BENEFIT-COST
STUDIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
To develop the air traffic projections in the 1996 and 1997 studies,
FAA officials considered the historical air traffic growth at the
Cherry Capital Airport and the mix of aircraft using the airport. As
shown in table 1, they assumed that air traffic at the airport would
grow, on average, about 1 percent annually. The FAA officials were
uncertain about how the higher projections in the 1994 study were
developed. They told us that the original projections were probably
based on historical data, but were adjusted upward based on input
from headquarters, regional, and district officials to reflect a
4.2-percent projected average annual growth rate, also shown in table
1. We could not determine the basis for the adjustments because FAA
did not maintain supporting documentation. Nevertheless, FAA
headquarters and regional officials, as well as the FAA officials and
controllers at the Cherry Capital Airport, all agreed that the 1994
projections were overstated.
Table 1
Projected Air Traffic Operations
Included in FAA's Benefit-Cost Studies
1994 study 1996 study 1997 study
------------------------ ------------------------ ------------------------
Number of Percentage Number of Percentage Number of Percentage
Year operations change\a operations change\a operations change\a
----------- ------------ ---------- ------------ ---------- ------------ ----------
1992 114,000 \b \b \b \b \b
1993 124,000 8.8 \b \b \b \b
1994 133,000 7.3 \b \b \b \b
1995 143,000 7.5 \b \b \b \b
1996 148,000 3.5 128,704 1.1 \b \b
1997 152,000 2.7 130,078 1.1 130,318 1.5
1998 157,000 3.3 131,087 0.8 131,801 1.1
1999 162,000 3.2 132,281 0.9 133,277 1.1
2000 166,000 2.5 133,478 0.9 134,742 1.1
2001 172,000 3.6 134,585 0.8 136,199 1.1
2002 178,000 3.5 135,694 0.8 137,648 1.1
2003 183,000 2.8 136,806 0.8 139,089 1.0
2004 189,000 3.3 137,919 0.8 140,547 1.0
2005 194,000 2.6 138,943 0.7 141,997 1.0
2006 \c \c 139,969 0.7 143,438 1.0
2007 \c \c 141,173 0.8 144,875 1.0
2008 \c \c 142,384 0.9 146,476 1.1
2009 \c \c 143,601 0.9 148,069 1.1
2010 \c \c 144,825 0.9 149,658 1.1
Projected 4.2% 0.9% 1.1%
average
annual
growth
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The percentages show the change in operations (takeoffs and
landings) from the previous year.
\b Not applicable.
\c The study only included air traffic projections up to 2005.
Source: FAA's Terminal Area Forecast Quick Reports.
For the 1996 and 1997 studies, FAA based its projections on actual
air traffic growth at the airport over the 10-year periods preceding
the 1996 (1986 through 1995) and 1997 (1987 through 1996) studies.
As shown in table 2, the actual annual growth of air traffic from
fiscal year 1986 through fiscal year 1996 ranged from an increase of
22.5 percent to a decrease of about 6.5 percent. According to FAA
officials, the large increase in air traffic in fiscal year 1987 was
due to the introduction of new air carrier service at the airport.
Because the officials did not expect such a large increase in air
traffic to reoccur in future years, they excluded the surge in air
traffic in fiscal year 1987 from the air traffic projections in the
1996 and 1997 studies. Therefore, the resulting average annual
growth rate used in the 1996 and 1997 studies was about 1 percent.
Also, as illustrated in tables 1 and 2, the 128,704 projected air
traffic operations included in the 1996 study more closely tracked
the 128,419 actual operations that occurred in 1996 than the 148,000
operations projected in the 1994 study. Even so, the 123,957 actual
air traffic operations reported for fiscal year 1997 were
considerably less than the 152,000 projected in the 1994 study, the
130,078 projected in the 1996 study, and the 130,318 projected in the
1997 studies.
Table 2
Actual Air Traffic Operations at the
Cherry Capital Airport From 1986 Through
1997
Number of Percentage
Year operations change
------------------------------ ------------------ ------------------
1986 95,626 \a
1987 117,143 22.5\b
1988 126,472 8.0
1989 127,522 0.8
1990 120,264 -5.7
1991 121,842 1.3
1992 113,875 -6.5
1993 114,789 0.8
1994 124,000 8.0
1995 127,341 2.7
1996 128,419 0.8
1997 123,957 -3.5
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Not applicable.
\b According to data obtained from FAA, the large increase in air
traffic in 1987 was due to the introduction of air carrier service at
the airport.
Source: FAA's Terminal Area Forecast Quick Reports.
IMPACT OF OTHER AIR TRAFFIC
PROJECTIONS ON THE 1997
BENEFIT-COST STUDY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Since air traffic projections were the most critical factors
influencing the results of the benefit-cost studies for the Cherry
Capital Airport, we requested air traffic projections developed by
the state of Michigan and Traverse City transportation planning
officials to determine what impact their projections would have had
on the results of FAA's 1997 study. We found, however, that the
state and local officials relied routinely on FAA's air traffic
projections and, therefore, that using their projections would not
have had any impact on the 1997 study results.
