Rail Transportation: Federal Railroad Administration's New Approach to
Railroad Safety (Chapter Report, 07/23/97, GAO/RCED-97-142).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed operational and safety
trends in the railroad industry, focusing on how the Federal Railroad
Administration (FRA) has responded to these trends by developing a new
partnering approach for improving safety on the nation's rail lines.

GAO noted that: (1) railroad safety has improved significantly over the
past 20 years; (2) reported accident and injury rates are down 70 and 74
percent, respectively, from 1976 levels; (3) railroad industry
representatives attribute the reductions to improvements made to the
railroads' plant and equipment; (4) however, labor representatives
expressed concern that, despite this progress, heavier loads and
increased traffic may adversely affect rail safety in the future; (5)
rail safety data indicate that the progress in reducing accidents has
slowed in recent years; (6) while preliminary data for 1996 show
improvements in key safety statistics, about 1,000 people die each year
as a result of grade-crossing accidents and trespassing, 11,000 railroad
employees are injured, thousands of people are evacuated from their
homes as a result of the hazardous materials that are released during
train accidents; (7) FRA instituted an important shift in its safety
program in 1993 to address safety problems in the rail industry; (8)
rather than using violations and civil penalties as the primary means to
obtain compliance with railroad safety regulations, FRA has emphasized
cooperative partnerships with other federal agencies, railroad
management, labor unions, and the states; (9) the partnering efforts
generally focus on the nation's larger railroads and have resulted in
FRA inspectors' conducting fewer site-specific inspections of the
railroad industry overall; (10) while the preliminary data for 1996 show
improvements, it is too early to determine if FRA's new approach will
sustain a long-term decline in accidents and fatalities; and (11) in
addition, FRA has allocated fewer resources to responding to concerns
about the level of workplace injuries for railroad employees and
railroad bridge safety.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-97-142
     TITLE:  Rail Transportation: Federal Railroad Administration's New 
             Approach to Railroad Safety
      DATE:  07/23/97
   SUBJECT:  Railroad industry
             Railroad safety
             Safety regulation
             Inspection
             Railroad accidents
             Railroad transportation operations
             Interagency relations
             Federal/state relations
             Equipment maintenance
             Occupational safety
IDENTIFIER:  FRA Safety Assurance and Compliance Program
             Silver Spring (MD)
             Secaucus (NJ)
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

July 1997

RAIL TRANSPORTATION - FEDERAL
RAILROAD ADMINISTRATION'S NEW
APPROACH TO RAILROAD SAFETY

GAO/RCED-97-142

Rail Transportation

(343880)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AAR - Association of American Railroads
  DOT - Department of Transportation
  FRA - Federal Railroad Administration
  OSHA - Occupational Safety and Health Administration
  RSAC - Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
  SACP - Safety Assurance and Compliance Program

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-275984

July 23, 1997

The Honorable James L.  Oberstar
Ranking Democratic Member
Committee on Transportation and
 Infrastructure
The Honorable Robert E.  Wise, Jr.
Ranking Democratic Member
Subcommittee on Railroads
Committee on Transportation and
 Infrastructure
The Honorable Bruce F.  Vento
House of Representatives

In response to your request, this report provides information on
operational and safety trends in the railroad industry, and describes
how the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) has responded to these
trends by developing a new partnering approach for improving safety
on the nation's rail lines. 

As arranged with your offices, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days after the date of this letter.  At that time, we will
send copies of this report to interested congressional committees,
the Secretary of Transportation, and the Administrator of FRA.  We
will also make copies available to others upon request. 

If you or your staffs have any questions, I can be reached at (202)
512-2834.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
V. 

John H.  Anderson, Jr.
Director, Transportation Issues


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

In 1980, the Congress passed the Staggers Rail Act, which fostered
substantial changes in the railroad industry.  By 1995, fewer large
freight railroads accounted for most of the industry's revenue and
train miles.  At the same time, these freight railroads substantially
reduced their workforce and track networks.  In response, the
Congress and railroad labor have raised concerns that these changes
in the industry could compromise safety. 

The Ranking Democratic Member of the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure, the Ranking Democratic Member of
that Committee's Subcommittee on Railroads, and Representative Bruce
F.  Vento asked GAO to describe (1) relationships that existed
between operational and safety trends in the railroad industry from
1976 to 1995 and (2) the Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA)
approach to improving safety on the nation's rail system.  GAO was
not able to identify any direct relationships between operational and
safety trends because of limitations in the data that were available
for the 1976 to 1995 period.  Therefore, this report provides
information on safety trends for the entire railroad industry and
describes how FRA has responded to both operational and safety trends
to develop a new partnering approach to improving safety on the
nation's rail lines.  In addition, chapter 1 provides information on
operational trends in the freight industry. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

In 1995, the railroad industry consisted of Amtrak (the nation's
largest passenger railroad), 14 large freight railroads--collectively
known as class I railroads--as well as over 600 regional and smaller
railroads.  The industry had changed significantly since the Staggers
Rail Act made it federal policy that railroads would rely, where
possible, on competition and the demand for services, rather than on
regulation to establish reasonable rates.  Prior to the act, several
of the largest freight railroads were earning a negative rate of
return on investment and at least three were bankrupt.  The
deregulation contributed to changes in the composition and operation
of the rail industry.  From 1976 through 1995, the nation's largest
freight railroads cut costs; increased the tonnage each train carried
and the distance this tonnage was carried; downsized their workforce;
and eliminated, sold, or abandoned thousands of miles of unprofitable
or little-used track. 

Since 1970, FRA has been responsible for regulating all aspects of
passenger and freight railroad safety under the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970, as amended.\1 In that capacity, FRA prescribes
regulations and issues orders that relate to railroad equipment,
track, signal systems, operating practices, and those aspects of
railroad workplace safety that pertain primarily to the movement of
trains.  The Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA)
regulates those aspects of railroad workplace safety that are typical
of any industrial workplace.  FRA also enforces the Hazardous
Materials Transportation Act as it pertains to the transportation of
hazardous materials by rail. 


--------------------
\1 In 1994, the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970, and other
federal railroad safety statutes, were repealed, codified, and
reenacted as chapters 201-213 of title 49, United States Code. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Railroad safety has improved significantly over the past 20 years. 
Reported accident and injury rates are down 70 and 74 percent,
respectively, from 1976 levels.  Railroad industry representatives
attribute the reductions to improvements made to the railroads' plant
and equipment.  However, labor representatives expressed concern
that, despite this progress, heavier loads and increased traffic may
adversely affect rail safety in the future.  Rail safety data
indicate that the progress in reducing accidents has slowed in recent
years.  While preliminary data for 1996 show improvements in key
safety statistics, about 1,000 people die each year as a result of
grade-crossing accidents and trespassing, 11,000 railroad employees
are injured, and thousands of people are evacuated from their homes
as a result of the hazardous materials that are released during train
accidents. 

FRA instituted an important shift in its safety program in 1993 to
address safety problems in the rail industry.  Rather than using
violations and civil penalties as the primary means to obtain
compliance with railroad safety regulations, FRA has emphasized
cooperative partnerships with other federal agencies, railroad
management, labor unions, and the states.  The partnering efforts
generally focus on the nation's larger railroads and have resulted in
FRA inspectors' conducting fewer site-specific inspections of the
railroad industry overall.  While the preliminary data for 1996 show
improvements, it is too early to determine if FRA's new approach will
sustain a long-term decline in accidents and fatalities.  In
addition, FRA has allocated fewer resources to responding to concerns
about the level of workplace injuries for railroad employees and
railroad bridge safety. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      SAFETY ON THE NATION'S
      RAILROADS HAS GENERALLY
      IMPROVED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

Safety on the nation's railroads has improved since 1976, although
the most rapid decrease in accidents occurred before 1987.  FRA and
industry officials attribute these improvements to advancements in
technology, increased investment focused on a downsized
infrastructure, and a more scientific approach toward reducing
injuries.  However, class I freight railroads, which account for most
of the industry's revenue and train-miles, are now using fewer
people, locomotives, and cars to haul more tonnage over fewer miles
of track.  Labor officials believe that these changes in operations
could lead to more rail collisions and accidents as a result of
greater congestion and fewer qualified employees to perform essential
maintenance.  While current safety trends are positive, it is
uncertain how further advancements in technology or reductions in
employment will affect safety in the future. 

Nonetheless, further improvements in safety are needed, since more
than 1,000 people die each year as a result of fatal collisions
between cars and trains or as a result of trespassers on railroad
property being struck by trains.  Hazardous materials releases
resulting from train accidents showed no clear trends between 1978
and 1995.  About 261,000 people were evacuated across the United
States because of rail-related hazardous materials releases occurring
over these years.  Concerns remain about evacuations because the
volume of chemical traffic increased by over one-third from 1976 to
1995. 


      FRA'S NEW SAFETY STRATEGY
      INVOLVES PARTNERSHIPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

Beginning in 1993, FRA reassessed its safety program to leverage the
agency's resources and established a cooperative approach that
focused on results to improve railroad safety.  With rail traffic
expected to grow through the remainder of the 1990s and beyond, FRA
anticipated the need for new approaches to enhance site-specific
inspections.  As a result, FRA formalized this shift with the
establishment of three new initiatives.  First, in 1994, FRA took the
lead responsibility for coordinating the Department of
Transportation's multiagency plans to reduce fatalities at
rail-highway crossings.  Second, in 1995, FRA formally established
the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program through which the agency
works cooperatively with railroad labor and management to identify
and solve the root causes of systemic problems facing the railroads. 
Third, in 1996, FRA established the Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee to develop recommendations for the agency's more complex or
contentious rulemakings by seeking consensus among the parties
affected by the rulemakings. 

It is too early to determine if FRA's collaborative efforts will
produce a sustained decline in rail accidents and fatalities.  FRA
credits its grade-crossing plan with contributing to a 19-percent
drop in fatalities in 1996.  Whether the plan contributed to the
decline is uncertain:  Past trends indicate that the total number of
railroad fatalities declined by 34 percent from 1976 to 1983 (from
1,630 to 1,073) but then fluctuated within a range of 1,036 and 1,324
deaths between 1983 and 1995.  FRA has implemented its Safety
Assurance and Compliance Program with 33 railroads.  This method has
improved the safety on many large railroads, but Norfolk Southern
Corporation has refused to participate until FRA substantiates safety
problems at the railroad.  With regards to the Advisory Committee,
the FRA Administrator has referred seven major rulemaking tasks to
it.  While the committee has developed proposed regulations on track
safety and radio communications standards, efforts to develop freight
power brake regulations have encountered problems in the negotiations
among FRA, railroad labor, and railroad management. 

To accommodate the new initiatives, FRA has shifted some of its
resources away from site-specific inspections, which have
historically served as FRA's primary means of ensuring compliance
with safety regulations.  The 53,113 inspections conducted in 1995
were 23 percent below the 68,715 inspections conducted in 1994.  As a
result, a greater number of railroads are not receiving inspections,
and inspectors are conducting fewer reviews of the railroads' own
inspection efforts. 

In addition, there are two important areas of railroad safety that
FRA's collaborative approach does not systematically address: 
workplace safety for railroad employees and the structural integrity
of railroad bridges.  While a 1978 policy statement by FRA provides
guidance on which workplace safety issues FRA and OSHA should cover,
the two agencies' inspection presence on railroad property varies
greatly.  FRA routinely inspects the railroads' track, equipment, and
operating practices.  In contrast, OSHA inspectors visit railroad
property only in response to an employee or union complaint about
working conditions or when investigating a workplace accident.  In
January 1997, FRA revised its injury reporting requirements to
capture additional information on workplace injuries, including where
an injury occurred, what activity was being performed at the time,
and what was the probable cause of the injury.  According to FRA, the
new information will provide better data for future rulemakings. 
Because these requirements only recently became effective, FRA has
yet to accumulate sufficient data for analysis.  Once sufficient data
are collected, the agency will be able to determine the causes of the
most frequent and serious injuries and focus efforts on corrective
actions. 

FRA does not have regulations governing the structural integrity of
the 100,700 railroad bridges in the nation.  Instead, a 1995
Statement of Agency Policy provides guidelines for railroads to use
for the formulation of their own bridge management programs.  FRA
inspectors do not cite specific defects for bridge conditions, nor do
they recommend violations, as they do for track, signal, or equipment
problems.  Instead, FRA inspectors call conditions to the attention
of railroad bridge maintenance and engineering officials.  According
to FRA, inspectors normally use informal procedures to advise
railroad personnel of bridge problems.  If a bridge condition
presents a hazard of death or personal injury, and the bridge owner
does not correct the condition, FRA exercises its emergency authority
to restrict or prohibit train operation over the bridge.  The
railroad industry agrees with FRA's policy that regulations are not
needed to address issues related to structural conditions of bridges. 
Railroad labor officials disagree and note that bridge safety is
equally as important as track safety, for which FRA has regulations. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FRA
Administrator to, in cooperation with the industry, where
appropriate, (1) analyze injury data collected under the revised
reporting requirements to determine the workplace safety issues that
lead to the most numerous or the most serious injuries; (2) in areas
where efforts to obtain voluntary corrective action do not address
the causes of these injuries, consider developing regulations; and
(3) use appropriate mechanisms, including the Safety Assurance and
Compliance Program, to ensure that a finding of potential structural
problems on a bridge is properly addressed by the bridge owner. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND GAO'S
   RESPONSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of
Transportation (DOT) for its review and comment.  GAO met with
departmental officials, including the FRA Administrator, Deputy
Administrator and Associate Administrator for Safety.  The officials
indicated that they agreed with many portions of the draft report's
historical perspective but said that the report did not adequately
reflect the more recent accomplishments and potential of the Safety
Assurance and Compliance Program.  The officials said that this
program represents a fundamentally new approach to working with
railroads to ensure regulatory compliance and accelerate safety
improvements.  The officials explained that although old methods of
encouraging regulatory compliance contributed to a substantial
reduction in railroad accidents between 1978 and 1986, the agency had
determined that further progress would require new approaches. 

