Wildlife Protection: Fish and Wildlife Service's Inspection Program Needs
Strengthening (Chapter Report, 12/29/94, GAO/RCED-95-8).

Growing demand throughout the world for wildlife and wildlife parts,
ranging from rhino horns to bear gall bladders, now threatens some
wildlife populations.  Although the full extent of illegal trade is
unknown, the value of such trade into and out of the United States is
estimated at up to $250 million annually.  Despite recent increases in
the Fish and Wildlife Service's (FWS) wildlife inspection program, the
program has had difficulty in accomplishing its mission of monitoring
wildlife and intercepting wildlife trade.  Given current budget
constraints and downsizing within the federal government, increases in
program funding are unlikely.  GAO raises questions about the program's
efficiency and effectiveness.  The passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement is likely to increase wildlife trade among the countries
that are party to the agreement--the United States, Canada, and Mexico.
The expected rise in trade will increase the workload of FWS inspectors,
who are already stretched thin along the U.S. borders.  Wildlife
inspectors, federal agency officials, and conservation and trade groups
cited advantages and disadvantages to transferring FWS' wildlife
inspection program to the Customs Service.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-95-8
     TITLE:  Wildlife Protection: Fish and Wildlife Service's Inspection 
             Program Needs Strengthening
      DATE:  12/29/94
   SUBJECT:  Interagency relations
             Law enforcement
             Wildlife conservation
             Endangered animals
             International trade
             Inspection
             Management information systems
             Fines (penalties)
             Use taxes
             Customs administration
IDENTIFIER:  FWS Wildlife Inspection Program
             Canada
             Mexico
             FWS Law Enforcement Management Information System
             World Wildlife Fund TRAFFIC USA Monitoring Program
             North American Free Trade Agreement
             NAFTA
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

December 1994

WILDLIFE PROTECTION - FISH AND
WILDLIFE SERVICE'S INSPECTION
PROGRAM NEEDS STRENGTHENING

GAO/RCED-95-8

Wildlife Inspection Program Needs Strengthening


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  APHIS - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
  CITES - Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of
     Wild Fauna and Flora
  FWS - U.S.  Fish and Wildlife Service
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  LEMIS - Law Enforcement Management Information System
  NAFTA - North American Free Trade Agreement

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER



B-257434

December 29, 1994

The Honorable Gerry E.  Studds
Chairman, Committee on Merchant Marine
 and Fisheries
House of Representatives

The Honorable Richard H.  Lehman
House of Representatives

This report responds to your request to review the wildlife
inspection program administered by the Department of the Interior's
Fish and Wildlife Service.  Specifically, you asked that we determine
(1) the effectiveness of the inspection program, (2) the potential
impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement on wildlife trade
and the inspection of wildlife shipments, and (3) the advantages and
disadvantages that might accrue from a transfer of jurisdiction for
the program from the Fish and Wildlife Service to the Department of
the Treasury's Customs Service. 

We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of the Interior;
the Director, Office of Management and Budget; and various
congressional committees.  We will also make copies available to
other interested parties upon request. 

This work was performed under the direction of James Duffus III,
Director, Natural Resources Management Issues, who can be reached at
(202) 512-7756 if you or your staff have any questions.  Other major
contributors to the report are listed in appendix IV.





Keith O.  Fultz
Assistant Comptroller General


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Growing demand throughout the world for wildlife and wildlife parts
and products has created a market in which commercial exploitation
has threatened certain wildlife populations.  Although the full
extent of illegal trade is not known, the value of such trade into
and out of the United States is estimated to be between $100 million
and $250 million annually.  Concerned about the growth of illegal
trade in wildlife, the Chairman of the House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries and Representative Richard H.  Lehman requested
that GAO determine the (1) effectiveness of the Fish and Wildlife
Service's (FWS) wildlife inspection program, (2) potential impact of
the North American Free Trade Agreement on wildlife trade and the
inspection of wildlife shipments, and (3) advantages and
disadvantages that might accrue from a transfer of the wildlife
inspection program from the Department of the Interior's FWS to the
Department of the Treasury's Customs Service. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

The United States is the largest consumer of wildlife in the world,
importing and exporting over $1 billion of the estimated $5 billion
to $8 billion in international wildlife trade occurring annually. 
FWS is responsible for ensuring that all wildlife shipments entering
or leaving the United States are in compliance with federal, state,
and foreign wildlife laws and treaties. 

FWS maintains a force of 74 wildlife inspectors stationed at 11
designated ports of entry and 14 other locations where wildlife
import and export shipments occur.  These wildlife inspectors monitor
trade in wildlife and intercept illegal shipments of federally
protected wildlife.  They work with other agencies--most notably the
Customs Service--to fulfill their inspection mission.  According to
FWS' data, an average of about 77,000 import and export shipments
containing wildlife or wildlife parts and products were processed
nationwide during fiscal years 1989 through 1993.  Funding for FWS'
wildlife inspection program comes from two primary sources--annual
appropriations, which totaled $2.81 million in fiscal year 1993, and
licenses and inspection fees collected from importers and exporters,
which totaled $2.25 million in the same year.  Whereas the program's
appropriations have risen over 235 percent in recent years, fees paid
by users have remained relatively stable. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

Despite recent increases in the program's appropriations, FWS'
current inspection program has had difficulty in accomplishing its
mission of monitoring wildlife trade and intercepting illegal
wildlife trade.  Given current budgetary constraints and downsizing
efforts within the federal government, additional increases in
program funding are unlikely to occur.  The information on program
activities that GAO reviewed raises questions about the program's
efficiency and effectiveness, including the allocation of resources
within the program.  Although FWS recently established goals for the
program, they are based solely on established output levels--a
percentage of shipments processed that are inspected--and do little
to measure program performance.  These goals, even if reached, will
not ensure that the wildlife inspection program is moving closer to
achieving its mission.  Furthermore, the lack of complete, accurate,
and timely data on the inspection program precludes FWS management
from making informed decisions about the need for and allocation of
resources within the inspection program. 

The passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement is likely to
increase wildlife trade among the three countries who are party to
the agreement--the United States, Canada, and Mexico.  The expected
increase in trade will increase the workload of the FWS inspectors,
who are already stretched thin along the U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada
borders, according to those GAO spoke with and studies GAO reviewed. 

Wildlife inspectors responding to a GAO questionnaire, federal agency
officials, and conservation and trade organizations that GAO
contacted identified both advantages and disadvantages to
transferring FWS' wildlife inspection program to the Customs Service. 
If such a transfer is ever formally proposed, each of the advantages
and disadvantages of moving the wildlife inspection program would
have to be carefully considered by policymakers. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      CURRENT PROGRAM IS LIMITED
      IN ITS ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH
      INSPECTION MISSION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

One of the means by which FWS monitors wildlife trade and intercepts
illegal imports and exports of wildlife is by conducting physical
inspections of shipments that either have been declared to contain
(presented to FWS for clearance) or are thought to contain wildlife
or wildlife parts and products.  However, most wildlife shipments are
not physically inspected, and it is likely that many illegal
shipments are evading detection.  Although it is impossible to
determine the extent of illegal wildlife trade, FWS estimates that it
is detecting less than 10 percent of the violations associated with
declared shipments and a much lower percentage of undeclared
shipments.  Furthermore, FWS' data on program activities show
significant variances in such things as the number of shipments
processed, the percentage of shipments inspected at each port of
entry, and the number of inspections performed per wildlife
inspector.  These variances raise questions about the level of staff
and accompanying resources allocated to each of the ports of entry. 

Despite recent increases in funding for the wildlife inspection
program, FWS officials attribute the program's limited ability to
accomplish its inspection mission to a need to hire additional
inspectors and provide them with more resources, such as safety
equipment (for example, breathing filters, eye protection, and
gloves) and administrative support.  Furthermore, the FWS Law
Enforcement Management Information System (LEMIS) currently does not
provide accurate or timely data on such things as the (1) level of
and trends in wildlife trade, (2) number of shipments processed and
inspected at each port of entry and by each inspector, (3) violations
detected and the fines and penalties assessed for these violations,
and (4) traders who repeatedly violate wildlife laws and
treaties--data that inspectors need to do their work and that
management needs to make informed decisions on the program's
direction and resource needs.  FWS recognizes that the quality of the
LEMIS data relating to the wildlife inspection program needs
improvement and has plans to improve the data's timeliness and
accuracy. 

FWS has recently established what it considers to be attainable goals
for the program, but these goals are based on an average of the
percentage of shipments that FWS inspectors have inspected over the
past several years.  The goals do not include such things as the
extensiveness of the inspections performed or the number of illegal
shipments that are intercepted and the ultimate disposition of the
interceptions. 

Because of higher priorities and staffing constraints within the
Department of the Interior's Office of the Solicitor and the
Department of Justice's U.S.  Attorney Offices, many violations
detected by FWS result only in the forfeiture of the seized goods. 
Penalties or fines and probation or jail are infrequently imposed on
violators.  According to FWS officials, the lack of penalties and
fines and other punitive measures assessed for violations detected by
the wildlife inspection program does little to instill in potential
violators the need to voluntarily comply with the laws and treaties
governing wildlife trade. 


      TRADE AGREEMENT EXPECTED TO
      INCREASE WILDLIFE TRADE AND
      INSPECTORS' WORKLOAD
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

The North American Free Trade Agreement will likely result in an
increase in the volume of cross-border traffic in most types of
trade, including wildlife.  Because of the limited number of wildlife
inspectors assigned to border ports, it has been difficult for FWS to
adequately monitor the current level of trade crossing the U.S. 
borders with Canada and Mexico.  Wildlife inspectors responding to a
GAO questionnaire, federal agency officials, and conservation
organizations that GAO contacted believe that the increased traffic
expected as a result of the trade agreement will add to FWS' workload
and make the detection of illegal trade even more difficult. 
Although regional officials that GAO contacted also identified ports
of entry not along the Mexican border that they believe will
experience increased workloads, FWS believes that the agreement's
greatest impact will be along the U.S.-Mexico border and thus far has
requested additional funding to address only the trade agreement's
impact along that border. 


      VIEWS ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

GAO was asked to determine the advantages and disadvantages that
might accrue from a transfer of the program from FWS to the Customs
Service.  Those GAO spoke with about such a transfer provided their
views on the possible advantages and disadvantages.  In terms of
advantages, some thought that Customs' larger, more dispersed
inspection force and its automated system for assessing shipments and
determining which ones to inspect would enable Customs to provide
greater wildlife coverage than does FWS.  In terms of disadvantages,
some of those GAO spoke with were concerned that, among other things,
wildlife protection would not receive emphasis within Customs and
that Customs inspectors lack wildlife identification expertise. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO is making a number of recommendations to ensure that FWS'
wildlife inspection program is better able to accomplish its mission
and that its current resources are used more efficiently and
effectively.  For example, GAO recommends that the Secretary of the
Interior direct the Director, FWS, to develop outcome-oriented,
performance-related goals that are indicative of an effective
inspection program and to give priority to completing its plans to
improve the law enforcement management information system.  GAO
believes that without outcome-oriented, performance-related goals and
an accurate management information system to report progress toward
achieving them, FWS management and the Congress are hindered in
making informed decisions about how well the inspection program is
accomplishing its mission and about the level of staff and resources
needed by the program.  GAO also recommends that FWS conduct a
comprehensive examination of the operations of each of the designated
and the nondesignated ports of entry where wildlife trade is known to
occur to determine if and where adjustments in the allocation of
resources can be made.  Additional recommendations made by GAO may be
found in chapter 5. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

GAO received written comments on a draft of this report from the
Department of the Interior.  Interior generally agreed with GAO's
recommendations to improve LEMIS and to establish
performance-oriented goals.  Although Interior disagreed with GAO's
recommendation involving possible adjustments in the allocation of
resources among the various ports of entry, it did state that
workload factors have been used to justify increased resources at
several ports of entry.  Interior pointed out that not only must a
minimum staffing level be maintained at designated ports of entry in
order to provide uninterrupted service, but that political and
economic factors must also be considered in its staffing decisions. 
GAO agrees.  More complete discussions of Interior's comments and
GAO's evaluation of them may be found in chapter 5 and appendix III. 

GAO discussed the contents of this report with Customs Service
officials, who said that the report clearly states the issues
surrounding the wildlife inspection program--particularly in
connection with a possible transfer of the program.  A more complete
discussion of the Customs officials' comments may be found at the end
of chapter 5. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1

The growing demand throughout the world for wildlife and wildlife
parts and products has created a market in which commercial
exploitation has threatened certain wildlife populations.  The
oriental medicine trade, for example, has created an illicit market
in bear gall bladders, rhinoceros horns, and parts of other
threatened and endangered species.\1 The United States is the world's
largest wildlife trading country, importing an average of $773
million and exporting about $256 million in such trade each year
since 1989.  Although the full extent of illegal trade is not known,
the value of illegal wildlife trade into and out of the United States
is estimated to be between $100 million and $250 million annually. 