We did, however, identify another set of air traffic projections
developed in 1996 (based on 1994 actual air traffic data), which had
been used by two consulting firms. The firms used the projections in
studies conducted for the Michigan Department of Transportation and
the Northwestern Regional Airport Commission to identify facility
improvements needed at the Cherry Capital Airport, such as expanding
the terminal building and parking areas. The projections the firms
used were based on a higher annual air traffic growth rate and a
higher baseline of air traffic operations than FAA's projections.
Whereas FAA projected an average annual growth rate of 1 percent in
its 1996 and 1997 studies, the firms projected a growth rate of about
1.5 percent. Also, FAA's actual air traffic count of 124,000 for
1994 included only aircraft operations that were managed by the
Cherry Capital and the Minneapolis controllers. The firms added
18,000 operations to FAA's air traffic count by including an estimate
of aircraft operations that were not managed by the controllers
because they occurred at Cherry Capital when the tower was closed.
While the firms' count might have been appropriate for determining
facility needs, FAA's count was more appropriate for determining
radar needs.
Nonetheless, we asked FAA to conduct a benefit-cost study using the
firms' projections to determine the impact on the 1997 study. When
the air traffic projections developed by the firms were used, they
produced a benefit-cost ratio of 1.35, which exceeded the minimal
threshold for meeting FAA's cost-effectiveness criteria to qualify
for a surveillance radar. However, as mentioned previously, FAA
officials told us that even if the airport were to achieve a
benefit-cost ratio of 1.0 or greater, it still would not get a
surveillance radar because other airports have greater operational
needs and the airport already receives better radar coverage than
many other airports that have surveillance radars.
ACTIONS FAA HAS TAKEN TO
ADDRESS SAFETY CONCERNS AT THE
CHERRY CAPITAL AIRPORT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
In response to the safety concerns raised by Members of Congress and
controllers at the Cherry Capital Airport, such as the greater risk
of aircraft collisions that results from increased air traffic, FAA
installed a Terminal Automated Radar Display and Information System
(TARDIS) in 1997 to help the controllers locate and identify aircraft
approaching or departing the airspace around the airport. The TARDIS
is a commercial, off-the-shelf system that consists of a computer,
monitor, and software costing about $23,000. Although the system
displays data, such as aircraft speed and altitude, received directly
from the surveillance radar in Empire, Michigan, the Cherry Capital
controllers can only use it as a visual aid and cannot use it to
control or separate aircraft. According to FAA regulations, the
Cherry Capital Airport controllers can only use visual procedures or
visual flight rules to track aircraft.
Controllers at the Cherry Capital Airport told us that the TARDIS has
helped them manage air traffic better, but that they have had
difficulty using it. They said that, on occasion, the information
the TARDIS has displayed on aircraft identification and altitude, for
example, has overlapped and has sometimes been unreadable.
FAA headquarters and regional officials agreed that the data display
problem exists occasionally but said that it is not unique to the
TARDIS at the Cherry Capital Airport. They commented that the
problem does not compromise safety at the airport because the
additional equipment is only intended to be used as a visual aid and
not to control air traffic. Moreover, the Minneapolis controllers
use the radar in Empire to track aircraft flying under instrument
flight rules until control of the aircraft is switched, via radio
contact, to the Cherry Capital controllers. The switch usually
occurs within a 5- or 10-mile radius of the airport. Also, FAA's
regulations require that pilots contact the Cherry Capital
controllers prior to entering the airport's airspace. According to
the officials, the TARDIS provides two benefits to the Cherry Capital
controllers--enhanced traffic monitoring capabilities and data
directly from the radar in Empire. Even if the automated system at
the Minneapolis facility fails, the TARDIS would still receive data
from the Empire radar.
FAA PLANS TO REPLACE
SURVEILLANCE RADARS AT AIRPORTS
WITH FEWER TOTAL AIR TRAFFIC
OPERATIONS THAN THE CHERRY
CAPITAL AIRPORT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
Beginning in 1999 and continuing through 2004, FAA plans to retire
all of the older airport surveillance radars (ASR), specifically
ASR-7 and ASR-8, which were installed in the 1960s and 1970s. These
radars, currently located at 101 airports, will be replaced as part
of FAA's efforts to modernize its air traffic control system with
new, technologically advanced ASR-11 radars, which cost over $5
million each.\7 During our review, we found that 75 of the 101
airports scheduled to have their radars upgraded had fewer total air
traffic operations than the Cherry Capital Airport in 1996 and that
FAA will spend well over $375 million to purchase replacement radars
for these airports. This cost does not include the additional
expenditures for auxiliary equipment and for the modifications to
airport infrastructure required for the effective operation of the
radars.
