Department of Energy: Opportunity to Improve Management of Major System
Acquisitions (Chapter Report, 11/26/96, GAO/RCED-97-17).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Department of
Energy's (DOE) ability to complete its major system acquisitions within
originally estimated cost and time schedules, focusing on: (1) DOE's
performance in completing its major system acquisitions; (2) key factors
that hinder the timely, cost-effective completion of the acquisitions;
and (3) DOE efforts to improve its performance.

GAO found that: (1) from 1980 through 1996, DOE conducted 80 projects
that it designated as major system acquisitions; (2) DOE has completed
15 of these projects, and most of them were finished behind schedule and
with cost overruns; (3) 31 other projects were terminated prior to
completion after expenditures of over $10 billion; (4) cost overruns and
schedule slippages continue to occur on many of the ongoing projects;
(5) the four key factors underlying the cost overruns, schedule
slippages, and terminations include unclear or changing missions,
incremental project funding, a flawed incentive system for DOE employees
and contractors, and lack of sufficient DOE personnel with the
appropriate skills to effectively oversee contractor operations; and (6)
DOE has implemented several initiatives that are helping to improve its
overall management, but all of these initiatives may not improve DOE's
management of its major system acquisitions.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-97-17
     TITLE:  Department of Energy: Opportunity to Improve Management of 
             Major System Acquisitions
      DATE:  11/26/96
   SUBJECT:  Cost overruns
             Cost control
             Management information systems
             Information resources management
             Project monitoring
             Contractor performance
             Contractor payments
             Federal procurement
             GOCO
             Strategic information systems planning
IDENTIFIER:  DOE New Production Reactors Program
             Clinch River Breeder Reactor (TN)
             DOE Strategic Plan
             DOE Superconducting Super Collider Project
             DOE Fuel Processing Restoration Project
             Savannah River (SC)
             DOE Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation Process Program
             DOE Strategic Systems Initiative
             DOE West Valley Demonstration Project (NY)
             DOE Fermilab Main Injector Project (IL)
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs, U.S. 
Senate

November 1996

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - OPPORTUNITY
TO IMPROVE MANAGEMENT OF MAJOR
SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS

GAO/RCED-97-17

Department of Energy

(302163)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOE - Department of Energy
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  MSA - major system acquisitions
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-274876

November 26, 1996

The Honorable Ted Stevens
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

As requested by the former Chairman, this report addresses key
factors affecting the Department of Energy's ability to complete its
major system acquisitions within originally estimated cost and time
schedules. 

As arranged, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we
plan no further distribution of this report until 15 days after the
date of this letter.  At that time, we will provide copies of the
report to the Secretary of Energy; the Director, Office of Management
and Budget; and other interested parties.  We will also make copies
available to others upon request. 

Please contact me on (202) 512-3841 if you or your staff have any
questions.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
V. 

Sincerely yours,

Victor S.  Rezendes
Director, Energy, Resources,
 and Science Issues


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Over the past decade and a half, the Department of Energy (DOE) has
spent tens of billions of dollars on projects, many of which
experienced significant cost overruns\1 and schedule delays, and some
have never been completed.  Concerned about this, the Chairman,
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked GAO to review DOE's
ability to complete its largest and most significant projects, called
major system acquisitions.  Specifically, GAO was asked to (1) assess
DOE's performance in completing its major system acquisitions; (2)
identify any key factors that hinder the timely, cost-effective
completion of the acquisitions; and (3) determine what DOE is doing
to improve its performance. 


--------------------
\1 Cost overruns are increases in a project's original cost estimate. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

Over the years, DOE has conducted technically complex activities for
the federal government at government-owned, contractor-operated
facilities across the country.  These activities have included
developing and producing nuclear weapons; operating nuclear reactors,
uranium enrichment plants, and plutonium production plants;
performing research and development on both military and civilian
uses of nuclear energy; promoting and funding nuclear and other
sciences; fostering energy conservation and efficiency; managing
federal petroleum reserves; and, more recently, cleaning up
environmental contamination resulting from its past operations. 

These activities have involved large-scale, first-of-a-kind projects
requiring substantial construction and other expenses.  DOE often
designates such projects as major system acquisitions because of
their high estimated costs (ranging from about $100 million to many
billions of dollars) and their perceived importance to fulfilling
DOE's missions. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

From 1980 through 1996, DOE conducted 80 projects that it designated
as major system acquisitions.  DOE has completed 15 of these
projects, and most of them were finished behind schedule and with
cost overruns.  Three of the completed projects have not yet been
used for their intended purpose.  Thirty-one other projects were
terminated prior to completion, after expenditures of over $10
billion.  The remaining 34 projects are ongoing.  Cost overruns and
"schedule slippages" have occurred and continue to occur on many of
the ongoing projects. 

GAO believes that there are four key factors underlying the cost
overruns, schedule slippages, and terminations--unclear or changing
missions; incremental funding of projects; a flawed system of
incentives both for DOE's employees and contractors; and a lack of
sufficient DOE personnel with the appropriate skills to effectively
oversee contractor operations. 

In recent years, DOE has implemented several initiatives that are
helping to improve the agency's overall management.  While not all of
these initiatives may improve DOE's management of its major system
acquisitions, GAO believes that their implementation offers DOE an
excellent opportunity to address the key factors. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      FEW PROJECTS COMPLETED AS
      PLANNED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

From 1980 through 1996, 31 of the 80 major system acquisitions DOE
conducted were terminated prior to completion, after expenditures of
over $10 billion.  Of the 15 projects completed, 3 have not yet been
used for their intended purpose.  For example, the Fuels and
Materials Examination Facility at DOE's Hanford Plant in Washington
State was to fabricate and examine a full range of breeder reactor
fuels.  However, the facility has never been operated for its
intended purpose because DOE's breeder reactor program was terminated
in the early 1980s when the Congress cut off funding.  The facility
is now being used for storage and office space.  DOE spent $234
million on this project. 

The terminated projects were canceled for a number of reasons.  In
some cases, changing circumstances and/or world events simply caught
up with the projects and they were no longer needed.  Some were
canceled due to changes in administration policy.  In other cases,
however, management problems and/or ineffective oversight by DOE led
to large cost overruns and schedule slippages and eventual
terminations.  As an example of changing circumstances, due to
reduced demand for uranium enrichment services to fuel commercial
nuclear power plants, DOE canceled the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment
Plant in Ohio after spending $2.8 billion.  Other projects were
terminated by the Congress.  For example, GAO reported to the
Congress that DOE's original cost estimate of $5.9 billion for the
Superconducting Super Collider in Texas (a project intended to
conduct high-energy physics experiments) had grown to $8.3 billion;
yet GAO identified additional known cost increases showing that the
total cost would exceed $11 billion.  The Congress cut off funding
for the project after a total expenditure of over $2 billion. 

As of June 1996, at least half of the 34 ongoing projects were
experiencing cost overruns and/or schedule slippages.\2 Most of the
completed projects also experienced cost overruns and schedule
slippages.  For example, the total cost for the West Valley
Demonstration Project in New York (to solidify high-level radioactive
waste for long-term storage) grew from about $446 million to over $1
billion, and the project was more than 7 years behind schedule when
completed. 


--------------------
\2 Complete original cost estimates and current cost estimates were
available for 22 of the 34 ongoing projects.  Of the 22 projects, 17
were experiencing cost overruns, and 16 were experiencing schedule
slippages. 


      FOUR KEY FACTORS AFFECT
      DOE'S MAJOR SYSTEM
      ACQUISITIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

GAO believes the high rate of cost overruns, schedule slippages, and
terminations on DOE's major acquisitions can be traced to four key
factors: 

  -- The constantly changing missions for DOE that often make it
     difficult to maintain departmental and congressional support for
     these long-term, high-cost projects. 

  -- The funding of projects incrementally, from year to year rather
     than up front, which subjects the projects to potential delays
     or terminations in funding each year. 

  -- A flawed system of incentives that does not always reward
     individuals and organizations for doing "the right thing" and
     has often rewarded contractors despite poor performance. 

  -- The difficulty in hiring, training, and retaining enough people
     with the requisite skills to provide effective oversight and/or
     management of contractors' operations. 

DOE's missions have continued to evolve to where the Department bears
little resemblance to the agency created in 1977.  DOE is no longer
focused primarily on developing alternative sources of energy,
developing nuclear weapons, or modernizing the nuclear weapons
complex.  Today, DOE's focus has turned more to maintaining the
nation's scientific and technological leadership, cleaning up the
environmental contamination resulting from the past 50 years of
operation, and providing stewardship for the nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile.  With changing missions, it is very difficult for DOE to
maintain congressional and stakeholder support for projects that take
years to complete and often cost billions of dollars.  For example,
in the early 1980s, DOE terminated five coal demonstration projects
on which it had spent $459 million because the new administration did
not believe that funding demonstration projects was an appropriate
mission for DOE. 

DOE has historically received incremental funding for its projects. 
One problem with incremental funding is that budget authority for the
total cost of the project is not provided at the time the project is
approved.  Furthermore, for many projects, particularly in their
first years of development and construction, the funding received is
considerably below the amount requested.  This causes project
schedules to slip and costs to rise, because certain contractor
expenses and administrative costs (e.g., for heat, lights, water,
security, etc.) will still accrue.  For example, the Fermilab Main
Injector Project in Illinois (to be used in high-energy physics
experiments) received only 40 percent of its first 3 years of planned
funding, and the Security Enhancements at the Pantex Plant in Texas
(where nuclear weapons are assembled and disassembled) received only
43 percent of its first 3 years of planned funding.  As a result,
according to DOE officials, both of these projects are now over their
originally estimated costs and years behind schedule. 

Inappropriate incentives have also contributed to late and costly
projects.  Past Secretaries of Energy have commented on the need to
change the production-oriented atmosphere in DOE to focus less on
quotas for nuclear weapons and more on other important issues, such
as environmental health and safety and management efficiency.  DOE
managers view themselves as advocates for their projects, which
provides an incentive to not surface potential problems that could
result in the project's being canceled.  For example, participants in
the Superconducting Super Collider were focused on continuing the
project in order to maintain U.S.  preeminence in high-energy physics
despite repeated reports of chronic management problems and enormous
cost overruns. 

Most DOE contracts have built-in incentives--such as bonuses or
penalties--to prompt satisfactory contractor performance.  However,
GAO found that in some instances, DOE contracting officers did not
use the penalty clauses and sometimes gave contractors substantial
bonuses despite subpar performance.  For example, during fiscal years
1986 through 1988, many safety and health deficiencies at DOE's Rocky
Flats Plant in Colorado were repeatedly raised by DOE safety staff. 
These included problems in the plant's radiological protection
program and a lack of commitment by plant management to improve
overall safety and health conditions.  Despite this poor performance,
the contractor received over $26 million in bonuses during this
period.  The plant was eventually shut down for, among other things,
safety problems. 

DOE continues to lack a sufficient number of employees in some areas
with the necessary technical expertise to oversee the design,
construction, and operation of its major system acquisitions.  A 1981
DOE task force and a 1987 report by the National Research Council
noted DOE's lack of technical capabilities and expertise.  A March
1996 report by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board echoed
those same concerns.  Throughout a series of management reviews of
DOE that GAO began in 1991, many DOE managers have told GAO that the
lack of skilled staff in program, project, and contracting oversight
positions is one of the most fundamental problems in the Department. 


      RESOLVING THE ACQUISITION
      PROBLEMS WILL BE DIFFICULT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

There are no quick, easy solutions to DOE's problems in keeping its
major system acquisitions on schedule and within budget.  However,
several governmentwide initiatives could help.  Recent changes to
federal procurement laws, including the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of
1996, provide impetus to agencies to, among other things, improve the
technical capabilities and performance of their acquisition
management staffs.  This could help resolve a long-standing problem
at DOE.  In addition, the Office of Management and Budget, as of July
1996, requires all federal agencies to request full funding for fixed
assets (including major system acquisitions).  If a project or
separable segment\3 of a project is approved, the agency will receive
budget authority for the full amount of the project's or segment's
estimated cost and will not have to return to the Congress for
additional budget authority each year.  The full-funding provision
could have a significant impact on DOE's management of its major
system acquisitions.  The agency and other stakeholders, such as the
Congress, need to reach a consensus on which of DOE's major system
acquisitions are most mission-critical.  Then, by knowing that the
funding will be available when needed, DOE and its contractors should
be better able to stay within cost estimates and keep the projects on
schedule. 