The mission of the Department of the Interior's Fish and Wildlife
Service (FWS) is to conserve and enhance fish and wildlife
populations and their habitats for the continuing benefit of the
American people.  Enforcing and administering laws and treaties
governing the importation and exportation of fish and wildlife
species, the animals' parts, and products made from the animals or
their parts is an important and necessary means by which FWS carries
out its mission.  The FWS Division of Law Enforcement, through its
wildlife inspection program established in 1975, helps ensure that
wildlife shipments entering or leaving the United States comply with
wildlife trade laws and treaties. 


--------------------
\1 Endangered species are those in danger of extinction throughout
all or a significant portion of their ranges.  Threatened species are
those likely to become endangered within the foreseeable future
throughout all or a significant portion of their ranges. 


   ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF
   FWS' WILDLIFE INSPECTION
   PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

The FWS Division of Law Enforcement, headquartered in Arlington,
Virginia, provides general direction and develops policy for the
seven FWS regions that oversee the wildlife inspection program.  Each
regional office is administered by a Regional Director, who is
responsible for all of FWS' activities within an assigned
geographical area and who manages the inspection program with the
help of an Assistant Regional Director for Law Enforcement. 

Trade in wildlife and wildlife parts and products generally involves
shipments that consist of packages, crates, or other containers that
are (1) transported by air, sea, and land carriers; (2) carried by
individuals; or (3) delivered through the mail.  To carry out its
responsibilities to monitor trade in wildlife and intercept illegal
shipments of federally protected wildlife, the Division of Law
Enforcement maintains a force of 74 wildlife inspectors, whose duties
include (1) examining documentation that accompanies shipments, (2)
physically inspecting the contents of shipments, (3) properly
handling seized property, (4) occasionally handling certain aspects
of the violation investigation process, and (5) fulfilling
administrative duties associated with the inspection and clearance of
wildlife imports and exports. 

FWS inspectors are stationed at 11 designated ports of entry and at
14 of the over 300 nondesignated (border or special) ports located
throughout the United States and its territories where wildlife
shipments occur.  By designating certain ports of entry for the
importation and exportation of wildlife, FWS has attempted to
concentrate wildlife shipments at a few locations to enable more
efficient and effective service.  The majority of wildlife shipments
are processed through the 11 designated ports.  Wildlife shipments
processed through any of the nondesignated ports must meet certain
criteria or be accompanied by a special FWS permit.  FWS' data show
that nationwide, an average of almost 77,000 shipments were processed
annually during the past 5 fiscal years. 

The FWS regions and the location of FWS wildlife inspectors at both
designated and nondesignated ports are shown in figure 1.1. 

   Figure 1.1:  Map of the Seven
   FWS Regions and the Locations
   of FWS Wildlife Inspectors

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Source:  Adapted by GAO from FWS originals. 

The Division of Law Enforcement also employs a force of about 225
special agents who are criminal investigators responsible for
protecting domestic and international fish, wildlife, and plant
resources.  They maintain liaison with all mutually interested
federal, state, and local enforcement authorities and investigate
suspected violations of federal wildlife laws.  As part of their
broad responsibilities, these agents work closely with wildlife
inspectors in enforcing and administering federal laws and
international treaties governing the importation and exportation of
wildlife and wildlife parts and products.  The agents are located in
field offices throughout each FWS region. 

In addition to its field inspectors and special agents, the Division
of Law Enforcement maintains a desk officer for inspections in its
Branch of Investigations.  This desk officer is responsible for,
among other things, (1) monitoring international wildlife trade to
determine trends and (2) representing FWS in interagency negotiations
and discussions to develop strategies for coordinated enforcement of
FWS-administered laws and regulations. 


   FUNDING OF WILDLIFE INSPECTION
   PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

Funding for FWS' wildlife inspection program is derived from two
primary sources--annual appropriations and license and inspection
fees collected from wildlife importers and exporters.  Import-export
licenses, which currently cost $125 annually, generated over $270,000
in fiscal year 1993.  Persons who import or export less than $25,000
in wildlife annually, common carriers and museums that import or
export wildlife for research or educational purposes, and certain
others are exempt from the licensing requirements.  The approximately
2,165 holders of import-export licenses must also pay a $25
inspection fee for each shipment that is imported or exported at a
designated port of entry.  These fees generated about $1.98 million
in fiscal year 1993. 

Appropriations and user fees for the wildlife inspection program for
fiscal years 1989 through 1993 are shown in table 1.1.  As can be
seen, in constant dollars over the 5-year period, appropriations have
risen over 235 percent--partially as a result of moneys provided by
the Congress for specific purposes, such as establishing designated
ports in Portland, Oregon, and Baltimore, Maryland, and
reestablishing a full-time wildlife inspector position in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.  User fees have remained relatively
stable during this period. 



                          Table 1.1
           
            Appropriations and User Fees for FWS'
             Wildlife Inspection Program, Fiscal
                        Years 1989-93

            (1993 Constant Dollars (in millions))


Source              1989     1990     1991     1992     1993
---------------  -------  -------  -------  -------  -------
Appropriations     $ .84    $ .89    $1.50    $2.18    $2.81
User fees           2.63     2.54     2.11     2.09     2.25
Less: Denver       (.28)    (.30)    (.22)    (.18)    (.15)
 Finance Center
 assessment\a
Amount             $3.19    $3.13    $3.39    $4.09    $4.91
 available
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Each year, Interior's Denver Finance Center assesses the program a
nominal amount for administrative overhead. 


   COOPERATIVE FEDERAL EFFORTS TO
   INSPECT WILDLIFE SHIPMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

FWS relies on the cooperation of other federal agencies in fulfilling
its mission of monitoring wildlife trade.  The Department of the
Treasury's Customs Service is the primary agency responsible for the
inspection and clearance of goods imported into the United States. 
In this capacity, the Customs Service is the first line of defense
against illegal wildlife shipments.  Before it clears a wildlife
shipment at a designated port where an FWS wildlife inspector is
present, Customs refers the shipment to FWS for inspection and
clearance.  At ports that do not have FWS inspectors, Customs
inspectors can clear wildlife shipments or take other appropriate
action. 

FWS also works closely with and coordinates its activities with other
federal agencies that have jurisdiction at ports of entry.  These
agencies include the Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service (APHIS), which is primarily responsible for
inspecting shipments of plants and animals entering or leaving the
United States and preventing the introduction of pests and plant and
animal diseases into the United States; the Department of Commerce's
National Marine Fisheries Service, which is responsible for
protecting certain marine mammals under the Marine Mammal Protection
Act and other laws regulating the importation of marine wildlife; the
Department of Justice's Immigration and Naturalization Service, which
is primarily responsible for enforcing the immigration laws of the
United States; and the Department of Transportation's Coast Guard,
which works with other agencies to (1) enforce the laws that pertain
to the protection of living and nonliving resources and (2) suppress
smuggling and illicit drug trafficking on the high seas. 

FWS relies on the Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (16
U.S.C.  1531-1544), and the Lacey Act, as amended (18 U.S.C.  42; 16
U.S.C.  3371-3378),\2 as the primary domestic legislation to control
wildlife imports and exports.  The Convention on International Trade
in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) is the major
international agreement for the control of trade in wildlife and
plants.  In the United States, CITES is implemented through the
Endangered Species Act.  The United States also has treaties with
four countries for the protection of migratory birds.  The Migratory
Bird Treaty Act, as amended (16 U.S.C.  703-712), which implemented
these treaties, prohibits the importation of migratory birds captured
or killed illegally in their country of origin.  (See app.  I for a
brief description of these and related laws.)


--------------------
\2 The Lacey Act prohibits the import, export, transportation, sale,
receipt, acquisition, or purchase of fish, wildlife, or plants that
are taken, possessed, transported, or sold in violation of any
federal, state, tribal, or foreign law. 


   GAO'S 1991 REPORT MADE SEVERAL
   RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN
   ENFORCEMENT OF WILDLIFE
   PROTECTION LAWS AND TREATIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

As discussed earlier in this chapter, FWS special agents work very
closely with the wildife inspectors to enforce and administer federal
laws and treaties governing the importation and exportation of
wildlife and wildlife parts and products.  In 1991, we reported on
law enforcement activities conducted in six FWS regions by special
agents.\3 Our report stated that because the Division of Law
Enforcement did not have reliable information on the effectiveness of
its special agents' enforcement efforts or the magnitude of suspected
crimes against wildlife that were not being investigated, it had not
fared well in the allocation of substantial increases in FWS' overall
staffing and funding.  As a result, the Division's special agents,
who are responsible for investigating cases involving (1) large-scale
selling or commercialization of wildlife and wildlife parts, (2)
crimes against threatened or endangered species, (3) illegal
importation of wildlife for commercial purposes, and (4) illegal
taking of migratory birds, were unable--because of a lack of
sufficient resources--to perform their basic responsibilities. 

To be better able to periodically assess the extent of crime against
wildlife and justify its funding and staffing needs and ensure that
its special agents are able to perform their basic responsibilities,
we recommended that FWS record (1) all instances of suspected
violations coming to its attention, including those that may not be
investigated; (2) the agency's handling of suspected violations; and
(3) the outcomes of the investigations.  We also recommended that FWS
then use this information to (1) periodically assess the extent of
suspected crimes against wildlife, (2) provide realistic estimates of
staff and funds needed to adequately address the problem, and (3)
include the estimates in annual budget requests.  Although the agency
agreed that it needed to improve its documentation of crimes against
wildlife, FWS disagreed that better documentation of reported
violations would provide meaningful data to justify increased funding
or staffing for law enforcement. 


--------------------
\3 Wildlife Protection:  Enforcement of Federal Laws Could Be
Strengthened (GAO/RCED-91-44, Apr.  26, 1991). 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5

Because of the documented growth of illegal commercial trade in
wildlife and wildlife parts and products and the similarities in the
work locations of FWS and Customs Service inspectors, the Chairman of
the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries and
Representative Richard H.  Lehman requested that we determine the (1)
effectiveness of FWS' wildlife inspection program, (2) potential
impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on wildlife
trade and the inspection of wildlife shipments, and (3) advantages
and disadvantages of moving the wildlife inspection program from FWS
to the Customs Service. 

We visited the designated ports of entry of Los Angeles, California,
and Miami, Florida, and the nondesignated ports of entry of San
Diego, California, and El Paso, Texas.  Los Angeles and Miami are
high-volume, worldwide import and export centers, and San Diego and
El Paso are centers of import and export trade between the United
States and Mexico. 

Our review focused on the field activities of FWS wildlife
inspectors.  We reviewed documentation on the activities of and the
resources devoted to the wildlife inspection program for fiscal years
1989 through 1993, including information from the FWS Law Enforcement
Management Information System (LEMIS).  Although the information in
LEMIS on the wildlife inspection program's activities is the best
information available, FWS officials told us that it is often
inaccurate and incomplete and, therefore, may understate the total
volume of imports and exports processed by FWS' wildlife inspection
program.  We also obtained information on the program's ability to
deter illegal wildlife trade from FWS headquarters, its seven
regional offices, and wildlife conservation organizations, including
the Wildlife Management Institute, the National Audubon Society, the
World Wildlife Fund, and the National Fish and Wildlife Foundation. 

To determine the potential impact of NAFTA on wildlife trade and the
inspection of wildlife shipments, we reviewed documentation and
available studies on the agreement's requirements and possible
outcomes.  We also spoke with officials from FWS, APHIS, and the
Centers for Disease Control's Public Health Service as well as
wildlife conservation groups about (1) the agreement's impacts on the
numbers and types of wildlife shipments that might be imported or
exported and (2) their plans to deal with such impacts. 

To determine the advantages and disadvantages of moving the wildlife
inspection program from FWS to the Customs Service, we interviewed
FWS headquarters and regional officials and wildlife inspectors;
Customs Service officials located at headquarters and the above
designated and nondesignated ports; and APHIS and Public Health
Service officials familiar with the program.  We also obtained views
on the advantages and disadvantages of such a transfer from wildlife
conservation and trade organizations. 