FRA officials maintained that the Safety Assurance and Compliance
Program provides the tools to leverage its limited resources while
achieving continued safety improvements.  The approach was based on
President Clinton's directive to federal regulatory agencies that
inspection and enforcement programs be designed to achieve results,
not punishment.  The officials indicated that the program establishes
a framework for FRA to work cooperatively with railroad management
and labor to identify and solve key safety issues.  The officials
indicated that while the program provides new tools to further
enhance railroad safety, FRA will continue to make full use of all
the enforcement options at its disposal as necessary and has begun to
focus on enforcement where it is most likely to reduce accidents,
injuries, and hazardous materials releases.  FRA officials produced
statistics that they maintain demonstrate the program's substantial
accomplishments during the 3 years since its initial implementation. 
Finally, while agreeing with two of GAO's three recommendations, FRA
commented on GAO's recommendation that the agency consider developing
regulations to address the issues that continue to cause the most
numerous or serious workplace injuries.  FRA officials said that the
agency would limit its consideration of regulations to those areas
that are related to train operations. 

In response to FRA's comments, GAO included additional information on
the accomplishments the agency's new rail safety program has achieved
by highlighting safety statistics for 1993 through 1996 and providing
detailed information on the successes with the Safety Assurance and
Compliance Program.  GAO also included FRA's performance goals for
improving rail safety that illustrate how rail safety has improved
since 1993.  However, reaching conclusions on FRA's new safety
program by isolating safety improvements over the most recent 3-year
period ignores past trends in railroad safety.  Over the past 20
years, noteworthy reductions in railroad accidents, fatalities, and
injuries were often followed by periods in which railroad safety
subsequently worsened.  As GAO concluded, it is too early to tell if
FRA's efforts will sustain improvements in railroad safety over an
extended period of time.  Finally, GAO disagrees with FRA's
contention that the agency should limit its consideration of
regulations to those areas that are related to train operations.  FRA
would have matters related to non-train operations under the purview
of OSHA.  But should FRA's analysis of workplace safety data show a
preponderance of non-train-related injuries, the agency should not
foreclose the need to consider regulations covering such injuries. 
Additional agency comments are included in chapter 3.  FRA officials
had additional technical and clarifying comments that GAO
incorporated throughout the report, where appropriate. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) enforces federal railroad
safety statutes under a delegation of authority from the Secretary of
Transportation.  FRA's mission is to protect railroad employees and
the public by ensuring the safe operation of freight and passenger
trains.  In 1980, the Congress passed the Staggers Rail Act, which
fostered substantial changes in the railroad industry.  By 1995,
fewer large railroads accounted for most of the industry's revenue
and train miles.  At the same time, these railroads substantially
reduced their workforce and track networks. 


   THE FEDERAL RAILROAD
   ADMINISTRATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

FRA has three major safety-related activities:  (1) administering
safety statutes, regulations, and programs, including the development
and promulgation of standards and procedures, technical training,
administration of postaccident and random testing of railroad
employees, and management of rail-highway grade-crossing projects;
(2) conducting research on railroad safety and national
transportation policy; and (3) enforcing federal safety statutes,
regulations, and standards by inspecting railroad track, equipment,
signals, and railroad operating practices.  FRA also enforces the
provisions of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act as it
applies to rail. 


      FRA'S RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

The impetus for rulemaking may come from the Congress; FRA's research
programs; inspections; the National Transportation Safety Board's
recommendations; or railroad management, employees, or unions.  FRA's
Office of Safety develops safety rules that are promulgated following
requirements, such as those of the Administrative Procedure Act, that
are contained in statutes and orders and are generally applicable to
executive branch agencies, and other statutes and orders that are
specifically applicable to the Department of Transportation (DOT) or
FRA, such as the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970.  Chapter 3
discusses FRA's rulemaking procedures in detail. 


      FRA'S RESEARCH AND
      DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

FRA's research and development programs provide scientific and
technological support for its rulemaking activities.  FRA sponsors
research on safety and performance improvements to freight and
passenger equipment, operating practices, track structure, track
components, railroad bridge and tunnel structures, signal and train
control systems, and track-vehicle interaction.  FRA also conducts
research on the safety of high-speed ground transportation, including
the development of safety performance standards. 


      FRA'S ENFORCEMENT PROCEDURES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3

FRA has an inspection system and the legal tools to enforce federal
railroad safety statutes and regulations.  FRA's 270 railroad
inspectors, who operate under eight regional administrators,
specialize in one of five disciplines:  motive power (e.g.,
locomotives) and equipment, track, signals, hazardous materials, and
operating practices.  Several states, whose railroad inspectors meet
federal qualification standards, augment FRA's inspection force with
about 130 additional inspectors. 

When a condition or operating practice does not comply with federal
statutes, regulations, or orders, an inspector may verbally recommend
corrective action or prepare a defect report.  As a result, the
railroad usually takes corrective action.  When the inspector
determines that the best method of obtaining compliance is to assess
a civil penalty, the inspector prepares a violation report, which is
essentially a recommendation for a civil penalty--FRA's most
frequently utilized enforcement tool. 

In deciding whether to recommend civil penalties, an inspector is
allowed to exercise considerable judgment under FRA's regulations. 
For example, the inspector may consider the degree of variation from
the standard, the railroad's general history of compliance, its
general level of current compliance, and the kind and degree of
potential hazard under specific circumstances.  If the inspector
observes defects that are likely to result in injury, property
damage, or loss of life, he or she is more likely to recommend civil
penalties.  Recommendations for civil penalties are reviewed at the
regional level and by FRA's Chief Counsel.  Although a schedule of
initial civil penalties exists for specific infractions, the final
monetary assessment is negotiated between FRA and the railroad
considering several statutory settlement criteria, including the
gravity of the violation and the violator's culpability and ability
to pay.\1 In addition, individuals may be subject to civil penalties
for willful violations of statutes, regulations, or orders. 
Generally, penalties can be assessed for up to $10,000 per violation. 
When the violation is a continuing one, each day that the violation
continues constitutes a separate offense.  In 1995, FRA closed over
1,300 civil penalty cases and collected over $5 million in fines. 

The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 and related safety statutes
also provide FRA with more severe enforcement tools.  FRA's most
severe enforcement tool is the emergency order, which the agency may
issue when an unsafe condition or practice, or a combination of
unsafe conditions or practices, causes an emergency situation
involving a hazard of death or personal injury.  FRA issued an
emergency order in February 1996 after fatal commuter railroad
accidents in Silver Spring, Maryland, and Secaucus, New Jersey, in
which several people died.  Among other things, the emergency order
required prompt action by passenger and commuter railroads to develop
emergency egress procedures that included the identification,
labeling, and safe operation of passenger emergency exits.  According
to FRA's Assistant Chief Counsel, the agency has issued 20 emergency
orders since 1970. 

The agency also has the authority to issue compliance orders.  FRA
has used this authority on a few occasions to achieve specific
remedial actions directed at improving compliance in specific areas. 
Unlike an emergency order, however, FRA can issue compliance orders
only after providing an opportunity for a hearing. 

Among its other enforcement tools, FRA also has the authority to
issue special notices requiring repairs and taking unsafe track or
equipment out of service.  FRA issues about 80 to 100 special notices
per year.  FRA may also seek injunctive relief.  The U.S.  Attorney
General, acting on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, may
seek a federal district court order to restrain violations or enforce
rules and standards issued under the railroad safety laws.  According
to FRA's Assistant Chief Counsel, the agency has used this authority
only once, to gain access to the property of a hazardous materials
shipper that was attempting to place unacceptable restrictions on the
access of FRA inspectors to its facilities. 


--------------------
\1 Due to certain statutory requirements, cases brought under the
Hazardous Materials Transportation Act involve the use of more formal
administrative procedures. 


   CHANGES IN THE FREIGHT RAILROAD
   INDUSTRY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

FRA oversees an industry that has changed substantially over the past
20 years.  The 88 class I freight railroads that operated in 1976
declined to 14 in 1995, owing to mergers and acquisitions.  The
Staggers Rail Act of 1980 accelerated changes in the freight
industry.  The act provided the railroads with greater flexibility to
negotiate freight rates and respond to market conditions.  The act
made it federal policy that freight railroads would rely, where
possible, on competition and the demand for services, rather than on
regulation to establish reasonable rates.  As a result of changes
fostered by the act, today's freight industry has fewer large
railroads; hauls more tonnage over fewer miles of track; and employs
fewer people, locomotives, and railcars. 


      LARGE RAILROADS CONTINUE TO
      MERGE WHILE TOTAL TRAIN
      MILES DECLINE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.1

From 1976 through 1995, the number of class I freight railroads
declined due to mergers and acquisitions.  In 1976, 88 class I
freight railroads--the nation's largest railroads--accounted for 98
percent of the industry's freight revenue, according to the
Association of American Railroads (AAR), and 89 percent of its train
miles.  Many of these railroads were earning a negative rate of
return or were moving toward insolvency; several bankrupt
northeastern railroads were consolidated into the Consolidated
Railroad Corporation, known as Conrail.  In addition, years of
declining profits had led to deferred maintenance on rights-of-way
and the deterioration of railroad plant and equipment.  Total train
miles, a standard measure of rail activity has declined for the
entire industry since 1976.  However, in 1995, class I freight train
miles were higher than 1976 levels. 

By 1995, mergers, acquisitions, and changes in the definition of a
class I railroad had reduced the number of such railroads to
15--Amtrak (the nation's largest passenger railroad) and 14 freight
railroads.  In spite of the reduction in the number of class I
freight railroads, these railroads still accounted for 91 percent of
the industry's freight revenue and 82 percent of its train miles in
1995.  The 14 class I freight railroads were the Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe Railway; Burlington Northern Railroad Co.; Chicago and
North Western Railway Co.; Consolidated Rail Corp.; CSX
Transportation; Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad; Grand Trunk
Western Railroad, Inc.; Illinois Central Railroad Co.; Kansas City
Southern Railway Co.; Norfolk Southern Corp.; Soo Line Railroad Co.;
Southern Pacific Transportation Co.; St.  Louis Southwestern Railway
Co.; and Union Pacific Railroad Co. 

Since 1995, the trend in mergers has continued.  Burlington
Northern/Santa Fe was created on September 22, 1995 from the merger
of the Burlington Northern Railroad Co.  and the Atchison, Topeka,
and Santa Fe Railway.  The two railroads officially began operating
as a single railroad in 1996.  The merger of Union Pacific Railroad
Co.  and Southern Pacific Transportation Co.  in 1996 reduced the
number of class I freight railroads to 10.  In 1997, CSX
Transportation and Norfolk Southern Railway Co.  proposed to purchase
Conrail, which could further reduce the number of class I freight
railroads.  FRA officials believe that within the next 5 to 10 years,
the remaining class I freight railroads could be merged into two
transcontinental railroads. 

As the class I freight railroads merged, the number of regional and
local railroads increased.  FRA believes that the number of these
types of railroads will continue to grow as the number of class I
freight railroads shrinks due to mergers and acquisitions. 

While the number of class I freight railroads has declined and the
number of nonclass I freight railroads has increased, overall
industry operations are still below 1976 levels.  As figure 1.1
shows, total train miles, commonly used by FRA and the railroad
industry to measure the level of rail activity, fell 28 percent--from
774.8 million in 1976 to a low of 558.2 million in 1983. 

   Figure 1.1:  Total Train Miles,
   Calendar Years 1976 Through
   1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  FRA. 

Train miles have declined overall for the railroad industry.  Since
1991, total train miles have risen to 669.8 million, which is still
below 1976 levels.  However, 1995 class I freight train miles
exceeded their 1976 levels.  In 1976, class I freight train miles
were 424.8 million, compared with 458.3 million in 1995--an increase
of 8 percent. 


      TONNAGE ON THE NATION'S
      RAILROADS HAS INCREASED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.2

Class I railroads have experienced growth in freight tonnage.  In
part, this growth has occurred because of deregulation of the rail
industry as well as improvements in technology that enabled railroads
to carry heavier loads over longer distances.  In addition, class I
freight railroads invested heavily in their infrastructure in the
1980s, improving both the capacity of their track and freight cars. 
Industry experts believe that rail traffic will continue to grow
through 2006. 