Furthermore, beginning in 1994, DOE has implemented management
initiatives in the areas of contract reform, strategic systems and
life-cycle asset management, strategic planning, information
resources management planning, and financial planning.  GAO believes
that these initiatives have the potential to help improve DOE's
management of its major system acquisitions.  However, it is
important to note that DOE may need help in addressing some of the
key factors.  For example, GAO believes that this is an ideal time to
reevaluate DOE's missions.  DOE cannot do this alone because the
Congress plays a key role in setting the agency's priorities. 
Nevertheless, GAO believes that DOE's management initiatives offer
the opportunity for the agency to begin addressing some of the key
factors affecting the Department's management of its major system
acquisitions. 


--------------------
\3 The guidance from the Office of Management and Budget allows the
full funding of economically or programmatically separable segments
of projects. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

This report does not contain recommendations. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

GAO provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and
comment.  DOE agreed that many of its major system acquisitions have
experienced cost growth, delays, and terminations.  DOE pointed out
the many new management initiatives it has under way that it believes
will help improve the management of all of its programs, including
its major system acquisitions. 

DOE raised three issues regarding the draft report, the first of
these being GAO's use of the term "cost overrun." DOE believes this
term leaves an unfair impression of mismanagement.  GAO does not mean
to leave this impression and uses the term simply to describe those
situations where project costs have increased above the original cost
estimates.  The second issue relates to GAO's discussion of DOE's
commitment to competition under its contract reform efforts.  DOE
defends its decision to extend certain contracts without competition. 
GAO remains concerned that DOE's public announcement to extend these
contracts before negotiations had taken place may compromise the
Department's ability to effectively negotiate the terms of the
extensions.  The third issue relates to GAO's discussion of DOE's
ability to hire, train, and retain qualified employees to oversee its
contractors.  DOE lists a series of initiatives to address these
concerns.  DOE's initiatives are recognized in this report, and GAO
believes that, if fully implemented, they can help resolve
long-standing departmental problems.  DOE also suggested several
changes to clarify information in the report, and GAO incorporated
those comments where appropriate.  The full text of DOE's comments
and GAO's response are included as appendix IV. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

The Department of Energy (DOE) is one of the most complex,
multifaceted departments within the federal government.  Established
in 1977 in response to the global energy crisis that disrupted U.S. 
and world markets and economies, DOE is an amalgam of various federal
agencies that had energy and science responsibilities.  The roots of
the Department came from the Atomic Energy Commission that was
established in 1947 to assume the responsibilities of the Manhattan
Engineer District, which had developed the first atomic bombs.  The
Commission was responsible for developing and producing nuclear
weapons; operating nuclear reactors, uranium enrichment plants and
plutonium production plants; performing research and development on
both military and civilian uses of nuclear energy; and promoting and
funding nuclear and other sciences.  DOE assumed these as well as
other responsibilities, including energy technology research,
development, and demonstration; fostering energy conservation and
efficiency; managing federal petroleum reserves; and, more recently,
cleaning up environmental contamination resulting from its past
operations. 

To carry out these responsibilities, DOE continues a highly
decentralized structure that began under the Atomic Energy
Commission.  This structure relies heavily on private contractors,
either corporations or universities, to manage most of its operations
and activities.  DOE owns the facilities needed to conduct the work,
but the private contractors manage and operate the facilities.  DOE's
work force is composed primarily of contractors.  As of mid-1996, DOE
had about 12,500 federal employees and about 120,000 contract workers
located at its headquarters and field facilities throughout the
country.  To support these facilities and workers, DOE receives
substantial funding, which ranged from $19.0 billion in 1986 to $23.7
billion in 1990.  For fiscal year 1996, DOE was authorized to spend
$19.7 billion. 


   DOE CONDUCTS MANY LARGE-SCALE,
   HIGH-RISK PROJECTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

More than most federal agencies, DOE's activities involve projects
that are usually long term and high cost.  In many cases, the
projects are first-of-a-kind and thus involve substantial risk. 
These projects generally involve substantial funding for
construction, are conducted to address a specific mission need, and
are often separate line items in DOE's budget.  For example: 

  -- DOE's science programs in high-energy physics and nuclear
     physics require the construction of accelerators, which are
     large machines that propel atomic particles near the speed of
     light.  The collisions of these particles are studied to explore
     the properties of matter.  These accelerators can range in cost
     from several hundred million dollars to several billion dollars,
     or more.  For example, the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator
     Facility in Virginia (recently renamed the Thomas Jefferson
     National Accelerator Facility), shown in figure 1.1, cost over
     $500 million.\1

  -- DOE's nuclear weapons programs required the construction of
     nuclear reactors to produce the materials needed for nuclear
     weapons.  Additionally, other large and specialized facilities
     are needed to process the materials and manufacture, assemble,
     and test nuclear weapons components.  Any of these facilities
     can easily cost over a billion dollars.  For example, just the
     design work and close-out costs for a nuclear reactor to produce
     tritium, a key component of nuclear weapons, were more than $1.2
     billion. 

  -- DOE's environmental management programs require facilities and
     technologies to process nuclear waste into forms suitable for
     longer-term or permanent disposal.  These programs also need
     technologies and equipment to remove nuclear and hazardous
     material contamination from existing facilities and sites.  Some
     facilities at major DOE field sites will cost many billions of
     dollars.  For example, the Defense Waste Processing Facility in
     South Carolina (to process high-level radioactive waste into a
     stable form for long-term storage), and the support facilities
     to prepare the waste for processing, shown in figure 1.2, cost
     over $4 billion. 

   Figure 1.1:  Continuous
   Electron Beam Accelerator
   Facility

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 1.2:  Defense Waste
   Processing Facility

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

These large-scale projects account for a significant portion of DOE's
budget.  Funds for many of the projects are requested by DOE as
specific construction line items, and funding for such projects is
identified in congressional committee reports.  However, from a total
budget standpoint, considerably more operating funds than
construction funds are provided for DOE projects, and the operating
funds provided for some projects cannot be as easily determined,
particularly for older projects.  Funds needed for conceptual design,
management, start up, and other nonconstruction activities--which can
be as much as 40 percent of a project's total cost--are included as
part of DOE's operating funds.  Furthermore, some projects are funded
entirely with operating funds.  For example, over $1 billion of the
operating funds appropriated annually for DOE's environmental
restoration activities are used for large-scale clean-up projects. 


--------------------
\1 All photographs in this report were provided courtesy of the U.S. 
Department of Energy. 


   MAJOR SYSTEM ACQUISITIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-109, dated April 5,
1976, recognized that certain projects and/or activities are crucial
to an agency accomplishing its missions.  The circular defined
projects that are critical to fulfilling an agency mission, entail
the allocation of relatively large amounts of resources, and warrant
special management attention as major system acquisitions (MSA).  The
circular (1) required early communication with the Congress that
relates MSAs to agency mission needs and goals, (2) focuses top-level
management attention on the determination of these mission needs and
goals, and (3) requires an integrated approach to budgeting,
contracting, and managing these projects.  However, the specific
criteria and dollar thresholds for determining which activities will
be considered MSAs were left to the discretion of the individual
agencies. 

In response to the OMB circular, DOE initially defined MSAs as
systems or projects that had a total project cost in excess of $250
million and were specifically identified as mission critical.  In
1990, DOE changed the cost threshold to $100 million.  During the
period 1980 through 1996, DOE conducted 80 different MSAs.  These
projects addressed many different program areas and activities,
including the Superconducting Super Collider; nuclear reactors;
uranium enrichment processes and facilities; fossil fuel
demonstration plants; nuclear waste disposal facilities; and
environmental cleanup efforts.  According to current cost estimates,
DOE has spent or plans to spend over $65 billion on these 80 MSAs.\2

Successfully completing MSAs on time and within estimated dollar
targets has proven difficult.  Over the past few years, we have
issued a number of reports that have discussed overall acquisition
issues and problems in other federal agencies, as well as problems
with individual projects.  In a December 1992 report, we discussed
problems with the Department of Defense's major weapons acquisitions
resulting in substantial cost overruns, delays in completing and
fielding these acquisitions, and performance problems.\3 Similarly,
in an August 1996 report, we discussed the Federal Aviation
Administration's problems in acquiring new air traffic control system
equipment within cost, schedule, and performance parameters.\4 Both
reports identified fundamental problems that inhibit the successful
completion of these agencies' major acquisitions.  For example, we
reported that Federal Aviation Administration officials acted in ways
that did not reflect a strong commitment to the agency's acquisition
mission.  They performed little or no mission needs analysis, set
unrealistic cost and schedule estimates, and started production on
the systems before having completed their development. 

Furthermore, in July 1995, we reported on governmentwide federal
information technology acquisitions that cost more than anticipated,
did not meet schedules, and did not meet mission needs.\5 All of
these acquisitions have suffered from a lack of advance planning and
ineffective management oversight that has led to cost overruns and
schedule slippages.  Currently, 11 federal agencies have problems
with information management or systems development that are serious
enough that they have been listed by GAO, OMB, and/or the General
Services Administration as high-risk programs. 

We have also discussed problems with specific DOE MSAs in many
reports over the years.\6 These reports address MSAs that range from
the multibillion dollar Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project
in Nevada (a proposed repository for high-level radioactive waste),
shown in figure 1.3, to the approximately $140 million Central
Receiver Solar Thermal Power Plant in California, shown in figure
1.4.  We have also reported on generic MSA management problems facing
DOE, such as the agency's frequent failure to ensure that critical
management control documents for MSAs are prepared before projects
are allowed to proceed beyond the conceptual design phase.\7

   Figure 1.3:  Yucca Mountain
   Site Characterization Project

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 1.4:  Central Receiver
   Solar Thermal Power Plant

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\2 DOE does not have complete cost estimates for all of its MSAs. 
Five of the ongoing MSAs without costs estimates are major
environmental management projects that will cost many billions of
dollars. 

\3 Weapons Acquisition:  A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change
(GAO/NSIAD-93-15, Dec.  1992). 

\4 Aviation Acquisition:  A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed for
Cultural Change at FAA (GAO/RCED-96-159, Aug.  22, 1996). 

\5 Information Technology Investment:  A Governmentwide Overview
(GAO/AIMD-95-208, July 31, 1995). 

\6 See "Related GAO Products" at the end of this report. 

\7 Department of Energy:  Status of Reporting Compliance for DOE's
Major System Acquisitions (GAO/RCED-92-204FS, Aug.  24, 1992). 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, asked us to
review DOE's acquisition management program and the past problems
that have occurred.  As agreed with the Chairman's office, this
report (1) assesses DOE's performance in completing its MSAs, (2)
identifies key factors that hinder the timely, cost-effective
completion of the acquisitions; and (3) determines what DOE is doing
to improve its performance. 

To respond to the Chairman's request, we interviewed and obtained
documents from DOE officials responsible for the Department's overall
MSA program and from DOE officials responsible for managing specific
MSAs.  We also obtained documents from officials of the National
Academy of Sciences and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board, which
had experience reviewing DOE's management of its MSAs.  We also
surveyed our managers who had prior experience in auditing specific
DOE MSAs and reviewed the reports and other documents resulting from
those audits.  (See "Related GAO Products.")

We obtained listings identifying 80 MSAs conducted during the period
1980 through 1996 from DOE's Office of Project and Fixed Asset
Management under the Deputy Associate Secretary for Field
Management.\8 DOE has not retained a comprehensive cost and schedule
history of its MSAs.  As a result, the data used in this report had
to be reconstructed from budget submissions, internal documents, and
from officials of DOE's Office of Project and Fixed Asset Management. 
We did not verify the data obtained from DOE.  However, we did
examine the reasonableness of these data based on information in
prior GAO reports and audits.  For this report, we used, wherever
possible, the MSA's "Total Project Cost," which includes construction
and operating funds.  Where these costs were not available, we used
the "Total Estimated Cost," which includes construction costs.  We
have footnoted the latter.  (See app.  I, II, and III.)