As a part of our review, we administered a questionnaire to 72 of the
74 FWS wildlife inspectors and the wildlife desk officer assigned to
the program at the end of fiscal year 1993 to obtain their
perceptions of the program, the impact of NAFTA on their work, and
the idea of moving the wildlife inspection program from FWS to
Customs.  One inspector left FWS prior to the mailing of our
questionnaire, and we did not send a questionnaire to a wildlife
inspector trainee who was hired in late fiscal year 1993. 
Sixty-three of the wildlife inspectors responded to our
questionnaire, a copy of which--including a compilation of the
wildlife inspectors' responses--is provided in appendix II.  For the
same purpose, we also contacted 20 FWS special agents who were
identified by senior resident agents (supervisors) as having
conducted investigations resulting from violations detected by
wildlife inspectors. 

Our review was conducted between February 1993 and November 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  We
obtained written comments on a draft of this report from the
Department of the Interior.  These comments are summarized and
evaluated in chapter 5 and reproduced in appendix III.  We also
discussed the contents of this report with officials in the
Department of the Treasury's Customs Service who provided several
technical clarifications, which have been incorporated into the
report. 


FWS' WILDLIFE INSPECTION PROGRAM
HAS LIMITED ABILITY TO ACCOMPLISH
ITS MISSION
============================================================ Chapter 2

At a time of complex laws and regulations controlling wildlife trade
and the possibility of increased shipments of imported and exported
wildlife as nations evolve into a world economy, FWS is limited in
its ability to monitor trade in wildlife and to intercept illegal
imports and exports of wildlife.  Under the current program,
inspection rates at the FWS ports of entry vary considerably; a
majority of wildlife shipments receive no physical inspection.  As a
result, many illegal imports or exports of wildlife may evade
detection. 

Despite recent increases in funding for the wildlife inspection
program, FWS officials report that many ports are without adequate
wildlife inspection coverage, and inspectors at some locations cite a
need for safety equipment and other resources, such as a better
information system, reference books, and computer and related
equipment, to more effectively perform their jobs.  Wildlife
inspectors are often kept from conducting physical inspections of
wildlife shipments because administrative tasks limit the time they
have available to conduct inspections.  In addition, LEMIS does not
provide accurate, timely information about the inspection program
that would aid wildlife inspectors in carrying out their
responsibilities and enable FWS officials to make informed decisions
about any staffing or other changes needed at specific ports of
entry. 

Furthermore, a lack of prosecutions, coupled with a lack of
significant penalties and fines imposed for violations that are
detected by the wildlife inspection program, do little to encourage
compliance with wildlife trade laws and treaties.  Because of higher
priorities and staffing constraints within the Department of the
Interior's Office of the Solicitor and the Department of Justice's
U.S.  Attorney Offices--the offices responsible for prosecuting
wildlife trade violations--the most frequent punitive measure
involves the forfeiture of the illegal wildlife the violators were
attempting to move into or out of the United States.  These violators
tend to view such forfeitures simply as a cost of doing business. 


   PROBABILITY IS HIGH THAT
   ILLEGAL WILDLIFE SHIPMENTS
   EVADE DETECTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

One of the ways FWS attempts to monitor the trade in wildlife and
intercept illegal imports and exports of wildlife is by conducting
physical inspections.  However, most wildlife shipments are not
physically inspected, and it is likely that many illegal wildlife
shipments are evading detection. 

Although the full extent of the illegal trade in wildlife imports and
exports is not known, such trade appears to be extensive as judged by
various studies and other assessments.  For example, in 1992, TRAFFIC
USA\1 estimated that global wildlife trade (excluding timber and
fisheries products) was valued at a minimum of $5 billion to $8
billion per year and that as much as $2 billion of this trade may
have been illegal.  FWS law enforcement officials we contacted during
our review pointed out that it is impossible to determine the extent
of illegal wildlife trade that is occurring.  However, they provided
a rough estimate that FWS is detecting less than 10 percent of the
violations associated with declared shipments (those presented to FWS
for clearance) and that the percentage is much lower for undeclared
shipments. 

Many FWS wildlife inspectors share these views.  For example, 44
(about 70 percent) of the 63 inspectors who responded to our
questionnaire believed that an illegal shipment would be able to
escape detection over 50 percent of the time.  The inspectors
identified several means, including containerized shipments,
passenger traffic at airports, and international mail, by which
illegal shipments of wildlife and wildlife parts and products can be
concealed and go undetected because of inadequate inspection
coverage. 

Law enforcement officials from the seven FWS regional offices
responsible for managing the wildlife inspection program agreed that
FWS is detecting very little illegal wildlife trade.  For example,
one FWS supervisory special agent estimated that wildlife inspectors
are detecting only about 1 to 3 percent of the illegal wildlife
shipments carried by passengers and 1 to 10 percent of illegally
imported or exported wildlife in declared cargo shipments. 
Undeclared illegal shipments of wildlife have an even higher
probability of going undetected, according to FWS officials. 


--------------------
\1 TRAFFIC USA is a wildlife trade monitoring program of the World
Wildlife Fund, an organization dedicated to protecting wildlife and
wildlife habitats and promoting the wise use of natural resources
throughout the world. 


      MOST WILDLIFE SHIPMENTS ARE
      NOT PHYSICALLY INSPECTED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1

Most wildlife shipments are not physically inspected, which is a
problem that has been recognized by FWS and others for years.  For
example, the U.S.  Fish and Wildlife Service Division of Law
Enforcement Briefing Materials, 1991 Edition stated that FWS is able
to inspect only a minute percentage of the containerized shipments
that enter this country annually.  In February 1992, the Director,
TRAFFIC USA, testified before a congressional subcommittee that fewer
than 5 percent of all wildlife shipments are physically inspected,
leaving most wildlife imports and exports completely unchecked.  Our
analysis indicates that the percentage of wildlife shipments that FWS
inspected during the 5-fiscal-year period from 1989 through 1993
averaged about 23 percent. 

As a monitoring and enforcement tool, physical inspections are
important.  Their purpose is to determine if the species and quantity
of wildlife contained in a shipment are the same as those specified
on its declaration documents.  The wildlife inspectors base their
decisions on how many shipments, and how much of any given shipment,
to inspect on a variety of factors that include the

amount of time they have available;

number of shipments awaiting inspection;

contents of the shipments--for example, live wildlife;

violation histories relative to different types of shipments;

violation histories of importers-exporters; and

countries from or to which shipments are being made. 

Before fiscal year 1994, FWS' wildlife inspection program had no
established inspection goals.  However, during the course of our
review, the Division of Law Enforcement set what it considered to be
attainable inspection goals for the program.  These goals require
that beginning in fiscal year 1994, FWS should physically inspect at
least 25 percent of all shipments presented for import or export at
the 11 designated ports of entry, and at least 50 percent of all
shipments at nondesignated ports of entry where it has assigned
wildlife inspectors.  The difference in the goals for the two types
of ports is primarily the result of the higher volume of shipments at
designated versus nondesignated ports.  According to the Deputy Chief
of the Division of Law Enforcement, these goals are based on an
average of the percentage of shipments that have been inspected
nationwide over the past several years. 

Against this backdrop, figure 2.1 shows the total numbers of wildlife
shipments processed and physically inspected by FWS over the
5-fiscal-year period from 1989 through 1993, along with the
percentage of shipments inspected.  The information shown in figure
2.1 and the other figures presented in this section are based on
import-export data from LEMIS.  As pointed out in chapter 1, the
information in LEMIS on wildlife inspection activities is, according
to FWS officials, often not accurate or timely and, therefore, more
than likely understates the total number of imports and exports
processed and physically inspected by FWS wildlife inspectors. 

   Figure 2.1:  Number of
   Shipments Processed and
   Physical Inspections Performed
   by FWS, Fiscal Years 1989-93

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  The percentages under the shaded bars show the portion of
shipments that were physically inspected. 

Source:  The FWS Division of Law Enforcement. 

The number of shipments processed during the 5-year period averaged
about 77,000, with a range of 86,909 in fiscal year 1989 to 71,661 in
fiscal year 1993.  The number of shipments processed during the past
3 fiscal years has been fairly consistent, hovering close to 72,000. 
The overall rate of conducting physical inspections of shipments
ranged from almost 20 percent in fiscal year 1991 to about 27 percent
in fiscal year 1993.  For the 5-year period, the inspection rate was
about 23 percent.  Reports on FWS' wildlife inspection activities
disclose, however, that the number of shipments that were physically
inspected at each designated and nondesignated port of entry during
the period varied considerably. 

Figure 2.2 shows the percentage of shipments that were physically
inspected over the 5-fiscal-year period at each of the 11 ports of
entry designated by FWS.\2

   Figure 2.2:  Percentage of
   Shipments That Were Physically
   Inspected at Designated Ports
   of Entry, 5-Year Average,
   Fiscal Years 1989-93

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  The average number of shipments processed by each port during
this 5-year period is shown in parentheses following the port name. 

Source:  The FWS Division of Law Enforcement. 

The figure shows, for example, that 7 percent of the shipments
processed in Miami, Florida, were inspected, in contrast to a
52-percent inspection rate in Honolulu, Hawaii.  As the figure shows,
the ports with the higher inspection rates are generally those that
process the least number of shipments, and the ports with the lower
inspection rates are generally those that process the most.  Overall,
the inspection rate for the 11 designated ports of entry was about 18
percent. 

Figure 2.3 shows the percentage of shipments that were physically
inspected during the 5-fiscal-year period at 13 of the nondesignated
ports of entry where FWS wildlife inspectors were assigned during the
period.\3

   Figure 2.3:  Percentage of
   Shipments That Were Physically
   Inspected at Nondesignated
   Ports of Entry With Inspector
   Coverage, 5-Year Average,
   Fiscal Years 1989-93

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

Note:  The average number of shipments processed by each port during
this 5-year period is shown in parentheses following the port name. 

Source:  The FWS Division of Law Enforcement. 

The rates of inspections at nondesignated ports vary even more over
the same 5-fiscal-year period than did the rates at designated ports. 
For example, almost 10 percent of the shipments processed in Tampa,
Florida, were physically inspected, while just over 80 percent of the
shipments processed in San Juan, Puerto Rico, were inspected.  As was
the case with the designated ports, figure 2.3 shows that the
nondesignated ports with the higher inspection rates are generally
those with the least number of shipments--the nondesignated ports
with the lower inspection rates are generally the ones that are the
busiest.  Overall, the inspection rate for the 13 nondesignated ports
with assigned inspectors approached 40 percent. 

Not only do the number of shipments processed and the percentage of
shipments inspected vary from port to port, the number of inspections
performed per wildlife inspector varies as well.  For example, the
5-fiscal-year average of the number of inspections performed per
inspector at designated ports ranged from a low of 76 in Miami,
Florida, to a high of 616 in Honolulu, Hawaii.  For nondesignated
ports, the average number of inspections performed per inspector per
year ranged from a low of 30 in Denver, Colorado, to a high of 778 in
El Paso, Texas. 

During the 5-fiscal-year period we examined, the inspection rates at
over half of both the designated and nondesignated ports exceeded the
recently established inspection rate goals.  The variances in the
inspection rates, the number of inspections performed per inspector,
and the fact that some ports that processed fewer shipments exceeded
the goals by significant margins suggest the possibility of an uneven
allocation of resources within the program.  When asked why such
variances exist, the Deputy Chief of the Division of Law Enforcement
could not identify the specific reasons for the variances, but he did
tell us that it is sometimes simply a matter of the various ports
giving inspections differing emphasis and priority.  Furthermore, FWS
regional officials told us that in addition to the inspection rates,
they consider other factors in determining a port's performance, such
as the number and type of shipments processed, the extensiveness of
the inspections that are performed, the number of seizures, and the
effectiveness of relationships established with other inspection
agencies. 


--------------------
\2 Portland became a designated port in fiscal year 1990.  The
figures shown for Portland represent the 4-year average for fiscal
years 1990 through 1993. 

\3 Because the nondesignated port of Guam did not have inspector
coverage for most of the 5-fiscal-year period, the numbers of
shipments processed and inspected at the Guam port of entry are not
shown. 


   LIMITED RESOURCES IDENTIFIED AS
   ADVERSELY AFFECTING FWS'
   INSPECTION EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

According to a number of sources, FWS' wildlife inspection program is
adversely affected by the limited number of inspectors and other
resources that FWS is able to devote to the program.  The problem
stems from the fact that the wildlife inspection staff of 74 cannot
adequately process and inspect the tens of thousands of wildlife
shipments that flow through the ports annually.  This situation has
been discussed in a number of reports over the past several years. 
Reports issued by the FWS Law Enforcement Advisory Commission\4 and
the FWS Law Enforcement Functional Analysis Team\5 in 1990 and 1991,
respectively, each identified shortfalls in the staffing and funding
devoted to the FWS' wildlife inspection program as adversely
affecting the agency's ability to accomplish its overall inspection
mission.  The National Fish and Wildlife Foundation,\6 in reports on
FWS' law enforcement efforts in 1988 and again in 1993, also
identified inadequate program staffing as a problem.  In addition,
the Director, TRAFFIC USA, testified in February 1992 that the
existing number of special agents and wildlife inspectors was wholly
insufficient to effectively enforce U.S.  wildlife laws and CITES
requirements. 

