Energy and Science: Five-Year Bibliography 1990-1994 (Letter Report,
12/01/95, GAO/RCED-96-7W).

GAO published a list and abstracts of its energy- and science-related
products issued from January 1990 through December 1994. The products
focus on: (1) the Department of Energy's property management and
contract costs; (2) energy research and supplies; (3) uranium
enrichment; (4) procurement; (5) nuclear safety and waste disposal; (6)
nuclear nonproliferation; (7) environmental cleanups; (8) nuclear
weapons; (9) nuclear regulation and security; (10) motor vehicle fuels;
and (11) international trade.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-96-7W
     TITLE:  Energy and Science: Five-Year Bibliography 1990-1994
      DATE:  12/01/95
   SUBJECT:  Energy research
             Energy supplies
             Environmental monitoring
             Financial management
             Federal property management
             Contract costs
             Nuclear facility safety
             Nuclear proliferation
             Nuclear waste disposal
             Safety regulation
IDENTIFIER:  Bibliographies
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division

December 1995

ENERGY AND SCIENCE:  FIVE-YEAR
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1990-1994

GAO/RCED-96-7W



Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AFMD - Accounting and Financial Management Division
  AIMD - Accounting and Information Management Division
  ANS - Alaskan North Slope
  APA - Alaska Power Administration
  AVLIS - atomic vapor laser isotope separation
  BCLLWC - Boyd County Low-Level Waste Monitoring Committee
  BPA - Bonneville Power Administration
  CDC - Centers for Disease Control
  CNG - compressed natural gas
  CRADA - cooperative research and development agreements
  DOD - Department of Defense
  DOE - Department of Energy
  DOT - Department of Transportation
  EIA - Energy Information Administration
  EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
  ERA - Economic Regulatory Administration
  ERMC - environmental restoration management contractor
  FERC - Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
  ES&H - environment, safety, and health
  FOCI - foreign owned, controlled, or influenced
  FTC - Federal Trade Commission
  FTS - Federal Telecommunications System
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  GGD - General Government Division
  GOCO - government-owned, contractor-operated
  HEHS - Health, Education and Human Services Division
  HERA - Hadron Electron Ring Accelerator
  HHS - Health and Human Services
  HUD - Department of Housing and Urban Development
  IAEA - International Atomic Energy Agency
  ICF - Inertial Confinement Fusion Program
  IEA - International Energy Agency
  IMTEC - Information Management and Technology Division
  INEL - Idaho National Engineering Laboratory
  INPO - Institute of Nuclear Power Operations
  IRM - information resources management
  MHD - magnetohydrodynamics
  MRS - monitored retrieval system
  NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration
  NAS - National Academy of Science
  NES - National Energy Strategy
  NIST - National Institutes of Standards and Technology
  NPR - Naval Petroleum Reserve
  NRC - Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  NSF - Nuclear Science Foundation
  NSIAD - National Security and International AffairsDivision
  OCG - Office of the Comptroller General
  OIG - Office of Inspector General
  OMB - Office of Management and Budget
  ORNL - Oak Ridge National Laboratory
  OSI - Office of Special Investigations
  PART - Professional Audit Review Team
  PEMD - Program Evaluation and Methodology Division
  PEMEX - Petroleos Mexicanos
  PUREX - plutonium-uranium extraction
  R&D - research and development
  RCED - Resources, Community, and Economic Development Division
  RCRA - Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
  REA - Rural Electrification Administration
  SBA - Small Business Administration
  SBIR - Small Business Innovation Research
  SEC - Securities and Exchange Commission
  SEIS - supplemental environmental impact statement
  SEMATECH -
  SPR - Strategic Petroleum Reserve
  TQM - total quality management
  TRU - transuranic
  TVA - Tennessee Valley Authority
  UEA - Uranium Enrichment Activity
  UEC - Uranium Enrichment Corporation
  WIPP - Waste Isolation Pilot Plant

PREFACE
============================================================ Chapter 0

The General Accounting Office (GAO), an arm of the Congress, was
established to provide independent oversight of federal programs and
activities.  GAO's Energy and Science Issue Area examines the
activities of such entities as the Department of Energy, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the National
Science Foundation, the Department of Commerce's National Institute
of Standards and Technology, and the Patent and Trademark Office. 
The Issue Area's work generally focuses on examining the role and
continued need for a federal presence in these areas, exposing
incidences of waste and mismanagement, and promoting a smaller, more
efficient, and cost-effective government. 

Organized by our four primary areas of responsibility, this 5-year
bibliography lists the energy- and science-related products issued
from January 1990 through December 1994.  The products are listed
chronologically, with the most recent reports first.  To help you
locate individual reports, a subject index is included in the back of
this document. 

Questions can be directed to me at the U.S.  General Accounting
Office, Room 1842, 441 G Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.  20548.  I
can also be reached on (202) 512-3841 or on the Internet at
[email protected].  Readers interested in ordering documents or
in requesting bibliographic searches on a specific topic should call
the Document Handling and Information Service at (202) 512-6000 or
fax a request to (301) 258-4066.  An order form and mailing list
request form are included in the back of this document; single copies
of the products are free of charge. 

Victor S.  Rezendes
Director, Energy and Science Issues
Resources, Community, and
 Economic Development Division


MANAGEMENT AND MISSIONS OF ENERGY
AND SCIENCE AGENCIES
============================================================ Chapter 1

Managing DOE:  Further Review Needed of Suspensions of Security
Clearances for Minority Employees (Letter Report, 12/08/94,
GAO/RCED-95-15). 

ABSTRACT:  From fiscal years 1989 through 1993, the Department of
Energy (DOE) suspended 425 security clearances for contractor
employees at its Albuquerque, Savannah River, and Oak Ridge
Operations Offices. 

At each of these locations, GAO found that the clearances of
African-Americans, Hispanics, or American Indians were suspended more
often than would be statistically expected if the suspensions had
been randomly distributed across racial/ethnic groups.  DOE does not
monitor suspensions of minority groups' security clearances and was
unaware of the statistical disparities.  GAO believes that DOE needs
to further evaluate why these disparities are occurring. 

Professional Audit Review Team:  Performance Evaluation of the Energy
Information Administration (Chapter Report, 12/94, GAO/PART-95-1). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reviewed the results of the Professional Audit
Review Team's (PART) evaluation of the Energy Information
Administration (EIA) for the period October 1992 through June 1994. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) most recipients of EIA reports were
confident in using the factual data in the reports and were satisfied
with the reports' content; (2) 83 percent of the recipients stated
that the reports were useful as sources of basic facts and for
maintaining trend information; (3) only 13 to 20 percent of the
recipients stated that the reports were useful for conducting
investment analysis; (4) 15 to 23 percent of the recipients believed
that the reports were timely for investment analysis purposes; (5) a
majority of the recipients believed that the reports would be more
useful if they were available sooner; (6) EIA improved the quality of
the data contained in its Underground Gas Storage Report by extending
the data reporting date by 10 days; (7) the National Energy Modeling
System has allowed EIA to enhance its ability to represent and
analyze alternative energy policies; (8) EIA has provided training
and technical information to its technical monitors; and (9) EIA
could reduce its operating costs by $5.8 million by performing more
of its support services inhouse. 

Managing DOE:  The Department of Energy Is Making Efforts to Control
Litigation Costs (Letter Report, 11/22/94, GAO/RCED-95-36). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) has not kept centralized
data on the costs it reimburses contractors for outside litigation;
however, available data indicate that DOE spent about $40 million in
fiscal year 1992 on costs linked to the legal defense of current and
former contractors.  Most costs were for legal fees, travel and
administrative expenses, and consultant fees incurred by outside law
firms hired by the contractors.  These costs, however, were poorly
controlled because DOE lacked effective criteria spelling out what
costs it would reimburse.  As a result, DOE was being billed at
higher rates than other federal agencies for professional legal fees,
travel, word processing, and photocopying.  Furthermore, legal bills
were being reimbursed with little or no departmental oversight.  DOE
has begun to strengthen its control over these costs.  In particular,
DOE issued specific cost guidelines and instituted procedures for
periodically reporting all litigation costs.  DOE is also
establishing an audit function to enable it to conduct a detailed
review of the bills it receives for legal services.  Finally, DOE is
trying to consolidate cases involving multiple contractors and law
firms to improve case management and cut costs. 

DOE Contractor's Recreational Costs (Correspondence, 09/30/94,
GAO/RCED-94-313R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
costs for recreational activities for contractor employees at the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Oak Ridge facilities for fiscal years
1992 through 1994.  GAO noted that (1) the management and operating
contractor continued to charge recreational costs to the government
as allowed by its contract; (2) the contractor spent over $513,000
for recreational activities in fiscal years 1992 and 1993 and over
$181,000 in the first 9 months of fiscal year 1994; (3) the
contractor charged recreational costs to three separate accounts; (4)
recreation expenses included balls, game officials, facility rentals,
and prizes and awards; and (5) to reduce costs in fiscal year 1995,
the contractor has eliminated one company-sponsored golf tournament
and will require its volleyball and softball teams to pay for the
costs of officials. 

Energy Management:  Department of Energy's Efforts to Manage Overtime
Costs Have Been Limited (Letter Report, 09/27/94, GAO/RCED-94-282). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) direct overtime costs for
federal employees almost doubled from $15.5 million to $30.4 million
in 1992.  DOE has paid overtime for everything from carpet
installation to the transport and escort of special nuclear
materials.  DOE's efforts to manage overtime and minimize costs have
been minimal.  First, written justifications for overtime are often
vague and reviewed only by the employees' immediate supervisors. 
Thus, some questionable overtime, such as driving DOE officials to
the airport from their homes on weekends, continues without scrutiny
to ensure that this work is essential or cost-effective.  Second,
although federal agencies may require that employees take
compensatory time rather than receive pay for overtime, DOE does not
require them to take compensatory time.  Finally, contrary to DOE's
policy, employees' annual leave is not always planned to minimize the
use of overtime.  In some cases, employees took annual leave, worked
several regular hours, and then worked overtime after regular working
hours. 

OMB's High-Risk Program:  Comments on the Status Reported in the
President's Fiscal Year 1995 Budget (Letter Report, 09/20/94,
GAO/AIMD-94-136). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO examined the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB)
update of its high-risk program, as presented in the President's
fiscal year 1995 budget submission.  For the 1995 budget submission,
OMB decided to delete 26 areas from the program.  GAO disagrees with
OMB's deletion decision in three areas--contract administration
controls at the Defense Department, the Energy Department's weapons
complex reconfiguration, and staffing at the Bureau of Prisons.  Of
the 84 active areas on OMB's high-risk list, GAO disagrees with OMB's
progress assessment for three areas--the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program, Superfund program controls, and financial
management at the Treasury Department. 

Managing DOE:  Government Property Worth Millions of Dollars Is
Missing (Testimony, 09/19/94, GAO/T-RCED-94-309). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO's work on property management at the Department of
Energy (DOE) facilities has led to several conclusions.  First, a
substantial amount of DOE property is missing, probably more than the
$74 million identified in GAO's April 1994 report on 20 major DOE
contractors, including the contractor at Rocky Flats.  Second, many
weaknesses plague DOE contractors' property management systems,
including inadequate property-tracking data bases and a lack of
physical protection of DOE's property from theft.  Third, DOE has not
provided enough oversight of the contractors' property management. 
For example, many contractors do not have approved property
management systems.  GAO recognizes that DOE is taking steps to
strengthen property management.  Although GAO believes that these
changes may help, it will take the Department many years of continual
management attention to adequately address all of the complex
property management problems it faces. 

DOE Management:  Contract Provisions Do Not Protect DOE From
Unnecessary Pension Costs (Chapter Report, 08/26/94,
GAO/RCED-94-201). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) funds the employer
retirement contribution for about 18,300 University of California
employees who work at DOE's three laboratories.  Before revisions
were made in October 1992, no limits were placed on the amount of
DOE's pension fund contributions and the university was not required
to obtain DOE approval of changes to pension benefits.  Although the
University of California retirement plan reached full funding in
1986, the university regents continued to require employer
contributions until November 1990.  This report examines (1) whether
DOE can recover unneeded pension fund payments and (2) whether the
provisions in the revised contracts will allow DOE to control its
future pension costs and prevent unneeded payments.  GAO recommends
the renegotiation of several contract provisions to minimize future
payments and better protect the government's interest. 

Energy Management:  Modest Reforms Made in University of California
Contracts, but Fees Are Substantially Higher (Chapter Report,
08/25/94, GAO/RCED-94-202). 

ABSTRACT:  The Energy Department (DOE) provides the University of
California about $2.5 billion a year for research and development at
the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Lawrence Berkeley
Laboratories.  In the past, these contracts contained many special,
nonstandard clauses that reduced or eliminated DOE's authority to
direct the university's actions and contributed to management
problems that led to losses of millions of dollars' worth of
government property, excessive subcontracting costs, and the loss of
classified documents.  In 1992, DOE and the University of California
negotiated new 5-year contracts.  This report discusses (1) DOE's
efforts to add standard clauses typical of DOE's other contracts and
eliminate requirements that weakened DOE's authority, (2) the
compensation that DOE negotiated for the current contracts, and (3)
the proposed changes in contracting policy announced by DOE in
February 1994 that may apply to these contracts with the University. 

Energy Management:  Payments in Lieu of Taxes for DOE Property May
Need to Be Reassessed (Letter Report, 07/18/94, GAO/RCED-94-204). 

ABSTRACT:  The Atomic Energy Commission and its successor
agencies--the Energy Research and Development Administration and the
Department of Energy (DOE)--acquired a large property inventory
nationwide.  Most of this property was acquired decades ago for the
Manhattan Project and subsequent nuclear weapons development.  The
Commission was authorized to compensate communities for the loss of
tax revenues when such properties were removed from the local tax
rolls.  Such compensation is termed "payment in lieu of taxes"
because federally owned property is not subject to state and local
taxation.  The Commission was also authorized to make payments in
excess of the taxes if a community experienced "special burdens" as a
result of these activities.  In response to congressional concerns
that some communities hosting DOE facilities are receiving
compensation while others are not, this report (1) identifies which
communities have received payments and how the amounts were
determined, (2) assesses whether a 1987 revision of DOE's payment
policy was consistent with the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, and (3)
examines the potential effect of DOE's 1983 changes to the payment
policy. 

Managing DOE:  Tighter Controls Needed Over the Department of
Energy's Outside Litigation Costs (Testimony, 07/13/94,
GAO/T-RCED-94-264). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) has spent millions of
dollars to defend its contractors against lawsuits but has not kept
track of total costs and has been lax in reviewing bills submitted by
law firms, including those for travel, meals, and other expenses. 
DOE's only attempt to collect data on litigation costs showed that
the agency spent about $31 million in fiscal year 1992 on outside
legal fees.  However, significant other costs, such as the
development and operation of litigation data bases--averaging more
than $8 million annually--were excluded from DOE's estimate.  DOE has
yet to establish criteria directing contractors to seek discounted
fees or to set limits on billings by law firms for administrative
expenses.  Also, DOE has not adequately reviewed legal bills to
ensure that they are justified.  These shortcomings have caused DOE
to pay more than was necessary for contractor litigation.  The need
for strong DOE controls will become more critical as the details of
past radiation experiments on humans continue to be disclosed.  These
revelations will likely produce more lawsuits against the operators
of DOE facilities, thus increasing legal costs for the agency. 

DOE's Property Management (Correspondence, 07/11/94,
GAO/RCED-94-249R). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) management
and operating contractor's control over government-owned property at
the agency's Oak Ridge Operations Office.  GAO noted that (1) the
contractor does not have a system for tracking and accounting for
government-owned property or ensuring that subcontractors have
procedures to manage and control government-owned property despite
contractual and regulatory requirements for such a system; (2) the
contractor has not corrected systematic problems since 1988, and Oak
Ridge has not ensured that the contractor has acted on recommended
corrective actions; (3) Oak Ridge does not know which subcontractors
have government-owned property in their possession, the value of the
property, or whether there are proper safeguards in place; and (4)
these problems persist because DOE does not give them priority
attention. 

Uranium Enrichment:  Activities Leading to Establishment of the U.S. 
Enrichment Corporation (Fact Sheet, 06/27/94, GAO/RCED-94-227FS). 

ABSTRACT:  This fact sheet reviews the transition of the Department
of Energy's uranium enrichment program to a new government
corporation--the United States Enrichment Corporation.  GAO discusses
(1) the transfer of property and other assets to the Corporation,
including uranium inventories and accounts receivable; (2) decisions
leading to the preparation of the Corporation's financial statements,
pursuant to the requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1956; (3)
the Corporation's contracting practices, including the extent to
which the Corporation complied with federal acquisition regulations;
and (4) the Corporation's personnel policies, such as salary and
staffing requirements. 

Energy Management:  Use of Uncosted Balances to Meet Budget Needs
(Fact Sheet, 06/06/94, GAO/RCED-94-232FS). 

ABSTRACT:  This fact sheet provides information on uncosted
obligations held by the Department of Energy's (DOE) management and
operating contractors.  Uncosted obligations are budget authority
that DOE has obligated to its contractors for goods and services that
have not yet been provided and for which costs have therefore not yet
been incurred.  At the end of fiscal year 1993, uncosted obligations
totaled about $9 billion for DOE-funded programs.  DOE's management
and operating contractors held about $5.7 billion of these uncosted
obligations.  This report discusses the uncosted balances reported by
contractors at nine DOE facilities.  GAO identified uncosted balances
related to ongoing programs that could be used to offset fiscal year
1995 budget needs.  GAO focused on the funds in two
areas--environmental restoration and waste management and defense
programs.  These program areas had the largest uncosted
balances--$1.8 billion and $2 billion, respectively--at the end of
fiscal year 1993. 

Title 2--UEA Discontinued Operations (Correspondence, 04/28/94,
GAO/AIMD-94-108R). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's Uranium
Enrichment Activity's (UEA) reporting of property and equipment
losses from discontinued operations.  GAO noted that:  (1) UEA
complied with mandated accounting and financial reporting
requirements in its June 1993 financial statements and (2) the net
book value of the property and equipment estimated at about $501
million should be recognized as a loss, since these assets no longer
benefit UEA, and UEA is unlikely to recover any portion of the cost
of the property. 

Department of Energy:  Status of DOE's Property Management Program
(Fact Sheet, 04/07/94, GAO/RCED-94-154FS). 

ABSTRACT:  This fact sheet provides information on the management of
Department of Energy (DOE) property by the 20 major contractors
involved in defense-related activities.  GAO focuses on (1) the
amount of missing property being reported to DOE by these contractors
in their most recent property inventory reports, (2) the extent to
which DOE has approved contractors' property management systems, and
(3) examples of weaknesses reported in the most recent DOE review of
the contractors' property management systems. 

Department of Energy:  Challenges to Implementing Contract Reform
(Letter Report, 03/21/94, GAO/RCED-94-150). 

ABSTRACT:  This report to the Secretary of Energy summarizes GAO's
views on her Contract Reform Team's 1994 report entitled Making
Contracting Work Better and Cost Less.  The Reform Team acknowledges
that weaknesses in the Department of Energy's (DOE) "contracting
practices are significant and systemic." In GAO's view, the Team's
recommendations--more than 45 in all--represent a bold step forward
for DOE and address many of GAO's long-standing concerns.  These
suggestions include using performance-based measures to evaluate
contractors, providing more incentives to motivate behavior, and
reducing strict reliance on cost contracts.  The challenge facing
DOE's leadership will be to develop a strategy for making these
reforms a reality.  Overcoming workforce and management information
weaknesses--essential prerequisites for change--is a major hurdle for
DOE. 

Energy Management:  Inadequate DOE Monitoring of Contractors'
Acquisitions From Affiliates (Testimony, 03/17/94,
GAO/T-RCED-94-128). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) monitoring of its main
contractors at the Savannah River Site in South
Carolina--Westinghouse and Bechtel--do not ensure that DOE pays fair
and reasonable prices for acquisitions of goods and services from the
contractors' subsidiaries.  GAO's review of Westinghouse and Bechtel
acquisitions uncovered inadequate cost controls and performance
problems, unallowable and questionable costs, and inappropriate
contract approvals and contract payments.  Poor Westinghouse
management and limited DOE internal controls were contributing
factors.  DOE has not complied with its own regulations requiring
competition for acquisitions from affiliates.  Furthermore,
Westinghouse and Bechtel have been able to acquire items from its
subsidiaries without the same level of scrutiny that DOE would apply
if the purchases were made from nonaffiliated third parties.  Various
DOE studies point out that problems with acquisitions from affiliates
exist elsewhere in the agency. 

Government Contractors:  Measuring Costs of Service Contractors
Versus Federal Employees (Letter Report, 03/10/94, GAO/GGD-94-95). 

ABSTRACT:  The federal government spent nearly $12 billion in fiscal
year 1992 on advisory and service contracts.  An analysis of studies
done by GAO, Departments of Energy, and Defense suggests that cost
comparisons can be useful in deciding how to acquire needed services
in the most cost-effective way.  Federal agencies are not now
required to do such cost comparisons in deciding whether to contract
for advisory and assistance services.  Although the nine studies GAO
reviewed indicate that it may be less expensive in some cases if
services were done by federal workers rather than by contractors, all
of the studies had limitations.  The studies also varied in the
extent to which they incorporated all possible cost factors.  In
addition to cost, GAO believes that agencies should consider other
factors in deciding whether to contract out for advisory services,
including quality, timeliness, the technical skills of federal
employees, and the duration of the work to be done.  GAO notes that a
potential conflict exists between the administration's objectives of
(1) giving federal managers the flexibility to obtain needed services
from the best possible source and (2) downsizing the federal
workforce. 

Department of Energy:  The Property Management System at the Rocky
Flats Plant Is Inadequate (Chapter Report, 03/01/94, GAO/RCED-94-77). 

ABSTRACT:  A recent audit of government-owned property at the Rocky
Flats nuclear weapons plant in Colorado has revealed nearly $30
million in missing items that range from computers to forklifts, a
problem attributed to inadequate contractor management and poor
Department of Energy (DOE) oversight.  Contrary to departmental
guidance, DOE has never investigated the circumstances surrounding
the missing property.  Moreover, the contractor's property management
system is inadequate.  The plant's property tracking system database
is incomplete and contains inaccurate serial numbers for some items. 
Inappropriate changes have been made to the database, including the
deletion of entire records.  Finally, the controls over how plant
property is retired are inadequate.  GAO found that DOE, contrary to
its own regulations, has allowed the contractor to operate without
written property management procedures and has not approved the
contractor's property management system.  In addition, DOE has not
ensured timely correction of previously flagged property management
weaknesses. 

Energy Management:  DOE Can Improve Distribution of Dollars Awarded
Under SBA's 8(a) Program (Letter Report, 02/23/94, GAO/RCED-94-28). 

ABSTRACT:  Contract dollars awarded by the Department of Energy (DOE)
under the Small Business Administration's 8(a) program are
concentrated among a small number of firms.  Nearly 60 percent of
DOE's $1 billion worth of active contracts in April 1992 went to 13
firms.  This concentration is due, in part, to the fact that DOE,
like other federal agencies, is authorized to direct noncompetitive
8(a) awards to firms that it specifies.  In addition, DOE's Oak Ridge
Office has contributed to the concentration of awards by combining
several procurements into a single larger procurement, resulting in
the award of only one contract rather than several.  Although these
practices are not prohibited, DOE is missing an opportunity to have a
positive impact on a large number of firms.  Agencies are required to
award 8(a) contracts competitively if the estimated prices of the
contracts exceed certain thresholds.  DOE, however, has kept price
estimates for contracts artificially low and structured contracts so
that their estimated prices fall below the thresholds specified for
competition.  This practice has further contributed to the
concentration of 8(a) contract dollars among a small number of firms. 

Energy Management:  Inadequate DOE Monitoring of Contractors'
Acquisitions From Affiliates (Chapter Report, 02/11/94,
GAO/RCED-94-83). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) monitoring of its main
contractors at the Savannah River Site in South
Carolina--Westinghouse and Bechtel--do not ensure that DOE pays fair
and reasonable prices for acquisitions of goods and services from the
contractors' subsidiaries.  GAO's review of Westinghouse and Bechtel
acquisitions uncovered inadequate cost controls and performance
problems, unallowable and questionable costs, and inappropriate
contract approvals and contract payments.  Poor Westinghouse
management and limited DOE internal controls were contributing
factors.  DOE has not complied with its own regulations requiring
competition for acquisitions from affiliates.  Furthermore,
Westinghouse and Bechtel have been able to acquire items from its
subsidiaries without the same level of scrutiny that DOE would apply
if the purchases were made from nonaffiliated third parties.  Various
DOE studies point out that problems with acquisitions from affiliates
exist elsewhere in the agency.  GAO summarized this report in
testimony before the Congress, See:  Energy Management:  Inadequate
DOE Monitoring of Contractors' Acquisitions From Affiliates
(GAO/T-RCED-94-128, Mar.  17, 1994) by Victor S.  Rezendes, Director
of Energy and Science Issues, before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs (10 pp.). 

DOE's National Laboratories:  Adopting New Missions and Managing
Effectively Pose Significant Challenges (Testimony, 02/03/94,
GAO/T-RCED-94-113). 

ABSTRACT:  Since the end of the Cold War, the Department of Energy's
(DOE) nine national laboratories--Argonne, Brookhaven, Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory, Lawrence Berkeley, Lawrence Livermore, Los
Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia--have come under
increasing pressure to apply their talents to a variety of national
issues, ranging from improving U.S.  economic competitiveness to
cleaning up the environment.  Experts and agency officials agree that
the laboratories' missions need to be clarified if their resources
are to be used most effectively.  GAO testified that if DOE is to
develop a more effective management strategy, it must better define
the laboratory missions and strengthen its working relationship with
the laboratories. 

Federal Contracting:  Weaknesses Exist in NSF's Process for Awarding
Contracts (Letter Report, 01/31/94, GAO/RCED-94-31). 

ABSTRACT:  Weaknesses exist in the National Science Foundation's
(NSF) process for awarding competitive contracts.  Among the 10
competitive contracts it reviewed, GAO discovered that NSF, when
soliciting for proposals, sometimes did not clearly describe the work
needed or identify the specific items that it would consider in
evaluating the offerors' proposals.  In addition, NSF sometimes
either changed or improperly scored evaluation factors during the
evaluation process.  These weaknesses were mainly due to NSF's
overall lack of emphasis of contracting activity, including
inadequate internal oversight of the contract award process. 
Insufficient guidance for preparing solicitations and evaluating
offerors' proposals were also contributing factors.  In addition, GAO
discovered shortcomings in NSF's process for awarding noncompetitive
contracts.  Although agencies are allowed to obtain services from a
sole source rather than through competition, the agency must justify
the decision to do so in writing.  The justification documents what
efforts were taken to identify other potential offerors and what
steps the agency plans to take to remove barriers to future
competition.  NSF did not meet either of these requirements for 6 of
11 noncompetitive contracts it awarded during fiscal years 1990 and
1991. 

Energy Management:  Controls Over the Livermore Laboratory's Indirect
Costs Are Inadequate (Chapter Report, 11/16/93, GAO/RCED-94-34). 

ABSTRACT:  In fiscal year 1991, the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, a
government research and development facility, incurred about $436
million in indirect costs--outlays that are not directly linked to a
particular program, such as costs for facility maintenance or
accounting services.  In response to congressional concerns that
indirect costs were not being adequately managed or controlled, GAO
examined the adequacy of (1) financial management controls over
indirect costs at the Livermore Laboratory and (2) Department of
Energy oversight of the laboratory's indirect costs.  GAO makes
recommendations intended to stop direct costs from being included in
the laboratory's overhead pool and to develop adequate internal
controls that will ensure the reliability of the laboratory's
financial information. 

Energy Management:  Additional Uncosted Balances Could Be Used to
Meet Future Budget Needs (Letter Report, 10/26/93, GAO/RCED-94-26). 

ABSTRACT:  In congressional testimony last year (GAO/T-RCED-92-41),
GAO recommended that the Department of Energy (DOE) develop a system
to ensure that uncosted obligations--commitments that DOE has made to
contractors for goods and services that have yet to be delivered--are
analyzed as part of its budget formation process.  Since then, DOE
has made significant strides towards effective evaluation of its
uncosted balances as part of its budget preparation process.  The
absence of supporting accounting systems and unfamiliarity with the
new definitions, however, have produced inaccuracies in the data
included in DOE's first uncosted balances report.  These inaccuracies
limit the information's usefulness in making budget decisions. 
Developing the systems to accumulate the information in the format
needed for this report would improve the reliability of the
information reported.  In addition, revising the definition of what
should be reported as approved work scope could help spot delayed
projects that have accumulated more funding than can be used
effectively during the following fiscal year.  DOE proposed using
about $1 billion of the uncosted balances to meet fiscal years 1993
and 1994 budget needs.  GAO believes, however, that the additional
amounts of the uncosted balances could be used to reduce the budget
amount needed for fiscal year 1994.  In addition, procedures
requiring the prompt release of encumbered amounts not needed to
settle completed and terminated purchase orders and contracts would
help ensure that such amounts are not reported as encumbrances in the
future. 

DOE Management:  Funds for Maintaining Contractors' Operations Could
Be Reduced and Better Controlled (Letter Report, 10/25/93,
GAO/RCED-94-27). 

ABSTRACT:  Prefinancing refers to the budget authority that
contractors maintain to continue operations at Department of Energy
(DOE) facilities in the event of a funding lapse at the start of a
fiscal year.  At the end of fiscal year 1992, prefinancing funds
among DOE contractors totaled $219 million.  GAO concludes that the
amount of prefinancing funds can be cut and, for some contractors,
eliminated.  DOE allows its contractors to keep enough money on hand
to finance operations for 20 days.  GAO questions the need for this
funding because (1) other money is available that can be used to
continue operations if funding lapses; (2) any lapses in funding are
likely to be shorter than 20 days; and (3) some essential activities,
such as running the nuclear weapons facilities, can legally be
continued for a limited time without appropriated funds.  DOE's
prefinancing funds are not adequately controlled.  For example,
prefinancing funds are not specifically requested and justified in
DOE's annual budget.  Furthermore, DOE does not require the
contractors to maintain separate balances for prefinancing funds,
allowing them instead to mingle prefinancing funds with operating or
construction funds.  In addition, DOE has used prefinancing money to
offset budget cuts rather than to bridge funding lapses. 

Nuclear Waste:  Overhead Costs at the Department of Energy's Savannah
River Site (Fact Sheet, 10/25/93, GAO/RCED-94-13FS). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) contract management,
including contractors' overhead costs, continues to be a topic of
concern to both the agency and the Congress.  GAO has been examining
overhead costs billed by Westinghouse, the contractor in charge of
DOE's facilities at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.  This
fact sheet provides information on overhead costs (1) budgeted under
Westinghouse's contract for fiscal year 1993 and the allocation of
these costs to Westinghouse's various organizational units at
Savannah River and (2) budgeted and incurred by Savannah River's
Environmental Restoration Program, including overhead costs
distributed to certain environmental restoration projects. 

Financial Management:  Energy's Material Financial Management
Weaknesses Require Corrective Action (Chapter Report, 09/30/93,
GAO/AIMD-93-29). 

ABSTRACT:  In fiscal year 1992, the Department of Energy (DOE) paid
$16 billion to universities and private companies to run
government-owned facilities involved in research and development and
other activities.  Serious problems with contractor operations at
these facilities have led to gross mismanagement of government
property and funds, prompting the Office of Management and Budget and
GAO to flag this area as one at highest risk for waste, fraud, and
abuse.  As part of a series of GAO management reviews of major
federal departments and agencies, this report examines DOE's efforts
to (1) oversee its contractors' financial operations and (2) correct
the financial management material weaknesses cited in its Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act report. 

Department of Energy:  Management Problems Require a Long-Term
Commitment to Change (Letter Report, 08/31/93, GAO/RCED-93-72). 

ABSTRACT:  The Congress and others have criticized the Department of
Energy (DOE) for inadequately managing its vast nuclear weapons
production complex and for allowing contractors, which now dominate
agency activities, to elude management and financial oversight.  DOE
admits these weaknesses and, to its credit, has launched a broad
range of initiatives to overcome them.  Yet the management challenges
facing DOE are so significant that fundamental change will come
slowly.  Strong leadership is needed to sustain the momentum and to
build an effective management structure.  Two of the most important
management changes have been (1) DOE's reorganization to instill
accountability and (2) procurement reforms to bolster contractor
oversight.  But fundamental DOE weaknesses, including poor
communication with field offices and inadequate technical and
administrative skills among DOE workers, are undermining the success
of these initiatives.  Aggressive action to overcome these
shortcomings is especially important as the incoming DOE leadership
begins grappling with problems plaguing DOE organizational structure
and contract management. 


Energy Management:  Systems Contracting Weaknesses Continue (Letter
Report, 06/23/93, GAO/RCED-93-143). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO reported in 1989 that the Department of Energy (DOE)
was encouraging the use of "systems contracts" without any proof that
these contracts were cost-effective.  Systems contracts are used to
procure commonly used items, such as office, industrial, and
laboratory supplies, as needed rather than purchasing the items in
bulk and storing them in inventory.  GAO revisited this issue and
discovered that DOE's San Francisco Operations Office has yet to
implement GAO's earlier recommendations to help ensure that the use
of systems contracting is in the government's best interest.  As a
result, since January 1990, contractors at DOE's Stanford Linear
Accelerator Center and the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory have spent
more than $2 million on office supplies without any assurance that
the contracts are cost-effective.  The San Francisco Operations
Office also has not determined whether controls over systems
contracts are adequate at the Stanford and Berkeley facilities. 
During a 9-month period in 1992, Stanford and Berkeley spent more
than $540,000 on office supplies with no guarantee that the prices
paid were competitive with prices from other suppliers. 

Performance Evaluation of the Energy Information Administration
(Chapter Report, 06/93, GAO/PART-93-1). 

ABSTRACT:  The Congress created the Professional Audit Review Team
(PART)--composed of representatives from leading statistical and
analytical agencies, including GAO--to evaluate periodically whether
the Energy Information Administration has been doing its work in an
independent, objective, and professional manner.  This report, which
covers the period June 1990 through September 1992, examines the
usefulness of energy information reports and the adequacy of contract
management, including various aspects of the technical monitor
program.  The report also looks at action the Energy Information
Administration has taken on earlier PART recommendations. 

Inspectors General:  Appointments and Related Issues (Fact Sheet,
05/28/93, GAO/AFMD-93-74FS). 

ABSTRACT:  This fact sheet provides information on federal inspectors
general at various government agencies.  Specifically, GAO discusses
(1) inspector general appointments and related issues, (2) Department
of Energy inspector general resources devoted to the audit of Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission activities, and (3) agency and inspector
general resources and staff in the 34 entities with inspectors
general appointed by the head of the agency. 

Energy Management:  DOE Has Improved Oversight of Its Work for Others
Program (Letter Report, 04/07/93, GAO/RCED-93-111). 

ABSTRACT:  In a February 1989 report (GAO/RCED-89-21), GAO pointed
out significant weaknesses in the Department of Energy's (DOE)
controls over the work it carries out for others, primarily other
federal agencies.  DOE does this work, called Work for Others, either
directly or through its contractors.  The program cost about $2
billion in fiscal year 1992.  This report discusses (1) the problems
identified in the 1989 report, (2) DOE's actions in response to these
problems, and (3) other problems needing corrective actions.  GAO
focuses on the activities of DOE's San Francisco Field Office and its
two largest facilities--the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
and the Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory--which are run for DOE by the
University of California. 

Title 7--Prepayments (Correspondence, 04/02/93, GAO/AFMD-93-57R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to an agency request, GAO clarified a Title 7
requirement that agencies record intragovernmental billings as
deferred items if payment is made prior to the receipt of goods and
services.  GAO noted that:  (1) intragovernmental payments often
occur before an agency receives goods or services when the agency
processes a bill through the Treasury On-Line Payment and Collection
System; (2) recording a deferred item helps ensure that immediate
recognition of the payment occurs, there are necessary controls to
facilitate adequate monitoring and adjustment of all transactions
where payment is made prior to receipt of items ordered, and year-end
reported expenses and deferred items are accurate; and (3) although
recognition of a deferred item is not necessary to comply with the
Title 7 requirement, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should provide
a periodic listing to management on the status of open items and
implement year-end cutoff procedures to reduce its expense account. 

TQM Implementation at Energy (Correspondence, 03/30/93,
GAO/GGD-93-21R). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE)
implementation of total quality management (TQM).  GAO noted that (1)
58 percent of the 19 Energy facilities surveyed are implementing
various phases of TQM; (2) as DOE invested more effort in TQM
activities, TQM implementation matured; (3) over two-thirds of the
DOE facilities reported positive benefits from TQM, but almost
one-third believed it was too soon to judge TQM benefits; (4)
reported benefits increased as maturity increased; and (5) 9 of 21
potential barriers to TQM were moderate to very major problems for 39
percent or more of the total federal respondents. 

Energy Management:  Improving Cost-Effectiveness in DOE's Support
Services Will Be Difficult (Letter Report, 03/05/93, GAO/RCED-93-88). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) contracts extensively for a
wide variety of support services, including management,
administrative, and technical activities.  GAO reported in August
1991 (GAO/RCED-91-186) that contracting for this work can cost
substantially more than using federal employees.  GAO also indicated
that many of these contracts had been awarded, not on the basis of
comparisons between federal and contract costs, but solely because
DOE did not have enough staff to do the work.  This report discusses
(1) what actions have been taken in response to GAO's earlier
recommendations, (2) obstacles DOE has encountered in trying to
improve the cost-effectiveness of support services, and (3) whether
steps have been taken to overcome these barriers. 

Energy Management:  High Risk Area Requires Fundamental Change
(Testimony, 02/17/93, GAO/T-RCED-93-7). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) contract management
philosophy has put billions of dollars in yearly contractors'
services at risk.  These problems date back to the Manhattan Project
of the 1940s, when the government, desirous of enlisting the private
sector in developing the atomic bomb, gave contractors wide latitude
in running the government's weapons research and production
facilities.  Today, DOE is trying to overcome this legacy of
inadequate oversight by giving contractors more incentive to act
responsibly while simultaneously increasing oversight of contractors'
activities.  GAO applauds these efforts but recognizes that they will
take years to implement.  With the new administration, DOE has a
chance to build on the momentum from recent changes in contract
management.  The new administration needs to continue demanding
greater contractor accountability.  Improved information and
financial management systems, along with better-trained technical
staff, will also be needed to ensure accountability.  Finally,
changes of this magnitude will take long-term commitment and
sustained leadership to implement. 

Energy Management:  Types of Allowable and Unallowable Costs Incurred
Under Two DOE Contracts (Fact Sheet, 01/29/93, GAO/RCED-93-76FS). 

ABSTRACT:  This fact sheet provides information on costs that the
Department of Energy's (DOE) management and operating contractor,
Martin Marietta Energy Systems, incurred while running DOE's
facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and
Portsmouth, Ohio.  Martin Marietta has two contracts with DOE, one
involving Oak Ridge and the other involving the Kentucky and Ohio
facilities.  GAO identified some limited instances in which costs
incurred were determined to be unallowable, including Martin Marietta
employee memberships in trade, business, and professional
organizations.  Compared with the more than $1.8 billion spent on the
two contracts in fiscal year 1991, however, the amounts of the
unallowable costs were relatively small, and either DOE or Martin
Marietta plans to take appropriate corrective action.  GAO also found
that the most recent allowability-of-costs report, an examination of
fiscal year 1991 costs prepared by Martin Marietta's internal audit
staff, included a broad discussion of unallowable cost issues and
identified some unallowable costs.  The two previous reports did not
identify any unallowable costs.  Furthermore, Martin Marietta gave
GAO data showing that it had incurred more than $2.2 million in costs
to run DOE facilities in 1992 that had not been charged to the
government because Martin Marietta considered them unallowable. 
These costs included relocation expenses, community relations
expenses, incentive compensation for executives, country club dues,
and entertainment costs.  Also, in fiscal year 1991, Martin Marietta
charged more than $320,000 in allowable recreational costs, including
$7,300 for golf balls and $20,000 for a Christmas party. 

Federal Contracting:  Cost-effective Contract Management Requires
Sustained Commitment (Testimony, 12/03/92, GAO/T-RCED-93-2). 

ABSTRACT:  Loose administration of government contracts has resulted
in contractors getting bonuses for mediocre performance and billing
agencies for millions of dollars in unallowable or questionable
costs, such as employee parties, tickets to sporting events, and
liquor.  Civilian agencies now spend about $55 billion per year on
contracts.  Although contractors can play a key role in delivering
needed services, once contracts are awarded federal agencies often
give short shrift to overseeing the quality and cost of completed
work.  More thorough and timely contract auditing could help minimize
the government's vulnerability to waste, fraud, and abuse. 
Currently, a significant backlog exists of audits of costs incurred
by contractors.  Civilian agencies could also beef up their audit
effectiveness by clarifying which agency has responsibility for
contractor audits, clearly spelling out unallowable and questionable
costs, and making clear the government's position on the use of
contractor discounts.  At the core of the contracting problems, GAO
has discovered a lack of senior management attention to agency
contracting.  In some cases, senior officials have remained
blissfully ignorant of waste and abuse because agencies have no way
of flagging contracting problems.  In other instances, senior
officials have neither made managers accountable for effective
contract administration nor committed themselves to correcting
contracting problems that have surfaced. 

TVA Bond Sales (Correspondence, 10/23/92, GAO/RCED-93-43R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on the extent to which minority and regional bond
underwriters that participated in the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA) bond sales were actually located in the TVA service delivery
area.  GAO noted that (1) the number of underwriting firms considered
in the TVA region differed depending on the definition used; (2)
between October 1989 and July 1992, TVA conducted seven bond sales
totaling $12.8 billion; (3) underwriters located in the seven-state
region, but not in the TVA service area, were responsible for 7.6
percent of sales, and underwriters located within the TVA service
area were responsible for 4.6 percent; (4) four of seven bond sales
included the participation of a single minority firm that was
responsible for sales ranging from $5 million to $20 million; (5)
another regional minority firm was responsible for $5 million in a
January 1992 bond sale, $9 million in a November 1989 bond sale, and
$10 million in an October 1989 bond sale; and (6) neither of the 2
minority firms were located in the area actually served by TVA. 

Department of Energy:  Project Management at the Rocky Flats Plant
Needs Improvement (Letter Report, 10/16/92, GAO/RCED-93-32). 

ABSTRACT:  Various studies of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Rocky
Flats Plant in Colorado have highlighted numerous management
weaknesses that have affected some projects at the plant.  GAO
identified two ongoing projects--the supercompactor and upgrades to
the plant's low-level waste transfer system--that have experienced
massive cost growth during the past 4 years.  In both cases, project
managers did not properly oversee the early stages of the projects'
development.  Both the plant contractor and DOE have taken steps to
address some of these weaknesses, but GAO is concerned that these
actions may not be comprehensive enough to resolve all the problems. 
Although the plant contractor has developed corrective action plans
and has made progress implementing them, the plans were based only on
the contractor's business management review study and may not include
some urgently needed corrective actions.  DOE officials have said
that they have addressed the problems cited in previous management
studies but have not yet developed a comprehensive corrective action
plan with detailed tasks and completion milestone dates.  DOE
officials believe that such a plan is necessary and have designated
someone to draft one.  The agency, however, still needs to define the
plan's scope and set a date when the plan should be finished. 

Department of Energy:  Better Information Resources Management Needed
to Accomplish Missions (Chapter Report, 09/29/92, GAO/IMTEC-92-53). 

ABSTRACT:  Although the Department of Energy (DOE) relies heavily on
information in dealing with everything from massive environmental
damage to unsafe nuclear weapons facilities, staff throughout the
agency are not always receiving the information they need.  This
situation could increase the likelihood that the public will be
unnecessarily exposed to dangerous contaminants; the safety and
health of workers will not be adequately protected; outdated weapons
components will continue to be manufactured and discarded; and
facilities, secrets, and employees will not be adequately protected
from threats.  In addition, DOE is wasting money developing and
running information systems that overlap or duplicate existing
systems.  These problems exist because DOE has not (1) implemented a
strategic information resources management (IRM) planning process
that focuses information resource investments on achieving strategic
mission objectives and (2) exercised adequate management control to
ensure that IRM activities are conducted in accordance with the law. 
Underlying DOE's ineffective IRM planning and management control is a
lack of top management attention to managing information. 

UEC Net Present Value (Correspondence, 09/23/92, GAO/RCED-92-294R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on cash flow projections for the proposed Uranium
Enrichment Corporation (UEC), as envisioned by proposed legislation. 
GAO noted that UEC adjusted Department of Energy estimates for
revenue and expenses associated with uranium enrichment operations
from 1993 through 2011 to project the present value of UEC net
operating income to be about $5.2 billion; (2) any estimate of
earnings from uranium enrichment operations is subject to major
uncertainties because of the inherent difficulty of determining the
amount and selling price of enrichment services; and (3) UEC computed
the net present value of UEC payments to the Treasury for loans,
royalties, leases, and dividends to be about $3.2 billion, but that
projection is also subject to major uncertainties. 

UEC Cash Flow Projection (Correspondence, 09/17/92,
GAO/RCED-92-292R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated a
consultant's cash flow projections for the uranium enrichment
corporation that would be created by proposed legislation.  GAO noted
that the projections:  (1) incorporate several assumptions that would
not apply to the corporation, as envisioned by the proposed
legislation; and (2) use revenue and cost figures that do not reflect
recent program changes.  GAO also noted that its revised projection: 
(1) uses more recent Department of Energy revenue and cost estimates;
(2) makes adjustments to reflect recent changes in the proposed
legislation; and (3) shows that, from 1993 through 2005, the
corporation will return to the government revenues totaling about
$3.8 billion. 

Department of Energy:  Status of Reporting Compliance for DOE's Major
System Acquisitions (Fact Sheet, 08/24/92, GAO/RCED-92-204FS). 

ABSTRACT:  This fact sheet provides information on the Department of
Energy's (DOE) compliance with documentation and reporting
requirements for its Major System Acquisitions, which are defined as
projects critical to fulfilling an agency's mission.  GAO looks at
whether certain key documents for each Major System Acquisition have
been approved by senior DOE management.  These documents include a
mission needs statement, a project plan, and an independent cost
estimate.  Approval of these documents is required before or at the
start of a project, which begins upon the completion of the
conceptual design. 


DOE Management:  Impediments to Environmental Restoration Management
Contracting (Letter Report, 08/14/92, GAO/RCED-92-244). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) proposed new contracting
approach for cleaning up contaminated nuclear weapons sites would
rely on environmental restoration management contractors, who would
assume sole responsibility for handling the cleanup effort.  Although
DOE has set several important goals for this contracting effort,
constraints such as the lack of qualified cleanup personnel would
make it hard to achieve them.  GAO believes that evaluation should be
a major component in the implementation of the 5-year pilot tests at
DOE sites in Fernald, Ohio, and Hanford, Washington.  DOE has not,
however, established final criteria for measuring the concept's
success, identified the information needed to evaluate the concept,
or established a timetable for conducting the evaluation.  In
addition, DOE has not yet hired all the staff needed to oversee the
pilot tests or developed plans to train current staff in their new
oversight duties. 

Energy Management:  Entertainment Costs Under DOE's Uranium
Enrichment Production Contract (Fact Sheet, 07/30/92,
GAO/RCED-92-230FS). 

ABSTRACT:  As part of a contract to produce enriched uranium at
government-owned facilities in Paducah, Kentucky, and Portsmouth,
Ohio, Martin Marietta Energy Systems was allowed to bill the
government for more than half a million dollars in entertainment and
liquor costs.  The final tab included golf outings, musical
performances, receptions, tours, and a charter boat ride.  These
parties were thrown for utility executives who are either current or
potential customers for the government's enriched uranium.  GAO
questions the legality of spending federal dollars on alcohol and the
presence of bureaucrats and contractor employees at such social
gatherings.  GAO is waiting to hear from the Department of Energy's
Office of General Counsel as to why these costs were allowed. 

Grant Management:  Benefits and Burdens of Increasing NSF Financial
Reporting Requirements (Briefing Report, 07/13/92,
GAO/RCED-92-201BR). 

ABSTRACT:  The National Science Foundation (NSF), an independent
federal agency established more than 40 years ago to bolster
scientific progress in the United States, funded more than 25,000
active research grants in 1992, mainly at universities.  Because of
congressional concerns about NSF's ability to effectively manage its
growing volume of grants--NSF relies heavily on grantee institutions
to ensure that funds are spent in accordance with federal
guidelines--this fact sheet provides information on NSF's financial
reporting requirements.  GAO discusses (1) NSF financial reporting
requirements, (2) the extent to which NSF grant funds have been
shifted between budget categories and whether large individual budget
shifts were used appropriately under current NSF guidelines, and (3)
the views of NSF and university officials on increased financial
reporting requirements. 

Nuclear Waste:  Questionable Uses of Program Funds at Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory (Letter Report, 05/28/92, GAO/RCED-92-157). 

ABSTRACT:  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory spent the bulk of
its $32.5 million in nuclear waste program funding on scientific and
technical work.  About $1.5 million of this money, however, went for
apparently unrelated research that the Department of Energy (DOE)
authorized even though such funds may be used only for purposes
spelled out in the Nuclear Waste Act.  DOE, in allowing at least two
of its other laboratories to use nuclear waste funds for independent
research, did not ensure that the laboratories limited the use of
these funds to activities covered by the act.  While Livermore's
yearly spending on scientific and technical work has fallen by about
60 percent since 1989, the expense of managing this declining
workload is expected to decrease only by about 17 percent.  Livermore
officials attribute the relatively small decline in management costs
to the need to meet basic regulatory and project control
requirements.  DOE has not determined if more efficient ways exist to
manage the limited work assigned to Livermore, such as transferring
this work to another project contractor.  Finally, Livermore awarded
all of its project subcontractors on a noncompetitive basis without
adequate justification, bringing into question whether the contracts
were reasonably priced or other qualified contractors were fairly
considered.  Livermore is now instituting new procurement policies
and procedures that may correct this procurement weakness. 

DOE Management:  Better Planning Needed to Correct Records Management
Problems (Letter Report, 05/08/92, GAO/RCED-92-88). 

ABSTRACT:  This report examines how the Department of Energy (DOE)
responded to a 1988 National Archives and Records Administration
evaluation of DOE's record management program, which involves some of
the most important and extensive scientific information in existence. 
That evaluation cited major problems affecting every phase of record
management--from creation and maintenance through disposal.  GAO
looks at (1) the potential impact of these deficiencies on DOE
operations, (2) how DOE has responded to the evaluation, and (3)
additional actions DOE should take to improve its responsiveness to
the recommendations. 