We provided a draft of this report to DOE for its review and comment. 
DOE's comments and our response are included as appendix IV and are
discussed in the chapters where appropriate.  We conducted our work
from August 1995 through October 1996.  Our work was conducted in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 


--------------------
\8 There may be other projects conducted by DOE that meet the
definition of an MSA, but they were not identified as MSAs to us by
DOE during our review. 


DOE'S LIMITED SUCCESS WITH ITS
MSAS
============================================================ Chapter 2

Since 1980, DOE has conducted 80 projects that it designated as MSAs. 
As of June 1996, 34 were ongoing.  Our analysis of DOE's success in
completing its MSAs shows that during the period 1980 through 1996: 

  -- DOE completed 15 of 80 MSAs, while more than twice as many
     projects (31) were terminated prior to completion. 

  -- Cost overruns occurred on most completed projects and at least
     half of the ongoing projects, in some cases more than doubling
     the original estimates. 

  -- Most of the completed projects were not finished on schedule,
     and many of the ongoing MSAs were behind schedule. 

  -- Three of the completed projects either have not achieved their
     expected results or have not yet been used for their intended
     purposes. 


   HIGH RATE OF PROJECT
   TERMINATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

Since 1980, 31 MSAs were terminated prior to completion.  These
projects had incurred substantial expenditures when they were
terminated, totaling more than $10 billion.\1

These terminated projects include: 

  -- The New Production Reactor program to produce tritium, a key
     ingredient in nuclear weapons, was canceled in 1992 after the
     expenditure of over $1.2 billion, primarily for design work and
     close-out costs.  No final technology or site was selected. 

  -- The Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project in Tennessee was
     intended to demonstrate a reactor that could create more fuel
     than it used.  Authorized in 1970 at an estimated total cost of
     $700 million, the project was terminated in 1983 after an
     expenditure of about $1.6 billion. 

  -- The Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant in Ohio, shown in figure
     2.1, authorized in 1975 at an estimated total cost of $5.1
     billion, was terminated in 1985 after an expenditure of $2.8
     billion. 

  -- The Superconducting Super Collider in Texas, shown in figure
     2.2, was designed to conduct high-energy physics experiments. 
     The collider would have required an oval tunnel 54 miles in
     circumference at an average depth of 150 feet below ground
     level.  Originally funded as a construction project in fiscal
     year 1990 at an estimated total cost of $5.9 billion, the
     project was terminated in 1993 after an expenditure of over $2
     billion. 

  -- The Fuel Processing Restoration Project in Idaho (to increase
     naval nuclear propulsion fuel processing capacity) was begun in
     1985.  About $306 million had been spent for construction when
     the project was terminated in 1992. 

  -- The Uranium Solidification Facility in South Carolina (to
     recycle enriched uranium and provide material for reactor fuel),
     begun in the late 1980s, had an original construction cost
     estimate of $85 million.  When the project was terminated in
     1994, about $116 million had been spent for construction. 

   Figure 2.1:  Gas Centrifuge
   Enrichment Plant

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 2.2:  Superconducting
   Super Collider

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

There are many reasons for these terminations, some of which were
outside of DOE's control.  In some cases, changing circumstances
and/or world events simply caught up with the projects, and they were
no longer needed.  In others, the necessary technologies to make the
projects work could not be perfected in time.  Some were canceled due
to changes in administration policy.  However, in other cases, as
pointed out in DOE Inspector General and our reports, management
problems and/or ineffective oversight by DOE led to enormous schedule
slippages and cost overruns, and the Congress eventually cut off
funding.  Appendix I lists the terminated projects, their original
cost estimates, and the amount spent on each prior to termination. 


--------------------
\1 Dollars in year expended. 


   COST OVERRUNS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Increases in projects' costs beyond original cost estimates, or cost
overruns, can result in program disruption and a lack of confidence
in project management, and can divert funds needed by other programs. 
Cost overruns on DOE projects were common occurrences during the 1980
through 1996 period.  Complete original cost estimates and
final/current cost estimates were available for 35 of the 49
completed or ongoing projects.  Of these 35 projects, 4 were
completed and 4 were expected to be completed at or below their
originally budgeted cost.  The remaining 27 projects had or were
projected to have cost overruns averaging over 70 percent.\2 Table
2.1 provides examples of projects that were experiencing substantial
cost overruns. 



                               Table 2.1
                
                   Examples of Ongoing and Completed
                Projects Experiencing Cost Overruns (as
                             of June 1996)

                         (Dollars in millions)

                                                    Final/     Percent
                                      Original     current        over
                                          cost        cost    original
Project name            Status        estimate    estimate    estimate
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Mirror Fusion Test      Completed       $132.5      $363.8         175
 Facility
Ebullated Bed (H-       Completed       $110.2      $277.9         152
 Coal) Pilot Plant
West Valley             Completed       $446.0    $1,008.5         126
 Demonstration Project
Defense Waste           Ongoing       $1,529.5    $2,470.7          62
 Processing Facility
Weldon Spring Remedial  Ongoing         $357.7      $865.0         142
 Action Project
High-Level Waste        Ongoing          $88.6      $828.2         835
 Removal from Filled
 Waste Tanks
Replacement High-       Ongoing          $46.7      $154.1         230
 Level Waste
 Evaporator
----------------------------------------------------------------------
A list of the original and final/current cost estimates for all
completed and ongoing projects are contained in appendixes II and
III, respectively. 

Cost overruns also occurred in terminated projects and, in some
cases, were the contributing factor to their termination.  For
example, DOE's estimate of the total cost to build the
Superconducting Super Collider grew from $5.9 billion in 1990 to
$8.25 billion in 1991.  In May 1993, we reported that additional
known costs showed that the project's total costs would exceed $11
billion and could go higher.\3 The project was terminated by the
Congress in October 1993, because of concerns over the escalating
costs and the federal budget deficit. 

Over the years, we and DOE's Inspector General have reported that
cost overruns on DOE's MSAs have occurred for a number of reasons,
including technical problems, some of which were beyond the agency's
control; poor initial cost estimates; and ineffective oversight of
contractor operations.  For example, in 1992, we reported that
technical problems were important factors causing the cost of the
Defense Waste Processing Facility to increase.\4 This facility, at
DOE's Savannah River Plant in South Carolina, was designed to turn
high-level radioactive waste into a glass-like form for long-term
storage.  The technical problems included the generation of benzene
during the pretreatment process and the buildup of highly explosive
gases during the vitrification process. 

In 1993, we reported that poor estimating of project costs
contributed to cost overruns with DOE's environmental projects.\5 In
1995, the Inspector General reported on problems with the High Level
Waste Evaporator at Savannah River.\6 The evaporator is designed to
evaporate water added to the high-level radioactive waste processing
stream, thereby reducing the total volume of waste.  The estimated
cost of the project had more than doubled, and the estimated
completion date had slipped by more than 4 years.  The Inspector
General found that many of the cost increases and schedule delays
could have been avoided if DOE had adequately planned, contracted,
funded, and maintained management continuity.  A major factor was
DOE's failure to ensure that the contractor followed the project
management guidance in DOE's orders. 

Project cost overruns have occurred for other reasons.  On some
projects, according to DOE officials, changing legal and regulatory
requirements have increased the scope of the projects resulting in
higher costs than were originally estimated.  For example, DOE
officials point out that the number of sites to be cleaned up under
DOE's Formerly Utilized Site Remedial Action Program increased, due
in part to legislation.  Furthermore, DOE officials told us that some
program offices were not consistently following guidance on which
costs are to be included as part of Total Project Cost, and this
resulted in understating those costs.  Consequently, the Total
Project Cost for some MSAs increased when these program offices began
to adhere to the cost guidance. 


--------------------
\2 For some projects, DOE does not have original and/or current
estimates for the Total Project Costs, so these projects are not
included in this average.  For example, according to DOE, some
environmental restoration projects were initiated as immediate
responses to certain legal and regulatory requirements.  As a result,
DOE did not have sufficient opportunity to completely define the
scope of the projects and develop Total Project Cost estimates. 

\3 Federal Research:  Super Collider--National Security Benefits,
Similar Projects, and Cost (GAO/RCED-93-158, May 14, 1993). 

\4 Nuclear Waste:  Defense Waste Processing Facility--Cost, Schedule,
and Technical Issues (GAO/RCED-92-183, June 17, 1992). 

\5 Nuclear Health and Safety:  More Can be Done to Better Control
Environmental Restoration Costs (GAO/RCED-92-71, Apr.  20, 1992). 

\6 The Audit of the Replacement High Level Waste Evaporator at the
Savannah River Site, Office of the Inspector General, U.S.  DOE
(ER-B-95-04, June 26, 1995). 


   SCHEDULE SLIPPAGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Schedule slippages can have serious implications for DOE projects. 
Slippages can adversely impact DOE's ability to produce or maintain
nuclear weapons components, achieve timely cleanup of contaminated
sites, or be the first to make new scientific breakthroughs. 
Schedule slippages also generally equate to additional project costs. 
Many administrative or overhead costs--such as security, heat, water,
etc.--will be incurred throughout the life of the project and
increase as the length of the project increases.  Contractors' costs,
which are passed on to DOE, will also rise as the schedule slips. 

Schedule delays and slippages were prevalent on DOE projects during
the period 1980 through 1996.  Most of the 15 completed MSAs did not
meet their originally scheduled completion dates.  Of the 34 ongoing
projects, only a few originally scheduled for completion in this
century are on time.  Examples of projects that experienced some
large schedule slippages are shown in table 2.2. 



                               Table 2.2
                
                   Projects With Significant Schedule
                       Slippage (as of June 1996)

                                                Final/
                                    Original    current          Years
                                    completion  completion      behind
Project name            Status      date        date          schedule
----------------------  ----------  ----------  ----------  ----------
Tritium Loading         Completed   September   December          4.25
Facility Replacement                1989        1993

West Valley             Completed   March 1988  August             7.4
Demonstration Project                           1995

Non-Radioactive         Ongoing     June 1986   June 1997         11.0
Hazardous Waste
Management

Defense Waste           Ongoing     March 1990  November          6.75
Processing Facility                             1996

Yucca Mountain Site     Ongoing     May 1991    March 2002        10.8
Characterization
Project\a

Security Enhancements,  Ongoing     June 1994   September         3.25
Pantex Plant                                    1997
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The original completion date is from a 1985 DOE estimate.  The
current completion date is derived from the MSA approved in January
1992 and from more recent project progress data. 

The reasons for schedule slippage are similar to those for cost
overruns, and they are very much intertwined.  Any event that causes
schedule slippage is likely to cause cost increases.  For example,
the schedule for the West Valley Demonstration Project in New York
State (to solidify high-level radioactive waste for long-term
storage), shown in figure 2.3, slipped by over 7 years and costs more
than doubled. 

   Figure 2.3:  West Valley
   Demonstration Project

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)



   SOME COMPLETED PROJECTS HAVE
   NOT OPERATED AS INTENDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

Once completed, an MSA must operate as intended in order to fulfill a
program need.  Of the 15 MSAs that DOE considered to be completed as
of June 1996, 3 have not performed as expected or otherwise have not
achieved their expected results. 

  -- The Mirror Fusion Test Facility in California, shown in figure
     2.4, was to perform experiments to provide an alternative
     approach for achieving fusion energy.  The project is listed by
     DOE as being completed at a final cost of $364 million; however,
     the facility never became operational because programmatic
     funding was reduced by the Congress, and the remaining funds
     were used by DOE for higher priority projects.  The facility has
     remained shut down since 1986. 