As stated in chapter 1, user fees collected by FWS' wildlife
inspection program have remained relatively stable during fiscal
years 1989 through 1993.  Appropriations, on the other hand, have
increased more than 235 percent during this period--rising in 1993
constant dollars from $.84 million to $2.81 million.  A large portion
of the increases in appropriations, however, was used to establish
ports in Portland, Oregon, and Baltimore, Maryland; to reestablish a
full-time inspector position in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and to
increase the inspection force at the port of Los Angeles, California. 
FWS officials told us that the funding increase that was left did not
keep pace with increases in the program's salary and operating costs
and that the inspection program continues to need additional
staffing, funding, and other resources to be more effective. 


--------------------
\4 In February 1990, FWS convened a Law Enforcement Advisory
Commission, composed of members from the Department of Agriculture's
Forest Service, the Department of Justice, the Department of the
Interior and the National Park Service, and the Department of the
Treasury's Customs Service and Federal Law Enforcement Training
Center, to conduct an evaluation of the FWS Division of Law
Enforcement.  (United States Fish and Wildlife Service Law
Enforcement Advisory Commission, Report of Findings and
Recommendations, June 1990.)

\5 United States Fish and Wildlife Service, Law Enforcement
Functional Analysis, November 1, 1991. 

\6 The National Fish and Wildlife Foundation is a nonprofit
organization dedicated to the conservation of natural resources.  It
was created by the Congress in 1984.  The Foundation achieves its
goals of habitat protection and conservation by forging partnerships
between the public and private sectors and by supporting conservation
activities that pinpoint the root causes of environmental problems. 


      FEW INSPECTORS ADDED DESPITE
      IDENTIFIED STAFFING
      SHORTFALLS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.1

Although reports such as the ones just discussed have pointed out
shortfalls in the staffing levels of the FWS inspection force over
the past several years, the number of FWS inspectors has remained
relatively constant.  For example, in 1991 the Law Enforcement
Functional Analysis Team identified a need for 30 additional
inspectors and recommended a total inspection force of 100.  However,
despite increased funding for the program, only eight inspectors have
been added to the wildlife inspection staff since 1989--increasing
the number of inspectors from 66 in fiscal year 1989 to 74 in fiscal
year 1993.  Law enforcement officials we contacted at each of the
seven FWS regions estimated that they collectively needed 43
additional inspectors to staff the ports of entry, resulting in a
total inspection force of 117.  Table 2.1 shows where FWS inspectors
are currently located and identifies where regional officials believe
they need additional inspectors.  The ports of entry identified by
the regional officials are generally ports (1) that FWS expects to
show an increase in wildlife trade, (2) that have not met the
recently established inspection goals, (3) that do not meet an FWS'
staffing criterion that calls for three inspectors per designated
port, or (4) that currently have no assigned wildlife inspector. 



                          Table 2.1
           
           Number of FWS Inspectors in Fiscal Year
            1993 and FWS' Estimates of Additional
                      Inspectors Needed

                                    Number of      Number of
                                     wildlife     additional
                                   inspectors       wildlife
                                    currently     inspectors
Ports of entry                       assigned         needed
------------------------------  -------------  -------------
Agana, Guam                                 1              1
Anchorage, Alaska                           1              2
Atlanta, Georgia                            1              2
Baltimore, Maryland                         1              2
Boston, Massachusetts                       1              2
Buffalo, New York                           2              2
Chicago, Illinois                           6              1
Dallas/Fort Worth, Texas                    4              0
Denver, Colorado                            1              0
Detroit, Michigan                           1              1
El Paso, Texas                              2              2
Honolulu, Hawaii                            3              2
Houston, Texas                              2              2
Laredo, Texas                               1              2
Los Angeles, California                    12              1
Miami, Florida                              6              5
Minneapolis/St. Paul,                       1              0
 Minnesota
New York City, New York/
 Newark, New Jersey                        15              3
New Orleans, Louisiana                      1              1
Portland, Oregon                            3              0
San Diego, California                       1              2
San Juan, Puerto Rico                       1              0
San Francisco, California                   3              0
Seattle, Washington                         3              0
Tampa, Florida                              1              1
Other ports (not currently                  0              9
 staffed by wildlife
 inspectors)
============================================================
Total                                      74             43
------------------------------------------------------------
Source:  FWS regional law enforcement officials. 

As pointed out in the various reports cited, the shortfalls in
staffing affect FWS' ability to conduct wildlife shipment
inspections.  This effect is illustrated in at least one instance
when FWS increased its inspection staff at the Los Angeles,
California, port of entry from 5 in fiscal year 1990 to 12 in fiscal
year 1993.  As a result of this increase, the number and percentage
of inspections occurring at the Los Angeles port more than tripled
during this period--increasing from 1,528, or almost 11 percent of
the shipments processed in fiscal year 1990, to 4,974, or about 34
percent of the shipments processed in fiscal year 1993. 

FWS' limited inspection workforce and budgetary restrictions on
overtime mean that FWS ports of entry are frequently without wildlife
inspection coverage.  For example, FWS inspectors at the New York
City, New York/Newark, New Jersey, port of entry, through which 29
percent of the nation's known wildlife shipments pass, do not work
late evenings, nights, or on weekends, unless a commercial broker
reimburses FWS for the inspectors' time.  In addition, because of the
limited number of staff, the majority of the nondesignated FWS ports
do not have wildlife inspectors assigned.  Eight of the ports
identified by FWS regional officials as needing staff are
nondesignated ports that currently have no inspectors.  Even those
nondesignated ports that do have assigned inspectors have very
limited staff--usually one inspector--which leaves these ports with
no wildlife inspection coverage when the inspectors are on leave, in
training, or otherwise not on the job.  When FWS inspectors are not
present, FWS must rely on staff from Customs or another federal
agency to clear any wildlife shipments received.  Although FWS does
receive such assistance, staff in these agencies have their own
responsibilities and may often lack the expertise and/or inclination
to vigorously pursue wildlife trade violations. 

Almost half of the wildlife inspectors responding to our
questionnaire believe that without an FWS presence, illegal wildlife
shipments are more likely to go undetected.  Officials from the
Customs Service and other federal agencies acknowledge that an FWS
presence influences the degree to which they scrutinize, detain, and
report suspicious wildlife shipments.  This influence is illustrated
by FWS' experience at the San Diego, California, port of entry.  Even
though they cannot document the actual numbers of violations reported
to them by other federal agencies before an FWS inspector was
assigned to the San Diego port in 1986, FWS regional officials
responsible for the port estimated the number to have been about 30
per year.  Since assigning an FWS inspector to that port, the number
of violations reported by FWS, including those detected by other
federal agencies, has jumped to more than 300 per year, or tenfold. 

In fiscal year 1994, FWS--as a part of the federal government's
downsizing efforts--reduced by 21 the number of full-time-equivalent
positions allocated to the Division of Law Enforcement.  The Deputy
Chief of the Division told us during our field work that because
staffing decisions have generally been delegated to the FWS regional
offices, he did not know the effect, if any, this reduction might
have on the size of the wildlife inspection force. 


      OTHER RESOURCE NEEDS
      IDENTIFIED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2.2

FWS has not, in all cases, provided its inspection staff with the
basic equipment and other resources needed to effectively perform
their jobs.  In fiscal years 1993 and 1994, FWS funded the inspection
program at a rate of $55,000 per inspector, an amount that was to pay
each inspector's salary and operating costs.  According to figures
provided to us by FWS regional officials, however, salary and benefit
costs consume most of the funding provided and leave little to pay
for such things as safety equipment (used when inspecting shipments
of live wildlife), reference books, computers and related equipment,
travel and transportation, office space, and uniforms.  One port of
entry reported to us that it is provided only $2,000 annually per
inspector by its region to pay for such things as those listed above,
and it estimated that double that amount was needed.  Of the 63
inspectors responding to our questionnaire, 41 (65 percent) said that
they did not have adequate resources with which to effectively do
their work, and they identified safety equipment, reference books,
administrative staff, and an improved management information system
as the resources they most needed. 

Because of the way that some regions account for their costs, the
Division of Law Enforcement has been unable to determine the level of
funding needed by the wildlife inspection program.  Regional
officials we contacted during our review, however, provided us with
estimates of the amount needed annually per inspector for both salary
and operating costs; these estimates ranged from $60,000 to $80,000,
depending on the region. 


         WILDLIFE INSPECTORS
         IDENTIFY THE NEED FOR
         SAFETY EQUIPMENT AND
         REFERENCE BOOKS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.1

Too little safety equipment and too few reference books have affected
the ability of some FWS inspectors to perform inspections.  Safety
equipment is particularly needed when inspectors are to inspect live
wildlife, which receive the highest priority for physical
inspections.  Live wildlife are sometimes carriers of transmittable
diseases and/or capable of physically harming inspectors.  Therefore,
inspectors are instructed to handle live wildlife with care by
avoiding direct physical contact, when possible, and by using safety
equipment, such as breathing filters, eye protection, and gloves,
when the handling of live wildlife is necessary.  However, 22 (35
percent) of the 63 inspectors who responded to our questionnaire
identified safety equipment as one of the resources they need, but do
not have, to effectively perform their jobs.  Wildlife inspectors we
spoke with told us that such equipment is often not available for
them to use and that they therefore often allow live wildlife
shipments to pass through ill-equipped ports of entry without
inspections by FWS.  For example, according to the Assistant Regional
Director for Law Enforcement in FWS Region 4, wildlife inspectors at
the port of Miami, Florida, did not perform physical inspections of
nonhuman primates--animals known to carry pathogens such as ebola and
tuberculosis, which are dangerous to humans--because the safety
equipment necessary to inspect the animals was not available. 
However, according to the preliminary results of an evaluation of the
risks associated with such inspections, the region recently acquired
the necessary safety equipment and began conducting physical
inspections of such shipments in November 1994. 

To be able to identify whether a species is endangered or threatened
is often crucial to a determination of the legality of a given
shipment.  However, 24 (38 percent) of the 63 respondents cited
wildlife identification reference books as a resource that they need,
but do not have, to effectively perform some inspections. 


         INSPECTORS IDENTIFY THE
         NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE
         AND SUPPORT PERSONNEL
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.2

Thirty-eight percent of the inspectors responding to our
questionnaire also identified the need for administrative and support
personnel to help them with their work.  Regional officials told us
that because of too few administrative and support personnel at many
ports of entry, inspectors must perform administrative duties that
keep them from physically inspecting more shipments.  In fact, of the
63 respondents to our questionnaire, only 13 (21 percent) reported
that they spend more than 50 percent of their time doing physical
inspections; much of their remaining time is spent performing
administrative duties, such as entering shipment data into LEMIS. 

These results are supported by the findings of an FWS wildlife
inspector assigned to the port of Miami, who analyzed his work
experience over a period of 4 months.  The inspector found that 49
percent of his time was spent on administrative and telephone duties,
making these duties the largest consumer of his time.  Another 23
percent of his time was spent reviewing declarations and the
associated paperwork, stamping FWS and Customs paperwork, and filing
completed wildlife shipment entries.  In contrast, the processing of
seizures of illegal wildlife and physical inspections consumed only 6
percent and 4 percent of his time, respectively. 


         THE NEED FOR AN IMPROVED
         MANAGEMENT INFORMATION
         SYSTEM IDENTIFIED
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.3

In our 1991 report on the law enforcement activities of FWS special
agents, we stated that the Division of Law Enforcement was at a
disadvantage in the yearly competition within FWS for funding and
staffing because it did not have the information it needed to develop
good estimates of the magnitude of the problems faced by its special
agents or the resources needed to address these problems.  Our review
of the wildlife inspection program--another component of the Division
of Law Enforcement-- shows that the lack of timely and accurate
information continues to be a problem and that an improved management
information system is needed that would enable (1) wildlife
inspectors to more effectively perform their jobs and (2) FWS
management to make more informed judgments about the program's
performance and resource needs. 