We noted that FAA officials routinely conduct benefit-cost studies
using air traffic operations as one of the critical factors in
deciding whether it would be cost-effective to install surveillance
radars at airports without radars. Yet FAA officials did not conduct
similar studies to determine whether it would be cost-beneficial to
replace all of the existing ASR-7 and ASR-8 radars, to prioritize
replacement of the radars, or to assess whether the circumstances
that initially warranted installation of the radars at the airports
had changed over the years. The officials agreed that the results of
benefit-cost studies would be a relevant factor in deciding whether
to install the replacement radars. But they said they have no plans
to conduct such studies because they believe that it would be very
difficult to discontinue radar operations at an airport found not to
qualify because the public's perception would be that safety was
being reduced, even if safety was not compromised and other
circumstances warranted the discontinuance of radar operations.
FAA's past practice has been that once an airport gets a radar, it
qualifies for a replacement radar regardless of changes in the air
traffic or the other circumstances that initially warranted the
radar. Although FAA has criteria for discontinuing radar operations,
the agency has never done so.
FAA officials also explained that there may be other important
reasons, besides cost-effectiveness, for replacing or installing a
radar at an airport. These reasons include an airport's location;
the complexity of the airspace surrounding an airport; the capacity
of an airport to serve multiple satellite airports; the capacity of
an airport to provide relief capacity to hub or major airports on an
as needed basis; and national security. We asked FAA for
documentation of the operational needs that showed why the radars
were installed initially at the 75 airports with fewer total air
traffic operations than the Cherry Capital Airport that are scheduled
to have their radars replaced. In response, FAA headquarters
officials contacted the airports to obtain information on the
rationale for installing the radars. Among the reasons FAA provided
were that some of the airports provide radar services to the Air
National Guard, military bases, and multiple satellite airports or
serve as alternates for major airports or that the radars are the
only sources for radar coverage in mountainous areas. FAA also cited
congressional interest as a reason for installing surveillance radars
at some airports. We were unable to verify the validity of FAA's
rationales because FAA did not have records dating back to the 1960s
and 1970s to document why the radars were installed. FAA's
information, however, shows that at some of the airports, the
circumstances that originally justified the installation of radars no
longer exist. See appendix II for a list of the 75 airports and more
details about FAA's justifications for the initial installation of
the radars in 1960s and 1970s.
Although installing and retaining radars at some of the airports with
fewer total air traffic operations than the Cherry Capital Airport
might be justified, conducting benefit-cost studies and revalidating
the operational needs would ensure that (1) radars are installed or
replaced first at the airports that have the greatest needs and (2)
FAA is not spending millions of dollars to replace radars when
continued operation of the existing radars might not be justified.
Since FAA already has a process in place for conducting benefit-cost
studies, we believe that the time and costs associated with
conducting similar studies to determine the effectiveness of
replacing existing radars would be minimal.
--------------------
\7 FAA initiated the modernization program in 1981 to enhance safe
and efficient air travel. This program consists primarily of the
acquisition and installation of radar, automation, and communications
equipment.
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
An overstatement of projected air traffic growth was the primary
reason the Cherry Capital Airport met FAA's cost-effectiveness
criteria in 1994, and agency officials prematurely concluded that the
airport qualified for a surveillance radar. FAA officials expected a
higher rate of growth for air traffic at the airport in future years,
and as a result, the potential benefits of installing a radar were
greater than the costs. If FAA had included less optimistic air
traffic projections in its 1994 study, the Cherry Capital Airport
would not have met the agency's cost-effectiveness criteria.
Furthermore, if FAA had followed its decision-making process by
assessing the airport's needs relative to other airports' needs and
considered the existing radar coverage, the airport would not have
been considered for a surveillance radar. Even if the benefits
exceeded the costs, there was no guarantee that the airport would get
a radar because of the competing needs of other airports within the
region and the quality of service that the radar in Empire, Michigan,
already provides to the Cherry Capital Airport.
Safety and confidence in the national airspace system are very
important, and several factors must be considered when making
decisions regarding the installation and replacement of surveillance
radars. However, FAA's current plans to install replacement radars
without conducting benefit-cost studies and revalidating operational
needs may result in the agency spending millions of dollars to
replace radars at airports with fewer air traffic operations than the
Cherry Capital Airport, which does not meet FAA's cost-effectiveness
criteria for having a radar. FAA's perceived difficulties in
discontinuing radar operations at an airport only elevate the need
for conducting benefit-cost studies and assessing the operational
needs. We believe that conducting benefit-cost studies and assessing
operational needs before replacing the radars would allow FAA to
obtain the convincing data needed to ensure that the equipment is
installed at the airports that have the greatest needs and that FAA
could use the data to prioritize the installation of the radars at
qualifying airports. In addition, conducting these analyses would
give FAA the opportunity to reassess the benefits and costs of
replacing the equipment and ensure that funds are not spent to
modernize radars at airports where continued radar operations might
not be justified.
RECOMMENDATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
Because of current budget constraints and the future expenditures
associated with installing radars as part of the effort to modernize
the nation's air traffic control system, we recommend that the
Secretary of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Federal
Aviation Administration to conduct benefit-cost studies to validate
the cost-effectiveness and revalidate the need for the radars at
airports scheduled to receive replacement radars and to use the
results of the studies in prioritizing the replacement of the radars
at qualifying airports. Furthermore, the Federal Aviation
Administration should advise the Congress on the results of these
studies for its consideration during deliberations on the Department
of Transportation's budget request.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10
We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Department of
Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration for review and
comment. We met with Federal Aviation Administration officials,
including the Project Leader, Integrated Product Team/Terminal
Surveillance Program, Communications, Navigation, Surveillance, and
Infrastructure Directorate, Air Traffic Services; and Business
Manager, Integrated Product Team/Terminal Surveillance Program,
Office of Communication, Navigation, and Surveillance Systems,
Research and Acquisitions. We also met with Department of
Transportation officials from the Offices of the Assistant
Secretaries for Administration and for Budget and Program
Performance. The agencies generally agreed with the findings,
conclusions, and recommendation presented, but commented that we
should include information in the report on instrument flight rule
operations and ASR-9 radars located at airports that had fewer total
air traffic operations than the Cherry Capital Airport in 1996.
Specifically, the agencies noted that instrument flight rule
operations may be a better indicator of the need for a radar at
airports than total air traffic operations and, thus, could have an
impact on the results of benefit-cost studies. In addition, they
commented that some airports that currently have ASR-9 surveillance
radars, which were installed in the 1980s, also had fewer total air
traffic operations than the Cherry Capital Airport did in 1996.
Although the Federal Aviation Administration currently has no plans
to replace these radars, the agencies noted that the equipment will
need to be replaced over the next 10 years. The Federal Aviation
Administration reiterated that the results of benefit-cost studies
also could be used to revalidate the operational needs for the radars
before they are replaced. However, the agency has no plans to
conduct such studies for these airports. In response to the
agencies' comments, we included more detailed information about the
airports that currently have ASR-9 radars in appendix I and
information about airports' instrument flight rule operations in
appendix II. The agencies also suggested several changes to improve
the accuracy and clarity of the report that we incorporated where
appropriate.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11
We performed audit work at FAA's headquarters in Washington, D.C.;
the Great Lakes Regional Office in Chicago; the Air Route Traffic
Control Center in Minneapolis; and the Cherry Capital Airport in
Traverse City, Michigan. To determine what process FAA currently has
in place for determining which airports that do not have radars may
be eligible for surveillance radars, we interviewed officials at
FAA's headquarters, regional, and airport offices; and reviewed and
analyzed pertinent FAA criteria, regulations, procedural, and other
guidance documents.
To identify the factors FAA considered when conducting the 1994,
1996, and 1997 benefit-cost studies, we analyzed the studies and
supporting documents, FAA's Investment Criteria for Airport
Surveillance Radar, dated May 1983, and other guidance documents for
conducting such studies. We interviewed FAA headquarters officials
currently responsible for conducting benefit-cost studies. We also
obtained information on the factors FAA considered when developing
air traffic projections, analyzed the projections, and compared
actual and projected air traffic operations. In addition, we
interviewed representatives of local planning and public interest
groups located in the Traverse City area that were familiar with the
Cherry Capital Airport's air traffic operations to obtain information
on past and anticipated air traffic growth, the need for a
surveillance radar, and the safety concerns at the airport.
To determine the impact other air traffic projections would have had
on the results of FAA's 1997 benefit-cost study, we interviewed FAA
officials and controllers working at the Cherry Capital Airport,
officials of the Michigan Department of Transportation and the
Traverse City Planning Commission, and representatives of two
aviation consulting firms. We obtained air traffic projections from
the consulting firms and had FAA headquarters officials conduct
sensitivity analyses using the projections. Although we evaluated
what impact the projections would have had on the results of the 1997
study, we did not evaluate the methodologies used by the consulting
firms to develop their projections because this was not part of the
scope of our review.
To determine what actions FAA has taken to address the safety
concerns raised by Members of Congress, air traffic controllers, and
local citizens, we obtained information on the operational
capabilities of the TARDIS and on how the equipment is intended to be
used through interviews with FAA headquarters and regional officials,
the Cherry Capital controllers, and airport officials.
In addition, we collected data from FAA that identified the airports
with fewer total air traffic operations than the Cherry Capital
Airport in 1996 that are scheduled to receive replacement
surveillance radars. We discussed with FAA headquarters officials
the rationales for initially installing surveillance radars at the
airports and when the existing radars are scheduled to be replaced.
However, we did not contact representatives at the airports to verify
the information provided by FAA headquarters officials. We also
obtained data on airports that currently have ASR-9 radars and fewer
total air traffic operations than the Cherry Capital Airport.
We performed our review from October 1997 through May 1998 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11.1
We are providing copies of this report to interested congressional
committees; the Secretary of Transportation; the Administrator, FAA;
and the Members of Congress representing the Traverse City area. We
will also make copies available to others on request. If you or your
staff have any questions or need additional information about this
report, please call me at (202) 512-2834. Major contributors to this
report are listed in appendix III.
John H. Anderson, Jr.