  -- The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico, shown in figure
     2.5, was to demonstrate the feasibility of underground storage
     of certain types of government-generated radioactive waste.  DOE
     declared the plant operational in 1991.  However, due to
     additional environmental, regulatory, and technical requirements
     that were imposed by legislation, the facility has not yet
     received the necessary certificates and permits to operate and
     has not yet received any radioactive waste.  DOE currently
     expects this facility to begin operations in fiscal year 1998. 
     To date, DOE has spent $710 million on this project. 

  -- The Fuels and Materials Examination Facility at DOE's Hanford
     Plant in Washington State, shown in figure 2.6, was to fabricate
     and examine a full range of breeder reactor fuels.  This
     project, although listed by DOE as being completed, has never
     operated for its intended purpose because DOE's breeder reactor
     program was terminated in the early 1980s when the Congress cut
     off funding.  The facility is now being used for storage and
     office space.  DOE spent $234 million on this project. 

   Figure 2.4:  Mirror Fusion Test
   Facility

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 2.5:  Waste Isolation
   Pilot Plant

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 2.6:  Fuels and
   Materials Examination Facility

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


KEY FACTORS INHIBITING THE
SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF MSAS
============================================================ Chapter 3

Our work over the years and that of others, including DOE's Inspector
General, has identified a wide variety of specific problems leading
to schedule slippages and cost overruns for MSAs.  When looked at
individually, there appears to be logical explanations of why
specific MSAs experienced delays and cost increases.  However, when
looked at collectively over an extended time (e.g., 80 MSAs from 1980
through 1996), other more fundamental reasons or factors can be seen. 
We believe that there are four key factors underlying the increasing
project costs, schedule slippages, and high number of terminations. 
The factors include

  -- constantly changing missions for DOE that often make it
     difficult to maintain departmental and congressional support for
     these long-term, high-cost projects;

  -- the funding of projects incrementally, from year to year rather
     than up front, which subjects those projects to potential delays
     or terminations in funding each year;

  -- a flawed system of incentives that does not always reward
     individuals and organizations for doing the right thing and has
     often rewarded contractors despite poor contract performance;
     and

  -- difficulty in hiring, training, and retaining enough people with
     the requisite skills to provide effective oversight and/or
     management of contractor operations. 


   CHANGING DOE MISSIONS AND
   INCONSISTENT SUPPORT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

Since its creation, DOE's missions have continued to change, and the
DOE of today bears little resemblance to the agency created in 1977. 
The relative priority of DOE's responsibilities has also changed
greatly over the years.  As a result, DOE no longer has major efforts
underway or has substantially cut back its efforts to

  -- develop alternative sources of energy to help promote energy
     independence (a key activity in the late 1970s);

  -- further develop commercial nuclear power (a major DOE activity
     in the late 1970s);

  -- build new nuclear weapons (a major buildup in the 1980s);

  -- rebuild the nuclear weapons complex (a principal agency concern
     in the late 1980s); or

  -- provide commercial uranium enrichment services (which the
     Congress transferred out of DOE in 1993 to a government
     corporation, the U.S.  Uranium Enrichment Corporation). 

At the same time, other missions have become a greater focus of the
agency's efforts.  These include cleaning up years of contamination
resulting from DOE's nuclear and other activities, improving the
nation's scientific and industrial competitiveness, and providing
stewardship for the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.  Accordingly,
many projects have been terminated, either by DOE or the Congress,
because they were no longer considered critical or important to DOE's
mission.  Examples include the following. 

  -- The Clinch River Breeder Reactor project was begun in 1970 as a
     high-priority project to demonstrate a nuclear reactor that
     could "breed" or produce more fuel than it consumed.  However,
     the fuel that it would produce is plutonium, a key material for
     nuclear weapons, and this raised concerns about the
     proliferation of nuclear weapons.  Coupled with reduced
     expectations for the future use of nuclear energy, the
     development of a breeder reactor was no longer a priority.  The
     project was terminated by the Congress in 1983 after the
     expenditure of about $1.6 billion. 

  -- The Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation Project in California,
     shown in figure 3.1, was begun in 1973 to develop a more
     efficient process to enrich uranium for use as fuel in
     commercial nuclear power plants.  In the early 1990s, however,
     DOE's mission of providing uranium enrichment services to public
     utilities and other non-DOE customers ended.  Consequently, DOE
     terminated its efforts on this project in 1993 after a total
     expenditure of $1.3 billion.\1

  -- The Fuel Processing Restoration Project was begun in 1985 to
     build improved facilities to process naval nuclear propulsion
     fuels for reuse in DOE's production reactors.  With the end of
     the cold war, however, this mission changed and the production
     reactors closed, thereby negating the need for this project. 
     The project was terminated by DOE in 1992 after a total
     expenditure of $306 million for construction. 

   Figure 3.1:  Atomic Vapor Laser
   Isotope Separation Project

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Projects have also been terminated when a change in administration
policy occurred.  In the early 1980s, DOE terminated five coal
demonstration plants, on which it had spent $459 million.  These
projects were looking at more efficient and/or environmentally safe
ways to burn coal.  The projects were canceled because the new
administration did not believe that funding demonstration projects
was an appropriate mission for DOE.  Other terminations resulted from
changing world conditions.  For example, after spending over $1.2
billion, DOE terminated plans to develop the New Production Reactor
to produce tritium, a vital material for nuclear weapons.  The
project was terminated because of anticipated reductions in the
nuclear weapons arsenal resulting from arms reduction agreements and
the end of the Cold War.  Also, because of reductions in nuclear
weapons, DOE terminated upgrades on its existing production reactor
at its Savannah River Plant after spending about $1.7 billion. 
Finally, DOE terminated the Uranium Solidification Facility when it
was 90 percent complete, because the products from the
facility--materials for nuclear fuel--were no longer needed with the
shut down of the Savannah River reactors. 


--------------------
\1 DOE transferred this project to the U.S.  Uranium Enrichment
Corporation, and DOE officials believe the Corporation will continue
work on the technology and eventually use it in commercial
applications. 


   INCREMENTAL FUNDING OF PROJECTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

Having funds available to keep a project on schedule is critical to
achieving project objectives.  DOE has historically received
incremental funding for its projects.  With incremental funding, the
Congress provides funds for one fiscal year for a project based on
the obligations estimated to be incurred within that fiscal year. 
Funds to continue the project must be requested from the Congress
each year.  DOE, in its annual budget submissions, develops and
provides the Congress with a profile or schedule of the funding it
will need each year to complete each project. 

However, when funds are provided incrementally, they often do not
keep pace with the agency's estimated needs.  For many projects,
particularly in their first years of development and construction,
the funding received is considerably below the amount requested. 
This causes project schedules to slip and costs to rise.  Contractors
continue to charge, and certain administrative costs (e.g., heat,
water, electricity, security, etc.) are incurred each month no matter
what the progress.  For example, the Continuous Electron Beam
Accelerator Facility was designed to conduct nuclear physics
experiments.  The project's funding request called for it to receive
a total of $236 million for construction during fiscal years 1987
through 1991.  However, in its first 3 years the project received
only $94 million, or about 60 percent, of the $155 million scheduled. 
According to DOE officials, largely because of this funding delay,
the project's construction schedule was extended 3 years, and the
construction costs increased by $77 million to $313 million.\2

Similarly, the Fermilab Main Injector Project in Illinois (to
construct a new particle accelerator for use in high-energy physics
experiments) received only 40 percent of its first 3 years planned
funding and the Security Enhancements at the Pantex Plant in Texas
(where nuclear weapons components are assembled into final weapons),
shown in figures 3.2 and 3.3, were funded at only 43 percent of the
first 3 years schedule.  According to DOE officials, both of these
projects are now over cost and years behind schedule as a result of
the reduced funding levels. 

   Figure 3.2:  Guard Observation
   Tower at Pantex Plant

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Figure 3.3:  Disassembled
   Nuclear Weapon at Pantex Plant

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

On the other hand, DOE has had better results with projects when
year-to-year funding was not a concern.  In May 1994, we reported
that under DOE's clean coal technology program, the Congress
appropriated $2.75 billion to fully fund the federal share of this
joint federal/nonfederal program.\3 Nonfederal contributions
eventually reached more than $4.5 billion.  According to DOE, this
advance commitment of federal funds was an important reason for the
industry's significant response to the program, in terms of both the
quantity and quality of the proposals received as well as the
nonfederal cost-sharing achieved.  Virtually all of the DOE
officials, project sponsors, and other program participants we spoke
with perceived the government's advance financial commitment as a
very big advantage for multiyear projects, because it indicated that
the government would be involved in cost-sharing throughout the life
of the projects.  The industry participants told us that they would
not want to commit significant funds in the early years of projects
if they perceived that the government might stop sharing costs before
the projects were completed.\4

An additional problem with incremental funding is that it may allow
some projects to be started that would not be funded if the Congress
had to provide budget authority for their full estimated costs at the
time the project was approved.  (This concept of full funding is
discussed in ch.  4.) In this regard, it is easier for DOE to start a
project by requesting $100 million for 1 year, rather than to request
the full cost of the project, which may be over a billion dollars. 


--------------------
\2 The Total Project Cost for this project was $513 million. 

\3 Fossil Fuels:  Lessons Learned in DOE's Clean Coal Technology
Program (GAO/RCED-94-174, May 26, 1994). 

\4 Advance federal funding did not solve all of the problems.  As we
reported, DOE still experienced some problems under the clean coal
program, particularly project delays and cost increases resulting
from compliance with environmental review requirements and project
site changes. 


   LACK OF EFFECTIVE INCENTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

Most organizations have available to them incentives that can be used
to affect the performance of their employees and contractors.  These
incentives normally consist of rewards for good performance and
penalties for performance that does not meet agreed-to standards.  To
the extent that these incentives are properly applied, they can be
effective in helping achieve agency goals.  On the other hand, if not
properly applied, incentives can impede successful completion of
projects such as MSAs.  DOE has incentives for its own employees and
for its contractors. 


      DOE EMPLOYEES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1

Incentives for DOE employees include salaries, promotions, and
bonuses.  Other incentives include job satisfaction, recognition for
good work, working for a prestigious agency or organization within an
agency, being part of a highly effective team, etc.  To the extent
that an organization uses these incentives to keep its employees
focused on the organizations goals, it will more likely achieve those
goals. 

However, goals can sometimes become unclear.  Parochial interests can
take over, and the real goal can become simply keeping the project
going.  Many DOE managers view themselves as advocates for their
projects, which provides an incentive to not surface problems that
could result in the project being terminated.  For example: 

  -- DOE and its contractors maintained efforts to build the $5.1
     billion Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant for 3 years after it was
     pointed out that the demand for enrichment services was
     declining and that the costs of the plant would not be
     recovered.\5 DOE eventually agreed that the project was no
     longer needed and terminated it after spending $2.8 billion. 
     The delay in stopping this project occurred largely because of
     DOE's desire to maintain its historical mission of being the
     major world supplier of enrichment services. 

  -- Participants in DOE's Superconducting Super Collider saw this
     project as allowing the United States to maintain preeminence in
     high-energy physics.  Project managers originally expected that
     it would cost $5.9 billion and that large amounts of foreign
     contributions to the project would be forthcoming.  However, the
     foreign contributions never reached expected levels, and project
     costs escalated greatly.  Project participants and other
     supporters continued to try to keep the project going despite
     evidence that the total cost would exceed $11 billion.\6 The
     Congress finally cut off funding for the project in 1993 after a
     total expenditure of over $2 billion. 

Upon taking office in 1989, the Secretary of Energy addressed this
concern and called for a changed "culture" within the Department. 
The Secretary indicated that an atmosphere, or culture, had been
created whereby the incentive for employees and contractors was to
push ahead and complete whatever project they were working on--there
was no incentive for anyone to question whether a project should be
continued. 


--------------------
\5 Issues Concerning The Department of Energy's Justification For
Building The Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GAO/EMD-82-88, May 25,
1982); and Supplement (GAO/EMD-82-88S, June 24, 1983). 

\6 Federal Research:  Super Collider--National Security Benefits,
Similar Projects, and Cost (GAO/RCED-93-158, May 14, 1993). 