Of the inspectors responding to our questionnaire, 26 (41 percent)
identified an improved management information system as a resource
they need to effectively perform their jobs.  FWS regional officials
and inspectors alike told us that the existing system, LEMIS, does
not provide timely and reliable information on the level of wildlife
trade, violations detected, and the fines and penalties assessed for
these violations.  We were told that because of the inspectors'
workload, the entry of wildlife shipment and inspection data into
LEMIS is often not timely or accurate, leading most likely to an
understatement of the data that are in the system.  Inspectors
sometimes do not enter information into LEMIS for as long as 6 months
after they process a shipment, and FWS does little or no quality
check of the information entered in the system to ensure its
accuracy. 

Many regional officials told us that LEMIS does not provide them with
the information necessary to manage or evaluate the wildlife
inspection program in terms of (1) wildlife trade trends; (2) traders
who repeatedly violate wildlife laws and treaties; or (3)
importers-exporters who "shop" the different ports, using those ports
that they believe will give their shipments less scrutiny.  According
to some of these officials, the only reports readily available from
LEMIS are monthly case management reports, which summarize and track
suspected violation cases under investigation.  Reports containing
other information must be requested from headquarters and sometimes
take months to receive. 

FWS recognizes that the quality of the LEMIS data on the wildlife
inspection program needs improvement and has plans to improve the
data's timeliness and accuracy.  For example, the Division of Law
Enforcement is developing a central computer data entry office that
will relieve wildlife inspectors from the duties of entering shipment
data into LEMIS.  They are also instituting several quality control
measures, such as periodically comparing the data entered into LEMIS
with the information contained on declarations, which are designed to
ensure the accuracy of the information entered into the system. 


         PROPOSED INCREASES IN
         USER FEES COULD PROVIDE
         ADDITIONAL FUNDING FOR
         THE PROGRAM
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 2:2.2.4

FWS has recently proposed revisions to its user-fee policies and
rates that would provide additional funding for the program. 
According to FWS' Final Report on Import/Export User Fees, which was
issued in January 1993, these revisions, if implemented, would double
the amount of fees currently generated by the wildlife inspection
program and allow FWS to recover the full costs of services for all
commercial import-export activities provided.  The report
acknowledged that more than half of the costs of the wildlife
inspection program was funded from congressional appropriations.  The
report stated that the proposed increases in user fees would free the
appropriated funds for activities such as increasing the number of
special agents and wildlife inspectors and creating a central
computer data entry office to enter wildlife import-export data into
LEMIS.  The Deputy Chief of the Division of Law Enforcement agreed
that the funds from increasing user fees could be used to provide
some resources needed by the wildlife inspection program, but he
stated that FWS' current staffing ceilings would prevent such funds
from being used to increase the size of the inspection force. 


   FEW PENALTIES AND FINES
   ASSESSED FOR VIOLATIONS
   DETECTED BY WILDLIFE INSPECTORS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

FWS officials have expressed concern about the lack of penalties and
fines that are being assessed for violations detected by the wildlife
inspection program.  According to those we spoke with, this lack not
only does little to instill in potential violators the need to
voluntarily comply with the laws and treaties governing wildlife
trade, but also fosters cynicism and low morale among the inspectors. 
They attributed the situation primarily to higher priorities and
staffing constraints within the Department of the Interior's Office
of the Solicitor and the Department of Justice's U.S.  Attorney
Offices, who are responsible for prosecuting wildlife trade
violations.  As a result, many violations detected by the program
have resulted only in the abandonment or forfeiture of the wildlife
and wildlife parts and products that were being illegally shipped. 
Some violators continue in business even after being found guilty. 
Even though federal statutes and implementing regulations provide
that the importer-exporter licenses of those who violate wildlife
laws and treaties can be suspended or, in the case of willful
violations, revoked, such actions are rare. 

Violations detected by the wildlife inspectors are handled in several
different ways.  For minor violations, FWS may offer the importer or
exporter the opportunity to voluntarily abandon the illegal wildlife
that was being shipped.  If accepted, FWS documents and closes the
violation as an "abandonment case." However, when FWS considers the
violation to be more significant, it charges the individual with the
violation and refers the case either to the Department of the
Interior's Office of the Solicitor for civil forfeiture and/or
monetary penalty or to one of the Department of Justice's U.S. 
Attorney Offices for criminal prosecution that could result in a fine
and/or jail. 

FWS does not maintain a record of the nature and disposition of all
violations of wildlife trade laws and treaties detected by its
wildlife inspection program.  However, we were able to obtain
information relative to Endangered Species Act violations, which we
were told make up a large percentage of the total violations detected
by the inspection program.  Our analysis of this information shows
that of 1,760 individuals and companies charged with 2,896 endangered
species violations that regional solicitors or the courts handled
during fiscal years 1989 through 1993, only about 25 percent of the
violators received penalties and/or fines for their infractions and a
much lesser percentage received probation or jail.  Over half of the
violators simply had to forfeit the illegal wildlife they were
attempting to ship into or out of the United States, while still
another 20 percent had their cases dismissed by regional solicitors
or the courts. 

Even repeat violators of the Endangered Species Act seldom received
substantial fines or penalties or had other measures levied against
them.  For example, from fiscal year 1989 through 1993, FWS caught
one importer 14 times attempting to illegally ship wildlife. 
However, the importer received no penalties or fines for the
infractions; all the cases either resulted in the forfeiture of the
illegal wildlife or were dismissed by the solicitor.  Some FWS
officials told us that even when penalties and fines are assessed,
they are often reduced through legal maneuvers to the point where
many importers-exporters view them simply as "a cost of doing
business."

Although FWS officials can point to several successful detections of
attempts to smuggle endangered or threatened species into or out of
the United States, the officials also admit that most violators are
not punished very harshly and most are allowed to remain in business
despite their infractions.  Although not all violations warrant such
action, only one region could identify for us instances in which it
had revoked or suspended import-export licenses as a result of
violations.  FWS officials pointed out that even if they revoke or
suspend a license, oftentimes the violator will arrange to use the
license of another company or individual, or will operate without
one.  One situation we became aware of in Florida involved a
commercial importer who was convicted of illegally transporting a
protected, endangered nonhuman primate.  During our review, we were
told that the individual was still involved in importation
activities, operating under a license in his wife's name.  When we
asked FWS law enforcement officials why this was allowed, they said
that they were gathering the additional evidence needed to show that
the individual was improperly involved in importation activities
using this license.  In mid-1994, FWS refused to renew the license on
the basis of the additional evidence it had gathered. 

FWS officials told us that the degree to which solicitors and U.S. 
attorneys consider and prosecute the wildlife trade cases referred to
them varies.  Regional solicitors we contacted attributed the lack of
penalties assessed for wildlife trade violations to a variety of
reasons, including (1) the longer amount of time required to process
a civil penalty versus a forfeiture only, (2) a lack of staff, (3) a
lack of strong evidence, (4) higher priorities, or (5) the
uncollectibility of any penalties that would be assessed.  Those FWS
officials who believed wildlife trade cases received little
consideration and attention by the offices of U.S.  Attorneys
attributed these situations to either wildlife crime being a low
priority or the limited staff available in these offices for such
cases. 


NAFTA EXPECTED TO INCREASE TRADE
AND WILDLIFE INSPECTORS' WORKLOAD
============================================================ Chapter 3

The North American Free Trade Agreement, better known as NAFTA, is an
agreement between the governments of the United States, Mexico, and
Canada that is designed, in part, to eliminate the barriers to trade
in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods and services
among the three countries and their territories.  It was approved by
the Congress on December 8, 1993 (P.L.  103-182).  The consensus of
those with whom we spoke and the studies we reviewed on NAFTA is that
the trade agreement will result in an increase in the volume of
cross-border traffic in most types of trade, including wildlife. 
According to an assessment of NAFTA by FWS, little recognition was
given to the impact of the agreement on fish and wildlife.  The three
governments, however, did agree to uphold the provisions of CITES,
which is the major international agreement for the control of trade
in wildlife and plants.  (See app.  I.)

Many of those we spoke with believe that the limited FWS inspection
staff is already taxed in terms of its ability to monitor the trade
in wildlife and wildlife parts and products that is occurring along
the United States' lengthy borders with Mexico and Canada and that
NAFTA will likely exacerbate this problem.  FWS has included
estimates in its fiscal year 1995 budget request for increased
funding to address NAFTA issues; however, these estimates address
only the impact of NAFTA along the U.S.-Mexico border.  They do not
address the impact of NAFTA on the other FWS ports of entry,
including those along the U.S.-Canada border. 


   NAFTA LIKELY TO INCREASE
   WILDLIFE TRADE AND EXACERBATE
   EXISTING INSPECTION PROBLEMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

The United States is the world's largest wildlife trading country,
and its neighbors, Mexico and Canada, are two of its partners in
wildlife trade.  According to TRAFFIC USA, declared wildlife trade
between the United States and Mexico reached almost $19 million in
1990.  Among the items the United States imported were exotic skins
and leather products, furs, animal curios (for example, stuffed
specimens, claws, teeth, feathers), live animals and specimens, coral
and shells, and live plants.  Exports from the United States to
Mexico included exotic skins and leather products, furs, trophies,
and tropical fish.  Declared wildlife trade between the United States
and Canada exceeded $133 million in 1990.  Although fur and fur
products dominated such trade, significant quantities of live birds,
reptiles, and fish; hunting trophies; exotic leathers and leather
products; and live plants were also traded. 

Undeclared wildlife trade between the United States and both Mexico
and Canada is also occurring.  Despite FWS' efforts to educate the
public on what they can and cannot bring into or take out of the
United States, tourists, hunters, and others continue to be involved
in numerous attempts to carry illegal wildlife and wildlife parts and
products across U.S.  borders.  Border port statistics show that many
wildlife shipments are being made that have not been cleared for
entry into or exit out of the United States. 

Because the FWS inspection force is limited, it is difficult for the
agency to adequately monitor all of the trade crossing the U.S. 
borders with Mexico and Canada.  In fact, FWS has inspectors
stationed at only 7 of the 31 border ports.  Of the 46 inspectors who
identified areas needing inspection coverage in their responses to
our questionnaire, 30 (65 percent) named ports along the Mexican
and/or Canadian borders.  Furthermore, most of the ports that do have
inspection coverage are staffed by a relatively small inspection
force, as illustrated by the following examples. 

The San Diego, California, port of entry's area of jurisdiction
includes land border stations at San Ysidro, Otay Mesa, Tecate,
Calexico, and Andrade, along the entire California-Mexico border. 
This is an area covered by a Customs Service workforce that consisted
of 473 inspectors and 60 canine enforcement officers as of May 1993. 
Until recently, one FWS wildlife inspector covered the same area.  In
fiscal year 1992, almost 570,000 trucks along with 27.3 million
private vehicles and 21.3 million pedestrians were cleared through
the San Diego area.  When the FWS inspector is on leave, in training,
or otherwise not at the port, the port and its various border
stations have no FWS inspection coverage, and FWS must rely on
Customs to clear wildlife shipments and to detect and detain any that
may be illegal. 

The El Paso, Texas, port of entry's area of jurisdiction also
includes a number of land border stations.  This is an area covered
by a Customs Service force that, as of June 1993, consisted of 258
inspectors and administrative personnel and 34 canine officers.  Also
stationed at the various El Paso border stations were 24 inspectors
from APHIS.  Two FWS wildlife inspectors cover this same area.  In
fiscal year 1992, over 575,000 commercial vehicles, including trains,
were cleared through the El Paso area along with 66.5 million
passenger vehicles, including buses, and 7.6 million pedestrians.  As
is the case in San Diego, when the two FWS inspectors at El Paso are
not at the port, FWS must rely on Customs to clear wildlife shipments
and to detect and detain any that may be illegal. 

Although it is difficult to accurately assess the impact of NAFTA, at
least two studies point toward likely increases in the flow of goods,
including wildlife and wildlife parts and products, between the
United States and both Mexico and Canada.  For example, in a 1991
report entitled A North American Free Trade Agreement:  The Impacts
on Wildlife Trade, TRAFFIC USA concluded, among other things, that

NAFTA is likely to increase wildlife trade;

NAFTA will likely increase pressure to exploit North American
wildlife resources;

NAFTA will increase wildlife trade monitoring and enforcement needs;
and

the U.S.  government currently has no specific plans to increase its
wildlife enforcement capability along the U.S.-Mexico border, despite
the potential increase in wildlife trade under NAFTA. 

In a 1993 assessment of NAFTA entitled U.S.  Fish and Wildlife
Service Implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement
with Mexico, FWS concluded that the flow of goods between the United
States and Mexico will increase under NAFTA and that the active
illegal wildlife trade that already exists between the two countries
will only increase as NAFTA is implemented.  FWS also concluded that
there are many areas of concern for the management of fish and
wildlife resources and their habitats between the United States and
Mexico and that, regardless of the effects of NAFTA, "there is a
clear indication of the need to place greater emphasis and commitment
of resources to address present responsibilities."