Energy Management:  Vulnerability of DOE's Contracting to Waste,
Fraud, Abuse, and Mismanagement (Chapter Report, 04/10/92,
GAO/RCED-92-101). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) spends about 90 percent of
its budget--more than $17 billion in fiscal year 1990--on
contractors, primarily those managing nuclear weapons facilities. 
Persistent weaknesses in DOE's oversight and management of
contractors have led GAO to designate DOE contracting as one of 16
government programs at high risk for waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement.  This vulnerability arises mainly from DOE's
long-standing management approach of indemnifying nearly all
contractor costs and not exercising adequate oversight over
contractor operations and activities.  This report discusses in
detail (1) problems resulting from DOE's approach to contracting and
(2) DOE's recent efforts to address these problems. 

NSF Review:  Review Process for the National Science Foundation's
Science and Engineering Pipeline Study (Testimony, 04/08/92,
GAO/T-RCED-92-24). 

ABSTRACT:  The National Science Foundation's (NSF) 1987 study
entitled "The Science and Engineering Pipeline" was approved by
several layers of NSF officials, and the internal review the study
received appears to have followed NSF procedures.  Information
reported in a September 1991 NSF letter, however, may have given the
impression that the study received more formal external review than
was the case.  GAO contacted nine individuals mentioned in the letter
and discovered that eight of them had not provided formal review in
the form of written or oral comments.  When GAO brought this matter
to the attention of NSF officials, they said that they used the word
"review" to mean "professional interaction," which includes
discussions within the professional community on concepts and topics
related to the study. 


Energy Management:  Systematic Analysis of DOE's Uncosted Obligations
Is Needed (Testimony, 03/24/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-41). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO testified on how the Department of Energy (DOE)
analyzes uncosted obligations when formulating its budget requests. 
Generally, uncosted obligations are obligations that DOE has made to
contractors for goods and services that have not yet been provided
and for which no costs have been incurred.  Thus, costs relating to
the obligations will be incurred in the future.  GAO discusses (1)
the size of DOE's growing uncosted obligations, (2) their
significance in the budget formulation process, (3) why the uncosted
balances exist, and (4) DOE's analysis of uncosted obligations for
its fiscal year 1993 budget request. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Increased Rating Results in Award Fee to
Rocky Flats Contractor (Letter Report, 03/24/92, GAO/RCED-92-162). 

ABSTRACT:  In 1989 GAO pointed out problems in the Department of
Energy's (DOE) award fee process and recommended that DOE restructure
it to reduce the level of discretion exercised in making a final
determination.  Although DOE tried to improve the process, the final
outcome of the first award fee determination for EG&G--the contractor
now running the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado--indicates that some of
the same problems persist.  Despite findings of significant
deficiencies and marginal environmental, safety, and health
performance, the contractor's overall performance was deemed "good"
and slightly more than $1.7 million was awarded.  This increase was
possible through discretion exercised by the fee determination
official with the concurrence of DOE's Defense Program Office,
suggesting that the process remains subjective.  Furthermore, the fee
was awarded without clearly showing that at least 51 percent of the
fee was based on environmental, safety, and health performance--a DOE
requirement. 

Energy Management:  Better Federal Oversight of Territories' Oil
Overcharge Funds Needed (Chapter Report, 02/21/92, GAO/RCED-92-24). 

ABSTRACT:  About $68 million from two oil overcharge cases was made
available to five U.S.  territories--American Samoa, Guam, the
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.  In response to
congressional concerns about whether these funds have been spent
appropriately, this report examines (1) the amount of funds the
territories have spent and whether this amount has been accurately
reported to the Congress and (2) whether the Departments of Energy
and Health and Human Services have adequate monitoring procedures and
have taken steps to ensure that the territories' use of oil
overcharge funds is in accordance with legal requirements. 

Tennessee Valley Authority:  Issues Surrounding Decision to Contract
Out Construction Activities (Letter Report, 01/31/92,
GAO/RCED-92-105). 

ABSTRACT:  The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) has traditionally
used its own employees to do most of its engineering, construction,
and modification work.  In a significant departure from its
long-standing reliance on an in-house construction work force, TVA
announced a new policy in May 1991 to contract out all construction
and major modification work.  Concerns were raised that this decision
could mean that thousands of TVA employees would lose their jobs. 
This report examines the (1) basis for TVA's decision to contract out
construction and major modification work; (2) rationale for certain
procedures TVA has followed in complying with the government in the
Sunshine Act; (3) effect of the decision on TVA employees, including
the number and type of employees affected; and (4) effect of the
decision on TVA operations. 

Energy Management:  DOE Has An Opportunity to Improve Its University
of California Contracts (Letter Report, 12/26/91, GAO/RCED-92-75). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) is negotiating extensions
of its management and operating contracts with the University of
California for the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, the
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory. 
GAO believes that these contract renegotiations afford DOE an
opportunity to institute changes that will help ensure that the three
laboratories are run effectively and efficiently.  Under its current
contracts with the University, DOE lacks the authority to direct
changes to the laboratories' procurement and property management
policies and procedures.  The nonstandard procurement and property
management clauses in the current contracts have precluded timely
corrective action in these areas and have permitted costly
procurement actions that do not comply with DOE's policies and
procedures.  In addition, the university's contracts include a number
of other nonstandard clauses that can further limit DOE's effective
oversight of the contracts, such as the nonstandard allowable costs
clause.  GAO strongly supports DOE's (1) goal of including as many
standard clauses in the contracts as possible and (2) decision to
have any deviations fully justified and approved by DOE's top
management. 

Energy Management:  Tightening Fee Process and Contractor
Accountability Will Challenge DOE (Chapter Report, 10/30/91,
GAO/RCED-92-9). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) contracting practices are
1 of 16 areas in the federal government that GAO has identified as
highly vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.  As part
of a broader GAO effort to examine DOE's process for formally
reviewing and assessing the performance of management and operating
contractors, this report focuses on those contractors operating under
cost-plus-award-fee contracts with DOE's Albuquerque Field Office. 
GAO selected this office because it administers contracts for four
large defense materials production plants--Kansas City, Mount,
Pantex, and Pinellas--as well as the contract for the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant, in which DOE plans to store radioactive waste.  GAO
discusses (1) the effectiveness of DOE's use of performance
objectives to set expectations and evaluate contractor performance,
(2) the effectiveness of DOE's use of data from on-site reviews to
evaluate contractor performance for award fee purposes, and (3) the
effect of DOE's new award fee regulations on the performance
evaluation and award determination process. 

Comments on Proposed Legislation to Restructure DOE's Uranium
Enrichment Program (Testimony, 10/29/91, GAO/T-RCED-92-14). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO testified on legislative proposals that address the
future of the Department of Energy's (DOE) uranium enrichment
program, established to promote national energy security goals while
recovering the government's costs.  Each of the three bills and a
proposal by Representative Sharp would help establish clear
objectives for the enrichment program and allow the new corporation
to operate more efficiently than does DOE's current program.  The
proposals would also help resolve several long-term issues that
challenge the program's future, including the need to pay billions of
dollars for environmental cleanup and decommissioning at the same
time that competition is expected to increase.  In addition, GAO
believes that all the proposals would be strengthened by including a
$3 billion cost recovery goal, rather than forgiving all past
recovered costs or relying on unspecified dividends, uncertain stock
sales, or undefined rent or royalty payments that may not
materialize. 

Energy Management:  Contract Audit Problems Create the Potential for
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse (Letter Report, 10/11/91, GAO/RCED-92-41). 

ABSTRACT:  Is the Department of Energy (DOE) adequately monitoring
and overseeing its contracting process by performing contract audits,
and what is the impact or potential impact to the government when
they are not performed?  Even though DOE contracted out about $17.6
billion in fiscal year 1990 for goods and services, no assurance
exists that oversight and control of contract expenditures, through
contract auditing, will deter and detect potential fraud, waste, and
abuse.  Beginning in April 1990, DOE's Office of Inspector General
(OIG) reported that DOE managers lack adequate OIG assurance that the
management and operating contractors are operating economically,
efficiently, and in the government's best interest.  The assurance is
lacking because the OIG's cyclical audit coverage of DOE's largest
management and operating contractors has been incomplete due to
staffing and resource limitations.  In addition, because
nonmanagement and operating contracts can go unaudited for many
years, DOE does not know whether it paid a fair and reasonable price
for such contracts or whether the costs claimed were accurate and
allowable.  GAO's review revealed many instances involving millions
of dollars in which the government was potentially overbilled, or the
amounts paid or claimed were questionable.  Unallowable costs claimed
included such items as alcoholic beverages, unauthorized spouse
travel, and registration for golf tournaments. 

Energy Management:  DOE Actions to Improve Oversight of Contractors'
Subcontracting Practices (Letter Report, 10/07/91, GAO/RCED-92-28). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's Contractor Purchasing System
Review Program oversees the extensive subcontracting activities of
DOE's management and operating contractors.  This report describes
the subcontracting deficiencies occurring at DOE, identifies
shortcomings in the program, and discusses the corrective actions
that DOE has committed to take in response to GAO findings. 
Management and operating subcontracts, totaling more than $5 billion
in 1990, are vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse--a fact that is
reflected in DOE's own reviews.  Poor procurement practices of
contractors, coupled with inadequate DOE oversight, have led to
excessive subcontractor costs for the government.  DOE's reviews have
shown that management and operating contractors often do not ensure
that subcontractor prices are fair and reasonable and that
contractors are also restricting competition by inappropriately using
sole-source purchases. 

DOE Management:  Improvements Needed In Oversight of Procurement and
Property Management Practices at the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (Testimony, 08/20/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-88). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed management issues relating to the
University of California's operation of the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory.  GAO noted that:  (1) the laboratory did not
have adequate controls to ensure that property in its custody was
safeguarded against theft, unauthorized use, or loss; (2) because
control over secret documents in the laboratory's custody was
inadequate and decentralized, management could not readily ensure
that secret information was being effectively managed or controlled;
(3) the laboratory inappropriately used sole-source purchases, did
not comply with Department of Energy (DOE) review and approval
requirements, and did not give adequate attention to subcontractor
costs; (4) the laboratory had leased up to 58 passenger vehicles on a
sole-source basis from the university, since capital funds were
unavailable to purchase the vehicles and the General Services
Administration did not have the types of vehicles required; (5) in
several instances, the university overbilled the laboratory for
vehicles that had been returned to the university or which remained
in service at the laboratory; (6) the laboratory leased vehicles
without obtaining DOE authorization; and (7) DOE and the laboratory
have disagreed on the appropriate vehicle fleet size for at least 5
years, mainly because of inadequate DOE oversight of laboratory
purchases and property and the mutuality concept included in certain
clauses in the DOE contract with the university.  GAO believes that
there is a need for substantial improvements in laboratory management
and DOE oversight of the management effort. 

Energy Management:  Using DOE Employees Can Reduce Costs for Some
Support Services (Letter Report, 08/16/91, GAO/RCED-91-186). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) support service contracting practices,
focusing on:  (1) the overall cost and use of such contracts; (2) the
adequacy of controls to ensure that DOE support service contracts are
cost-effective; and (3) whether work performed on selected support
service contracts could be performed less expensively by federal
personnel. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) in fiscal year 1990, DOE obligated
$522 million for support service contracts, a 56-percent increase
from 1986; (2) the Office of Management and Budget's (OMB) guidance
on support service contracting does not uniformly require agencies to
compare contract and in-house performance costs to determine which is
more cost-effective; (3) DOE awarded few support service contracts on
the basis of cost comparisons, since it could not get additional
staff to perform the work in-house because of personnel ceilings; (4)
although DOE guidelines for managing support service contracts limit
the duration of each contract to 5 years, the guidelines do not limit
how long an activity can be performed under successive support
service contracts; (5) DOE policy does not require cost comparisons
or establish other controls over assessing whether DOE support
service contracts are cost-effective; (6) for 11 of the 12 contracts
reviewed, DOE use of support service contracts cost $5 million more
than federal employees would have cost; and (7) recent actions
indicate that OMB may be willing to consider requests for additional
staff if the requests adequately justify claimed cost savings. 

DOE Management:  DOE Needs to Improve Oversight of Subcontracting
Practices of Management and Operating Contractors (Testimony,
08/01/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-79). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the adequacy of the Department of Energy's
(DOE) management controls to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in
subcontracting, focusing on:  (1) subcontracting deficiencies at the
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and (2) DOE's Contractor
Purchasing System Review Program's effectiveness in identifying and
correcting subcontracting deficiencies.  GAO noted that:  (1) DOE
reviews show that contractors did not adequately perform and document
basic analyses needed to ensure that subcontract prices are fair and
reasonable; (2) inadequate DOE oversight and contractors' poor
procurement practices have led to excessive subcontract costs; (3)
the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory had such serious systemic
weaknesses as inappropriate sole-source purchases, noncompliance with
DOE review and approval requirements, and inadequate attention to
subcontract costs; (4) the Contractor Purchasing System Reviews have
identified internal control weaknesses in contractors' purchases of
systems and the award of subcontracts after work has begun; and (5)
such limitations in the DOE program as insufficient headquarters
oversight, inadequate follow-up by field offices, and resistance to
limit contractor purchasing authority have restricted DOE's ability
to identify all significant procurement weaknesses.  GAO believes
that millions of dollars may be wasted each year due to the extent of
overpricing associated with the procurement weaknesses identified. 

DOE Management:  Management Problems at the Three DOE Laboratories
Operated by the University of California (Testimony, 07/31/91,
GAO/T-RCED-91-86). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed management issues relating to the
University of California's operation of three Department of Energy
(DOE) laboratories.  GAO noted that:  (1) weaknesses in the
University of California's operation of two DOE laboratories included
inadequate controls for managing properties, protecting classified
documents, and ensuring that subcontractors were not subject to
foreign influence; (2) laboratories had weak property accountability
controls, resulting in serious inventory losses, and management lacks
a system of accountability controls; (3) two laboratories did not
comply with DOE regulations and procedures for determining whether
contractors were owned, controlled, or influenced by foreign
entities, increasing the potential for compromising national
security; (4) DOE did not ensure that procedures regarding foreign
interests or document classification were in place to protect the
government's interest, and DOE headquarters and field offices did not
adequately review on-site contractor operations; (5) there were
concerns as to whether DOE had adequate resources to carry out its
oversight responsibilities; (6) DOE could not effectively manage the
contracts for the university-operated laboratories, because the
contracts included clauses that provided DOE with less authority than
the government regulations; (7) the DOE Inspector General noted a
number of weaknesses in the agency's oversight and management
practices of university-operated laboratories; and (8) DOE recognized
the management weaknesses and has taken action to improve overall
contract management. 

Comments on Proposed Legislation to Restructure DOE's Uranium
Enrichment Program (Testimony, 04/10/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-33). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed proposed legislation that would
restructure the Department of Energy's (DOE) uranium enrichment
program as a government corporation.  GAO noted that:  (1) DOE had
limited ability to act quickly in a competitive enrichment market and
to set flexible prices; (2) DOE did not recover total costs of its
uranium enrichment program through revenues; (3) each of the proposed
bills sanctioned an earlier DOE writeoff of unrecovered costs and
eliminated all or most of the remaining unrecovered costs; (4) DOE
estimated that the corporation could generate over $3 billion in
gross income by the year 2000 and over $8 billion by 2008; (5) the
cost of related environmental cleanup and decommissioning would
discourage privatization of the corporation and could also threaten
its survival; (6) DOE estimated in 1988 that decommissioning costs
for the three uranium enrichment plants could total $3 billion; (7)
DOE did not completely identify or characterize the waste sites at
enrichment plants, and past experience indicated that those costs
increased as more information became available; (8) DOE did not set
aside any revenues for future cleanup costs; and (9) the
administration's 1992 budget requested funds for completing the
demonstration of the DOE atomic vapor laser isotope separation
process but did not contemplate funding program activities, such as
site selection.  GAO believes that the proposed bills would:  (1)
establish clear objectives for the enrichment program; (2) allow it
to operate in a more businesslike manner in a competitive market; and
(3) address longstanding problems. 

Energy Management:  DOE Needs to Better Implement
Conflict-of-Interest Controls (Chapter Report, 12/26/90,
GAO/RCED-91-15). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) controls over conflicts of interest in
subcontracts awarded by its research centers, focusing on:  (1) DOE
policies and procedures for identifying and avoiding conflicts of
interest and (2) implementation of those policies. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE regulations relied on
subcontractors' self-reporting for identifying possible conflicts of
interest; (2) DOE research centers did not properly implement
conflict-of-interest determination policies and procedures; (3) DOE's
Albuquerque Operations Office improperly allowed the Los Alamos and
Sandia research centers to review subcontracts for conflicts of
interest resulting in three cases of possible conflicts of interest;
(4) Albuquerque failed to verify the accuracy of subcontractors'
certifications; (5) Sandia's practices did not follow DOE regulations
or approved procedures; (6) Los Alamos and Sandia failed to document
their conflict-of-interest decisions; (7) DOE headquarters and the
Albuquerque Operations Office failed to exercise proper oversight to
ensure avoidance of conflict of interest; and (8) as a result of this
review, Albuquerque began to bring its practices into compliance with
DOE regulations.  In addition, GAO noted that it was unable to test
whether policies and procedures were effective, since Albuquerque had
not properly implemented them. 

Comments on H.R.  2480, The Uranium Enrichment Reorganization Act
(Testimony, 10/11/90, GAO/T-RCED-91-3). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed proposed legislation that would
restructure the Department of Energy's (DOE) uranium enrichment
program as a government corporation.  GAO noted that:  (1) it
supported restructuring the program as a government corporation and
establishing a decommissioning fund; (2) such legislation should
include a specific goal to recover past government costs associated
with the program; (3) the costs of cleaning up any new facilities
should rest with the new corporation; (4) the Congress should set a
specific repayment amount consistent with DOE projections of the
corporation's expected earnings over the next 10 to 15 years, rather
than rely on the receipt of unspecified dividends or on uncertain
stock sales; (5) unforeseen licensing problems, environmental and
decommissioning costs, and increased competition could inhibit the
feasibility of privatization; and (6) the government should pay its
share of the cleanup costs associated with the production of uranium
under government contracts. 

Comments on Smith Barney's Uranium Enrichment Analysis (Testimony,
07/31/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-101). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed an independent assessment of the
Department of Energy's (DOE) uranium enrichment program.  GAO noted
that the assessment concluded that:  (1) the enrichment program
should be restructured as a government corporation and operate on a
competitive basis; (2) DOE could reduce total costs by making various
adjustments and policy decisions; and (3) the government should
retain responsibility for environmental and decommissioning costs
associated with enriched uranium production.  GAO also noted that: 
(1) past unrecovered costs have hindered congressional initiatives to
restructure the program as a government corporation; (2) DOE
government customers were responsible for about $764 million of the
$9.6 billion in unrecovered costs; (3) a $5.7 billion write-off was
not necessary to ensure competitiveness, since DOE priced its
enrichment services to recover $3 billion over the next 12 years and
projected $3 billion in net income by 2000; (4) restructuring the
enrichment program would require the establishment of a fund to
decommission the three existing nuclear fuel plants; and (5) several
factors concerning the establishment of a private sector enterprise
involved licensing old facilities, increased competition, and the
resolution of liabilities. 

Comments on Smith Barney's Uranium Enrichment Analysis (Testimony,
07/31/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-101A). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed restructuring the Department of Energy's
uranium enrichment program as a government corporation.  GAO found
that before a private company is formed:  (1) the new corporation
should bear the costs of modernizing old plants and cleaning up and
decommissioning existing facilities; (2) the Congress should consider
restructuring legislation to ensure repayment of $3 billion in past
costs rather than relying on unspecified dividends and stock sales;
and (3) restructuring legislation should require the government to
match the corporation's fund contributions. 

Energy Management:  DOE Controls Over Contractors' Use of FTS Are
Inadequate (Letter Report, 07/17/90, GAO/RCED-90-184). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the
Department of Energy's (DOE) controls over contractors' use of the
Federal Telecommunications System (FTS). 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE policies make supervisors
responsible for preventing misuse of the FTS lines assigned to their
units; (2) DOE has neither developed procedures to guide supervisors
in carrying out this function nor provided information about the
calls made over their FTS lines; (3) DOE cannot develop more
effective controls over FTS use until it establishes a Privacy Act
system of records for its detailed information; and (4) DOE could
devise a cost-effective method for reviewing FTS telephone calls and
for following up on possible unofficial calls. 


CONSEQUENCES AND IMPLICATIONS OF
THE NUCLEAR AGE
============================================================ Chapter 2

Nuclear Materials:  Plutonium Storage at DOE's Rocky Flats Plant
(Letter Report, 12/29/94, GAO/RCED-95-49). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) faces a variety of
important, unresolved safety problems with plutonium storage at the
Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado.  When the plant was shut down in 1989,
DOE intended to restart operations in a few months, and plutonium was
left in place or packaged for short-term storage.  However, the
operations were never restarted, and the plutonium stayed where it
was, raising concerns about plutonium liquid leaking from pipes and
tanks, fire hazards, and worker exposure to plutonium.  Although DOE
has efforts under way to address these problems, important decisions,
such as what to do with the plutonium residues, have yet to be made. 
As a result, estimating the time frames and the total cost for
resolving the concerns is difficult.  In any event, fully
implementing DOE's programs will take many years and will likely cost
hundreds of millions of dollars. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation:  U.S.  International Nuclear Materials
Tracking Capabilities Are Limited (Letter Report, 12/27/94,
GAO/RCED/AIMD-95-5). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) computerized Nuclear
Materials Management and Safeguards System has significant
limitations that impair its ability to track the international
movement of nuclear materials.  GAO is concerned that DOE's new
tracking system will not overcome existing limitations that are often
caused by nonsystem problems.  For example, the system lacks data
that are not required to be reported under the U.S.  agreements for
cooperation.  GAO believes that DOE should have explored systems
alterations and asked its intended users to try to mitigate some of
these limitations.  In addition, because DOE has not followed good
systems development practices, it cannot be sure that the system will
be cost-effective or will even fulfill the needs of its major users. 

Nuclear Waste:  Change in Test Strategy Sound, but DOE Overstated
Savings (Letter Report, 12/27/94, GAO/RCED-95-44). 

ABSTRACT:  After pursuing for a decade a strategy for underground
tests with nuclear wastes in the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant--a
proposed repository for the disposal of transuranic wastes located
near Carlsbad, New Mexico--the Department of Energy (DOE) announced
in October 1993 that it was abandoning these tests in favor of
laboratory-based tests.  DOE claimed that this change would save
about $139 million by January 2000 and would allow DOE to begin
disposing of waste by 1998.  The general consensus among scientists,
experts, and regulators is that DOE's decision to discontinue its
planned underground tests with transuranic wastes is sound.  However,
GAO questions DOE's projected cost savings.  For instance, DOE lacks
documentation for many elements of the estimated cost savings.  GAO
also concludes that DOE will not be able to open the plant by 1998
instead of 2000.  Numerous unresolved issues could affect when DOE
can eventually begin disposing of wastes in the facility.  For
example, it is unclear whether DOE's schedule gives the Environmental
Protection Agency enough time to review DOE's procedures and decide
if DOE has complied with the Agency's regulatory requirements for
disposing of transuranic wastes in a repository. 

Nuclear Waste:  DOE's Management and Organization of the Nevada
Repository Project (Letter Report, 12/23/94, GAO/RCED-95-27). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE), in 1991, hired a
contractor--at an estimated cost of $1 billion over 10 years--to
engineer, develop, and manage a system for permanently disposing of
highly radioactive waste.  The centerpiece of this disposal system is
a geological repository for disposing of waste.  One of DOE's
original objectives for hiring this contractor was to reduce the
number of participants working on the disposal program, including
consolidating under the contractor much of the program work and the
investigation of the suitability of Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a
repository site.  This report examines whether DOE is effectively
using the contractor--TRW Environmental Safety Systems, Inc., a
subsidiary of TRW, Inc.--to manage the project.  Specifically, GAO
reviews DOE's efforts to consolidate participants' activities,
streamline decision-making, and cut costs at the repository project. 
GAO also assesses DOE's recent initiative to reorganize project
management. 

Nuclear Cleanup:  Difficulties in Coordinating Activities Under Two
Environmental Laws (Letter Report, 12/22/94, GAO/RCED-95-66). 

ABSTRACT:  In cleaning up waste sites within its nuclear weapons
facilities, the Department of Energy (DOE) must comply with two major
environmental laws--the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 and the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980.  The first law regulates the management of
facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes and the
cleanup of hazardous wastes released from such facilities.  The
second law governs the cleanup of inactive waste sites--that is,
sites where disposal is no longer occurring.  This report discusses
(1) what DOE has done to coordinate its cleanup activities under the
two acts, (2) what problems with coordination continue and how
cleanup activities have been affected, and (3) how DOE plans to
improve the coordination of cleanup activities in the future. 

Health and Safety:  Status of Federal Efforts to Disclose Cold War
Radiation Experiments Involving Humans (Testimony, 12/01/94,
GAO/T-RCED-95-40). 

ABSTRACT:  The federal agencies and an independent advisory committee
have been working diligently to disclose the details of U.S. 
government experiments that exposed human beings to radiation during
the Cold War era.  Although the federal effort is still evolving and
thousands of experiments have been identified, it now appears that
the full extent of these radiation experiments may never be known
because of difficulty locating and analyzing all pertinent documents
describing experiments that occurred 30 to 50 years ago. 
Furthermore, agencies have used inconsistent definitions for their
searches and, for the most part, have not verified the accuracy of
these searches.  As a result, federal agencies are having trouble
identifying persons involved in the radiation experiments.  Thus, it
may prove impossible to achieve one of the major objectives of this
effort--to contact the subjects of the experiments or their
relatives.  Moreover, concern is growing that the advisory committee
will not be able to complete its work within the current 1-year time
frame.  The committee is having problems satisfying its original
charters and has done little of the ethical and scientific analysis
of Cold War experiments called for in its charter.  Despite these
difficulties, the committee has decided to expand the overall scope
of its work. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Further Improvement Needed in the Hanford
Tank Farm Maintenance Program (Letter Report, 11/08/94,
GAO/RCED-95-29). 

ABSTRACT:  At the Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford facility in
Washington State, a backlog in routine maintenance increases the risk
of a significant leak or accident involving underground storage tanks
that hold 61 million gallons of high-level radioactive waste.  Some
progress has been made in strengthening the tank farm maintenance
program.  Westinghouse, a contractor at Hanford, believes that a new
maintenance approach has helped to reduce the number of uncompleted
maintenance projects from 1,969 to 1,517.  However, the remaining
backlog of projects is still too great to guarantee that needed
maintenance will be done in a timely manner.  Tank farm maintenance
personnel estimate that to respond promptly to maintenance needs, the
number of projects awaiting completion should not exceed 3 months'
work--about 300 projects, or less than one-fifth of the current
backlog.  Westinghouse can further improve its maintenance program by
reducing the time spent preparing and closing out maintenance
projects.  Westinghouse has started to experiment with procedures
that other DOE sites use to reduce delays, and these experiments show
promise.  Westinghouse can also improve its program by gathering and
analyzing more information about how it processes maintenance
projects. 

Nuclear Safety:  International Assistance Efforts to Make
Soviet-Designed Reactors Safer (Letter Report, 09/29/94,
GAO/RCED-94-234). 

ABSTRACT:  The United States and other nations have serious concerns
about the safety of 58 Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors in
Russia and eastern Europe.  These reactors do not meet international
nuclear safety standards.  Twenty-five of these reactors, because
they are of the oldest design, pose the greatest safety risk; 15 of
these reactors are the type that exploded at Chernobyl in 1986.  In
July 1992, the Group of 7--the major industrialized
nations--announced a multimillion-dollar plan to improve the safety
of these nuclear power reactors.  This report describes the (1) goals
and scope of the international assistance, (2) United States' planned
and ongoing assistance efforts, (3) impact of the assistance
provided, and (4) potential for closing the highest-risk reactors. 

Human Experimentation:  An Overview on Cold War Era Programs
(Testimony, 09/28/94, GAO/T-NSIAD-94-266). 

ABSTRACT:  During World War II and the Cold War, the Department of
Defense (DOD) and other national security agencies conducted
extensive radiological, chemical, and biological research programs. 
Precise information on the number of tests, experiments, and
participants is unavailable, and the exact numbers may never be
known.  However, GAO has identified hundreds of experiments in which
hundreds of thousands of people were used as test subjects.  These
experiments often involved hazardous substances, such as radiation,
blister and nerve agents, biological agents, and LSD.  In some cases,
basic safeguards to protect people were either not in place or were
not followed.  Some tests and experiments were done in secret, and
others involved the use of people without their knowledge or consent
or their full knowledge of the risks involved.  The effects of the
experiments are hard to determine.  Although some participants
suffered immediate injuries, and some died, in other instances health
problems did not surface until 20 or 30 years later.  It has proven
difficult for participants in government experiments between 1940 and
1974 to pursue claims because little centralized information is
available to prove participation or determine whether health problems
resulted from the testing.  Government experiments with human
subjects continue today.  For example, the Army uses volunteers to
test new vaccines for malaria, hepatitis, and other exotic diseases. 
Since 1974, however, federal regulations have required (1) the
formation of institutional review boards and procedures and (2)
researchers to obtain informed consent from human subjects and ensure
that their participation is voluntary and based on knowledge of the
potential risks and benefits. 

Nuclear Waste:  Comprehensive Review of the Disposal Program Is
Needed (Letter Report, 09/27/94, GAO/RCED-94-299). 

ABSTRACT:  Recognizing that problems exist with its program to
permanently dispose of highly radioactive waste, the Department of
Energy (DOE) recently undertook several review initiatives, including
a review of past criticisms of the program, a financial and
management evaluation of the repository project, and a public inquiry
into the continued storage of waste by utilities at their nuclear
power reactors after January 1988.  Taken together, these efforts are
too narrow in scope and are not objective enough to provide the
thoughtful and thorough program evaluation that is needed.  Many
members of the Congress have called for a broad-based independent
review of nuclear waste management, including the management of
highly radioactive waste from civilian nuclear power reactors.  This
report discusses why GAO continues to believe that a comprehensive
independent review of the disposal program and basic policies guiding
the program is needed.  Without a comprehensive independent review of
the disposal program and its policies, millions--if not billions--of
dollars could be wasted in implementing the program over the next
several decades. 

Health and Safety:  Protecting Workers and the Public Continues to
Challenge DOE (Testimony, 09/22/94, GAO/T-RCED-94-283). 

ABSTRACT:  This testimony focuses on the efforts of the Department of
Energy (DOE) to protect the health and safety of the workers at its
facilities and the people living in neighboring communities.  GAO
recently issued two reports on two key functions of DOE's Office of
Environment, Safety, and Health--health surveillance and nuclear
safety oversight.  GAO discusses the findings and recommendations of
these reports and the steps DOE has taken in response, as well as
outstanding issues concerning the transition of DOE's facilities to
regulation by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Consensus on Acceptable Radiation Risk to
the Public Is Lacking (Letter Report, 09/19/94, GAO/RCED-94-190). 

ABSTRACT:  Differences exist in the limits on human exposure to
radiation set by federal agencies, such as the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency, raising questions
about the precision, credibility, and overall effectiveness of
federal radiation standards and guidelines in protecting public
health.  Taken together, the radiation standards that have been
developed reflect a lack of overall interagency agreement on how much
radiation risk to the public is acceptable.  GAO found at least 26
different draft or final federal radiation standards or guidelines. 
Agencies also do not agree on how to calculate radiation protection
standards. 

Nuclear Cleanup:  Completion of Standards and Effectiveness of Land
Use Planning Are Uncertain (Letter Report, 08/26/94,
GAO/RCED-94-144). 

ABSTRACT:  During 50 years of nuclear weapons production, the
Department of Energy (DOE) and its predecessor agencies have
generated huge amounts of radioactive wastes that have contaminated
soil and groundwater.  As a result, DOE faces a massive, complex, and
costly cleanup effort.  During the next several years, DOE and the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) will decide on methods to be
used for environmental cleanup at DOE sites.  Standards for "how
clean is clean enough" and information about future land uses of DOE
sites would help in selecting appropriate remedial actions.  Past
efforts to develop cleanup standards for radioactive substances were
unsuccessful.  This report determines (1) how cleanup levels are now
determined for DOE sites, (2) the status and the likelihood of
success of EPA's efforts to develop cleanup standards for radioactive
substances, (3) the status of DOE's land use planning efforts, and
(4) what hurdles would need to be overcome if land use planning were
to be effectively implemented in determining levels of cleanup. 

Department of Energy:  Management Changes Needed to Expand Use of
Innovative Cleanup Technologies (Letter Report, 08/10/94,
GAO/RCED-94-205). 

ABSTRACT:  Although the Energy Department (DOE) has spent a
substantial amount of money to develop waste cleanup technology for
the nation's nuclear weapons complex, little new technology has found
its way into use.  Even where new technology has been successfully
demonstrated, agency officials have been reluctant to try new
approaches, tending instead to choose conventional techniques to
clean up their facilities.  As a result, opportunities for more
effective cleanup solutions may be missed. 

Nuclear Waste:  Foreign Countries' Approaches to High-Level Waste
Storage and Disposal (Letter Report, 08/04/94, GAO/RCED-94-172). 

ABSTRACT:  Some features of other countries' approaches to nuclear
waste disposal may offer insight for the United States, but a variety
of economic, political, geographic, and other factors must be
considered in deciding whether these features warrant further
exploration and possible adaptation to the U.S.  program. 
Governments around the world support the use of geologic repositories
as the best method for disposing of highly radioactive waste, but no
country has yet built an operational facility.  All the countries GAO
visited had experienced problems with their waste management
programs, and most do not plan to have a repository until 2020 or
later.  Differences exist between the U.S.  and foreign approaches to
repository development.  For example, all the countries GAO visited
have addressed the issue of temporary waste storage, thereby
relieving pressure to quickly build a repository.  Also, other
countries often involve nuclear facilities in their repository
development programs and allow waste managers much flexibility in
developing their technical and engineering repository concepts. 
Finally, several countries are exploring the use of long-lived
engineered barriers--fabricated components, such as waste
containers--for containing radiation in the repositories they are
designing. 

Independent Evaluation (Correspondence, 07/27/94, GAO/RCED-94-258R). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO commented on its evaluation of the Department of
Energy's (DOE) Yucca Mountain Site Characterization Project.  GAO
noted that the:  (1) scope of its evaluation is limited to selected
funding and scheduling issues (2) evaluation should include a
determination of the site's suitability as a radioactive waste
repository and the amount of funding and time needed to complete a
full investigation (3) draft statement of work places too much
emphasis on evaluating issues other entities have previously reviewed
(4) earlier work should be used as a basis for analyzing potential
problems in the program and (5) narrow scope of the draft statement
of work could result in an assessment that may not address many of
the project's major issues. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Sites Used for Disposal of Radioactive
Waste in Alaska (Fact Sheet, 07/06/94, GAO/RCED-94-130FS). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO's review of available information on Project
Chariot--an experiment conducted in the 1960s by the former Atomic
Energy Commission in which radioactive waste was buried in
Alaska--suggests that the amount of radioactive material at the site
is not harmful to humans.  GAO also identified six Army and Air Force
installations in Alaska where radioactive materials had either been
disposed of or stored on-site.  These radioactive materials involved
such items as nuclear power reactor cooling water and smoke
detectors.  In addition, the Naval Arctic Research Laboratory was
used by various institutions for research that included the use of
radioactive tracers.  Amchitka Island, where underground nuclear
tests were done from 1965 to 1971, is being monitored by the Energy
Department and the Environmental Protection Agency.  The Army Corps
of Engineers must still determine whether 138 defense facilities no
longer owned by the federal government are contaminated by hazardous
or radioactive materials and whether remedial action is required. 
Sites at five other nonfederal facilities that disposed of or stored
radioactive materials were also brought to GAO's attention.  These
involved (1) storage of pipe contaminated with radioactive material
resulting from oil drilling and (2) land and ocean disposal of
radioactive waste resulting from university research and aircraft
manufacturing. 

Nuclear Regulation:  Action Needed to Control Radioactive
Contamination at Sewage Treatment Plants (Testimony, 06/21/94,
GAO/T-RCED-94-247). 

ABSTRACT:  Radioactive materials are sometimes discharged into
municipal sewer systems by hospitals, decontamination laundries,
research facilities, and manufacturers licensed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).  NRC regulations fall short, however, in
controlling low-level radioactive wastes being discharged into
municipal sewer systems, possibly putting treatment plant workers,
plant property, and the general public at risk.  During the past
decade, at least nine cases of radioactive contamination of sewage
sludge have occurred at treatment plants.  One of the most recent was
the inadvertent discovery by NRC in 1991 of radioactive contamination
at the Southerly Sewage Treatment Plant in Cleveland, Ohio.  NRC has
concluded that the elevated radiation levels at the site do not pose
health or safety risks to plant workers or to the public.  The
facility has already spent more than $1.5 million for on-site cleanup
and a secured fence, and estimates for off-site disposal range as
high as $3 billion.  The full extent of contamination at other
treatment plants nationwide is unknown because (1) NRC has inspected
only 15 of the 1,100 licensees that may discharge radioactive
material to determine if a concentration problem exists, (2) NRC does
not know how many of the estimated 3,000 "agreement state" licensees
may have been inspected, and (3) neither NRC nor the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) requires treatment plants to test for the
presence of radioactive materials in sewage sludge.  Exposure to
treatment plant sludge, ash, and related by-products can occur in a
variety of ways.  For example, some of the substances are used for
agricultural and residential purposes, such as lawn fertilizer.  NRC
and EPA studies on the health effects of radioactive materials in
sewage sludge and ash have been inconclusive. 

International Nuclear Analysis (Correspondence, 06/09/94,
GAO/AIMD-94-142R). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reviewed a subcontract that supports the Department
of Energy's (DOE) International Nuclear Analysis Program.  GAO noted
that:  (1) the subcontract is due to expire on June 30, 1994, and DOE
plans to make it definite in the near future; (2) the subcontract is
for systems development and replacement of the current DOE nuclear
material management tracking system; (3) DOE needs to clarify certain
contractual items, such as the scope of work, systems acceptance
criteria, and remedies for system deficiencies; and (4) DOE needs to
ensure that the subcontract adequately protects the government's
interest. 

Nuclear Safety:  Unresolved Issues Could Impair DOE's Oversight
Effectiveness (Letter Report, 06/07/94, GAO/RCED-94-129). 

ABSTRACT:  In April 1993, the Department of Energy (DOE) announced
the transfer of the oversight functions of its Office of Nuclear
Safety to the Office of Environment, Safety, and Health as part of a
broader streamlining of the entire agency.  This report reviews DOE's
restructuring of nuclear safety oversight and evaluates whether the
proposed changes would improve or detract from DOE's ability to
ensure nuclear safety.  GAO (1) determines the process DOE used in
deciding to consolidate the two offices and (2) identifies issues
that could influence the effectiveness of the nuclear safety
oversight carried out by the Office of Environment, Safety, and
Health. 

Nuclear Regulation:  Action Needed to Control Radioactive
Contamination at Sewage Treatment Plants (Letter Report, 05/18/94,
GAO/RCED-94-133). 

ABSTRACT:  Radioactive materials are sometimes discharged into
municipal sewer systems by hospitals, decontamination laundries,
research facilities, and manufacturers licensed by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission (NRC).  NRC regulations fall short, however, in
controlling low-level radioactive wastes being discharged into
municipal sewer systems, possibly putting treatment plant workers,
plant property, and the general public at risk.  During the past
decade, at least nine cases of radioactive contamination of sewage
sludge have occurred at treatment plants.  One of the most recent was
the inadvertent discovery by NRC in 1991 of radioactive contamination
at the Southerly Sewage Treatment Plant in Cleveland, Ohio.  NRC has
concluded that the elevated radiation levels at the site do not pose
health or safety risks to plant workers or to the public.  The
facility has already spent more than $1.5 million for on-site cleanup
and a secured fence, and estimates for off-site disposal range as
high as $3 billion.  The full extent of contamination at other
treatment plants nationwide is unknown because (1) NRC has inspected
only 15 of the 1,100 licensees that may discharge radioactive
material to determine if a concentration problem exists, (2) NRC does
not know how many of the estimated 3,000 "agreement state" licensees
may have been inspected, and (3) neither NRC nor the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) requires treatment plants to test for the
presence of radioactive materials in sewage sludge.  Exposure to
treatment plant sludge, ash, and related by-products can occur in a
variety of ways.  For example, some of the substances are used for
agricultural and residential purposes, such as lawn fertilizer.  NRC
and EPA studies on the health effects of radioactive materials in
sewage sludge and ash have been inconclusive.  GAO summarized this
report in testimony before the Congress; see:  Nuclear Regulation: 
Action Needed to Control Radioactive Contamination at Sewage
Treatment Plants (GAO/T-RCED-94-247, June 21, 1994) by Jim Wells,
Associate Director for Energy and Science Issues, before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs and the Subcommittee on the
Environment, Energy, and Natural Resources, House Committee on
Government Operations (15 pp.). 

Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Exports
Need Strengthening (Testimony, 05/17/94, GAO/T-NSIAD-94-163). 

ABSTRACT:  Iraq's use of so-called dual-use equipment--items with
civilian uses that can also be used to build nuclear explosives or
produce weapons grade uranium and plutonium--has raised concerns
about the effectiveness of export controls over this material.  The
United States approved more than 1,500 licenses for dual-use items,
mainly high-speed computers, to eight countries with suspected
nuclear weapons programs, significantly increasing the risk that U.S. 
exports are fueling nuclear proliferation.  Weaknesses in the
interagency licensing review process have resulted in the approval of
a number of sensitive license applications without review by the
Energy Department or other members of the Subgroup on Nuclear Export
Coordination, an interagency group.  United States government
approval of sensitive exports dictates the need for effective ways to
prevent or detect export diversions, but GAO discovered several
weaknesses in current procedures.  These include (1) inadequate
criteria for selecting prelicense checks and postshipment
verifications, (2) ineffective methods used to do these inspections,
and (3) a lack of verification of government-to-government assurances
against unclear end uses. 

Nuclear Waste:  Much Effort Needed to Meet Federal Facility
Compliance Act's Requirements (Letter Report, 05/17/94,
GAO/RCED-94-179). 

ABSTRACT:  The Federal Facility Compliance Act requires the
Department of Energy (DOE) to (1) submit plans for treating mixed
wastes, which contain radioactive and hazardous material, to host
states or to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA); (2) get
approval of the treatment plans from the states or EPA; and (3) enter
into legal orders requiring DOE to comply with the approved plans. 
If DOE fails to meet an October 1995 deadline, it will be subject to
fines of up to $25,000 per day for each violation of restrictions
against storing untreated mixed wastes.  Because DOE is months away
from developing draft and proposed site treatment plans, it is too
early to tell if DOE, the states, and EPA will be able to resolve
technical and policy issues, negotiate final site treatment plans,
and sign compliance orders in time to meet the deadline.  However,
considering the amount of work that remains and the time available to
finish it, if DOE either misses its milestones for preparing the
draft and final site treatment plans or if the draft and plans do not
adequately resolve mixed waste treatment, characterization, and
disposal issues, the likelihood of missing the deadline increases. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Export Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use
Items Need to Be Strengthened (Chapter Report, 04/26/94,
GAO/NSIAD-94-119). 

ABSTRACT:  Iraq's use of so-called dual-use equipment--items with
civilian uses that can also be used to build nuclear explosives or
produce weapons grade uranium and plutonium--has raised concerns
about the effectiveness of export controls over this material.  The
United States approved more than 1,500 licenses for dual-use items,
mainly high-speed computers, to eight countries with suspected
nuclear weapons programs, significantly increasing the risk that U.S. 
exports are fueling nuclear proliferation.  Weaknesses in the
interagency licensing review process have resulted in the approval of
a number of sensitive license applications without review by the
Department of Energy (DOE) or other members of the Subgroup on
Nuclear Export Coordination, an interagency group.  United States
government approval of sensitive exports dictates the need for
effective ways to prevent or detect export diversions, but GAO
discovered several weaknesses in current procedures.  These include
(1) inadequate criteria for selecting prelicense checks and
postshipment verifications, (2) ineffective methods used to do these
inspections, and (3) a lack of verification of
government-to-government assurances against nuclear end uses.  GAO
summarized this report in testimony before the Congress; see: 
Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Licensing Procedures for Dual-Use Export
Need Strengthening (GAO/T-NSIAD-94-163, May 17, 1994) by Joseph E. 
Kelley, Director of International Affairs Issues, before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs (20 pp.). 

Federal Facilities:  Agencies Slow to Define the Scope and Cost of
Hazardous Waste Site Cleanups (Letter Report, 04/15/94,
GAO/RCED-94-73). 

ABSTRACT:  Environmental laws require federal agencies to clean up
hazardous and radioactive waste contamination at facilities they own
or use or once owned or used.  Agencies' early cleanup experiences
indicate that the overall federal cleanup effort will be enormously
expensive and will require decades to complete.  Published estimates
of the government's cleanup liability now range in the hundreds of
billions of dollars and are still growing.  This report (1)
determines the status of federal efforts to identify facilities
potentially requiring cleanup, (2) estimates future cleanup costs and
(3) discusses obstacles to agencies' progress in these areas. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Concerns With U.S.  Delays in Accepting
Foreign Research Reactors' Spent Fuel (Letter Report, 03/25/94,
GAO/RCED-94-119). 

ABSTRACT:  A key nonproliferation goal of the United States is to
discourage the use of highly enriched uranium, a material that can be
used to make nuclear bombs, in civilian nuclear programs worldwide. 
Research reactors are of particular concern because the major
civilian use of highly enriched uranium is as fuel in these reactors. 
U.S.  officials question the safety of spent, highly enriched uranium
fuel left in interim storage at reactor sites worldwide and, for
security reasons, would prefer that this spent fuel be consolidated
and stored permanently in the United States.  Under its Off-Site Fuel
Policy, the Department of Energy (DOE) has since 1968 been taking
back the spent fuel, reprocessing it, and storing the resulting waste
at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.  But DOE stopped this
practice in the late 1980s, arguing that the fuels policy could not
be renewed until environmental studies were done.  No spent fuel of
U.S.  origin has been taken back since the fuels policy expired,
despite warnings from operators of foreign research reactors that
they were facing fuel storage problems.  This report provides
information on (1) the effects of delays in renewing the Off-Site
Fuels Policy on U.S.  nonproliferation goals and
programs--specifically, the reduced enrichment program; (2) DOE's
efforts to renew the fuels policy; and (3) the price to be charged to
the operators of foreign reactors for DOE's activities in taking back
the spent fuel. 

Health and Safety:  Protecting Department of Energy Workers' Health
and Safety (Testimony, 03/09/94, GAO/T-RCED-94-143). 

ABSTRACT:  During the past 50 years, the Department of Energy's (DOE)
nuclear weapons complex produced tens of thousands of nuclear
weapons.  A by-product of this effort was vast quantities of
radioactive and other toxic substances, ranging from plutonium and
cesium to mercury and lead, all of which pose potential health and
safety threats to plant workers--more than 600,000 over the
years--and to persons who have lived in neighboring communities. 
Protecting workers from exposure to radiation and hazardous materials
continues to be a problem at DOE sites, and the cleanup program will
expose workers to additional dangers.  DOE needs a vigorous health
and safety program that can accurately determine and minimize the
need for improvement.  Although DOE has tried to strengthen the
Office of Environment, Safety, and Health, GAO's examination of a key
program--the Health Surveillance Program--uncovered many problems. 
Moreover, concerns have been raised about the quality and reliability
of DOE's data on worker exposure to hazardous substances. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Safety and Health Oversight at DOE
Defense Nuclear Facilities (Testimony, 03/01/94, GAO/T-RCED-94-138). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) history contains many
examples in which safety, health, and environmental concerns have
taken a backseat to weapons production.  DOE officials acknowledge
that this has occurred in the past.  Since the late 1980s, DOE has
tried to strengthen its internal oversight, and in 1988, the Congress
created the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to provide
outside independent oversight.  These changes have improved safety
and health operations at DOE.  Even so, GAO believes it is
appropriate to assess the effectiveness of these controls and work to
provide greater assurances that health and safety are not
compromised. 

Health and Safety:  DOE's Implementation of a Comprehensive Health
Surveillance Program Is Slow (Letter Report, 12/16/93,
GAO/RCED-94-47). 

ABSTRACT:  Workers in the Department of Energy's (DOE) industrial
complex are at risk of exposure to ionizing radiation, potentially
toxic chemicals, and other health hazards.  A 1989 DOE panel
recommended that the agency implement a health surveillance program
to systematically collect and analyze data on workers' health and
workplace conditions to detect illnesses or health trends linked to
workplace exposure.  In the 4 years since, DOE has not fully
implemented such a program.  DOE attributes the delays to technical
difficulties and staffing shortages, although GAO believes that a
lack of program planning has also been a contributing factor.  DOE
now projects full program implementation by 1998.  Until a
comprehensive program is developed, DOE will continue a program that
began at the University of Washington in 1983--one that is limited to
analyzing patterns of illnesses and injuries on the basis of
information provided by DOE sites.  A lack of complete reporting of
illnesses and injuries, however, limits the current program's ability
to flag the occupational diseases, injuries, and premature deaths
that threaten workers.  Expanding the program to additional sites
without correcting these problems will simply make a program with
limited effectiveness larger and will do little to improve the health
of DOE workers. 

Nuclear Science:  Developing Technology to Reduce Radioactive Waste
May Take Decades and Be Costly (Chapter Report, 12/10/93,
GAO/RCED-94-16). 

ABSTRACT:  U.S.  efforts to develop a technology, known as waste
transmutation, that might be able to reduce the volume and the
radioactivity of nuclear waste have lagged because the Department of
Energy (DOE) believes that the technology is too costly and
unnecessary.  Such radioactive waste, the legacy of commercial
nuclear power and nuclear weapons production, will have to be buried
in a deep geological repository.  In essence, any practical
application of transmutation is at least decades away, and several
roadblocks would likely slow or prevent application should it be
pursued.  These include current funding constraints; the high cost
and the long time needed to develop and implement transmutation; and
the technical, institutional, and public challenges that would need
to be overcome.  Moreover, DOE's waste managers, industry
representatives, and others now believe that transmutation is neither
necessary nor cost-beneficial. 

DOE Management:  Implementing the Environmental Restoration
Management Contractor Concept (Testimony, 12/01/93,
GAO/T-RCED-94-86). 