Director, Transportation Issues
AIRPORTS WITH ASR-9 RADARS THAT
HAD FEWER TOTAL AIR TRAFFIC
OPERATIONS IN 1996 THAN THE CHERRY
CAPITAL AIRPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I
Operations in 1996
----------------------------
Total FAA's rationale for
Total\a instrument\b installing the radar
----------- -------------------- ---------- ---------------- ------------------------
Cherry Capital 128,419 27,594 \c
(Traverse City, MI)
1 Nantucket Memorial 128,289 45,299 --Congressional mandate
(Nantucket, MA) in 1988
2 Theodore Francis 119,355 259,480 --Former military
Green State installation
(Providence, RI)
3 Stewart 117,366 36,151 --Provides support for
International military training
(Newburgh, NY) --Air route traffic
control center does not
have adequate coverage
of the airspace
4 Portland 115,032 132,210 --Provides support for
International Air Force and Navy
(Portland, ME) operations
--Provides coverage and
services for numerous
satellite airports
5 Spokane 114,767 172,448 --Former military
International installation
(Spokane, WA) --Provides coverage in
mountainous terrain
6 Atlantic City 111,127 149,953 --Supports FAA Technical
International Center
(Atlantic City, NJ) --Provides support for
the Department of
Defense Air Defense
Squadron
--Provides support for
FAA flight testing
7 Toledo Express 109,059 179,409 --Provides support to
(Toledo, OH) the Toledo industrial
district
8 Grant County 106,154 30,777 --Congressional
(Moses Lake, WA) interest\d
9 Fort Wayne 99,335 149,124 --Congressional interest
International
(Fort Wayne, IN)
10 Roswell Industrial 95,426 24,925 --Congressional mandate
Air Center in 1991
(Roswell, NM)
11 Gainesville 87,524 28,809 --Congressional mandate
Regional in 1988
(Gainesville, FL)
12 Charlottesville- 80,697 27,774 --Congressional mandate
Albermarle in 1988
(Charlottesville,
VA)
13 Cedar Rapids 78,964 102,364 --Provides support for
Municipal air freight operations
(Cedar Rapids, IA) for northeast Iowa
--Alternate base for the
Des Moines Air National
Guard
--Provides support for
Rockwell Collins
Avionics Manufacturing
14 Harrisburg 78,161 183,124 --Provides coverage and
International services in challenging
(Harrisburg, PA) terrain environment
15 Walker Field 77,275 19,508 --Congressional mandate
(Grand Junction, CO) in 1992
16 Yakima Air Terminal 73,968 22,995 --Congressional interest
(Yakima, WA)
17 Huntsville 73,399 101,868 --Provides services to
International-Carl pilot training facility
T. Jones Field --Air route traffic
(Huntsville, AL) control center does not
have adequate coverage
of airspace
18 Mathis Field 72,279 24,222 --Congressional interest
(San Angelo, TX)
19 Rogue Valley 68,891 21,824 --Congressional interest
International
(Medford, OR)
20 Tri-Cities 68,452 80,355 --Provides coverage in
(Pasco, WA) mountainous terrain
21 Rio Grande Valley 60,088 30,422 --Provides coverage for
International the Rio Grande Valley
(Brownsville, TX) for air carrier services
provided to three
airports
--Radar signal is
remoted to the terminal
radar approach control
facility in Corpus
Christi
22 Lynchburg Regional- 52,129 19,903 --Congressional mandate
Preston Glenn Field in 1991
(Lynchburg, VA) --Radar signal will be
remoted to the terminal
radar approach control
facility in Roanoke, VA
23 Fayetteville 47,417 180,897 --Provides support for
Regional/Grannis military operations
(Fayetteville, NC) --Provides tower air
route traffic control
services
24 Missoula 46,714 15,444 --Congressional mandate
International in 1988
(Missoula, MT)
25 Drake Field 44,283 31,781 --Congressional interest
(Fayetteville, AR)
26 Columbia Regional 41,353 13,509 --Congressional interest
(Columbia, MO)
27 Eastern West \e \e --Congressional mandate
Virginia Regional- in 1991
Shepard Field --Radar signal will be
(Martinsburg, WV) remoted to the terminal
radar approach control
facility at Dulles
International Airport
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Total operations are the number of takeoffs and landings by
different types of aircraft, such as commercial air carriers,
commuter, and general aviation, at the airports. For example, the
Cherry Capital Airport is mainly a general aviation airport, whereas
some of the other airports have more air carrier and commuter air
traffic.
\b Total instrument operations are the number of aircraft that passed
through the airports' airspace in addition to aircraft approaching
and departing the airports themselves. Hence, total instrument
operations may exceed total airport operations because some airports
provide radar coverage to satellite airports.
\c Not applicable.
\d The term "congressional interest" does not necessarily refer to
radars installed as a result of congressional mandates.
\e Not available.
Source: FAA.