Many of the conservation groups we contacted and 68 percent of the
wildlife inspectors responding to our questionnaire echoed these
thoughts.  The consensus was that NAFTA will increase the volume of
wildlife trade and make the detection of illegal trade even more
difficult. 

Even though the value of the wildlife traded between the United
States and Canada is seven times greater than it is between the
United States and Mexico, FWS officials believe that NAFTA's impact
on wildlife trade will be most pronounced along the U.S.-Mexico
border.  The officials believe that the opportunity for growth in
wildlife trade is greater between the United States and Mexico than
between the United States and Canada.  They also recognize that while
U.S.-Canada trade consists of primarily well-regulated commercial
trade in furs and fur products, U.S.-Mexico trade is more problematic
in terms of the wildlife species that are traded along the highly
permeable U.S.-Mexico border. 

An FWS official told us that in mid-1993 FWS asked its regions, other
than Region 2, to provide assessments of the impact of NAFTA on their
operations.  FWS did not ask Region 2 because it had already
developed an assessment of NAFTA that FWS used as a basis for its
1993 assessment.  According to the FWS official, none of the regions'
assessments had changed FWS' thinking that the most significant
impact of NAFTA on wildlife trade would occur along the U.S.-Mexico
border. 


   FUNDING REQUESTED TO ADDRESS
   NAFTA'S IMPACT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

On the basis of its 1993 assessment of NAFTA, FWS included a request
for a little over $10.8 million in funding in its fiscal year 1995
budget to address NAFTA's impact on wildlife and its associated
habitat along the U.S.-Mexico border.  Of that amount, approximately
$1.9 million would be designated for increased law enforcement,
including the wildlife inspection program.  Projected increases in
staffing of wildlife inspectors at U.S.-Mexico border ports are shown
in table 3.1. 



                          Table 3.1
           
              Projected Staff Increases at U.S.-
            Mexico Border Ports to Address NAFTA's
                            Impact

                                      Current     Additional
                                    number of     inspectors
                                     wildlife  projected due
Border ports                       inspectors       to NAFTA
------------------------------  -------------  -------------
Arizona:
 Nogales                                    0              1
 San Luis-Yuma                              0              1
California:
 San Diego                                  2              2
Texas:
 Del Rio                                    0              1
 El Paso                                    2              2
 Houston                                    2              2
 McAllen-Brownsville                        0              1
 Laredo                                     1              2
============================================================
Total                                       7             12
------------------------------------------------------------
Although FWS expects NAFTA's greatest impact to be along the
U.S.-Mexico border and has requested funds to address that impact,
FWS regional officials and inspectors we contacted during our review
told us that NAFTA will also affect other ports, including those
along the U.S.-Canada border and/or those involved in flights between
the United States and Canada or Mexico.  For example, Region 5
officials estimated that they need three additional wildlife
inspectors in New York--one at Champlain and two at Buffalo--to
handle normal wildlife traffic and the increase in trade expected
from NAFTA.  Law enforcement officials in Chicago, Illinois; Miami,
Florida; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Atlanta, Georgia, also believe
that NAFTA will increase the number of imports and exports processed
at those ports.  Despite these anticipated needs, FWS had no plans at
the time of our review to increase either funding or staffing at any
ports of entry other than those shown above--all of which, with the
exception of Houston, are along the U.S.-Mexico border. 


VIEWS ON POSSIBLE TRANSFER OF
WILDLIFE INSPECTION PROGRAM
============================================================ Chapter 4

We were requested to obtain the views of various officials on the
possible transfer of the wildlife inspection program from FWS to the
Customs Service.  The basis for considering such a move involves
either the perception or recognition that (1) the program is
currently not working as well as it should and (2) the work of the
FWS and Customs inspectors often involves the same ports of entry. 

We spoke with officials of FWS, the Customs Service, APHIS, the
Public Health Service, and various wildlife conservation and trade
organizations to obtain their views about the advantages and
disadvantages of moving the wildlife inspection program from FWS to
Customs.  Several officials told us that the advantages of such a
transfer would accrue primarily from Customs' greater inspection
resources--about 6,600 Customs inspectors nationwide compared with 74
FWS wildlife inspectors in a relatively few locations.  However,
others were concerned that the importance of the wildlife inspection
program would be lost in such a transfer.  In addition, the FWS
wildlife inspectors, whose jobs and lives would be most affected by a
transfer, generally were not in favor of it. 


   ADVANTAGES OF A TRANSFER TO
   CUSTOMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

If the wildlife inspection program were to be moved from FWS, the
Customs Service--as the country's first line of defense against
illegal wildlife shipments--would be the logical agency in which to
place it.  FWS, because of its small inspection force, already relies
upon cooperation with Customs in its efforts to accomplish its
inspection mission.  A number of officials from FWS, Customs, APHIS,
and wildlife conservation and trade organizations that we spoke with
cited two principal advantages that would result from a transfer of
the wildlife inspection program from FWS to Customs.  They believed
that Customs' larger, more dispersed inspection force and the
automated system it has for assessing shipments and determining which
ones to inspect would enable Customs to provide greater wildlife
inspection coverage than does FWS. 

The 6,600 Customs inspectors are located at 300 ports of entry
scattered throughout the United States and Puerto Rico.  Several of
the FWS and Customs officials we spoke with believe that Customs,
with this larger, more widely dispersed inspection force, could
provide greater wildlife inspection coverage than FWS with its 74
inspectors located at only 25 ports of entry. 

In conjunction with this much larger inspection force, according to a
number of those we spoke with, Customs' automated system to assess
various shipments and determine which shipments to inspect and which
ones to clear without inspections is better than FWS' system, which
relies on its inspectors to decide which shipments to physically
inspect.  Several of these officials noted that it is well known
within the commercial trade sector that the inspection of various
commodity shipments is more stringent at some ports of entry than at
others.  According to FWS officials, this knowledge prompts some
shippers to engage in the practice of "port shopping," whereby they
route their shipments through those ports that have a reputation for
allowing certain commodities to flow through them more freely.  This
practice is a particularly useful tool for shippers who have been
detected violating wildlife laws and treaties.  Because these
shippers fear scrutiny at those ports where they have been identified
as violators, they route their shipments elsewhere in the hope that
less familiar FWS inspectors will allow their shipments to more
easily pass through.  FWS currently has no formal or efficient means
to check for such occurrences.  Although FWS had planned at one time
to upgrade its management information system, thus enabling its
inspection force to more clearly and readily identify the licenses of
shippers with previous violations or restrictions, it has not yet
done so.  If the wildlife inspection program were to be transferred
to Customs, these officials expect that Customs' automated system for
assessing shipments for inspections and the much larger presence of
Customs inspectors at each port of entry would help reduce the
practice of port shopping. 


   DISADVANTAGES OF A TRANSFER TO
   CUSTOMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

In terms of the disadvantages that would come from a transfer of the
inspection program, some officials from FWS, Customs, APHIS, the
Public Health Service, and wildlife conservation and trade
organizations, as well as some wildlife inspectors, were concerned
that (1) Customs would not emphasize wildlife protection; (2) Customs
inspectors lack wildlife identification expertise; (3) difficulties
might arise in coordinating Customs' inspection efforts with FWS'
efforts to protect wildlife, including the implementation of
CITES--functions that would most likely remain at FWS; and (4) some
costs would be incurred.  The results from the discussions we held
and the views of the inspectors responding to our questionnaire are
included in the sections that follow. 


      CUSTOMS' GREATER RESOURCES
      WOULD NOT NECESSARILY
      GUARANTEE INCREASED FOCUS ON
      WILDLIFE PROTECTION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.1

Although it is recognized that Customs has a larger inspection force
than does FWS, among the concerns cited by those we contacted about
transferring the wildlife inspection program to Customs was that
Customs was not inclined to, nor would it ever, place much emphasis
on wildlife trade or protection.  Customs is responsible for
protecting U.S.  borders from imports that do not comply with trade
laws and policies and from illegal smuggling activities, such as drug
trafficking and money laundering.  Its enforcement mission has grown
increasingly more challenging over the years as the volume and value
of imports has increased significantly, translating into a
substantial increase in Customs' workload.  Two of our reports have
dealt with the complex, challenging nature of Customs' enforcement
responsibilities and the problems Customs was experiencing in
carrying out these responsibilities.\1 For example, in our September
1992 report, we stated that the Customs Service could not adequately
ensure that it was meeting its responsibilities to combat unfair
foreign trade practices or protect the public from unsafe goods and
that Customs was finding only a small percentage of the estimated
violations in imported cargo.  Our June 1994 report stated that
Customs was operating in an extremely challenging environment, with a
diverse mission that includes collecting duties, taxes, and fees on
imports; enforcing laws intended to prevent unfair trade practices;
and protecting public health by interdicting narcotics and other
hazardous goods before they enter the country. 

Wildlife trade has not been a priority at Customs, according to
Customs officials.  Furthermore, results from the questionnaire we
sent to all FWS inspectors disclosed that one of the primary reasons
that shipments containing wildlife violations are currently slipping
into and out of the United States is that, in the absence of FWS
inspectors at given ports of entry at given times, inspectors from
other agencies rank the detection of wildlife violations very low in
comparison with their own inspection responsibilities.  Even if the
wildlife inspection function were transferred from FWS to Customs,
some of the officials we spoke with believed that, because of
Customs' existing responsibilities and its heavy workload, the
attention and emphasis Customs would be able to give to wildlife
trade would never be very high. 

Officials at Customs headquarters were among those who held this
belief.  They did not look favorably on the idea of shifting the
wildlife inspection program to their agency.  The officials told us
that Customs already has more work than it can accomplish and that a
transfer of the wildlife inspection program, without some kind of an
increase in Customs' funding and staffing, would add to their
burdens.  Customs officials acknowledged that wildlife trade would
not receive the emphasis in Customs that it is given in FWS. 


--------------------
\1 Customs Service:  Trade Enforcement Activities Impaired by
Management Problems (GAO/GGD-92-123, Sept.  24, 1992) and Financial
Audit:  Examination of Customs' Fiscal Year 1993 Financial Statements
(GAO/AIMD-94-119, June 15, 1994). 


      CUSTOMS SERVICE INSPECTORS
      LACK WILDLIFE IDENTIFICATION
      EXPERTISE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.2

Some of those we spoke with cited the Customs Service inspectors'
lack of wildlife "expertise" as a major drawback when considering
transferring the wildlife inspection function from FWS to Customs. 
Although Customs inspectors can do basic wildlife indentification,
most of them lack the expertise that is necessary to make final
species identification. 

Customs inspectors currently receive very limited training in the
identification of illegal shipments of wildlife and wildlife parts
and products.  For the most part, the Customs inspectors' orientation
training devotes only about 2 hours to wildlife identification. 
Additional training is provided by FWS inspectors to Customs at
certain locations, but only on a limited basis. 

Currently, while many Customs Service inspectors do possess college
degrees, the degrees are not, according to Customs officials, in
biology and related disciplines.  FWS inspectors, on the other hand,
do possess such degrees.  For example, of the 63 FWS inspectors who
responded to our questionnaire, 45 (71 percent) held bachelors or
masters degrees, and many of them were in the fields of biology,
wildlife sciences, and conservation. 


      COORDINATION WITH OTHER FWS
      UNITS RESPONSIBLE FOR
      WILDLIFE PROTECTION MIGHT
      SUFFER
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.3

FWS wildlife inspectors and special agents currently work together to
enforce wildlife laws and treaties.  For example, once an inspector
detects an illegal wildlife shipment, the responsibility for
investigating the violation is turned over to a special agent.  Many
officials believe that this closeness between the inspectors and
special agents would be adversely affected if the wildlife inspection
function, without the special agents, were transferred to Customs. 
We contacted 20 FWS special agents to get their reactions to a
possible shift of the inspection function to Customs.  A number of
these agents told us that Customs' mission is very different from
FWS' mission and that wildlife trade would not be a priority within
Customs.  Furthermore, some of the agents told us that a transfer
would likely lengthen the time it takes for them to perform an
investigation and that greater coordination would be required between
FWS and Customs.  Others stated that they would probably be asked to
conduct fewer investigations because Customs would likely want to use
its own investigators, who, as some of the FWS agents pointed out,
are not as versed in wildlife laws and treaties as they are. 