ABSTRACT:  As part of its effort to reform contract management, the
Department of Energy (DOE) is now pilot testing at its Fernald, Ohio,
and Hanford, Washington, sites a new environmental restoration
management contractor approach.  DOE hopes that this approach will
lower cleanup costs, accelerate cleanups, and strengthen agency
management control over contractors.  GAO testified that the
environmental restoration management contractor concept, with its
ambitious goals and use of an invoice approach, offers the promise of
better DOE oversight of cleanup contractors.  Several constraints,
however, may make it difficult to realize the concept's goals.  GAO
continues to believe that a thorough and careful evaluation should be
a major component of the pilot tests.  More importantly, the success
of the pilot tests could be seriously jeopardized unless DOE meets
its own estimates of the number of qualified staff and adequately
trains them to oversee the contractors. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Examples of Post World War II Radiation
Releases at U.S.  Nuclear Sites (Fact Sheet, 11/24/93,
GAO/RCED-94-51FS). 

ABSTRACT:  In reaction to the Soviet Union's first atomic bomb
detonation in the late 1940s, the U.S.  government began a series of
nuclear tests that released into the atmosphere what are today
considered potentially dangerous quantities of radioactive material. 
During the 1949 Green Run Test at Hanford, Washington, the military
and the Atomic Energy Commission released a radioactive cloud that
spread out over southeast Washington and Oregon.  The details of
these tests have been shrouded in secrecy over the years.  This fact
sheet provides information on the Green Run Test as well as 12 other
radioactive releases at three other nuclear sites--Oak Ridge,
Tennessee; Dugway, Utah; and Los Alamos, New Mexico--between 1948 and
1952.  During two of the tests at the Los Alamos site, for example,
atmospheric radiation reached small towns 70 miles away.  The
potential health consequences of these experiments are still under
study. 

ERMC Follow-up (Correspondence, 10/27/93, GAO/RCED-94-49R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in implementing pilot tests for
new environmental restoration management contractors (ERMC) at its
Fernald and Hanford sites.  GAO found that:  (1) DOE has selected a
contractor for the ERMC pilot test at the Fernald site; (2) DOE has
not fully implemented the recommendations for improving ERMC pilot
tests and is in the process of designing a plan for evaluating the
ERMC approach; (3) DOE evaluation, scheduled to be completed by May
1994, will determine ERMC program effectiveness and whether pilot
tests can be used at other DOE cleanup sites; and (4) although DOE
has identified staffing needs at the Fernald and Hanford sites, it
has not developed a plan for acquiring staff for either site. 

Safety and Health:  Worker Safety and Health Oversight Issues Facing
DOE (Testimony, 10/21/93, GAO/T-RCED-94-54). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) is involved in various
activities that could expose workers to radiation and toxic
chemicals.  In 1992 alone, 15 DOE workers died during on-the-job
mishaps.  During the past decade, GAO has repeatedly called for
improvements in DOE's safety and health oversight.  Although recent
DOE initiatives aimed at improving safety and health programs are an
important step, the agency needs to develop a clear safety
policy--one that clearly spells out what is expected of contractors
and their workers--if its efforts are to succeed.  Such a policy,
along with specific goals and performance measures, could help DOE
improve its safety culture and performance.  In addition, GAO
continues to believe that DOE's Office of Environment, Safety, and
Health needs adequate authority, independence, and resources to
perform vigorous independent internal oversight.  Finally, a detailed
plan could help to ensure a smooth, successful transition to
oversight by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. 

Nuclear Weapons:  Safety, Technical, and Manpower Issues Slow DOE's
Disassembly Efforts (Chapter Report, 10/20/93, GAO/RCED-94-9). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) very ambitious schedule
for dismantling retired nuclear weapons at its Pantex facility in
Texas, coupled with unresolved safety and uranium storage concerns,
could lead to conflict between safety and production goals.  About 63
percent of the weapons scheduled were disassembled during fiscal year
1992.  Disassembly was curtailed, however, by a transportation
problem that prevented the delivery of retired weapons to Pantex for
about 2 months.  As a result, Pantex substantially slowed its
disassembly to avoid depleting its inventory of weapons to be
disassembled.  Concerns about possible exposure of Pantex technicians
to radioactive material also curtailed disassembly efforts.  In GAO's
view, the prospects for meeting DOE's disassembly schedule in the
next several years are poor.  DOE needs to address several issues
that could affect its ability to disassemble nuclear weapons,
including a shortage of disassembly technicians and the adequacy of
facilities for and the environmental impact of storing large amounts
of plutonium at Pantex.  More than half of the required safety
analysis reports, which enable decisions to be made about whether a
facility can operate safely, have not been completed at Pantex.  Many
of the uncompleted safety analysis reports are for disassembly
activities or facilities. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation and Safety:  Challenges Facing the
International Atomic Energy Agency (Chapter Report, 09/22/93,
GAO/NSIAD/RCED-93-284). 

ABSTRACT:  The discovery of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, North
Korea's refusal to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) to conduct nuclear inspections, and the Chernobyl nuclear
power plant accident have focused attention on nuclear proliferation
and the safety of nuclear power plants.  These issues are of
particular concern to IAEA, whose main duties are verifying the
peaceful use of nuclear material and promoting nuclear energy.  This
report examines the (1) effectiveness of IAEA's safeguards program
and the adequacy of program funding, (2) management of U.S. 
technical assistance to IAEA's safeguards program, (3) effectiveness
of IAEA's program for advising member states about the safety of
nuclear power plants, and (4) adequacy of program funding. 

Nuclear Waste:  Funds Spent to Identify a Monitored Retrievable
Storage Facility Site (Letter Report, 09/07/93, GAO/RCED-93-199). 

ABSTRACT:  The expenditures of the Nuclear Waste Negotiator's Office
were consistent with the administrative provisions of the legislation
that created the office.  The Negotiator was empowered to find a
state or an Indian tribe willing to host a repository or a monitored
retrievable storage facility for storing hazardous waste.  The
Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1987 gives the Negotiator
considerable discretion in managing office procedures, such as hiring
and paying staff and entering into leases and contracts.  The
Department of Energy's (DOE) awards of grants to counties and Indian
tribes were consistent with the objectives of the monitored
retrievable storage program.  DOE has adequately reviewed grant
applications and has monitored grantees' expenditures. 

Nuclear Materials:  Nuclear Arsenal Reductions Allow Consideration of
Tritium Production Options (Letter Report, 08/17/93,
GAO/RCED-93-189). 

ABSTRACT:  Plans underway to cut the nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile by about 75 percent from 1988 levels will strongly affect
future demand for tritium, a gaseous radioactive isotope of hydrogen
used to boost the power of nuclear warheads.  Because tritium decays
yearly, it must be periodically replenished to maintain the potency
of the warheads.  This report provides information on (1) the impact
of nuclear stockpile reductions on the Department of Energy's tritium
supply and (2) the agency's alternatives for meeting tritium
requirements and for providing a contingency in the event that
requirements increase. 

Nuclear Security:  DOE's Progress on Reducing Its Security Clearance
Work Load (Letter Report, 08/12/93, GAO/RCED-93-183). 

ABSTRACT:  The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 requires the Department of
Energy (DOE), which runs the nation's nuclear weapons program and
other sensitive undertakings, to run security checks on persons with
access to classified information.  DOE has cut its backlog of
personnel security clearances from about 135,000 cases in 1988 to
about 1,000 cases in June 1993--a 99-percent reduction.  Although
during the late 1980s DOE was not timely in processing clearances for
its contractors' employees, the 20 contractor representatives who GAO
interviewed could not recall or document significant problems caused
by clearance delays.  Most of the delays were characterized as
inconveniences that the contractors "worked around." Virtually all
the representatives said that they were pleased with DOE's current
clearance processing times.  DOE has not, however, effectively
managed its workload of cases involving questionable information. 
DOE, although committed to reduce the processing time of these cases,
has yet to establish adequate controls over contractors'
preemployment checks to screen out unsuitable applicants.  According
to DOE security officials, some contractors are not verifying
information on prospective employees, such as education, personal
references, past employers, and credit and criminal records. 

Nuclear Regulation:  NRC's Nuclear Materials Program Needs
Improvement to Protect Public Health and Safety (Testimony, 07/30/93,
GAO/T-RCED-93-51). 

ABSTRACT:  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses millions
of individuals and organizations throughout the United States to use
radioactive material for research and development; medical diagnosis
and treatment; and industrial, academic, and consumer activities. 
This testimony, which draws on an April 1993 GAO report
(GAO/RCED-93-90), questions whether the public is being adequately
protected from nuclear materials outside power plants, noting that
NRC lacks information on whether all states receive the same minimum
level of protection.  NRC does not collect comparable data for its
licensing and inspection programs, and the agency lacks a common set
of performance indicators to effectively evaluate both the
agreement-states program and the NRC-regulated states program. 
Moreover, NRC does not have specific criteria or procedures for
suspending or revoking an agreement state's program.  As a result,
NRC has failed to suspend or revoke state programs even though the
states are not complying with NRC requirements. 


DOE Management:  Consistent Cleanup Indemnification Policy Is Needed
(Letter Report, 07/12/93, GAO/RCED-93-167). 

ABSTRACT:  In indemnifying its cleanup contractors, the Department of
Energy (DOE) has adopted an inconsistent approach in which the
government often accepts liabilities and contractors assume little
financial responsibility.  Individual contractors are indemnified not
on the basis of a well-analyzed policy but as the result of
negotiations, during which DOE does not first test to see whether
indemnification is needed or set limits to its potential cost.  As a
result, some contractors have received more-favorable indemnification
provisions than have others.  More importantly, this approach has
exposed the government to unknown but potentially significant
financial risk since more than $5 billion in environmental damage
lawsuits and claims have been filed under existing contracts.  A
consistent policy for indemnification that takes into account use of
section 119 of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act, as
well as other specific statutes, such as the Price-Anderson Act, can
ensure that cleanup contractors are indemnified in a way that
protects both the contractors' and the government's interests. 

Nuclear Waste:  Yucca Mountain Project Management and Funding Issues
(Testimony, 07/01/93, GAO/T-RCED-93-58). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) has given low priority to
scientifically assessing Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as a possible
disposal site for highly radioactive waste, requesting only about
half of the funds needed to complete its investigation on schedule. 
If DOE continues to request and allot limited funds for the
investigation, this effort could take at least 5 to 13 years longer
than planned and could boost the disposal program's total cost.  To
streamline the project, DOE has compressed the time permitted for
various scientific studies and is considering similar measures to
reduce costs.  These actions increase the risk that the site
investigations will be inadequate.  Moreover, they come at a time
when unanticipated technical issues have emerged that could lengthen
the investigation.  DOE wants to establish a revolving fund to ensure
that adequate funds are made available to the disposal program--a
move that has implications for the federal deficit, congressional
oversight, and the program's long-term financial health. 


Nuclear Regulation:  Cleanup Delays Continue at Two Radioactive Waste
Sites in Ohio (Letter Report, 06/28/93, GAO/RCED-93-156). 

ABSTRACT:  Two sites in Newburgh Heights, Ohio, are contaminated with
low-level radioactive material used during the Chemetron
Corporation's chemical manufacturing.  Although the company ceased
operations more than 20 years ago, it has yet to clean up the sites
and still holds a license to possess nuclear materials.  The Nuclear
Regulatory Commission will not cancel Chemetron's license until the
company properly disposes of radioactive material and has spearheaded
recent efforts to clean up the sites.  This report reviews
Chemetron's efforts to clean up the two sites, discusses factors that
led to the failure of past cleanups, and addresses problems that
Chemetron faces with its current cleanup proposal. 

Department of Energy:  Cleaning Up Inactive Facilities Will Be
Difficult (Letter Report, 06/25/93, GAO/RCED-93-149). 

ABSTRACT:  Changing defense requirements and tightening domestic
budgets are forcing the Department of Energy (DOE) to redefine its
missions and to reexamine the need for many of its inactive
facilities.  Cleaning up these inactive facilities can be a lengthy
process, involving everything from preliminary assessments of the
type and the amount of contamination in floors, walls, and ceilings
to the actual removal of nuclear and hazardous materials.  GAO found
that DOE is in only the preliminary stages of cleaning up inactive
facilities.  DOE does not know the number of its facilities that are
inactive but not yet transferred to its Office of Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management, the full extent of the dangers they
pose, or the cost of improving their safety until they can be
decontaminated and decommissioned.  DOE also lacks an accurate idea
of the number of facilities it will close during the next 30 years
because of changes in its missions, nor does it know how cleaning up
these additional facilities could affect the program's total cost. 
GAO believes that given that DOE might close up to 7,000 facilities,
as well as the program's potential cost, having a single office
manage all work at inactive facilities may be a more effective
approach to coordinating cleanups. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Japan's Shipment of Plutonium Raises
Concerns About Reprocessing (Letter Report, 06/14/93,
GAO/RCED-93-154). 

ABSTRACT:  In January 1993, the Japanese ship Akatsuki Maru, along
with an armed escort vessel, completed a 2-month voyage during which
it transported 1.7 tons of plutonium oxide from France to Japan. 
Although the plutonium had been reprocessed at a French facility, it
was originally obtained from the United States in the form of spent
nuclear fuel.  The Japanese sought the plutonium to generate
commercial nuclear power.  Under a 1988 agreement between Japan and
the United States, Japan is required to ensure the physical security
and safety of such shipments.  This report discusses the physical
security and safety of the Akatsuki Maru shipment, as well as any
costs to the United States arising from it.  In addition, the report
discusses broader issues raised by the shipment, including concerns
about reprocessing and the resulting growth in world plutonium
stocks.  Finally, the report discusses the implications of the 1988
agreement for future U.S.  nuclear agreements. 

Radioactive Waste:  EPA Standards Delayed by Low Priority and
Coordination Problems (Letter Report, 06/03/93, GAO/RCED-93-126). 

ABSTRACT:  The management and the disposal of radioactive waste have
long been of national concern, but without congressional or judicial
mandates, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is unlikely to
issue radiation protection standards in a timely fashion, which could
harm the cleanup of contaminated facilities and radioactive waste
disposal.  Efforts to promulgate radiation protection standards have
been delayed, in part, because EPA perceives radiation protection as
less important than other agency activities and has, therefore,
allocated limited resources to this effort.  EPA has also experienced
delays in developing proposed standards because of disputes with the
Department of Energy (DOE), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).  Although EPA has
tried to strengthen coordination with DOE and NRC, OMB has raised
additional concerns about standards submitted for its review.  OMB's
concerns are largely responsible for delaying the issuance of
groundwater protection standards for inactive uranium-processing
sites.  For more than 3 years, EPA has been unable to resolve these
concerns, and the two parties still fundamentally disagree about
whether contaminated groundwater not now being used should be cleaned
up. 

Nuclear Waste:  Yucca Mountain Project Behind Schedule and Facing
Major Scientific Uncertainties (Chapter Report, 05/21/93,
GAO/RCED-93-124). 

ABSTRACT:  In response to the buildup of highly radioactive waste at
more than 70 nuclear facility sites across the country, the
Department of Energy (DOE) has been developing an underground
repository that was expected to be up and running in 1988.  By 1991,
DOE was estimating that its scientific investigation of a site at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada, could be completed in 2001 at a cost of $6.3
billion and that, if the site proved suitable, a repository could be
in operation in 2010.  GAO found that at its present pace, DOE's
investigation of Yucca Mountain will take at least 5 to 13 years
longer than planned and could cost up to $600 million more than the
agency has projected.  GAO recommends that DOE review the program's
goals and objectives in light of the program's funding priorities. 
Such a review should address whether the program's emphasis on the
scientific investigation of Yucca Mountain is sufficient and how that
investigation can be done more efficiently without sacrificing
technical quality. 

Safety and Health:  Key Independent Oversight Program at DOE Needs
Strengthening (Chapter Report, 05/17/93, GAO/RCED-93-85). 

ABSTRACT:  Since its inception in 1988, the Environment, Safety, and
Health Office's Site Representative Program has not provided the
vigorous independent oversight originally envisioned.  Staffing
constraints have limited the program's coverage of Department of
Energy (DOE) sites, and the office has lacked a systemic approach for
using the site residents' observations to evaluate safety and health
performance.  In addition, DOE has not required line management to
respond to the site residents' findings.  As a result, line
management has failed to adequately address some major safety and
health issues cited by site residents, posing unnecessary risks to
workers.  In restructuring the program in 1992, the Environment,
Safety, and Health Office made a number of improvements, but basic
problems persist, such as staffing constraints.  In addition, new
problems further limit this oversight capability--the program's
coverage of occupational health has ceased; the program has not set
minimum training requirements for site representatives; and the site
representatives are not spending enough time touring work areas to
identify safety problems.  Finally, the office's ability to resolve
problems once they are identified is limited because of the absence
of requirements spelling out how line managers should respond to
findings. 

Nuclear Safety:  Progress Toward International Agreement to Improve
Reactor Safety (Letter Report, 05/14/93, GAO/RCED-93-153). 

ABSTRACT:  Representatives of nearly half of the 114 members states
of the International Atomic Energy Agency, including the United
States, have participated in the development of an international
nuclear safety convention--a proposed multilateral treaty to improve
civil nuclear power reactor safety.  A preliminary draft of the
convention has been developed, but discussions are continuing, and
when the final convention text will be completed and presented to
member states for signature is uncertain.  This report provides
information on the development of the nuclear safety convention.  GAO
discusses (1) the draft convention's scope and objectives, (2) how
the convention will be implemented and monitored, (3) the views of
selected country representatives on what provisions should be
included in the draft convention, and (4) the convention's potential
benefits and limitations. 

Personnel Security:  Efforts by DOD and DOE to Eliminate Duplicative
Background Investigations (Letter Report, 05/10/93, GAO/RCED-93-23). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of Energy
(DOE), and other agencies have developed their own requirements for
conducting background investigations and granting security
clearances.  As a result, clearances are not routinely accepted among
agencies, and duplicative investigations may occur.  The 1991
National Defense Authorization Act requires DOD and DOE to avoid
duplicative background investigations on employees seeking security
clearances.  Both agencies are major users of background
investigations, together budgeting nearly $200 million in fiscal year
1991 for background investigations of their employees.  This report
examines (1) DOD and DOE efforts to eliminate duplication by
automating the exchange of investigative data and (2) DOD's and DOE's
participation in interagency efforts to eliminate duplication by
standardizing the security clearance process. 

Nuclear Regulation:  Better Criteria and Data Would Help Ensure
Safety of Nuclear Materials (Chapter Report, 04/26/93,
GAO/RCED-93-90). 

ABSTRACT:  Nuclear materials--some intensely radioactive--are widely
used in instruments that identify flaws in construction materials for
bridges and other structures, as well as in medicine to treat
diseases like cancer.  The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
regulates the safe use and control of these materials.  NRC enforces
its regulations either on its own or by entering into agreements with
states.  These states assume regulatory responsibility and must have
programs that are compatible with NRC's and are adequate to protect
public health and safety.  In response to congressional concerns
about whether NRC is adequately protecting the public from these
nuclear materials, this report reviews (1) the comparability of NRC's
programs for agreement states and NRC-regulated states, including
assessments of the effectiveness of both programs, and (2) NRC's
actions on GAO's past recommendations. 


Nuclear Waste:  Connecticut's First Site Selection Process for a
Disposal Facility (Chapter Report, 04/05/93, GAO/RCED-93-81). 

ABSTRACT:  Connecticut, like all other states, is required to dispose
of commercial low-level radioactive waste generated within its
borders.  Because Connecticut is highly developed and densely
populated, however, the search for an appropriate disposal site has
been lengthy.  The process has been further delayed by opposition
from citizens groups, as well as a directive from the state
legislature requiring the state siting authority to restart the site
screening process.  This report reviews Connecticut's first effort to
develop a low-level radioactive waste disposal facility, including
opportunities for public involvement, and compares the incentives
that Connecticut will offer to potential host communities with the
incentives offered by other states. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Corrective Actions on Tiger Teams'
Findings Progressing Slower Than Planned (Letter Report, 03/25/93,
GAO/RCED-93-66). 

ABSTRACT:  Since 1989, the Department of Energy (DOE) has used Tiger
Teams--groups composed of DOE and contractor experts--to assess DOE
facilities' compliance with environment, safety, and health (ES&H)
regulations.  Although the Tiger Teams have helped establish a
baseline of compliance at major facilities and have raised awareness
throughout DOE about the need to improve performance in this vital
area, considerable efforts will be needed to fully comply with ES&H
requirements and to establish vigorous and formal ES&H programs at
DOE.  It could take as long as 7 years to complete all corrective
actions on Tiger Team findings.  As a result, DOE needs to continue
to work with its field offices on verifying the adequacy of
corrective actions.  DOE needs to ensure that specific measures of
contractor responsiveness to Tiger Team findings are included in all
performance evaluation plans. 

Nuclear Waste:  Hanford Tank Waste Program Needs Cost, Schedule, and
Management Changes (Chapter Report, 03/08/93, GAO/RCED-93-99). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) has been trying to clean up
the radioactive waste at its Hanford Site in Washington State by
encasing it in glass--a process known as vitrification--and shipping
it to a geologic repository for permanent disposal.  Major technical
problems have beset all key steps of the program.  Specifically, DOE
has not determined how many samples it will ultimately need to
determine the contents of the waste and lacks adequate facilities for
analyzing the material.  DOE has not fully tested its approach for
retrieving different wastes to be treated and is basing its
pretreatment plans on unproven technology.  Even if DOE surmounts
these obstacles, the vitrification plant may not be large enough to
treat all of the high-level waste in a reasonable time frame and the
technical feasibility of DOE's approach to disposing of low-level
waste has yet to be demonstrated.  In addition to these technical
uncertainties, questions have also been raised about the program's
cost, schedule, and management.  For example, estimates for
completing the project have soared from $14 billion to nearly $50
billion. 

Nuclear Waste:  Hanford's Well-Drilling Costs Can Be Reduced (Letter
Report, 03/04/93, GAO/RCED-93-71). 

ABSTRACT:  To clean up radioactive and hazardous wastes at its
Hanford Site in Washington state, the Department of Energy (DOE) will
sink nearly 900 monitoring wells over the next several years at a
cost of more than $270 million.  The wells are designed to provide
information on the nature and the extent of soil and groundwater
contamination.  Recent studies have suggested that DOE could
substantially reduce its costs for sinking the wells by using more
efficient drilling methods.  Although the Hanford Site contractors
have implemented many of the recommended cost-saving measures, other
actions could further reduce well-drilling costs.  These actions
include (1) adopting faster and less expensive well-drilling
technologies, (2) using the well-drilling program's work force more
efficiently, and (3) centralizing the management of the well-drilling
program to improve its effectiveness.  DOE and the Hanford
contractors, however, have made little effort to take advantage of
these opportunities. 

Operation Desert Storm:  Army Not Adequately Prepared to Deal With
Depleted Uranium Contamination (Letter Report, 01/29/93,
GAO/NSIAD-93-90). 

ABSTRACT:  During the Persian Gulf War, a number of U.S.  combat
vehicles were contaminated by depleted uranium after being struck by
munitions or when ammunition stored on board was ignited by
accidental fires.  Although the Army does not know the full extent to
which personnel were exposed to depleted uranium--a radioactive,
chemically toxic metal--GAO discovered that at least several dozen
U.S.  soldiers, some unknowingly, either breathed it in, ingested it,
or were hit by contaminated shrapnel.  Army and Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) officials believe, however, that the exposure levels
did not exceed allowable limits set by NRC.  Although the Army's
policy is to minimize individuals' exposure to radiation, it has not
effectively educated its personnel about the hazards of depleted
uranium contamination or about proper safety measures.  What little
information is available is not widely disseminated.  The military
has begun to test crew members who were injured in Abrams tanks and
Bradley Fighting vehicles contaminated by munitions hits, along with
an Army National Guard unit that claimed exposure while working with
contaminated vehicles in the Persian Gulf, but the Army has no plans
to medically evaluate other personnel who might have been exposed. 
The Army still lacks a formal plan to ensure that contaminated
vehicles are decontaminated, disposed of, and repaired in an
efficient way.  These issues may also be relevant to the other
services. 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  Weaknesses in DOE's Nonnuclear
Consolidation Plan (Letter Report, 11/19/92, GAO/RCED-93-56). 

ABSTRACT:  The end of the cold war and expected reductions in the
nation's nuclear weapons arsenal has prompted the Department of
Energy (DOE) to study ways to consolidate the agency's nuclear
weapons complex.  The agency's first choice is to centralize most of
its nonnuclear operations, which produce nonnuclear components for
weapons, in Kansas City, Missouri.  A number of other nonnuclear
activities would move to other DOE facilities or be privatized.  GAO
is concerned because the costs associated with this plan are
uncertain, and the technical risks of consolidation have not been
thoroughly explored.  DOE recognizes some of these weaknesses and is
looking into other options, such as moving specific operations to the
national laboratories.  DOE is also doing more detailed cost
estimates on other options.  Some weaknesses, however, continue to
receive little attention.  Further analysis of additional policy
options and technical risks is needed to assure the Congress and the
public that all reasonable options have been explored and that DOE's
approach will minimize risks.  Moreover, a specific size for the
complex has yet to be decided.  GAO believes that the selection of
the complex's size and capabilities sets a critical baseline for
consolidation planning.  Once parameters are placed on the future
production capability of the complex, consolidation planning to
establish that capability can go forward. 

Nuclear Security:  Improving Correction of Security Deficiencies at
DOE's Weapons Facilities (Letter Report, 11/16/92, GAO/RCED-93-10). 

ABSTRACT:  Although it is critical that the nation's stock of nuclear
materials be properly secured and safeguarded, routine Department of
Energy (DOE) security inspections in 1989 and 1990 uncovered more
than 2,100 security deficiencies at 39 of its contractor-run weapons
facilities.  This report reviews attempts by DOE operating
contractors to correct security deficiencies and examines how DOE
supervises such contractor efforts.  GAO evaluated 20 security
deficiency cases at four nuclear weapons facilities and found that
contractors are not adequately conducting four of the eight
procedures considered necessary to ensure proper correction of
deficiencies.  The contractors cannot always prove that they have
done three critical analyses--root cause, risk assessment, and
cost-benefit--and do not always adequately verify that corrective
actions are appropriate, effective, and complete.  At the same time,
DOE oversight has been hampered by computer system incompatibility. 
DOE reviews of contractors' corrective action plans are sometimes
untimely, and DOE cannot always show that it has validated
contractors' corrective actions. 

Nuclear Security:  Safeguards and Security Planning at DOE Facilities
Incomplete (Letter Report, 10/30/92, GAO/RCED-93-14). 

ABSTRACT:  High-risk vulnerabilities may be going undetected at
Department of Energy (DOE) field facilities because of ineffective
safeguards and security planning.  Protection plans, many of which
have been in the works for years, remain incomplete for a large
number of DOE's sensitive facilities and most of its sites.  Although
DOE has cited various reasons--such as lack of staff or changes in
mission--to explain the situation, GAO believes that the underlying
problem is DOE's lack of commitment to the planning process. 
According to DOE officials, the agency's proposal to improve the
process by requiring a new overall plan may actually further
complicate the process.  The officials believe that the modified
planning process could further delay the safeguards and security
plans because many plans now being prepared will have to be rewritten
and because work required to develop vulnerability assessments will
be increased.  GAO agrees that implementation of the revised process
could increase the amount of vulnerability assessment work, further
delaying the completion of plans.  In GAO's view, it is important for
DOE to complete the remaining sensitive facility plans. 

Nebraska Low-Level Waste (Correspondence, 10/14/92, GAO/RCED-93-47R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on the site selection for a low-level radioactive waste
facility in Nebraska, focusing on the Boyd County Low-Level Waste
Monitoring Committee's (BCLLWC):  (1) reservations about the proposed
site in the county; (2) concern about the facility licensing
proceeding and any plans to store mixed and decommissioned wastes at
the site; and (3) concern that the site might receive wastes from
other states.  GAO found that:  (1) although they did not find the
site unsuitable, two BCLLWC geology consultants reported that
groundwater could become contaminated and be discharged into a nearby
creek and, therefore, the site would not meet regulatory
requirements; (2) the site developer did not include mixed wastes and
decommissioned wastes in its application for state licensing but
would request such permission later; (3) BCLLWC believed the plans
for mixed and decommissioned wastes should have been raised at the
licensing proceeding; and (4) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
alone could grant emergency access to the Nebraska facility if the
denial of access would pose a public health threat, but NRC said that
applicants first had to exhaust all other alternatives, and it did
not anticipate any such situation arising. 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  Issues Surrounding Consolidating Los Alamos
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories (Testimony, 09/24/92,
GAO/T-RCED-92-98). 

ABSTRACT:  This testimony focuses on the Department of Energy's (DOE)
nuclear weapons laboratories.  GAO discusses three main issues:  (1)
the research, development, and testing capabilities of the Los Alamos
and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories; (2) recent trends in
staffing and funding at DOE's weapons laboratories; and (3) the
options identified by the laboratories and DOE for consolidating the
Los Alamos and Livermore research, development, and testing programs. 

Nuclear Safety:  Concerns About the Nuclear Power Reactors in Cuba
(Letter Report, 09/24/92, GAO/RCED-92-262). 

ABSTRACT:  If Cuba obtains the help needed to complete construction
of its two Soviet-designed nuclear power reactors, the United States
will need assurances that they are built and will be operated in a
way that does not pose a risk to the United States in the event of an
accidental release of radioactive material.  Although work has halted
on the two reactors, the first unit is believed to be virtually
finished while the second is between 20 and 30 percent complete.  The
main reactor components have not yet been installed, and the nuclear
fuel has not been delivered.  Concerns about the reactors center on
the questionable quality of the construction, limited regulatory
oversight, inadequate training for operators, lax safety standards,
and the absence of a Cuban industrial infrastructure to support the
reactors' operation and maintenance.  Concerns also exist that the
upper portion of the containment dome was designed to withstand
pressures of only 7 pounds per square inch.  Because Russia demands
hard currency as payment for--and Cuba now lacks the money to
buy--equipment needed for the reactors, when the reactors will start
up is unclear.  Continued monitoring of Cuba's progress toward
completing the reactors is warranted. 

Nuclear Materials:  Removing Plutonium Residues From Rocky Flats Will
Be Difficult and Costly (Chapter Report, 09/04/92, GAO/RCED-92-219). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) Rocky Flats Plant, near
Denver, Colorado, processed plutonium for nuclear weapons for nearly
40 years.  Plutonium residues, a by-product of this activity, have
been accumulating at the plant and DOE now faces removing this
material.  The plant's latest inventory records for lean residues
(materials with relatively low amounts of plutonium) show that 97,000
kilograms of solid residues and 14,000 liters of liquid
residues--together containing about 2,900 kilograms of plutonium--are
stored at the plant.  To clean up Rocky Flats, DOE will have to
remove these residues, a difficult task because the residues contain
combustible materials and other characteristics that preclude
shipping.  DOE has not yet decided how it will eliminate the residue
backlog at Rocky Flats.  The agency is considering three basic
alternatives--processing the residues to separate out the plutonium,
shipping them to other facilities for processing, or disposing of
them as wastes. 

Nuclear Materials:  Plutonium Processing in the Nuclear Weapons
Complex (Fact Sheet, 08/20/92, GAO/RCED-92-109FS). 

ABSTRACT:  This fact sheet describes the methods and facilities that
the Department of Energy (DOE) uses to process plutonium for use in
nuclear weapons.  Plutonium is not found in nature and has to be
artificially produced.  DOE no longer manufactures new plutonium,
however.  Instead, DOE processes and recycles the plutonium from
retired nuclear weapons and the plutonium that remains as scrap or
residue from plutonium processing.  In summary, DOE recovers
plutonium in two main ways--aqueous and pyrochemical--at four
processing sites.  Due to environmental and safety concerns and cuts
in the numbers of nuclear weapons, only the Los Alamos processing
facility is now up and running. 

Nuclear Science:  Status of DOE's Self-Supporting Isotope Program
(Testimony, 08/12/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-88). 

ABSTRACT:  Isotopes have important applications in medicine,
industry, and scientific research.  Although the Department of
Energy's (DOE) program to produce and distribute isotopes is
relatively small, it is an important domestic source of this
material.  GAO testified that DOE faces significant obstacles in
trying to run the program on a self-supporting basis.  Because DOE
has been unable to recoup program costs through isotope sales, its
original $16 million operating fund has been depleted, and the agency
is borrowing money to keep the program solvent.  High, uncontrollable
operating costs; lack of capital funding; and foreign
competition--much of it subsidized--have been the main barriers to
the program's self-sufficiency.  DOE has hired a consulting firm to
help redesign the program.  DOE and the firm will then seek ways to
finance DOE's newly defined role in the isotope field.  But continued
government funding is likely to be needed to keep the program afloat. 
GAO testified that had DOE completed such a study before reorganizing
its isotope program in 1989, many of these problems could have been
avoided. 

Nuclear Waste:  New York's Adherence to Site Selection Procedures Is
Unclear (Letter Report, 08/11/92, GAO/RCED-92-172). 

ABSTRACT:  A New York commission charged with choosing a site for a
low-level radioactive waste facility announced in September 1989 that
it planned limited investigations at five potential sites.  Four of
the sites were chosen as a result of a statewide screening process,
while the fifth site had been offered to the commission by an owner. 
The counties where the sites are located have raised objections to
the site-selection process.  GAO concludes that the commission's
consideration of the offered site was inconsistent with some of its
procedures and may not have followed others. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Mortality Study of Atmospheric Nuclear
Test Participants Is Flawed (Letter Report, 08/10/92,
GAO/RCED-92-182). 

ABSTRACT:  A 1979 report from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
suggested that the incidence of leukemia among servicemen who had
participated in atmospheric nuclear tests in the 1950s may have been
seriously underestimated.  In response, the Defense Nuclear Agency
commissioned the National Academy of Sciences to study how low-level
radiation affected participants in other atmospheric tests.  The
Academy's 1985 report concluded that the death rate from cancer in
the five tests reviewed was generally less than that which would be
expected in the general population.  New information developed by the
Defense Nuclear Agency in 1989, however, raised doubts about the
validity of the Academy study.  GAO provides information on the
actions or omissions by the federal government in connection with the
1985 National Academy of Sciences report.  GAO discusses (1) the
accuracy of the data supplied to the Academy, (2) when and how
inaccuracies in the data were discovered, (3) when and how the
inaccuracies occurred, and (4) what actions have been taken to
correct the data and update the 1985 mortality study. 

Environmental Technology:  Comments on S.  2632, the National
Environmental Technologies Agency Act (Testimony, 07/21/92,
GAO/T-RCED-92-81). 

ABSTRACT:  Innovative technologies are needed to clean up the
environment and protect it in the future.  The combined public and
private cleanup effort in the United States alone may cost more than
half a trillion dollars during the next 30 years, while the recent
summit in Rio de Janeiro underscores the growing global dimensions of
the environmental problem.  Proposed legislation before the
Congress--S.  2632--would create an agency to promote the development
and commercial application of environmentally safe technologies and
to improve the nation's competitiveness in meeting world demand for
such technologies.  Although the bill highlights the need for
innovative environmental technologies, it also raises fundamental
questions that the Congress may want to consider before committing
considerable federal investment in a new agency.  For example, what
are the research and development needs?  What are the needs for
transfer of technology?  What are the regulatory barriers to more
widespread use?  In any case, GAO believes that some of the bill's
provisions could be clarified to avoid potential problems and help
ensure success.  Finally, the Congress may want to examine the roles
of existing government organizations and how they should be
integrated to promote the development and deployment of innovative
environmental technologies. 

Nuclear Science:  Monitoring Improved, but More Planning Needed for
DOE Test and Research Reactors (Letter Report, 07/15/92,
GAO/RCED-92-123). 

ABSTRACT:  As its stock of nondefense nuclear reactors dwindles due
to lower demand and higher operating costs, the Department of Energy
(DOE) must decide which reactors to shut down and which to maintain
or replace.  In DOE's view, the small number of remaining reactors
and their specialized functions makes unnecessary formal long-range
planning that would compare the capabilities, ages, and conditions of
the reactors.  Yet GAO believes that, given the ages of the test and
research reactors and the deterioration taking place, it is not
premature to plan for the timely retirement or replacement of these
reactors.  The absence of such planning could lead to safety
problems, diminished reactor performance, increased costs to maintain
existing safety levels, and gaps in service to experimenters using
the equipment.  Safety, or at least the identification of safety
problems, has improved at DOE's nondefense test and research
facilities.  DOE now has an inventory of identified problems at these
facilities that will take years to correct.  Ensuring safer
operations, however, demands continued identification and correction
of problems. 

Nuclear Waste:  Improvements Needed in Monitoring Contaminants in
Hanford Soils (Letter Report, 07/06/92, GAO/RCED-92-149). 

ABSTRACT:  Since so much of the radioactive and hazardous waste
stored at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford site either has
been buried or has leaked from underground storage tanks, monitoring
is vital to detect whether contaminants are seeping toward
groundwater.  GAO has discovered, however, that programs to spot
contamination in the vadose zone--the unsaturated soil layer above
the groundwater level--have received scant funding, are operating
with out-of-date and uncalibrated equipment, and are not
comprehensive enough to assess the migration of contaminants.  The
several different programs and organizations now spending vadose zone
funds are often unaware of each other's activities and tend not to
share data, personnel, or knowledge.  Furthermore, DOE has no plan
for improving its vadose zone activities.  Vadose zone technology
could help DOE save money by reducing the need for doing laboratory
analyses and drilling wells. 

Nuclear Security:  Weak Internal Controls Hamper Oversight of DOE's
Security Program (Letter Report, 06/29/92, GAO/RCED-92-146). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE), overseer of the nation's
nuclear weapons program, runs a broad range of plants and
laboratories to carry out research, development, and production. 
Given the potentially devastating consequence of radiological
sabotage or terrorism, tight security is a must at these facilities. 
Accordingly, DOE spends nearly $1 billion annually to protect them. 
GAO reviewed DOE's practice of granting exceptions to the agency's
safeguards and security orders.  Approved exceptions have ranged from
exceptions to administration requirements, involving, for example,
the labeling or marking of classified documents, to more substantive
exceptions involving the inventory or storage of special nuclear
materials.  This report (1) cites the number of exceptions that have
been approved, (2) determines whether DOE's written policies and
procedures for reviewing and approving exceptions have been followed,
and (3) describes the kind of internal control system used for
monitoring and following up on individual exceptions. 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  Status of Restart Issues at the Rocky Flats
Plant (Fact Sheet, 06/22/92, GAO/RCED-92-176FS). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to
resume plutonium operations at the Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado. 
This fact sheet provides information on (1) the process that is being
used at Rocky Flats to identify and manage environment, safety, and
health issues; (2) the overall status of these issues at Rocky Flats;
and (3) the status of these issues at the buildings where DOE plans
to resume plutonium operations. 

Uranium Enrichment:  Unresolved Trade Issues Leave Uncertain Future
for U.S.  Uranium Industry (Letter Report, 06/19/92,
GAO/RCED-92-194). 

ABSTRACT:  Total U.S.  imports of Soviet-produced natural and
enriched uranium were 17 times greater in 1991 than they were 5 years
earlier.  Department of Energy (DOE) uranium enrichment officials and
U.S.  miners view these imports as a threat to the domestic uranium
market, and in November 1991, the miners filed an antidumping
petition against Soviet importers.  This report discusses (1) the
increasing volume of natural and enriched uranium imported into the
United States from the Soviet Union; (2) the ongoing antidumping case
initiated by U.S.  uranium miners; (3) other factors that will play a
large role in determining the future of the domestic uranium
market--namely, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the commercial
use of highly enriched uranium originally produced for nuclear
weapons; and (4) DOE's uranium inventories. 


Nuclear Waste:  Defense Waste Processing Facility--Cost, Schedule,
and Technical Issues (Chapter Report, 06/17/92, GAO/RCED-92-183). 

ABSTRACT:  Since the early 1980s, the Department of Energy (DOE) has
been planning or building facilities to treat and dispose of 34
million gallons of high-level radioactive waste stored in underground
tanks at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina.  The program has
experienced cost increases and is now expected to cost nearly $4
billion and run about 5 years behind schedule.  Further cost
increases and schedule delays are possible because of technical
issues and other uncertainties.  Much of the cost increases and
schedule slippages resulted from ineffective program management.  In
addition, because of the way in which DOE reported funding and budget
information about the program in the past, the Congress did not have
a clear picture of the cost increases and schedule slippages.  DOE
has taken steps to correct these problems.  Two key pretreatment
processes continue to be plagued by technical problems.  At the same
time, an alternative pretreatment method with lower operating costs
has become available, raising questions about which pretreatment
technology can come online quickest and offer environmental, safety,
performance, and cost advantages.  GAO recommends that DOE assess and
compare the existing and alternative pretreatment technologies to see
whether DOE should accelerate its planned efforts to replace the
existing technology. 

Nuclear Science:  Consideration of Accelerator Production of Tritium
Requires R&D (Letter Report, 06/15/92, GAO/RCED-92-154). 

ABSTRACT:  Tritium, a crucial material used in nuclear weapons,
gradually decays and must be continually replaced.  The Department of
Energy (DOE) is responsible for producing tritium and has
traditionally generated it at its nuclear reactors.  The reactors are
getting old, however, and it is unclear how much longer they will
last.  An alternative--producing tritium with a particle
accelerator--was first proposed in 1989 by scientists at Los Alamos
and Brookhaven National Laboratories.  DOE has devoted scant funds to
test the concept, however, and the full extent of the accelerator's
abilities remains unknown.  DOE declined to pursue this idea because
it doubted that enough time existed to develop the concept, given the
immaturity of the technology and the urgency with which DOE believed
new tritium production capacity would be needed.  Reductions in the
nuclear weapons stockpile have eliminated the need for an urgent
schedule and have given DOE more time to study the accelerator.  To
sufficiently develop the technology for an accelerator so that it can
be compared with reactors for tritium production would require a
research and development program. 

Nuclear Waste:  Status of Actions to Improve DOE User-Fee Assessments
(Letter Report, 06/10/92, GAO/RCED-92-165). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) is required to build a deep
underground repository for the safe, permanent disposal of nuclear
waste from the government and the private sector.  According to DOE
estimates, the program could cost as much as $34 billion if two
repositories are built.  In a June 1990 report (GAO/RCED-90-65), GAO
noted that DOE's methods for estimating program costs and revenues
and for assessing fees did not adequately take into account
uncertainties like inflation that are inherent in such a long-term
program.  GAO discusses DOE's periodic assessment of whether the fees
charged to utilities running nuclear power plants are adequate to
cover the costs of the civilian nuclear waste disposal program.  GAO
also discusses the need to disclose in the fund's financial
statements the possibility that a portion of the one-time user fees
due from utilities may be uncollectible because of the uncertain
condition of some utilities. 

Nuclear Science:  DOE's Self-Supporting Isotope Program Is
Experiencing Problems (Fact Sheet, 06/03/92, GAO/RCED-92-122FS). 

ABSTRACT:  Production and distribution of isotopes, which have
medical, industrial, and scientific applications, has been a
long-standing mission of the Department of Energy (DOE).  DOE now
generates less than 5 percent of all worldwide isotope sales.  DOE is
having problems running its isotope sales program on a
self-supporting basis, and since 1990, program operating costs have
exceeded revenues.  Foreign competition and high operating costs have
been the main factors discouraging the program's self-sufficiency. 
U.S.  isotope users are concerned that DOE's commitment to operating
the program on a self-sufficient basis may limit the domestic
availability of some isotopes if DOE cannot produce them
cost-effectively. 

Nuclear Waste:  DOE's Repository Site Investigations, a Long and
Difficult Task (Chapter Report, 05/27/92, GAO/RCED-92-73). 

ABSTRACT:  More than 20,000 metric tons of highly radioactive wastes
are stored at more than 70 sites across the country.  Because these
wastes will remain dangerous for thousands of years, the Department
of Energy (DOE) is seeking to develop an underground repository for
safe, permanent disposal of this material.  Under 1987 legislation,
DOE must consider Yucca Mountain, Nevada, as the sole potential
repository site.  This report focuses on (1) DOE's efforts to
investigate Yucca Mountain since 1988; (2) DOE's efforts to ensure
the early identification, primarily through surface-based tests, of
any conditions that could disqualify the site; and (3) the effects of
delays in DOE's obtaining environmental permits from the state of
Nevada. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  More Can Be Done to Better Control
Environmental Restoration Costs (Chapter Report, 04/20/92,
GAO/RCED-92-71). 

ABSTRACT:  For more than 40 years, the nuclear weapons complex run by
the Department of Energy (DOE) has been disposing of hazardous and
radioactive waste at sites across the country.  DOE estimated in 1988
that its environmental restoration effort, a process to clean up
these sites and meet federal and state standards, could cost as much
as $64 billion.  Although data are unavailable to determine aggregate
cost growth associated with DOE's environmental restoration program,
indications are that costs are soaring.  In response to these
increases, DOE began reviewing the causes of cost growth in 1990 to
determine whether the cost escalation could be minimized.  DOE,
concluding that some cost growth has been unnecessary and should be
better controlled, has begun (1) conducting program cost reviews, (2)
developing procedures that require preparing documentation to support
cost estimates, and (3) instituting cost-estimating review
procedures.  GAO questions the direction and pace of DOE's actions. 
Specifically, DOE still lacks some basic management tools, such as
baselines for individual projects and an information system for
monitoring cost growth, to properly understand and analyze
environmental restoration cost growth.  While these tools would not
in themselves stem the program's cost growth, they would help DOE
better identify and understand the reasons behind the cost increases,
allowing DOE management to deal with the problem. 

Cleanup Technology:  Better Management for DOE's Technology
Development Program (Letter Report, 04/10/92, GAO/RCED-92-145). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) has implemented its
technology development program for environmental cleanup and has
funded major research and development projects.  The program's
funding for fiscal year 1992 is about $303 million, and DOE is
requesting about $315 million for fiscal year 1993.  The agency has
not, however, developed measurable performance goals, overall cost
estimates and schedules, and key decision points for evaluating
program projects.  Without these basic management tools, DOE will
have a hard time determining what its objectives are, how best to
achieve them, and when it has achieved them.  Moreover, the Congress
will have difficulty determining what investments the program is
making and what funding is needed. 

Nuclear Science:  Fast Flux Test Facility on Standby, Awaiting DOE
Decision on Future Missions (Fact Sheet, 04/09/92,
GAO/RCED-92-121FS). 

ABSTRACT:  The Fast Flux Test Facility, located at the Hanford
Reservation in Washington state, is the Department of Energy's (DOE)
newest and largest test and research reactor facility.  In operation
since 1982, the facility is designed primarily to test how well
materials and components proposed for use in advanced reactors work
in an operating test reactor.  This fact sheet explores the rationale
for DOE's 1990 decision to shut down the facility as well as DOE's
response to proposals to keep the facility operating. 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  GAO's Views on Reconfiguring the Complex
(Testimony, 04/01/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-49). 

ABSTRACT:  In addition to long-standing safety and environmental
problems plaguing the nuclear weapons complex, the Department of
Energy (DOE) faces a major new challenge--how to reconfigure the
weapons complex to meet the nation's defense needs in the 21st
century.  Key decisions still need to be made about the size of the
complex; where, if necessary, to relocate various operations; what
technologies to use for new tritium production; and what to do with
excess weapons-grade material.  The choices confronting DOE and the
Congress are difficult given the conflicting demands for limited
resources. 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  Improving DOE's Management of the
Environmental Cleanup (Testimony, 03/30/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-43). 

ABSTRACT:  Sound, credible management systems are essential to the
Department of Energy's (DOE) cleanup of the nation's nuclear weapons
complex.  Addressing the environmental problems created by nearly
half a century of nuclear weapons production is a herculean task. 
DOE and the Congress will need to make hard choices between the
weapons complex cleanup and other national needs.  Management systems
to set priorities, estimate project costs, and track programs will be
critical to this decision-making.  While DOE is making progress on
these systems, further steps are necessary to improve the
prioritization system and determine how it will be used, refine how
DOE estimates costs, and complete and expand the Progress Tracking
System. 

Connecticut Low-Level Waste (Correspondence, 03/17/92,
GAO/RCED-92-137R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on states' efforts to implement the Low-Level Radioactive
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, focusing on Connecticut's
program for developing a disposal facility for commercial low-level
radioactive waste.  GAO noted that:  (1) 13 states, including 8
states that are members of state compacts, plan to develop new
disposal facilities; (2) only California, a member of a 4-state
compact, may have a facility operational by the January 1, 1993,
deadline, and the other planned facilities could be completed between
1993 and 1999; and (3) Connecticut's facility development schedule is
unknown, since it suspended site-specific testing after determining
that its site-screening contractor made some errors in its technical
investigation of three candidate sites. 

Nuclear Waste:  Development of Casks for Transporting Spent Fuel
Needs Modification (Letter Report, 03/13/92, GAO/RCED-92-56). 

ABSTRACT:  So that it can start removing radioactive wastes from the
nation's nuclear plants in 1998, the Department of Energy (DOE) is
developing two kinds of high-capacity casks for shipping spent fuel
by truck or by rail and barge.  The pace and direction of DOE's cask
development program are based on the agency's conviction that a
storage facility can be developed in time to receive and store the
spent fuel by 1998.  GAO doubts that DOE will have a facility up and
running by then.  Despite grant applications from possible host
jurisdictions, the likelihood that a volunteer site will be found
remains uncertain.  This situation affords DOE an opportunity over
the next several years to reevaluate the course and direction of the
cask development program while conserving funds until there is a
clear need to produce casks.  With more time available, DOE can
address whether possible technical and operational concerns might
affect cask designs. 

The SP-100 Nuclear Reactor Program:  Should It Be Continued? 
(Testimony, 03/12/92, GAO/T-NSIAD-92-15). 

ABSTRACT:  The SP-100 Space Nuclear Reactor Program was created to
develop technology for space reactor power systems used in future
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and Defense Department
space missions.  The program has been struggling, and the government
is at a point at which it must decide whether to continue it.  GAO's
testimony discusses (1) the program's past and projected costs, (2)
missions identified by potential users of the technology, (3) recent
events that raise questions about the program's continued viability,
and (4) possible options for the program's future. 

Cleanup Technology:  DOE's Management of Environmental Cleanup
Technology (Testimony, 02/26/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-29). 