Since 1976, class I freight railroads have increasingly been able to
carry more tonnage over longer distances.  For example, in 1995, each
train hauled an average of 2,870 tons--up from 1,954 tons in 1976,
and the average length of haul was 843 miles--up from 564 miles in
1976.  As a result, the class I freight railroads were able to
increase revenue ton miles\2 by 64 percent.\3 As shown in figure 1.2,
revenue ton miles increased from 794 billion in 1976 to over 1.3
trillion in 1995. 

   Figure 1.2:  Class I Freight
   Railroads' Revenue Ton Miles,
   Calendar Years 1976 Through
   1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  AAR. 

Railroad officials said that improvements in railroad technology have
allowed railroads to increase the average tonnage carried per train
without requiring additional locomotives or freight cars.  For
example, class I freight railroads have replaced many of their older
locomotives with newer ones that are more powerful and have better
traction.  As a result, these railroads have been able to reduce the
number of locomotives in service by 32 percent.  Also, while the
average number of revenue tons per train load increased from 1976 to
1995, the average number of cars per train remained unchanged.  The
increase in tons carried per train resulted, in part, from the
construction of lighter-weight cars made from aluminum, rather than
steel.  The freight railroads also upgraded their track in the 1980s
by replacing it with stronger rails and improved track ties.  In
addition, advancements in the strength of freight car wheel
assemblies have allowed the industry to use larger and longer freight
cars and increase their maximum gross load capacity from 263,000 to
315,000 pounds.  Railroads have also introduced double-stacked cars
for their intermodal service, thereby increasing the carrying
capacity of these cars. 

Rail traffic is expected to continue to grow.  In response to a draft
of this report, FRA officials indicated that total rail tonnage is
expected to increase at a rate of 1.5 percent annually through 2006. 
Coal, chemicals, farm products, and intermodal traffic, which account
for roughly 60 percent of rail tons originated, are expected to
increase over this period due to strong demand.  FRA officials
believe that coal traffic will increase as the demand for coal
increases, particularly for electricity generation, and that the
demand for chemicals by textile and paper mills and tire producers
will fuel the growth in chemical traffic.  Farm product
traffic--mostly for grain shipments--is forecasted to increase with
higher crop yields for domestic production as well as a greater
number of exports.  Finally, FRA officials believe that intermodal
traffic--which grew at a rate of 5 percent per year from 1986 through
1995--will continue to grow, but at a slower rate. 


--------------------
\2 A revenue ton mile is the movement of 1 ton of revenue freight 1
mile. 

\3 The revenue ton mile totals exclude Amtrak. 


      REDUCTIONS IN CLASS I
      FREIGHT RAILROAD WORKFORCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.3

Class I freight railroad employment has declined by more than 60
percent since 1976 and is forecast to continue declining over the
next 10 years.  Meanwhile, nonclass I freight railroad employment has
increased.  New technology, compromises from labor, and railroad
mergers have each contributed to the class I freight railroads'
ability to diminish their workforces. 

From 1976 through 1995, class I freight railroads reduced their
workforce by 61 percent--from 483,000 to 188,000 employees (see fig. 
1.3).\4 According to FRA, some of the decline in class I freight
railroad employment was offset by a growth in regional railroad and
short-line employment.  However, total employee hours worked across
the entire industry--not just for the class I freight
railroads--declined by 52 percent during this period, suggesting that
employment did not entirely shift from large to small railroads.\5 As
table 1.1 shows, downsizing affected all categories of railroad
employees. 

   Figure 1.3:  Class I Freight
   Railroad Employment, Calendar
   Years 1976 Through 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  AAR and the Railroad Retirement Board. 



                               Table 1.1
                
                   Change in Class I Freight Railroad
                 Employment by Category, Calendar Years
                           1976 Through 1995

Employment                        Calendar      Calendar       Percent
category                         year 1976     year 1995        change
----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
Executives, officials, and
 staff assistants                   16,105        10,708           -34
Professional and
 administrative                     99,312        26,940           -73
Maintenance-of-way and
 structures\a                       86,901        40,033           -54
Maintenance-of-equipment and
 stores\b                          102,996        37,106           -64
Transportation (other than          34,130         9,597           -72
 train and engine)\c
Transportation (train and          143,438        63,831           -55
 engine)\d
Total                              482,882       188,215           -61
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Employees who maintain track, signal systems, buildings, and
bridges. 

\b Employees who maintain or repair locomotives and freight cars. 

\c Employees such as dispatchers and telegraphers. 

\d Employees such as engineers, conductors, and brakemen. 

Source:  AAR and the Railroad Retirement Board. 

In a response to a draft of this report, FRA officials said that the
Railroad Retirement Board estimates that class I railroad employment
will continue to decline to 143,000 by 2006--a 24-percent decline
from 1995 employment levels.  Regional and short-line employment was
also forecast to decline. 

According to railroad industry representatives, technology
innovations, labor concessions, and railroad mergers enabled the
class I freight railroads to achieve this reduction.  For example: 

  -- Modern maintenance-of-way equipment has reduced the number of
     maintenance-of-way and structures employees in a tie gang (a
     group of railroad employees assembled to conduct track
     maintenance) from between 7 and 15 to between 3 and 5.  Figure
     1.4 shows examples of modern maintenance-of-way equipment. 

   Figure 1.4:  Examples of Modern
   Maintenance-of-Way Equipment

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  AAR.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

  -- End-of-train devices--electronic boxes that monitor brake-line
     pressure and are attached to the train's last car--have replaced
     almost all cabooses and their crews, resulting in a 25-percent
     reduction in train crew size. 

  -- Electronic waybilling and computerization have considerably
     reduced the need for clerical personnel to track the location
     and contents of freight cars. 

  -- Improvements in traffic control systems have increased line
     capacity. 

  -- Labor concessions reduced the average train crew size from four
     to two or three--including the elimination of the fireman
     position (a position that was important during the era of steam
     locomotives)--allowed greater distances before a crew change,
     and allowed employees to perform tasks in more than one craft.\6

  -- Mergers have contributed to the reduction in class I freight
     railroads from 88 in 1976 to 14 in 1995.  With these mergers
     came reductions in employment. 

  -- The Staggers Rail Act made it easier for railroads to abandon
     unprofitable or duplicative lines or sell them to short-line and
     regional railroads.  The elimination of these lines allowed the
     larger railroads to make further employment reductions. 


--------------------
\4 Employment statistics exclude contractors. 

\5 Average annual employment totals were not available for the entire
industry. 

\6 A craft constitutes a particular type of job.  For example,
electrical workers and welders would belong to different crafts. 


      REDUCTIONS IN MILES OF TRACK
      OWNED BY CLASS I FREIGHT
      RAILROADS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.4

The Staggers Rail Act of 1980 made it easier for freight railroads to
cease unprofitable operations.  Accordingly, the class I freight
railroads eliminated, abandoned, or sold 41 percent of their trackage
(see fig.  1.5).  According to AAR, class I freight railroad traffic
was not distributed evenly over the entire network that they owned in
the 1970s.  Most of the track that the class I freight railroads
eliminated was little-used and expensive to maintain.  However, most
of the traffic has been and still is on the main lines.  In addition
to reductions in employment, the reduction in track miles has allowed
the class I freight railroads to concentrate their capital
investments on improving their high-volume main-line corridors.  The
railroads are enlarging or eliminating tunnels, increasing bridge
clearances, and expanding electronic signal systems over more
main-line corridors.  For example, Conrail and the state of
Pennsylvania completed a 3-year capacity improvement project along
Conrail's main line from Pittsburgh to Philadelphia.  This project
increased tunnel and bridge clearances along the corridor, which
enabled Conrail to use double-stacked container cars and thereby move
more commerce into Philadelphia. 

   Figure 1.5:  Miles of Track
   Owned by Class I Freight
   Railroads, Calendar Years 1976
   Through 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  AAR. 

FRA officials said that the total rail network is projected to
decline slightly each year.  The net effect of the slow decrease in
the rail network, together with the slight increase in traffic on the
main lines, will be to increase the concentration of rail traffic on
some lines. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

In view of the changes that have occurred in the railroad industry
over the past 20 years and concerns about overall safety in the
railroad industry, the Ranking Democratic Member of the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Ranking
Democratic Member of that Committee's Subcommittee on Railroads, and
Representative Bruce F.  Vento asked us to describe (1) relationships
that exist between operational and safety trends in the railroad
industry from 1976 to 1995 and (2) FRA's approach to improving safety
on the nation's rail system. 

To address the first objective, we obtained information on the
operational trends in the railroad industry from the AAR and safety
statistics from FRA's annual safety bulletins for 1976 through 1995
(the most recent edition available).  FRA officials also provided us
with preliminary safety statistics for 1996.  Because of time
limitations, we did not perform a reliability assessment on the
automated database that is the source for FRA's bulletins.  AAR and
FRA are the primary sources for information on operational and safety
trends in the railroad industry for the 20-year period of our review. 
However, the data from AAR and FRA are not directly comparable
because they cover different aspects of the railroad industry.  AAR's
data provide important information on how the freight industry has
changed since 1976, such as the miles of track owned and number of
locomotives and cars used.  AAR collects these data only for the
class I freight railroads.  In contrast, FRA's safety data cover the
entire industry--both freight and passenger (including commuter)
railroads.  FRA's 20-year data could not be segregated to isolate
safety statistics only for the class I freight railroads.  Although
class I freight railroads account for 91 percent of the industry's
freight revenue and 82 percent of its train miles, any direct
comparison with safety data that are not limited specifically to
class I freight railroads would be inconclusive.  Accordingly, we
were not able to reach conclusions on whether there are direct
relationships between operational trends in the freight industry and
safety trends for the entire industry.  However, chapter 1 provides
information on operational trends in the freight industry.  Chapter 2
provides information on safety trends in the entire industry and
presents the views of FRA, rail management, and labor unions on how
freight operational changes might have affected railroad safety. 
Chapter 3 then describes how FRA has responded to these operational
and safety trends and developed a new partnering approach to
improving safety on the nation's rail lines. 

We also discussed operational and safety issues with FRA's
Administrator and Deputy Administrator and officials from three
headquarters offices--Chief Counsel, Safety Enforcement, and Safety
Analysis; officials of the National Transportation Safety Board;
railroad labor representatives; officials at AAR; Operation
Lifesaver\7 ; the Chemical Manufacturers Association; Railroad
Retirement Board; and the National Railroad Construction and
Maintenance Association.  We also reviewed several reports by the
National Transportation Safety Board. 

To address the second objective, we met with FRA officials and
reviewed FRA documents on the new programs and associated activities. 
Our review included the October 1996 agency report to the Congress
assessing the benefits of the current safety program, as well as FRA
notices in the Federal Register and rulemaking dockets.  In gauging
industry reaction to FRA's new programs, we met with officials of
AAR, the American Short Line Railroad Association, the Regional
Railroads of America, and several labor organizations.  Finally, in
order to examine how FRA's new programs have affected resources
available to oversee the railroad industry, we obtained and analyzed
data on FRA's inspection activities contained in the Railroad
Inspection Reporting System database for calendar years 1992 through
1995.  (See app.  I for more details on this system.)

To obtain a first-hand perspective of railroad operations and of how
FRA's safety strategy is being implemented in the field, we
interviewed FRA's regional administrators and inspectors in two field
offices.  We also interviewed officials and observed operations at
the Burlington Northern/Santa Fe Railway, a class I railroad; the
Maryland Midland Railway, a small railroad; and the Belt Railway of
Chicago and Houston's Port Terminal Railroad Association, both of
which perform switching and terminal operations for larger railroads. 
Additionally, we observed research activities at AAR's Transportation
Test Center in Pueblo, Colorado. 

For information on workplace safety, we interviewed officials from
FRA and the Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA).  We also talked with officials in several
states that have the authority to operate their own occupational
health and safety programs:  California, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.  We also reviewed appropriate legislation,
regulations, and agency documents governing workplace safety
oversight.  We conducted our work from July 1996 through June 1997 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOT for its review and comment. 
We met with FRA's Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and Associate
Administrator for Safety.  FRA's comments and our response are
provided in the executive summary and the end of chapter 3. 


--------------------
\7 An organization that receives private and federal funds to conduct
rail-highway grade-crossing safety programs throughout the country. 


RAILROAD SAFETY TRENDS
============================================================ Chapter 2

Railroad safety has generally improved over the past 20 years. 
Railroad accident rates are down from 1976 levels, but the rate of
decline has slowed since 1987.  Further improvements in safety are
needed, since, in 1995, over 1,000 people died in railroad accidents
and incidents, 11,000 railroad employees were injured, and nearly
3,000 people were evacuated from their homes as a result of hazardous
materials released from train accidents. 