The FWS wildlife inspectors also work closely with the FWS Office of
Management Authority, which is responsible for implementing CITES. 
This Office generally considers more than 4,700 applications each
year for permits to engage in otherwise prohibited activities, such
as the killing, taking, transporting, or trading of CITES-protected
wildlife species.  FWS inspectors ensure that all wildlife shipments
entering the United States are accompanied by appropriate permits and
are not in violation of CITES or various wildlife laws.  FWS and
Customs officials we spoke with believed that a transfer of the
wildlife inspection function could complicate the coordination of
activities between the wildlife inspectors and this Office, simply
because two separate, distinct agencies could be involved rather than
one. 


      SOME COSTS AND OTHER
      OUTCOMES WOULD RESULT FROM A
      TRANSFER OF THE INSPECTION
      PROGRAM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2.4

Although we are unaware of any cost-benefit analysis that has been
done for a transfer of the wildlife inspection program, Customs
headquarters officials we spoke with mentioned that some costs would
be incurred from such a move.  According to these officials, obvious
costs would be incurred in preparing new work space for the
inspectors and moving them and their associated equipment, furniture,
and other items from their current locations to new ones.  Costs
would likely be incurred for various administrative activities
associated with or resulting from the move, including those involved
with planning, integrating accounting and management information
systems, processing personnel matters, and printing.  Costs
associated with the cross-training of FWS and Customs inspectors
would also be incurred.  Additionally, if such a transfer took place,
Customs headquarters officials told us that other less quantifiable
outcomes would likely ensue, including (1) the disruption,
instability, and loss of continuity in the wildlife inspection
program during, and for a while after, the transfer; (2) a need to
replace FWS inspectors who chose not to transfer; (3) uncertainty
within the regulated import-export community; (4) delays in issuing
regulations and operational guidance; and (5) a need to establish
proper communication channels within Customs and between Customs and
other federal inspection agencies for Customs' new wildlife
inspection responsibility. 


   FWS INSPECTORS DO NOT FAVOR A
   MOVE OF THE WILDLIFE INSPECTION
   PROGRAM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

The questionnaire we sent to FWS wildlife inspectors and the wildlife
desk officer included several questions on a possible move of the
wildlife inspection program from FWS to Customs.  Those responding to
the questionnaire generally were not in favor of having the program
and, in all likelihood, their jobs moved to Customs. 

We asked the inspectors if they thought the protection of wildlife
would be enhanced if the inspection function were moved to Customs. 
Under a scenario in which all the FWS inspectors would be moved to
Customs as a specialized, segregated unit, 16 of the 63 respondents
(25 percent) strongly or somewhat agreed that wildlife protection
would be enhanced, 35 (56 percent) somewhat or strongly disagreed, 8
(13 percent) neither agreed or disagreed, and 4 (6 percent) indicated
that they had no basis to judge such a question.  Under a scenario in
which all the FWS inspectors would be moved to and absorbed into
Customs without any emphasis on wildlife protection, only 2
respondents (3 percent) strongly or somewhat agreed that wildlife
protection would be enhanced, 55 (87 percent) somewhat or strongly
disagreed, 4 (6 percent) neither agreed nor disagreed, and 2 (3
percent) indicated that they had no basis to judge such a question. 
The results of the questionnaire indicated that a transfer of the
inspection function would negatively affect the FWS inspectors'
morale.  Also, the majority of the inspectors believed that their
education and work experience is valued more at FWS than it would be
at Customs. 


CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 5

FWS' wildlife inspection program was established almost 20 years ago
to accomplish the dual mission of monitoring trade in wildlife and
intercepting illegal imports and exports of wildlife.  On the basis
of our review, we believe that FWS has had difficulty in
accomplishing either aspect of this mission. 

Under the current program, the number of shipments processed and the
rate of inspections performed at FWS ports of entry vary
considerably, and most wildlife shipments receive no physical
inspection.  As a result, many undetected illegal shipments of
wildlife are thought to be occurring.  Although it is impossible to
precisely determine how much illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife
parts and products is occurring or FWS' impact on it, estimates are
that FWS is detecting less than 10 percent of the violations
associated with declared wildlife shipments (those presented to it
for clearance) and a much lower percentage of the violations
associated with undeclared shipments.  The approval of NAFTA within
the past year is likely to increase the volume of cross-border
traffic among the United States, Mexico, and Canada, thus decreasing
even further the chance of violations being detected.  Moreover, many
violations currently detected by the program result only in the
abandonment or forfeiture of the wildlife or wildlife parts or
products being illegally shipped, which does little to encourage
compliance with wildlife trade laws and treaties. 

Despite recent increases in the wildlife inspection program's
appropriations, FWS and others largely attribute the program's
limited ability to accomplish its inspection mission to a need to
hire more inspectors, as well as more administrative and support
personnel, and to provide the inspectors with more resources, such as
a better information system, safety equipment, reference books,
computer and related equipment, travel and transportation, office
space, and uniforms.  However, given current budgetary constraints
and downsizing efforts within the federal government, increased
funding for the wildlife inspection program at any level of
significance, in all likelihood, will not occur.  Although recently
proposed revisions in FWS' user fees would provide additional funding
for the program, current FWS staffing ceilings would prevent any of
this increased funding from being used to increase the size of the
inspection force.  Furthermore, program data that reflect significant
variances in inspection rates at the ports of entry and in the number
of inspections performed by individual inspectors raise questions
about the allocation of resources within the program. 

Before fiscal year 1994, FWS had not established any goals for its
wildlife inspection program.  The ones that were established in
fiscal year 1994, while perhaps representing a start, do little to
measure program performance or define what an effective inspection
program should look like.  Rather than establishing goals that are
outcome-oriented and performance- related, FWS established inspection
goals that it believed it could attain--physically inspecting at
least 25 percent of all shipments presented for import or export at
its 11 designated ports of entry and at least 50 percent of all such
shipments at nondesignated ports of entry where it has assigned
wildlife inspectors.  These goals, however, do not take into account
such things as the (1) types of shipments that are being processed,
(2) extensiveness of the inspections performed, and (3) number of
illegal shipments that are intercepted.  Moreover, it must also be
recognized that, in its efforts to achieve its inspection mission,
FWS relies on the cooperation of other federal agencies, including
Customs and APHIS, which assist in the detection of illegal wildlife
shipments, and the Department of the Interior's Office of the
Solicitor and the Department of Justice, which handle the prosecution
of the cases resulting from violations detected by the wildlife
inspection program.  As such, the achievement of any of FWS' goals
hinge, in part, on the degree of cooperation that FWS receives from
these other agencies.  Furthermore, any determinations as to whether
the goals established are being achieved will have to be made using
LEMIS data that are known to be inaccurate and
incomplete--shortcomings that FWS recognizes and has plans to
address.  Without outcome-oriented, performance-related goals and an
accurate management information system to report progress toward
achieving them, FWS management and the Congress are hindered in
making informed decisions about how well the inspection program is
accomplishing its mission and about the level of staff and other
resources needed by the program. 

We believe that it may take some time for FWS to develop
outcome-oriented, performance-related goals and an accurate
information system with which it can measure progress toward
achieving such goals.  In the meantime, variances that currently
exist in such things as the number of shipments processed, number of
inspectors assigned to the specific designated and nondesignated
ports of entry, number of shipments inspected, and number of
inspections performed per inspector at the various ports of entry
suggest that FWS is not making the most efficient and effective use
of its limited resources.  A comprehensive examination by FWS of the
size of the inspection staff and the level of accompanying resources
that should be devoted to each port would help the agency to more
clearly define an effective wildlife inspection program. 

FWS' difficulties in accomplishing its inspection mission have caused
some to suggest that other alternatives be explored, such as
transferring the program to Customs, an agency with a larger, more
widely dispersed inspection force.  Those whom we contacted to obtain
their views on this suggestion identified both advantages and
disadvantages to such a move.  For example, although the primary
advantage of such a transfer is Customs' larger inspection force,
many of those we spoke with believed that because of Customs' already
heavy workload, a transfer could, in fact, diminish the attention now
afforded wildlife shipments.  If such a transfer is ever formally
proposed, each of the advantages and disadvantages of moving the
wildlife inspection program would have to be carefully considered by
policymakers. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE
   SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1

To ensure that the wildlife inspection program is better able to
accomplish its mission and that its current resources are more
efficiently and effectively used, we recommend that the Secretary of
the Interior direct the Director of FWS to: 

Develop outcome-oriented, performance-related goals that are
indicative of an effective inspection program and take into account
not only the number of shipments processed and inspected, but also
such things as the extensiveness of the inspections performed and the
results of those inspections. 

Give priority to the completion of FWS' current plans to improve the
timeliness, accuracy, and completeness of the information contained
in LEMIS, including the information relating to (1) the levels and
trends in wildlife trade; (2) port of entry inspection rates and
inspector productivity; (3) results of inspections, including fines
and penalties assessed; and (4) repeat wildlife trade violators. 

Conduct a comprehensive examination of the operations of each of the
designated and the nondesignated ports of entry and the size and
level of accompanying resources currently allocated to each of these
ports, looking for ways in which the allocation of resources might be
adjusted to respond to current needs at the specific ports and to
improve the program's overall efficiency and effectiveness. 

Identify the principal reasons for the lack of more frequent and
effective pursuit of wildlife inspection program violations and, in
conjunction with the Department of the Interior's Office of the
Solicitor and the Department of Justice, determine what measures can
be taken, within existing resources and funding constraints, to make
law enforcement efforts more efficient and effective. 

Proceed with plans to increase the user fees charged by the wildlife
inspection program and apply the increased funding to those areas
where resource needs have been identified. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
   EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2

The Department of the Interior generally agreed with our
recommendations to improve LEMIS, to proceed with plans to increase
the fees charged for inspection services, and to develop
outcome-oriented, performance-related goals that are indicative of an
effective inspection program. 

Interior disagreed with our recommendation to examine the operations
of the various ports of entry and look for ways in which the
allocation of resources might be adjusted to respond to the current
needs at the ports and to improve the program's overall efficiency
and effectiveness.  It did indicate, however, that workload factors
have been used to justify increased resources at several ports of
entry (namely, Los Angeles, Chicago, and U.S.-Mexico border ports)
and that they would continue to be considered.  Interior pointed out
that any decision to reallocate existing resources must also factor
in political and economic considerations and the fact that FWS has
determined that it must maintain a minimum staffing presence at its
designated ports to provide uninterrupted service.  We agree that
such factors should be a part of any reallocation considerations. 
Our analysis indicates, however, that the variances among the
different ports of entry in terms of such things as the number of (1)
inspectors assigned, (2) shipments processed, and (3) shipments
inspected are significant enough to warrant additional scrutiny by
FWS of its allocation of resources to the wildlife inspection
program. 

Interior also disagreed with a recommendation in our draft report to
conduct a study of the penalties and fines assessed as a result of
violations detected by the wildlife inspection program, and then meet
with the Office of the Solicitor and the Department of Justice to
identify ways in which the parties might work better together in
catching and prosecuting those who violate wildlife trade laws and
treaties.  Interior stated that it was not apparent how a study of
the penalties and fines is relevant to identifying ways in which the
enforcement and prosecution parties can work better together. 

In our opinion, the number and dollar amounts of the penalties and
fines assessed as a result of FWS' wildlife inspection program is an
important gauge of the effectiveness of the program.  While it is
unrealistic to expect every violation to result in a penalty or fine,
we believe that FWS management should be concerned by the fact that
few penalties and fines are currently being assessed for violations
detected by the wildlife inspection program and that this lack of
penalties and fines provides little or no deterrent to those who
would otherwise be inclined to violate wildlife laws and treaties. 
Given the limited resources that FWS devotes to the wildlife
inspection program, it is our opinion that FWS should attempt to get
the most out of those resources.  One such way would be for
FWS--armed with basic data on the numbers of inspections conducted,
violations detected, and penalties and fines assessed for these
violations--to initiate discussions with the Office of the Solicitor
and the Department of Justice that would seek to ensure a more
efficient and effective wildlife inspection program.  We have revised
our recommendation to more specifically state the action that we
believe is needed. 

Interior provided several technical clarifications, which we
incorporated into the report as appropriate.  Interior's comments in
their entirety and our responses are presented in appendix III. 

In addition to the written comments received from Interior, we
discussed the contents of this report with officials in the
Department of the Treasury's Customs Service.  We were told that the
report clearly states the issues surrounding the wildlife inspection
program, particularly in connection with the possible transfer of the
inspection program, and that the report accurately states what
Customs officials consider to be the advantages and disadvantages of
such a transfer.  We were told that although wildlife is not
emphasized at Customs (because of other priorities), Customs, in a
limited manner, does look at wildlife shipments and includes some of
them in its automated cargo system, which is accessible to FWS
inspectors.  Additionally, we were provided with several technical
clarifications, which we incorporated into the report. 