      DOE'S CONTRACTORS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2

DOE builds incentives into its contracts that can include bonuses for
work that meets or exceeds expectations or penalties for poor
performance.  As we have previously reported, however, DOE contract
managers seemed reluctant to use the penalties and sometimes used the
financial rewards inappropriately.  In some cases, DOE rewarded
contractors with award fees, or bonuses, even though their
performance was poor.  In October 1989, we reported that during
fiscal years 1986 through 1988, many safety and health deficiencies
at DOE's Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado had been repeatedly raised by
DOE safety staff, including problems in the plant's radiological
protection program and a lack of commitment by plant management to
improve overall safety and health conditions.\7

Despite this poor performance, the contractor received over $26
million in bonuses during this period.  In late 1989, the plant was
shut down for, among other things, safety problems.  About 2 years
later, we reported that bonuses were again paid at Rocky Flats
despite evidence of poor performance.\8

These DOE practices run counter to those in private industry.  A
recent study of projects under DOE's environmental management program
pointed out that among the best industry practices for successful
projects is to have incentives that reward participants based on
their performance.\9 The study pointed out that DOE lacked such
incentives. 


--------------------
\7 Nuclear Health and Safety:  DOE's Award Fees at Rocky Flats Do Not
Adequately Reflect ES&H Problems (GAO/RCED-90-47, Oct.  23, 1989). 

\8 Nuclear Health and Safety:  Increased Rating Results in Award Fee
to Rocky Flats Contractor (GAO/RCED-92-162, Mar.  24, 1992). 

\9 The Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Restoration &
Waste Management:  Project Performance Study (Nov.  30, 1993);
Prepared by Independent Project Analysis, Inc., Reston, VA. 


   INADEQUATE TECHNICAL AND
   MANAGERIAL EXPERTISE TO OVERSEE
   MSAS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

DOE's lack of adequate technical expertise to oversee the design,
construction, and operation of these large, complex projects is a
long-standing problem.  A 1981 DOE internal task force and a 1987
report by the National Research Council noted DOE's lack of technical
capabilities and expertise.  We have issued several reports that
pointed out the difficulties that DOE had in addressing technical
problems on DOE construction projects that led to large schedule
slippages and cost overruns.\10 The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board, in its annual reports to the Congress, has repeatedly stated
that the lack of appropriate technical expertise in DOE is a
significant problem.\11 Through a series of management reviews of DOE
that we began in 1991, managers throughout DOE have told us that the
lack of skilled staff in program, project, and contracting oversight
positions is one of the most fundamental problems in the Department. 

In a June 1992 report, we pointed out that an internal DOE assessment
of its Defense Waste Processing Facility in South Carolina faulted
project managers for their lack of experience with large-scale,
first-of-a-kind technology projects.\12 DOE's assessment also
criticized the project's management for not focusing sufficient
attention on technical, institutional, or management issues.  This
project is for a large, first-of-a-kind plant using a process called
vitrification to convert high-level radioactive waste into a
glass-like form for permanent underground storage.  The facility
itself has experienced more than $900 million in cost increases, and
the Total Project Cost--including other buildings and processes
needed to prepare waste for vitrification--is over $4 billion.  When
it began operations in March 1996, the project was about 6 years
behind schedule.  Technical problems such as equipment failures,
design deficiencies, poor component integration, and problems in
obtaining permits were important causes of the cost increases and
schedule slippage. 

There have also been dramatic cost increases in DOE's overall
environmental restoration program.  A 1993 study of the causes of
these cost increases found that the reasons included (1)
inexperienced project teams unfamiliar with environmental
regulations, such as permitting requirements; (2) design errors and
resulting changes; (3) poor project definition, for example little
knowledge of essential geotechnical information; (4) project team
turnover; and (5) contracting issues.\13


--------------------
\10 See "Related GAO Products" at end of report. 

\11 An Assessment Concerning Safety at Defense Nuclear Facilities: 
The DOE Technical Personnel Problem, DNFSB/TECH-10 (Mar.  1996),
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board. 

\12 Nuclear Waste:  Defense Waste Processing Facility--Cost,
Schedule, and Technical Issues (GAO/RCED-92-183, June 17, 1992). 

\13 The Department of Energy, Office of Environmental Restoration &
Waste Management:  Project Performance Study (Nov.  30, 1993);
Prepared by Independent Project Analysis, Inc., Reston, VA. 


ACTIONS THAT MAY HELP IMPROVE
DOE'S ACQUISITION PROCESS
============================================================ Chapter 4

The need for reform of the federal acquisition process has led to
several governmental actions.  Legislative changes have been enacted
to, among other things, streamline the acquisition process and open
the system to more participation from the commercial market. 
Furthermore, OMB requires that agencies now request full funding for
their acquisitions rather than the incremental annual funding
previously requested.  Also, DOE has begun new management initiatives
to improve the way it does business.  These actions could help DOE
address some of the key factors leading to major cost overruns and
schedule slippages for its MSAs. 


   CHANGES IN FEDERAL PROCUREMENT
   LAW
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

Over the past several years, there have been several changes to
procurement law and regulations.  In 1994, the Congress passed the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.\1 The act contains more
than 200 sections changing the laws that govern how federal agencies
acquire almost $200 billion of goods and services annually.  In 1996,
the Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1996.\2 Division D of this act, referred to as the Federal
Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, also contains provisions for
improving federal acquisitions. 

Included in this major contracting reform legislation are provisions
that could help DOE improve its management of its MSAs.  Title V of
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 is designed to
foster the development of (1) measurable cost, schedule, and
performance goals, and (2) incentives for acquisition personnel to
reach these goals.  Subtitle B, which applies to civilian agencies,
provides that agency heads are to establish cost, schedule, and
performance goals for acquisition programs and annually report on the
progress in meeting those goals.  These goals are to include
achieving, on average, 90 percent of the established cost and
schedule goals without reducing the performance or capabilities of
the items being acquired.  Subtitle B also requires that agency heads
are to manage employees in acquisition positions (including their
education, training, and career development) by relating employees'
evaluations, pay, and promotions to their performance in helping
achieve cost, schedule, and performance goals. 

The Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 1996 provides for the
establishment of policies and procedures for the management,
education, and training of the civilian acquisition work force. 
Career development of the work force is to include the identification
of appropriate career paths, mandatory education and training in the
critical duties and tasks of these career paths, and an enhanced
system of performance incentives to encourage excellence in the
acquisition work force.  In addition, the act requires agencies to
specify in their budget justification documents the funding levels
requested for educating and training the acquisition work force and
provides that funds appropriated for this purpose may not be used for
any other purpose.  We believe that these changes in procurement law
could help the Department in recruiting additional contracting staff
and in improving the technical capabilities of existing staff, and
thus address a long-standing departmental problem. 


--------------------
\1 Public Law 103-355, enacted Oct.  13, 1994. 

\2 Public Law 104-106, enacted Feb.  10, 1996. 


   AGENCIES MUST REQUEST FULL
   FUNDING FOR MAJOR ACQUISITIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

Recent OMB actions concerning federal agency acquisition of fixed
assets could impact on how DOE manages its MSAs.  Revisions to OMB
guidance\3 now require that federal agencies (1) report by September
9, 1996, on the cost of full funding of fixed assets previously
funded incrementally and (2) provide a fixed asset plan and
justification for major system acquisitions.  Full funding means that
when an asset or any programmatically or economically separable
segment of an asset is approved by the Congress, the requesting
agency is given budget authority for the full estimated cost of that
asset or segment.  For example, if an agency was undertaking a
project that required the construction of a building first, and then
the subsequent installation of equipment to perform a task, the
agency would request the full cost of constructing the building in
one fiscal year.  If approved, the agency would be given budget
authority for the full amount and would not have to return to the
Congress each year for additional budget authority for the building. 

The full-funding provision could have significant impact on DOE's
management of its MSAs.  The agency and other stakeholders, such as
the Congress, would need to reach a consensus on which of DOE's MSAs
are most mission-critical.  Also, having full funding could help
improve DOE's management of its MSAs.  By knowing that the funding
would be available when needed, DOE and its contractors should be
better able to stay within cost estimates and keep the projects on
schedule. 


--------------------
\3 OMB Circular A-11, Part 3, "Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition
of Fixed Assets," (July 16, 1996). 


   DOE MANAGEMENT INITIATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

We believe that DOE's difficulties in completing MSA projects, or of
completing them on time and within original cost estimates, are a
result of the key factors that we discuss in chapter 3--constantly
changing missions, incremental funding of MSAs, lack of effective
incentives, and shortages of employees with contracting and oversight
skills.  The problems resulting from these factors--cost overruns,
schedule slippages, and project terminations--continue to exist
despite many attempts at reform, and this underscores the difficulty
facing DOE.  As a practical matter, it is unlikely that schedule
slippages and cost overruns can ever be completely eliminated given
the inherent risk associated with many of DOE's projects.  However,
the slippages and overruns can be reduced with continual effort.  DOE
currently has undertaken several initiatives to improve the
management of its operations.  Some of these initiatives can affect
the agency's management of its MSAs, and DOE can use them to begin
addressing the key factors. 


      CONTRACT REFORM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1

Typically, most of DOE's budget goes to contractors, including those
who manage and operate its sites and facilities.  For example, in
fiscal year 1995, more than 91 percent of DOE's obligations went to
contractors.  In recent years, both we and DOE's Inspector General
have reported on many problems with DOE's contracting.  These
problems include poor administration of contracts, inadequate
monitoring of contractor performance, and weak financial and
accounting controls. 

In February 1994, DOE issued a report containing initiatives to
reform its contracting practices.\4 The report details plans to
encourage competition wherever possible and develop specific contract
performance measurements and incentives.  The reform initiatives will
require DOE to develop definitive work scopes and objective
performance measurement criteria to replace the requirements now
contained in most traditional cost-reimbursement contracts used by
the Department.  Once specific performance criteria are established,
the contracts must provide incentives and/or disincentives to
motivate the contractors to meet expectations.  To accomplish this,
DOE should have a central role in overseeing and evaluating
contractor performance.  The contract reform report recommended more
than 40 specific actions that DOE began implementing in early 1994. 

We believe that the contract reform initiatives could improve many
aspects of DOE's contracting.  More competition and better control
over the contractors should lead to cost savings and quality
improvements.  These initiatives could also benefit DOE's MSAs.  Some
of the key factors we previously identified, such as lack of
effective incentives, could be addressed by contract reform,
depending on how performance objectives are established.  If these
objectives focus on successful outcomes, cost control, and
timeliness, they could improve the MSA process.  Nevertheless, as we
concluded in a 1989 report, contracting deficiencies generally
resulted from people failing to carry out their responsibilities,
rather than from a need for more rules and regulations.\5 Realizing
this, the full benefits of contract reform will require that DOE have
enough properly trained staff to oversee the implementation of the
reforms. 

Furthermore, recent DOE actions raise questions about the agency's
commitment to fully implementing the contract reforms.\6 Two basic
tenets of DOE's philosophy of contract reform are that contracts will
be competed except in unusual circumstances, and, if current
contracts are to be extended, the terms of the extended contracts
will be negotiated before DOE makes its decision to extend them. 
However, in May 1996, DOE extended the University of California's
three laboratory contracts (currently valued at about $3 billion)
rather than compete them.  These large contracts have been held by
the university continuously for 50 years.  DOE justified its decision
on the basis of its long-term relationship with the university.  This
decision was made despite DOE's Contract Reform Team's conclusion
that the agency's contracting suffered from a lack of competition,
which was caused, in part, by several long-term relationships with
particular contractors.  Our primary concern was that both the
President and the Secretary of Energy publicly announced that the
contracts would be extended before any negotiations had taken place
on the terms of the contract extensions. 


--------------------
\4 Making Contracting Work Better and Cost Less:  Report of the
Contract Reform Team (DOE/S-0107), U.S.  DOE (Feb.  1994). 

\5 Civilian Agency Procurement:  Improvements Needed in Contracting
and Contract Administration (GAO/GGD-89-109, Sept.  5, 1989). 

\6 Department of Energy:  Observations on the Future of the
Department (GAO/T-RCED-96-224, Sept.  4, 1996). 