AIRPORTS WITH FEWER TOTAL AIR
TRAFFIC OPERATIONS IN 1996 THAN
THE CHERRY CAPITAL AIRPORT THAT
HAVE ASR-7 AND ASR-8 RADARS
SCHEDULED FOR REPLACEMENT
========================================================== Appendix II
Operations in 1996
------------------------------
FAA's
rationale for Scheduled date
Total installing the for installing
Total\a instrument\b radar radar\c
--------- -------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Cherry Capital 128,419 27,594 \d \d
(Traverse
City, MI)
1 Bishop 125,957 112,128 --Alternate or Jan. 2003
International reliever
(Flint, MI) airport for
Detroit
Metropolitan
Airport
--Provides
services to
corporate
travelers,
including
General Motors
2 Pensacola 121,576 95,709 --Provides Apr. 2005
Regional coverage and
(Pensacola, services for a
FL) large naval
flight
training
center
3 Reading 120,535 54,398 -- July 2004
Regional/ Congressional
Spaatz Field interest\e
(Reading, PA) --Radar was
installed
after an
accident
4 Fairbanks 119,455 50,625 --Provides Oct. 2001
International coverage and
(Fairbanks, services for a
AK) military base
--Former Air
Force base
5 Mobile 117,774 147,203 --Provides Mar. 2003
Regional coverage and
(Mobile, AL) services for a
military base
--Former Air
Force base
6 Lincoln 115,103 99,646 --Previously Apr. 2001
Municipal provided
(Lincoln, NE) approach
control
services for
the Department
of Defense's
Strategic Air
Command Base
7 Capital City 114,532 165,022 --State Aug. 2001
(Lansing, MI) capital
8 Mahlon Sweet 112,898 95,937 --Provides Dec. 2003
Field coverage and
(Eugene, OR) services in
mountainous
terrain
--Flight
school at
airport
--Provides
services to
numerous
satellite
airports
--Low-
visibility
airport during
winter months
9 Tallahassee 111,018 124,373 -- Jan. 2004
Regional Congressional
(Tallahassee, interest
FL) --State
capital
10 Burlington 110,646 110,172 --Provides Sept. 2001
International coverage and
(Burlington, services to
VT) the Air
National Guard
and military
bases
11 Gulfport- 110,441 104,411 --Provides Oct. 2003
Biloxi coverage and
Regional services to
(Gulfport, MS) the Air
National Guard
and services
for military
bases
12 Springfield- 108,246 95,129 --Air route Nov. 2001
Branson traffic
Regional control center
(Springfield, does not have
MO) adequate
coverage of
the airspace
--Formerly a
hub for Ozark
Airlines
13 Columbia 107,107 139,058 --Provides Mar. 2002
Metropolitan coverage and
(Columbia, SC) services to
Air National
Guard base
--Airport has
capability to
provide air
route traffic
control
services
14 Akron-Canton 103,798 171,135 -- July 2001
Regional Congressional
(Akron, OH) interest
--Provides
services to
corporate
travelers,
including
Goodyear
Corporation
and Timkin
Roller Bearing
15 Kalamazoo/ 103,376 123,894 --Air National May 2003
Battle Creek Guard base
International
(Kalamazoo,
MI)
16 Capital 102,851 118,638 -- July 2002
(Springfield, Congressional
IL) interest
--State
capital
17 Greater 101,727 161,041 --Provides June 2003
Rockford coverage and
(Rockford, IL) services for
the Camp Grant
military base
--Provided
services for
military
training
flights
because
Chicago O'Hare
could not
accommodate
these
aircraft
-A hub for
United Parcel
Service
18 Roanoke 101,427 93,875 --Provides May 2001
Regional/ coverage in
Woodrum Field mountainous
(Roanoke, VA) terrain
--Air route
traffic
control center
does not have
adequate
coverage of
the airspace
19 Billings Logan 101,420 80,435 --Provides June 2001
International coverage in
(Billings, MT) mountainous
terrain
--No long-
range
surveillance
radar coverage
available
20 Midland 95,992 148,181 --Provides Dec. 2002
International coverage and
(Midland, TX) services for
military
training
21 Savannah 95,472 147,046 --Former Nov. 2002
International military base
(Savannah, GA)
22 Monterey 95,140 132,296 --Former Jan. 2005
Peninsula military base
(Monterey, CA)
23 Blue Grass 94,166 118,464 --Provides Dec. 2002
(Lexington, coverage to
KY) four satellite
airports
24 Youngstown 93,588 116,606 -- Nov. 2002
Warren Congressional
Regional interest
(Youngstown/ --Provides
Warren, OH) coverage and
services for
the Air Force
Reserves
25 Palm Springs 93,584 131,226 -- Nov. 2004
Regional Congressional
(Palm Springs, interest
CA) --Provides
coverage in
mountainous
terrain
26 Abilene 92,710 129,373 --Provides May 2002
Regional coverage and
(Abilene, TX) services to
the largest B1
bomber base
--Provides
services to
five satellite
airports
27 Lafayette 91,250 119,582 --Provides Oct. 2001
Regional coverage and
(Layfayette, services for
LA) military
practice
approaches
--Provides
services to
satellite
airports