MAJOR LAWS AND TREATIES THAT
CONTROL WILDLIFE IMPORTS AND
EXPORTS
=========================================================== Appendix I

The Lacey Act, as amended (18 U.S.C.  42; 16 U.S.C.  3371-3378). 
Passed in 1900, the Lacey Act prohibits the import, export,
transportation, sale, receipt, acquisition, or purchase of fish,
wildlife, or plants that are taken, possessed, transported, or sold
in violation of any federal, state, tribal, or foreign law. 
Amendments to the act in 1981, which provided, among other things,
the authority for warrantless search and seizure when violations are
suspected, were designed to (1) strengthen federal enforcement of
laws to protect fish and wildlife and (2) improve relevant federal
assistance to states and foreign governments.  The act is used to
control the smuggling of and trade in illegally taken fish and
wildlife.  The Lacey Act also regulates the transportation of live
wildlife, requiring that animals be transported into the United
States under humane and healthful conditions.  Furthermore, the act
allows the Secretary of the Interior to designate wildlife species as
injurious to humans and to prohibit the importation of such species. 

Individuals convicted of violating the Lacey Act may, for
misdemeanors, be sentenced to up to 1 year in jail and fined up to
$100,000 and, for felonies, may be sentenced to up to 5 years and
fined up to $250,000.  Fines for organizations in violation of the
act are, for misdemeanor and felony violations, up to $200,000 and
$500,000, respectively.  In addition, vehicles, aircraft, and
equipment used in a violation, as well as illegally obtained fish,
wildlife, and plants, may be subject to forfeiture.  Persons who
provide information on violations of the Lacey Act may be eligible
for cash rewards. 

Endangered Species Act of 1973, as amended (16 U.S.C.  1531-1544). 
This act is designed to regulate a wide range of activities affecting
plants and animals designated as endangered or threatened.  It
prohibits the following activities: 

importing into or exporting from the United States;

taking (includes harassing, harming, pursuing, hunting, shooting,
wounding, trapping, killing, capturing, or collecting) within the
United States and its territorial seas;

taking on the high seas;

possessing, selling, delivering, carrying, transporting, or shipping
any species unlawfully taken within the United States, its
territorial seas, or on the high seas;

delivering, receiving, carrying, transporting, or shipping in
interstate or foreign commerce in the course of a commercial
activity; and

selling or offering for sale in interstate or foreign commerce. 

The prohibitions apply to endangered species, their parts, and
products made from their parts.  Most of these restrictions also
apply to species listed as threatened, unless the species qualifies
for an exception.  The act also allows listing as protected, species
similar in appearance to those that are endangered or threatened,
when doing so would provide additional protection for the listed
endangered or threatened species.  Individuals in violation of the
Endangered Species Act are subject to fines of up to $100,000 and 1
year's imprisonment.  Organizations found in violation may be fined
up to $200,000.  Fish, wildlife, plants, and vehicles and equipment
used in violations may be subject to forfeiture.  Individuals
providing information leading to a civil penalty or criminal
conviction may be eligible for cash rewards. 

The Endangered Species Act of 1973 also implements the provisions of
the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora (CITES).  The purpose of CITES is to prevent
international trade from contributing to the endangerment of any
species.  To achieve this, CITES establishes a system of trade
controls that vary in their restrictiveness, depending upon the
degree of jeopardy each species faces.  The trade controls imposed by
CITES apply only to the species listed in three appendixes to the
treaty.  The species listed in appendix I of the treaty receive the
most protection:  They cannot be imported or exported for primarily
commercial purposes.  To be traded for other purposes, a specimen of
any species listed in appendix I must be accompanied by an export
permit from the exporting country and an import permit from the
importing country. 

Species listed in appendix II of the treaty, which are the vast
majority of all species protected by CITES, can be traded for both
commercial and noncommercial purposes.  However, they must be
accompanied by an export permit, which may be issued only upon the
finding that the export of the specimens concerned will not be
detrimental to the survival of the species.  This requirement allows
countries to control trade in those species listed in appendix II. 

Member countries may unilaterally list in appendix III of the treaty
species that are protected within the countries' borders.  The
purpose of appendix III is to obtain international cooperation in the
enforcement of national conservation laws.  Countries importing
specimens of a species listed in appendix III from the country
responsible for including the species in the appendix must insist
upon presentation of a permit showing that the specimens were
lawfully acquired and exported from that country. 

The parties to CITES agreed that hybrid species may be listed in the
above appendixes if they form distinctive and stable populations in
the wild.  Also, hybrids are subject to the provisions of CITES even
if they are not included in the appendixes, if one or both of their
parents are of listed species. 

Antarctic Conservation Act of 1978 (16 U.S.C.  2401-2412).  The
purpose of the act is to provide for the conservation and protection
of the fauna and flora of Antarctica and of the ecosystem on which
fauna and flora depend.  The primary prohibitions of the act make it
unlawful for any U.S.  citizen to take any native bird or mammal in
Antarctica or to collect any native plant from any specially
protected area within Antarctica.  In addition, the act makes it
unlawful for any U.S.  citizen or any foreign person in the United
States to possess, sell, offer for sale, deliver, receive, carry,
transport, import to or export from the United States, or attempt to
import or export any native mammal or bird taken in Antarctica or any
plant collected in any specially protected area. 

African Elephant Conservation Act (16 U.S.C.  4201-4245).  The
purpose of the act, passed in 1988, is to provide additional
protection for the African elephant.  The act establishes an
assistance program to the countries of Africa where elephants are
indigenous and provides for the establishment of an African Elephant
Conservation Fund.  In addition, the act places a moratorium on the
importation of raw or worked ivory from African countries not meeting
certain criteria found in the act. 

Migratory Bird Treaty Act, as amended (16 U.S.C.  703-712). 
Originally passed in 1918, this act makes it unlawful--except as
allowed by implementing regulations--to take, possess, buy, sell,
purchase, or barter any migratory bird, including the feathers or
other parts, nests, eggs, or migratory bird products.  "Taking" is
defined as pursuing, hunting, shooting, shooting at, poisoning,
wounding, killing, capturing, trapping, or collecting migratory
birds.  Migratory bird hunting regulations, established by FWS, allow
during designated seasons the taking of ducks, geese, doves, rail,
woodcock, and some other species.  In addition, permits may be
granted for various noncommercial activities involving migratory
birds and some commercial activities involving birds bred in
captivity.  Individuals and organizations may be fined up to $5,000
and $10,000, respectively, and those convicted may face up to 6
months' imprisonment for misdemeanor violations of the act.  Felony
violations may result in fines of up to $250,000 for individuals and
$500,000 for organizations and up to 2 years' imprisonment for those
convicted. 

The Migratory Bird Treaty Act also implemented four international
treaties that individually affected migratory birds common to the
United States and four countries--Canada, Japan, Mexico, and the
Soviet Union.  It authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to
determine when, how, and the extent to which migratory birds may be
taken consistent with the treaties that the act implements, and the
act prohibits anyone from taking such birds except in accordance with
the Secretary's regulations. 

Eagle Protection Act (16 U.S.C.  668-668c).  Passed in 1940, this act
makes it illegal to import, export, or take bald or golden eagles or
to sell, purchase, or barter their parts, nests, or eggs or products
made from the animals.  "Taking" encompasses pursuing, shooting,
shooting at, poisoning, wounding, killing, capturing, trapping,
collecting, molesting, or disturbing.  Permits may be granted for
scientific, exhibitory, or Indian religious purposes.  However, no
permits may be issued for the import, export, or commercialization of
eagles.  Misdemeanor violations may result in fines of up to $100,000
for individuals and $200,000 for organizations, and 1 year's
imprisonment.  For felony violations, fines of up to $250,000 and
$500,000 for individuals and organizations, respectively, and 2
years' imprisonment may result.  Persons providing information
leading to the conviction of violators of the Eagle Protection Act
may be eligible for cash rewards. 

Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (16 U.S.C.  1361-1407).  This
act establishes a moratorium on the taking and importation of marine
mammals, including parts and products, and defines federal
responsibility for the conservation of marine mammals:  Management
authority is vested in the Department of the Interior for the sea
otter, marine otter, walrus, polar bear, dugong, and manatee.  Under
this act, it is unlawful to take any marine mammal on the high seas
or in water or on lands under the jurisdiction of the United States. 
It is also unlawful to (1) use any port or harbor under U.S. 
jurisdiction for any purpose connected with the unlawful taking or
importation of any marine mammal; (2) possess any unlawfully taken
marine mammal, including parts and products; or (3) transport,
purchase, sell, or offer to purchase or sell any marine mammal,
including parts and products. 

Alaskan Aleuts, Indians, and Eskimos who reside in Alaska are
permitted to take marine mammals for the purpose of subsistence or
for use in the manufacture and sale of native handicrafts.  Permits
may be granted for research on or display of marine mammals; permits
may also be granted to those who show economic hardship.  Violations
of the act may result in fines of up to $100,000 and 1 year's
imprisonment for individuals and fines of up to $200,000 for
organizations.  In addition, the entire cargo, or its monetary value,
of aircraft, vessels, or other conveyances used in violations may be
forfeited. 

Wild Bird Conservation Act (16 U.S.C.  4901-4916).  This act, passed
in 1992, promotes the conservation of wild exotic birds.  It
prohibits the importation of any exotic bird in violation of any
prohibition, suspension, or quota issued under the act and the
importation of an exotic bird of a species included in a list of
approved captive-bred species if the bird was not captive-bred at a
qualifying facility.  Criminal violations of the act may result in
fines of up to $250,000 and 2 years' imprisonment for individuals and
fines of up to $500,000 for organizations.  Civil violations can
result in $12,000 to $25,000 in fines for any person who knowingly
violates the act and $500 in fines for any person who violates the
act.  In addition, criminal violations can result in the forfeiture
of all fish, wildlife, plants, vessels, vehicles, and other equipment
involved in a felony.  Civil violations can result in the forfeiture
of all fish, wildlife, and plants. 




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
GAO QUESTIONNAIRE
=========================================================== Appendix I



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(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR
=========================================================== Appendix I



(See figure in printed edition.)

 See comment 1. 

 Now on p.  15.
See comment 2. 

 Now on p.  19.
See comment 3. 

 Now on p.  20.
See comment 3. 

 Now on p.  47.

 See comment 4. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 Recommendations
may now be found
on pp.  48 and 49. 

 See comment 5. 

 See comment 5. 



(See figure in printed edition.)

 See comment 5. 

 See comment 6. 

 See comment 5. 


The following are GAO's comments on the Department of the Interior's
letter dated November 16, 1994. 


   GAO'S COMMENTS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1

1. We recognize that LEMIS contains information on the number of
shipments processed and inspected.  However, the entry of wildlife
shipment and inspection data into LEMIS, according to a number of FWS
officials contacted during our review, is oftentimes not timely or
accurate, and little or no quality check of the data is made to
ensure its accuracy.  FWS recognizes that the quality of the data
needs improvement and is planning some steps to increase the data's
timeliness and accuracy. 

While LEMIS does contain information that can be evaluated to
determine the levels and trends in wildlife shipments and that has
been used by the FWS Division of Law Enforcement and TRAFFIC USA in
the past to analyze trade trends, the information has little value
unless it is compiled, analyzed, and disseminated to those who need
it.  As we point out in the report, FWS regional officials and
wildlife inspectors alike told us that they generally are not
provided with the LEMIS information they need. 

2. We consider the information in our 1991 report to be relevant to
this report.  Not only are the special agents and wildlife inspectors
both a part of the FWS Division of Law Enforcement, but as we discuss
in this report, the special agents work very closely with the
wildlife inspectors to enforce and administer the federal laws and
treaties governing the exportation and importation of wildlife and
wildlife parts and products.  Furthermore, the problems affecting the
wildlife inspection program--for example, limited resources devoted
to the program and a lack of current and reliable LEMIS data--are
similar to those we reported as negatively affecting the special
agents' ability to conduct their activities. 

3. We revised our final report to recognize this comment. 

4. We revised the conclusions in our final report to recognize these
comments. 

5. This comment is recognized and evaluated at the end of chapter 5. 

6. This comment is recognized and evaluated at the end of chapter 5. 
We have also revised the recommendation in our final report to more
clearly state the action that we believe FWS should take. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV


   RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND
   ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION,
   WASHINGTON, D.C. 
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:1

John H.  Anderson, Jr.
Sherry L.  Casas
Kelly S.  Ervin
Curtis L.  Groves
Ralph W.  Lamoreaux


   SEATTLE REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix IV:2

Rodney R.  Conti
Sterling J.  Leibenguth