      STRATEGIC SYSTEMS AND
      LIFE-CYCLE ASSET MANAGEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.2

In November 1994, DOE announced its intention to improve existing
policies and procedures for MSAs.  DOE decided to decentralize
decision making and empower lower levels of management and integrate
the decision process with the strategic and annual budget planning
process.  DOE also decided to designate selected MSAs as "Strategic
Systems," based on the criteria of national urgency, risk factors,
international implications, estimated costs totaling over $400
million, or visibility.  As of July 1996, 12 of the ongoing MSAs had
been designated as Strategic Systems, and they will come under the
oversight of the Secretary of Energy.  The remaining MSAs will
receive management oversight from cognizant DOE officers, such as the
Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs, Assistant Secretary for
Environmental Management, etc. 

To implement these changes, DOE issued a directive, "Life-Cycle Asset
Management" (DOE Order 430.1, Aug.  4, 1995), which provides minimum
performance requirements for building and managing its
assets--including MSAs.  Under the order, DOE headquarters' oversight
offices and program offices, along with DOE field offices, will
develop specific objectives, criteria, and measures governing the
conduct of operations at specific DOE sites.  The field offices are
to be assessed each year on the extent to which they meet their
objectives. 

DOE's Office of Project and Fixed Asset Management is responsible for
developing objectives and criteria for life-cycle asset management
implementation.  One overall objective is to assist DOE project
managers in completing more projects on schedule and within budget. 
More specific objectives can include how best industry practices are
used, the quality of cost and schedule estimates, and the completion
of safety and environmental documents.  The performance objectives
are to be adjusted annually. 

This initiative could improve performance by DOE's field offices in
managing MSAs or Strategic Systems.  As pointed out in chapter 3,
lack of effective incentives has been a problem associated with DOE's
performance in completing its MSAs.  Setting specific objectives and
criteria and holding managers accountable to those criteria will put
DOE in a more business-like situation.  DOE has only just begun a
pilot of this initiative, and it is too early to gauge its
effectiveness. 


      OTHER DOE MANAGEMENT
      INITIATIVES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.3

DOE has implemented several other management improvement initiatives
that may indirectly help it to better manage its MSAs.  These
initiatives include strategic planning, information resources
management planning, and financial planning.  As with the Strategic
Systems Initiative, most of these initiatives are just being
implemented, and it is too early to assess their impact. 

A strategic plan can be useful in setting forth an agency's overall
goals, strategies to meet those goals, and guidance for its employees
as to what the agency's priorities are.  In April 1994, DOE issued
its Strategic Plan that recognized the many changes taking place in
the World, such as the end of the Cold War, and set forth a
restructuring of DOE's missions.\7 The plan sets goals, strategies,
and success indicators for each mission.  The plan also recognizes
the importance of meeting the needs of DOE's numerous customers, from
the taxpayer to the Congress, and recognizes many of their concerns. 
The specific details of how the agency will achieve its goals are not
described in the plan but rather in the budget and operational plans
of individual offices.  DOE has revised its strategic plan to address
four core missions:  (1) protecting national security and reducing
the nuclear danger; (2) weapons site cleanup and environmental
management; (3) science and technology; and (4) enhancing energy
security.  The key to the successful implementation of DOE's
Strategic Plan, and also what the plan is now missing, is how a
consensus will be reached to carry out these missions.  Such a
consensus should involve departmental leadership, the Congress, and
other stakeholders and will be crucial in the successful completion
of these long-term, high-cost MSAs. 

DOE is also revising its management information systems.  Over the
years, DOE has implemented numerous management information systems
and has been criticized by us and others because (1) different
contractors were allowed to operate different systems that were not
compatible, (2) there was considerable overlap among the systems, and
(3) many of the systems produced incorrect data.  In July 1994, DOE
issued an information management plan\8 to support the objectives in
its Strategic Plan.  Lack of reliable information has been a
long-standing problem with DOE's MSAs.  We recently found that DOE
lacks comprehensive historical data on many of the MSAs.  To the
extent that DOE's information management initiative can improve its
ability to develop and deliver accurate management information, the
initiative could also help improve the management of MSAs. 

DOE has also been criticized over the years for its inability to
develop uniform, accurate, cost and budget data.  In a May 1995
report, DOE's Financial Information Team recommended a number of
actions to address the agency's financial and business information
needs.\9 For example, the report pointed out that DOE's budget
information came from a myriad of budget documents and in various
formats.  Because of this, the budget process did not provide the
accurate and timely data managers needed.  Among other things, the
report recommended that DOE adopt a consistent budget format for the
agency; adopt standard, electronically integrated budget software;
and centralize budget preparation with the Chief Financial Officer. 
Better identification and reporting of cost data is a necessary step
toward better DOE oversight and management of all of its activities,
including MSAs.  Having accurate and timely cost data is critical to
management for early identification of problems and the prevention of
cost overruns. 


--------------------
\7 Fueling a Competitive Economy:  Strategic Plan, U.S.  DOE,
DOE/S-0108 (Apr.  1994). 

\8 Information Management Strategic Plan, U.S.  DOE, DOE/HR-0099
(July 1994). 

\9 Financial Management Excellence, Report of the Financial
Information Team, U.S.  DOE (May 1995). 


   OBSERVATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

There are no quick, easy solutions for DOE to keep its major system
acquisitions on schedule and within budget.  However, a number of
recent federal and DOE initiatives could help.  Recent changes to
federal procurement laws could help contracting officers, including
DOE's, do their jobs better.  In addition, the new requirement that
all federal agencies request full funding for major projects could
force DOE to reduce the number of MSAs it has ongoing and could
improve project management by ensuring that project funds are
available when needed.  DOE's management initiatives in the areas of
contract reform, strategic systems and life-cycle asset management,
strategic planning, information resources management planning, and
financial planning could improve the management of its MSAs.  To
attain meaningful change through its initiatives, DOE will need to
carry them through to completion.  Another current issue that could
impact DOE's MSAs is the need, in our opinion and that of others, to
reassess DOE's missions.  As we have pointed out in testimonies
before the Congress, such reassessment would require the involvement
of the Congress and would necessitate examining which MSAs really are
key to the agency's missions.\10 Nevertheless, we believe that the
management initiatives that DOE currently has under way offer an
excellent opportunity for the agency to begin addressing some of the
key factors affecting the management of its MSAs. 


--------------------
\10 Department of Energy:  Need to Reevaluate Its Role and Missions
(GAO/T-RCED-95-85, Jan.  18, 1995).  Department of Energy: 
Observations on the Future of the Department (GAO/T-RCED-96-224,
Sept.  4, 1996). 


MSAS TERMINATED DURING 1980
THROUGH 1996
=========================================================== Appendix I

                                  (Dollars in millions)


Project name and
construction line      Original cost          Cost at          Original
item number\a          estimate           termination   completion date  Termination date
---------------------  --------------  --------------  ----------------  ----------------
50 MWe Geothermal      $70.0                    $28.0        March 1982      January 1982
 Demonstration Power
 Plant (80-G-001)
Advanced Isotope       N/A                     $275.3               N/A          May 1982
 Separation Program
Clinch River Breeder   $699.0                $1,600.0              1979     December 1983
 Reactor
Compact Ignition       $444.5                  $107.1    September 1993              1992
 Tokamak (88-R-902)
Electric Vehicle       N/A                     $180.0               N/A              1983
 Project
Elmo Bumpy Torus       $173.9                   $28.1         June 1982              1984
 Proof-of-Principle
 (80-MF-3)
Fuel Processing        $270.0\b              $305.8\b    September 1992        April 1992
 Restoration (85-D-
 139)
Fusion Materials       $134.4                  $105.9    September 1983              1985
 Irradiation Test
 Facility (78-3-b)
Gas Centrifuge         $5,100.0              $2,814.1         June 1993         June 1985
 Enrichment Plant
 (76-8-g)
Hanford Waste          $1,010.2                $418.3    September 1996       August 1996
 Vitrification Plant
 (88-D-173)
High BTU Synthetic     $198.8                   $53.7        March 1981         July 1981
 Pipeline Gas
 Demonstration Plant
 (CONOCO)
High BTU Synthetic     $156.8                   $77.8        March 1981         July 1981
 Pipeline Gas
 Demonstration Plant
 (ICGG)
Intersecting Storage   $398.6                  $201.3         June 1986              1983
 Accelerator (78-10-
 b)
Low-Level Waste        $141.8                    $7.0    September 2004    September 1996
 Disposal Facilities
 (94-D-406)
Medium BTU Industrial  $93.0                    $65.6    September 1981         July 1981
 Fuel Gas
 Demonstration Plant
Monitored Retrievable  N/A                      $35.7               N/A               N/A
 Storage Project (93-
 D-406)\c
Multi-Tank Waste       $240.0                   $56.1         June 1999     December 1995
 Storage Facility
 (93-D-183)
New Production         N/A                   $1,257.0              2000      October 1992
 Reactor Capacity
 (92-D-300)
Plutonium Recovery     $370.8\b               $24.3\b    September 1997      October 1990
 Modification
 Project
 (89-D-125)
Process Facility       $140.0\b               $57.9\b               N/A         June 1988
 Modification (84-D-
 135)
Reactor Safety         $109.1\b               $15.6\b    September 1994         June 1994
 Assurance (90-D-
 150)
Reactor Seismic        $103.4                     N/A    September 1996       August 1993
 Improvements (92-D-
 141)
Solvent Refined Coal   N/A                      $70.8    September 1984         July 1981
 Demon. Plant (SRC-
 2)
Solvent Refined Coal   N/A                     $190.7         June 1984       August 1984
 Demon. Plant (SRC-
 1)
Space Nuclear Reactor  $22.7\b                $36.3\b     December 1988              1992
 Power System (86-N-
 105)
Special Nuclear        $210.0\b               $37.0\b        March 1994     February 1991
 Materials Research
 and Development
 Laboratory
 Replacement (88-D-
 105)
Special Isotope        $530.0\b               $85.0\b        March 1995               N/A
 Separation Project
 (86-D-148)
Strategic Petroleum    $1,460.0                  $6.0               N/A     December 1993
 Reserve Expansion
Superconducting Super  $5,893.6            $2,201.9\d        March 1998      October 1993
 Collider (90-R-106)
Tokamak Physics        $694.0                   $73.7    September 2000              1995
 Experiment (94-E-
 200)
Uranium                $85.0\b               $116.3\b        March 1988     February 1994
 Solidification
 Facility (formerly
 Fuel Production
 Facility) (85-D-
 145)
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Projects that are not funded as construction line items do not
have project numbers.  All costs, unless otherwise specified, are
"Total Project Costs." The cost data were obtained from initial
budget submissions, final cost reports, and other DOE-provided data. 
The term "N/A" means cost or schedule information is not available or
not yet developed. 

\b These amounts represent the project's "Total Estimated Cost,"
which includes costs such as land, engineering, design, and
construction.  Other costs, such as research and development,
conceptual design, startup, and initial training, are not available. 

\c The Monitored Retrievable Storage Project was terminated; however,
portions of the project were continued and have now been combined
with other activities into the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
Strategic System. 

\d The termination activities for the Superconducting Super Collider
are not yet complete.  The cost at termination for this project is
based on data through fiscal year 1996. 