   TRAIN ACCIDENTS HAVE DECLINED
   BY 74 PERCENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

As shown in figure 2.1, the number of train accidents declined from
10,248 in 1976 to 2,619 in 1995--a 74-percent reduction.  The number
of accidents per million train miles showed similar improvements with
a 70-percent decline during this same period.\1 While the number of
accidents declined rapidly prior to 1987, progress continued at a
slower rate from 1987 to 1995.  As chapter 1 noted, class I freight
railroads, which account for most of the industry's freight revenue
and more than three-quarters of its train miles, are using fewer
people, locomotives, and cars to haul more tonnage over fewer miles
of track.  On the one hand, labor officials contend that these
changes could lead to more rail collisions and accidents as a result
of greater congestion and fewer qualified employees to perform
essential maintenance.  In addition, FRA inspectors have observed
signs of degraded maintenance on some railroads in their recent
inspections.  On the other hand, AAR and rail management contend that
(1) most congestion is confined to rail yards and (2) the railroads
have employed better scheduling and technology to maintain the rail
infrastructure.  In addition, detailed safety statistics show
continued reductions in accidents resulting from collisions,
derailments, track problems, and human errors. 

   Figure 2.1:  Total Train
   Accidents, All Railroads,
   Calendar Years 1976 Through
   1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  FRA. 


--------------------
\1 Showing accidents per million train miles takes into account
changing rail activity over the years. 


      RAIL LABOR BELIEVES THAT
      CONGESTION AND LACK OF
      MAINTENANCE COULD AFFECT
      RAIL ACCIDENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1

Between 1976 and 1995, the number of train miles for class I freight
railroads increased by 7 percent, while these railroads decreased the
number of track miles they owned by 41 percent during the same
period.  These changes suggest that more traffic is being
concentrated on substantially fewer miles of track, resulting in more
congestion and the potential for more collisions.  In addition, a
senior rail labor official said that reductions in railroad
dispatchers (employees who control train movements) lend further
concern about their ability to ensure safety.  Some class I railroads
have created large control centers from which dispatchers direct
train movements throughout the railroad's network.  According to the
official, dispatchers in these centers have larger territories to
control and are less familiar with their territories than in the past
when they covered smaller territories.  These factors increase the
chances that a dispatcher could direct two trains to occupy the same
location at the same time. 

In addition to the reduction in dispatchers, labor officials say that
reductions in maintenance crews could affect accident and collision
rates.  For example, the number of maintenance-of-equipment and
stores employees at class I railroads declined by 64 percent from
1976 through 1995.  Many of these employees are carmen who repair and
maintain railcars.  Railroad labor officials contend that the
reduction in qualified carmen to maintain railcars has resulted in
the railroads' using unqualified train crews to inspect trains prior
to departing terminals.  As a result, labor officials said that
railroads are dispatching unsafe trains. 

In addition, a labor representative noted that maintenance
requirements for track have increased substantially as the industry
has increased the amount of tonnage carried in each car.  While the
installation of heavier rail has mitigated some of the effects of
heavier loads, fasteners and ties need more frequent attention. 
Labor-saving devices have reduced the need for some employees, but
labor officials believe that such devices are oriented toward major
renewal projects, rather than day-to-day maintenance.  As a result,
maintenance crews tend to spend much of their time attending to
crises.  Finally, the officials told us that increases in traffic
volume are making it more difficult to complete needed maintenance on
the rail lines, although machinery that gets to the work site faster
and does the job faster has helped. 

FRA inspectors have observed safety problems on some class I freight
railroads which they attribute to reduced maintenance.  For example,
the trackage on one class I freight railroad, which in previous years
had exceeded FRA's safety standards, had subsequently degraded to the
point at which it minimally met the standards.  In the case of
another class I freight railroad, FRA inspectors found that the
railroad did not have sufficient signal maintainers to test the
systems and make necessary repairs.  As a result, inspectors found
signal structures that had decayed to a condition such that railroad
employees could not climb them to perform routine inspections.  The
inspectors also observed signal wires that were not properly covered
and thereby exposed to poor weather conditions.  Figure 2.2 shows
these conditions. 

   Figure 2.2:  Examples of
   Neglected Maintenance

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

   Source:  FRA.

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Our analysis of AAR's data for class I freight railroads lends some
support to the inspectors' observations.  Although class I freight
railroads had 41 percent less track to maintain in 1995 than in 1976,
during this same period these railroads eliminated 54 percent of the
employees who maintain the track, resulting in fewer maintenance
employees per track mile.  For example, in 1976, these railroads
employed 86,901 maintenance-of-way and structures employees to
maintain 304,100 miles of track--a ratio of 29 employees per 100
miles of track.  In 1995, these railroads employed 40,033
maintenance-of-way and structures employees to maintain 180,419 miles
of track--a ratio of 22 employees per 100 miles of track.  As a
result, the number of maintenance-of-way and structures employees per
100 miles of track dropped by 22 percent from 1976 through 1995 for
class I freight railroads. 

Representatives from labor unions said that railroads must make more
investments in technologies that will improve safety.  Labor
officials noted that positive train separation--a system designed to
prevent collisions--is one safety investment that the railroads
should make. 


      RAILROAD MANAGEMENT BELIEVES
      THAT MERGERS AND TECHNOLOGY
      IMPROVEMENTS MAY LESSEN RAIL
      ACCIDENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2

According to a senior AAR official, congestion on the railroads' main
lines has not increased significantly.  Although the railroads have
eliminated, sold, or abandoned many miles of track, the AAR official
said that most of the traffic today remains concentrated over the
same main lines used 20 years ago.  In addition, FRA and railroad
officials said that most congestion occurs in and around rail yards. 
In locations where main-line congestion has become a problem, the
railroads are adding capacity as needed, according to railroad and
AAR officials.  However, AAR was not able to provide expenditure data
on the railroads' total investments made to increase rail-line
capacity.  In addition, FRA did not have data that showed where
congestion exists on the nation's rail lines. 

According to a senior official of a class I railroad, railroads are
cooperating with one another to reduce potential congestion.  For
example, the Union Pacific and Southern Pacific Railroads have
converted parallel tracks to one-way operations in opposite
directions, thereby greatly increasing the tracks' combined capacity. 
The official said that mergers of major railroads have resulted in
other similar arrangements.  Mergers have also eliminated some of the
need to interchange cars at freight yards, which allows trains to
avoid some of the more congested areas. 

According to AAR officials, advancements in the strength of freight
car wheel assemblies have allowed the industry to use larger and
longer freight cars and increase their maximum gross load capacity
from 263,000 to 315,000 pounds.  These heavier loads place more
stress on the rails, which could imply the need for additional
maintenance.  However, AAR officials said that the impact of these
cars on the rail infrastructure is mitigated by new cars that are
constructed with lighter materials.  The officials also said that
reducing the amount of track that the class I freight railroads owned
allowed them to concentrate their capital investments on maintaining
their remaining track and associated signal systems.  Part of this
capital investment involved the installation of stronger rail and
better ties to stand up to the increased loads.  AAR officials
believe that these factors have reduced accidents caused by track and
signal defects. 

AAR officials also said that neither congestion nor employment
reductions have adversely affected railroads' ability to perform
maintenance on the tracks.  By carefully scheduling maintenance
windows and using labor-saving devices that get the job done using
fewer employees, the railroads have been able to maintain tracks in
spite of heavier traffic.  For example, in one instance, a railroad
arranged for advance delivery of its coal and shut down a complete
line for a week.  By working around the clock, the railroad
completely rebuilt the line over the course of the week. 

AAR officials noted that if safety problems were occurring, they
would show up in statistical data.  As table 2.1 shows, while the
overall accident rate declined more rapidly between 1976 and 1987, it
continued to decline by 2 percent per year after 1987.  In addition,
collisions and accidents caused by failed equipment, signals, or
track defects also continued to decline. 



                               Table 2.1
                
                Comparison of Average Annual Decline in
                    Types of Accidents and Causes of
                   Accidents per Million Train Miles,
                  Calendar Years 1976 Through 1987 and
                           1987 Through 1995

                                  Average annual percentage decline
                                --------------------------------------
Types and causes of accidents              1976-87             1987-95
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
All accidents                                    9                   2
Collisions                                      10                   4
Accidents caused by failed
 equipment                                      11                   6
Accidents caused by signal or
 track defects
                                                10                   2
Accidents caused by human
 error                                           6                   0
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO's analysis of FRA's data. 

AAR also contends that the slowing of improvements in the accident
rate should not be attributed to employee reductions but to
railroads' having already addressed the easiest-to-solve safety
problems.  Most of the reductions in railroad employees who inspect,
repair, and operate trains occurred by the end of 1987.  AAR noted
that further reductions in accidents will be more difficult to
achieve. 

For example, human factors-caused accidents, which declined by an
annual average rate of 6 percent between 1976 and 1987, showed no
decline from 1987 through 1995.\2 AAR recognizes that human
factors-caused accidents continue to be a problem.  One class I
freight railroad commissioned a study on employee fatigue in an
effort to better understand how to reduce these types of accidents
further.  However, FRA's preliminary data for 1996 show a 19-percent
reduction in human factors-caused accidents from 1995 levels.  In
addition, railroad labor noted that statistical data may overstate
the role of human error in rail accidents.  Labor officials told us
that railroad management favors placing the blame on the operator
whenever possible, when the accident may have actually been caused by
faulty track or equipment.  If such cases had been reported as
equipment- or track-caused accidents, human factors-caused accidents
could have declined between 1987 and 1995, rather than remaining
unchanged on average and may have declined even more sharply in 1996. 


--------------------
\2 Human factors-caused accidents are those caused by operator error,
such as missing a stop signal or exceeding speed restrictions. 


   TRENDS IN FATALITIES HAVE BEEN
   STAGNANT UNTIL RECENTLY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

In 1993, the fatality rate per million train miles stood at 2.08,
only 1 percent lower than the 1976 rate.\3 However, beginning in
1994, the fatality rate declined significantly and in 1995 stood at
1.71 fatalities per million train miles, as shown in figure 2.3. 
Additionally, when factoring in risk exposure, which FRA defines as
motor vehicle miles traveled multiplied by the train miles, the
accident rate declined in most years since 1976.  Despite this
progress, about 1,100 people were killed in 1995 on the nation's rail
lines.  Most of these deaths (94 percent) were the result of either
fatal collisions between cars and trains at highway grade crossings
or trespassers killed by trains while on railroad property. 

   Figure 2.3:  Rail-Related
   Fatalities Per Million Train
   Miles, All Railroads, Calendar
   Years 1976 Through 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  FRA. 

Since 1993, declines in the fatality rates at grade crossings and for
trespassers contributed to the drop in the overall fatality rate. 
This decline coincides with DOT's implementation of its Grade
Crossing Safety Action Plan in June 1994.  We reported on DOT's
efforts to improve rail-highway crossing safety in 1995.\4 The report
described engineering, educational, and enforcement methods that
federal and state governments and the railroad industry could pursue
to improve rail crossing safety.  Chapter 3 contains additional
information on DOT's plans. 


--------------------
\3 The fatality rates are presented per million train miles to take
into account changing rail activity over the years. 

\4 Railroad Safety:  Status of Efforts to Improve Railroad Crossing
Safety (GAO/RCED-95-191, Aug.  3, 1995). 


   INJURIES AND ILLNESSES CONTINUE
   A STEADY DOWNWARD TREND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

In addition to overall declines in accidents and fatalities,
rail-related injuries and illnesses per million train miles declined
since 1976.  Railroads must report injuries that require medical
treatment or result in work restrictions and lost work days.\5 As
figure 2.4 shows, the injury and illness rate per million train miles
declined from 84.32 in 1976 to 21.56 in 1995--a 74-percent drop. 
This reduction resulted in 50,891 fewer injuries and illnesses in
1995 than in 1976.  Three-quarters of these injuries and illnesses
affected railroad employees. 

   Figure 2.4:  Total Rail-Related
   Injuries and Illnesses per
   Million Train Miles, All
   Railroads, Calendar Years 1976
   Through 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  FRA. 

According to industry representatives, as the railroads reduced their
number of employees, the chances for workers to be injured declined
as well.  Additionally, railroads began to implement experimental
safety programs aimed at reducing lost work days for those remaining
employees.  One railroad, for example, began an experimental "napping
strategy" to reduce the affects of fatigue, whereby train engineers
are permitted short naps while other crew members remain alert. 
Despite the improvements in employee safety, about 11,000 railroad
employee injuries and illnesses were reported to FRA in 1995. 
Workplace safety is discussed in chapter 3. 


--------------------
\5 FRA's data combine injuries and illnesses.  Injury and illness
rates are presented per million train miles to take into account
changing levels of rail activity over the years. 


   THOUSANDS OF PEOPLE ARE
   EVACUATED DUE TO HAZARDOUS
   MATERIALS RELEASES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

Each year thousands of people are evacuated because train accidents
caused the release of hazardous materials.  As figure 2.5 shows, the
number of people evacuated ranged from 2,852 in 1995 to 39,701 in
1986.  The figure also shows that hazardous materials releases
resulting from train accidents are often random events and episodic;
the number of people evacuated relates to whether or not the spill
occurred near a population center.  For example, a hazardous material
release resulting from a Baltimore and Ohio Railroad accident in
Miamisburg, Ohio, contributed to the large number of evacuations in
1986.  When a tank car filled with poisonous phosphorous derailed,
the resulting chemical releases forced 30,000 people to evacuate
their homes.  Between 1978 and 1995, about 261,000 people were
evacuated across the United States because of rail-related hazardous
materials releases--an average of about 14,500 people evacuated each
year.  If the 1986 evacuations were excluded, the annual average
would fall to 13,039.  Concerns remain about evacuations because the
volume of chemical traffic has increased by over one-third from 1976
to 1995. 