ABSTRACT:  To clean up its nuclear weapons complex in a
cost-effective way, the Department of Energy (DOE) believes that it
needs improved cleanup technologies.  As a result, DOE has begun a
technology development program and has started funding eight
integrated cleanup research and development projects.  The number of
these demonstration projects is expected to change as DOE reassesses
its program strategy.  Nonetheless, DOE's focus to date has been on
setting up the program, not on its future management.  GAO testified
that DOE needs to develop key management tools fundamental to the
program's effectiveness.  These tools include measurable performance
goals, overall project cost estimates and schedules, and major
decision points.  Without them, DOE will have problems in measuring
the technology development program's progress, informing the Congress
about the investments being made and funding required, and weeding
out poorly performing projects that are no longer beneficial. 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  Major Safety, Environmental, and
Reconfiguration Issues Facing DOE (Testimony, 02/25/92,
GAO/T-RCED-92-31). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) faces a monumental task in
addressing the legacy of safety and environmental problems created by
almost a half century of nuclear weapons production and, at the same
time, addressing important issues about the size and structure of the
complex in light of a substantially reduced nuclear weapons arsenal. 
The cost will be large and the difficulties immense.  This testimony
discusses the (1) progress DOE has made in developing and
implementing a safety policy and culture, (2) major challenges DOE
faces in cleaning up the weapons complex, and (3) key issues DOE
faces in reconfiguring the complex in light of weapons reductions. 

Nuclear Waste:  DOE Assistance in Funding Route Improvements to Waste
Isolation Plant (Fact Sheet, 01/14/92, GAO/RCED-92-65FS). 

ABSTRACT:  Located near Carlsbad, New Mexico, the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant is intended to be an underground repository for the
permanent disposal of transuranic waste--material contaminated with
radioactive elements that have atomic numbers greater than uranium. 
The Department of Energy (DOE) produces this waste at various
facilities in its nuclear weapons complex.  This fact sheet provides
information on DOE's fulfillment agreements with New Mexico to assist
the state in obtaining federal funds to improve roads in connection
with the plant. 

Nuclear Waste:  Weak DOE Contract Management Invited TRUPACT-II
Setbacks (Chapter Report, 01/14/92, GAO/RCED-92-26). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) spent about $3 million to
buy 24 defective shipping containers intended to transport
transuranic waste to storage sites in New Mexico.  The containers
were built under a subcontract with Westinghouse, DOE's managing
contractor for the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.  While smoothing
welded surfaces on the containers, the contractors ground the walls
too thin to meet the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) approved
design.  NRC later rejected the thin-walled containers.  Concerned
that the contractor might declare bankruptcy and jeopardize the
opening of the plant, DOE allowed Westinghouse to enter into an
agreement with the contractor to build 15 NRC-approved containers and
purchase the defective ones.  This report details several ineffective
contracting practices that led to DOE's purchase of the defective
containers.  Ineffective oversight by Westinghouse and DOE
exacerbated the situation.  Historically, DOE has given its
contractors wide latitude but has done little oversight.  Although
DOE is trying to improve its contract-management approach,
instituting effective, lasting changes will be difficult. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Radiation Events at DOE's Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory (Fact Sheet, 01/13/92, GAO/RCED-92-64FS). 

ABSTRACT:  The Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, established in
1949, is an engineering facility whose primary function is to build,
test, and operate nuclear reactors and support facilities.  During
the 1950s and 1960s, the laboratory released radioactive materials
into the atmosphere on several occasions.  This fact sheet provides
information on nuclear events at the laboratory through the 1980s and
on the extent to which the Department of Energy considered such
events in determining the award fee paid to the laboratory
contractor.  GAO focused on (1) airborne radiation releases that may
have exposed the public to radiation levels greater than the current
public exposure standards and (2) events that resulted in one or more
workers receiving an exposure exceeding the current annual standards
for protecting workers from radiation. 

Nuclear Waste:  Slow Progress Developing Low-Level Radioactive Waste
Disposal Facilities (Chapter Report, 01/10/92, GAO/RCED-92-61). 

ABSTRACT:  Each year, nuclear power plants, businesses, hospitals,
and universities generate more than 1 million cubic feet of hardware,
rags, paper, liquid waste, and protective clothing that have been
contaminated with radioactivity.  While most of this waste has been
disposed of in facilities in Nevada, South Carolina, and Washington
State, recent legislation made the states responsible--either
individually, or through groups of states called compacts--for
developing new disposal facilities.  This report discusses (1) the
states' progress and problems in meeting facility development
milestones in the law, (2) federal and state efforts to resolve
issues related to mixed waste (low-level waste that also contains
hazardous chemicals) and waste with very low levels of radioactivity,
and (3) the Department of Energy's progress in discharging the
federal government's responsibility under the law to manage the most
hazardous low-level waste. 

Nuclear Security:  Safeguards and Security Weaknesses at DOE's
Weapons Facilities (Letter Report, 12/13/91, GAO/RCED-92-39). 

ABSTRACT:  Despite their crucial importance to national security,
safeguards at the Department of Energy's (DOE) weapons facilities may
be falling short.  DOE security inspections have identified many
weaknesses, including poor performance by members of DOE's security
force, poor accountability for quantities of nuclear materials, and
the inability of personnel to locate documents containing classified
information.  About 13 percent of the 2,100 identified weaknesses
resulted in DOE inspectors' giving out unsatisfactory security
ratings; another 38 percent led to marginal ratings.  In addition,
DOE's centralized safeguards and security information tracking system
lacks current data on whether DOE field offices have corrected the
identified weaknesses.  Without reliable information, DOE has no way
of knowing whether timely action was taken to correct problems, nor
can it determine whether weaknesses are systemic.  DOE has tried to
minimize the impact of these security weaknesses at its facilities by
establishing multiple layers of protection measures and instituting
interim and compensatory measures for identified weaknesses.  DOE is
also planning enhancements to the centralized tracking system that
should improve its reliability and increase its effectiveness. 

Uranium Enrichment:  Analysis of Decontamination and Decommissioning
Scenarios (Briefing Report, 11/15/91, GAO/RCED-92-77BR). 

ABSTRACT:  This briefing report analyzes--using four different
scenarios--the adequacy of a $500 million annual deposit into a fund
to pay for the cost of cleaning up the Department of Energy's (DOE)
three aging uranium enrichment plants located in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee; Paducah, Kentucky; and Portsmouth, Ohio.  GAO found that a
fixed annual $500 million deposit made into a cleanup fund would not
be adequate to cover total expected cleanup costs, nor would it be
adequate to cover expected decontamination and decommissioning costs. 
A $500 million annual deposit indexed to an inflation rate would
likely be adequate to pay for all expected cleanup costs, including
decontamination and decommissioning costs, and depleted uranium
costs. 

Nuclear Power Safety:  Chernobyl Accident Prompted Worldwide Actions
but Further Efforts Needed (Chapter Report, 11/04/91,
GAO/NSIAD-92-28). 

ABSTRACT:  Since the Chernobyl nuclear plant accident in 1986, over
70 of the International Atomic Energy Agency's 112 member states have
adopted two conventions to enhance international cooperation by
providing (1) timely notification of an accident and (2) emergency
assistance.  The Agency and other international organizations also
developed programs to improve nuclear power plant safety and minimize
dangers from radioactive contamination.  Despite meaningful
improvements, some of the measures have limitations, and serious
nuclear safety problems remain in the design and operation of the
older, Soviet-designed nuclear power plants.  The Agency's ability to
select reactors under its operational safety review program is
limited.  Also, information on the extent and seriousness of
safety-related incidents at reactors in foreign countries is not
publicly available.  No agreements exist among nuclear power
countries to make compliance with any nuclear safety standards or
principles mandatory.  Currently, adherence to international safety
standards or principles is voluntary and nonbinding.  Some states
support the concept of mandatory compliance, but others, including
the United States, believe that mandatory compliance infringes on
national sovereignty and that the responsibility for nuclear reactor
safety remains with each nation. 

Nuclear Science:  Accelerator Technology for Tritium Production Needs
Further Study (Letter Report, 10/31/91, GAO/RCED-92-1). 

ABSTRACT:  Has the Department of Energy (DOE) given full and fair
consideration to using a particle accelerator for tritium production? 
In a 1987 report, DOE's Energy Research Advisory Board assessed the
feasibility of using an accelerator to produce tritium.  GAO
concludes that the criteria used to assess the accelerator technology
did not provide the flexibility necessary to assess and report on the
advantages of relatively small-size accelerators.  Cost estimates for
accelerators to produce tritium are very uncertain because a detailed
design has not been done.  Further study is needed to develop
meaningful cost estimates.  Recent decreases in projected tritium
needs for servicing existing and planned nuclear weapons, and a new
target concept for the accelerator technology may provide significant
benefits.  The projected decrease in the need for tritium could make
the small accelerators more attractive because they may be capable of
meeting future tritium needs, thus reducing the amount of electric
power needed for the process.  In addition, the successful
development of the helium-3 target could almost eliminate radioactive
waste from the tritium production cycle.  While GAO takes no position
on constructing an accelerator for the production of tritium, it does
believe that it is valid technology that deserves more balanced
consideration. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Problems Continue for Rocky Flats Solar
Pond Cleanup Program (Letter Report, 10/17/91, GAO/RCED-92-18). 

ABSTRACT:  In an earlier report (GAO/RCED-91-31, Jan.  3, 1991), GAO
discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to clean up the
solar evaporation ponds at its Rocky Flats Plant in Colorado.  DOE is
trying to excavate the ponds used for storing and evaporating
low-level radioactive and hazardous waste and stabilize the material
by mixing it with concrete.  DOE issued a press release in March 1991
stating that it has imposed strict cost control measures in managing
the project.  Yet DOE's most recent cost data show that total cleanup
costs have soared to an estimated $169 million through completion in
2009--$50 million more than the amount GAO reported 9 months ago. 
Delays have plagued the completion and approval of the managing plans
for conducting and monitoring the program.  Cleanup activities that
DOE expected to resume by December 1990 have not yet begun.  DOE will
not meet the first major milestone of the solar ponds
program--cleaning up the ponds and moving all the "pondcrete" off
site by October 1991.  Furthermore, unless DOE provides enough
project funding or resolves concerns over pondcrete disposal in
Nevada, it will not finish pondcrete processing before Rocky Flats'
interim status permit for pondcrete operations expires in November
1992. 

Nuclear R&D:  Research Efforts Under Way to Support Nuclear Power
Plant License Renewal (Letter Report, 09/25/91, GAO/RCED-91-207). 

ABSTRACT:  Within the next 20 years, licenses will expire for 42 of
the 113 nuclear power plants licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC).  At NRC's request, the National Research Council of
the National Academy of Sciences examined the future role of NRC's
regulatory research, including research on the aging of nuclear power
reactors and the possibility of extending their operating licenses
for 20 years beyond the normal 40-year term.  The Council issued a
report in 1986 containing many recommendations on revitalizing
nuclear safety research; only four of these recommendations were
directed at research related to license renewal.  GAO discusses the
(1) actions NRC has taken to implement the Council's recommendations
on the need for NRC research on reactor aging to support its license
renewal efforts; (2) the research on reactor aging completed by the
Department of Energy and the industry in response to the Council's
recommendation that research be done to prove that license conditions
set by NRC can be met, and whether the results have been provided to
NRC; and (3) NRC's plan to refine the estimates of risks (or the
probability of accidents) created by extending the life of the
present generation of reactors. 

Nuclear Waste:  Operation of Monitored Retrievable Storage Facility
Is Unlikely by 1998 (Chapter Report, 09/24/91, GAO/RCED-91-194). 

ABSTRACT:  Radioactive waste at U.S.  nuclear power plants is
mounting at a rate of more than 2,000 metric tons a year.  Yet the
Department of Energy (DOE) does not expect a geologic repository to
be available before 2010.  In response to concerns about how best to
store the waste until a repository is available, GAO reviewed the
alternatives of continued storage at utilities' reactor sites or
transferring waste to a monitored retrievable storage facility.  This
report assesses the (1) likelihood of a monitored retrievable storage
facility operating by 1998, (2) legal implications if DOE is unable
to take delivery of wastes in 1998, (3) propriety of using the
Nuclear Waste Fund--from which DOE's waste program costs are paid--to
pay utilities for on-site storage capacity added after 1998, (4) the
ability of utilities to store their waste on-site until a repository
is operating, and (5) relative costs and safety of the two storage
alternatives. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Workers' Compensation Rights Protected at
Hanford (Letter Report, 09/10/91, GAO/RCED-91-203). 

ABSTRACT:  Since 1943 the Washington State Department of Labor and
Industries has had a contract with the Department of Energy (DOE) or
its predecessor to administer a self-insured workers'
compensation/pension program for contractor employees at DOE's
Hanford Site near Richland, Washington.  This review stemmed from
concerns that the contract's implementation could have prevented
Hanford employees from filing workers' compensation claims for
radiation-related injuries or occupational diseases resulting from
their employment at the Hanford Site.  GAO found that the procedures
since the late 1950s for filing claims contain sufficient checks and
balances to ensure that they cannot be blocked by DOE.  However, this
assurance is lacking for claims initiated between 1943, when Hanford
was founded, and the late 1950s.  Claim-filing procedures in effect
at that time required claims to be submitted to the state through the
employer.  However, no evidence was found that DOE did not forward
employee claims to the state before the procedural change, nor were
DOE, state officials, or employee union representatives aware of any
Hanford employee being denied the right to file a workers'
compensation claim. 

Uranium Enrichment:  DOE Needs to Pursue Alternative AVLIS Deployment
Options (Chapter Report, 08/08/91, GAO/RCED-91-88). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE)
demonstration and deployment of the atomic vapor laser isotope
separation (AVLIS) program and the building of an AVLIS plant,
focusing on technical, program, and economic issues. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) independent experts believe that the
AVLIS demonstration program will be successful, but the program will
not provide the specific cost information needed for a complete
evaluation of deployment by the end of 1992 due to unresolved
technical issues; (2) by November 1992, DOE will not have fully
demonstrated the processes needed to effectively integrate AVLIS into
the existing nuclear fuel cycle; (3) such program activities as plant
licensing and site selection and preparation will delay AVLIS plant
construction beyond 1993; (4) DOE stopped most AVLIS program
activities for fiscal year 1992 in anticipation of the formation of a
government corporation to complete such activities, but DOE has not
developed any contingency plan for deploying the AVLIS technology
should a government corporation not be formed; (5) an updated and
expanded uranium enrichment market analysis is needed before any
decision is made about building an AVLIS plant; and (6) DOE stopped a
planned program that was to obtain private companies' expertise in
deploying a commercial plant. 

Nuclear Waste:  Hanford Single-Shell Tank Leaks Greater Than
Estimated (Letter Report, 08/05/91, GAO/RCED-91-177). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined
whether the Department of Energy (DOE) or its Hanford, Washington,
site contractor fully disclosed the volume of waste that leaked from
the site's underground single-shell storage tanks. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE estimated that 750,000 gallons of
liquid waste leaked from 66 shell tanks, but did not include the
volume of cooling water that had been added to the tanks, some of
which could have leaked; (2) DOE historically did not include cooling
water that could leak from the tanks in its tank leak studies; (3)
DOE noted that it added cooling water to a single tank and that some
did leak, but did not provide any volume figures; (4) the
contractor's estimate indicated that only 5,000 gallons of waste
leaked from that tank, but records indicated that more than 500,000
gallons of contaminated cooling water leaked from the tank; (5) as of
February 1991, the contractor estimated that between 50,000 gallons
and 800,000 gallons of the cooling water added to the tank between
February 1971 and December 1978 could have leaked; and (6) in October
1990, DOE directed the contractor to examine past records to
determine the amount of liquid waste that could have leaked from the
66 tanks classified as assumed leakers, including the aforementioned
tank. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Environmental, Health, and Safety
Practices at Naval Reactors Facilities (Chapter Report, 08/01/91,
GAO/RCED-91-157). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
environmental, health, and safety practices at the Department of
Energy's Naval Reactors Program facilities, focusing on the programs
and procedures the Naval Reactors implemented to:  (1) protect the
environment and (2) ensure the health and safety of workers and the
public. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) Naval Reactors and its contractors
developed and implemented adequate procedures to protect workers and
the environment from radiation exposure and other hazardous
materials, including asbestos; (2) Naval Reactors requires its
workers to take an extensive initial radioactive training course and
periodically retrains them on safety procedures; (3) each laboratory
and site conducts routine radiological surveys of facilities either
daily, weekly, monthly, or annually; (4) records concluded that,
since 1967, no Naval Reactors Program personnel has exceeded the
federal radiation exposure limit, or the Naval Reactors
administrative limit since 1984; (5) the prototype reactor design
provides safety measures consistent with commercial nuclear power
requirements, but minor environmental and safety accidents have
occurred, and past activities resulted in environmental problems that
require continuous monitoring; (6) Naval Reactors' asbestos control
procedures and requirements either met or exceeded federal standards;
(7) although Naval Reactors was previously exempt from oversight,
some federal and state environmental oversight agencies have recently
been permitted access to Naval Reactors facilities; (8) Naval
Reactors and its contractors established an extensive internal
oversight program aimed at reporting requirement or procedure
deviations; and (9) although Naval Reactors did not routinely
overclassify information to prevent public disclosure, it did
occasionally misclassify documents. 

Nuclear Waste:  Extensive Process to Site Low-Level Waste Disposal
Facility in Nebraska (Letter Report, 07/05/91, GAO/RCED-91-149). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the
selection of a site for a low-level radioactive waste disposal
facility within a 5-state area, focusing on:  (1) the contractor's
site-selection process, (2) the scientific merit of the geological
and hydrologic assessments of the candidate sites, (3) Nebraska's
statutory policy requiring community support for the proposed
facility at the chosen Boyd County site, and (4) the provision of
financial protection to the public against injury or property damages
that might result from operation of the proposed facility. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the detailed geologic and hydrologic
assessments at the three candidate sites appeared to be technically
correct; (2) the site-screening process included technical records
reviews, on-site assessments, and consideration of such nontechnical
factors as public values and concerns, community support, and
identification of available land; (3) although initially supported by
the Boyd County community, the county board of supervisors withdrew
its support for the project after it determined that the contractor
was unwilling or unable to meet board conditions; (4) the contractor
maintains that it complied with state policy to obtain community
support for the proposed facility, but the issue remains open and the
state legislature is considering the need for a county vote to
address this issue; (5) the contractor will obtain nuclear facility
liability insurance and other commercially available insurance as
required by the state; and (6) due to concerns about major liability
claims, Nebraska enacted legislation requiring all states in the
compact to share in the risk of third-party liability. 

Nuclear Security:  DOE Original Classification Authority Has Been
Improperly Delegated (Letter Report, 07/05/91, GAO/RCED-91-183). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the
Department of Energy's (DOE) use and authorization of contractors to
make original classification determinations about national security
information. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE granted original classification
authority on a selective basis but had granted such authority to
persons in senior-level positions at facilities dealing with large
volumes of classified information, including government-owned,
contractor-operated (GOCO) laboratories; (2) as of May 1991, 142
persons, including over 50 contractor employees, had original
classification authority; (3) 14 percent of those authorized
contractor employees had top-secret level classification authority;
(4) contractor employees made 3 top-secret determinations and 189
secret or confidential determinations between fiscal years 1985 and
1990, while DOE personnel made a total of 3,091 original
classification determinations during that period; (5) although an
executive order limited classification authority to agency heads and
their subordinates, DOE believed that its long-standing unique
relationship with GOCO facilities and adequate controls to review
determinations justified granting such authority to contractors; (6)
the National Security Council recommended that DOE reconsider its
authorization policy after identifying such delegations during a 1986
site visit, but did not follow up on the recommendation during its
1988 visit; and (7) DOE did not know the extent to which it reviewed
or approved contractor classification determinations.  GAO believes
that misclassification of information could potentially seriously
impact and threaten U.S.  national security interests. 

Nuclear Waste:  Delays in Addressing Environmental Requirements and
New Safety Concerns Affect DOE's Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(Testimony, 06/13/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-67). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the status of the Department of Energy's
(DOE) program for conducting transuranic (TRU) waste disposal tests
at its Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).  GAO noted that:  (1) DOE
cannot use the WIPP repository until the facility meets environmental
requirements and DOE resolves safety concerns; (2) from 1981 through
1988, DOE focused on building WIPP and failed to consider
environmental compliance issues; (3) in 1989, DOE proposed to test
TRU waste in WIPP to determine compliance with environmental
requirements but delayed the tests until it could determine that WIPP
would comply with environmental standards; (4) technical problems
delaying the tests included gases generated by TRU wastes, the
interaction of brine with TRU wastes, and obtaining waste samples
characteristics of the waste to be stored at WIPP; (5) the natural
movement of rock surrounding underground storage areas raised
questions regarding the safety of waste storage operations and the
retrieval of wastes after the tests; (6) DOE has not identified where
it will store TRU waste in the event that WIPP fails to meet
environmental requirements; and (7) temporary storage of TRU wastes
has become a contentious issue betweeen DOE and states hosting
temporary storage facilities. 

Nuclear Waste:  Pretreatment Modifications at DOE Hanford's B Plant
Should Be Stopped (Letter Report, 06/12/91, GAO/RCED-91-165). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) plans to modify its Hanford Site B Plant
in Washington State to pretreat mixed high-level radioactive waste
before the vitrification process to turn it into glass. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) although DOE was aware that the plant
had not met specific federal or DOE regulations since 1987, it failed
to timely discuss the compliance problems with Washington; (2)
although the plant did not comply with regulatory requirements, DOE
considered modification less costly than construction of a new
facility; (3) despite a March 1991 recommendation by Washington that
DOE abandon plans to establish the plant as a pretreatment facility,
DOE continued to modify B Plant for that purpose; (4) the process DOE
was developing for pretreating approximately 75 percent of its
high-level waste could cause extensive corrosion to the plant's
embedded waste pipes; (5) DOE was reevaluating B Plant's viability as
a pretreatment facility, alternative pretreatment processing options,
and alternative pretreatment facilities; (6) a DOE assessment of
vitrification process risks suggested that B Plant would not meet
federal environmental requirements; (7) DOE believed that its
noncompliance was due to the absence of double containment for pipes,
tanks, and other processing facilities; and (8) even though DOE
halted modification projects totaling more than $400 million, it
continued pretreatment projects totaling about $43 million. 

Nuclear Regulation:  NRC's Relationship With the Institute of Nuclear
Power Operations (Letter Report, 05/16/91, GAO/RCED-91-122). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) relationship with the Institute
of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO), focusing on whether NRC:  (1)
used INPO evaluation reports instead of its own oversight of the
nuclear power industry and (2) relied on INPO communications to alert
industry of potential nuclear plant safety problems instead of
issuing its own information notices. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the nuclear power industry
established INPO not to supplant the NRC regulatory role but to
provide the means whereby the industry itself could make its nuclear
operations safer; (2) INPO had no legal authority over nuclear
utilities but worked with NRC to coordinate regulatory activities;
(3) NRC did not routinely use INPO evaluation reports instead of its
own inspections to carry out its oversight of the nuclear power
industry; (4) approximately 12 times over the past 2 years, NRC
decided not to issue its own information notice since INPO had
already alerted the industry to the potential problem; and (5) NRC
decisions not to issue notices on the same matters reported on by
INPO reduced the amount of nuclear power plant safety information
available to the public, since INPO reports were not available to the
public. 

Nuclear Security:  Property Control Problems at DOE's Livermore
Laboratory Continue (Letter Report, 05/16/91, GAO/RCED-91-141). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's
claim that it found approximately 99 percent of the inventory it
previously reported as missing, focusing on:  (1) the accuracy of
laboratory claims; (2) whether controls over government-owned
property at the laboratory were strengthened; and (3) the adequacy of
DOE property control oversight. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the laboratory's claim was
inaccurate, since it excluded missing noncapital equipment purchased
prior to 1985 from its analysis and it used a different basis than
GAO did for calculating and reporting missing item percentages; (2)
taking the differences into consideration, the laboratory actually
located only 3 percent of the inventoried equipment, acquired at a
cost of $26.8 million, and 13 percent of the inventoried equipment,
acquired at a cost of $18.6 million, remained missing; (3) the
laboratory's property management policy manual lacked property
accountability controls over all noncapital equipment; (4) DOE
oversight of changes in laboratory property controls was inadequate;
and (5) the DOE San Francisco Operations Office approved the property
management policy manual without ensuring that it complied with
federal and departmental regulations. 

Nuclear Waste:  Changes Needed in DOE User-Fee Assessments
(Testimony, 05/08/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-52). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE)
procedures for annually assessing the adequacy of the fee that
utilities pay for disposal of spent nuclear fuel.  GAO noted that: 
(1) the nuclear waste program was susceptible to future budget
shortfalls; (2) without a fee increase, the civilian waste nuclear
program might be underfunded by at least $2.4 billion; (3) inflation
was the major contributing factor to program cost increases; (4)
indexing the disposal fee to the inflation rate would protect the
Nuclear Waste Fund from the effects of inflation; (5) inflation
indexing would permit DOE to concentrate its fee assessments on
estimated program costs that were unrelated to inflation and revenue
uncertainties; (6) a fee increase was not necessary to recover
program costs with one repository, but for two repositories the
current fee would result in a Fund program deficit of $23 billion;
and (7) DOE did not pay its share of program costs.  GAO also noted
that:  (1) DOE had not yet begun investigating the Yucca Mountain,
Nevada, repository site; (2) technical and management problems
resulted in DOE spending $12 million in 1989 and 1990 to develop a
new drilling technology and a facility for managing core samples
obtained during the site investigation; (3) DOE spent over $36
million to design the exploratory shaft facility in 1988 and 1989,
but poor design and construction methods resulted in DOE selecting a
new design and construction method; and (4) DOE spent about $122
million on general project management. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Environmental, Health, and Safety
Practices at Naval Reactors Facilities (Testimony, 04/25/91,
GAO/T-RCED-91-24). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed environmental, health, and safety
practices at two Naval Reactors Program research and development
facilities.  GAO noted that:  (1) the laboratories and sites were in
full compliance with federal and state standards regarding
radioactive releases to the environment and there was no evidence of
unsafe radiological operations or conditions; (2) there was no
evidence in personnel exposure records, incident reports, and other
exposure information that any personnel had exceeded the annual
radiation exposure limit; (3) the laboratories and sites provided
safety measures that were consistent with the requirements for
commercial nuclear reactors; (4) prototype reactors did employ
enhanced safety systems and met the intent of safety criteria for
normal operations and accident conditions; and (5) the Naval Reactors
Program approved a $68 million program to remove or stabilize
asbestos at all of its facilities over the next 10 years.  GAO
believes that all laboratories and sites were:  (1) in the process of
complying with legislative requirements that potentially hazardous
areas be characterized and remedial action taken if necessary and (2)
addressing problems associated with radioactively contaminated
buildings and chemical wastes in landfills and disposal sites to
protect public and worker health and safety. 

Nuclear Waste:  Problems and Delays With Characterizing Hanford's
Single-Shell Tank Waste (Letter Report, 04/23/91, GAO/RCED-91-118). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
status of Department of Energy (DOE) efforts to characterize
single-shell tank wastes at its Hanford, Washington, site, focusing
on impediments such as:  (1) technological limitations and (2) safety
considerations. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) due to the number of unresolved
issues, DOE was unlikely to complete the first-phase characterization
of the single-shell tank wastes by the 1998 deadline; (2) due to
several unanticipated events during the initial characterization
phase, the contractor lacked sufficient information to develop a
revised waste characterization plan by the November 1990 deadline;
(3) although 16 core samples were retrieved by April 1990, the
contractor only reviewed and approved 8 data packages in time to
support revising the characterization plan; (4) the diversion of
single-shell tank resources, such as personnel and the only tank
sampling truck, to address higher-priority double-shell tank safety
issues in February 1991 would delay the scheduled May 1991 sampling
of two single-shell tanks until September 1991 and could affect other
future samplings; (5) if the revised plan increased the amount of
required sampling, the tri-party agreement between Washington State,
DOE, and the Environmental Protection Agency could be affected in
terms of milestone dates and program costs; (6) DOE's analysis of the
variance in samples analyzed to date and the statements of agency and
contractor officials supported the view that two samples would not
provide an adequate basis for making informed decisions; (7) due to
the number of uncertainties, the Washington State Department of
Ecology and DOE believed it would take 2 to 3 years to develop a
revised waste characterization plan for sampling the balance of the
single-shell tanks; and (8) DOE was conducting studies to resolve
safety problems associated with potentially explosive wastes. 

Nuclear Waste:  DOE Expenditures on The Yucca Mountain Project
(Testimony, 04/18/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-37). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) use of
appropriated funds for completing a scientific investigation needed
to obtain a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license to construct
and operate a nuclear waste repository site at Yucca Mountain,
Nevada.  GAO noted that:  (1) DOE was not ready to begin on-site
investigations, originally scheduled for 1987, until 1991 because it
took longer than it expected to complete its site investigation plan
and NRC compliance program; (2) Nevada did not issue essential
environmental permits that DOE needed before it could start the
investigation; (3) prior to 1987, DOE spent about $48 million on
drilling holes and obtaining core samples, but due to technical and
management problems, the samples' usefulness was unclear; (4) from
1989 to 1990, DOE spent $12 million on developing a new drilling
technology and core management facility to use in on-site
investigation; (5) DOE spent over $36 million in 1988 and 1989 on the
design of an exploratory shaft facility before selecting a new
facility design and construction plan due to external criticism of
its original plan; (6) it was unclear as to how much of the original
design work DOE will have to redo or the additional costs that it
will incur due to the new plan; and (7) DOE and its contractors spent
about $122 million, or 25 percent of total project costs, on general
management of the Yucca Mountain project over a 3-year period. 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  Reconfiguring DOE's Weapons Complex
(Testimony, 04/18/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-40). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts
to develop long-term modernization plans to address environmental and
safety problems of its aging nuclear weapons complex.  GAO noted
that:  (1) DOE still needs to make key decisions about the size of
the complex, where to relocate plutonium operations, which
technologies to use for new tritium production, and what to do with
excess production; (2) the nation's future provision of tritium for
nuclear weapons and management of its plutonium inventory were
uncertain and undefined; (3) reconfiguration and modernization costs
will be much greater than the $6.7 billion to $15.2 billion that DOE
estimated, since its study did not include all upgrades and
modernization projects; and (4) DOE failure to resolve such
long-standing management issues as reliance on contractors and lack
of technical expertise could be detrimental to any reconfiguration of
the complex. 

Nuclear Waste:  Issues Affecting Land Withdrawal of DOE's Waste
Isolation Pilot Project (Testimony, 04/16/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-38). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) Waste
Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP).  GAO noted that:  (1) by fiscal year
1997, DOE plans to determine whether WIPP meets the Environmental
Protection Agency's (EPA) standards for disposal of transuranic waste
in repositories and plans to obtain a variance or exception from the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA); (2) DOE postponed
plans to demonstrate large-scale waste handling and storage
operations until after it determines that WIPP will comply with EPA
standards; (3) DOE issued a test plan that reduced the proposed
amount of waste to about 1 percent of facility capacity, but it could
not determine the exact quantity of waste to be stored until after
the compliance determination; and (4) DOE issued a plan describing
the decisionmaking process it would follow in deciding where to store
the wastes if retrieval became necessary.  GAO believes that:  (1)
DOE needed to demonstrate to EPA that the hazardous wastes would not
migrate beyond the WIPP boundary for as long as they remain hazardous
to obtain an RCRA exception; (2) the nature and significance of WIPP
storage issues warranted congressional input and direction, rather
than administrative action; and (3) DOE should address storage issues
now before it needs to retrieve and store it elsewhere. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  More Attention to Health and Safety
Needed at Pantex (Letter Report, 04/15/91, GAO/RCED-91-103). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined key
safety and health problems at the Department of Energy's (DOE)
contractor-operated Pantex Plant to determine its need for external
safety oversight. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) Pantex cited a lack of personnel for
its failure to complete more than half of the safety analysis reports
needed to ensure plant safety; (2) a DOE team of specialists
identified several deficiencies in the plant's radiation protection
program, including inadequate staffing, training, and procedures
designed to protect workers and the environment from radiation; (3)
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration found 168
violations of worker protection regulations at Pantex that had the
potential to result in death or serious physical harm; (4) radiation
accidents and incomplete safety analysis reports raised questions
about the adequacy of Pantex's attention to safety and health; (5)
Pantex had one of the highest injury/illness and lost workday rates
in the DOE weapons complex; and (6) since Pantex experienced the same
types of safety and health problems as those at other DOE facilities,
external oversight was needed to ensure the safety of its defense
nuclear operations. 

Managing the Environmental Cleanup of DOE's Nuclear Weapons Complex
(Testimony, 04/11/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-27). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) cleanup
of the nation's nuclear weapons complex.  GAO found that:  (1) DOE
reorganized its headquarters regional activities to ensure better
management focus on the cleanup effort; (2) DOE restructured its
award-fee program to better ensure that its contractors appropriately
emphasized environment, safety, and health issues; (3) there were
problems and delays in cleaning up the almost 57 million gallons of
high-level radioactive waste in the single- and double-shell tanks at
the DOE Hanford facility; (4) DOE failed to provide effective
management and oversight of relatively simple cleanup actions; (5)
despite some progress in improving budget estimates, DOE did not
adequately review contractor cost estimates and relied on inadequate
contractor analyses to substantiate cleanup cost estimates; (6) DOE
unilaterally delayed a series of milestones in its agreement with the
Environmental Protection Agency and Washington State to govern the
Hanford cleanup; (7) DOE failed to set priorities that could
stabilize its environmental problems and avoid further environmental
damage; (8) there were fundamental problems in DOE's control and
oversight of all of its contractors, including improper procurement
procedures, ineffective contract cost control, and failure to carry
out its responsibilities; and (9) DOE acknowledged the need for
better contract management by taking steps to improve its management
of contractors, but solving the problems will be difficult. 

Uranium Enrichment:  GAO's Views on DOE's New Laser Enrichment
Technology--AVLIS (Testimony, 04/10/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-23). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) program
to develop the atomic vapor laser isotope separation process (AVLIS),
a new uranium enrichment technology, focusing on issues that DOE
needed to address before building an AVLIS plant.  GAO noted that,
before building an AVLIS plant, DOE should:  (1) adequately
demonstrate the AVLIS process with full-scale equipment and develop
convincing cost projections; (2) demonstrate an efficient process for
integrating an AVLIS plant with existing nuclear fuel companies; (3)
submit to the government or a private company a definitive cost
analysis; (4) establish a government corporation to complete such
program activities as selecting a site and completing the plant
licensing process; and (5) update and expand its existing market
analysis that considers the impact of possible new nuclear plants and
competitors' sales strategies.  GAO also noted that:  (1) DOE needed
to complete the demonstration project to keep future AVLIS deployment
options open, such as using a new government corporation for
construction or making a technology transfer agreement with a private
company; (2) the technical and related cost and market information
DOE would develop by completing the demonstration could enhance a new
government corporation's ability to timely and efficiently deploy
AVLIS and assist private investors in making sound construction
decisions; and (3) the Congress should recognize that DOE will not be
able to completely address all remaining deployment issues by the end
of 1992. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation:  Controls Over the Commercial Sale and
Export of Tritium Can Be Improved (Letter Report, 03/25/91,
GAO/RCED-91-90). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the
adequacy of the Department of Energy's (DOE) and the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's (NRC) existing controls on the commercial
sales and exports of tritium. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE and its contractor-operated Oak
Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) were slow to investigate the major
shipper-receiver and internal tritium discrepancies that allegedly
occurred at ORNL in July and August of 1988; (2) DOE, ORNL, and other
investigators identified a lack of appropriate ORNL management and
DOE oversight as underlying causes of tritium discrepancies; and (3)
NRC performed limited monitoring of tritium end use because it
considered tritium less strategic than special nuclear materials. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation:  DOE Needs Better Controls to Identify
Contractors Having Foreign Interests (Letter Report, 03/25/91,
GAO/RCED-91-83). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed
whether the Department of Energy (DOE) and three of its weapons
laboratories complied with DOE regulations and procedures designed to
protect the United States against uncontrolled transfers of nuclear
weapons-related technology or material to entities that are foreign
owned, controlled, or influenced (FOCI) U.S.  companies performing
classified work for DOE. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE and its government-owned,
contractor-operated weapons laboratories did not fully comply with
DOE regulations and procedures aimed at determining contractors'
vulnerability to foreign interests and preventing associated risks;
(2) DOE did not follow FOCI procedures for 98 percent of the
classified contracts it awarded from October 1987 through March 1990
that were subject to such procedures; (3) none of the eight DOE field
operations offices completely complied with FOCI procedures when
awarding management and operating contracts; (4) DOE regulations for
determining whether contractors were subject to FOCI were inadequate;
(5) the regulations required DOE contracting officers to make
national security determinations, even though DOE safeguards and
security officials were more qualified to make such determinations;
(6) numerous DOE FOCI requirements were burdensome, and some were
inconsistent with Department of Defense (DOD) regulations for
determining whether DOD contractors were subject to FOCI, causing
confusion among contractors working on both DOE and DOD classified
contracts; (7) DOE internal control weaknesses caused numerous
problems in safeguarding classified information; and (8) all three
DOE weapons laboratories lacked adequate data systems to accurately
identify all classified contracts. 

Nuclear Materials:  GAO's Views on Decreasing Tritium Requirements
and Their Effect on DOE Programs (Testimony, 03/13/91,
GAO/T-RCED-91-21). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) tritium
supplies, focusing on:  (1) DOE projections of tritium requirements
and supplies and (2) the impact of future tritium supplies on DOE
programs.  GAO noted that:  (1) the projected U.S.  defense tritium
requirements and planned nuclear weapons decreased dramatically from
1988 through 1990 and could decrease further; (2) sufficient tritium
supplies will exist to meet the anticipated needs of the nuclear
weapons stockpile for the next several years; (3) further retirements
of weapons, in addition to those already planned, and negotiations of
arms reduction treaties could reduce tritium requirements further;
(4) maintaining an overly large tritium reserve would present such
disadvantages as tritium's rapid decay rate and the need to
constantly replenish it; (5) the decreased tritium requirement
provided additional time for DOE to evaluate and resolve outstanding
safety and environmental issues and reconsider whether plans for
future tritium production capacity were appropriate; (6) three
production reactors, which closed in 1988 for safety upgrades, are
currently the nation's only production source of tritium; (7) the
decrease in current and projected DOE tritium demand suggests that
the urgency associated with restarting the reactors has diminished;
(8) DOE did not plan to further delay the scheduled restart of the
first reactor, in spite of decreases in tritium requirements; and (9)
DOE reported that, due to high costs, it would build only one of two
reactors it had planned to construct. 

Nuclear Safety:  Status of Reactor Restart Efforts and Safety Culture
Changes (Letter Report, 03/13/91, GAO/RCED-91-95). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) activities to restart three nuclear
reactors at its Savannah River, South Carolina, site, focusing on: 
(1) delays in the restart schedule; (2) factors causing the delays;
and (3) safety oversight changes and safety culture concerns. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE announced on February 4, 1991,
that it planned to restart the K-reactor in the summer of 1991 and
the L-reactor in early 1992; (2) DOE also announced that it planned
to terminate the P-reactor as an operational reactor and maintain it
in a cold standby status; (3) various factors causing delays in
meeting the K-reactor's originally proposed September 1990 restart
date included the late development of the startup test program,
delays in completing originally scheduled work, new maintenance and
restart requirements, and environmental and fire protection issues;
(4) DOE and other interested organizations took such actions to
increase attention to safety as reorganizations addressing safety
management and oversight issues and extensive independent external
oversight of DOE nuclear safety activities; (5) although DOE made
safety oversight changes, both DOE and its contractor officials
recognized that improving the underlying safety attitude was a
long-term effort that may not be fully completed before restart; and
(6) DOE estimated that it would spend $3.2 billion on reactor restart
and operations between fiscal years 1989 and 1993. 

Nuclear Safety and Health:  Nonconforming Products Are A
Governmentwide Problem (Testimony, 03/06/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-9). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed contractors' supply of nonconforming
products to the federal government.  GAO noted that:  (1) nuclear
utilities installed or received such nonconforming products as
fasteners, steel, fuses, pumps, valves, and circuit breakers in about
64 percent of the 113 domestic nuclear power plants; (2)
nonconforming products were a governmentwide problem, since the
Department's of Defense, Energy, and Transportation and the Federal
Aviation Administration and National Aeronautics and Space
Administration found them in weapons systems, submarines, aircraft,
and the space shuttle; (3) the Nuclear Regulatory Commission reduced
its regulatory influence over the nuclear industry by delaying
procurement inspections for at least 1 year and withdrawing civil
penalties against utilities; (4) there was no governmentwide effort
to address nonconforming products, since the Office of Management and
Budget failed to fulfill its 1988 committment to act as an
information clearinghouse; and (5) federal agencies could benefit
from sharing information on their receipt of nonconforming products. 

Nuclear Weapons Complex:  GAO's Views on DOE's Reconfiguration Study
(Testimony, 02/25/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-8). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts
to develop a comprehensive plan to address its nuclear weapons
complex's environmental and safety problems.  GAO noted that DOE's
nuclear weapons complex reconfiguration study:  (1) represented the
first phase of a long-term effort to develop a more detailed plan and
a programmatic environmental impact statement that DOE expected to
complete in 1993 on various alternatives for reconfiguring the
complex; (2) recommended a smaller complex in the future, but did not
specify the dimensions; (3) provided information on four possible
complex size scenarios ranging from 15 to 70 percent of the fiscal
year 1990 nuclear weapons stockpile; (4) recognized the need to
stabilize nuclear weapons requirements and concluded that the Nuclear
Weapons Council should specify sizing levels upon which to base the
future complex; (5) provided only a limited discussion on how the
nation would meet its future tritium requirements and manage its
plutonium inventory; and (6) estimated reconfiguration and
modernization costs ranging from $6.7 billion to $15.2 billion, but
did not include the costs of critical components for the future
complex.  GAO also noted that such long-standing management issues as
reliance on contractors and lack of technical expertise could have a
detrimental impact on any reconfiguration of the complex. 

Nuclear Waste:  Quarterly Report as of March 31, 1990 (Letter Report,
02/15/91, GAO/RCED-91-55). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the
Department of Energy's (DOE) implementation of the Nuclear Waste
Policy Act of 1982, focusing on:  (1) public comments regarding the
Secretary of Energy's November 1989 report to the Congress assessing
the civilian nuclear waste program; (2) uncertainties regarding DOE's
criteria for identifying unsuitable site conditions at Yucca
Mountain; and (3) how Nevada's refusal to allow DOE access to the
Yucca Mountain site could affect its near-term site investigation
plans. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) public comments on the Secretary's
report called for changes in the nuclear waste program, management
restructuring, emphasis on scientific investigation of Yucca
Mountain, and a proposal to develop a monitored retrieval storage
(MRS) facility; (2) in general, respondents agreed with DOE's
restructured program management plan, its efforts to implement a
scientifically based investigation, and its revised schedule; (3) DOE
received mixed comments on its plans to conduct surface tests of the
mountain before constructing an exploratory shaft facility; (4) DOE
received mixed views on its plan to separately develop an MRS
facility from a repository, and some respondents were concerned that
such an action could result in an MRS facility becoming a repository
replacement; (5) DOE decided to use its own as well as the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission's regulations for identifying unsuitable
conditions; (6) DOE and Nevada were engaged in a legal battle over
state environmental permits needed for site investigations, and DOE
sought legislation enabling it to comply with permit requirements
without Nevada's involvement; and (7) DOE believed that, if the site
investigation was delayed, DOE may abandon surface-based testing,
which could eliminate the possibility of identifying unsuitable site
conditions before performing more costly underground work. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Environmental Problems at DOE's Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (Letter Report, 02/12/91,
GAO/RCED-91-56). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated
environmental problems at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory (INEL), focusing on:  (1) the
environmental impact of those problems and their impact on DOE
operations and (2) difficulties DOE encountered in managing the
site's environmental problems. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) underground pipes and tanks used to
transfer and store mixed wastes at the INEL chemical processing plant
did not meet secondary containment standards, the primary reason for
the plant's remaining closed for over a year; (2) DOE also identified
problems related to the treatment and storage of mixed wastes and the
lack of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved treatment
technologies; (3) past waste disposal practices resulted in releases
of radioactive and hazardous contaminants into the ground and the
Snake River Plain aquifer; (4) delays occurred in INEL environmental
cleanup and compliance activities, partly due to ongoing negotiations
among DOE, EPA, and the state of Idaho; and (5) INEL has begun little
physical cleanup on more than 200 inactive waste sites. 

Nuclear Materials:  Decreasing Tritium Requirements and Their Effect
on DOE Programs (Letter Report, 02/08/91, GAO/RCED-91-100). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on the adequacy of the Department of Energy's (DOE)
tritium supplies, focusing on its ability to meet current and future
defense tritium requirements for nuclear weapons and the effect of
changes in those requirements on DOE programs. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE obtained most of its tritium from
reactors currently shut down for safety upgrades and from returned
tritium from the nuclear weapons stockpile; (2) since 1988, the
actual and projected number of weapons in the stockpile has decreased
significantly, resulting in reduced future tritium requirements; (3)
sufficient tritium supplies existed to meet the anticipated
requirements for the nuclear weapons stockpile for the next several
years; (4) further retirements of weapons, in addition to those
already planned, and negotiations of reduction treaties could further
reduce future tritium requirements; (5) tritium requirements could
decrease even more if the projected number of nuclear warheads is
further reduced by additional unilateral retirements or the signing
of an arms reduction treaty; (6) the decreased requirements provided
additional time for DOE to evaluate outstanding safety and
environmental issues before restarting the closed reactors; (7) DOE
did not plan to further delay the scheduled 1991 restart of the first
reactor, in spite of the decreases in tritium requirements; and (8)
the estimated cost of two reactors DOE planned to build was $6.8
billion, and DOE reported that, due to the high cost, it would build
only one reactor, while leaving the option of constructing the second
reactor open. 

Nuclear Security:  Accountability for Livermore's Secret Classified
Documents Is Inadequate (Letter Report, 02/08/91, GAO/RCED-91-65). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's
controls over weapons research documents, focusing on the:  (1)
extent of missing classified documents and (2) adequacy of classified
document accountability. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) a recent internal inventory
identified 12,000 missing secret documents covering a wide range of
subjects; (2) since the laboratory did not assess the missing
documents' potential for compromising national security, neither the
laboratory nor DOE could provide assurance that classified
information had not been compromised; (3) an ongoing reconciliation
effort located 2,000 missing documents; (4) laboratory accountability
for secret documents was inadequate; (5) approximately 108 laboratory
groups managed and controlled secret documents using a variety of
classified document accountability systems; (6) due to varied
accountability practices, the laboratory could not ensure effective
document management; (7) laboratory management was implementing a
centralized computer data base to ensure effective document control;
(8) the laboratory did not keep accurate records showing the location
and disposition of all accountable classified documents due to
several recordkeeping weaknesses; and (9) DOE failed to provide
adequate oversight of the laboratory's secret document control
program. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Efforts to Strengthen DOE's Health and
Epidemiology Programs (Letter Report, 02/05/91, GAO/RCED-91-57). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) initiatives to
address concerns about its ability to effectively oversee health,
environmental, and safety activities related to its nuclear weapons
production plants. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE did not effectively oversee its
health programs, lacked credibility in its health-effects research
activities, and did not standardize the collection of pertinent data
on the health of its workers; (2) DOE planned to increase its Office
of Health staff from 26 to 86 personnel by fiscal year 1992, but the
current shortage of qualified staff could hinder its ability to
attract the staff required to perform its duties; (3) DOE plans to
establish an advisory committee of non-DOE personnel in early 1991 to
oversee its environmental, safety, and health activities; (4) DOE was
developing a comprehensive database to consolidate previously
collected worker health data and provide for collection of future
data; (5) DOE reported that the database would be operational by the
end of fiscal year 1992 at an estimated developmental cost of about
$3 million; and (6) DOE signed an agreement with the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS) to transfer $17 million to HHS in
fiscal year 1991 for the management of the ongoing, long-term
health-effects and epidemiology studies and research.  GAO believes
that DOE consolidation of its occupational health programs:  (1) and
the transfer of its studies to HHS provides a credible framework for
overseeing the health of its workers and nearby communities and (2)
would strengthen its efforts in overseeing management of its health
responsibilities. 

Nuclear Safety:  The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's First
Year of Operation (Chapter Report, 02/05/91, GAO/RCED-91-54). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the
accomplishments, operations, and problems faced by the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, focusing on:  (1) the Board's
mission to improve safety and health conditions at the Department of
Energy's (DOE) defense nuclear facilities; (2) problems encountered
in hiring technical staff; and (3) changes needed to enhance the
Board's independence and credibility. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that the:  (1) Board, in its first year of
operation, established its financial operations, acquired office
space, hired staff, and issued recommendations to improve safety at
four major DOE facilities; (2) Board's recommendations for improving
DOE facilities involved such issues as operation training, safety
standards, radioactive waste storage, restarting plutonium
operations, and the need for systematic evaluations of safety issues;
(3) Board's inability to offer salaries sufficient to hire scientific
and technical staff limited its ability to carry out its functions;
(4) Board's independence and public knowledge of its recommendations
were essential to establishing and maintaining the public's
confidence; and (5) Board lacked a strategic plan to identify future
work priorities to help ensure that its oversight was comprehensive
and to make its agenda visible to the public. 

Nuclear Waste:  Quality Assurance Auditors Need Access to Employee
Records (Letter Report, 01/18/91, GAO/RCED-91-7). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to identify and resolve problems
stemming from the Privacy Act of 1974's restrictions on maintenance
and disclosure of personnel information, focusing on the act's effect
on the DOE quality assurance program for contractor personnel
involved in the Yucca Mountain, Nevada, nuclear waste repository
project. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) under the quality assurance program,
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission required DOE to document that DOE
and contractor employees were properly qualified and trained to
perform repository-related work; (2) DOE did not address the act's
restrictions until almost 2 years after it anticipated the need to
establish a new system of records that covered both DOE and
contractor employees and that permitted quality assurance auditors to
have access to the records; (3) the delay in resolving the issue was
partially due to confusion over the act's applicability to contractor
employees; (4) the delay in addressing the restrictions resulted in a
temporary lack of access to records so that quality assurance
auditors could verify training and qualification requirements for
contractor employees; and (5) before new site characterization work
can begin, DOE must ensure quality assurance auditors' and observers'
unrestricted access to training and qualification records of DOE and
contractor employees. 