--Provides
services to
the largest
civil fleet of
helicopters
28 Hilo 90,024 27,441 --Alternate June 2004
International airport for
(Hilo, HI) Honolulu
--Island with
highest
terrain; heavy
rainfall area,
limited
visibility
--Stopover for
flights to and
from Australia
and New
Zealand
29 Bangor 89,960 97,804 --Stopover May 2001
International airport for
(Bangor, ME) flights from
Europe
--Alternate
airport for
Boston Logan
International
30 Joe Foss 89,481 61,011 --Air National Nov. 2003
Field Guard fighter
(Sioux Falls, wing
SD) --Minihub for
air cargo
operations
--Largest city
in South
Dakota
31 Lovell Field 88,567 105,312 --Provides Apr. 2004
(Chattanooga, services to 10
TN) satellite
airports
32 Yeager 88,546 111,601 -- Aug. 2002
(Charleston, Congressional
WV) interest
--Provides
services to
satellite
airports
33 Stockton 83,759 144,338 --FAA takeover June 1999
Metropolitan of a
(Stockton, CA) Department of
Defense site
34 Jackson 83,651 120,448 --Radar June 2003
International installed when
(Jackson, MS) new airport
was built in
1963 to cover
growth in
general
aviation,
military, and
air carrier
traffic
35 Amarillo 83,516 93,312 --Provides Apr. 2003
International coverage and
(Amarillo, TX) services to
the military
--Previously
provided
approach
control
services to
the Department
of Defense's
Strategic Air
Command base
36 Evansville 82,665 115,713 --Provides Sept. 2002
Regional services to 12
(Evansville, satellite
IN) airports
--Provides
coverage and
services to
100 scheduled
air carriers
daily
37 Hector 82,328 66,418 --Only airport Apr. 2002
International with primary
(Fargo, ND) radar within
120 miles
--Provides
services to
the Air
National Guard
38 Cyril E. King 81,259 28,009 --Provides Sept. 2004
(Charlotte coverage for a
Amalie, VI) combined air
traffic
control center
and terminal
radar approach
control
facility in
San Juan, PR
39 Michina 80,442 142,492 --Provides Aug. 2003
Regional services to 18
Transportation satellite
Center airports
(South Bend, --Alternate
IN) airport for
Chicago
O'Hare
--Provides
overflight
services to
and from
Chicago O'Hare
40 Pueblo 77,564 30,655 --Possible May 2002
Memorial congressional
(Pueblo, CO) mandate;
however, no
documentation
available
--Provides
support for
surrounding
restricted
military area
activities
41 Greater Peoria 73,629 142,829 --Provides Jan. 2002
Regional services to
(Peoria, IL) four satellite
airports
42 Tri-Cities 73,030 96,664 -- Feb. 2002
Regional TN/ Congressional
VA interest
(Bristol/ --Provides
Johnson/ coverage in
Kingsport, TN) mountainous
terrain
--Moody
Aviation
trains bush
pilots for
missionary
work
43 Monroe 72,574 98,891 --Provides Mar. 2003
Regional services to 10
(Monroe, LA) satellite
airports
--Air route
traffic
control center
does not have
adequate
coverage of
the airspace
44 Gregg County 70,702 95,204 --Provides Sept. 2003
(Longview, TX) coverage for
Longview and
Tyler, TX,
airports
--Provides
services for
oil industry
business jet
air traffic
45 Quad-City 70,500 102,407 --Provides Aug. 2002
(Moline, IL) service to
corporate
travelers,
including John
Deere
Corporation
46 Muskegon 69,538 89,808 --Provides Feb. 2002
County support for
(Muskegon, MI) air taxi and
military
approaches
47 Asheville 68,560 103,273 --Provides Jan. 2004
Regional coverage in
(Asheville, mountainous
NC) terrain
48 Fort Smith 68,008 221,673 --Provides June 2001
Regional coverage and
(Fort Smith, services to an
AR) Air National
Guard base
--Provides
approach
control
services for
northwest
Arkansas,
including
Fayetteville,
AR
49 New Hanover 67,640 102,754 --Provides July 2002
International services to
(Wilmington, four satellite
NC) airports and
to military
air traffic
50 Elmira/ 64,222 69,160 --Provides Aug. 2003
Corning coverage in
Regional mountainous
(Elmira, NY) terrain
--Provides
services to
satellite
airports
--Previously
provided
approach
control
services to
the Seneca
Army Air Depot
51 Austin 64,042 120,557 --Provides Oct. 2002
Straubel services to
International nine satellite
(Green Bay, airports
WI) --Third-
largest
approach
control
facility and
fourth-
busiest
airport in the
state
52 Duluth 60,340 38,208 --Provides Mar. 2004
International coverage and
(Duluth, MN) services to
the Air
National
Guard
--Provides
coverage and
services to
overflow and
diverted
traffic from
Minneapolis
--Previously
provided
services to
two Air Force
base squadrons
53 Greenville- 59,371 150,139 -- Mar. 2002
Spartanburg Congressional
(Greer, SC) interest
54 Sioux Gateway 58,006 41,376 --Provides June 2004
(Sioux City, coverage and
IA) services to
the Air
National Guard
and four
satellite