   Figure 2.5:  Number of People
   Evacuated Due to Hazardous
   Materials Releases, Calendar
   Years 1978 Through 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  These data reflect evacuations reported to FRA by the
railroads.  These data may differ from information reported by the
National Transportation Safety Board, which uses evacuations reported
by the local municipalities. 

Source:  FRA. 

In recent years, the rail and chemical industries have improved tank
cars to lessen the chances that they will release hazardous materials
during accidents.  For example, manufacturers have reinforced the
ends of tankcars, adding metal jackets with thermal protection
systems to those transporting certain hazardous materials to resist
puncture during accidents.  In addition, researchers found that
during derailments, adjoining cars would uncouple from hazardous
materials cars allowing the ends of the cars to ram into one another. 
As a result, new couplers were designed and installed on tank cars to
make them less likely to uncouple during a derailment.  These and
other improvements were mandated in a series of rules issued by DOT
over the past 20 years.  FRA's data show that the collective efforts
of FRA and the industry, combined with fewer derailments, helped to
reduce hazardous materials releases per million train miles by 77
percent from 1978 to 1995. 


FRA HAS SHIFTED TO A PARTNERSHIP
APPROACH TO IMPROVE RAILROAD
SAFETY
============================================================ Chapter 3

In response to operational and safety trends within the railroad
industry, in 1993, FRA began to institute an important shift in its
safety program.  Rather than using violations and civil penalties as
important means to improve railroad safety, FRA now emphasizes
cooperative partnerships with railroad management, labor, the states,
and other federal agencies to reduce railroad accidents, fatalities,
and injuries.  Accordingly, FRA has developed cooperative plans to
reduce grade-crossing accidents, promote voluntary industry
compliance with federal safety statutes and regulations, and achieve
consensus on complex and contentious railroad safety rules.  The
partnering efforts generally focus on the nation's larger railroads
and have resulted in FRA inspectors' conducting fewer site-specific
inspections of the railroad industry overall.  While preliminary data
for 1996 shows improvements in key safety statistics, it is too early
to determine if FRA's new approach will sustain a long-term decline
in accidents and fatalities.  In addition, there are two important
areas of railroad safety that FRA's collaborative approach does not
systematically address:  workplace safety for railroad employees and
the structural integrity of railroad bridges. 


   FRA HAS ESTABLISHED THREE KEY
   INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE RAIL
   SAFETY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

Beginning in 1993, FRA reassessed its safety program to leverage the
agency's resources and establish a cooperative approach that focused
on results to improve railroad safety.  With rail traffic expected to
grow through the remainder of the 1990s and beyond, FRA anticipated
the need for new approaches to enhance its site-specific inspections. 
As a result, FRA formalized this shift from inspection to
collaboration with the establishment of three new initiatives. 
First, in 1994, FRA took the lead responsibility for coordinating
DOT's multiagency plans to reduce fatalities at rail-highway
crossings.  Second, in 1995, FRA formally established a Safety
Assurance and Compliance Program through which the agency works
cooperatively with railroad labor and management to identify and
solve the root causes of systemic problems facing the railroads. 
Third, in 1996, FRA established the Railroad Safety Advisory
Committee to develop recommendations for the agency's more complex or
contentious rulemakings by seeking consensus among the affected
parties. 


      DOT WORKS WITH INDUSTRY AND
      STATES TO IMPROVE
      RAIL-HIGHWAY CROSSING SAFETY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1

About 94 percent of railroad fatalities occur as a result of either
fatal collisions between cars and trains at highway grade crossings
or trespassers killed by trains while on railroad property.  Since
many federal, state, and local agencies have enforcement or
coordinating roles in reducing these fatalities, FRA cannot reduce
fatality rates solely through its own rulemaking and enforcement
actions.  Accordingly, FRA took the lead role, in 1994, when DOT
initiated the Rail-Highway Crossing Safety Action Plan--an effort
targeting federal, state, and industry efforts in improving
rail-highway crossing safety and reducing fatalities among
trespassers.  To successfully implement the plan, FRA is working with
the Federal Highway, National Highway Traffic Safety, and Federal
Transit Administrations; the states, railroads, and the Congress to
strengthen education and research activities; enhance federal, state,
and local enforcement efforts; and increase or preserve federal
rail-highway crossing safety funds.  In the action plan, DOT
established a 10-year goal to reduce the number of rail-highway
grade-crossing accidents and fatalities by 50 percent.  As of January
1997, DOT agencies were making progress in implementing 52 of the 55
proposals included in the action plan.  Of the 52 proposals, 15 were
complete; some of the remaining were intended to be continuing
efforts. 

In March 1996, the DOT released a second report focusing on
grade-crossing safety.  That report, titled Accidents That Shouldn't
Happen, focused on developing solutions to communications and
coordination problems among the many agencies involved in ensuring
grade crossing safety.  Such problems had been cited in the
investigation of the collision in October 1995 between a school bus
and a commuter train in Fox River Grove, Illinois, in which seven
students died.  The report made 24 recommendations directed at
improving communications and coordination between railroads and
highway authorities and developing or expanding options in each of
these areas.  DOT has continued to monitor and encourage the
implementation of these recommendations. 

As shown in figure 3.1, the number of fatalities in the railroad
industry has declined since 1976. 

   Figure 3.1:  Railroad Industry
   Fatalities, Calendar Years 1976
   Through 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's analysis of FRA's data. 

The period of decline in fatalities began with the establishment of
the Rail-Highway Crossing Program in 1974 (also known as the section
130 program because of its origin in title 23 of the United States
Code).  Over the next 23 years, the Congress appropriated about $5.8
billion (in constant 1997 dollars) for states to improve safety at
rail-highway crossings.  According to DOT officials, during the early
years of the program, states were able to focus their initial efforts
on the most dangerous crossings, thereby contributing to a
significant reduction in deaths in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 

The steady decline in railroad fatalities stopped in 1983, followed
by several years in which increases in deaths in one year were
followed by sharp drops in the next year.  FRA estimates that total
fatalities declined to 1,022 in 1996--the lowest level in 20 years. 
In addition, rail-highway grade-crossing collisions declined by 15
percent between 1993 and 1996.  FRA attributed the improved
statistics to their safety initiatives which includes the
rail-highway crossing program.  Whether the plan contributed to the
decline is uncertain:  Past trends indicate the total number of
railroad fatalities declined by 34 percent from 1976 to 1983 (from
1,630 to 1,073) but then fluctuated within a range of 1,022 and 1,324
deaths between 1983 and 1996.  Additionally, when normalized for
risk--taking into account the annual change in vehicle and train
miles--collision and fatality rates continued a steady rate of
decline, rather than declining more rapidly in recent years. 


      SAFETY ASSURANCE AND
      COMPLIANCE PROGRAM SEEKS
      VOLUNTARY COOPERATION OF
      RAILROAD MANAGEMENT AND
      LABOR
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2

In 1994, FRA began the Safety Assurance and Compliance Program (SACP)
with the Chicago and Northwestern Railroad and Southern Pacific
Railroad.  These initial reviews were followed by FRA's announcement
in March 1995 formally establishing the SACP process.  FRA initiated
the program in response to a period of little decline in accident
statistics and the belief that a continuation of existing approaches
would not produce any further declines.  In commenting on a draft of
this report, FRA officials also said that SACP is an outgrowth of
President Clinton's directive to federal regulatory agencies that
their inspection and enforcement programs be designed to achieve
results, not punishment.  SACP seeks to address safety problems at
the level where they originate:  If a problem is systemic in nature,
FRA seeks a systemwide solution to the problem's root causes.  When
solutions are identified, they are embodied in the SACP action plan;
FRA then monitors to ensure that commitments are fulfilled.  While
most major railroads are participating in the SACP process, one major
railroad--Norfolk Southern--has refused to participate until FRA
substantiates safety problems at the railroad. 

The SACP process consists of four elements:  a safety profile, senior
management meetings, a safety action plan, and a safety audit. 
First, rail labor and management work with FRA and states to develop
a safety profile of the railroad.  The safety profile takes 2 to 6
months to prepare, depending on the size of the railroad and the
complexity of the relevant issues.  The profile includes descriptions
of the railroad's safety strengths and weaknesses, reported
accidents, summaries of previous inspections, summaries of "listening
sessions" with railroad labor and management, and other safety
concerns.  Once FRA identifies the root causes of any systemic safety
issues raised in the safety profile, it requests a meeting with the
railroad's senior management and labor representatives.  During the
meeting, FRA presents the safety profile, which FRA, rail management,
labor, and the states will use to negotiate the details of the safety
action plan.  FRA expects the railroads to develop these plans within
30 to 60 days.  The action plan then becomes the "informal contract"
under which the railroad voluntarily remedies its safety problems. 
Although the length of time that specific railroads require to
complete their action plans varies on the basis of the complexity of
the issues, FRA expects the railroads to complete the plans within 1
year. 

FRA inspectors monitor the railroad's compliance with the safety
action plan through a safety audit, in conjunction with their routine
site-specific inspections.  During this period, unless a particular
violation is severe, FRA suspends the assessment of civil penalties
for defects related to systemic problems as long as the railroad is
making a good-faith effort to identify the problems and develop its
action plan.  If FRA finds that the railroad is not making a
good-faith effort in executing its action plan, FRA is likely to
process the civil penalties that it held in abeyance.  FRA officials
believe that the threat of this enforcement is an important tool for
motivating the industry toward FRA's goal of zero accidents and zero
injuries.  FRA officials believe that this focus results in more
significant improvements in safety than what the agency achieved
under its traditional site-specific inspections. 

Initially, FRA planned on closing out SACP activities at a railroad
once the railroad addressed the safety defects cited in the safety
profile.  However, FRA has found that the SACP has established lines
of communication with railroad labor and management and between
railroad labor and management.  Because the safety profiles are
discussed in meetings with senior railroad management, these
high-level managers have become involved in the safety process.  FRA
officials said that SACP has also helped gain the railroads'
voluntary cooperation in taking corrective action on safety issues
that are not covered under FRA's safety regulations.  Accordingly,
FRA plans to continue to use the process to identify systemic
problems and root causes in the future.  Over time, FRA expects that
a railroad will develop a series of action plans, which FRA will
monitor for completion. 

According to FRA, it has been able to use the SACP process to
successfully address systemic problems at larger railroads.  For
example, FRA initiated a SACP with Burlington Northern/Santa Fe
Railroad in the aftermath of a February 1, 1996, derailment in Cajon
Pass, California.  When the train's braking systems failed, the
subsequent derailment and fire killed two crew men and closed
Interstate 15 for several days.  A similar accident had occurred at
the same location 14 months earlier.  After the February accident,
FRA sent 56 inspectors to conduct a safety compliance review of the
railroad in conjunction with the California Public Utilities
Commission.  During the 8-day review, FRA prevented the railroad from
operating any trains until safety problems were resolved.  FRA
identified 13 specific safety issues and required the railroad's
management, in conjunction with labor, to develop an action plan to
remedy these issues.  According to FRA, the railroad successfully
addressed all of the issues during the following months. 

Following the first Cajon Pass accident, the railroad had agreed to
install two-way end-of-train devices on those trains operating in the
Cajon Pass area.  According to FRA, such a device might have
prevented the second accident.  The derailed train in the second
accident had a two-way end-of-train device but it was not switched
on.  FRA found that the safety culture of the railroad had eroded to
the point that supervisors and employees found it acceptable to
operate trains with inoperative two-way end-of-train devices and to
cut other corners in mechanical inspections and repairs. 

According to FRA, its review resulted in changes in the railroad's
operating rules for the Cajon Pass area, improved quality control
practices, redistribution of supervisory personnel to ensure an equal
quality of supervision over all shifts, and a review of event
recorder data on every train descending from the pass to ensure that
rules were followed.  FRA credits the SACP for the progress that has
been made in changing the railroad's culture and believes that such
changes could not have occurred if FRA had only enforced existing
regulations. 

As of January 1997, FRA had conducted initial SACP meetings with
management at 33 railroads and planned to initiate SACPs at 21
additional railroads by the end of fiscal year 1997 (see app.  II). 
FRA does not plan to conduct a SACP assessment of all of the more
than 600 railroads in the United States.  Instead, according to the
Director of the Office of Safety Analysis, FRA inspectors are
expected to look for root causes of defects found at smaller
railroads through FRA's traditional site-specific inspections.  FRA
cites improvements in safety statistics since 1993 as evidence that
the SACP is improving safety throughout the nation's railroad system. 
From 1993 through 1996, rail-related fatalities declined by 20
percent, employee injuries declined by about 40 percent, and train
accident rates declined by 16 percent. 

However, SACP still depends on the cooperation of the railroads.  For
example, Norfolk Southern has not participated in the SACP.  The
railroad's position is that until FRA can identify specific areas of
noncompliance, it will not participate.  FRA officials do not believe
that the issue is closed and plan to discuss the matter again with
Norfolk Southern at a later date.  FRA officials said that they may
need to apply a more traditional enforcement approach if Norfolk
Southern continues to rebuff the agency's SACP initiatives. 