Nuclear Safety and Health:  Problems With Cleaning Up the Solar Ponds
at Rocky Flats (Letter Report, 01/03/91, GAO/RCED-91-31). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in cleaning up solar
evaporation ponds at its Rocky Flats Nuclear Weapons Plant. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) in September 1986, DOE had to
reclassify the ponds' low-level radioactive waste to mixed waste
after detecting low concentrations of hazardous waste; (2) the
reclassification resulted in the requirement that DOE obtain the
necessary permits for hazardous waste storage and disposal; (3) the
DOE contractor improperly mixed the cement and sludge waste in making
pondcrete, a solidified waste form, causing thousands of pondcrete
blocks to crumble and crack; (4) pondcrete packaging material
deteriorated under adverse weather conditions; (5) lack of program
plans and control mechanisms contributed to the cleanup problems; (6)
the contractor developed procedures for processing pondcrete,
reinspecting all pondcrete boxes, frequent monitoring of storage
pads, and repackaging failed pondcrete boxes; (7) in addition to
remixing and repackaging more than 8,000 pondcrete blocks, DOE still
had to remove sediment from the largest pond and clean out the
remaining four; (8) continued cleanup could result in the production
of as many as 20,000 additional pondcrete blocks; and (9) DOE
believed that the total project cost would be over $100 million. 

Nuclear Regulation:  NRC's Efforts to Ensure Effective Plant
Maintenance Are Incomplete (Chapter Report, 12/17/90,
GAO/RCED-91-36). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the
(1) importance of safe nuclear power plant operations and (2) status
of the debate between the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the
nuclear utility industry on the need for facility maintenance
regulations. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) while both NRC and the industry
agreed that maintenance was crucial to safe, reliable, and efficient
power plant operations and nuclear utilities improved such
maintenance, some problems still remained; (2) the debate centered on
NRC's need to establish additional comprehensive maintenance
regulations, its endorsement of the industry's program, and the
specific plant areas and systems included in such regulations or
programs; (3) NRC concluded that the lack of comprehensive
regulations applicable to maintenance contributed to inconsistency in
utility program implementation; and (4) NRC proposed maintenance
regulations that would broaden its oversight over all plant systems. 
In addition, GAO found that industry opposed NRC maintenance
regulations over all systems, since (1) power plants developed a
nearly identical program; (2) including all balance-of-plant systems
would dilute attention from the plant's safety-related portions; and
(3) NRC lacked guidance that the utilities could use to establish
acceptable maintenance programs.  GAO also found that:  (1) industry
believed that utilities, not NRC, should determine the plant systems,
structures, and components to be emphasized in maintenance programs;
(2) NRC lacked specific standards applicable to all aspects of plant
operations and extrapolated the results of selected samples of
utility operations to make a judgment about the entire plant; and (3)
industry questioned NRC's ability to develop a single quantitative
indicator to predict equipment or system failures resulting from poor
maintenance practices. 

Nuclear Safety and Health:  Counterfeit and Substandard Products Are
a Governmentwide Concern (Chapter Report, 10/16/90, GAO/RCED-91-6). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) and five other agencies'
practices for identifying and preventing the supply of nonconforming
products, including counterfeit and substandard parts. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the supply of nonconforming products
was a governmentwide problem, since all six agencies contacted found
them in various components and systems; (2) although NRC took some
actions to detect and minimize the incidence of nonconforming parts
in commercial nuclear power plants, it deferred its regulatory
responsibility by rescinding penalties and postponing inspections;
(3) although individual agencies had programs to detect nonconforming
parts, there was no governmentwide effort to address the issue; and
(4) there was no centralized source of consolidated information on
nonconforming products to increase information exchange and joint
investigations among agencies. 

Nuclear Safety:  Potential Security Weaknesses at Los Alamos and
Other DOE Facilities (Chapter Report, 10/11/90, GAO/RCED-91-12). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined:  (1)
the adequacy of security at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and
other Department of Energy (DOE) facilities; (2) DOE oversight of
contractor security forces; and (3) the feasibility of establishing
federal security forces at DOE facilities. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE did not assess the adequacy of
the replacement force at Los Alamos until 6 weeks after contractor
personnel went on strike; (2) during the strike, DOE waived medical
and physical fitness requirements for the replacement force, and many
personnel failed to meet 1 or more of the 12 minimum required skills;
(3) DOE sites were not prepared for such strikes; (4) security force
training and certification documents were incomplete, inaccurate, or
missing, indicating that potential security problems existed; (5) 75
percent of the regular security force lacked one or more of nine
skills needed to ensure a minimum level of protection; (6) DOE
inspections identified recurring and similar weaknesses, yet rated
only one security program as unsatisfactory; (7) DOE lacked specific
criteria for rating facility security; (8) DOE lacked an effective
system to track corrective actions taken as a result of inspection
findings; (9) contractors provided security forces at all but one DOE
facility; and (10) labor and benefit costs for a federal security
force would be at least $15 million less per year than contract
costs, and federal employees could not legally strike. 

Nuclear Energy:  Consequences of Explosion of Hanford's Single-Shell
Tanks Are Understated (Letter Report, 10/10/90, GAO/RCED-91-34). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the
potential for ferrocyanide explosions in underground tanks containing
high-level waste at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford site. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE lacked sufficient information for
judging the probability of a ferrocyanide explosion, and not enough
was known to rule out the possibility of a spontaneous explosion; (2)
the Hanford environmental impact statement understated the potential
consequences of a ferrocyanide explosion; (3) a ferrocyanide
explosion could contaminate large areas within and possibly beyond
site boundaries and result in high-level radiation exposure at levels
with significant radiation-induced cancer consequences; (4) a DOE
task force agreed with a GAO assessment that the respirable fraction
of radioactive particles produced by an explosion would be higher
than originally thought and recommended additional studies; and (5)
in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
recommendations, DOE planned to study possible chemical reactions
that could cause heat generation in the storage tanks, improve
temperature measurements, and test radiation stability of
ferrocyanide precipitates and the energetics of ferrocyanide
reactions. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Long-Term Plans to Address Problems of
the Weapons Complex Are Evolving (Letter Report, 09/28/90,
GAO/RCED-90-219). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) cost estimates for modernizing and
cleaning up its nuclear weapons complex. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) over the next 20 to 30 years, it
could cost from $125 billion to about $155 billion to modernize and
address the complex's environmental problems; (2) DOE developed a
5-year plan for environmental restoration and waste management to
modernize and clean up the nuclear weapons complex; (3) the 1990
updated plan showed substantially higher estimates for environmental
restoration and waste management activities; and (4) DOE could not
project long-term costs of the clean-up because uncertainties existed
about the nature and extent of contamination and the effectiveness of
research and development in improving cleanup technologies. 

Nuclear Research and Development:  Shippingport Decommissioning--How
Applicable Are the Lessons Learned?  (Letter Report, 09/04/90,
GAO/RCED-90-208). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) decommissioning of a Pennsylvania
nuclear power plant, focusing on:  (1) whether DOE had met
congressional goals described in a 1986 hearing and (2) additional
information that could assist the commercial power plant industry. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE generally met congressional goals
established for the power plant by timely completing decommissioning
activities at $7 million under the estimated cost of $98.3 million;
(2) DOE used eight contractors to optimize involvement and developed
extensive data to help future decommissioning projects; (3) although
the power plant increased knowledge regarding the decommissioning of
nuclear power plants, the benefits of the lessons learned will vary
depending upon the timing and the decommissioning approaches various
utilities select; (4) utilities operating commercial plants will
probably have to disassemble their reactor pressure vessels when
decommissioning because of their large size; (5) DOE decommissioning
activities disposed of all the low-level radioactive waste at one
facility; (6) utilities will have to dispose of commercial sites'
waste at costs higher than those incurred by noncommercial plants,
due to their larger size, higher contamination levels, undetermined
disposal sites, and inadequate management structures; and (7) DOE was
exchanging decommissioning information with two foreign countries and
was assessing the need to use robotics. 

Nuclear Waste:  DOE Needs to Ensure Nevada's Conformance With Grant
Requirements (Chapter Report, 07/09/90, GAO/RCED-90-173). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) program to provide financial assistance
to Nevada under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) Nevada opposes the DOE Yucca Mountain
project; (2) Nevada spent most of the $32 million in nuclear waste
act grants properly but used $1 million of the funds for activities
that were not authorized; (3) Nevada employed law firms that
performed lobbying activities between July 1986 and June 1989; (4)
Nevada used grant funds to pay expenses incurred in suing DOE; (5)
Nevada exceeded the congressional limit on the money it could spend
on socioeconomic studies for the year ended June 1989; (6) Nevada
used over $150,000 in grant funds to pay expenses of the state's
nuclear waste legislative committee; (7) Nevada has internal control
weaknesses that place funds at risk; (8) DOE and Nevada have not
formally agreed to all of the terms of the grant amendments award
documents; and (9) DOE did not resolve the disagreements over the
lobbying provision before releasing grant funds, and it has not
determined the best way to recover grant funds used for unallowable
purposes. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  DOE Has Not Demonstrated That Restarting
PUREX Is a Sound Decision (Letter Report, 06/29/90, GAO/RCED-90-207). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
shutdown and planned restart of the Plutonium-Uranium Extraction
plant (PUREX) at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Hanford Site in
Washington State. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that DOE has not:  (1) demonstrated that
restarting PUREX would be a sound decision; (2) demonstrated that a
need exists for weapons-grade plutonium from PUREX; (3) determined
the need for a supplemental environmental impact statement for PUREX;
(4) required that all identified deficiencies in the final safety
analysis report be corrected before the planned restart date; and (5)
adequately addressed PUREX staff turnover and training problems. 

Nuclear Science:  Factors Leading to the Termination of the Antares
Laser Research Program (Letter Report, 06/13/90, GAO/RCED-90-160). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on the termination of the Antares Laser Research Program
at the Department of Energy's (DOE) Los Alamos National Laboratory. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE terminated the laser research
program at the end of fiscal year 1985 because of a technical
problem; (2) Los Alamos discovered that long-wavelength lasers
generated electrons that preheated the target containing the fuel for
the fusion reaction, thereby preventing fusion; (3) DOE and Los
Alamos believed the problem would have required developing an
impractical and expensive laser system for effective use; (4) Los
Alamos efforts to fix the technical problem were unsuccessful; (5)
Los Alamos conducted two technical evaluations and concluded that the
Antares technology was not a good candidate for achieving fusion; and
(6) two scientific panels' reviews supported the Los Alamos
conclusion. 

Nuclear Waste:  Information on DOE's Interim Transuranic Waste
Storage Facilities (Letter Report, 06/08/90, GAO/RCED-90-166). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed:  (1)
remaining transuranic (TRU) waste storage capacity at Department of
Energy (DOE) interim storage sites and projected dates when capacity
will be exceeded; (2) statutory or administrative provisions limiting
the amount of waste DOE could store at interim storage sites; and (3)
planned alternatives to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) for
stored wastes. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) 6 DOE storage sites had the capacity
to store an additional 8,700 to 9,700 cubic meters of TRU waste, and
an additional storage facility could store about 393
plutonium-equivalent curies of TRU waste, but the extent of remaining
storage capacity varied greatly from site to site; (2) 3 storage
sites' space for contact-handled TRU waste was beginning to run out;
(3) DOE was in the process of constructing or could construct
additional storage facilities as needed, if no other safety
restrictions applied; (4) although storage site officials did not
identify any statutory restrictions on the amount of TRU waste that
could be stored at the sites, certain administrative restrictions
could affect storage at some sites; (5) due to regulations regarding
waste storage mixtures, some storage sites would have to either
revise their status permits or obtain state regulatory agency
approval in order to expand capacity beyond permitted limits; (6)
until WIPP is operational, DOE plans to continue TRU waste storage at
its interim storage sites, but is exploring the possibility of
storing TRU waste on Department of Defense-controlled property; and
(7) DOE required each interim site to develop site-specific waste
management plans describing how they would manage TRU waste until DOE
constructed a final disposal site. 

Nuclear R&D:  Usefulness of Information From Shippingport
Decommissioning for Rancho Seco (Letter Report, 06/07/90,
GAO/RCED-90-171). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information related to the Department of Energy's (DOE)
decommissioning of the Shippingport, Pennsylvania, nuclear power
plant and the usefulness of this information to the decommissioning
of the Rancho Seco, California, nuclear power plant. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that DOE reported that:  (1) a nuclear power
plant could be decommissioned within the established costs and time
frames, (2) equipment and technology exist to decommission a nuclear
power plant, and (3) strict management attention to planning can lead
to reduced occupational exposures and efficient removal of
radioactively contaminated components.  GAO believes that DOE needs
to:  (1) wait for results from international research and other
activities before deciding to participate in the decommissioning of
Rancho Seco, (2) consider decommissioning Rancho Seco through a
contractor that performs work in connection with commercial or
government nuclear activities, and (3) weigh the costs of conducting
research at Rancho Seco against the long-term benefits. 

Nuclear Waste:  Changes Needed in DOE User-Fee Assessments to Avoid
Funding Shortfall (Chapter Report, 06/07/90, GAO/RCED-90-65). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO provided
information on the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to implement
nuclear waste legislation. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the nuclear waste program might be
susceptible to future budget shortfalls; (2) without a fee increase,
the civilian waste part of the program might be underfunded by at
least $2.4 billion; (3) DOE has neither paid its share of costs nor
disclosed this liability in its financial records; (4) DOE estimates
did not adequately recognize program uncertainties; (5) DOE intends
to address one major cost uncertainty by indexing the civilian
disposal fee to the inflation rate; and (6) DOE did not use a
realistic inflation rate as its most probable scenario in assessing
whether user fees were adequate. 

Correcting Environmental Problems Facing the Nuclear Weapons Complex
(Testimony, 05/17/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-85). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts
to correct the environmental problems facing the nuclear weapons
complex.  GAO found that:  (1) in making nuclear weapons, enormous
amounts of hazardous and radioactive wastes are generated, and DOE
now faces serious and costly environmental problems; (2) DOE data
show that it might cost over $100 billion to address the
environmental problems; (3) future costs may be greater as more is
learned about the nature and extent of contamination, because the
full scope of the problems is unknown; (4) some areas of the weapons
complex may be irreversibly contaminated and may require long-term
institutional control; (5) DOE has made important changes to its
organization that should help change its management focus from
materials production to environmental concerns; (6) DOE must properly
organize itself to manage the long-term program needed to address the
many environmental problems it faces; and (7) DOE must have an
effective management system to ensure that the most serious
environmental problems are identified and adequately funded and that
funds allocated to correcting environmental problems are used
effectively. 

Nuclear Waste:  Quarterly Report as of December 31, 1989 (Letter
Report, 04/30/90, GAO/RCED-90-130). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided its
quarterly status report on the Department of Energy's (DOE)
implementation of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, focusing on
the:  (1) Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) ability to implement
an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) containment standard for
repository licensing; and (2) impact of that requirement on DOE
determination of a proposed repository site's suitability. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the EPA repository containment
standard limited the cumulative release of radioactive material into
the environment over a 10,000-year period; (2) NRC expressed concern
regarding potential DOE difficulty in satisfactorily demonstrating
such compliance, since there were limitations and uncertainties in
the methods and data for calculating acceptable levels of risk; (3)
NRC collaboratively worked with EPA to develop additional guidance on
how DOE could demonstrate compliance with the containment standard
and avoid lengthy licensing delays; (4) NRC guidance regarding the
standard emphasized maintaining the quality of the scientific work
that supported the numerical results of compliance analyses; and (5)
both NRC and EPA believed that DOE attempts to characterize the site
of its proposed repository would provide valuable insight into
potential problems of demonstrating compliance with the containment
standard. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Status of GAO's Environmental, Safety,
and Health Recommendations to DOE (Letter Report, 04/20/90,
GAO/RCED-90-125). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the
Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in resolving problems at its
contractor-operated sites, focusing on the status of GAO
recommendations concerning environmental, safety, and health matters
relating to the nuclear weapons complex. 

FINDINGS:  GAO noted that:  (1) since 1980, it had made 54 specific
recommendations to DOE on various environmental, safety, and health
matters and (2) open recommendations to DOE called for program
control improvements and clearer standards and policies related to
environmental, safety, and health matters.  GAO found that:  (1) DOE
took corrective actions to fulfill 31 of the 54 GAO recommendations;
(2) the Congress established a Defense Nuclear Facilities Board to
oversee operations within the nuclear weapons complex; and (3) DOE
has instituted changes that should result in a higher degree of
sensitivity to environmental, safety, and health matters. 

Nuclear Security:  DOE Oversight of Livermore's Property Management
System Is Inadequate (Chapter Report, 04/18/90, GAO/RCED-90-122). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined the
extent of property losses at the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and assessed the adequacy of
laboratory controls over government-owned property. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the laboratory could not account for
or locate a substantial number of government-owned items in its
custody; (2) an internal inventory determined that the missing
property had an acquisition value of over $45 million; (3) the
laboratory had lost accountability over about 14 percent of certain
high-value theft-prone items, worth about $2 million when acquired;
and (4) despite the substantial number of missing items, the contract
between DOE and the laboratory contractor protected the contractor
against liability for such losses.  GAO also found that:  (1) the
laboratory's property controls did not ensure that government-owned
property was adequately safeguarded against theft, unauthorized use,
or loss; (2) the laboratory had no policies and procedures for
controlling items with an acquisition cost below $1,000 and gathered
no consistent data on those items, which made it difficult to
identify how many items the laboratory bought; (3) the laboratory did
not independently verify government-owned inventories of precious
metals that were in the custody of subcontractors, making it
difficult for it to verify reported consumption of the metals; (4)
DOE did not provide adequate oversight of the laboratory's property
management system and allowed the contractor to prescribe the terms
of the contract; (5) DOE neither required the laboratory to conform
with DOE property management regulations nor approved its property
management system; and (6) DOE did not develop or provide guidance
spelling out the criteria for performance of property management
functions. 

Nuclear Safety:  Concerns About Reactor Restart and Implications for
DOE's Safety Culture (Letter Report, 04/12/90, GAO/RCED-90-104). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to restart three nuclear
production reactors at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the site contractor submitted a
restart plan to DOE that detailed actions needed for restart; (2) the
plan proposed to restart one reactor in September 1990, and the other
two in December 1990 and March 1991, respectively; (3) as of March
1990, the contractor was revising the plan to assess the effects of
tasks added to restart requirements; (4) DOE planned to announce a
restart schedule in April 1990; (5) the contractor planned to make
safety, operational, and management changes by fall 1990, which could
cause additional restart delays; (6) potential delays ranged from 1.5
months to over 2 years; (7) DOE needed to improve employee attitudes
toward safety at the site; (8) the contractor intended for the plan
and associated activities to address safety issues; and (9) the
contractor prepared a management policy statement describing
implemented or planned culture changes, but the policy lacked a plan
for measuring the success of those changes. 

Performance of Participants in DOE's Inertial Confinement Fusion
Program (Testimony, 04/05/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-58). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed six contractors' performance under the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Inertial Confinement Fusion Program
(ICF).  GAO found that although one contractor successfully performed
some support tasks:  (1) it performed unacceptably on some target
fabrication and delivery tasks; (2) its role under the current
contract was to support the efforts of other contractors by supplying
components for use in ICF experiments; (3) one contractor had to
subcontract for some needed support services; and (4) complaints
about the quality of some of its cryogenic target work persisted. 
GAO also found that:  (1) the lead laboratory for the ICF glass laser
program accomplished many of its objectives but had to defer some
important experiments because it did not receive sufficient funding;
and (2) other laboratories cited funding problems, lack of access to
other laser facilities, and complex experiments as reasons for
program schedule delays. 

Nuclear Health and Safety:  Need for Improved Responsiveness to
Problems at DOE Sites (Letter Report, 03/28/90, GAO/RCED-90-101). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information about the Department of Energy's (DOE) and its
contractors' responsiveness to DOE technical safety appraisals and
environmental surveys of contractor-operated facilities and sites. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE has conducted 48 technical safety
appraisals of facilities and operations at DOE sites between 1986 and
the present; (2) DOE has conducted environmental surveys at 37 sites
between 1985 and the present; (3) the appraisals and surveys
identified over 1,700 safety and health problems and almost 1,300
environmental problems at the sites; (4) DOE and its contractors
resolved 591, or 34 percent, of identified health and safety
problems, including 46 of the 113 highest-priority problems; (5) DOE
has not completely resolved any of the identified environmental
problems, many of which it characterized as very serious and complex;
and (6) the DOE computer-assisted tracking system did not include all
of the important information necessary to provide a comprehensive
picture of identified environmental, safety, and health problems. 

Efforts to Improve DOE's Management of the Nuclear Weapons Complex
(Testimony, 03/28/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-64). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts
to resolve environmental, safety, and health problems at its nuclear
weapons facilities.  GAO found that DOE:  (1) took a number of
initiatives to deal with major problems involving facility
deterioration; noncompliance with environmental, safety, and health
standards; improper disposal of radioactive wastes; and contaminated
groundwater; (2) issued strategic plans for modernization and
environmental cleanup activities at its facilities and made efforts
to hold its contractors more accountable; (3) restructured its
oversight and management functions to ensure the safe operation of
its facilities; and (4) began facility assessments to determine
whether they met federal, state, and local environmental, safety, and
health standards.  GAO concluded that successful management of DOE
nuclear facilities depended on:  (1) effective coordination among
program offices; (2) recruitment of technically qualified staff; and
(3) the commitment to resolve environmental, safety, and health
problems at all departmental levels. 

Nuclear Regulation:  The Military Would Benefit From a Comprehensive
Waste Disposal Program (Chapter Report, 03/23/90, GAO/RCED-90-96). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO compared the
Army's, Navy's, and Air Force's low-level radioactive waste disposal
practices. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the Department of Defense (DOD)
lacked a comprehensive waste disposal program; (2) none of the three
services had complete information on the amounts or types of
low-level radioactive waste generated or disposed of; (3) the Navy
lacked a low-level radioactive waste disposal program, while the Air
Force participated in the Army's disposal program; (4) the services'
stockpiling of waste, pending long-term disposal at three commercial
sites, increased the potential for accidental releases of waste
similar to that which occurred at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in
1986; (5) commercial sites have periodically banned the Army and the
Air Force for failure to comply with federal and state waste
packaging and shipping requirements; (6) compliance problems could
worsen after 1993, when there could be as many as 16 different
interstate compact and state disposal requirements; (7) significant
differences existed among and within the services regarding waste
disposal management expertise and training, volume-reduction
techniques, and use of cost-effective methods; (8) commercial sites'
surcharges and penalties resulted in DOD paying almost twice the
actual cost of waste disposal; and (9) two of the three commercial
sites will close by December 1992, increasing the likelihood that DOD
will store waste or seek exemptions to dispose of waste outside each
generator's region if no other sites become available. 

DOE's Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Weapons Complex
(Testimony, 03/22/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-52). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE)
management and oversight of the nuclear weapons complex, focusing on: 
(1) unresolved environmental, safety, and operational problems; (2)
long-term management problems; (3) the current status of DOE
management initiatives; and (4) its views on those initiatives.  GAO
noted that:  (1) the costs of remedying continual safety and
environmental problems regarding the aging and deterioration of DOE
nuclear facilities, groundwater and soil contamination, and
radioactive waste disposal could total $155 billion; (2) DOE has not
developed strategies for addressing long-standing management problems
concerning the emphasis on production over safety concerns,
inadequate environmental and safety oversight, and a lack of
technically qualified personnel; (3) DOE initiated actions to address
long-standing management problems, including the restructuring of
internal oversight responsibilities, issuance of environmental
restoration, waste management, and modernization strategies,
assessments of facilities' compliance with applicable regulations,
and efforts to increase contractors' accountability; and (4) the
success of recent management initiatives will depend on the
commitment of DOE to environmental, safety, and health issues,
effective coordination and cooperation among DOE oversight groups,
and the availability of technically qualified personnel. 

Nuclear Science:  DOE's Acceptance of Academy of Sciences' 1986
Inertial Fusion Technical Priorities (Fact Sheet, 03/15/90,
GAO/RCED-90-115FS). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed
aspects of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Inertial Confinement
Fusion (ICF) program, focusing on:  (1) the National Academy of
Sciences' (NAS) 1986 review panel recommendations concerning ICF
program priorities, which recommendations DOE accepted; and (2) DOE
use and application of the recommendations in negotiating the ICF
contract. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the NAS report listed priority areas
for the ICF program to pursue in the 5 subsequent years; (2) DOE
directed its program toward the technical priority recommendations,
while ICF laboratories responded in their individual programs; (3)
program objectives, major laboratories' capabilities, and smaller
programs' roles had either been strengthened or pursued; (4)
NAS-recommended funding was inadequate because of inflation, and some
laboratories did not meet program objectives; (5) DOE and some of the
laboratories gave advanced laser development a higher priority than
recommended, which caused the ICF program to be distracted from
orderly scientific progress; and (6) based on NAS' recommendation,
DOE made contractor fabrication and delivery of components the
highest priorities under the ICF contract. 

Nuclear Science:  Performance of Participants in DOE's Inertial
Confinement Fusion Program (Briefing Report, 03/15/90,
GAO/RCED-90-113BR). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Inertial Confinement Fusion Program,
focusing on the performance of the six participating laboratories for
the period January 1, 1987, through June 30, 1989. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) while the program emphasized
decentralization and laboratory autonomy, the six participants worked
in close cooperation with each other to achieve program objectives;
(2) one contractor was not effectively achieving program objectives,
primarily because of difficulties in transitioning from a primary
research role to a laboratory support role; (3) DOE believes that the
contractor's 3-year contract period is sufficient to correct existing
problems and will therefore recompete the contract when it expires in
1990; (4) overall, the other five laboratories met most of their
program objectives, but three laboratories cited limited funding and
unanticipated technical difficulties as reasons for deferring or not
completing certain goals; (5) despite a 1985 National Academy of
Sciences' recommendation that program funding remain constant with
that year's performance levels, inflation has cut the program's
budget by about $88 million; and (6) the 1990 budget request for the
program was $168.9 million, although congressional committees
supported a funding increase to $173.9 million. 

DOE's Efforts to Correct Environmental Problems of the Nuclear
Weapons Complex (Testimony, 03/15/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-47). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts
to correct environmental problems in its nuclear weapons complex. 
GAO noted that:  (1) the weapons complex faced such serious and
costly environmental problems as inactive waste sites requiring
cleanup, groundwater and soil contamination, facilities'
noncompliance with environmental laws and standards, and delayed
opening of a permanent waste repository; (2) although the full extent
of environmental problems in the complex was unknown, data indicated
that it could cost over $100 billion for environmental restoration;
(3) to focus management attention on environmental problems, DOE
underwent programmatic restructuring, issued a 5-year plan for
environmental restoration and waste management, and took actions to
make its contractors more accountable for environmental and safety
matters; and (4) DOE requested $2.8 billion for fiscal year 1991
environmental restoration and waste management activities, although
that amount would not fully fund all of the activities it outlined in
its 5-year plan.  GAO believes that, although DOE has taken several
actions to better address environmental problems in its nuclear
weapons complex, DOE must have more effective management systems in
place to ensure that it:  (1) identifies and obtains funding for the
most serious environmental problems; (2) effectively manages and
spends funds allocated for cleanup and waste management; and (3)
maintains a strong commitment to resolving environmental problems. 

Nuclear Waste:  Quarterly Report as of September 30, 1989 (Letter
Report, 03/02/90, GAO/RCED-90-103). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
status of the Department of Energy's (DOE) implementation of mandated
policies and procedures for nuclear waste storage, disposal, and
transportation in an underground repository, focusing on:  (1)
whether DOE was ready to begin construction of the facility and (2)
how recent changes in scheduling and in its developmental approach
have affected DOE activities. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE did not begin construction on an
exploratory shaft facility by November 1989, as planned, because it
did not comply with Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) quality
assurance requirements, resolve facility-design problems, or obtain
the required state permits; (2) DOE restructured the repository
program, which extended site characterization and repository
licensing deadlines to October 2001, exploratory shaft facility
completion to November 1992, and underground testing deadlines to
September 1995; (3) responding to state and NRC recommendations to
identify disqualifying conditions early in site preparation, DOE
planned to precede underground testing with surface testing,
beginning in January 1991; and (4) the scheduled extensions will
allow DOE to reevaluate its plans for the exploratory shaft facility,
resolve problems in obtaining state permits, and conduct thorough
site investigations. 

GAO's Views on DOE's 1991 Budget for Addressing Problems at the
Nuclear Weapons Complex (Testimony, 03/02/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-33). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) 1991
budget request relating to cleaning up and modernizing its nuclear
weapons complex.  GAO noted that:  (1) to more effectively deal with
its problems, DOE restructured its programmatic and safety
organizations, issued a 5-year plan for environmental restoration and
waste management, and undertook efforts to make contractors more
accountable for environmental and safety matters; (2) the Congress
mandated the establishment of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board to help ensure the safe operation of DOE facilities; (3)
although the full scope of DOE environmental problems was still
unknown, estimates indicated that cleanup could cost up to $155
billion; (4) unresolved problems included the shut-down of several
key facilities, delayed opening of a waste repository, reactor and
facility operational safety, facility deterioration, and groundwater
and soil contamination; (5) DOE requested $8.6 billion for its
weapons complex, including $1.9 billion for modernization and safety
upgrades; (6) DOE also requested $2.8 billion for environmental
restoration and waste management for 1991; (7) DOE projected that
funding for environmental restoration would continue to increase over
the next 5 fiscal years; (8) DOE planned to perform some
modernization efforts during 1991 without the benefit of an overall
approved strategic plan; and (9) DOE identified several material
weaknesses that could affect its ability to rebuild and clean up the
nuclear weapons complex. 

Nuclear Waste:  Transuranic Waste Storage Limitations at Rocky Flats
Plant (Letter Report, 02/28/90, GAO/RCED-90-109). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) plans for
resolving the on-site waste storage problem at its Rocky Flats
nuclear weapons plant. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the shutdown of Rocky Flats weapons
production facilities precluded accurate projections of the on-site
waste storage capacity; (2) DOE took initiatives to extend the
storage limit by reducing the volume of waste generated, removing
some waste from the current radioactive-mixed waste inventory, and
installing equipment to reduce the waste in the current inventory;
(3) monthly generation of waste declined from an average of 361 cubic
yards in fiscal year 1984 to 95 cubic yards during fiscal year 1989;
and (4) DOE took steps to increase employee awareness and training on
using hazardous chemicals so that radioactive waste could be
minimized. 

Nuclear Science:  The Feasibility of Using a Particle Accelerator to
Produce Tritium (Briefing Report, 02/02/90, GAO/RCED-90-73BR). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
feasibility of the Department of Energy (DOE) producing tritium, a
critical material for nuclear weapons, using a linear accelerator,
rather than a nuclear reactor, focusing on:  (1) whether DOE
adequately considered particle accelerator technologies during its
examination of tritium production options and (2) the cost, safety,
and environmental advantages of accelerator production over nuclear
reactor production of tritium. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) although accelerator production of
tritium appeared feasible, DOE needed to design an accelerator with
the operating characteristics necessary for tritium production; (2)
although DOE concluded that alternative technologies could not
provide new tritium production capacity within the needed time frame,
it was reviewing the accelerator in more detail; (3) accelerator
production of tritium would present fewer safety and environmental
concerns, could have more cost and schedule advantages, and could be
sized to meet specific tritium needs; and (4) because of the amount
of electricity required to produce tritium with an accelerator, DOE
could need a new electric generating plant, which could cause
environmental consequences associated with fossil fuel or nuclear
power generation. 

Environment, Safety, and Health:  Status of DOE's Reorganization of
Its Safety Oversight Function (Briefing Report, 01/30/90,
GAO/RCED-90-82BR). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
impact a proposed Department of Energy (DOE) reorganization plan
would have on its safety oversight activities for nuclear facilities. 

FINDINGS:  GAO noted that:  (1) DOE responded to public concern over
a 1979 nuclear accident by establishing the Office of Assistant
Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health in September 1985; (2)
a 1986 accident in the Soviet Union led to a 1988 congressional
mandate for an external, independent oversight board; and (3) despite
previous actions to address safety issues, the Secretary of Energy
determined in 1989 that the DOE safety oversight program was a
failure, primarily because clear lines of responsibility did not
exist for DOE oversight activities.  GAO found that the proposed
restructuring plan would clearly identify lines of responsibility for
DOE safety management and oversight by:  (1) specifying safety
responsibilities for management personnel; (2) reorganizing DOE
offices for independent, internal oversight of safety activities; and
(3) clarifying the external safety board's role in overseeing the
internal safety program.  GAO also found that the plan's success
depended on:  (1) the degree of personnel commitment to safety and
reconciliation of safety concerns with production goals; (2) whether
each oversight group had a clear role and adequate guidelines
regarding its responsibilities and relationships with the other
groups; (3) how effectively DOE oversight groups worked together to
achieve safety goals; and (4) the availability of experienced and
qualified personnel to perform safety oversight activities. 


COMPETITION AND SECURITY IN ENERGY
SUPPLIES
============================================================ Chapter 3

Electric Vehicles:  Likely Consequences of U.S.  and Other Nations'
Programs and Policies (Chapter Report, 12/30/94, GAO/PEMD-95-7). 

ABSTRACT:  California and several northeastern states have adopted or
are considering legislation that would require automobile
manufacturers--both foreign and domestic--to supply 70,000 electric
vehicles in 1998 and nearly a million by 2003.  Uncertainties about
the readiness of electric vehicle technology led GAO to compare
electric vehicle development and commercialization programs
internationally.  Reviewing programs in France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, as well as the
United States, GAO sought to answer the following questions:  (1)
What are the current barriers to the widespread introduction of
electric vehicles?  (2) What are the nature and extent of other
nations' policies and programs for developing, producing, and
promoting electric vehicles?  (3) What are the likely effects of
introducing electric vehicles in terms of costs to the individual,
national energy savings, and effects on the environment? 

Natural Gas Regulation:  Little Opposition to FERC's Recent Policies
on Transportation-Related Services (Letter Report, 12/21/94,
GAO/RCED-95-39). 

ABSTRACT:  During the past decade, the Congress and the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) have taken several steps to
lessen federal regulation of the production and interstate
transportation of natural gas.  Industry attention has now focused on
regulatory changes in transportation services.  This report reviews
recent regulatory changes affecting three aspects of the
industry--the collection of gas from wells for delivery to a
processing plant or pipeline; the holding of gas, normally in
underground reservoirs, for later use; and the interconnection points
among several pipelines where gas and transportation services can be
obtained easily.  GAO discusses how producers, pipeline companies,
and end-users view these changes.  GAO also reviews the Energy
Department's plans to intervene in energy-related regulatory
proceedings in the states and the extent to which Energy plans to
work with FERC in such interventions. 

Air Pollution:  Allowance Trading Offers an Opportunity to Reduce
Emissions at Less Cost (Chapter Report, 12/16/94, GAO/RCED-95-30). 

ABSTRACT:  In 1990, the Congress adopted a new regulatory approach to
reduce acid rain, allowing electric utilities to trade allowances to
emit sulfur dioxide, a major cause of acid rain.  Utilities that
reduce their emissions below their required levels can sell their
extra allowances to other utilities to help them meet their
requirements.  The Environmental Protection Agency estimates that
this flexible approach to curbing acid rain could reduce costs
significantly because trading allowances can be less costly than
other methods of controlling pollution.  This report discusses the
(1) extent to which trading is expected to cut sulfur dioxide
emissions and compliance costs and the status of the allowance
trading market; (2) impediments to increased trading of allowances;
and (3) implications of designing a similar approach to curb carbon
dioxide emissions. 

Gasohol:  Federal Agencies' Use of Gasohol Limited by High Prices and
Other Factors (Letter Report, 12/13/94, GAO/RCED-95-41). 

ABSTRACT:  The total amount of gasohol used by the federal government
remains unknown because agencies do not keep information on purchases
by individual drivers, which account for about 54 percent of all
motor fuel use.  The remaining motor fuel is bought in bulk, and the
percentage represented by gasohol has not increased significantly
since 1981.  GAO found that gasohol consumption by the federal fleet
was 269 million gallons in fiscal year 1993.  This amount would
represent the upper limit of potential gasohol consumption if all
vehicles used by federal agencies were refueled with gasohol during
that year.  If, instead, federal agencies bought gasohol at the same
rate as the general public--7.1 percent of gasoline consumption--they
would potentially use about 19 million gallons.  Although federal
agencies have tried to encourage the use of gasohol since 1991,
several barriers still exist that limit purchases.  The main
impediment is that the price of gasohol is not competitive with the
price of gasoline.  Gasohol is also sometimes unavailable because of
the small number of ethanol and gasohol suppliers in some locations. 
In addition, environmental regulations mandating the use of
clean-burning fuels to reduce emissions may limit the use of gasohol
in some areas or affect its supply and price in others. 

International Trade:  Issues Regarding Imposition of an Oil Embargo
Against Nigeria (Letter Report, 11/10/94, GAO/GGD-95-24). 

ABSTRACT:  The U.S.  House of Representatives has condemned the
effort of Nigeria's military government to thwart that country's
return to civilian and democratic rule and in jailing prominent human
rights activists and democratic political leaders.  This report
assesses the potential economic impact of a multilateral oil embargo
on Nigeria, the world oil market, and the U.S.  economy.  GAO also
examines the political viability of undertaking such an action. 
Finally, GAO assesses the potential economic impact of a U.S. 
unilateral oil embargo on Nigeria, the world market, and the U.S. 
economy, as well as its potential political impact on Nigeria. 

Energy Supply:  Energy Potential of Municipal Solid Waste Is Limited
(Letter Report, 09/20/94, GAO/RCED-94-200). 

ABSTRACT:  More than 195 million tons of municipal solid
waste--basically household and commercial garbage--were generated in
the United States.  Yet only a small portion of solid waste is now
used for energy production, mainly through the use of
electricity-generating facilities that burn municipal waste as a fuel
and engines fueled by waste gases from landfills.  GAO concludes that
energy recovery from municipal solid waste holds limited potential to
contribute to the nation's overall energy production, not only
because of the volume and energy content of the waste itself, but
also because of factors affecting the use of waste disposal,
including public opposition and the availability of financing.  This
report also discusses (1) the environmental impact of producing
energy from waste, (2) the Energy Department's research and
development efforts to use waste as a viable energy source, and (3)
the potential energy savings from and environmental impact of
recycling waste material. 

Energy Policy:  Ranking Options to Improve the Readiness of and
Expand the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (Letter Report, 08/18/94,
GAO/RCED-94-259). 

ABSTRACT:  This report discusses several near- and long-term options
for improving the readiness of and expanding the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve.  Resolving problems affecting the Reserve's readiness, such
as the buildup of geothermal heat and gas in stored crude oil, and
replacing equipment at the end of its design life would overcome the
significantly degraded ability of the Reserve to respond to oil
disruptions.  As a result, GAO ranked these options as high
priorities.  Continuing to fill the reserve to its current capacity
of 750 million barrels or expanding the reserve to hold one billion
barrels would both cost much more.  Considering the limited potential
benefits and the higher costs of filling or expanding the Reserve,
GAO gave this option a relatively low priority.  The benefits of
increasing the Reserve's daily drawdown capability are less clear;
however, implementing this option would increase the nation's ability
to respond more flexibly to oil disruptions and would likely entail
more moderate costs.  GAO ranked this option as a medium priority. 

Alternative-Fueled Vehicles:  Progress Made in Accelerating Federal
Purchases, but Benefits and Costs Remain Uncertain (Chapter Report,
07/15/94, GAO/RCED-94-161). 

ABSTRACT:  To reduce U.S.  dependence on foreign oil and improve air
quality, federal agencies have pioneered the use of vehicles fueled
by ethanol, natural gas, methanol, propane, and electricity.  Federal
agencies now manage a fleet of about 7,800 cars, trucks, and vans
that use alternative fuels.  Wider public acceptance of these
vehicles, however, has been stymied by a shortage of convenient
refueling stations; high costs; and uncertainties surrounding the
economic, environmental, and other benefits of alternative fuels. 
This report (1) identifies uncertainties about the benefits and costs
of using alternative fuels; (2) assesses federal efforts to encourage
the development of refueling facilities for such fuels; (3) reviews
federal efforts to accelerate acquisitions of alternative-fueled
vehicles; and (4) evaluates efforts to coordinate federal, state, and
local alternative fuels programs. 

Electromagnetic Fields:  Federal Efforts to Determine Health Effects
Are Behind Schedule (Chapter Report, 06/21/94, GAO/RCED-94-115). 

ABSTRACT:  Much needed federal research on the health consequences of
exposure to electromagnetic fields emitted from power lines lags
behind schedule, and a final report to be delivered to the Congress
by March 1997 will likely be based on limited information.  Most
federal power lines are found in rural areas, where the risk of
public exposure to electromagnetic fields is lower.  Sources other
than power lines, such as home appliances and office equipment, are
more common sources of exposure to electromagnetic fields.  Lacking
conclusive scientific evidence on the health effects of such
exposure, states and utilities have responded cautiously to the
public's concerns and have taken relatively inexpensive and
convenient measures to reduce public exposures, such as restricting
public uses of power line rights-of-way.  Future actions will be
driven largely by the results of scientific research.  The Department
of Energy (DOE) and other agencies have missed milestones for
implementing a national research program on electromagnetic fields. 
DOE officials blame the delay on competing priorities during the
1992-1993 presidential transition. 

Geothermal Energy:  Outlook Limited for Some Uses but Promising for
Geothermal Heat Pumps (Chapter Report, 06/03/94, GAO/RCED-94-84). 

ABSTRACT:  Growth in the use of geothermal energy to generate
electricity will be modest because most of the known economically
viable hydrothermal fields are slowly being depleted from use. 
Furthermore, the price of electricity being generated from these
fields is only marginally competitive with that of electricity
derived from other sources.  To improve the competitiveness of
geothermal power, the Department of Energy (DOE) is supporting
industry efforts to extend the life of the hydrothermal fields,
explore for new resources, and cut drilling costs.  Geothermal power
production causes fewer, less serious environmental problems than
does conventional power production.  Geothermal resources suitable
for direct-use heating applications offer an environmentally benign
resource alternative; however, their growth potential is poor because
of the high risk of drilling and the high cost of installation, low
price of fossil fuels, and lack of information on geothermal
resources located near large cities.  Geothermal heat pumps are the
most energy-efficient way to heat and cool buildings in most parts of
the country.  Their wider use could cut energy costs, conserve fossil
fuels, and reduce emission.  Their use to date, however, has been
limited because consumers, contractors, installers, and utilities are
unfamiliar with the technology; installation costs are high; and
neither DOE nor industry has actively promoted them. 

Energy Policy:  Energy Policy and Conservation Act Reauthorization
(Testimony, 05/25/94, GAO/T-RCED-94-214). 

ABSTRACT:  The government-owned and -operated Naval Petroleum Reserve
(NPR) in Elk Hills, California--the seventh largest oil field in the
lower 48 states--generated oil sales revenues of $327 million in
1992.  The Department of Energy (DOE) sells most of this oil to
California refiners through competitive bids.  The prices received by
the government for this oil have been lower than prices for crude oil
in other parts of the country.  GAO concludes that it will be
difficult for DOE to boost revenues from NPR oil sales by selling oil
to Gulf Coast or midcontinent oil refineries because this oil is of
lower quality than other available crudes, and shipping costs are
high.  This report explores other ways that DOE may be able to
increase revenues.  For example, DOE bills its customers more often
than private oil producers do, resulting in buyers making lower bids
to compensate for the higher administrative costs.  DOE also does not
market its oil as aggressively as private producers do.  GAO also
discussed (1) the relative priority that should be given to several
options for improving the readiness and expansion of the Strategic
Petroleum Reserve and (2) the evolving mission of the International
Energy Agency. 

Naval Petroleum Reserve:  Limited Opportunities Exist to Increase
Revenues From Oil Sales in California (Letter Report, 05/24/94,
GAO/RCED-94-126). 

ABSTRACT:  The government-owned and -operated Naval Petroleum Reserve
(NPR) in Elk Hills, California--the seventh largest oil field in the
lower 48 states--generated oil sales revenues of $327 million in
1992.  The Department of Energy (DOE) sells most of this oil to
California refiners through competitive bids.  The prices received by
the government for this oil have been lower than prices for crude oil
in other parts of the country.  GAO concludes that it will be
difficult for DOE to boost revenues from NPR oil sales by selling oil
to Gulf Coast or midcontinent oil refineries because this oil is of
lower quality than other available crudes, and shipping costs are
high.  This report explores other ways that DOE may be able to
increase revenues.  For example, DOE bills its customers more often
than private oil producers do, resulting in buyers making lower bids
to compensate for the higher administrative costs.  DOE also does not
market its oil as aggressively as private producers do.  In testimony
before Congress, GAO summarized this report and also discussed (1)
the relative priority that should be given to several options for
improving the readiness and expansion of the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve and (2) the evolving mission of the International Energy
Agency; see:  Energy Policy:  Energy Policy and Conservation Act
Reauthorization (GAO/T-RCED-94-214, May 25, 1994), by Victor S. 
Rezendes, Director of Energy and Science Issues, before the
Subcommittee on Energy and Power, House Committee on Energy and
Commerce (15 pp.). 

Electricity Regulation:  FERC's Efforts to Monitor and Enforce
Hydroelectric Requirements (Letter Report, 05/24/94,
GAO/RCED-94-162). 

ABSTRACT:  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates
about 1,670 nonfederal hydroelectric projects across the country. 
FERC's main concern is that project operators abide by terms and
conditions designed to protect people, property, and the environment. 
GAO concludes that FERC's monitoring procedures and practices are
adequate to ensure that these projects are complying with its
requirements.  FERC's procedures for investigating allegations of
noncompliance with license requirements are adequate and generally
followed.  FERC's monitoring and enforcement efforts to ensure
structural soundness, public safety, and environmental protection are
showing positive results.  The number of violations committed each
year fell from 157 in fiscal year 1989 to 87 in 1993, a 45-percent
decline.  Over the same period, FERC increased its enforcement
efforts against project owners who commit violations.  Compliance
orders, which are directives to correct deficiencies, jumped from 26
to 37; fines totaling $3.7 million were levied against 31 projects;
and eight licenses were revoked. 

Energy Conservation:  Contractors' Efforts at Federally Owned Sites
(Letter Report, 04/29/94, GAO/RCED-94-96). 

ABSTRACT:  Energy experts estimate that the federal government--the
nation's largest energy consumer--could cut annual energy use in its
buildings by at least 25 percent.  This report focuses on how energy
contractors managing sites owned by five agencies--the Departments of
the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Energy, and the National Aeronautics
and Space Administration--have achieved reductions in energy use. 
GAO discusses (1) energy consumption at the government-owned sites
operated by contractors in the United States, (2) incentives and
funding sources available for contractors to use in reducing energy
consumption, and (3) contractors' energy conservation efforts and the
results these efforts have achieved. 

Bonneville Power Administration:  Borrowing Practices and Financial
Condition (Briefing Report, 04/19/94, GAO/AIMD-94-67BR). 

ABSTRACT:  The Bonneville Power Administration (BPA), which markets
and distributes power generated on the Columbia River and its
tributaries, faces significant operating and financial risks because
of its heavy reliance on borrowing, recent operating losses, and
other uncertainties.  For nearly all of its capital investments, BPA
uses debt financing--that is, BPA borrows money and repays the debt,
with interest, through future revenues.  Almost all of BPA's new
borrowing is projected to come from the U.S.  Treasury.  By contrast,
public utilities and federal entities, such as the Tennessee Valley
Authority, generally use a higher portion of their current revenues
to pay for capital expenditures than BPA does.  In the short term,
BPA's low financial reserves provide little flexibility to respond to
further operating losses, increasing the possibility that BPA would
be unable to make its annual payment to Treasury.  In the longer
term, BPA's financial viability could also be jeopardized if the gap
between BPA rates and the cost of alternative energy sources
continues to narrow.  Such a scenario could cause some BPA customers
to meet their energy needs elsewhere, leaving a dwindling pool of
ratepayers to pay off the debt burden accumulated during previous
years. 

Energy Conservation:  Federal Agencies' Funding Sources and Reporting
Procedures (Letter Report, 03/30/94, GAO/RCED-94-70). 

ABSTRACT:  The federal government is the largest single energy user
in the nation.  In fiscal year 1992, the energy bill for 500,000
federal buildings and facilities came to more than $3.6 billion.  The
National Energy Conservation Policy Act requires that federal
agencies, by the year 2000, cut energy use 20 percent from 1995
levels.  This report provides the latest information available on the
energy activities at the six largest energy-consuming agencies:  the
Departments of Defense, Energy, Transportation, and Veterans Affairs;
the General Services Administration; and the Postal Service.  GAO
identifies (1) energy expenditures, spending on energy conservation,
and energy efficiencies achieved; (2) funding sources available for
energy conservation measures; and (3) procedures used for tracking
them. 

International Trade:  Kazakhstan Unlikely to Be Major Source of Oil
for the United States (Letter Report, 03/04/94, GAO/GGD-94-74). 

ABSTRACT:  Covering a territory of more than 1 million square miles,
or about one-third of the continental United States, Kazakhstan, part
of the former Soviet Union, is rich in oil, gas, and mineral
deposits.  The risk of disruption to Middle East oil production and
the rising U.S.  demand for foreign oil have spurred American
interest in oil sources outside the Persian Gulf.  This report
provides information on Kazakhstan's potential as (1) a source of oil
for the United States and (2) an investment opportunity for the U.S. 
petroleum industry and an export market for U.S.  oil and gas
equipment supplies.  GAO also discusses Kazakhstan's oil and gas
production, reserves, exports, and consumption; the possible pipeline
routes for bringing Kazakhstan's oil to export markets; the factors
encouraging and discouraging investment in Kazakhstan's petroleum
sector; and the efforts of the U.S.  government to support exports to
and investment in Kazakhstan's petroleum sector and U.S.  oil
companies' responses to those efforts. 

Natural Gas:  Costs, Benefits, and Concerns Related to FERC's Order
636 (Letter Report, 11/08/93, GAO/RCED-94-11). 

ABSTRACT:  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) Order
636 is intended to spur development of a more open and accessible
pipeline system for buyers and sellers of natural gas.  The order
requires many interstate pipeline companies to offer their customers
transportation, storage, and other services separately or as part of
a "bundled" package by the 1993 winter heating season.  The pipeline
companies will be able to recover from their customers the costs that
can be directly attributed to the new regulation as long as FERC
determines that these costs were prudently incurred.  Order 636
changes how FERC sets the pipeline transportation rates.  Under the
new rate design, customers requiring uninterrupted service--mainly
local distribution companies serving residential or commercial
users--will pay more of the pipeline companies' fixed costs. 
Customers that can tolerate "interruptible" service, such as
manufacturers of fertilizer or glass, could end up paying less.  In
response to congressional concerns about the effect of Order 636 on
consumers' gas bills, this report (1) estimates the potential shift
in fixed costs among pipeline consumers resulting from the changes in
the way that transportation rates are designed, (2) reports the
pipeline companies' estimates of the transition costs of implementing
the new rule, and (3) summarizes available information on the
benefits of the new order and the costs and benefits arising from
changes in the law and FERC regulations since 1978. 