MSAS COMPLETED DURING 1980 THROUGH
1996
========================================================== Appendix II

                                  (Dollars in millions)


Project name and
construction line      Original cost                           Original            Actual
item number\a          estimate            Final cost   completion date   completion date
---------------------  --------------  --------------  ----------------  ----------------
10 MWe Central         $108.0                  $139.6               N/A         July 1987
 Receiver Solar
 Thermal Power Plant
 (76-2-b)
1-2 GeV Synchrotron    $145.3                  $146.0        March 1992        March 1993
 Radiation Source
 (Advanced Light
 Source) (87-R-406)
6-7 GeV Synchrotron    $626.9                  $798.8        March 1996     February 1996
 Radiation Source
 (Advanced Photon
 Source) (89-R-402)
Continuous Electron    $262.6                  $513.1        March 1992        March 1995
 Beam Accelerator
 Facility
 (87-R-203)
Ebullated Bed (H-      $110.2                  $277.9        March 1980    September 1982
 Coal) Pilot Plant
Fuels and Materials    $167.6                  $233.8         June 1983       August 1984
 Examination Facility
 (78-6-f)
Hanford Environmental  $262.3                  $242.4        March 1996     December 1995
 Compliance (89-D-
 172)
High Energy Laser      $195.0\b              $177.7\b    September 1983     December 1985
 Facility (NOVA) (78-
 4-a)
Mirror Fusion Test     $132.5                  $363.8    September 1981     February 1986
 Facility (78-3-a)
Stirling Engine        N/A                     $130.0               N/A     December 1989
 Systems Development
Strategic Petroleum    $2,499.0              $2,461.0         June 1991    September 1991
 Reserves
Tokamak Fusion Test    $390.6                  $497.5         June 1981     December 1982
 Reactor (76-5-a)
Tritium Loading        $125.4                  $409.2    September 1989     December 1993
 Facility Replacement
 (88-D-130)
Waste Isolation Pilot  $737.0                  $709.9         June 1988        March 1991
 Plant
 (77-13-f)
West Valley            $446.0                $1,008.5        March 1988       August 1995
 Demonstration
 Project
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Projects that are not funded as construction line items do not
have project numbers.  All costs, unless otherwise specified, are
"Total Project Costs." The cost data were obtained from initial
budget submissions, final cost reports, and other DOE-provided data. 
The term "N/A" means cost or schedule information is not available or
not yet developed. 

\b These amounts represent the project's "Total Estimated Cost,"
which includes costs such as land, engineering, design, and
construction.  Other costs, such as research and development,
conceptual design, startup, and initial training, are not available. 


MSAS ONGOING AS OF JUNE 1996
========================================================= Appendix III

                                  (Dollars in millions)


Project name and
construction line      Original cost     Current cost          Original           Current
item number\a          estimate              estimate   completion date   completion date
---------------------  --------------  --------------  ----------------  ----------------
Albuquerque            \b                    $1,348.0               N/A              2010
 Laboratory
 Environmental
 Restoration Project
 (AL-1)
Albuquerque            \b                      $254.0    September 2019              2014
 Production
 Environmental
 Restoration Project
 (AL-2)
Albuquerque            \b                          \b    September 2004    September 2004
 Environmental
 Restoration Project
 GJPR, MRAP (AL-5)
AVLIS R&D Project\c    N/A                   $1,304.9               N/A      October 1993
B-Factory (94-G-304)   $293.2                  $293.2        March 1998    September 1998
Chemistry and          $204.0                  $223.6    September 2003    September 2002
 Metallurgy Research
 Upgrade (95-D-102)
Defense Waste          $1,529.5              $2,470.7        March 1990     November 1996
 Processing Facility
 (81-T-105)
Environmental,         $26.8                    $95.5         June 1994    September 1996
 Safety, and Health
 Enhancements (90-D-
 126)
Environmental          $217.8                  $229.9    September 1995    September 1997
 Molecular Sciences
 Laboratory (91-E-
 100)
Facilities Capability  N/A                     $447.7               N/A               N/A
 Assurance Program
 (88-D-122)\d
Fermilab Main          $197.0                  $259.3    September 1996         June 1999
 Injector (92-G-302)
Fernald Environmental  \b                          \b    September 2023    September 2020
 Management Program
Formerly Utilized      $706.0                $2,500.0              2001              2016
 Sites Remedial
 Action Project
High-Level Waste       $88.6                   $828.2    September 1999    September 2008
 Removal from Filled
 Waste Tanks (93-D-
 187)
High-Level Waste Tank  $296.2                   $91.2    September 1998         June 1996
 Farm Replacement
 (91-D-172)
Idaho National         \b                    $3,365.0    September 2019              2023
 Engineering
 Laboratory
 Environmental
 Restoration Project
Initial Tank           $245.0                  $358.2        March 2010        March 2010
 Retrieval System
 (94-D-407)
Non-Radioactive        $20.7                   $165.7         June 1986         June 1997
 Hazardous Waste
 Management
 (83-D-148)
Nonnuclear             $26.0                   $198.1               N/A         June 1998
 Reconfiguration,
 Complex-21 (93-D-
 123)
Nuclear Weapons
 Research,
 Development, and
 Testing Facilities     $361.4               $306.6\e    September 1993         June 1998
 Revitalization         $70.1                  $106.3    September 1993         June 1998
 Phase II (88-D-        $96.4                   $95.8    September 1996    September 1997
 106)                   $82.0                   $37.4     December 1997        March 1998
 Phase III (90-D-
 102)
 Phase IV (92-D-
 102)
 Phase V (94-D-102)
Oak Ridge Operations   \b                          \b               N/A               N/A
 Office
 (Environmental
 Restoration Project)
Plantwide Fire         $321.2                  $159.7         June 1997     December 1999
 Protection Phases I
 and II (90-D-149)\f
Radioactive Waste      $146.5                  $154.9    September 1994        April 1999
 Management Complex
 Transuranic Waste
 Treatment and
 Storage Facility
 (90-D-177)
Relativistic Heavy     $497.1                  $616.5         June 1997         June 1999
 Ion Collider (91-G-
 300)
Replacement High-      $46.7                   $154.1        March 1993     December 1997
 Level Waste
 Evaporator (89-D-
 174)
Richland               \b                   $21,860.0    September 2018    September 2047
 Environmental
 Restoration Project
Rocky Flats            \b                          \b         June 2011               N/A
 Environmental
 Technology Site
 Environmental
 Restoration Project
Savannah River Site    \b                          \b    September 2019    September 2019
 Environmental
 Restoration Project
Security Enhancement,  $110.0                  $130.0         June 1994    September 1997
 Pantex Plant (88-D-
 123)
Solid Waste            $290.3                     N/A    September 1998               N/A
 Operations Complex
 (94-D-411)\g
Uranium Mill Tailings  $777.0                  $574.0               N/A    September 2014
 Remedial Action--
 Ground Water
 Restoration
Uranium Mill Tailings  $992.5                $1,349.0    September 1992    September 1998
 Remedial Action--
 Surface Project
Weldon Spring          $357.7                  $865.0    September 1995              2001
 Remedial Action
 Project
Yucca Mountain Site    $3,200.0              $4,300.0          May 1991        March 2002
 Characterization
 Project\h
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Projects that are not funded as construction line items do not
have project numbers.  All costs, unless otherwise specified, are
"Total Project Costs." The cost data were obtained from initial
budget submissions, current cost reports, and other DOE-provided
data.  The term "N/A" means cost or schedule information is not
available or not yet developed. 

\b DOE's original and/or current cost estimates for these
environmental restoration projects do not estimate costs through
project completion. 

\c DOE is no longer involved in this project; however, the U.S. 
Enrichment Corporation has funding responsibility for AVLIS
development, and its directors may take action to further develop and
commercialize this technology. 

\d The Facilities Capability Assurance Program consists of a number
of different subprograms intended to upgrade and maintain DOE's
nuclear weapons production facilities.  The project was expected to
be funded at a level of $150 million annually until the deficiencies
at the DOE facilities are identified and corrected.  Consequently,
the project does not have an original cost estimate or ending date. 

\e The current cost estimate for Phase II, Nuclear Weapons Research,
Development, and Testing Facilities Revitalization was reduced
because one subproject--the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrotest
Facility--was established as a separate project.  The estimated cost
of this facility is $85.6 million. 

\f The current cost estimate for Plantwide Fire Protection Phases I
and II reflects a planned reduction in this project's scope. 

\g This project is being divided into three separate subprojects, of
which one is currently under construction, one is on hold, and one
may be included in a privatization contract.  For these reasons, DOE
is not maintaining cost and schedule data for this project. 

\h The Yucca Mountain project involves only site characterization and
not the actual construction of a waste repository.  Accordingly, the
project is considered complete with the submission of an application
to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for authorization to construct a
nuclear waste repository.  The original cost and schedule reflect a
1985 DOE estimate.  In January 1992, the Secretary of Energy's Energy
Systems Acquisition Advisory Board approved a $6.3 billion estimate
for the Yucca Mountain project.  Officials from DOE's Office of
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management consider this estimate to be
the project's original cost estimate. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix IV
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
========================================================= Appendix III



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


The following are GAO's comments on DOE's letter dated October 31,
1996. 

1.  The first issue DOE raises concerns our use of the term "cost
overrun." We define this term to mean increases in cost above the
original project cost estimate.  DOE is concerned that this term
leaves an unfair impression of carelessness or mismanagement on the
part of DOE.  Giving that impression is not our intention. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that all of the original cost
estimates contained in this report were provided by DOE to the
Congress as the total cost necessary to complete the projects.  As
pointed out in this report, for many projects the final costs
exceeded the original cost estimates, and we consider these to be
cost overruns.  We have added a footnote to explicitly define cost
overruns.  Also, as pointed out in this report, in some cases the
overruns were beyond DOE's control, and in some cases the overruns
should have been controlled by DOE. 

2.  DOE's second issue involves our comments concerning the extent of
its commitment to implement the contract reforms that it has
proposed.  DOE defends its decision to extend its contracts with the
University of California to manage three of its laboratories.  As
stated in this report, two basic tenets of DOE's contract reforms are
that contracts will be competed except in unusual circumstances, and,
if current contracts are to be extended, the terms of the extensions
will be negotiated before DOE makes its decision to extend them.  Our
primary concern is that the President and the Secretary of Energy
publicly announced that the contracts with the University of
California would be extended before any negotiations had taken place. 
As pointed out in our report, we believe that the announcements could
compromise the Department's ability to effectively negotiate the
terms of the extensions. 

3.  DOE's final issue addresses our concerns and those of others
about its ability to hire, train, and retain enough employees with
the requisite skills to effectively oversee the work of DOE's
contractors.  DOE lists a series of initiatives that have recently or
will soon be implemented to help address these concerns.  We agree
and so note in our report that these initiatives, and those mandated
in the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 and the Federal
Acquisition Reform Act of 1996, if fully implemented, can help
resolve this long-standing departmental problem. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix V

RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

Bernice Steinhardt, Associate Director
William F.  Fenzel
Michael F.  Duffy
John R.  Schulze
Tracy K.  Solheim

OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL

Susan W.  Irwin, Staff Attorney

SAN FRANCISCO REGIONAL OFFICE

Randolph D.  Jones
Margie K.  Shields


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1

1980

Increasing Costs, Competition May Hinder U.S.  Position of Leadership
in High Energy Physics (EMD-80-58, Sept.  16, 1980). 

U.S.  Fast Breeder Reactor Program Needs Direction (EMD-80-81, Sept. 
22, 1980). 

1981

Response to Questions Clarifying a Previous GAO Report on the
Department of Energy's Breeder Reactor Program (EMD-81-83, May 4,
1981). 

Termination Cost of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant Project
(May 11, 1981). 

Department of Energy Can Improve Management of the Acquisition of
Major Projects (MASAD-81-33, June 22, 1981). 

Update of Cost Information Contained in a Previous GAO Report on
Specific Aspects of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project
(EMD-81-112, June 26, 1981). 

1982

While the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Steam Generator Contract Could
Not Have Been Terminated for Default, Many Aspects of the Contracting
Process are Questionable (EMD-82-37, Mar.  17, 1982). 

The Department of Energy Did Not Provide the Subcommittee With All
Documents Related to the Contract for the Clinch River Breeder
Reactor's Steam Generator (EMD-82-56, Mar.  17, 1982). 

DOE Confident It Can Fuel the Clinch River Breeder Reactor and Other
Breeder Reactor Projects (GAO/EMD-82-89, May 14, 1982). 

Revising the Clinch River Breeder Reactor Steam Generator Testing
Program Can Reduce Risk (GAO/EMD-82-75, May 25, 1982). 

Issues Concerning the Department of Energy's Justification for
Building the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (GAO/EMD-82-88, May 25,
1982). 