      PREMATURE TO ASSESS RESULTS
      FROM ACTIONS OF FRA'S
      RAILROAD SAFETY ADVISORY
      COMMITTEE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3

In March 1996, FRA established a Railroad Safety Advisory Committee
consisting of representatives from railroad management, labor unions,
and others representing various rail industry perspectives, to
provide FRA with recommendations on important rail safety issues
through a consensus-based process.  FRA decided to form the committee
based on what the agency believed to be a successful experience in
developing its Roadway Worker Safety rule through a collaborative
process.  FRA uses the Advisory Committee to obtain input from those
most affected by regulatory decisions, improve the quality of rules,
reduce the time required to complete them, and reduce the likelihood
of litigation after they are promulgated.  Since the inception of the
committee, the FRA Administrator has referred seven major rulemaking
tasks to it, most of which were for rulemakings initiated prior to
its establishment.  FRA has not yet issued any final rules developed
by the committee.  However, the committee has proposed revisions to
the track safety standards that the Congress mandated FRA to complete
by September 1995.  In addition, the committee has proposed revisions
to the radio communications standards.  While it is too early to
measure the committee's success in meeting FRA's objectives, efforts
to develop freight power brake regulations have encountered problems
in the negotiations between FRA and the industry. 

The Advisory Committee is composed of 48 representatives from 27
member organizations.  The committee is chaired by FRA's Associate
Administrator for Safety and includes representatives of the
Association of American Railroads, the American Short Line Railroad
Association, state governments, and numerous labor groups.  In
addition, the Mexican Transport Minister and the Canadian Transport
Minister have one nonvoting seat each. 

Once FRA refers a regulatory task to the Advisory Committee, it forms
a working group that represents the membership of the full committee. 
The working group in turn can establish task forces to pursue
specific issues.  For each task assigned, the working group addresses
the relevant facts, defines the safety problem presented, develops a
range of options, and decides upon a recommendation.  Once the
working group has achieved unanimous consensus, it presents its
recommendation to the full committee.  If the full committee accepts
the recommendation by either unanimous or majority consensus, it is
sent to the FRA Administrator, who can in turn, accept, reject, or
modify the recommendation.  Of the seven rulemaking tasks that have
been referred to the committee, two have been referred to the
Administrator. 

As shown in figure 3.2, when FRA has made a decision to regulate, the
Advisory Committee can provide recommendations with respect to either
the agency's proposed or final action, or both.  FRA will refer these
matters separately to the committee on a case-by-case basis. 

   Figure 3.2:  Chronology of
   FRA's Rulemaking Procedures

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's analysis. 

As the figure shows, the committee's participation supplements rather
than eliminates required steps in the rulemaking process.  For
example, under departmental procedures and executive orders,
significant proposed rules are reviewed and approved by the Office of
the Secretary and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before
FRA issues notices of proposed rulemaking.\1 In addition, a 60-day
public comment period and public hearing are provided.  Furthermore,
significant final rules are reviewed and approved by the Office of
the Secretary and OMB before publication.  However, FRA officials
believe that since the affected parties are directly involved in the
development of rules through consensus, there will be fewer and less
contentious comments on notices of proposed rulemaking, fewer public
hearings on proposed rules, fewer changes to proposed rules, and less
litigation after rules are finalized. 

As table 3.1 shows, FRA has referred seven rulemaking tasks to the
committee. 



                               Table 3.1
                
                FRA's Rulemaking Actions Assigned to the
                           Advisory Committee

                                                          Date rule
                                                          was tasked
                              Source of                   to the
                              decision to   Legal         Advisory
Title                         regulate      deadline      Committee
----------------------------  ------------  ------------  ------------
Locomotive Crashworthiness    Rail Safety   Final rule    10/31/96\a
and Working Conditions        Enforcement   or report,
                              and Review    3/3/95
                              Act-9/3/92

Qualification and             Petitions to  None          10/31/96
Certification of Locomotive   reconsider
Engineers                     aspects of
                              an existing
                              rule

Track Safety Standards        Rail Safety   Final, 9/1/   4/1/96\b
                              Enforcement   95
                              and Review
                              Act-9/3/92

Reinvention of Steam          Reinventing   None          7/24/96
Locomotive Inspection         government
Regulations                   effort

Radio Communication-          Rail Safety   None          4/1/96\d
Advanced Train Control        Enforcement
System                        and Review
                              Act-9/3/
                              92\c

Freight Power Brakes          Rail Safety   Final, 12/    4/1/96
                              Enforcement   31/93
                              and Review
                              Act-9/3/92

Track Motor Vehicle and       Petition to   None          10/31/96
Roadway Equipment Safety      develop a
                              rule
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act required FRA to
complete a rulemaking proceeding to consider prescribing regulations
in this area within 30 months of enactment.  The act required FRA to
report to the Congress if it decided, based on the rulemaking
proceeding, not to prescribe regulations.  FRA reported the results
of its investigation to the Congress in September 1996 and
subsequently referred the matter to the Advisory Committee. 

\b The Advisory Committee voted to recommend a proposal to the FRA
Administrator in November 1996.  FRA published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on July 3, 1997. 

\c The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act required a safety
inquiry regarding railroad radio standards and procedures, and FRA
committed to revise its rules based on this study. 

\d The Advisory Committee voted to recommend a proposal to the FRA
Administrator in April 1997.  FRA published a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking on June 26, 1997. 

Source:  GAO's analysis.  (See app.  III for full inventory of FRA's
rulemaking actions.)

Most of the tasks referred to the committee were complex or
controversial rulemaking activities that FRA had been working on for
several years.  For example, FRA had been working on the Locomotive
Crashworthiness, Track Safety, Radio Communication-Advanced Train
Control, and Freight Power Brake rules for 4 years before referring
them to the Advisory Committee.  In two cases, FRA had missed the
congressional mandate to issue final rules.\2 However, the committee
developed a recommendation on track safety standards within 7 months
after the FRA Administrator referred the task to it and has
recommended revisions to FRA's rules on radio communications.  FRA
has prepared notices of proposed rulemaking based on both the track
and radio communications recommendations.  FRA published a Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking on track safety standards on July 3, 1997 and a
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on radio communications on June 26,
1997. 

If the FRA Administrator believes that the Advisory Committee's
action on proposed rules are not progressing or have reached a
stalemate, the Administrator can withdraw the task from the committee
and direct FRA staff to develop their own proposed rule without
benefit of a consensus recommendation.  As of June 1997, the
Administrator was considering such action due to a stalemate in
negotiations on the freight power brake rule.  The problems in
negotiations centered on who should inspect trains, where trains
should be inspected, and how often they should be inspected.  In
January 1997, FRA issued two technical bulletins that specified how
inspectors were to enforce existing power brake rules and inspection
requirements under the freight car safety standards.  According to
FRA officials, the bulletins were intended to give inspectors
guidance on when to issue violations on the improper inspection of
power brakes and freight cars.  However, AAR protested the move by
bringing a court challenge and by filing a petition to reconsider
with FRA, stating that FRA was promulgating new standards without
going through the rulemaking process.  As of June 1997, FRA and AAR
were still working to resolve the dispute. 


--------------------
\1 DOT defines the term "significant regulation" to include any
regulation that involves important departmental policy.  For OMB's
review, Executive Order 12866 defines the term significant regulation
to include an action likely to result in a rule that may raise novel
legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President's
priorities, or the principles set forth in the executive order. 

\2 Originally due by March 1995, FRA's report on Locomotive
Crashworthiness and Cab Working Conditions was issued in September
1996. 


   INSPECTION EFFORTS HAVE CHANGED
   UNDER THE PARTNERING APPROACH
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

The collaborative approach that FRA has adopted for obtaining
voluntary compliance with railroad safety rules has shifted some of
FRA's resources away from site-specific inspections, which have
historically served as FRA's primary means of ensuring compliance
with safety regulations.  This shift is most evident in the
23-percent decline in the number of inspections conducted between
1994 and 1995.  As a result, a greater number of railroads are not
receiving inspections, and inspectors are conducting fewer reviews of
the railroads' own inspection efforts. 

FRA's efforts to increase cooperation with the railroad industry to
promulgate and enforce rail safety regulations adds new
responsibilities for its 270 inspectors.  New responsibilities
include participating in SACP activities, such as listening sessions
with rail management and labor to identify safety issues and team
inspections to develop rail safety profiles.  Inspectors also
participate in the Advisory Committee's working groups and task
forces.  Nearly all inspectors participate in SACP either in
conducting formal listening sessions with labor, participating in
senior management meetings, or focusing on SACP-related issues when
conducting routine site-specific inspections. 

As figure 3.3 shows, the 67,966 field inspections FRA conducted in
1985 had increased slightly to 69,423 by 1992.  However, inspections
began to decline in 1993 and declined further to 53,113 by 1995.  The
number of inspections conducted in 1995 was 23 percent below the
68,715 inspections conducted in 1994.\3 The decline occurred across
all of FRA's disciplines (track, equipment, signals, hazardous
materials, and operating practices) but most notably in operating
practices, which experienced a 41-percent decline.  (Operating
practices inspectors are responsible for enforcing federal
regulations governing the operation of trains.) The number of
inspections at class I railroads declined by 24 percent while
inspections at smaller railroads declined by 19 percent between 1994
and 1995.  Figure 3.3 also shows that after gradually increasing
during the late 1980s, the number of defects FRA inspectors cited
declined from 391,233 in 1989 to 270,312 in 1995--a 31-percent drop. 
Defects are instances of noncompliance with federal safety
regulations, for which railroads are expected to take corrective
action.  For example, inspectors would cite defects for cracks found
on rail track.  According to FRA officials, defects declined because
fewer inspections were conducted during this period, and inspectors
may have overreacted to FRA's emphasis on cooperation and partnering. 

   Figure 3.3:  Inspections and
   Defects, Calendar Years 1985
   Through 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's analysis of FRA's data. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, FRA officials said that the
agency never intended to eliminate or discourage the use of
enforcement tools.  In April 1997, FRA issued guidance to all of its
safety personnel in an effort to clarify that enforcement--while not
an end in itself--is an essential element of SACP.  The guidance
explains the concept of ï¿½focused enforcement,ï¿½ which encourages
inspectors to concentrate their enforcement efforts where they will
do the most good, that is, where accident trends, inspection data,
direct observations, and/or the violation's inherent seriousness
indicates that enforcement action is needed to address a significant
safety risk. 

The decline in total inspections has also resulted in a greater
number of railroads not receiving inspections.  As table 3.2 shows,
the number of railroads that received no inspections by FRA increased
from 43 to 95 between 1992 and 1995.  Although these railroads only
reported nine accidents during this period, it is FRA's goal to
inspect all railroads at least once a year. 



                               Table 3.2
                
                   Railroads With No Inspections and
                 Inspections in One or Two Disciplines,
                    Calendar Years 1992 Through 1995

                                                        Railroads with
                                         Railroads  inspections in one
                                           with no                  or
Year                                 inspections\a   two disciplines\a
------------------------------  ------------------  ------------------
1992                                            43                 187
1993                                            50                 214
1994                                            66                 245
1995                                            95                 271
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a The number of railroads receiving inspections in each year has
been adjusted to combine parent railroads with their subsidiaries. 

Source:  GAO's analysis of FRA's data. 

In addition, many railroads received inspections in only one or two
of the five inspection disciplines.  As shown in table 3.2, the
number of railroads receiving inspections in only one or two
disciplines increased from 187 in 1992 to 271 in 1995. 

The reduction in total inspections also has resulted in FRA
inspectors' conducting fewer reviews of the railroads' own
inspections--known as records inspections.  Our analysis of FRA's
inspection data also found that between 1992 and 1995, the percentage
of inspected railroads in which FRA completed a records inspection
declined sharply in each discipline.  Table 3.3 shows that the drop
was most precipitous in 1995. 



                               Table 3.3
                
                 Percentage of Railroads That Received
                Records Inspections, Calendar Years 1992
                              Through 1995

                         (Amounts in percents)

                       Percentage of railroads inspected, by type of
                                         inspection
                      ------------------------------------------------
                                                    Hazardou  Operatin
                                                           s         g
                                Equipmen            material  practice
Year                     Track         t    Signal         s         s
--------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------
1992                        60        42        64        34        60
1993                        58        43        51        32        54
1994                        55        40        44        32        52
1995                        32        12        34        21        47
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  GAO's analysis of FRA's data. 

The nation's railroads are primarily responsible for conducting
safety inspections of their equipment and facilities and keeping
records of their inspections.  FRA's responsibility is to monitor the
inspection activity of the railroads.  FRA's policy advises
inspectors to prepare for an inspection by reviewing a railroad's
inspection records.  According to FRA's policy standards, these
records are a good source of information for FRA inspectors about the
extent to which a railroad has met the regulatory requirements and
about the type of problems the railroad has found. 


--------------------
\3 Our data show the number of inspection reports.  While FRA
inspectors sometimes reported inspections in different disciplines on
the same report before 1995, this became a more general practice in
1995 when FRA introduced a new form that was specifically designed to
record inspections in more than one discipline.  Although the number
of forms submitted to FRA declined with the use of the new form, our
data reflect the number of inspection reports regardless of the
number of forms submitted. 