GAO Products on International Energy Agency (Correspondence,
09/17/93, GAO/RCED-93-217R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO summarized its
reviews of U.S.  participation in the International Energy Agency
(IEA).  GAO found that:  (1) in general, the United States has
benefitted from participation in IEA and should continue to
participate; (2) although IEA has tested its emergency oil-sharing
system and resolved some problems, it is uncertain whether the system
will function successfully in an oil shortage; (3) the United States
will initially have to provide oil to participants in an emergency,
since oil imports represent a small percentage of its oil supplies;
(4) the United States has not developed a fair-sharing system to
ensure that domestic and international oil producers share the burden
of supplying oil in emergencies, since officials do not believe it is
needed; (5) antitrust concerns and foreign barriers to information
exchange could hamper the emergency system's function; (6) the United
States relies primarily on market forces to restrain demand during
oil shortages and drawdowns of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve; (7)
several IEA members have not met the 90-day reserve requirement; (8)
companies are reluctant to provide complete data to IEA information
systems which impairs the emergency system's function; and (9)
although IEA has established long-term conservation and research and
development programs to reduce dependence on imported oil, the United
States and several other IEA members have not met IEA goals. 

Electricity Regulation:  Factors Affecting the Processing of Electric
Power Applications (Testimony, 08/06/93, GAO/T-RCED-93-65). 

ABSTRACT:  Although the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
has tried to cut the time required to process electric power
applications, further improvements are possible.  FERC is responsible
for regulating the rates, the terms, and the conditions of proposed
wholesale electricity transactions--a growing portion of the nation's
electricity business--as well as mergers and other deals among
utilities.  These improvements are especially important considering
the potential increased workload arising from the Energy Policy Act. 
FERC's management information system could be upgraded to give agency
managers more specific information with which to spot problems and
assess performance.  By examining the information exchanged by
applicants and FERC staff at the initial filing stage, FERC could
determine if changing policy statements or filing requirements would
reduce the number of incomplete applications.  Alternative resolution
techniques could reduce the need for time-consuming trial-like
hearings.  Similar techniques could help applicants settle disputes
before submitting applications to FERC. 

Rural Electrification:  REA Borrowers' Investments in Cable and
Satellite Television Services (Chapter Report, 07/29/93,
GAO/RCED-93-164). 

ABSTRACT:  Concerns have been raised about the possibility that
borrowers have been using loans from the Rural Electrification
Administration (REA) to subsidize their cable or satellite television
services.  One-fourth of the REA borrowers responding to a GAO survey
provide such services; respondents reported investments in these
businesses totaling $357 million.  REA borrowers may have a
competitive advantage in their cable or satellite businesses.  They
have access, for example, to credit sources created to finance
electric and telephone cooperatives.  Many share space, equipment,
and staff used for their utility services with their cable or
satellite business.  REA does restrict the amounts that borrowers may
invest in nonutility activities.  REA also has accounting and
auditing controls, including annual audits of borrowers, designed to
ensure that borrowers comply with their loan agreements.  Regulation
of REA borrowers by other federal agencies is limited.  State
regulation of borrowers and their affiliates varies, depending on
whether the borrower is a cooperative or is investor-owned.  GAO did
not determine whether federal and state oversight prevents borrowers
from cross-subsidizing their cable and satellite businesses. 

Fossil Fuels:  The Department of Energy's Magnetohydrodynamics
Development Program (Letter Report, 07/29/93, GAO/RCED-93-174). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE), along with industry, has
been working for years to develop magnetohydrodynamics (MHD)
technology for generating electricity.  MHD is a potentially
high-efficiency technology that generates electrical power from coal
by passing extremely hot coal combustion gases through a channel
surrounded by a magnetic field.  In recent years, DOE's MHD program
has focused on demonstrating the proof-of-concept, or feasibility, of
coal-fired MHD electric power plants.  This report discusses (1) the
financial history of developing MHD technology, (2) progress in
meeting the proof-of-concept program's schedule, (3) potential
problems and concerns, (4) DOE's management of the program, and (5)
DOE's plans for MHD. 

Electricity Regulation:  Factors Affecting the Processing of Electric
Power Applications (Letter Report, 07/23/93, GAO/RCED-93-168). 

ABSTRACT:  Although the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
has tried to cut the time required to process electric power
applications, further improvements are possible.  FERC is responsible
for regulating the rates, the terms, and the conditions of proposed
wholesale electricity transactions--a growing portion of the nation's
electricity business--as well as mergers and other deals among
utilities.  These improvements are especially important considering
the potential increased workload arising from the Energy Policy Act. 
FERC's management information system could be upgraded to give agency
managers more specific information with which to spot problems and
assess performance.  By examining the information exchanged by
applicants and FERC staff at the initial filing stage, FERC could
determine if changing policy statements or filing requirements would
reduce the number of incomplete applications.  Alternative resolution
techniques could reduce the need for time-consuming trial-like
hearings.  Similar techniques could help applicants settle disputes
before submitting applications to FERC.  GAO summarized this report
in testimony before the Congress; see:  Electricity Regulation: 
Factors Affecting the Processing of Electric Power Applications
(GAO/T-RCED-93-65, Aug.  6, 1993), by Victor S.  Rezendes, Director
of Energy and Science Issues, before the Subcommittee on Environment,
Energy, and Natural Resources, House Committee on Government
Operations (16 pp.). 

Energy Policy:  Other Nations' Policies to Reduce Oil and Coal Use in
Transport and Industry (Chapter Report, 05/28/93, GAO/RCED-93-139). 

ABSTRACT:  By 2010, U.S.  oil and coal consumption are projected to
rise by almost one-fifth over 1990 levels.  The nation's continued
heavy reliance on fossil fuels, particularly oil and coal, raises
questions about its ability to meet energy security, environmental,
and economic objectives.  This report examines how other
industrialized nations have dealt with the dilemma.  GAO discusses
the (1) factors that influence the type and the amount of energy that
other nations use and, specifically, the trends in energy supply and
use in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and South Korea and (2) key
policies and programs that these nations have adopted to promote
conservation and the efficient use of oil and coal in their
transportation and industrial sectors. 

Natural Gas:  FERC's Compliance and Enforcement Programs Could Be
Further Enhanced (Chapter Report, 05/27/93, GAO/RCED-93-122). 

ABSTRACT:  The natural gas industry, despite increasing competition,
retains many characteristics of a monopoly.  To protect the public
interest, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) regulates
the sale and the transportation of natural gas and the construction
of pipeline facilities.  FERC has tried to stop pipeline companies
from engaging in potentially discriminatory practices that favor
their own unregulated subsidiaries, but FERC's efforts could be even
more effective.  For example, FERC needs to aggressively enforce
pipeline bulletin board and other reporting requirements used to
detect and deter discriminatory practices.  FERC also needs to target
audits of pipeline companies on the basis of information suggesting
that discriminatory practices may exist.  FERC recently tried to beef
up its enforcement of environmental regulations by hiring more
inspection staff and by better informing its inspection staff and the
industry of FERC's environmental requirements.  GAO suggests that
FERC (1) require companies to give FERC advance notice of
construction scheduled for environmentally sensitive areas, (2)
require companies to submit periodic environmental compliance reports
for all major construction projects requiring environmental
mitigation measures, and (3) formally seek civil penalty authority
from the Congress to enforce FERC's requirements for projects
approved under the Natural Gas Act. 

Energy Policy:  Changes Needed to Make National Energy Planning More
Useful (Chapter Report, 04/27/93, GAO/RCED-93-29). 

ABSTRACT:  The oil and price shocks of the early 1970s spurred the
Congress to create a permanent mechanism for developing and
implementing a national energy policy.  Under the law, the President
must submit a comprehensive national energy plan to the Congress
every 2 years.  GAO found that the six national energy plans
submitted by three administrations since 1979 have varied
significantly in responding to the law's provisions.  Although most
plans set objectives and outlined strategies to achieve them, no plan
fully addressed the act's main provisions.  For example, no plan
established the specified 5- and 10-year objectives.  Most plans
included only general goals, and only three plans provided analysis
supporting these goals.  The administrations' differing views on the
federal role in energy as well as new energy developments influenced
the content of the plans and the degree to which they addressed the
law's provisions.  GAO believes that although the law provides a
useful framework for developing an energy policy, the frequency and
timing requirements have not contributed to effective planning.  As a
result, plans are unlikely to involve the comprehensive planning
exercise the Congress envisioned. 

Alternative-Fueled Vehicles:  Potential Impact of Exemptions From
Transportation Control Measures (Letter Report, 04/19/93,
GAO/RCED-93-125). 

ABSTRACT:  To reduce air pollution and U.S.  oil dependence, the
Congress has passed legislation promoting the use of
alternative-fueled vehicles.  Several barriers, however, including
higher fuel costs and uncertainty about the availability of
alternative fuels, may deter businesses and consumers from buying
these vehicles.  As a result, legislation has been introduced that
would offer potential buyers exemptions from some transportation
control measures, including high-occupancy vehicle lanes.  This
report examines (1) how exemptions might affect achieving the
transportation control measures' purposes, (2) how effective
exemptions might be in increasing purchases of alternative fueled
vehicles and the use of alternative fuels, (3) whether government and
industry officials believe that an exemption program should be
controlled by the federal government or the states, (4) how the
public might react to exemptions, (5) how exemptions are likely to
affect the enforcement of transportation control measures, and (6)
what specific kinds of alternative-fueled vehicles might receive
exemptions. 

Electricity Supply:  Efforts Under Way to Develop Solar and Wind
Energy (Chapter Report, 04/16/93, GAO/RCED-93-118). 

ABSTRACT:  Wind and sunlight have the potential to help meet the
United States' electrical needs without the adverse environmental
effects associated with other energy sources, yet they now supply
less than 1 percent of the nation's electricity.  This report
identifies (1) economic and institutional barriers that discourage
electric utilities from using wind or solar power; (2) efforts by
government, utilities, and industry to foster the use of wind and
solar power; and (3) ways in which the Department of Energy's
programs could further assist the development of wind and solar
technologies. 

Trans-Alaska Pipeline:  Projections of Long-Term Viability Are
Uncertain (Letter Report, 04/08/93, GAO/RCED-93-69). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) asserts that the Congress
will have to authorize the leasing of the coastal plain of Alaska's
Arctic National Wildlife Refuge--an area of high oil and gas
potential--by 1997 to keep the Trans-Alaska Pipeline operating.  DOE
concludes that because of the projected rate of decline in oil
production from Alaska's North Slope, the pipeline will likely be
forced to shut down by the year 2009.  The possible shutdown of the
pipeline could be a consideration in reaching a policy decision on
whether to open the refuge to oil and gas development or whether to
designate the coastal plain as wilderness, thereby precluding future
development.  In assessing DOE's conclusion that 2009 is the most
likely year that the pipeline will be forced to shut down, GAO
evaluated the reasonableness of (1) the minimum operating level that
DOE assumed for the pipeline and (2) the model and the key economic,
geologic, engineering, and cost assumptions that DOE used to estimate
oil production at the North Slope.  GAO also looked at the
reasonableness of DOE's belief that it will take 10 to 12 years to
develop new oil fields in the refuge. 

GAO Products on Bonneville Power Administration (Correspondence,
03/31/93, GAO/RCED-93-133R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided a
summary of its work on the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) and
other related agencies involved in BPA system operations since the
enactment of the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Act.  GAO noted that its work:  (1) included
recommendations for agency actions and how the agency responded to
the recommendations and (2) concerned issues of financial management,
endangered species, resource acquisition, irrigation, electricity
transmission, administration, nuclear power plant construction, and
utility rates. 

Energy Conservation:  Appliance Standards and Labeling Programs Can
Be Improved (Chapter Report, 03/24/93, GAO/RCED-93-102). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) is behind schedule in
upgrading energy efficiency standards for household appliances, such
as refrigerators, air conditioners, and heat pumps.  This has
happened because (1) the appliance program's budget has been cut and
staffing has remained flat despite an increasing workload and (2) DOE
officials generally review proposed standards sequentially, rather
than using a faster concurrent review process.  The upshot is that
U.S.  consumers, by continuing to buy less efficient appliances, will
spend an estimated $1.7 billion more on energy costs through 2030
than they would have if DOE had upgraded the standards on time.  The
Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) labeling program is intended to
inform consumers about appliance energy use and costs.  Despite
concerns voiced by consumers and manufacturers about the accuracy of
existing appliance labels, which do not take into account changing
energy prices, FTC has not reviewed the format and information
content of labels, calling into question the program's effectiveness. 
To promote compliance with federal efficiency standards and accuracy
in labels, DOE and FTC rely largely on voluntary tests done by
industry associations.  GAO did not determine the extent to which
appliances met efficiency standards, but it did discover instances in
which pool heaters and refrigerator-freezers fell short of the energy
efficiency claims on their labels or were less efficient than the
standards required.  DOE and FTC do not systematically monitor and
investigate compliance with the standards. 

Energy Security and Policy:  Analysis of the Pricing of Crude Oil and
Petroleum Products (Chapter Report, 03/19/93, GAO/RCED-93-17). 

ABSTRACT:  During the first week following the Iraqi invasion of
Kuwait in August 1990, crude oil prices in the United States shot up
by more than one-third--from about $22 a barrel to about $30 a
barrel.  The prices of gasoline, home heating oil, and jet fuel also
increased substantially.  Yet world inventories of crude oil were at
their highest level since the late 1970s.  This situation raised
questions about how prices for crude oil and petroleum products are
set, particularly during market shocks.  This report (1) explains the
pricing of crude oil and three products refined from it--gasoline,
home heating oil, and jet fuel--under normal market conditions and
during market shocks and (2) describes the federal government's
authority to respond to disruptions in the oil supply and the
government's use of this authority during the Persian Gulf war. 

Electricity Regulation:  Electric Consumers Protection Act's Effects
on Licensing Hydroelectric Dams (Chapter Report, 09/18/92,
GAO/RCED-92-246). 

ABSTRACT:  The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) faces a
major challenge.  By the end of 1993, the long-term operating
licenses for more than 15 percent of the nation's nonfederal
hydroelectric power projects will expire.  In relicensing these
projects, FERC must balance electricity needs with environmental and
other considerations, as spelled out in the 1986 Electric Consumers
Protection Act.  This report:  (1) reviews the effects of that
legislation on FERC's licensing process for and decisions about
hydroelectric power projects, (2) provides information on FERC's use
of temporary licenses for projects seeking relicensing, and (3)
identifies FERC's requirements for ensuring public safety at
hydroelectric projects. 

Energy Policy:  Options to Reduce Environmental and Other Costs of
Gasoline Consumption (Chapter Report, 09/17/92, GAO/RCED-92-260). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO evaluated six policy options--a higher gas tax, a tax
on tail pipe emissions, subsidies for alternative fuels, higher fuel
economy standards for new vehicles, surcharges for cars that are less
fuel efficient and pollute more, and financial rewards for people who
voluntarily scrap older vehicles--to determine their effect on the
economy, the environment, traffic congestion, and other issues. 
These policy options can be modified or combined to more effectively
reduce gasoline consumption and air pollution from cars and light
trucks and to meet other important policy objectives.  Options that
send consumers clear market signals, such as higher gasoline or
tailpipe emission taxes, could help ensure that the costs of gasoline
use in these vehicles are visible and fully considered by consumers
when they buy, maintain, drive, and trade in vehicles.  These options
could also increase the demand for more fuel-efficient and
alternatively fueled vehicles.  Relying on just one option to meet
multiple and sometimes conflicting policy objectives, however, could
be difficult and costly.  This, in turn, could reduce the chance that
any policies will be adopted.  An eclectic strategy incorporating the
best designs of individual policy options seems desirable.  GAO
summarized this report in testimony before the Congress; see:  Energy
Policy:  Options to Reduce Environmental and Other Costs of Gasoline
Consumption (GAO/T-RCED-92-94, Sept.  17, 1992) by Victor S. 
Rezendes, Director of Energy and Science Issues, before the
Subcommittee on Environment, House Committee on Science, Space, and
Technology (12 pp.). 

Energy Policy:  Options to Reduce Environmental and Other Costs of
Gasoline Consumption (Testimony, 09/17/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-94). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the external costs of gasoline consumption
and fuel policy options, focusing on the:  (1) current options'
effect on consumers and the economy and (2) effects of option
modifications and combinations.  GAO noted that:  (1) options that
could reduce gasoline consumption and pollutants include federal
gasoline taxes, tailpipe emission taxes, and alternative fuel usage;
(2) federal gasoline taxes could lead to slower economic growth and
impose a financial burden on the poor; (3) tailpipe emission taxes
could reduce pollution severity, but measurement and enforcement
would be difficult; (4) alternative fuels could increase greenhouse
emissions, vary emission aspects, and require federal subsidies to
compete with low gasoline prices; (5) higher Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standards and a fee-rebate program could improve fuel economy
and reduce greenhouse emissions but would impose additional costs on
the U.S.  automobile industry; (6) scrap program options would target
old vehicles and reduce emissions but could impose a financial burden
on lower income groups; (7) redesigning fuel tax options could
redirect negative economic growth effects and burdens on the poor;
(8) improvements in gasoline and tailpipe tax options could assist in
deficit reduction, reduce other taxes, and promote long-term economic
growth; (9) combining alternative fuel and tax options could increase
alternative fuel demand and usage, reduce emissions, and reduce the
need for subsidies; and (10) combining higher Corporate Average Fuel
Economy standards, fee-rebate programs, and scrap programs would
reduce emissions and increase demand for fuel-efficient vehicles. 

East European Energy:  Romania's Energy Needs Persist (Chapter
Report, 08/04/92, GAO/NSIAD-92-257). 

ABSTRACT:  Modernization of Romania's energy sector and increased
production are crucial if that country is to achieve market reforms
and reinvigorate its economy.  Because the changing energy economies
of Romania and other East European countries may open up new markets
for Western energy technologies, this report provides information on
(1) trends and problems linked to Romania's energy production and
imports, (2) Romania's energy needs and the steps being taken or
planned to address them, (3) factors that discourage U.S.  trade with
and investment in Romania's energy sector, and (4) U.S.  government
and international efforts to develop Romania's energy sector. 

Alternative Fuels (Correspondence, 07/24/92, GAO/RCED-92-240R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on:  (1) tunnel restrictions for gaseous-fueled vehicles
in Baltimore, Boston, and New York; (2) the implications of
Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations requiring
recertification of compressed natural gas (CNG) cylinders; and (3)
the consistency of provisions for alternative-fuel tax benefits in
recently proposed legislation.  GAO noted that:  (1) regulatory
agencies in Baltimore, Boston, and New York have recently supported
relaxing their regulations that block access for gaseous-fueled
vehicles and have been working with the CNG and liquified petroleum
gas industries to resolve potential safety issues associated with
gaseous fuels; (2) DOT requires CNG cylinder recertification only for
those vehicles involved in commerce, but some state and local
governments require all CNG vehicle users to maintain DOT
certification; and (3) inconsistencies among the proposed
legislation's provisions for tax deductions could result in some
acceptable fuels' not receiving tax benefits. 

Hydroelectric Dams:  Proposed Legislation to Restore Elwha River
Ecosystem and Fisheries (Testimony, 07/09/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-80). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Elwha River Ecosystem and Fisheries
Restoration Act, focusing on:  (1) the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission's (FERC) authority to license dams on the Elwha River; (2)
the Department of the Interior's position on removal of the dams to
restore fisheries; and (3) who should pay the costs if the dams are
removed.  GAO noted that:  (1) the Glines Canyon Dam is within the
boundaries of a national park, where FERC does not have the authority
to license dams; (2) Interior, FERC, and the National Marine
Fisheries Service believe that removing both dams offers the best
prospects for restoring the Elwha River fisheries and their
surrounding ecosystem; and (3) the cost of removing the dams should
be allocated among parties in proportion to the benefits they have
received from the dams or will receive from the restoration of the
river. 

Gasohol:  Federal Agencies' Use of Gasohol (Testimony, 06/24/92,
GAO/T-RCED-92-73). 

ABSTRACT:  This testimony examines federal agencies' use of
gasohol--gasoline containing 10 percent ethanol.  Bulk purchases of
gasohol for use in federal motor vehicles have been limited, and the
extent to which gasohol has been used by federal credit card
purchasers of motor fuel is unknown.  Eliminating or tightening
exemptions from requirements for the use of gasohol and promoting its
use among credit card users may increase demand.  The Defense
Department (DOD) has advertised in trade publications its need for
more suppliers, generating increased supplier inquiries about future
federal contracts.  Yet questions remain about the ability of DOD and
industry to meet increased demand, particularly given the current
limited availability of gasohol, pending environmental regulation
that may spur ethanol demand, and the expense of gasohol when
handling and other costs are factored in. 

Energy Conservation:  Efforts Promoting More Efficient Electricity
Use (Testimony, 06/23/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-74). 

ABSTRACT:  Utility-sponsored "demand-side management" programs
encourage consumers to use less energy by better insulating their
homes and businesses and by replacing appliances with more efficient
models.  This testimony discusses (1) the likelihood that such
programs will result in energy conservation; (2) impediments that
must be overcome; and (3) Department of Energy efforts to promote
demand-side management and integrated resource planning, including
efforts identified in the agency's National Energy Strategy. 

South American Oil:  Marginal Producers Not a Likely Source for
Increased U.S.  Imports (Letter Report, 06/16/92, GAO/NSIAD-92-227). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO reviewed the petroleum industries of the following
eight South American countries that produce petroleum but are not
major exporters:  Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Tobago, and Trinidad.  This report discusses (1) the
amount of crude oil the United States imports from the eight
countries, (2) expected crude oil production for these countries
through the year 2010, and (3) investment reforms that these
countries have recently made in their petroleum industries.  In
general, although the United States imports some oil from these
countries, as a group, the eight countries are currently net oil
importers because combined domestic oil consumption exceeds oil
production.  Furthermore, the net oil imports are expected to
continue to increase through the year 2010, making it unlikely that
the United States will obtain increased oil shipments from these
countries. 

Alternative Fuels:  Experiences of Brazil, Canada, and New Zealand in
Using Alternative Motor Fuels (Chapter Report, 05/07/92,
GAO/RCED-92-119). 

ABSTRACT:  The oil crisis of the 1970s spurred the governments of
Brazil, Canada, and New Zealand to seek domestic alternatives for
their motor fuels.  Each government was the catalyst for action on
alternative fuels, and this leadership proved crucial in removing
economic and technological barriers and persuading industry and
consumers that alternative fuels were important.  Participation by
the fuel, automotive, and utility industries was vital in attracting
and retaining consumers for alternative fuels and vehicles in each
country.  Finally, consumer acceptance was essential to the use of
alternative fuels in these countries, and incentives such as reduced
taxes or subsidies helped boost consumer use of alternative fuels. 
These countries' experiences, however, show that introducing and
sustaining the use of alternative fuels is neither a quick nor an
easy undertaking.  For example, consistent long-term government
commitment was sometimes hard to maintain because of resource
limitations and other reasons.  In some cases, failure to maintain
this commitment undercut sustained use of alternative fuels. 
Furthermore, alternative fuel initiatives struggled when industry was
not actively involved in vehicle development, fueling system
construction, and marketing. 

Energy R&D:  DOE's Prioritization and Budgeting Process for Renewable
Energy Research (Testimony, 04/30/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-57). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) planning
and budgeting processes for renewable energy technology research and
development.  GAO noted that:  (1) the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) provides DOE with overall policy and budgetary
direction, including budget planning targets that are based primarily
on the preceding year's budget; (2) using the preceding year's budget
request as a guide, DOE allocates OMB spending targets among DOE
program offices, and the Secretary meets with each of the Assistant
Secretaries to review program office priorities and funding levels;
(3) the Secretary sends the approved budget proposal to OMB for
review before it goes to the Congress; (4) starting with its fiscal
year 1993 budget request, the Secretary has directed the Office of
Policy, Planning and Analysis to rank civilian energy research and
development activities according to their projected contributions to
National Energy Strategy objectives; (6) within the Office of
Conservation and Renewable Energy, the Assistant Secretary determines
budget allocations developed by each of the five Conservation and
Renewable Energy offices; (7) the offices base their proposals on a
process that incorporates strategic and multiyear program plans and
the views of national laboratories, renewable energy industries, and
end-users of renewable energy; and (8) although the Office of
Conservation and Renewable Energy has no written procedures for
ensuring compliance with congressional spending directives, program
officials make provisions for following through on the directives. 

Energy R&D:  DOE's Prioritization and Budgeting Process for Renewable
Energy Research (Letter Report, 04/29/92, GAO/RCED-92-155). 

ABSTRACT:  This report examines how the Department of Energy (DOE)
plans and budgets research and development projects for renewable
energy technologies.  Such technologies include electricity
generation from solar, wind, and geothermal energy sources.  GAO
discusses how DOE (1) determines the annual budget for energy
technologies, including renewal, fossil, and nuclear energy, and the
role played in this process by the Office of Management and Budget;
(2) allocates research and development funds among renewable energy
technologies; and (3) ensures that specific congressional directives
for research and development projects for renewable energy technology
are followed.  GAO summarized this report in testimony before the
Congress; see:  Energy R&D:  DOE's Prioritization and Budgeting
Process for Renewable Energy Research (GAO/T-RCED-92-57, Apr.  30,
1992) by Victor S.  Rezendes, Director of Energy Issues, before the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology (15 pp.). 

Electricity Supply:  Efforts Under Way to Improve Federal Electrical
Disruption Preparedness (Letter Report, 04/20/92, GAO/RCED-92-125). 

ABSTRACT:  This report examines the federal government's plans and
policies for meeting major disruptions in the supply of energy, such
as those caused by severe weather or sabotage.  GAO discusses (1) to
what extent the Department of Energy (DOE) includes other federal,
state, local, and utility organizations in its preparedness planning;
(2) how sufficient the statutory authorities available to federal
agencies are for responding to major electrical disruptions; and (3)
whether emergency plans incorporate restoration priorities and
measures to help ensure adequate supplies of electrical equipment. 

Energy Conservation:  DOE's Efforts to Promote Energy Conservation
and Efficiency (Letter Report, 04/16/92, GAO/RCED-92-103). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for
spearheading federal efforts to encourage energy conservation.  This
report focuses on DOE programs promoting electricity and overall
energy efficiency.  GAO examines (1) the scope of DOE's energy
conservation and efficiency programs, including its Integrated
Resource Planning Program; (2) the way in which policy options
identified in the National Energy Strategy promote conservation and
efficiency, as well as increased energy supplies; and (3) the extent
to which DOE evaluates program results and considers evaluation
results when planning and budgeting for these programs.  GAO also
discusses the role of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which
regulates most wholesale electricity transactions, in promoting
energy conservation and efficiency. 

Electricity Supply:  Regulating Utility Holding Companies in a
Changing Electric Industry (Letter Report, 04/09/92, GAO/RCED-92-98). 

ABSTRACT:  How adequately are consumers and investors protected in
the electric utility industry?  This report looks at (1) recent
changes within the electric utility industry that involve utility
holding companies; (2) the effect of these changes on the Securities
and Exchange Commission's (SEC) administration of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935; and (3) the relationship between SEC,
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and state regulators in
protecting consumer and investor interests in the changing industry. 

Mexican Oil:  Issues Affecting Potential U.S.  Trade and Investment
(Chapter Report, 03/18/92, GAO/NSIAD-92-169). 

ABSTRACT:  This report deals with issues affecting potential future
U.S.  trade with and investment in Mexico's petroleum industry.  GAO
discusses (1) recent trends in Mexican oil production and exports and
the main factors affecting Mexico's ability to meet current
production and export goals, (2) the views of U.S.  oil-producing and
oil service contracting companies on principal barriers to and
possible benefits of U.S.  trade with and investment in Mexico's oil
industry and the response of Mexican officials, and (3) the U.S. 
government's efforts to help Mexico's petroleum sector.  GAO
summarized this report in testimony before the Congress; see: 
Mexican Oil:  Mexican Policies Affect U.S.  Trade and Investment
Opportunities (GAO/T-GGD-92-24, Mar.  26, 1992) by Allan I. 
Mendelowitz, Director of International Trade and Finance Issues,
before the Subcommittee on International Economic Policy and Trade
and on Western Hemisphere Affairs, House Committee on Foreign Affairs
(10 pp.). 

Natural Gas:  Factors Affecting Approval Times for Construction of
Natural Gas Pipelines (Letter Report, 02/26/92, GAO/RCED-92-100). 

ABSTRACT:  During the period of GAO's review, the median processing
time for the Federal Energy Regulation Commission (FERC) to approve
applications to build natural gas pipelines was about 1 year, but
some approvals took much longer.  FERC has tried to shorten the time
it takes pipeline companies to receive approval to start
construction, and the Congress is considering several bills aimed at
speeding or eliminating the need for FERC approval.  Nevertheless,
FERC could further improve its timeliness and performance in
processing applications by better informing and training its staff
and others on policy changes, negotiating generic agreements with
other federal agencies on their environmental reviews of pipeline
applications, and strengthening its management information system. 

Energy Management:  Better Federal Oversight of Territories' Oil
Overcharge Funds Needed (Chapter Report, 02/21/92, GAO/RCED-92-24). 

ABSTRACT:  About $68 million from two oil overcharge cases was made
available to five U.S.  territories--American Samoa, Guam, the
Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.  In response to
congressional concerns about whether these funds have been spent
appropriately, this report examines (1) the amount of funds the
territories have spent and whether this amount has been accurately
reported to the Congress and (2) whether the Departments of Energy
and Health and Human Services have adequate monitoring procedures and
have taken steps to ensure that the territories' use of oil
overcharge funds is in accordance with legal requirements. 

International Energy Agency:  Response to the Oil Supply Disruption
Caused by the Persian Gulf Crisis (Letter Report, 01/21/92,
GAO/NSIAD-92-93). 

ABSTRACT:  The rapid increase in worldwide oil prices after Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait in 1990 focused renewed attention on how the use
of emergency oil stocks held by members of the International Energy
Agency can mitigate the effects of an oil supply disruption.  This
report reviews (1) the International Energy Agency's decision on
whether to draw down emergency oil stocks in response to the
disruption in oil supplies following the Iraqi invasion, (2) the U.S. 
policy on restraining oil demand, (3) the U.S.  position on domestic
sharing of oil supplies in an emergency and oil companies' views on
that position, and (4) the extent of the Department of Energy's
efforts to educate the American people about U.S.  participation in
the International Energy Agency. 

Electricity Supply:  Potential Effects of Amending the Public Utility
Holding Company Act (Chapter Report, 01/07/92, GAO/RCED-92-52). 

ABSTRACT:  Seeking to reap the potential benefits of greater
competition, proposals to exempt some electric generators from the
ownership restrictions of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
1935 could alter the structure of the nation's $170 billion electric
utility industry.  This report evaluates how the proposals might
affect (1) the reliability and cost of the U.S.  electricity supply
and (2) state and federal regulation of electric utilities. 

Venezuelan Energy:  Oil Production and Conditions Affecting Potential
Future U.S.  Investment (Letter Report, 12/12/91, GAO/NSIAD-92-73). 

ABSTRACT:  Because military and political instability in the Persian
Gulf makes the United States vulnerable to oil supply disruptions, a
1991 Department of Energy report encourages diversification of U.S. 
oil sources and greater reliance on imports from countries outside
the Gulf, such as Venezuela.  GAO's report, also published in
Spanish, (1) discusses recent increases in Venezuelan oil production
and the main factors affecting continued increases through 1996, (2)
assesses recent investment reforms in the Venezuelan petroleum
industry and U.S.  petroleum companies' response to these reforms,
(3) identifies the major impediments and inducements to U.S. 
investment in Venezuela's petroleum industry, and (5) reviews the
U.S.  government's efforts to support Venezuela's energy sector. 

Sector de Energia en Venezuela:  La Produccion Petrolera y las
Condiciones Para Posibles Inversiones de los EE.UU.  (Letter Report,
12/12/91, GAO/NSIAD-92-73SV). 

ABSTRACT:  Because military and political instability in the Persian
Gulf makes the United States vulnerable to oil supply disruptions, a
1991 Department of Energy report encourages diversification of U.S. 
oil sources and greater reliance on imports from countries outside
the Gulf, such as Venezuela.  This Spanish translation; (1) discusses
recent increases in Venezuelan oil production and the main factors
affecting continued increases through 1996; (2) assesses recent
investment reforms in the Venezuelan petroleum industry and U.S. 
petroleum companies' response to these reforms; (3) identifies the
major impediments and inducements to U.S.  investment in Venezuela's
petroleum industry; and (4) reviews the U.S.  government's efforts to
support Venezuela's energy sector. 

Electricity Supply:  Utility Demand-Side Management Programs Can
Reduce Electricity Use (Chapter Report, 10/31/91, GAO/RCED-92-13). 

ABSTRACT:  According to Department of Energy projections, to meet
electricity demand in the year 2000, the nation may need more than
100 new large power plants.  Utility-sponsored programs promoting
more efficient electricity use--called demand-side management
programs--can help avoid the costs and environmental concerns
associated with power plants.  This report examines (1) the potential
for utility-sponsored demand-side management programs to cut future
electricity demand; (2) impediments to the effectiveness of such
programs; and (3) efforts by utilities, states, and federal
power-marketing agencies to encourage efficient electricity use. 

Electricity Supply:  Regulation of the Changing Electric Industry
Under the Public Utility Holding Company Act (Testimony, 10/03/91,
GAO/T-RCED-92-2). 

ABSTRACT:  This testimony focuses on the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (SEC) administration of the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, intended to protect the public, investors, and
consumers from abuses associated with the control of electric and gas
utility companies through the holding company structure.  These
abuses include subjecting subsidiary utilities to excessive charges
for services, construction work, and materials; frustrating effective
state regulation through the holding company structure; and
overloading subsidiary utilities with debt to prevent voluntary rate
reductions.  GAO discusses (1) industry changes during the past
decade involving electric utility holding companies; (2) SEC's
regulatory response to such changes; and (3) the relationship between
SEC, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, and states in
protecting consumer and investor interests in light of these changes. 

Oil Reserve:  Impact of NPR-1 Operations on Wildlife and Water Is
Uncertain (Letter Report, 08/01/91, GAO/RCED-91-129). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
basis for the disagreements between the Department of Energy (DOE)
and its Argonne National Laboratory relating to Argonne's development
of a supplemental environmental impact statement (SEIS) for Naval
Petroleum Reserve No.  1 (NPR-1), focusing on:  (1) the DOE Naval
Petroleum Reserves-California (NPRC) and Argonne positions on NPR-1
impacts on endangered species and groundwater quality and how SEIS
would discuss those uncertainties; and (2) NPR-1 compliance with
environmental laws and regulations governing endangered species,
wastewater disposal, and historic preservation activities. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) between 1981 and 1989, the number of
foxes living free within the NPR-1 study area decreased from 164 to
between 44 and 58; (2) Argonne concluded in an SEIS draft that NPR-1
operations could have contributed to the decline of foxes in that
area; (3) NPRC and Argonne staffs disagreed about how SEIS should
describe the effects of NPR-1 operations on endangered foxes and
nearby groundwater, primarily due to a lack of definitive data; (4)
in September 1990, NPRC notified Argonne that DOE would prepare a
final SEIS, but it was unclear to what extent DOE would use Argonne's
data and views; (5) DOE and others were conducting research that
could provide additional data on factors affecting the fox population
and wastewater migration; (6) DOE has not ensured that NPR-1
operations comply with the Endangered Species Act and the National
Historic Preservation Act's regulations; (7) Argonne concluded in a
June 1990 SEIS draft that NPR-1 operations violated California
wastewater disposal requirements for sumping, but DOE believed that
NPR-1 had not violated the requirements, and the state had not made a
determination on that issue; (8) factors contributing to the
noncompliance included NPRC officials' lack of knowledge regarding
environmental requirements, noncoordination with federal and state
agencies having environmental responsibilities, and mismanagement,
which could result in legal action, fines, or a temporary shutdown;
and (9) NPRC is taking action to address the problems, but unless DOE
improves its management controls, similar problems may continue to
exist. 

Alternative Fuels:  Experiences of Countries Using Alternative Motor
Fuels (Testimony, 07/29/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-85). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed other countries' use of alternative motor
fuels, focusing on:  (1) Brazil's, Canada's, and New Zealand's
programs to encourage such fuel usage; and (2) the Department of
Energy's (DOE) progress in implementing the Alternative Motor Fuels
Act of 1988.  GAO noted that:  (1) despite Brazil's difficulties with
poor alternative-fueled vehicle performance and an inadequate fuel
supply, about 30 percent of its passenger vehicles exclusively
operated on ethanol; (2) in 1981, Canada began converting gasoline
fuel to propane, encouraging the use of natural gas, providing
conversion grants, and installing alternative-fueling stations; (3)
currently, there are about 27,000 natural gas powered vehicles in
Canada; (4) New Zealand initiated its alternative fuel program in
1979 to reduce its dependence on imported oil, but reduced such
incentives in 1985 because of governmentwide austerity efforts; (5)
currently, there are about 105,000 converted vehicles operating in
New Zealand; (6) factors affecting consumers' acceptance of
alternative fuel include price, convenience, and reliability; and (7)
in each country, the fuel industry played a role in ensuring vehicle
quality, providing fueling infrastructure, and establishing marketing
approaches.  GAO also noted that:  (1) auto manufacturers have not
provided DOE with the quantity, type, and size of alternative-fueled
vehicles solicited because of technological readiness problems and
market uncertainties; and (2) DOE experienced higher than expected
costs for procuring such vehicles. 

Full Disclosure of National Energy Strategy Analyses Needed to
Enhance Strategy's Credibility (Testimony, 07/08/91,
GAO/T-RCED-91-76). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the development of the Department of
Energy's (DOE) National Energy Strategy (NES), focusing on the:  (1)
analytical support the policy proposals set forth and (2) factors
that will influence its potential success.  GAO noted that:  (1) in
the latter stages of the NES development process, there was less
public participation than DOE originally intended; (2) energy and
environmental benefits from implementing NES are unclear and may be
overstated, since the administration included the estimated impacts
of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990 in projecting the overall
impacts of NES; (3) the supporting analyses did not compare the NES
package of proposals with alternative proposals or variations; (4)
DOE had not published rigorous cost-benefit analyses supporting two
somewhat controversial measures of government intervention not to be
included; and (5) the rate of growth in gross national product used
in the NES analysis was significantly higher than other GNP
projections.  GAO believes that the:  (1) NES proposals to improve
energy efficiency may not be as successful as projected if current
low oil prices continue and (2) administration and DOE set very high
expectations for the NES process, which might have been too difficult
to meet even under ideal circumstances. 

Natural Gas:  Factors Affecting the Time It Takes to Approve
Construction of Natural Gas Pipelines (Testimony, 06/27/91,
GAO/T-RCED-91-73). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
(FERC) approval process for natural gas pipeline construction,
focusing on the:  (1) time it takes FERC to process pipeline
construction applications, (2) factors affecting its application
processing time, (3) potential impact of FERC actions and proposed
regulations and legislation to expedite its application procedures,
and (4) need for improvements in its management information systems. 
GAO noted that:  (1) the median time for processing the 125
certificates or approved applications reviewed was 331 days, 40
percent took longer than 1 year, and 10 certificates took at least 2
years; (2) factors affecting processing time included outside
intervention, projects involving multiple applicants, unresolved
policy issues, incomplete applications, and lengthy environmental
reviews; (3) FERC took such actions to reduce its processing and
construction times as placing limits on filing competitive
applications, adopting a two-phase decision approach, shifting
certification process requirements, and requiring less data and
proposed rule changes to further streamline the certification
process; (4) proposed legislation would facilitate faster pipeline
construction by providing the industry with unregulated options to
either limit or increase FERC authority; (5) FERC believes that it
needs more authority to continue processing construction applications
when agencies do not review environmental assessments in a timely
manner; and (6) FERC's information system is deficient and does not
enable FERC to effectively evaluate its application review process. 

Gasoline Marketing:  Consumers May Not Be Receiving the Octane They
Are Paying for or May Be Unnecessarily Buying Premium Gasoline
(Testimony, 06/12/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-65). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed:  (1) gasoline octane mislabelling; and
(2) possible consumer overbuying of premium gasoline.  GAO noted
that:  (1) consumers may be unknowingly purchasing gasoline with
lower octane than they need due to mislabeled octane ratings on
gasoline pumps; (2) the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not
tested octane ratings at retail stations since 1981, and the Federal
Trade Commission failed to ensure that octane testing requirements
were being met or prosecute violators; (3) the extent of mislabeling
nationwide is unknown, but industry and state information indicates
that mislabeling is occurring and is costly to consumers; (4) the
Petroleum Marketing Practices Act excluded the newer gasoline-alcohol
blends from octane posting requirements; (5) although states agreed
that testing for octane rating accuracy was an effective deterrent to
mislabeling, only 32 states had such programs; (6) involving states
in testing octane ratings could better ensure that consumers receive
the octane they pay for; and (7) the 3- to 26-percent difference
between premium gasoline sales and the automotive fleet needing
premium gasoline indicated that consumers might have spent from $441
million to approximately $4.3 billion in 1989 for unnecessary premium
gasoline.  GAO believes that consumers need increased awareness about
vehicle octane requirements and posted octane rating accuracy. 

Alternative Fuels:  Increasing Federal Procurement of
Alternative-Fueled Vehicles (Letter Report, 05/24/91,
GAO/RCED-91-169). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in implementing the Alternative
Motor Fuels Act of 1988, enacted to encourage the development and use
of methanol, ethanol, and natural gas as transportation fuels, and
the production of methanol-, ethanol-, and natural gas-powered
vehicles. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) due to technological readiness
problems and market uncertainties, automobile manufacturers did not
provide DOE with the quantity, type, price, and size of
alternative-fueled light-duty vehicles it desired; (2) the extent to
which future corporate average fuel economy credits would encourage
manufacturers to build alternative-fueled light-duty vehicles was
uncertain; (3) DOE was unable to establish a commercial heavy-duty
truck program or to collect data to study the use of alcohol and
natural gas fuel in such trucks but expected to make progress on this
program during 1991 as a result of planned initiatives with industry;
(4) DOE was able to collect performance and emissions data on only a
limited number of alternative-fueled buses through 1990, but it
expected to place and test more buses in service during 1991; and (5)
the extent to which alternative fuels were competitively priced with
gasoline would determine their use. 

Electricity Regulation:  Issues Concerning the Hydroelectric Project
Licensing Process (Letter Report, 05/10/91, GAO/RCED-91-120). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the: 
(1) Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's (FERC) review of the
financial and economic feasibility of proposed hydroelectric projects
during its licensing process, (2) extent of speculation on potential
hydropower sites, and (3) possible need to amend the Federal Power
Act to allow licensees more time to arrange financing and commence
construction of licensed projects. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) FERC's analysis was not intended to
guarantee that a licensed project will prove to be economically or
financially feasible; (2) the Federal Power Act allows licensees an
initial 2 years to commence construction and then allowed FERC to
grant one 2-year extension, if requested by the licensee and
warranted by circumstances; (3) nonfederal hydroelectric projects
affecting the nation's navigable waterways required a license from
FERC; (4) FERC must give equal consideration to such nondevelopmental
aspects as conserving energy and preserving environmental quality;
(5) between fiscal years 1980 and 1985, FERC issued 430 hydroelectric
licenses for new projects, and 93 percent began construction within 4
years of receiving a license; and (6) the Federal Power Act
established a 4-year limit for beginning construction of licensed
hydropower sites to discourage speculation. 

U.S.-Mexico Energy:  The U.S.  Reaction to Recent Reforms in Mexico's
Petrochemical Industry (Letter Report, 05/03/91, GAO/NSIAD-91-212). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined recent
reforms in Mexico's petrochemical industry. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) Mexico's petrochemical industry faced
shortages in supplies of basic petrochemicals and investment funds;
(2) Mexico lacked financial resources for natural gas, the primary
raw material for the petrochemical industry, exploration, and
development; (3) the Mexican government had the exclusive right to
produce and distribute all basic petrochemicals, but foreign
investors may now acquire 100-percent ownership of a secondary
petrochemical plant if they establish a special trust with a Mexican
credit institution; (4) the Mexican government-owned oil company,
Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), created a program to obtain private or
foreign investment in its basic petrochemical plants, but PEMEX would
remain the operator; (5) Mexican petrochemical investment reforms are
subject to a risk of reversal, because they were created by
administrative decree, not by law; (6) Mexico's accessibility to raw
materials makes it the most economical place for U.S.  producers of
secondary petrochemicals to locate; and (7) the U.S.  and Mexican
petrochemical industries are complimentary. 

Progress Made Implementing the Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988
(Testimony, 04/25/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-44). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE)
implementation of the Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988.  GAO noted
that:  (1) technological readiness problems, market uncertainties,
and other factors resulted in automobile manufacturers not providing
DOE with the quantity, type, and size of alternative-fueled
light-duty vehicles it desired; (2) DOE experienced much higher than
projected additional costs for procuring and placing such vehicles;
(3) those additional costs resulted in the agency's experiencing
delays in collecting vehicle performance data; (4) the extent to
which future corporate average fuel economy credits will encourage
manufacturers to build alternative-fueled light-duty vehicles was
uncertain and depended on such factors as development costs and
gasoline prices; (5) DOE was unable to establish a commercial
heavy-duty truck program or collect data to study the trucks' use of
alcohol and natural gas fuel, as required by the act; and (6) DOE
only collected performance and emissions data on a limited number of
alternative-fueled buses through 1990, but it expected to place and
test more buses in service during the remainder of 1991. 

Balanced Approach and Improved R&D Management Needed to Achieve
Energy Efficiency Objectives (Testimony, 04/17/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-36). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) energy
conservation research and development (R&D) programs and the
administration's National Energy Strategy (NES).  GAO noted that: 
(1) NES was directed at increasing government R&D funding for
long-term energy-efficient technologies but did not address the
possibility that energy prices may remain relatively low in the
future; (2) the current low market prices for energy, particularly
fossil fuels, did not fully reflect all of the production and
consumption costs; (3) DOE projections of energy-efficiency
improvements were uncertain because of the limited information
available and the questionable reliability of the information in DOE
models; and (4) the conservation R&D budget request of $274 million
in fiscal year 1992 was a 28-percent increase over fiscal year 1991
but was still below the $296 million received in fiscal year 1980. 
GAO believes that:  (1) energy prices will directly affect NES
proposals because relatively low prices generate less urgency to
identify and implement efficient alternatives and higher prices
encourage the development and use of more efficient technologies and
(2) the effective use of the limited R&D funding will depend on
strong planning and management. 

Hydroelectric Dams:  Costs and Alternatives for Restoring Fisheries
in the Elwha River (Letter Report, 03/27/91, GAO/RCED-91-104). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
effects of the Elwha and Glines Canyon dams on fisheries in the Elwha
River in Washington State, focusing on the:  (1) Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission's (FERC) authority to license those dams; (2)
potential costs of removing the dams to restore the fisheries; (3)
potential costs of restoring the fisheries without removing the dams;
and (4) effectiveness of both dam removal and dam retention, coupled
with mitigation measures in restoring fish to the Elwha River. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) FERC estimated that the cost of
removing both dams would be about $61 million and was subject to an
increase of $124.6 million if FERC requires the transfer of dam
sediment to a disposal site; (2) FERC estimated that the cost of
constructing fish passage facilities with the dams in place ranged
from $20 million to $40.4 million, depending on the facilities
selected; (3) FERC estimated the annual cost of operating and
maintaining such facilities at $160,000 to $260,000; (4) FERC
estimated that it would cost $3.1 million to construct hatchery
facilities to restore fish upriver from the dams with passage
facilities and would cost $240,000 a year to operate; (5) FERC
believed that dam removal would provide the best prospects for
restoring the fisheries but would also result in the loss of nearly
40 percent of local power supplied by the dams' hydroelectric
generators; (6) FERC could purchase replacement power from a local
utility; and (7) although dam retention with mitigation measures
would allow the continued use of dam-produced power to meet part of
its energy requirements, FERC's analysis indicated that such measures
would increase dam-generated electricity costs to about the local
utility's rate. 

Federal Electric Power:  Effects of Delaying Colorado River Storage
Project Irrigation Units (Letter Report, 03/22/91, GAO/RCED-91-62). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on the effects of the Bureau of Reclamation's and the
Department of Energy's (DOE) exclusion from the hydropower rate of
irrigation construction costs for certain projects within the
Colorado River Storage Project. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the exclusion of participating
projects' costs resulted in lower Colorado Project power rates and
revenues than would otherwise exist; (2) such exclusion would not
materially affect the required repayment of project costs or the
ultimate development of water resources within the Upper Colorado
River Basin; (3) rescheduling the indefinite projects did not affect
the cost recovery of the remaining participating projects, and the
U.S.  Treasury would recover its investment within the required 50
years; (4) 13 of 19 participating projects, and portions of another
project, were or would be constructed; (5) irrigation construction
costs for the indefinite participating projects totaled about $1.24
billion, a cost excluded from the power rate calculation; (6) the
estimated irrigation construction cost of all authorized Central Utah
Project units was $1.1 billion; (7) the Bureau and DOE excluded the
cost of indefinite participating projects from power rate
calculations because power users were concerned that they were paying
for projects that would never be built; (8) excluding the estimated
costs of indefinite Colorado projects from the power rate calculation
was not precluded by law; and (9) none of the information provided to
the Congress identified which of the Colorado's participating
projects were included in the current electric power rate calculation
or why some projects were excluded. 

Federal Responses to December 1989 Heating Fuel Shortages Were
Limited (Testimony, 03/13/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-7). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed:  (1) alleged December 1989 heating fuel
shortages, (2) the type of data the Department of Energy's Energy
Information Administration (EIA) collected and its analyses of
heating fuel supply and demand, (3) the impact of federal agencies'
delayed processing of Jones Act waivers on heating fuel supplies, and
(4) the impact of interruptible natural gas contracts on heating fuel
supplies and availability.  GAO noted that:  (1) in December 1989,
the east coast experienced short-term heating fuel shortages; (2) two
principle reasons for the shortages were increased demand due to
extremely cold temperatures and the inability of the distribution
system to move heating fuel stocks from refineries and storage
terminals to areas experiencing shortages; (3) federal agencies took
from 6 to 17 days to process Jones Act waivers that would have
allowed foreign-flagged vessels to transport heating fuels between
U.S.  ports; (4) EIA maintained data and prepared forecasts on
distillate demand and supply, but data limitations reduced EIA
ability to adequately monitor the supply shortages; (5) in December
1989, some customers with interruptible natural gas contracts
discontinued their gas services; and (6) those contract customers
entered distillate and propane markets, reducing fuel supplies
available to residential consumers. 