Further Improvements Needed in the Department of Energy for
Estimating and Reporting Project Costs (GAO/MASAD-82-37, May 26,
1982). 

The Liquid Metal Fast Breeder Reactor--Options for Deciding Future
Pace and Direction (GAO/EMD-82-79, July 12, 1982). 

Questions Regarding Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project Funding and
Costs (GAO/EMD-82-123, Sept.  15, 1982). 

Information on the Cost of Plutonium Needed to Operate the Clinch
River Breeder Reactor for Its 5-Year Demonstration (GAO/EMD-82-128,
Sept.  17, 1982). 

Interim Report on GAO's Review of the Total Cost Estimate for the
Clinch River Breeder Reactor Project (GAO/EMD-82-131, Sept.  23,
1982). 

Review of Selected Aspects of DOE's CRBR Cost Estimate
(GAO/RCED-83-74, Dec.  10, 1982). 

Analysis of the Department of Energy's Clinch River Breeder Reactor
Cost Estimate (GAO/RCED-83-74, Dec.  10, 1982). 

1983

Status of DOE's Implementation of the Magnetic Fusion Energy
Engineering Act of 1980 (GAO/RCED-83-105, Apr.  29, 1983). 

Analysis of Studies on Alternative Financing for the Clinch River
Breeder Reactor (GAO/RCED-83-151, May 12, 1983). 

Issues Concerning the Department of Energy's Justification for
Building the Gas Centrifuge Enrichment Plant (Supplement)
(GAO/EMD-82-88s, June 24, 1983). 

Comments on a Plan for Obtaining Private Financing for the Clinch
River Breeder Reactor (GAO/RCED-83-226, Aug.  22, 1983). 

Private Financing for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor
(GAO/T-RCED-83-151, Sept.  20, 1983). 

1984

The Impact of International Cooperation in DOE's Magnetic Confinement
Fusion Program (GAO/RCED-84-74, Feb.  17, 1984). 

1985

DOE's Physics Accelerators:  Their Costs and Benefits
(GAO/RCED-85-96, Apr.  1, 1985). 

DOE's Plutonium-Processing Facility at Rocky Flats--Operational
Problems, Costly Resolutions, and Future Uncertainties
(GAO/C-RCED-85-3, Sept.  11, 1985). 

1986

Nuclear Science:  DOE Should Provide More Control in Its Accelerator
Selection Process (GAO/RCED-86-108, Apr.  4, 1986). 

Nuclear Science:  Information on DOE Accelerators Should Be Better
Disclosed in the Budget (GAO/RCED-86-79, Apr.  9, 1986). 

1987

Nuclear Materials:  Alternatives for Relocating Rocky Flats Plant's
Plutonium Operations (GAO/RCED-87-93, Apr.  14, 1987). 

Federal Research Projects:  Concerns About DOE's Super Collider Site
Selection Process (GAO/RCED-87-175FS, Aug.  6, 1987). 

Energy Management:  DOE Controls Over Contractor Expenditures Need
Strengthening (GAO/RCED-87-166, Aug.  28, 1987). 

1988

Status of the Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(GAO/T-RCED-88-63, Sept.  13, 1988). 

Nuclear Science:  Usefulness of Space Power Research to Ground-Based
Nuclear Reactor Systems (GAO/RCED-89-17, Dec.  6, 1988). 

1989

Federal Research:  Determination of the Best Qualified Sites for
DOE's Super Collider (GAO/RCED-89-18, Jan.  30, 1989). 

Site Selection Process for the Department of Energy's Super Collider
(GAO/T-RCED-89-22, Apr.  5, 1989). 

Status of the Department of Energy's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(GAO/T-RCED-89-50, June 12, 1989). 

GAO's Views on DOE's New Production Reactor Selection Process
(GAO/T-RCED-89-46, May 24, 1989). 

Federal Research:  Final Site Selection Process for DOE's Super
Collider (GAO/RCED-89-129BR, June 16, 1989). 

Civilian Agency Procurement:  Improvements Needed in Contracting and
Contract Administration (GAO/GGD-89-109, Sept.  5, 1989). 

Nuclear Science:  Better Information Needed for Selection of New
Production Reactor (GAO/RCED-89-206, Sept.  21, 1989). 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Policy Implications of Funding DOE's K
Reactor Cooling Tower Project (GAO/RCED-89-212, Oct.  23, 1989). 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  DOE's Award Fees at Rocky Flats Do Not
Adequately Reflect ES&H Problems (GAO/RCED-90-47, Oct.  23, 1989). 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Information on Award Fees Paid at
Selected DOE Facilities (GAO/RCED-90-60FS, Oct.  23, 1989). 

Nuclear Materials:  Information on DOE's Replacement Tritium Facility
(GAO/RCED-90-54, Nov.  22, 1989). 

Nuclear Waste:  Storage Issues at DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
in New Mexico (GAO/RCED-90-1, Dec.  8, 1989). 

1990

Nuclear Energy:  Consequences of Explosion of Hanford's Single-Shell
Tanks are Understated (GAO/RCED-91-34, Oct.  10, 1990). 

1991

Nuclear Safety and Health:  Problems With Cleaning Up the Solar Ponds
at Rocky Flats (GAO/RCED-91-31, Jan.  3, 1991). 

Federal Research:  Super Collider Estimates and Germany's
Industrially Produced Magnets (GAO/RCED-91-94FS, Feb.  12, 1991). 

Federal Research:  Status of DOE's Superconducting Super Collider
(GAO/RCED-91-116, Apr.  15, 1991). 

Nuclear Waste:  Issues Affecting Land Withdrawal of DOE's Waste
Isolation Pilot Project (GAO/T-RCED-91-38, Apr.  16, 1991). 

Nuclear Waste:  DOE Expenditures on the Yucca Mountain Project
(GAO/T-RCED-91-37, Apr.  18, 1991). 

Nuclear Waste:  Problems and Delays with Characterizing Hanford's
Single-Shell Tank Waste (GAO/RCED-91-118, Apr.  23, 1991). 

Federal Research:  Concerns About Developing and Producing Magnets
for the Superconducting Super Collider (GAO/T-RCED-91-51, May 9,
1991). 

Nuclear Waste:  Pretreatment Modifications at DOE Hanford's B Plant
Should Be Stopped (GAO/RCED-91-165, June 12, 1991). 

Nuclear Waste:  Delays in Addressing Environmental Requirements and
New Safety Concerns Affect DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(GAO/T-RCED-91-67, June 13, 1991). 

Nuclear Waste:  Hanford Single-Shell Tank Leaks Greater Than
Estimated (GAO/RCED-91/177, Aug.  5, 1991). 

Uranium Enrichment:  DOE Needs to Pursue Alternative AVLIS Deployment
Options (GAO/RCED-91-88, Aug.  8, 1991). 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Problems Continue for Rocky Flats Solar
Pond Cleanup Program (GAO/RCED-92-18, Oct.  17, 1991). 

1992

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Increased Rating Results in Award Fee to
Rocky Flats Contractor (GAO/RCED-92-162, Mar.  24, 1992). 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  Improving DOE's Management of the
Environmental Cleanup (GAO/T-RCED-92-43, Mar.  30, 1992). 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  More Can Be Done to Better Control
Environmental Restoration Costs (RCED-92-71, Apr.  20, 1992). 

Nuclear Waste:  DOE's Repository Site Investigations, a Long and
Difficult Task (RCED-92-73, May 27, 1992). 

Nuclear Waste:  Defense Waste Processing Facility--Cost, Schedule,
and Technical Issues (RCED-92-183, June 17, 1992). 

Federal Research:  Implementation of the Super Collider's Cost and
Schedule Control System (GAO/RCED-92-242, July 21, 1992). 

Department of Energy:  Status of Reporting Compliance for DOE's Major
System Acquisitions (GAO/RCED-92-204FS, Aug.  24, 1992). 

Nuclear Materials:  Removing Plutonium Residues From Rocky Flats Will
Be Difficult and Costly (GAO/RCED-92-219, Sept.  4, 1992). 

Department of Energy:  Project Management at the Rocky Flats Plant
Needs Improvement (GAO/RCED-93-32, Oct.  16, 1992). 

Weapons Acquisition:  A Rare Opportunity for Lasting Change
(GAO/NSIAD-93-15, Dec.  1992). 

Federal Research:  Foreign Contributions to the Superconducting Super
Collider (GAO/RCED-93-75, Dec.  30, 1992). 

1993

Federal Research:  Super Collider is Over Budget and Behind Schedule
(GAO/RCED-93-87, Feb.  12, 1993). 

Nuclear Waste:  Hanford's Well-Drilling Costs Can Be Reduced
(GAO/RCED-93-71, Mar.  4, 1993). 

Nuclear Waste:  Hanford Tank Waste Program Needs Cost, Schedule, and
Management Changes (GAO/RCED-93-99, Mar.  8, 1993). 

Federal Research:  Super Collider--National Security Benefits,
Similar Projects, and Cost (GAO/RCED-93-158, May 14, 1993). 

Nuclear Waste:  Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing
Major Scientific Uncertainties (RCED-93-124, May 21, 1993). 

Federal Research:  Superconducting Super Collider Cost and Schedule
(GAO/T-RCED-93-47, May 26, 1993). 

Federal Research:  Superconducting Super Collider's Total Estimated
Cost Will Exceed $11 Billion (GAO/T-RCED-93-57, June 30, 1993). 

Nuclear Waste:  Yucca Mountain Project Management and Funding Issues
(GAO/T-RCED-93-58, July 1, 1993). 

Nuclear Materials:  Nuclear Arsenal Reductions Allow Consideration of
Tritium Production Options (GAO/RCED-93-189, Aug.17, 1993). 

Department of Energy:  Management Problems Require a Long-Term
Commitment to Change (GAO/RCED-93-72, Aug.  31, 1993). 

DOE Management:  Implementing the Environmental Restoration
Management Contractor Concept (GAO/T-RCED-94-86, Dec.  1, 1993). 

1994

Federal Research:  Additional Funds for Terminating the Super
Collider Are Not Justified (GAO/RCED-94-153, Apr.  8, 1994). 

Fossil Fuels:  Lessons Learned in DOE's Clean Coal Technology Program
(GAO/RCED-94-174, May 26, 1994). 

Nuclear Waste:  Comprehensive Review of the Disposal Program is
Needed (GAO/RCED-94-299, Sept.  27, 1994). 

Nuclear Waste:  DOE's Management and Organization of the Nevada
Repository Project (GAO/RCED-95-27, Dec.  23, 1994). 

Nuclear Waste:  Change in Test Strategy Sound, but DOE Overstated
Savings (RCED-95-44, Dec.  27, 1994). 

1995

Department of Energy:  Need to Reevaluate Its Role and Missions
(GAO/RCED-95-85, Jan.  18, 1995). 

Department of Energy:  National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions
and Better Management (GAO/RCED-95-10, Jan.  27, 1995). 

Nuclear Waste:  Issues Affecting the Opening of DOE's Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant (GAO/T-RCED-95-254, June 21, 1995). 

Information Technology Investment:  A Governmentwide Overview
(GAO/AIMD-95-208, July 31, 1995). 

Department of Energy:  A Framework for Restructuring DOE and Its
Missions (GAO/RCED-95-197, Aug.  21, 1995). 

1996

Energy Downsizing:  While DOE is Achieving Budget Cuts, It is Too
Soon to Gauge Effects (GAO/RCED-96-154, May 13, 1996). 

Acquisition Reform:  Regulatory Implementation of the Federal
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (GAO/NSIAD-96-139, June 28,
1996). 

Nuclear Waste:  Uncertainties About Opening Waste Isolation Pilot
Plant (GAO/RCED-96-146, July 16, 1996). 

Aviation Acquisition:  A Comprehensive Strategy Is Needed For
Cultural Change at FAA (GAO/RCED-96-159, Aug.  22, 1996). 

Department of Energy:  Observations on the Future of the Department
(GAO/T-RCED-96-224, Sept.  4, 1996). 

Budget Issues:  Budgeting for Federal Capital (GAO/AIMD-97-5, Nov. 
12, 1996). 


*** End of document. ***