   FRA DOES NOT SYSTEMATICALLY
   OVERSEE WORKPLACE AND BRIDGE
   SAFETY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

During our review of FRA's rail safety approach, we identified two
issues that the agency's partnering or inspection efforts do not
systematically address:  improving the workplace safety of railroad
employees and ensuring that railroad bridges receive inspection
oversight comparable to other railroad areas.  FRA has chosen not to
issue regulations addressing many workplace safety issues, although
railroad employees accounted for most of the 14,400 rail-related
injuries and illnesses that occurred in 1995.  In addition, FRA's
1995 decision not to promulgate bridge safety regulations requires
FRA personnel to rely primarily on voluntary correction of potential
problems with bridge safety. 


      EMPLOYEE WORKPLACE SAFETY
      AND HEALTH RECEIVE LESS
      OVERSIGHT THAN OTHER ASPECTS
      OF RAILROAD SAFETY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1

The number of rail-related injuries and illnesses has declined from
65,331 in 1976 to 14,440 in 1995.  As figure 3.4 shows, most of these
injuries and illnesses involve railroad employees.\4 Railroads must
report injuries that require medical treatment or result in work
restrictions and lost work days. 

   Figure 3.4:  Injuries and
   Illnesses by Type of Person and
   Occurrence, Calendar Years 1976
   Through 1995

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  GAO's analysis of FRA's data. 

Efforts to reduce injuries to workers must rely on the combined
efforts of FRA and OSHA.\5 For example, FRA oversees safety issues
intrinsic to railroad operations such as ensuring that employees are
not struck by moving trains because they did not follow FRA's safety
procedures while working on railroad track.\6 OSHA, on the other
hand, is responsible for employee safety and health issues that would
be associated with any industrial workplace.  For example, OSHA would
ensure that employees using welding equipment while working on the
track used appropriate safety equipment, such as goggles. 

While a 1978 policy statement by FRA provides guidance on which
workplace safety and health issues FRA or OSHA should cover, the two
agencies' inspection presence on railroad property varies greatly. 
For example, in 1995, FRA conducted over 50,000 inspections of track,
railroad equipment, and operating practices related to train
operations.  In contrast, OSHA inspectors normally visit railroad
properties only in response to an employee or union complaint about
working conditions or when investigating a workplace accident that
resulted in the injury of three or more employees.\7

Labor representatives expressed concern that because of OSHA's
limited resources, certain workplace safety and health issues are not
adequately addressed under the split responsibility.  For example,
labor representatives pointed out that pipe insulation and gaskets
often contain asbestos, but there is no guidance from FRA on how to
handle these hazardous materials.  FRA inspectors told us that they
look for unsafe work practices or situations when conducting site
inspections.  When they observe unsafe work practices, such as an
employee welding without proper eye protection, inspectors can point
out the problem to railroad supervisory personnel for voluntary
compliance.  However, FRA inspectors have no authority to cite
railroads for workplace safety problems that fall under OSHA's
jurisdiction if the railroad does not voluntarily comply with the
inspector's suggestions. 

In January 1997, FRA revised its injury reporting requirements to
capture additional information on workplace injuries, including where
the injury occurred, what activity was being performed at the time,
what tools were used, and what was the probable cause.  According to
FRA, new codes were developed to isolate injuries and provide better
data for future rulemakings.  Because these requirements only
recently became effective, FRA has yet to accumulate sufficient data
for analysis.  Once sufficient data are collected, FRA will be able
to determine the causes of the most frequent and/or serious injuries
and illnesses and focus its efforts and those of the industry on
corrective actions.  The refined data will also allow FRA to
determine if additional regulations are needed.  In the interim, FRA
will continue to provide to the regions data on workers' injuries
along with the accident and inspection data that the regions now
receive for planning purposes. 


--------------------
\4 Data on injuries and illnesses by type of person and occurrence
were available only for calendar years 1979 through 1995. 

\5 The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 gave the Secretary
of Labor responsibility for promulgating and enforcing occupational
safety and health standards.  Section 4(b)(1) provides that the act
does not apply to working conditions where another federal agency
exercises statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards or
regulations affecting occupational safety or health.  The Federal
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 allows the Secretary of Transportation to
develop regulations that parallel standards under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act and preempt the Secretary of Labor from
enforcing such standards in the railroad industry. 

\6 FRA has developed some regulations relating to the safety of
railroad employees, such as those concerning safety for roadway and
bridge workers. 

\7 OSHA administers workplace safety programs in 25 states, while the
remaining states administer their own OSHA-approved programs.  Some
of the state-administered programs follow OSHA's procedures for
inspections, while others do not. 


      FRA'S POLICY RELIES ON
      INDUSTRY TO INSPECT RAILROAD
      BRIDGES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2

Rather than issue regulations governing the structural integrity of
the nation's 100,700 railroad bridges, FRA is relying on the
voluntary cooperation of the railroads.  A 1995 policy statement
provides railroads with advisory guidelines to use in implementing
their own bridge inspection programs.  FRA expects its track
inspectors to observe structural problems on bridges as they perform
their routine inspections and seek cooperative resolutions with the
railroad.  FRA states that the railroads have generally been
responsive in taking corrective action in response to inspectors'
observations.  However, unlike safety problems with track, signals,
or equipment, where inspectors have the discretion to cite defects or
recommend violations, inspectors have no such discretion when dealing
with potentially serious bridge problems.  Their only recourse is to
exercise emergency authority to close the bridge if conditions
present an imminent hazard of death or personal injury.\8

FRA was forced to take this action in February 1996 after a New York
State railroad inspector fell through a deteriorated bridge.  The
bridge was owned by a small railroad that operated one locomotive
over 1.5 miles of track.  FRA tried to reach a cooperative solution
with the railroad's owner over a 6-week period, but the railroad did
not cooperate.  After a bridge engineering consultant investigated
the bridge and concluded that it was unsafe for the movement of the
railroad's 50-ton locomotive, FRA issued an emergency order to close
the bridge.  The emergency order continued to be in effect in May
1997. 

Although FRA has noted that some smaller railroads have not addressed
all of their responsibilities for the safety of their bridges, FRA
officials said that bridge regulations are not necessary.  In 1995,
FRA issued a report that concluded (1) bridges owned by the class I
railroads were not in danger of collapse because they were designed
and built to support steam locomotives that weigh more than modern
locomotives, (2) over the past five decades no fatalities have
resulted from railroad bridge failures,\9 (3) the great majority of
railroad bridges are under effective management programs conducted by
their owners, (4) FRA and industry bridge inspectors do not have the
expertise needed to make a proper evaluation of the safety of most
rail bridges, and (5) FRA can use emergency orders as an ultimate
remedy for hazardous bridge conditions.  FRA also noted that
railroads have a considerable incentive, even without federal
regulations, to maintain their bridges in a safe condition, since the
loss of a bridge could not only cause human casualties but would also
cause serious economic losses and operating problems for the
railroads. 

FRA officials said that developing railroad bridge regulations will
dilute the agency's capacity to address issues that the agency
believes are more important.  While AAR agrees with FRA's policy that
regulations are not needed, railroad labor officials disagreed and
noted that bridge safety is equally as important as track safety, for
which FRA has promulgated regulations. 


--------------------
\8 As indicated in the 1995 policy statement, FRA maintains the
authority to issue emergency, compliance, and disqualification
orders, as well as the authority to seek injunctive relief in federal
district court. 

\9 Forty-seven fatalities did occur in a September 1993 accident when
a barge tow struck a railroad bridge in Mobile, Alabama, just before
an Amtrak passenger train arrived.  In other instances, railroad
bridges have been struck by motor vehicles or marine vessels, but,
according to FRA, no human casualties resulted. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

FRA has always faced the challenge of determining how best to deploy
its limited resources to oversee the nation's freight railroads. 
While field inspections and enforcement actions defined the agency's
approach in the past, the agency believes that the collaborative
approaches it has pursued since 1993 will provide a more effective
means to oversee an increasingly productive and growing industry. 
Railroad stakeholders have expressed initial support for FRA's SACP
process and are working to address systemic safety problems within
the major railroads.  On the other hand, efforts to develop freight
power brake regulations through the Advisory Committee have
encountered problems in the negotiations between FRA and the
industry. 

Similarly, it is unclear how the shift in FRA's resources away from
site-specific inspections--the mainstay of FRA's safety program for
many years--will affect rail safety.  FRA's field inspectors are
conducting fewer inspections as a result of their additional
partnering responsibilities.  These site-specific inspections served
an important oversight function and may have contributed to the
improvements in rail safety over the past 20 years.  FRA believes
that inspectors' time is well spent on the partnership efforts. 
Since these efforts are still evolving, including the role of
inspectors, it is too early to assess if they will improve railroad
safety over the long term. 

FRA's new approach has not yet systematically addressed concerns
about improving the workplace safety of railroad employees or
ensuring that railroad bridges receive inspection oversight
comparable to other railroad areas.  FRA's new injury reporting
requirements and database could provide the agency with the means to
determine the causes of the most numerous or serious injuries and
illnesses.  FRA and the industry could then work together to develop
corrective action.  The cooperative arrangements inherent in the SACP
provide a vehicle for FRA, labor, and the railroads to jointly seek
solutions to workplace injury problems.  If the injuries and
illnesses do not decrease as a result of these efforts, FRA could
consider addressing continuing workplace safety issues through
regulations.  The SACP process could also provide FRA with the means
to address bridge safety problems before they become emergencies.  By
ensuring that bridge safety problems that track inspectors find are
included in the SACP, FRA could quickly elevate the problems to
senior railroad management for resolution. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the FRA
Administrator to, in cooperation with the industry, where
appropriate, (1) analyze injury data collected under the revised
reporting requirements to determine the workplace safety issues that
lead to the most numerous or the most serious injuries; (2) in areas
where efforts to obtain voluntary corrective action do not address
the causes of these injuries, consider developing regulations; and
(3) use appropriate mechanisms, including the Safety Assurance and
Compliance Program, to ensure that a finding of potential structural
problems on a bridge is properly addressed by the bridge owner. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

In commenting on a draft of this report, FRA officials said that it
did not provide detailed information on the accomplishments the
agency's new rail safety program had attained since it was initiated
in 1993.  The officials cited improvements in key safety statistics
since 1993 and safety improvements in the operations of many larger
railroads as examples of how the agency's new systemic approach has
improved rail safety.  For example, railroad fatalities declined by
20 percent between 1993 and 1996 compared with a 1.4-percent decline
between 1990 and 1993.  In addition, the officials said that
limitations on its resources and expertise currently constrain the
agency's ability to address the workplace safety and bridge safety
issues that we cited in the draft report.  FRA said that these
limitations would affect its ability to continue its present
activities, adequately address new issues that will confront the
agency, and address concerns about improving workplace safety of
railroad employees or ensuring that railroad bridges receive
oversight comparable to other railroad areas.  Finally, while
agreeing with two of our three recommendations, FRA officials
commented on our recommendation that the agency consider developing
regulations to address the issues that continue to cause the most
numerous or serious workplace injuries.  The officials said that it
would limit its consideration of regulations to those areas that are
related to train operations.  FRA would have matters related to
non-train operations under OSHA's purview. 

In response to FRA's comments, we included additional information on
the accomplishments the agency's new rail safety program has achieved
by highlighting safety statistics for 1993 through 1996 and providing
detailed information on the successes with the SACP process. 
Specifically, we added information on noticeable reductions in
railroad fatalities and collisions that occurred during this 3-year
period.  We also included in appendix IV, FRA's performance goals for
improving rail safety in response to the Government Performance and
Results Act of 1993.  FRA's performance goals and 3-year record show
that safety has improved since 1993.  However, reaching conclusions
on FRA's new safety program by isolating safety improvements over the
most recent 3-year period ignores past trends in railroad safety. 
The past 20 years shows that periods of noteworthy reductions in
railroad accidents, fatalities, and injuries were often followed by
periods in which railroad safety worsened.  As we concluded, it is
too early to tell if FRA's efforts will sustain improvements in
railroad safety over an extended time.  Finally, we disagree with
FRA's contention that any workplace safety regulations that it may
consider issuing should be limited to train-related operations only. 
In assessing the more detailed workplace safety information that the
agency began collecting in January 1997, FRA may find a preponderance
of non-train-related injuries that warrant the agency's and
industry's attention.  Accordingly, FRA should not foreclose the need
to at least consider regulations that may cover serious injuries that
occur away from train operations. 

FRA had additional comments that we incorporated throughout the
report, where appropriate. 


METHODOLOGY USED TO ANALYZE DATA
FROM THE FEDERAL RAILROAD
ADMINISTRATION'S RAILROAD
INSPECTION REPORTING SYSTEM
=========================================================== Appendix I

To analyze the impact of the Federal Railroad Administration's new
approach on field inspections, we obtained data from the agency's
Railroad Inspection Reporting System.  The system contains all
records for calendar years 1992 through 1994 for inspections of
motive power and equipment, operations and hazardous materials,
signal and train control, and track.  For calendar year 1995, we
obtained data from FRA's current database which combines all of these
disciplines into one file.  These data included information such as
the railroad inspected, geographic region, inspection discipline,
defects, and violations recommended.  We worked closely with agency
officials to develop a list of subsidiary railroads to combine with
parent railroads for each year represented in our data, as well as to
develop a coding structure designating railroads as class I, group
II, or all others.  We also worked closely with agency officials to
ensure that we were counting the numbers of inspections, records
inspections, defects, and recommended violations consistently with
FRA's methods of generating statistics describing such activities. 