airports
55 Benedum 57,524 51,607 -- Dec. 2003
(Clarksburg, Congressional
WV) interest
56 Rochester 57,149 38,167 --Provides Apr. 2004
International services for
(Rochester, the Mayo
MN) Clinic,
including
lifeguard
flights
--Alternate
airport for
Minneapolis
airport
--Airport has
one of the few
Global
Positioning
System
Heliport
instrument
approaches
--Provides
services for
large cargo
operations
57 Waterloo 56,476 48,589 --Provides Apr. 2003
Municipal services to
(Waterloo, IA) the Air
National Guard
and satellite
airports
--Provides
tower air
route traffic
control
services
58 Columbus 56,372 106,848 --Provides Aug. 2004
Metropolitan coverage and
(Columbus, GA) services to
Fort Benning
Military Base
--Provides
services to 19
satellite
airports
--Sequences
turboprops and
props into
Atlanta
Hartsfield
59 Wilkes Barre/ 56,262 93,831 -- Mar. 2004
Scranton Congressional
International interest
(Wilkes Barre/
Scranton, PA)
60 Great Falls 53,996 48,994 --Provides Sept. 2002
International coverage and
(Great Falls, services to
MT) the Air
National
Guard
--Provides
coverage for
detecting and
interdicting
aircraft
involved in
illegal drug
activities
61 Myrtle Beach 52,637 82,573 --FAA takeover Apr. 2002
International of a
(Myrtle Beach, Department of
SC) Defense site
--Provides
services for
military
practice
approaches
62 Bismarck 52,451 29,169 -- May 2004
Municipal Congressional
(Bismarck, ND) interest
--State
capital
--Provides
services to
three
satellite
airports
--Provides
coverage and
services to
the Air
National Guard
63 Tri-City 51,498 93,755 --Provides Jan. 2003
International services in
(Saginaw, MI) restricted
military
airspace
--Provides
coverage for
air carrier
and air taxi
operations
64 Erie 49,892 90,664 --Provides Aug. 2001
International coverage in
(Erie, PA) mountainous
terrain
--Provides
service to
three
satellite
airports
65 Waco Regional 49,803 76,082 --Part of the Dec. 2001
(Waco, TX) Dallas-Fort
Worth
Metroplex
--Provides air
traffic relief
services to an
air route
traffic
control center
66 Hulman 49,548 94,353 --Provides Oct. 2003
Regional coverage and
(Terre Haute, services to
IN) the Air
National
Guard
--Indiana
State
University
student pilot
training
--Midnight
freight
operations
67 Jefferson 44,362 63,166 --Fills radar Feb. 2004
County coverage gap
(Beaumont/ for terminal
Port Arthur, radar approach
TX) control in
Houston
68 Natrona County 43,396 18,411 -- May 2004
International Congressional
(Casper, WY) interest
--Provides
services for
oil industry
related air
traffic
--Provides
coverage in
mountainous
terrain
69 Binghamton 43,343 63,842 --Provides July 2003
Regional coverage in
(Binghamton, mountainous
NY) terrain
70 Lake Charles 42,863 68,049 --Department July 2003
Regional of Defense's
(Lake Charles, Air Defense
LA) Identification
Zone
--Military
practice
approaches
conducted at
the airport
71 Bush Field 42,054 74,672 --Host of Oct. 2002
(Augusta, GA) Master's
Tournament
--Supports
increasing
corporate air
traffic
72 Middle Georgia 41,343 135,527 --Provides July 2004
Regional coverage and
(Macon, GA) approach
control
services for
Middle Georgia
Regional and
Robbins Air
Force Base
--Provides
coverage and
services for
the military
73 Mansfield Lahm 39,618 56,150 -- Feb. 2004
Municipal Congressional
(Mansfield, interest
OH) --Provides
coverage and
services for
the local Air
National Guard
74 Tri-State 38,786 79,139 -- Sept. 2003
(Huntington, Congressional
WV) interest
75 Florence 34,337 69,170 -- Feb. 2003
Regional Congressional
(Florence, SC) interest
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Total operations are the number of takeoffs and landings performed
by the mix of aircraft, such as commercial air carriers, commuter,
and general aviation, using the airports. For example, the Cherry
Capital Airport is mainly a general aviation airport, whereas some of
the other airports have more air carrier and commuter air traffic.
\b Total instrument operations are the number of aircraft that passed
through the airports' airspace in addition to aircraft approaching
and departing the airports themselves. Hence, total instrument
operations may exceed total airport operations because some airports
provide radar coverage to satellite airports.
\c These are the scheduled installation dates as of February 1998.
\d Not applicable.
\e The term "congressional interest" does not necessarily refer to
radars installed as a result of congressional mandates.
Source: FAA.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
Janet Barbee
Sharon Dyer
Wanda Hawkins
Mehrzad Nadji
John Thomson
*** End of document. ***