Gasoline Marketing:  Premium Gasoline Overbuying May Be Occurring,
but Extent Unknown (Letter Report, 02/26/91, GAO/RCED-91-58). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO determined: 
(1) whether consumers were needlessly buying premium gasoline, (2)
whether the higher retail price of premium gasoline included a
greater price mark-up than that included in the retail price of
regular gasoline, and (3) possible reasons for the price differences
between premium and regular gasoline. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) premium gasoline sales exceeded the
percentage of vehicles that required premium gasoline; (2) government
and industry studies, although not conclusive, indicated that
consumers might be overbuying premium gasoline; (3) although
consumers perceived premium gasoline to be a better product, fewer of
them were willing to substitute it for a lower octane fuel when
prices rose substantially; (4) the price difference between premium
and regular gasoline was the same at the refinery and the retail
pump; and (5) additional processing costs, better detergent
additives, and increased advertising contributed to the higher price
of premium gasoline. 

Energy Policy:  Evolution of DOE's Process for Developing a National
Energy Strategy (Letter Report, 02/21/91, GAO/RCED-91-76). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) process for developing the National
Energy Strategy (NES), focusing on the opportunities DOE provided for
public comment. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE began developing NES in July 1989
in response to a presidential directive and legislative requirement
that the President biennially prepare and submit to the Congress a
National Energy Policy Plan; (2) DOE expected NES to serve as a
comprehensive blueprint for decisions about energy and be an
administration plan rather than a DOE plan; (3) NES received
significantly greater public input in the early development stage
than in the latter stages; (4) DOE held 18 public hearings during NES
development on a variety of energy topics and received 2,067 written
submissions; (5) DOE failed to announce public hearings far in
advance, providing less than 2 weeks' notice for 10 hearings and less
than 1 weeks' notice for 6 hearings; (6) the Secretary of Energy
intended the first NES draft to help the Congress understand the
direction of the national energy policy and how the administration
planned to achieve it and to facilitate continued dialogue; (7) the
interim NES report summarized the voluminous public input rather than
the intended draft strategy; (8) although the interim report did not
satisfy the plan criteria, DOE planned to meet the requirements with
its final NES report; (9) public review of NES options under
consideration was limited; and (10) the option summaries lacked
sufficient information to act as a quality control mechanism and were
not presented in a manner that facilitated comparison in terms of the
President's NES objectives. 

Energy Security:  Federal Responses to December 1989 Heating Fuel
Shortages Were Limited (Letter Report, 02/20/91, GAO/RCED-91-78). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined:  (1)
alleged December 1989 heating fuel shortages, (2) the type of data
the Department of Energy's (DOE) Energy Information Administration
(EIA) collected and its analyses of heating fuel supply and demand;
(3) the impact of federal agencies' delayed processing of Jones Act
waivers on heating fuel supplies, and (4) the impact of interruptible
natural gas contracts on heating fuel supplies and availability. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) in December 1989, the east coast
experienced short-term heating fuel shortages; (2) two principle
reasons for the shortages were increased demand due to extremely cold
temperatures and the inability of the distribution system to move
heating fuel stocks from refineries and storage terminals to areas
experiencing shortages; (3) EIA maintained data and prepared
forecasts on distillate demand and supply, but data limitations
reduced EIA's ability to adequately monitor the supply shortages; (4)
federal agencies took from 6 to 17 days to process Jones Act waivers
that would have allowed foreign-flagged vessels to transport heating
fuels between U.S.  ports; (5) DOE established a new waiver process,
but it was difficult to adequately determine its criteria for
granting waivers; (6) in December 1989, some customers with
interruptible natural gas contracts had their gas services
discontinued; (7) those customers entered distillate and propane
markets, reducing fuel supplies available to residential consumers;
and (8) EIA began a study that would provide additional information
on the impact of the interruptible gas contracts on heating fuels and
supplies. 

Oil Reserve:  Some Concerns Remain About SPR Drawdown and
Distribution (Chapter Report, 11/28/90, GAO/RCED-91-16). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR)
drawdown plans, focusing on:  (1) DOE capability for withdrawing and
distributing SPR oil, (2) SPR compliance with pipeline safety
requirements, and (3) the status of DOE actions to correct problems
previously identified by GAO. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE estimated that it could withdraw
and distribute SPR oil at a maximum sustainable rate of approximately
3.5 million barrels per day for 90 days; (2) if DOE withdrew SPR oil
at the maximum achievable rate, the bulk of oil would be drawn down
within 200 days; (3) DOE could not reach its downgrade goal of 4.5
million barrels per day until it completed planned drawdown and
distribution enhancements and stored enough oil at one of its sites
to support its planned drawdown rate; (4) crude oil prices could be
almost $5 per barrel higher if the withdrawal rate were 2.5 million
instead of 3.5 million barrels per day; (5) insufficient availability
of U.S.-flag tankers could hamper SPR drawdown and distribution; (6)
DOE and oil industry officials believed that there were not enough
U.S.  tankers available to move the amount of oil at the higher
drawdown rates; (7) DOE voluntarily attempted to comply with
Department of Transportation pipeline safety standards; (8) pipeline
operation problems during drawdown could have severe economic and
environmental impacts; (9) SPR contractors failed to perform
right-of-way and erosion control equipment inspections as frequently
as required and to retain pipeline repair records; and (10) SPR was
not in full compliance with Transportation safety standards.  In
addition, GAO found that DOE implemented several prior GAO
recommendations involving:  (1) conducting 20 drawdown-related tests
between 1986 and 1989, (2) completing automated controls to operate
valves and pumps and monitor control equipment, (3) developing a
program to identify pipeline conditions and needed corrective
actions, and (4) developing a logistics support system to ensure an
adequate supply of spare parts. 

Energy Security:  Impacts of Lifting Alaskan North Slope Oil Exports
Ban (Letter Report, 11/08/90, GAO/RCED-91-21). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO assessed the
impact of removing export restrictions on Alaskan North Slope (ANS)
crude oil, focusing on likely changes in the Alaskan oil trade
between now and 1995, both with and without the ban, and how those
changes could affect the nation's economy and energy security. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) ANS crude oil distribution to eastern
ports could cease in the near future due to lower ANS production and
higher west coast consumption, and (2) the Energy Information
Administration's computer model estimated that ANS crude exports and
related price increases would be considerably smaller in 1995 than in
1988 due to decreased production.  GAO also found that lifting the
ANS oil export ban could:  (1) divert all the oil shipped to eastern
U.S.  ports and some of the oil shipped to the west coast to Pacific
Rim countries, (2) lead to potential economic efficiencies due to
significantly lower transportation costs to U.S.  eastern ports and
improvements in refinery efficiency, (3) benefit some oil producers
while hurting independent California refiners and the U.S.  maritime
industry, and (4) increase gross U.S.  imports but possibly decrease
net U.S imports and improve worldwide oil market efficiency. 

Natural Gas:  Opportunities for Federal Cost Savings Through
Competitive Purchases (Letter Report, 10/23/90, GAO/RCED-91-35). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reviewed natural gas purchases by an Air Force base
and two veterans medical centers to determine:  (1) the extent to
which the agencies used competitive procurement practices, (2) actual
and potential cost savings from competitive procurement, and (3) why
more agencies did not use competitive procurement practices. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the military spent over $345 million
annually for natural gas, but only 63 of 600 military installations
purchased it competitively; (2) federal civilian agencies spent over
$160 million annually for natural gas, but there was little knowledge
on how they purchased it; (3) facilities that purchased gas
competitively saved 10 to 30 percent on their gas costs; (4) four
agencies could have reduced their natural gas costs by 11 to 22
percent over a 12-month period if they had purchased it
competitively; and (5) the Department of Defense (DOD) could save an
estimated $25 million to $38 million, or 7 to 11 percent, on gas
costs annually if it purchased gas competitively.  In addition, GAO
found that more agencies did not buy natural gas competitively
because they lacked:  (1) awareness of this purchase option and (2)
time, staff resources, and technical expertise for evaluating the
various options available and for managing the competitive bid
process.  GAO also found that:  (1) the General Services
Administration planned to initiate a program to assess federal
civilian agency potential to procure natural gas competitively and
(2) in January 1990, DOD established a program to increase natural
gas competitive purchasing by centralizing and expanding wellhead
purchases. 

Electricity Supply:  Older Plants' Impact on Reliability and Air
Quality (Chapter Report, 09/10/90, GAO/RCED-90-200). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed
electric utilities' life extension plans for older fossil fuel power
plants and examined the effects of life extension on the reliability
of the nation's power supply and air quality. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the number of fossil fuel generating
units over 30 years of age will increase from approximately 2,500 in
1989 to roughly 3,700 in 1998, and their share of generating capacity
will increase from 13 percent in 1989 to 27 percent in 1998; (2)
plants accounting for about one-third of the total generating
capacity of fossil fuel plants could undergo life extension by the
year 2000; (3) proposed acid rain control legislation could
discourage life extension projects; (4) utilities' plans to construct
plants will produce only one-third of the additional capacity needed
by 2000; (5) while life extension programs would be more
cost-effective than building new plants, the long-term success of
such programs was uncertain; (6) if life extension does not achieve
its goal, electric supply could be impaired; (7) older plants exempt
from the Clean Air Act emitted 88 percent of total sulfur dioxide
emissions and 79 percent of total nitrogen oxide emissions; (8) more
stringent emission requirements for currently exempt plants would
eliminate those that pollute the most, but could adversely affect
electricity supply in the short term; and (9) more stringent emission
requirements would increase electricity production costs. 

Hydroelectric Dams:  Issues Surrounding Columbia River Basin Juvenile
Fish Bypasses (Chapter Report, 09/06/90, GAO/RCED-90-180). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO evaluated the
Army Corps of Engineers' program for assisting fish migration past
certain river dams, focusing on the Corps':  (1) use of benefit and
cost analysis and a computer model to estimate benefits, (2)
consideration of other factors in its benefit estimates, and (3)
consideration of the views of outside groups in deciding against
constructing the bypasses. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the Corps developed a computer model
to estimate the number of additional adult fish that would return
from the ocean if it constructed the proposed bypasses; (2) local
agencies, tribes, and others noted model limitations, and researchers
concluded that data limitations rendered the model inadequate for
making precise economic benefit determinations; (3) the Corps
acknowledged the model's data shortcomings and reliability problems;
(4) the Corps did not recognize the proposed bypasses' potential for
increased revenues through different electricity generation methods;
(5) regulations did not require the Corps to consider noneconomic
factors in constructing the bypasses, and it did not consider such
potential benefits as the cultural and religious value of fish to
Indian tribes; (6) the Corps did not adequately involve appropriate
agencies in conducting planning studies as required; (7) the Corps
could experience difficulty in establishing a mitigation objective,
since comprehensive data on fish migrations prior to dam construction
did not exist; and (8) the Corps' ability to base bypass construction
decisions on cost-effectiveness may be limited, since information
about bypass effectiveness was scarce and inconclusive. 

Long-Term Policies Needed to Address Energy Use and Price Volatility
(Testimony, 09/05/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-105). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the oil price increases that have taken
place since Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.  GAO noted that:  (1) between
August 1 and August 23, 1990, the price for oil futures increased
from $21 per barrel to almost $32 per barrel before falling to about
$27 on August 27; (2) retail gasoline prices increased about 10 cents
a gallon after a major oil spill in March 1989; (3) retail home
heating oil and propane prices increased 29 percent between November
1989 and January 1990, due to severe cold weather; (4) the increased
oil prices affected the costs of many other industrial and
agricultural products; and (5) U.S.  dependence on the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Persian Gulf nations will
increase dramatically if the demand for oil imports continues to
rise.  GAO believes that:  (1) the development of a national energy
strategy is sorely needed and long overdue, and (2) actions are
needed to encourage improvements in energy efficiency to reduce U.S. 
dependence on oil and its vulnerability to potential oil supply
disruptions. 

Electricity Supply:  The Effects of Competitive Power Purchases Are
Not Yet Certain (Letter Report, 08/23/90, GAO/RCED-90-182). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed:  (1)
electric utilities' use of competitive bidding to purchase
electricity from nonutility generating sources and (2) how such
purchases might affect the reliability and cost of electric power. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the effects of competitive power
purchases on the long-term reliability of electric services are not
yet certain and are difficult to assess; (2) determining the effects
of competitive bidding on the cost of power requires comparing
estimates of what the future costs and demand for electricity might
be; (3) utilities may incur extra costs to replace lost generating
sources, which could potentially affect the ultimate cost of
purchased power; and (4) a lack of access to transmission facilities,
eligibility criteria specified by utilities, and certain regulatory
restrictions limit the potential for competition and affect cost. 

Energy Regulation:  Factors Relating to Oil Overcharge Settlements
Need Better Documentation (Letter Report, 08/23/90, GAO/RCED-90-181). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on several aspects of the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Economic Regulatory Administration's (ERA) handling of the proposed
settlement of overcharge litigation against an oil company. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) ERA had little documentation of many
of the significant events and decisions leading to the proposed
settlement; (2) the proposed consent order between ERA and the oil
company allowed the oil company to pay the settlement amount, plus
interest, over an 8-year period; (3) ERA later determined that the
oil company could pay the settlement in less than 8 years; (4) ERA
did not adequately document its litigation risk analysis; and (5) ERA
litigating attorney participation in the negotiations leading to the
proposed consent order was very limited. 

Alcohol Fuels:  Impacts From Increased Use of Ethanol Blended Fuels
(Chapter Report, 07/16/90, GAO/RCED-90-156). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on:  (1) the ethanol industry's capability to expand its
production capacity, (2) the effects that expanded ethanol production
could have on the agricultural sector and food prices,; and (3) how
increased production could affect certain aspects of the federal
budget. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) in 1989, the United States produced
about 1 billion gallons of ethanol, and studies demonstrated the
feasibility of doubling or tripling production; (2) the largest
producer operates four ethanol plants with a combined capacity of 600
million gallons, which is about 60 percent of the U.S.  production
capacity; (3) faced with uncertain market conditions, some ethanol
plants have discontinued operations; (4) there are no technological
reasons why domestic producers cannot supply the ethanol required;
(5) expanded ethanol production would increase both the demand for
and price of corn, but this increase would affect other sectors of
American agriculture; (6) domestic soybean production would be
adversely affected by increased ethanol production; (7) higher corn
prices, caused by increased demand from added ethanol production,
would increase cattle producers' feed costs and lower their profits;
(8) in contrast, the lower prices for soybean meal and other
high-protein feed could benefit poultry producers; (9) net farm cash
income would increase by an average of about 1.3 percent, and
consumers would face slightly higher food prices; and (10) increased
ethanol production would reduce federal outlays for farm support
programs, but federal revenues from motor fuel taxes would also be
reduced. 

Consumers Have Limited Assurance That Octane Ratings Are Accurate
(Testimony, 06/20/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-90). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the results of a nationwide review on
gasoline octane labeling, focusing on consumer concern that gasoline
will meet vehicle octane requirements.  GAO noted that:  (1) newer
gasoline-alcohol blended fuels or future fuels that may become
available to abate vehicle pollution are subject to the Petroleum
Marketing Practices Act's octane posting requirements; (2) octane
mislabeling is occurring and is costly to consumers, but the
nationwide extent of mislabeling is unknown; (3) testing fuel to
ensure that posted ratings are accurate is an effective deterrent to
mislabeling; and (4) the act's provisions may limit state enforcement
efforts.  GAO believes that there are options for including the
states in the program in a way likely to result in greater assurance
that the act's objectives are achieved. 

Consumers Have Limited Assurance That Octane Ratings Are Accurate
(Testimony, 06/20/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-90A). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO provided a summary of its testimony on gasoline
octane mislabeling.  GAO found that:  (1) responsible federal
agencies had not established systems to prevent mislabeling; (2) the
extent of mislabeling nationwide is unknown, and (3) not all motor
fuels are covered by the applicable law. 

Energy Policy:  Developing Strategies for Energy Policies in the
1990s (Letter Report, 06/19/90, GAO/RCED-90-85). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on energy policy issues, focusing on:  (1) energy
consumption, (2) increased dependence on imported oil from Persian
Gulf sources, (3) uncertainty over the adequacy of future generating
capacity, and (4) concern for the potentially adverse environmental
effects of energy consumption. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) since 1983, U.S.  energy consumption
has increased by about 16 percent, and an upward trend is expected to
continue through 2000; (2) petroleum supplies about 41 percent of
total U.S.  energy consumption; (3) the United States has become
increasingly dependent on imported oil from the Persian Gulf, which
has increased vulnerability to potential oil supply disruptions; (4)
it was uncertain whether there would be adequate generating capacity
to meet future electricity needs; (5) much of the additional
generating capacity projected to come online is in early construction
stages and might not be completed in time to meet future needs; (6)
energy consumption creates potentially serious and costly
environmental, health, and safety consequences; and (7) the President
has directed the Department of Energy to develop a national energy
strategy that would integrate and balance concerns for energy choices
against other national concerns, such as environmental protection and
economic growth. 

Gasoline Marketing:  Uncertainties Surround Reformulated Gasoline as
a Motor Fuel (Letter Report, 06/14/90, GAO/RCED-90-153). 

BACKGROUND:  In response to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on reformulated gasoline, including:  (1) when
reformulated gasoline could be made available and how it would be
produced; and (2) the impacts of production and use of reformulated
gasoline. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) reformulated gasoline has improved
emissions characteristics, (2) government and industry officials
agreed that reformulated gasoline would make a positive contribution
to air quality by helping to reduce some vehicle emissions, and (3)
reformulated gasoline offers advantages over other clean-burning
alternative fuels because it can be distributed through the existing
petroleum distribution system.  GAO also found that negative impacts
of reformulated gasoline could include:  (1) increased production
costs for refiners, (2) the financial failure of some small refiners
and independent gasoline marketers, (3) increases in the consumer
cost of gasoline, and (4) increased crude oil imports. 

Nuclear Science:  U.S.  Electricity Needs and DOE's Civilian Reactor
Development Program (Letter Report, 05/29/90, GAO/RCED-90-151). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed:  (1)
projected U.S.  electricity needs through 1998, (2) whether the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Civilian Reactor Development Program
could help meet those needs, and (3) the views of utility company and
nuclear industry officials on DOE's efforts to promote advanced
reactor development. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) from 1989 to 1998, the summer demand
for electricity is projected to increase approximately 2 percent
annually, from 522,000 megawatts in 1989 to 623,000 megawatts in
1998; (2) from 1989 to 1998, projected available electrical
generating capacity is projected to increase 1 percent annually, from
approximately 544,000 megawatts in 1989 to 606,000 megawatts in 1998,
which could result in some regions experiencing electrical shortfalls
during projected peak periods; (3) in 1989, utility companies were
completing the construction of nuclear generators, adding other types
of generators, and planning to use demand management programs; (4)
DOE expected to obtain certification for three light-water reactors
by 1995 and supported the development of additional reactors to be
operational after 2000; and (5) utility company and nuclear industry
officials generally supported DOE's approach to advanced nuclear
reactor development but did not plan to purchase advanced reactors
until after 2000 because of their high cost and public opposition. 

Gasoline Marketing:  Consumers Have Limited Assurance That Octane
Ratings Are Accurate (Chapter Report, 04/16/90, GAO/RCED-90-50). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Federal Trade Commission's and the Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) implementation of gasoline octane certification and posting
requirements. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the Commission and EPA did not
monitor compliance with octane-posting requirements or use octane
test results to prosecute violators, (2) there were no federal
controls to ensure that gasoline octane postings were accurate, (3)
over 9 percent of the gasoline sampled between 1979 and 1987
misstated octane ratings by more than one-half point, and (4)
one-time tests of gasoline octane levels in states that did not have
an octane testing program revealed that mislabeling ranged from 22 to
53 percent.  GAO also found that:  (1) there was more potential for
mislabeling to occur at distributors or retail stations than at
refineries, pipelines, or bulk terminals because those locations
lacked extensive quality control programs to test octane ratings; (2)
the Commission limited octane ratings to traditional gasoline fuels
and excluded newer gasoline-alcohol blends from posting requirements;
and (3) legislation authorized only limited civil remedies and
penalties for mislabeling violations. 

Alaskan Crude Oil Exports (Testimony, 04/05/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-59). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the potential consequences of lifting the
existing ban on the export of Alaskan North Slope (ANS) crude oil,
focusing on the changes in the Alaskan oil trade that are likely to
occur and how those changes could affect the U.S.  economy and energy
security.  GAO noted that:  (1) removal of the ban would likely
result in the export of ANS crude oil to Pacific Rim countries, since
oil transport costs were low and the characteristics of ANS crude oil
were more suitable to the needs of Pacific Rim refiners than to those
of west coast refiners and (2) such exports and decreased Alaskan oil
production would eventually result in decreased consumption of ANS
crude oil by west coast refiners and the elimination of more costly
shipments to the east coast, the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. 
GAO also noted that probable effects of exporting ANS crude oil would
include:  (1) an increase in the price of ANS crude oil at the
wellhead and, subsequently, the price that west coast refiners paid
for crude oil; (2) increased economic efficiency through reduced oil
transportation costs, increased domestic oil production, better use
of refinery processing resources, and the allocation of ANS oil to
its highest valued uses; (3) damage to the maritime industry, since
oil would likely be transported on foreign-flag, rather than
U.S.-flag tankers; and (4) increased total U.S.  oil imports, but
decreased net imports, to the extent that oil production and refinery
efficiency would increase. 

Utilities' Potential Use of Clean Coal Technologies (Testimony,
03/28/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-56). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the results of its nationwide survey on
utilities' plans to use clean coal technologies.  GAO found that: 
(1) utilities planned to use clean coal technologies for only 5
percent of their coal-fired generating units; (2) consideration of
specific technologies depended on the severity of emission reduction
requirements, target dates for compliance, and present and future
electricity demands; and (3) utilities considered switching to
low-sulfur coal to achieve emission-reduction requirements.  GAO also
found that:  (1) new technologies may not contribute significantly to
the reduction of acid rain-causing emissions during the next 15
years, (2) the Department of Energy experienced problems and delays
in formalizing cooperative agreements with project sponsors, and (3)
utilities would likely test new technologies on one unit before
installing them on others. 

Energy Management:  Extent of Crude Oil Contamination Is Uncertain
(Briefing Report, 03/08/90, GAO/RCED-90-114BR). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed
allegations of crude oil contamination, focusing on:  (1) the extent
and types of contamination, (2) how environmental legislation has
affected the contamination issue, and (3) corrective actions that the
government and the oil industry have taken concerning crude oil
contamination. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) oil industry officials identified 40
cases of crude oil contamination occurring from 1982 to 1989, and 3
of those cases resulted in damaged refinery equipment or refinery
fires; (2) all 40 cases involved chloride, iodine, alcohol, bromine,
nitrogen, or iron contamination; (3) government and industry
officials could not agree on the extent of crude oil contamination,
but the Environmental Protection Agency and other government agencies
generally believed that refining the contaminated oil would not cause
unusual risks to health and the environment; (4) although
environmental legislation generally prohibited disposal of hazardous
wastes in crude oil, it exempted certain hazardous waste generated
from oil exploration and production, and toxic substances found in
used oil; (5) eight of nine oil refineries conducted routine testing
of crude oil for basic properties but limited the frequency and
accuracy of testing for toxic materials; (6) three oil companies had
taken legal or other actions against suppliers suspected of providing
contaminated crude oil; and (7) state and federal regulatory agencies
had taken only limited action to prevent crude oil contamination. 

Greenhouse Effect:  DOE's Programs and Activities Relevant to the
Global Warming Phenomenon (Briefing Report, 03/05/90,
GAO/RCED-90-74BR). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information about Department of Energy (DOE) programs and activities
associated with global warming and DOE efforts to incorporate global
warming into its energy policy and planning activities, focusing on: 
(1) scientific understanding of the global warming phenomenon and its
research efforts to fill information gaps, (2) DOE program planning
and criteria it used for evaluating research and development, and (3)
proposed policy or program changes for improving energy efficiency or
reducing energy-related emissions with potential climate change
effects. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) scientific understanding of global
climate systems has increased in the past few years, but
uncertainties remain regarding cloud cover, oceans, and vegetation
growth; (2) DOE requested $28 million for fiscal year 1990, an
increase of $5 million over fiscal year 1989; (3) DOE requested about
$1.3 billion for fiscal year 1990 indirectly related research,
development, and demonstration programs, an increase of $330 million
over FY 1989; (4) DOE established six principles to guide its
approach to global warming and made the issue a central part of its
National Energy Strategy; and (5) public and private organizations'
proposals addressing global warming included increasing energy
efficiency, switching to nonfossil fuels, and reducing emissions from
fossil fuel use. 

Federal Electric Power:  Views on the Sale of Alaska Power
Administration Hydropower Assets (Letter Report, 02/22/90,
GAO/RCED-90-93). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) proposed sale of the Alaska Power
Administration's (APA) assets, focusing on whether the APA
divestiture method would:  (1) allow the government to fully recover
APA costs and (2) reveal the full value of APA assets to potential
purchasers. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) APA sales agreements benefited APA
ratepayers at the expense of taxpayers; (2) the bids that APA
received probably did not reflect the full market value of its
assets, since APA limited the sale to current purchasers of APA power
and to certain state and local concerns; (3) the APA present-value
pricing method limited taxpayers' cost recovery by not assuming the
assets' residual value following federal loan repayment; (4) the
pricing method did not consider that the Department of the Treasury
would not recover all interest costs of its loan to APA, since
federal power interest rates were usually below the Treasury's
borrowing rates; and (5) unresolved possible costs included obtaining
rights-of-way across private and Native American lands, and $5.8
million for the completion of a construction project. 

Federal Electric Power:  Bonneville's Residential Exchange Program
(Chapter Report, 02/06/90, GAO/RCED-90-34). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Bonneville Power Administration's (BPA) implementation of the
Residential Exchange Program, which would reduce the disparity in
power rates charged to residential consumers, focusing on:  (1) the
significance of the program to the participating utilities, the
utilities' residential and small-farm customers, and BPA and its
customers; and (2) BPA efforts to ensure that participating utilities
passed the exchange energy cost savings to their customers. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the exchange program provided
benefits to utilities that had higher costs than BPA; (2) BPA
estimated exchange benefits totaling about $1.3 billion between 1989
and 1995; (3) program benefits reduced the cost of electricity
provided to residential and small-farm customers by between 10 and 25
percent in 1988; (4) although the program reduced the disparity in
electricity rates, BPA more than tripled its rates between 1981 and
1987, which increased the cost of BPA power relative to the costs of
utilities' power; (5) BPA needed about 9 percent of its operating
revenues to cover $1.37 billion in program costs through 1988, of
which it charged 45 percent to its industrial customers, 29 percent
to its investor-owned utilities, and the remainder to its public
utilities; (6) BPA relied on state utility regulatory commissions and
public utility boards to determine whether utilities receiving
program benefits passed the benefits to customers; (7) there were no
independent reviews covering public utility districts, municipal
utilities, and electric cooperatives, since those entities did not
fall within the states' jurisdictions; and (8) although a BPA review
of two public utilities showed that the utilities either did not pass
on sufficient benefits or passed benefits to customers other than
residential customers, BPA did not discuss its findings with the
utilities. 

Perspectives on Potential Agricultural and Budgetary Impacts From an
Increased Use of Ethanol Fuels (Testimony, 02/01/90,
GAO/T-RCED-90-23). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the potential effects of expanded ethanol
production on the domestic ethanol industry, the agricultural sector
and consumer food prices, and certain aspects of the federal budget. 
GAO noted that:  (1) there were no technological impediments to
increasing the domestic ethanol industry's production capacity to 2.2
billion or 3.3 billion gallons per year over the next 8 years; (2)
American farmers could supply the corn necessary to produce those
amounts of ethanol, although industry officials believed that farmers
would require continued government incentives to maintain such
growth; (3) corn producers would benefit from the increased demand
for corn to make ethanol and the resulting higher corn prices; (4)
the conversion of corn into ethanol-generated byproducts, including
poultry feed, that would compete with and possibly lower the demand
and prices for soybean products; (5) increases in corn feed costs
could hurt cattle producers, although the lower cost of poultry feed
could benefit poultry producers; (6) overall, net farm cash income
would increase, but not in all sectors; (7) expanded ethanol
production would cause a slight increase in consumer food prices; (8)
expanded ethanol production would decrease federal farm program
outlays by an average of about $1.4 billion per year; and (9) the
increased use of ethanol fuels could reduce federal motor fuel tax
revenues by an average of about $813 million per year. 


FEDERAL ROLE AND INVESTMENT IN
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
============================================================ Chapter 4

Technology Transfers:  Benefits of Cooperative R&D Agreements (Letter
Report, 12/16/94, GAO/RCED-95-52). 

ABSTRACT:  Technology transfer between federal laboratories and
industry is increasingly viewed as a significant factor in the
economic growth and well-being of the United States.  Cooperative
Research and Development Agreements (CRADA) define the terms and the
conditions of collaboration by federal laboratories and private
industry on research and development.  Although all CRADAs may not
achieve the same level of benefits, both the federal agencies and
private firms GAO reviewed benefited from the collaborations.  The
CRADAs offered opportunities for federal laboratories and industry to
collaborate on research while meeting their missions.  Technology
from federal laboratories was transferred to the private sector,
resulting in commercial products.  Research and development programs
were advanced.  The sharing of resources helped federal laboratories
and private companies accomplish the CRADA's objectives.  In
addition, some CRADAs showed long-term potential to improve the U.S. 
economy, health, and environment. 

Department of Energy:  Procedures Followed in Awarding Grants to
Study Uses of Collider's Assets (Letter Report, 12/13/94,
GAO/RCED-95-53). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) generally complied with
federal regulations and its own procedures in awarding grants to
study future uses of the Superconducting Super Collider's assets. 
GAO's review of DOE's grant award processes did not disclose any
departures from applicable regulations and procedures in selecting
the grantees and making the grants.  However, when notifying
applicants that they had not been chosen, DOE did not follow its
regulation that applicants be told in writing that they could ask for
more detailed information on DOE's decision.  Instead, DOE officials
assumed that they would be contacted by the unsuccessful applicants
if more information was desired.  The 11 solicited grants that DOE
awarded varied in terms of the funding and technical support provided
to the grantees because the scope, nature, and complexity of the
studies varied although the grants were generally comparable in
timing.  The grantees generally received the level of funding and
technical support they requested and were generally satisfied with
the amount of support they received.  Although grantees residing in
Texas had the obvious advantage of being near the collider site, no
other advantages for Texas grantees were identified. 

National Test Facility:  Civilian Agency Use of Supercomputers Not
Feasible (Letter Report, 12/09/94, GAO/AIMD-95-28). 

ABSTRACT:  On the basis of its interviews with the civilian agencies
cited in the House Armed Services Committee report accompanying the
National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 1995, GAO
concludes that none of the agencies would be able to make effective
use of the National Test Facility's excess supercomputing
capabilities.  These agencies said that they could not use the
resources mainly because (1) the facility's supercomputers are older
machines whose performance and costs cannot match those of more
advanced computers available from other sources and (2) some agencies
have not yet developed applications requiring supercomputer
capabilities or lack funding to support such activities.  In
addition, future support for the hardware and the software at the
National Test Facility is uncertain, making any investment by an
outside user risky. 

National Laboratories:  Are Their R&D Activities Related to
Commercial Product Development?(Letter Report, 11/25/94,
GAO/PEMD-95-2). 

ABSTRACT:  In response to congressional interest in how the national
laboratories of the Department of Energy (DOE) can best be focused to
help solve the problems faced by the nation during the 1990s, this
report presents an inventory of the human and capital resources
housed in the national laboratories that will provide baseline data
for future GAO reports on DOE laboratory policy issues.  This report
addresses congressional interest in the current balance of the
research efforts in 10 laboratories' research programs.  The 10
laboratories are as follows:  Argonne, Brookhaven, Idaho Engineering,
Lawrence Livermore, Lawrence Berkeley, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific
Northwest, Sandia, and the Solar Energy Research Institute.  GAO also
examines the extent to which these national laboratories are now
engaged in basic and applied research or in research linked to
commercial product development. 

High Performance Computing and Communications:  New Program Direction
Would Benefit from a More Focused Effort (Chapter Report, 11/04/94,
GAO/AIMD-95-6). 

ABSTRACT:  The federal High Performance Computing and Communication
Program seeks to accelerate research and development of high
performance computers and networks and promote their use in both the
federal government and the private sector.  If successful, the
program could significantly extend U.S.  technological leadership and
enhance national competitiveness.  This report examines (1) the
effectiveness of the program's management structure in setting goals
and measuring progress and (2) how extensively private industry has
been involved in the program's planning and execution.  GAO also
identifies opportunities to improve the program and makes
recommendations to focus the program on its new role in developing
new technology in support of the national information infrastructure. 

U.S.  Government Aid to Business:  Federal Government Programs That
Provide Management and Technical Assistance (Fact Sheet, 10/14/94,
GAO/GGD-95-3FS). 

ABSTRACT:  This fact sheet provides information on federal government
programs that give management and technical assistance to businesses. 
GAO (1) identifies, given the limited time constraints of the
assignment, as many federal government programs that provide such
help as was possible; (2) briefly describes these programs and
identified the target customers that these programs were designed to
serve; and (3) reports the current funding levels for these programs. 

Precollege Math and Science Education:  Department of Energy's
Precollege Program Managed Ineffectively (Letter Report, 09/13/94,
GAO/HEHS-94-208). 

ABSTRACT:  Public policymakers and U.S.  industrial leaders have
expressed grave concern about precollege students in other
industrialized countries significantly outperforming American
students on recent international mathematics and science tests.  In
recognition of the Department of Energy's (DOE) world-class
scientists and engineers as well as its state-of-the-art research
facilities, the Congress made mathematics and science education a
major mission for DOE in fiscal year 1991.  DOE's precollege
mathematics and science budget has grown about 1,250
percent--reaching about $27 million in fiscal year 1993.  In the
early 1990s, DOE did not effectively manage this program.  First, DOE
jeopardized the program's success by not using a risk management
strategy to run the program's projects.  Second, DOE forfeited an
invaluable management tool by taking a lax approach to program
evaluation.  Third, DOE greatly reduced its chances of helping
achieve National Education Goal 5--"By the year 2000, U.S.  students
will be first in the world in mathematics and science
achievement"--by launching a variety of projects that did not clearly
seek to improve student achievement.  DOE has announced steps to
substantially improve the program's management and evaluation
functions; however, the depth of executive support for these measures
and their subsequent staying power are uncertain. 

National Science Foundation:  Better Use of Existing Resources Could
Improve Program Administration (Letter Report, 06/24/94,
GAO/RCED-94-95). 

ABSTRACT:  The National Science Foundation (NSF), through its
Directorate for Education and Human Resources, exercises the unique
federal role of advancing science, mathematics, engineering, and
technology education programs.  For fiscal years 1990 through 1993,
money available for these programs more than doubled, from about $243
million to $512 million, while resources to administer and manage the
programs grew by less than one-fourth, or from about $6 million to
$7.3 million, adjusted for inflation.  This report examines (1) how
the Directorate sets priorities for its education programs, (2) how
the Directorate evaluates the results of its programs and how these
evaluations are used to set future priorities, and (3) whether the
Directorate has obtained the resources it needs to run its programs
effectively. 

Fossil Fuels:  Lessons Learned in DOE's Clean Coal Technology Program
(Letter Report, 05/26/94, GAO/RCED-94-174). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) Clean Coal Technology
Program, which has been underway since 1986, is a unique partnership
between government and industry for sharing the costs of
commercial-scale projects demonstrating innovative technologies for
using coal in a more environmentally sound, efficient, and economical
way.  DOE funds up to half of a project's cost, with the project's
sponsor and other nonfederal participants picking up the tab for the
rest.  This report reviews the lessons DOE has learned in
implementing the clean coal program and the changes it has made that
would be useful to other federal agencies that share in the costs of
developing and demonstrating technologies.  GAO also obtained
information on DOE's plans for the future direction of the clean coal
program.  Although it is too soon to judge the commercial success of
the innovative technologies developed, the program has shown that the
government and the private sector can work together to develop and
apply new technologies. 

Texas's Collider Claim (Correspondence, 04/22/94, GAO/RCED-94-199R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information about the Department of Energy's (DOE) settlement of
Texas' claim for its investment in the terminated Superconducting
Super Collider project.  GAO noted that:  (1) DOE has not estimated
the cost of settling Texas' claim for project investment and cannot
predict when it will be able to estimate those costs, (2) DOE agrees
that Texas invested about $500 million, and is negotiating with the
state to reach a settlement, and (3) a previous GAO report concluded
that DOE does not currently need additional funds to cover its
estimated costs for project termination activities.  GAO believes
that, when DOE determines that the costs of settling with Texas
exceed its funds, it could then ask the Congress for additional
money. 

Technology Transfer:  Improving the Use of Cooperative R&D Agreements
at DOE's Contractor-Operated Laboratories (Letter Report, 04/15/94,
GAO/RCED-94-91). 

ABSTRACT:  Technology transfer between federal laboratories and
industry is increasingly viewed as a major factor contributing to the
economic strength and competitiveness of the United States.  In 1986,
the Congress sought to enhance the effectiveness of this transfer by
authorizing cooperative research and development agreements as
another form of technology transfer.  This report compares the
Department of Energy's (DOE) process for implementing cooperative
research and development agreements to the approaches used by the
Army and the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
determine why some federal laboratories had entered into more
agreements than DOE's laboratories. 

Federal Research:  Additional Funds for Terminating the Super
Collider Are Not Justified (Letter Report, 04/08/94,
GAO/RCED-94-153). 

ABSTRACT:  A request from the Department of Energy (DOE) for an
additional $180 million to cover termination costs for the
Superconducting Super Collider in Texas, on top of $735 million
already available, is not adequately justified and is not needed for
currently estimated termination activities.  The $735 million
available for terminating the super collider exceeds DOE's latest
cost estimate, made in March 1994, by $167 million; this estimate
pegs termination costs at $568 million.  This amount omits the costs
of settling Texas' demand for a $539 million refund from DOE for its
investment in the project.  DOE has not yet determined what is owed
to Texas and is now negotiating with the state on a settlement. 
DOE's $180 million request for fiscal year 1995 to cover termination
costs and to potentially fund new uses of the collider's assets is
justified at this time.  Additional funds are not needed for
currently estimated termination activities, and it is premature to
fund yet-to-be-determined future users of the collider's assets. 

Federal Research:  Interim Report on the Pilot Technology Access
Program (Letter Report, 03/07/94, GAO/RCED-94-75). 

ABSTRACT:  As part of the federal effort to bolster U.S.  industries'
competitiveness, the Pilot Technology Access Program provides small
businesses with access to:  (1) computerized data bases containing
technical and business information that they typically are unaware
of, or cannot afford, and (2) experts knowledgeable in a wide range
of technical fields.  The program is being implemented at several
small business development centers, which provide counseling,
training, and research assistance to small businesses nationwide. 
The centers are run by the Small Business Administration.  In 1991,
six centers in Maryland, Missouri, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
Wisconsin were chosen to implement the program.  This report
discusses the status, implementation, and evaluation of the program. 
GAO also includes the views of the directors of the participating
centers on the program's effect on small businesses' productivity and
innovation. 

Advanced Technology:  Proposal Review Process and Treatment of
Foreign-Owned Businesses (Letter Report, 01/18/94, GAO/RCED-94-81). 

ABSTRACT:  This report reviews the implementation of the Advanced
Technology Program, which seeks to help U.S.  businesses create and
apply the generic technology and research necessary to rapidly
commercialize major scientific discoveries and new technologies and
to refine manufacturing technologies.  Funding for the program, which
is run by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, rose
from $68 million in fiscal year 1993 to $200 million in fiscal year
1994--a 194-percent increase.  GAO discusses (1) how the program
limits its awards to research and development on "precompetitive
generic technology" and (2) the treatment of foreign-owned businesses
that submit proposals for awards. 

Metric Conversion:  Future Progress Depends Upon Private Sector and
Public Support (Chapter Report, 01/13/94, GAO/RCED-94-23). 

ABSTRACT:  Metric use among the U.S.  government, private sector, and
public is only inching along, despite the fact that the Congress
sanctioned the use of the metric system in this country as far back
as 1866.  Most federal agencies have made great strides in
establishing guidelines and issuing reports on metric conversion but
still face hurdles in putting their plans into practice.  For
instance, under the procurement system, most products are nonmetric,
and the government's total market share is too small to stimulate
private industry conversion.  These difficulties have prompted the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Pentagon to
request waivers from metric requirements in cases affecting entire
ships and satellites.  Mixed progress has been made toward metric
conversion in the areas of federal grants and other business
activities.  GAO notes that the federal government alone cannot
achieve the goal of metric conversions.  A broader national dialogue
between the government, the private sector, and the public is needed
to discuss the next steps in the metric conversion process. 

Technology Transfer:  Improving Incentives for Technology Transfer at
Federal Laboratories (Testimony, 10/26/93, GAO/T-RCED-94-42). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO supports the provisions of the Technology
Commercialization Act of 1993, which would increase the up-front
royalty payments to investors and limit the amount of remaining
income that can be used for nonscientific purposes.  GAO believes
that these measures should stimulate federal scientists' interest in
reporting inventions and spur federal laboratory directors to
encourage technology transfer.  Although GAO is uncertain what the
impact would be of assigning title to intellectual property to
Cooperative Research and Development Agreement collaborators,
industry representatives told GAO that ownership and control over
technology is important to developing new products.  In addition,
procedural impediments, such as the lack of ready access to advice on
patenting inventions or the slow and arbitrary nature of selecting
inventions to patent, continue to diminish incentives for technology
transfer at federal laboratories. 

Federal Research:  Assessment of the Financial Audit for SEMATECH's
Activities in 1992 (Letter Report, 10/13/93, GAO/RCED-94-17). 

ABSTRACT:  In reviewing the audit of SEMATECH's 1992 financial
statements, GAO found no indication the Price Waterhouse's report on
the internal control structure or its report on compliance with laws
and regulations cannot be relied on.  SEMATECH is a U.S. 
semiconductor manufacturer-Defense Department consortium that seeks
to advance semiconductor manufacturing technology.  In January 1993,
DOD began providing advance payments to SEMATECH on a monthly instead
of a quarterly basis.  This procedure, adopted in response to an
earlier GAO recommendation, appears to provide enough working capital
funds while minimizing the amount of unexpended government funds that
SEMATECH holds. 

Nuclear Science:  More Planning Needed to Support Future Needs for
Electric Power in Space (Letter Report, 10/07/93, GAO/RCED-94-6). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) builds radioisotope
thermoelectric generators to produce electricity for use in deep
space and remote terrestrial areas.  The power systems have been
critical to both the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
and Department of Defense missions for more than 30 years.  DOE is
considering moving its generator operations from its Mound Plant in
Ohio to a new facility being built at the Hanford Reservation in
Washington.  This report answers the following questions:  Where does
DOE plan to assemble generators in the future?  How much would it
cost to overhaul the Mound Plant facility to make it suitable for
long-term generator assembly?  How will DOE address previously cited
public safety concerns about Mound doing nuclear work in a
residential area?  How much money has DOE spent to modify Hanford's
Fuels and Materials Examination facility in preparation for the
assembly of generators?  How much will it cost to complete this
changeover? 

Federal Research:  Aging Federal Laboratories Need Repairs and
Upgrades (Testimony, 09/23/93, GAO/T-RCED-93-71). 

ABSTRACT:  Most federal research laboratories are experiencing common
problems associated with aging facilities--leaking roofs and gutters,
drafty window frames, power outages, and poor ventilating systems
that do not meet industry standards for air circulation.  Most of the
laboratories GAO visited are more than 30 years old.  Although
facility managers generally believe that funding for laboratory
maintenance is adequate, the eight agencies GAO reviewed reported
backlogs of more than $3.8 billion in needed laboratory repairs. 
Moreover, funding to renovate existing laboratories or build new ones
is often minimal.  Four of the eight agencies recently started up
task forces to reexamine their research and development missions and
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their laboratories. 
Their findings should help in deciding whether to realign,
consolidate, or close laboratories and whether to boost funding for
laboratories doing essential work. 

Federal Research:  Aging Federal Laboratories Need Repairs and
Upgrades (Letter Report, 09/20/93, GAO/RCED-93-203). 

ABSTRACT:  Most federal research laboratories are experiencing common
problems associated with aging facilities--leaking roofs and gutters,
drafty window frames, power outages, and poor ventilating systems
that do not meet industry standards for air circulation.  Most of the
laboratories GAO visited are more than 30 years old.  Although
facility managers generally believe that funding for laboratory
maintenance is adequate, the eight agencies GAO reviewed reported
backlogs of more than $3.8 billion in needed laboratory repairs. 
Moreover, funding to renovate existing laboratories or build new ones
is often minimal.  Four of the eight agencies recently started up
task forces to reexamine their research and development missions and
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of their laboratories. 
Their findings should help in deciding whether to realign,
consolidate, or close laboratories and whether to boost funding for
laboratories doing essential work.  GAO summarized this report in
testimony before the Congress; see:  Federal Research:  Aging Federal
Laboratories Need Repairs and Upgrades (GAO/T-RCED-93-71, Sept.  23,
1993) by Jim Wells, Associate Director for Energy and Science Issues,
before the Joint Economic Committee (8 pp.). 

Federal Research:  Advanced Technology Program's Indirect Cost Rates
and Program Evaluation Status (Letter Report, 09/10/93,
GAO/RCED-93-221). 

ABSTRACT:  The Advanced Technology Program, run by the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), is meant to help U.S. 
businesses rapidly commercialize major new scientific discoveries and
technologies and refine manufacturing technologies.  The program's
goals are to improve the competitive position of U.S.  businesses,
give preference to discoveries and technologies that have great
economic potential, and avoid providing undue advantages to specific
companies.  Since 1991, NIST has funded 60 projects proposed by
individual or joint ventures.  The administration has proposed
boosting program funding to $200 million in fiscal year 1997--a
194-percent increase over the year before.  This report provides
information on (1) program awardees' indirect cost rates, (2)
completed projects, and (3) NIST's plans to evaluate the program's
effectiveness. 

Federal Research:  Superconducting Super Collider's Total Estimated
Cost Will Exceed $11 Billion (Testimony, 06/30/93, GAO/T-RCED-93-57). 

ABSTRACT:  Management problems continue to hinder accurate and timely
reporting of the Superconducting Super Collider's cost and status. 
Although the project's total cost cannot be reliability estimated,
GAO believes that costs have more than doubled since the Super
Collider was first proposed to the Congress in 1987--from $5.3
billion to more than $11 billion.  Because the project's prime
contractor and the Department of Energy (DOE) have been slow to
disclose project costs and anticipated cost increases, the Congress
has not been receiving timely and complete information.  The project
is now at a crossroads, and key funding decisions must be made.  The
federal share of the project's cost, now capped at $5.6 billion, will
have to increase.  DOE now expects to receive only $1.4 billion from
nonfederal sources--$400 million from foreign sources and $1 billion
from Texas.  As a result, the Congress will have to boost federal
funding substantially if the project is to be completed. 

Technology Transfer:  Implementation of CRADAs at NIST, Army, and DOE
(Testimony, 06/10/93, GAO/T-RCED-93-53). 

ABSTRACT:  Cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs)
are one of several mechanisms that federal laboratories use to
transfer technology to the private sector.  Under a CRADA, federal
laboratories and collaborators agree to share resources as they
conduct research and development.  The CRADA defines the terms and
conditions for the collaboration, including who will own, use, and
commercialize a technology.  This testimony compares the Department
of Energy's implementation of CRADAs with the approaches used by the
Army and the National Institute of Standards and Technology. 

Federal Research:  Minor Changes Would Further Improve New NSF
Indirect Cost Guidance (Letter Report, 06/03/93, GAO/RCED-93-140). 

ABSTRACT:  The National Science Foundation (NSF), an independent
federal agency with a budget of about $2.7 billion, promotes science
in the United States through grants to research institutions.  The
grants pay for both direct costs, such as the salaries of the
investigators and the equipment needed for a project, and indirect
costs or overhead, which include utility and accounting expenses.  In
April 1992, GAO reported that several large universities receiving
federal grant money were charging inappropriate indirect costs to the
government, including entertainment expenses, depreciation of a
72-foot yacht, and the operating costs of a shopping center.  This
report provides information on, and identifies improvements needed
in, (1) the indirect cost guidance that NSF provides to small
organizations and small businesses, (2) NSF's procedures for
establishing indirect cost rates, and (3) the extent to which NSF's
audit guidelines and audits cover indirect cost charges. 

Federal Research:  Superconducting Super Collider Cost and Schedule
(Testimony, 05/26/93, GAO/T-RCED-93-47). 

ABSTRACT:  The Superconducting Super Collider will be the world's
largest particle accelerator, a basic research tool for seeking
fundamental knowledge about matter and energy.  The Department of
Energy's (DOE) estimate to build the super collider grew from $5.3
billion in 1987 to $8.25 billion in 1991.  The super collider is not
expected to produce any direct national security benefits, although
national security may indirectly benefit from the potential but
unpredictable practical applications of research discoveries or from
technological spin-offs.  Although the United States and other
countries have smaller accelerators operating, no existing or planned
accelerator will be exactly the same as the super collider.  Known
cost increases suggest that the total cost for the super collider
will exceed $11 billion.  To preclude the cost and schedule from
continuing to increase beyond $11 billion, annual funding levels
would need to increase dramatically over that projected in the
President's budget.  In fact, DOE is assuming in its projection that
there will be no funding constraints after fiscal year 1998--an
assumption that could prove unrealistic unless the budget deficit
improves markedly. 

Federal Research:  Super Collider--National Security Benefits,
Similar Projects, and Cost (Letter Report, 05/14/93,
GAO/RCED-93-158). 

ABSTRACT:  The Superconducting Super Collider will be the world's
largest particle accelerator, a basic research tool for seeking
fundamental knowledge about matter and energy.  The Department of
Energy's (DOE) estimate to build the super collider grew from $5.3
billion in 1987 to $8.25 billion in 1991.  The super collider is not
expected to produce any direct national security benefits, although
national security may indirectly benefit from the potential but
unpredictable practical applications of research discoveries or from
technological spin-offs.  Although the United States and other
countries have smaller accelerators operating, no existing or planned
accelerator will be exactly the same as the super collider.  Known
cost increases suggest that the total cost for the super collider
will exceed $11 billion.  To preclude the cost and schedule from
continuing to increase beyond $11 billion, annual funding levels
would need to increase dramatically over that projected in the
President's budget.  In fact, DOE is assuming in its projection that
there will be no funding constraints after fiscal year 1998--an
assumption that could prove unrealistic unless the budget deficit
improves markedly.  GAO summarized this report in testimony before
the Congress; see:  Federal Research:  Superconducting Super Collider
Cost and Schedule (GAO/T-RCED-93-47, May 26, 1993) by Victor S. 
Rezendes, Director of Energy and Science Issues, before the House
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology (16 pp.). 