To determine railroads that had not received inspections, we
generated a list of railroads from FRA's Operations and Casualty
databases for each calendar year 1992 through 1995.  We compared this
list to the railroads (with subsidiaries combined with parents) from
the inspections data we received from FRA.  We focused on railroads
that received no inspection in any of the five inspection disciplines
or that received inspections in only one or two of the five
inspection disciplines. 


      RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF
      FRA'S INSPECTION DATA
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:0.1

We reported the results of our limited reliability assessment of the
Railroad Inspection Reporting System as required by the government
auditing standards in 1990.\1


--------------------
\1 Railroad Safety:  New Approach Needed for Effective FRA Safety
Inspection Program (GAO/RCED-90-194, July 31, 1990). 


SAFETY ASSURANCE AND COMPLIANCE
PROGRAM'S SENIOR MANAGEMENT
MEETINGS
========================================================== Appendix II



                               Table II.1
                
                       Fiscal Year 1995 Meetings

Railroad                                  Date of meeting
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
Chicago and Northwestern                  October 25, 1994

Southern Pacific                          February 15, 1995

Iowa Interstate                           April 26, 1995

Conrail                                   May 26, 1995

Kansas City Southern                      July 12, 1995

Florida East Coast                        July 18, 1995

Tri-Rail                                  July 19, 1995

Union Pacific                             August 23, 1995
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  FRA. 



                               Table II.2
                
                       Fiscal Year 1996 Meetings

Railroad                                  Date of meeting
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
Montana Rail Link                         October 11, 1995

CSX Transportation                        October 31, 1995

Dakota, Minnesota, & Eastern              January 25, 1996

Gateway Western                           January 31, 1996

Metra (Chicago)                           February 22, 1996

Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation  March 8, 1996
Authority (SEPTA)

Wisconsin Central                         March 29, 1996

Long Island                               April 3, 1996

Springfield Terminal                      April 16, 1996

Belt Railway of Chicago                   May 28, 1996

Norfolk Southern                          June 20, 1996

Alaska                                    July 16, 1996

New Jersey Transit                        July 18, 1996

Rail Tex (Central Oregon and Pacific)     August 6, 1996

Elgin, Joliet & Eastern                   August 20, 1996

Metro North                               August 27, 1996

Burlington Northern Santa Fe              August 30, 1996

Duluth Missabe and Iron Range             September 23, 1996

Canadian National (Grand Trunk Western /  September 24, 1996
Duluth, Winnipeg, and Pacific)

Illinois Central (Chicago Central and     September 26, 1996
Pacific)
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  FRA. 



                               Table II.3
                
                       Fiscal Year 1997 Meetings

Railroad                                  Date of meeting
----------------------------------------  ----------------------------
Metro Link (SCRRRA)                       October 17, 1996

Indiana Harbor Belt                       November 12, 1996

Canadian Pacific                          December 12, 1996

Amtrak                                    December 4, 1996

Texas Mexican                             To be determined

Farmrail/Grainbelt                        To be determined

Texas, Oklahoma & Eastern/DeQueen &       To be determined
Eastern

North American Rail Net                   February 1997

I&M Rail Link                             March 1997

Wisconsin Southern                        March 1997

Toledo, Peoria, and Western               April 1997

Northern Indiana Commuter                 April 1997

Escanaba and Lake Superior                May 1997

Dakota, Missouri Valley, and Western      June 1997

Central Railroad of Michigan              June 1997

Carolina Southern                         July 1997

Arizona and California                    July 1997

Blue Mountain Reading and Northern        July 1997

Ann Arbor                                 July 1997

Kyle Railroad                             To be determined

Wheeling and Lake Erie                    August 1997

Amtrak Capital Corridor                   August 1997

Indianapolis and Louisville               August 1997

North Shore Group                         September 1997

Red River Valley and Western Railroad     September 1997
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  FRA. 


FRA'S RULEMAKING ACTIONS
========================================================= Appendix III

                                     Source of
                                     decision to       Legal
Stage              Title             regulate          deadline          Other
-----------------  ----------------  ----------------  ----------------  ----------------
Prerule            Hours of Service  Reinventing       None
                   Electronic        government
                   Recordkeeping     effort
                   Project

Proposed rule      Track Motor       Petition to       None              Tasked to the
                   Vehicle and       develop a rule                      Railroad Safety
                   Roadway                                               Advisory
                   Equipment Safety                                      Committee (RSAC)
                                                                         on 10/31/96

Proposed rule      Locomotive        Rail Safety       Final rule or     Tasked to RSAC
                   Crashworthiness   Enforcement and   report, 3/3/95    on 10/31/96\a
                   and Working       Review Act -9/
                   Conditions        3/92

Proposed rule      Florida Overland  FRA               None
                   Express High
                   Speed Rail Rule
                   of Particular
                   Applicability

Proposed rule      Passenger         Federal Railroad  Initial
                   Equipment Safety  Safety            regulations, 11/
                   Standards         Authorization     2/97;
                                     Act of 1994 -     final, 11/2/99
                                     11/2/94

Proposed rule      Whistle-Bans at   Title III,        Final, 11/2/96
                   Highway-Rail      Public Law 103-
                   Grade Crossings   440

Proposed rule      Qualification     Petitions to      None              Tasked to RSAC
                   and               reconsider                          on 10/31/96
                   Certification of  aspects of an
                   Locomotive        existing rule
                   Engineers

Proposed rule      Track Safety      Rail Safety       Final, 9/1/95     Tasked to RSAC
                   Standards         Enforcement and                     on 4/1/96\b
                                     Review Act -9/
                                     3/92

Proposed rule      Environmental     FRA, FTA, and     None
                   Impact and        FHWA revisions
                   Related           to environmental
                   Procedures        regulations

Proposed rule      Reinvention of    Reinventing       None              Tasked to RSAC
                   Steam Locomotive  government                          on 7/24/96
                   Inspection        effort
                   Regulations

Proposed rule      Radio             Rail Safety       None              Tasked to RSAC
                   Communication-    Enforcement and                     on 4/1/96\d
                   Advanced Train    Review Act-9/3/
                   Control System    92\c

Proposed rule      Freight Power     Rail Safety       Final, 12/31/93   Tasked to RSAC
                   Brakes            Enforcement and                     on 4/1/96\e
                                     Review Act-9/3/
                                     92

Final rule         Rail Passenger    Federal Railroad  Initial
                   Service:          Safety            regulations, 11/
                   Emergency         Authorization     2/97;
                   Preparedness      Act of 1994 -     final, 11/2/99
                                     11/2/94

Final rule\f       Statement of      FRA               None
                   Policy Regarding
                   Safety of
                   Railroad Bridges

Final rule         Use of Remotely   FRA               None
                   Controlled
                   Locomotives in
                   Rail Operations

Final rule         Use of One-       FRA               None
                   Person Crews in
                   Railroad
                   Operations

Final rule         Alcohol/Drug      Reinventing       None
                   Regulations;      government
                   Miscellaneous     effort
                   Technical
                   Amendments and
                   Corrections

Final rule         Local Rail        FRA               None
                   Freight
                   Assistance to
                   States

Final rule         Freight Car       Reinventing       None
                   Safety            government
                   Standards:        effort
                   Maintenance-of-
                   Way Equipment

Final rule\g       Reinvention of    Reinventing       None
                   Regulations       government
                   Addressing        effort
                   Discontinuance
                   or Modification
                   of Signal
                   Systems

Final rule\h       Reinvention of    Reinventing       None
                   Signal System     government
                   Reporting         effort
                   Requirements

Final rule\i       Maintenance,      Reinventing       None
                   Inspection, and   government
                   Testing of        effort;
                   Grade-Crossing    petitions to
                   Signal Systems    reconsider
                                     aspects of an
                                     existing rule

Rule published on  Railroad          Reinventing       None
6/18/96\j          Accident          government
                   Reporting         effort

Rule published on  FRA Hazardous     Senate Report     Final, 5/1/95\k
7/25/96            Materials         103-150, Public
                   Penalty           Law 103-122
                   Guidelines

Rule published on  Roadway Worker    Rail Safety       Final, 9/1/95
12/16/96           Protection        Enforcement and
                                     Review Act -9/
                                     3/92

Rule published on  Power Brake       Rail Safety       Final, 12/31/93
1/2/97             Regulations: Two  Enforcement and
                   Way End of Train  Review Act -9/
                   Telemetry         3/92
                   Devices

Long term          Reinvention of    Reinventing       None
                   Regulations       government
                   Addressing        effort
                   Railroad User
                   Fees

Long term          Small Railroads;  Small Business    3/29/97
                   Policy Statement  Regulatory
                   on Enforcement    Enforcement
                   Program           Fairness Act of
                                     1996 -3/29/96

Long term          Tourist and       FRA, Regulatory   None
                   Historic Working  Flexibility
                   Group Regulatory  Act\l
                   Review (Section
                   610 Review)

Long term          Amtrak Waste      The National and  None
                   Disposal          Community
                                     Service Act of
                                     1990 -11/16/90

Long term          Protection of     Petitions to      None
                   Utility           reconsider
                   Employees         aspects of an
                                     existing rule

Long term          Selection and     FRA               None
                   Installation of
                   Grade Crossing
                   Warning Systems
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note:  Rules currently pending for which action was completed in the
last 12 months. 

\a The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act required FRA to
complete a rulemaking proceeding to consider prescribing regulations
in this area within 30 months of enactment.  The act required FRA to
report to the Congress if it decided, based on the rulemaking
proceeding, not to prescribe regulations.  FRA reported the results
of its investigation to the Congress in September 1996 and
subsequently referred the matter to the RSAC. 

\b The RSAC voted to recommend a proposal to the FRA Administrator in
November 1996.  FRA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on July
3, 1997. 

\c The Rail Safety Enforcement and Review Act required a safety
inquiry regarding railroad radio standards and procedures, and FRA
committed to revise its rules based on this study. 

\d The RSAC voted to recommend a proposal to the FRA Administrator in
April 1997.  FRA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on June
26, 1997. 

\e Proposals for passenger brake revisions are also being developed
with the assistance of a passenger equipment standards working group. 

\f FRA published an Interim Statement of Policy on April 27, 1995. 

\g FRA published an Interim Final Rule on July 1, 1996. 

\h FRA published an Interim Final Rule on July 1, 1996. 

\i FRA published a Final Rule on September 30, 1994, requiring that
railroads take actions to protect the travelling public and railroad
employees from the hazards posed by malfunctioning highway-rail grade
crossing warning systems, and that railroads follow specific
standards for maintaining, inspecting, and testing those systems. 
This rule was effective on January 1, 1995.  FRA is making technical
changes and minor amendments to this final rule.  FRA published an
Interim Final Rule on June 20, 1996. 

\j On June 18, November 22, and November 29, 1996, FRA published
final rules amending the railroad accident reporting regulations.  On
December 23, 1996, FRA responded to remaining issues raised in
petitions for reconsideration, issued amendments addressing some of
those concerns, and made some technical minor amendments. 

\k As stated in the report of the Senate Appropriations Committee on
the Department of Transportation's Fiscal Year 1994 appropriations. 

\l Under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, agencies periodically review
existing and proposed regulations that have or will have a
significant economic impact on a substantial number of small
entities.  The RSAC's Tourist and Historic Working Group will review
existing and proposed regulations for their appropriate applicability
to tourist and historic railroads. 

Source:  Semiannual Regulatory Agenda (Apr.  25, 1997) and FRA. 


KEY SAFETY STATISTICS, CALENDAR
YEARS 1993 THROUGH 1996, AND FRA'S
PERFORMANCE GOALS
========================================================== Appendix IV

                                                              Comparis
                                                                 on of
                                          Reductio                1996
                                                 n                with
                                          (percent      1998      1998
Performance measure       1993    1996\a         )      goal      goal
--------------------  --------  --------  --------  --------  --------
Rail-related             1,279     1,023        20     1,151      -128
 fatalities
Train accidents          2,785     2,511       9.8     2,414       +97
Rail passenger             617       437      29.2       423       +14
 fatalities/
 injuries
Rail employee           15,762     8,949      43.2    11,645    -2,696
 fatalities/
 injuries
Grade crossing           4,892     4,159      15.0     4,377      -218
 accidents
Trespasser                 523       472       9.8       494       -22
 fatalities
Hazardous materials      1,154     1,087       5.8     1,110       -23
 releases
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a 1996 data are preliminary. 

Source:  FRA. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix V

RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION

Joseph A.  Christoff, (312) 220-7703
Stephen M.  Cleary
Helen T.  Desaulniers
Sharon E.  Dyer
Bonnie Pignatiello Leer
Edmond E.  Menoche
Judy K.  Pagano
Phyllis F.  Scheinberg


*** End of document. ***