Fossil Fuels:  Ways to Strengthen Controls Over Clean Coal Technology
Project Costs (Letter Report, 03/31/93, GAO/RCED-93-104). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy's (DOE) program for clean coal
technology, under way since 1986, has earmarked $2.75 billion to
produce innovative technologies that use coal in a highly efficient,
environmentally sound, and economically competitive way.  DOE has
adequate procedures and has made a good effort to review the
reasonableness of industry sponsors' projected costs before projects
began.  In all but one case, project files contained information on
how questionable cost estimates had been resolved.  After projects
were under way, however, incurred-cost audits were not done promptly
to ensure that sponsors submitted only allowable costs for
reimbursement.  Options exist that could yield more timely audits. 
DOE could also better protect the government's interest by
withholding part of federal project funds until necessary cost
records are provided and incurred-cost audits are finished.  DOE
allows sponsors to include third-party contributions in the sponsors'
share of project financing, rather than sharing such contributions
with DOE, a practice that increases DOE's investment and financial
risk in projects while decreasing the sponsors' investment and risk. 

Federally Funded Research:  Controlling Inappropriate Access to
Research Results (Testimony, 03/11/93, GAO/T-RCED-93-19). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO believes that generally the public interest is better
served if appropriate controls and safeguards are in place governing
who gets access to and ultimately benefits from the results of
federally funded research.  GAO's May 1992 report (GAO/RCED-92-104)
recommended that the National Institutes of Health and the National
Science Foundation require their grantees to have procedures in place
to effectively manage potential conflicts of interest, such as by
requiring investigators and other key personnel to disclose any
outside interests as part of the grant award process.  GAO also
believes that the government should at least be consulted about any
major, multimillion-dollar agreement that a university, hospital, or
other nonprofit research group seeks to negotiate with a private
company if that institution receives substantial federal funding and
rights to resulting commercial technologies. 

Science and Technology:  Federal Efforts to Collect and Analyze
Information on Foreign Science and Technology (Testimony, 02/23/93,
GAO/T-RCED-93-8). 

ABSTRACT:  A whole host of federal offices and laboratories collect
information on foreign science and technology.  Scattered throughout
the government, these organizations are concerned primarily with
defense, intelligence, commerce, and science.  Generally, the groups
obtain their information from the public.  In some
cases--particularly in the intelligence community--the organizations
analyze it and restrict access to their analyses.  No central federal
agency is responsible for coordinating either the collection or the
monitoring of information on foreign science and technology. 
Agencies with common interests, however, are trying to coordinate the
collection and monitoring of relevant information.  It is unclear at
this point how valuable these data might be to U.S.  businesses and
whether firms would have much interest in obtaining the information
from the government. 

Federal Research:  Super Collider Is Over Budget and Behind Schedule
(Chapter Report, 02/12/93, GAO/RCED-93-87). 

ABSTRACT:  The Superconducting Super Collider--a potential source of
basic knowledge about matter and energy--will, when completed, be the
world's largest particle accelerator.  The prime contractor for the
multibillion dollar project, which is being built about 30 miles
south of Dallas, Texas, still has not come up with a fully
functioning cost and schedule control system.  Such a system--with
trend analysis showing the estimated cost and schedule for completing
the project--is not expected to be up and running until July 1993 or
later.  Analysis of the major subcontractors' work in progress showed
that the project is over budget and behind schedule.  For example,
trend analyses show that costs at completion for architect and
engineering services and conventional construction will be $630
million over the baseline cost estimate of $1.25 billion. 
Furthermore, it is unclear how much these increases will ultimately
change the project's total cost and schedule.  To counter cost
increases, the Department of Energy (DOE) plans to follow a
build-to-cost strategy.  This effort is intended to hold construction
costs to baseline cost estimates by eliminating, reducing, or
deferring some components.  Such actions would reduce the Super
Collider's experimental capabilities, could harm the experimental
research, and could increase overall costs to the government.  DOE
recently advised the Congress that it may only be able to obtain
about $400 million of the $1.7 billion that it is seeking from
foreign contributors--leaving a shortfall of $1.3 billion.  As a
result, the Congress faces the prospect of having to substantially
boost federal funding to complete the project. 

Federal Research:  Foreign Contributions to the Superconducting Super
Collider (Letter Report, 12/30/92, GAO/RCED-93-75). 

ABSTRACT:  The Department of Energy (DOE) may have a hard time
getting the foreign contributions needed to meet its $1.7 billion
goal for the Superconducting Super Collider.  As of the end of fiscal
year 1992, DOE had received about $15 million in foreign
contributions consisting of pledges and contributions of labor and
materials from India, Russia, and China.  This amount is close to the
$20 million DOE estimated that it would receive by the end of fiscal
year 1992.  The Superconducting Super Collider funding profile,
however, calls for DOE to obtain an additional $1.1 billion in
foreign contributions through fiscal year 1996.  Although most of
this money will have to come from Japan, Japanese officials have said
that they are still studying the merits of the project and have yet
to decide whether to contribute.  If the foreign contributions do not
materialize, the tab for U.S.  taxpayers will increase regardless of
whether the Congress decides to make up for the funding shortfall or
let the project's schedule slip.  According to DOE, a 1-year slippage
in the project's overall completion schedule would boost costs by
about $400 million--or roughly $1 million a day. 

Federal Research:  Assessment of the Financial Audit for SEMATECH's
Activities in 1991 (Letter Report, 12/11/92, GAO/RCED-93-50). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO found no indication during its review that the opinion
of Price Waterhouse on SEMATECH's 1991 financial statements, its
report on internal control structure, or its report on compliance
with laws and regulations cannot be relied upon.  In its report on
SEMATECH's 1990 financial statements, GAO recommended that the
Pentagon require funds to be disbursed through a letter of credit
instead of being disbursed in advance through quarterly payments to
SEMATECH.  The Department of Defense has agreed to modify its
procedure in January 1993, when it revises the grant agreement, by
providing advance payments to SEMATECH on a monthly basis.  Five
member companies acknowledge including part of their SEMATECH
contributions as overhead costs on government contracts that they
held.  Although allowable under government cost accounting
principles, reimbursing members' contributions through overhead
serves indirectly to increase the government's overall support for
SEMATECH.  GAO notes, however, that even if the amounts included as
overhead were added to federal and state government contributions,
member companies would still have paid their required 50 percent of
SEMATECH's costs. 

Technology Transfer:  Barriers Limit Royalty Sharing's Effectiveness
(Chapter Report, 12/07/92, GAO/RCED-93-6). 

ABSTRACT:  Despite the introduction of royalty-sharing programs at
government laboratories, federal scientists' interest in patenting
has not increased.  Many scientists said that the small financial
rewards, such as those paid under some royalty-sharing programs,
offer little incentive to patent.  For example, 17 of 21 agencies GAO
reviewed use royalty-sharing formulas that often pay an individual
only a few hundred dollars for an invention.  GAO also found
inadequate financial controls over payments to inventors.  In
addition, agency management is using virtually all of the
laboratory's share of invention income to cover the administrative
costs of transferring federal technology to U.S.  companies, meaning
that the benefits of royalty sharing are not visible to other
potential inventors. 

Federal Research:  Lessons Learned From SEMATECH (Letter Report,
09/28/92, GAO/RCED-92-283). 

ABSTRACT:  SEMATECH--formed in 1987 to help the United States regain
its leadership role in semiconductor production--has shown that a
government-industry research and development alliance can help
improve a U.S.  industry's technological position while protecting
the government's interest that the consortium be managed well. 
Whether this feat can be replicated and what conditions would lead to
this result in other cases is uncertain.  This report discusses the
specific strengths and weaknesses of SEMATECH and makes suggestions
to the Congress in considering any future support for consortia
intended to improve the competitive position of U.S.  manufacturers. 

High-Technology Competitiveness:  Trends in U.S.  and Foreign
Performance (Chapter Report, 09/16/92, GAO/NSIAD-92-236). 

ABSTRACT:  Debates about U.S.  policy on everything from trade to
education have increasingly focused on the ability of American
producers to compete successfully in global markets.  High-technology
products have received considerable attention because their strong
performance has been linked to increases in overall economic
performance and growth.  This report assesses U.S.  competitiveness
in high-technology areas, considering, in particular, trends in U.S. 
performance over the last decade and comparisons with Japan.  GAO
considers several basic questions.  First, what is the significance
of high-technology performance and how well can it be measured? 
Second, what do measures of overall U.S.  performance in
high-technology areas suggest?  And third, for 11
industries--pharmaceuticals, civilian aircraft, telecommunications
equipment, fiber optics, semiconductors, semiconductor equipment and
materials, robotics, flexible manufacturing systems, supercomputers,
advanced materials, and consumer electronics--what has been the
relative performance of U.S.  producers and U.S.  research efforts
during the past decade? 

Federal Research:  System for Reimbursing Universities' Indirect
Costs Should Be Reevaluated (Chapter Report, 08/26/92,
GAO/RCED-92-203). 

ABSTRACT:  For every dollar spent on federally funded university
research, the government pays another 50 cents for overhead, or
indirect costs.  Because of inadequate federal guidance and oversight
and weak internal controls at the universities, the government has
been charged millions of dollars for unallowable and questionable
overhead costs, including entertainment, foreign travel, and utility
bills.  Although the universities and government have sought to
address problems with overhead billing, their actions could escalate
indirect costs even further.  For example, the universities will
likely try to bill the government for any costs associated with (1)
improving their accounting systems and internal controls and (2)
responding to new government requirements.  In GAO's view, the depth
and persistence of the problems and the upward trend in indirect
charges over the years make this an opportune time to consider basic
changes to the reimbursement system.  This report discusses
advantages and disadvantages of several alternative approaches to
restructuring the reimbursement system.  GAO believes that regardless
of any long-term solution chosen, it is inefficient to have both the
Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Department of
Defense (DOD) running the program, particularly when they are using
fundamentally different approaches.  HHS negotiates indirect cost
rates that limit the federal reimbursement, resulting in an average
indirect cost rate of about 50 percent, whereas DOD provides for full
recovery of the universities' claimed allowable indirect costs,
resulting in a cost rate of 59 percent. 

Federal Research:  Implementation of the Super Collider's Cost and
Schedule Control System (Letter Report, 07/21/92, GAO/RCED-92-242). 

ABSTRACT:  The Superconducting Super Collider project, estimated to
cost $8.25 billion and to be completed over a 10-year period ending
in 1999, is designed to produce intense proton collisions, thereby
providing insights into the fundamental components of matter.  In
April 1992 testimony (GAO/T-RCED-92-48), GAO indicated that the
Department of Energy (DOE) lacked an integrated system for monitoring
cost and schedule performance.  DOE argued that GAO's testimony
relied on 1990 audit work and did not accurately reflect present
conditions.  This report provides information on (1) the time frame
and the basis of GAO's data that supported the April 1992 testimony
and (2) the status of both GAO's review and DOE's system for managing
the Superconducting Super Collider's cost and schedule. 

Federal Research:  SEMATECH's Technological Progress and Proposed R&D
Program (Briefing Report, 07/16/92, GAO/RCED-92-223BR). 

ABSTRACT:  SEMATECH--the government-industry research and development
consortium formed in 1987 to help the United States regain world
leadership in semiconductor manufacturing by the end of 1992--appears
to be on schedule for achieving its objective, but the Pentagon plans
to phase out future direct funding for the consortium despite member
companies' support for continued funding.  The 1992 goal of producing
state-of-the-art semiconductors using only U.S.  equipment will
likely be achieved, although this capability will enable U.S. 
industry to only reach parity with--not surpass--the Japanese.  U. 
S.  semiconductor manufacturers and equipment suppliers seem to have
stemmed the decline in their worldwide market share.  How much credit
SEMATECH should get for this turnaround is unclear, however.  The
Department of Defense (DOD) has proposed phasing out funding
earmarked for SEMATECH at the end of this year.  Under the proposal,
projects at SEMATECH and other groups would be funded on a
case-by-case basis.  The agency plans to spend $80 million annually
on semiconductor research during the next 5 years.  SEMATECH member
companies, citing both national defense and economic benefits,
support continued federal backing for SEMATECH.  This report also
details SEMATECH's expenditures during its first 5 years and its
proposed budget after 1992. 

University Research:  Controlling Inappropriate Access to Federally
Funded Research Results (Letter Report, 05/04/92, GAO/RCED-92-104). 

ABSTRACT:  During the 1980s, the increasing importance of university
research to technological innovation forged new links among industry,
academia, and government.  The federal government spent $9.6 billion
sponsoring research at universities in fiscal year 1990, while
business outlays for such research topped $1 billion that year. 
Closer ties between universities and the private sector raise
concerns, however, about possible conflicts of interest or other
relationships that might give businesses inappropriate access to and
therefore an unfair advantage in commercializing the results of
federally funded research.  Requiring that investigators and other
key personnel disclose outside interests as part of the grant award
process, which both the National Institutes of Health and the
National Science Foundation are considering, is an essential first
step toward improving university management controls over potential
conflicts of interest.  But GAO believes that additional steps are
warranted to strengthen these controls and to address the ability of
industrial liaison program members to get advance access to the
results of federally funded research. 

Energy R&D:  DOE's Prioritization and Budgeting Process for Renewable
Energy Research (Testimony, 04/30/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-57). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE) planning
and budgeting processes for renewable energy technology research and
development.  GAO noted that:  (1) the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) provides DOE with overall policy and budgetary
direction, including budget planning targets that are based primarily
on the preceding year's budget; (2) using the preceding year's budget
request as a guide, DOE allocates OMB spending targets among DOE
program offices and the Secretary meets with each of the Assistant
Secretaries to review program office priorities and funding levels;
(3) the Secretary sends the approved budget proposal to OMB for
review before it goes to the Congress; (4) starting with its fiscal
year 1993 budget request, the Secretary has directed the Office of
Policy, Planning and Analysis to rank civilian energy research and
development activities according to their projected contributions to
the National Energy Strategy's objectives; (6) within the Office of
Conservation and Renewable Energy, the Assistant Secretary determines
budget allocations developed by each of the five Conservation and
Renewable Energy offices; (7) the offices base their proposals on a
process that incorporates strategic and multiyear program plans and
the views of national laboratories, renewable energy industries, and
end-users of renewable energy; and (8) although the Office of
Conservation and Renewable Energy has no written procedures for
ensuring compliance with congressional spending directives, program
officials make provisions for following through on the directives. 

Energy R&D:  DOE's Prioritization and Budgeting Process for Renewable
Energy Research (Letter Report, 04/29/92, GAO/RCED-92-155). 

ABSTRACT:  This report examines how the Department of Energy (DOE)
plans and budgets research and development projects for renewable
energy technologies.  Such technologies include electricity
generation from solar, wind, and geothermal energy sources.  GAO
discusses how DOE (1) determines the annual budget for energy
technologies, including renewal, fossil, and nuclear energy, and the
role played in this process by the Office of Management and Budget;
(2) allocates research and development funds among renewable energy
technologies; and (3) ensures that specific congressional directives
for research and development projects for renewable energy technology
are followed.  GAO summarized this report in testimony before the
Congress; see:  Energy R&D:  DOE's Prioritization and Budgeting
Process for Renewable Energy Research (GAO/T-RCED-92-57, Apr.  30,
1992) by Victor S.  Rezendes, Director of Energy Issues, before the
Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House Committee on
Science, Space, and Technology (15 pp.). 

Federal Research:  Assessment of the Financial Audit for SEMATECH's
Activities in 1990 (Letter Report, 04/09/92, GAO/RCED-92-97). 

ABSTRACT:  In this third annual audit of the financial statements of
SEMATECH, Inc., a consortium of U.S.  semiconductor manufacturers and
the Department of Defense (DOD), GAO concludes that Price
Waterhouse's opinion on SEMATECH's 1990 financial statements and its
reports on internal control structure and compliance with laws and
regulations should be reliable.  While it has incorporated GAO
recommendations in its 1990 financial statements, SEMATECH did not
disclose postemployment payments to its former chief operating
officer as GAO had suggested.  An earlier GAO report found that at
least two of SEMATECH's member companies had included part of their
SEMATECH contributions for reimbursement as overhead costs on
government contracts they held, a practice that indirectly boosts the
federal government's overall outlay for SEMATECH's research and
development activities.  One of these companies has changed its
accounting practices so that its SEMATECH contributions are now
primarily expensed against profits from its commercial business. 
SEMATECH retains larger on-hand balances of government funds than it
needs to meet normal operating expenses, reimbursing interest earned
on these cash balances to the U.S.  Treasury.  If DOD continues to
fund SEMATECH activities or participate in other joint
industry-government consortia, it should disperse funds through a
letter of credit rather than by advance payments to the consortium. 

Federal Research:  Concerns About the Superconducting Super Collider
(Testimony, 04/09/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-48). 

ABSTRACT:  So far, the Congress has provided about $1.3 billion
toward construction of the Superconducting Super Collider and is now
considering the President's request for another $650 million for
fiscal year 1993.  GAO testified that several factors could delay the
project, increase its cost to the U.S.  government, or reduce
potential benefits.  GAO believes that, as the investment increases
and construction advances, it is more likely that project funding
will continue even if costs increase and other countries do not help
pay for it.  Accordingly, correcting the problems cited by GAO and
obtaining firm funding commitments from other nations are necessary
to protect the U.S.  investment in the project.  Continuation of
federal funding could also be made contingent on the Department of
Energy's putting in place an integrated cost and schedule system,
assessing the impact on the domestic economy of using foreign
subcontractors, and obtaining firm commitments for contributions for
other nations by a certain date. 

DOE's Clean Coal Technology Program (Correspondence, 04/03/92,
GAO/RCED-92-143R). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO commented on
the Department of Energy's (DOE) response to a previous GAO report on
improvements needed in the DOE Clean Coal Technology Program.  GAO
noted that:  (1) DOE believes that the GAO report does not portray
the larger picture of the program's successes and that the Clean Coal
Technology Program is achieving significant successes and (2) of the
five GAO recommendations included in the report, DOE disagrees with
one, agrees with or is taking action on two others, and believes its
current procedures are sufficient to meet the intent of the remaining
two. 

Federal Research:  Small Business Innovation Research Program Shows
Success but Can Be Strengthened (Testimony, 03/31/92,
GAO/T-RCED-92-45). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Small Business Innovation Research
Program (SBIR), focusing on:  (1) whether the program has met its
goals, (2) the reasons for minority and disadvantaged businesses' low
level of phase III program activity, (3) the level of foreign
investment and attention that SBIR awardees have attracted, and (4)
changes that could improve the program.  GAO noted that:  (1) the
program is showing success in phase III activity even though many
projects have not had sufficient time to achieve their full
commercial potential; (2) SBIR-funded research and development is
moving toward increased private-sector commercialization, since the
majority of sales and additional developmental funding comes from the
private sector; (3) the quality of SBIR research compared favorably
with other federal research; (4) minority and disadvantaged
businesses are achieving a lower level of activity than other
companies in phase III and lower sales levels; (5) domestic
involvement in SBIR is substantially higher than foreign involvement;
and (6) project sales averages vary by agency.  GAO believes that, to
strengthen the program:  (1) the Department of Defense needs to
increase private-sector commercialization without weakening its
commitment to meeting its own mission-related goals, (2) federal
officials need to clarify the contractual procedures for entering
into phase III follow-on non-SBIR-funded production contracts, and
(3) federal officials need to determine whether the company or the
agency should perform additional post-program work. 

Federal Research:  Small Business Innovation Research Shows Success
but Can Be Strengthened (Chapter Report, 03/30/92, GAO/RCED-92-37). 

ABSTRACT:  As a nation competing in a global economy, the United
States depends heavily on research and development (R&D).  The Small
Business Innovation Research Program was created in 1982 to
strengthen the R&D role of small, innovative companies.  Even though
many program projects have not yet had enough time to achieve their
full commercial potential, the program is showing success in phase
III, which involves the use of nonfederal funds for commercial
application of a technology.  Most pase III activity took place in
the private sector, showing a trend toward one of the program's
goals--increasing private-sector commercialization.  Major federal
agencies, however, differ in their responses to this goal, as shown
by their wide variation in average sales per project and the
percentage of sales to the private sector.  GAO notes three issues
that need to be addressed:  (1) the extent of the Defense
Department's commitment to the goal of increasing private-sector
commercialization, (2) inconsistent practices in requiring
competition for projects entering phase III, and (3) the need to
clarify the circumstances under which an agency may work on its own
or continue working with the company through follow-on contractors
after program funding ends.  GAO summarized this report in testimony
before Congress; see:  Federal Research:  Small Business Innovation
Research Program Shows Success but Can Be Strengthened
(GAO/T-RCED-92-45, Mar.  31, 1992) by Jim Wells, Associate Director
for Energy Issues, before the Subcommittee on Innovation,
Productivity, and Technology, Senate Committee on Small Business (20
pp.). 

Federal Research:  Small Business Innovation Research Program Shows
Success but Can Be Strengthened (Testimony, 02/26/92,
GAO/T-RCED-92-32). 

ABSTRACT:  The Small Business Innovation Research Program emphasizes
the benefits of technological innovation and the ability of small
businesses to transform research and development results into new
programs.  Even though many of the program's projects have not yet
had enough time to achieve their full commercial potential, the
program is showing success in phase III, which centers on the
commercial or government applications of developed technology.  This
is indicated by the $1.1 billion in sales and additional development
funding reported as of July 1991, two-thirds of which has occurred in
the private sector.  In addition, the majority of phase II projects
remain active in phase III, and companies expect up to $3 billion in
further sales and additional development funding through 1993.  GAO
recommends that the following three issues be addressed to further
strengthen the program:  (1) the extent of the Defense Department's
commitment to increasing private-sector commercialization, (2)
inconsistent practices in requiring competition for projects entering
Phase III, and (3) the need to clarify the circumstances under which
an agency may work on its own or continue working with the company
through follow-on contracts after program funding ends. 

Federally Sponsored Research:  Indirect Costs Charged by Selected
Universities (Testimony, 01/29/92, GAO/T-RCED-92-20). 

ABSTRACT:  In testimony last year, GAO discussed how Stanford
University charged excessive indirect research costs, or "overhead"
as it is commonly known, to the federal government.  (See
GAO/T-RCED-91-18, Mar.  13, 1991.) This testimony focuses on three
other institutions:  Harvard Medical School, the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, and the University of California at
Berkeley.  GAO found many deficiencies in the cost allocation methods
and charging practices at the three schools.  In some cases, GAO
discovered problems that the university, the university's external
auditors, or government agencies had already reviewed but had not
questioned.  These problems arose because (1) certain Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-21 criteria were inadequate
for determining which types of costs should be allowed or how costs
should be properly allocated among different university functions,
(2) universities generally lacked adequate systems and internal
controls to ensure that only allowable indirect costs were charged to
the government, and (3) lax oversight practices by federal agencies
had resulted in universities claiming excessive indirect costs. 
Since the March 1991 hearings, all parties involved have taken steps
to address these problems.  However, GAO believes that this is an
opportune time to reexamine the federal government's approach to
reimbursing universities for indirect costs.  Both OMB and the
Department of Health and Human Services have already established task
forces on the cost reimbursement system.  Several proposals have been
offered, both for simplifying the process and for reducing overall
expenditures for indirect costs through the application of caps or
fixed rates on the various categories of indirect costs.  GAO plans
to revisit this issue in an upcoming report. 

Technology Transfer:  Federal Efforts to Enhance the Competitiveness
of Small Manufacturers (Chapter Report, 11/22/91, GAO/RCED-92-30). 

ABSTRACT:  The United States has experienced major trade deficits in
manufactured goods each year since 1983, and U.S.  companies have
lost significant market share to foreign competitors.  In particular,
small manufacturers have not kept pace with their foreign rivals
because they have not upgraded their manufacturing processes with
basic automated equipment like computer-aided design systems.  In
response, four federal programs were created during the last 3 years
to help small manufacturers regain their industrial competitiveness. 
The primary technology need of most small manufacturers is for
proven, off-the-shelf automated technologies to enable them to raise
productivity, improve product quality, and respond to changing market
conditions.  Most small manufacturers cannot effectively use
advanced, state-of-the-art automated technologies developed at the
National Institute of Standards and Technology and other federal
laboratories because they generally do not have the resources or
trained personnel to incorporate such technologies into their
operations.  Overall, GAO found that the four federal programs have
been only somewhat effective in addressing the technological needs of
small manufacturers to improve their competitiveness.  In addition,
the four programs have affected only a relatively small percentage of
small manufacturers; by themselves, they are insufficient to have
much effect on improving small manufacturers' competitive positions. 
Moreover, while the federal programs offer incentives for states to
start or expand technology assistance services, only seven states
provide direct consultation to manufacturers--the type of help
experts consider most effective in assisting manufacturers. 
Recently, three of these states substantially cut funding for their
programs because of budget constraints. 

Fossil Fuels:  Improvements Needed in DOE's Clean Coal Technology
Program (Chapter Report, 10/30/91, GAO/RCED-92-17). 

ABSTRACT:  Coal provides about one-quarter of the nation's energy
needs, but emissions from coal combustion have contributed to air
pollution, including acid rain.  Under a program to provide more
advanced, efficient, and environmentally acceptable coal utilization
technologies, the Department of Energy (DOE) funds up to 50 percent
of the costs of industry-sponsored projects to demonstrate
commercial-scale applications of innovative clean coal technologies. 
As of September 1991, about half of the 32 ongoing funded projects
were progressing on schedule and within cost estimates.  Equipment
failures, additional equipment requirements, and problems in
scheduling tests were contributing factors to projects that were
behind schedule or over budget.  GAO believes that DOE's selection of
some projects, while meeting selection criteria, may not be the most
effective use of federal funds.  For example, some projects are
demonstrating technologies that might have been commercialized
without federal assistance.  GAO also identifies projects with
potentially limited applications and projects that have proven
economically unviable.  GAO questions whether DOE has done all that
it could to ensure that its investment is adequately protected.  For
example, DOE continued to fund some projects that it knew were
experiencing financing problems and that were eventually withdrawn
from the program; DOE has since improved controls over project costs. 

Grant Management:  Improvements Needed in Federal Oversight of NSF
Grants (Testimony, 09/24/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-92). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed grant administration at the National
Science Foundation (NSF), focusing on the federal oversight process
for the NSF grant program at three institutions.  GAO noted that: 
(1) NSF has given grant recipients almost total responsibility for
ensuring that funds are used in accordance with applicable federal
requirements, but the effectiveness of controls over the use of grant
funds varies by university; (2) although the three universities
established controls over expenditures charged to NSF grants, there
were instances of federal fund misuse that the institutions failed to
prevent or detect; (3) other investigations identified instances of
NSF fund misuse at universities that resulted in larger problems that
may have gone undetected if allegations of misuse had not been
reported and investigated; (4) although NSF primarily relies on
required independent audits to ensure that larger institutions
protect the government's interest, it has not received many of those
audits because federal guidelines do not explicitly require
institutions to perform or submit acceptable audits to NSF; and (5)
NSF lacks a mechanism to ensure that grantees inform it of misconduct
involving grant funds. 

Fossil Fuels:  DOE's Effort to Provide Clean Coal Technology to
Poland (Letter Report, 05/22/91, GAO/RCED-91-155). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) efforts to implement a legislative
requirement that it cooperate with Polish officials to retrofit a
coal-fired powerplant in Poland with advanced coal technology,
focusing on DOE:  (1) revision of its original definition of a U.S. 
firm eligible for the project and (2) reduction of its sulfur dioxide
emission requirements for the project. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE revised its original definition
of a U.S.  firm to eliminate a requirement that at least 50 percent
of the firm's voting stock be owned by U.S.  citizens, due to
comments it received from coal industry representatives before it
solicited bids; (2) those comments indicated that a less restrictive
definition would enable more companies to bid; (3) DOE had discretion
in defining what constituted a U.S.  company, and DOE's Office of the
General Counsel's definition was consistent with the act; (4) DOE
believed that additional complexities could arise from a more
restrictive definition; (5) DOE lowered the sulfur dioxide emission
reduction level from 70 percent to 65 percent because it believed
that a lower level would increase the number of companies eligible to
compete for the contract; (6) DOE indicated that it discussed that
change with representatives from Poland, who voiced no concern; (7)
lowering the sulfur dioxide level to 65 percent made no difference in
the number of powerplants that would meet emission-reduction
requirements if DOE used the technology at other powerplants in
Poland; (8) DOE estimated that, as a result of those changes, an
additional 10 companies would be eligible to compete for the project;
and (9) DOE planned to award the contract in the fall of 1991. 

Federal Research:  Concerns About Developing and Producing Magnets
for the Superconducting Super Collider (Testimony, 05/09/91,
GAO/T-RCED-91-51). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the status of the Department of Energy's
(DOE) Superconducting Super Collider, focusing on DOE's and super
collider laboratory's approach in developing and industrially
producing superconducting magnets.  GAO noted that:  (1) although the
industry produced superconducting magnets for an accelerator, it was
difficult to determine whether DOE and the laboratory would be
similarly successful, since they took a different approach in
developing and producing the magnets for a substantially larger
accelerator; (2) DOE did not build or test full-size superconducting
collider dipole magnets for the current super collider design, and a
significant risk remained regarding whether the magnets would work as
intended; and (3) the compressed development schedule for those
magnets increased the risk that they will not work as intended, since
DOE did not allow enough time to resolve any problems that it may
encounter. 

Federal Research:  Status of DOE's Superconducting Super Collider
(Letter Report, 04/15/91, GAO/RCED-91-116). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
status of the Department of Energy's (DOE) Superconducting Super
Collider, focusing on the:  (1) stability of DOE and super collider
laboratory project management, (2) uncertainties related to the super
collider site geology, (3) uncertainties and risks associated with
magnet development and production, and (4) Texas' proposed
contribution to the project's costs. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the super collider laboratory and
DOE's super collider program office experienced management
instability due to high turnover in key positions; (2) Texas based
its 1987 site proposal on the expectation that DOE would excavate the
super collider tunnel through two types of geologic formations, but a
change in the tunnel shape and location required excavation through a
third type of geologic formation that has a high shrink-swell
potential; (3) to better understand the site geology, the laboratory
planned to construct a section of the tunnel before beginning
full-scale construction; (4) DOE did not build or test full-size
dipole magnets for the current super collider design; (5) because DOE
changed the magnet design in December 1989, the tooling to build the
full-size magnet was not yet available; (6) to reduce magnet risks,
the super collider laboratory added 5 months to the scheduled
production start for the magnets, but the schedule remained
compressed; (7) the magnets' delayed development schedule increased
performance risks, since little time will be available to resolve any
encountered problems; (8) Texas offered to contribute at least $1
billion and land toward the super collider in its September 1987 site
proposal; and (9) in September 1990, DOE agreed that the state would
contribute $875 million toward the $8.2-billion estimated total
project cost and use the remaining $125 million for super
collider-related activities. 

Better DOE Controls Needed Over Contractors' Discretionary R&D Funds
(Testimony, 03/19/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-25). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the Department of Energy's (DOE)
management oversight of three multiprogram laboratories'
discretionary research and development (R&D) activities.  GAO noted
that DOE:  (1) had specific authority to approve laboratories'
reasonable use of funds for discretionary R&D activities; (2)
guidance was not clear enough to ensure that laboratories used
discretionary R&D funds appropriately; (3) lacked effective controls
and oversight over laboratories' administration and use of
discretionary funds; (4) inappropriately charged $1.5 million to the
discretionary R&D program for a cost overrun on a contract performed
for a private firm; (5) issued revised guidance for the laboratories'
discretionary R&D activities, but failed to address appropriate uses
of discretionary R&D funds and guidance implementation issues; and
(6) failed to formally assess the benefits of the discretionary R&D
programs. 

Federally Sponsored Research:  Indirect Costs Charged By Stanford
University (Testimony, 03/13/91, GAO/T-RCED-91-18). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed how universities conducting federally
sponsored research charged indirect costs and if those costs were in
accordance with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines,
focusing on Stanford University's accounting system.  GAO noted that: 
(1) Stanford's deficient cost allocation and charging practices, and
inadequate federal oversight, led to significant overcharges to the
government; (2) Stanford's indirect cost rates rose from 58 percent
in fiscal year 1980 to 74 percent in fiscal year 1990; (3) Stanford
made $3.6 million in unallowable or inappropriate charges, with
almost $1 million erroneously charged to the government; and (4)
several key memorandums of understanding between Stanford and the
federal government included questionable assumptions, did not provide
adequate justification for allocation methods, and resulted in higher
allocations of costs to organize research than the default method
allowed.  GAO believes that:  (1) overcharges resulted because
Stanford officials did not ensure the charging of proper costs to the
government and either did not review, inadequately reviewed, or
otherwise allowed unallowable costs; and (2) Stanford initiated
actions recognizing shortcomings in its accounting system and
announced a three-step approach that could bring the identified
problems under control. 

Federal Research:  Super Collider Estimates and Germany's
Industrially Produced Magnets (Fact Sheet, 02/12/91,
GAO/RCED-91-94FS). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided:  (1)
a chronological history of the Department of Energy's (DOE)
Superconducting Super Collider's cost estimates, (2) information on
Germany's experience with industrially produced superconducting
magnets for its Hadron Electron Ring Accelerator (HERA), and (3)
information on the super collider's approach to developing and
producing superconducting magnets. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE presented many cost estimates for
the super collider project that were not necessarily comparable since
some estimates failed to include all project costs or did not have
the same time frame; (2) the cost estimate grew from $4 billion in
1984 to $5.1 billion in 1989 and was reconciled at $8.2 billion in
1990 based on estimates by various DOE groups; (3) HERA officials
showed that superconducting magnets could be industrially produced,
despite the presence of numerous but expected minor problems during
development and production; (4) HERA officials attributed their
success to centralized authority for all magnet decisions, clear
identification of magnet specifications, leverage over contractors,
and full measurement and testing of each magnet; and (5) the super
collider laboratory relied primarily on other DOE laboratories'
technical expertise, solicited bids before building or testing a
current prototype magnet, allowed one contractor to lead design and
development, and relied on the contractor for measurement and testing
of the magnets. 

Energy Management:  Better DOE Controls Needed Over Contractors'
Discretionary R&D Funds (Chapter Report, 12/05/90, GAO/RCED-91-18). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
discretionary research and development (R&D) activities of three
Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories and DOE's need for, uses of,
and management controls over those activities. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE had specific authority to approve
laboratories' reasonable use of funds for discretionary R&D
activities; (2) DOE had statutory authority to use laboratory
operating funds to conduct R&D projects at the discretion of the
laboratory directors; (3) DOE's order regarding the use of
exploratory R&D funds was not clear enough to ensure that
laboratories used funds appropriately; (4) DOE did not evaluate
laboratories' discretionary R&D activities to determine the extent to
which results benefited DOE programs; and (5) DOE lacked effective
controls over laboratories' administration and use of discretionary
funds. 

Energy R&D:  Conservation Planning and Management Should Be
Strengthened (Chapter Report, 07/30/90, GAO/RCED-90-195). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) energy conservation research and
development (R&D) program, focusing on planning and management
improvements that would increase program effectiveness. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) energy conservation R&D funding and
staff declined substantially in 1980, reflecting the administration's
view that conservation research should be conducted primarily by the
private sector; (2) the 1991 budget request reflects a 9-percent
funding reduction; (3) DOE's multiyear conservation R&D plan did not
provide detailed information on proposed individual projects and
milestones; (4) DOE has not steadily promoted technology transfer
activities that effectively promote the commercialization of R&D
efforts; (5) independent peer reviews of R&D activities could help
ensure the continuing relevance of ongoing research activities and
sharpen management decisionmaking; and (6) DOE may inadvertently
overlook some relevant critical review recommendations or fail to
implement them in a timely manner. 

Technology Transfer:  Copyright Law Constrains Commercialization of
Some Federal Software (Chapter Report, 06/01/90, GAO/RCED-90-145). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided
information on federal agencies' efforts to comply with the
prohibition on copyrighting government works, focusing on the:  (1)
extent to which copyright law has constrained the transfer of federal
computer software and other new technologies and (2) benefits and
disadvantages of amending copyright law to allow federal agencies to
copyright software. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) there was no evidence that federal
agencies improperly copyrighted government software; (2) top
officials at six of the seven agencies GAO reviewed believed software
copyrighting and licensing constraints hurt their efforts to transfer
computer software for commercial application to U.S.  businesses; (3)
agency officials said copyright and licensing authorities would
stimulate the transfer of federal software with commercial
applications to U.S.  businesses by providing investment protection;
(4) royalty-sharing would also give federal researchers an incentive
to further develop and document the software; and (5) industry
officials expressed concern that authority to copyright and license
software could limit access to federal scientific and demographic
databases. 

Energy R&D:  DOE's Allocation of Funds for Basic and Applied Research
and Development (Briefing Report, 05/24/90, GAO/RCED-90-148BR). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) process for allocating energy research
and development (R&D) funds, focusing on:  (1) how DOE prioritized
and coordinated funding requests among R&D program areas, (2) how DOE
priorities have evolved over the past 10 years, (3) how DOE
distributed R&D funding, and (4) the extent to which DOE has invested
in major demonstration projects over the past 10 years. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) the Office of Management and Budget's
(OMB) budget targets and the DOE budget process determined how DOE
allocated R&D funds; (2) DOE used budget guidance and general policy
statements to determine its program funding priorities; (3) DOE was
planning to complete a national energy strategy by December 1990; (4)
OMB's budget targets have played an important role in reducing
program funds for applied technology; (5) DOE primarily coordinated
its R&D agenda through the analysis of energy and program areas; (6)
over the past 10 years, DOE R&D priorities have shifted from energy
technology program areas and renewable R&D to basic energy program
areas; (7) from 1980 to 1990, energy technology program areas
decreased 45 percent and basic energy program areas increased over
140 percent; (8) from fiscal year 1983 to fiscal year 1990,
congressional appropriations for the energy technology areas
influenced priorities because they were greater than DOE requested;
(9) over the past 10 years, basic research and applied research funds
have increased, while development funds have decreased; and (10) from
fiscal year 1975 through fiscal year 1990, DOE invested over $6
million for 41 demonstration projects, of which 15 were terminated
for various reasons, 9 were completed, and 17 were ongoing. 

Fossil Fuels:  Outlook for Utilities' Potential Use of Clean Coal
Technologies (Chapter Report, 05/24/90, GAO/RCED-90-165). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO examined:  (1)
the extent to which electric utilities plan to use clean coal
technologies for coal-fired power generation units, and (2) how such
technologies could contribute to reducing acid rain. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) utilities plan to use clean coal
technologies at only 5 percent of their existing coal-fired units by
2010, (2) new technologies have not been successfully demonstrated on
a commercial scale, and (3) utilities have expressed concern about
the technical feasibility and cost-effectiveness of clean coal
technologies.  GAO also found that:  (1) the Department of Energy
(DOE) conducted three solicitations for project proposals and
experienced major delays in negotiating agreements with project
sponsors; (2) three projects withdrew from the DOE program; (3) seven
funded projects experienced coordination, equipment, and financing
problems that caused delays in completing project phases and
extensions of some completion dates; and (4) it may take 5 to 10
years for clean coal technologies to penetrate the market once they
are proven and commercially available. 

Utilities' Potential Use of Clean Coal Technologies (Testimony,
03/28/90, GAO/T-RCED-90-56). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO discussed the results of its nationwide survey on
utilities' plans to use clean coal technologies.  GAO found that: 
(1) utilities planned to use clean coal technologies for only 5
percent of their coal-fired generating units; (2) consideration of
specific technologies depended on the severity of emission reduction
requirements, target dates for compliance, and present and future
electricity demands; and (3) utilities considered switching to
low-sulfur coal to achieve emission reduction requirements.  GAO also
found that:  (1) new technologies may not contribute significantly to
the reduction of acid-rain-causing emissions during the next 15
years; (2) the Department of Energy experienced problems and delays
in formalizing cooperative agreements with project sponsors; and (3)
utilities would likely test new technologies on one unit before
installing them on others. 

Fossil Fuels:  Pace and Focus of the Clean Coal Technology Program
Need to Be Assessed (Chapter Report, 03/19/90, GAO/RCED-90-67). 

BACKGROUND:  Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the
Department of Energy's (DOE) evaluation and selection of project
proposals under the second round of the Clean Coal Technology
Program. 

FINDINGS:  GAO found that:  (1) DOE formed a board to develop
proposal evaluation and selection criteria and evaluate proposed
projects, and (2) DOE developed evaluation criteria in accordance
with congressional and other program guidance.  GAO also found that: 
(1) DOE picked 16 projects that represented the highest-ranked
proposals for the range of technologies it included, but DOE rated 12
of the 16 projects weak in meeting one or more comprehensive
evaluation criteria, acid rain reduction criteria, or technical
readiness criteria; (2) half of the 48 proposals that DOE evaluated
fared poorly against three or more of the evaluation criteria; and
(3) 14 of the 32 projects that DOE did not select had better
potential for reducing acid-rain-causing emissions than the nine
weakest projects DOE selected. 


SPECIAL PUBLICATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 5

Energy and Science Reports and Testimony:  1993 (Letter Report,
06/94, GAO/RCED-94-176W). 

ABSTRACT:  GAO's Energy and Science Issue Area conducts in-depth
studies of the production, regulation, and consumption of all forms
of energy and analyzes federal science and technology programs.  This
annual index, organized by broad subject areas, summarizes these and
other GAO documents issued during 1993.  An order form is included. 

GAO High-Risk Program (Correspondence, 01/27/94, GAO/AIMD-94-72R). 

ABSTRACT:  Since early 1990, GAO has been reviewing and reporting on
government programs especially vulnerable to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement.  This report updates the 17 areas included in GAO's
High-Risk Series issued in December 1992 and adds to the list the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), where billions of
dollars continue be at risk due to long-standing organizational,
systems, and staffing problems.  In GAO's view, HUD warrants the
special focus that comes with high-risk designation. 

Procurement Reform:  Comments on Proposed Acquisition Improvement Act
of 1993 (Testimony, 05/25/93, GAO/T-OGC-93-1). 

ABSTRACT:  Procurement reform is especially critical in today's era
of federal budget austerity.  Although the government spends billions
of dollars on procurements, this area does not always get the
attention it warrants.  GAO testified in support of the Federal
Acquisition Improvement Act of 1993, which seeks to bring greater
efficiency and fairness to the federal procurement system. 

Energy and Science Reports and Testimony:  1992 (Other Written
Product, 04/93, GAO/RCED-93-131). 

ABSTRACT:  Included among the leading energy and science issues today
are the continuing U.S.  dependence on imported oil, the staggering
costs to clean up the nuclear weapons complex, and the expectations
for science and technology to improve U.S.  competitiveness abroad. 
This document contains summaries of GAO reports and testimony issued
during 1992 on energy and science topics.  Order forms are included
to obtain documents of interest. 

Government Management--Report on 17 High-Risk Areas (Testimony,
01/08/93, GAO/T-OCG-93-2). 

ABSTRACT:  Many GAO audit reports have spotlighted the effect of
management failures in the federal government--waste, inefficiency,
and even scandal.  Political leaders have been forced to spend too
much time reacting to surprises like the Department of Housing and
Urban Development debacle rather than doing the work the agencies
were created to do.  GAO began its high-risk program to identify
those high-dollar government programs most vulnerable to fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement.  This testimony summarizes the
high-risk series of reports, which examine the federal government's
efforts to identify and correct problems in 17 especially vulnerable
areas, that fall into three main categories:  lending and insuring,
contracting, and accountability.  Many of the root causes of the
problems afflicting these government programs are traceable to the
absence of fundamental processes and systems.  GAO urges that future
congressional oversight focus on the agency reports and audited
financial statements required by the Chief Financial Officers Act,
agency management's progress in correcting material weaknesses in
program internal control and accounting systems, and federal agency
efforts to develop and implement performance standards. 

Department of Energy Contract Management (Letter Report, 12/92,
GAO/HR-93-9). 

ABSTRACT:  Many GAO audit reports have spotlighted the effect of
management failures in the federal government--waste, inefficiency,
and even scandal.  Political leaders have been forced to spend too
much time reacting to surprises like the Department of Housing and
Urban Development debacle rather than doing the work the agencies
were created to do.  GAO began its high-risk program to identify
those high-dollar government programs most vulnerable to fraud,
waste, abuse, and mismanagement.  This report is part of the
program's high-risk series of reports, which examine the federal
government's efforts to identify and correct problems in 17
especially vulnerable areas, that fall into three main categories: 
lending and insuring, contracting, and accountability.  Many of the
root causes of the problems afflicting these government programs are
traceable to the absence of fundamental processes and systems.  GAO
urges that future congressional oversight focus on the agency reports
and audited financial statements required by the Chief Financial
Officers Act, agency management's progress in correcting material
weaknesses in program internal control and accounting systems, and
federal agency efforts to develop and implement performance
standards.  The Comptroller General summarized the high-risk series
in testimony before the Congress; see:  Government Management--Report
on 17 High-Risk Areas (GAO/T-OGC-93-2, Jan.  8, 1993) by Charles A. 
Bowsher, Comptroller General of the United States, before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs (22 pp.). 

Energy Issues (Letter Report, 12/92, GAO/OCG-93-13TR). 

ABSTRACT:  This report is part of the transition series, a set of 28
reports summarizing GAO's findings on major problems confronting
federal agencies, as well as economic and management issues facing
the Congress and the incoming Administration.  One cluster of
transition reports, including those on the budget deficit and
investment, addresses broad policy issues affecting government as a
whole and its relationship to the economy.  Another group of reports
addresses issues affecting specific federal agencies, such as the
Defense Department and the Internal Revenue Service.  A third group
of reports looks at cross-cutting management issues--everything from
financial management to information management.  GAO highlighted many
of these problems in a similar set of reports issued in 1988.  In
some instances, progress has been made; all too often, however, the
problems have continued to fester and grow worse.  In general, the
state of management in the federal government is poor.  Too many
management ideas--and resulting agency structures and processes--that
worked well in the past now hinder the government from responding
quickly and effectively to a world in tremendous flux.  Most agencies
have no strategic vision of the future, lack sound systems to collect
and apply financial and program information to gauge operational
success and accountability, and too often do without people with the
skills necessary to accomplish their missions.  The Comptroller
General summarized the series in testimony before the Congress; see: 
Major Issues Facing a New Congress and a New Administration
(GAO/T-OGC-93-1, Jan.  8, 1993) by Charles A.  Bowsher, Comptroller
General of the United States, before the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs (30 pp.). 

Energy Reports and Testimony:  1991 (Letter Report, 03/92,
GAO/RCED-92-120). 

ABSTRACT:  From the Persian Gulf War to the collapse of communism,
world events significantly shaped GAO's work on energy topics in
1991.  This annual index references GAO documents published last year
in this issue area.  Summaries of GAO reports and testimony are
grouped under several subject headings.  To assist the reader in
obtaining documents, an order form is included. 

Meeting the Energy Challenges of the 1990s:  Experts Define the Key
Policy Issues (Letter Report, 03/91, GAO/RCED-91-66). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO reported on a conference it sponsored to examine
emerging energy policy issues, focusing on:  (1) energy supply and
demand, (2) energy and the environment, (3) management challenges at
the Department of Energy (DOE), (4) the DOE nuclear weapons complex,
and (5) energy research and development. 

FINDINGS:  GAO noted that:  (1) a panel on the balancing energy
supply and demand discussed securing sufficient and reliable future
energy supplies to meet the increased energy demand projected for the
future; (2) the energy and the environment panel discussed critical
choices that energy policymakers needed to make regarding the
environmental effects of their energy use decisions; (3) the managing
the Department of Energy panel provided an overview of the management
challenges facing the Congress and DOE regarding its diverse
missions; (4) a panel on producing nuclear weapons safely identified
several weapons complex issues requiring resolution, such as
establishing cleanup priorities and standards, the potential of
wasting funds on ineffective cleanup approaches, overlapping
oversight and assessment groups, and the acute and long-term health
effects of radiation exposure; and (5) the opportunities for energy
research and development panel noted that an expanded federal role
was needed to assist in the transfer of energy technologies in the
workplace. 

Energy Reports and Testimony:  1990 (Letter Report, 01/91,
GAO/RCED-91-84). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO presented an index of energy-related reports and
testimony it issued between January and December 1990. 

FINDINGS:  GAO presented a brief synopsis of:  (1) 14 reports and 4
testimonies relating to energy supply and demand, (2) 2 reports and 2
testimonies on managing the Department of Energy, (3) 10 reports and
1 testimony pertaining to energy and the environment, (4) 15 reports
and 6 testimonies on safe production of nuclear weapons, (5) 5
reports on energy research and development, and (6) a special
publication of energy-related documents it issued between January
1986 and December 1989. 

Energy:  Bibliography of GAO Documents January 1986-December 1989
(Letter Report, 07/90, GAO/RCED-90-179). 

BACKGROUND:  GAO provided a bibliography of its documents directly or
indirectly relating to energy that were issued between January 1986
and December 1989. 

FINDINGS:  GAO included references to reports, speeches, testimonies,
and other documents, chosen to represent the broad interrelationship
between energy and such other issues as transportation, the
environment, natural resources, and national defense. 


SUBJECT INDEX
============================================================ Chapter 6


MAILING LIST REQUEST FORM
============================================================ Chapter 7

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MISSIONS & MANAGEMENT OF ENERGY & SCIENCE AGENCIES

___Department of Energy (DOE) Missions and Structure
___DOE Contractor Oversight Issues
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___Other Management Issues

NUCLEAR ISSUES

___Nuclear Weapons Complex Restructuring
___Nuclear Waste Cleanup
___Health and Safety Issues
___Proliferation of Nuclear Materials and Technologies
___Civilian Nuclear Waste Management
___Nuclear Regulation


ENERGY SECURITY AND SUPPLY

___National Energy Policy
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___Energy Resources
___Energy Security/Preparedness Issues
___Energy Regulation
___Alternative Motor Fuels
___Tennessee Valley Authority and Power Marketing Administrations

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Mail or Fax to:  Victor S.  Rezendes, Director
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Room 1842
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*** End of document. ***