Nuclear Materials: Plutonium Storage at DOE's Rocky Flats Plant (Letter
Report, 12/29/94, GAO/RCED-95-49).

The Energy Department (DOE) faces a variety of important, unresolved
safety problems with plutonium storage at the Rocky Flats Plant in
Colorado.  When the plant was shut down in 1989, DOE intended to restart
operations in a few months and plutonium was left in place or packaged
for short-term storage.  However, the operations were never restarted
and the plutonium stayed where it was, raising concerns about plutonium
liquid leaking from pipes and tanks, fire hazards, and worker exposure
to plutonium.  Although DOE has efforts under way to address these
problems, important decisions, such as what to do with the plutonium
residues, have yet to be made.  As a result, estimating the time frames
and the total cost for resolving the concerns is difficult.  In any
event, fully implementing DOE's programs will take many years and will
likely cost hundreds of millions of dollars.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-95-49
     TITLE:  Nuclear Materials: Plutonium Storage at DOE's Rocky Flats 
             Plant
      DATE:  12/29/94
   SUBJECT:  Nuclear waste management
             Toxic substances
             Nuclear waste storage
             Radioactive wastes
             Atomic energy defense activities
             Radiation exposure hazards
             Nuclear weapons plants
             GOCO
             Safety standards
             Nuclear facility safety

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives

December 1994

NUCLEAR MATERIALS - PLUTONIUM
STORAGE AT DOE'S ROCKY FLATS PLANT

GAO/RCED-95-49

Plutonium Storage at Rocky Flats


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOE
  GAO
  PEIS

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-259072

December 29, 1994

The Honorable John D.  Dingell
Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight
 and Investigations
Committee on Energy and Commerce
House of Representatives

Dear Mr.  Chairman: 

Since the 1950s, the Department of Energy's (DOE) Rocky Flats Plant
has processed material containing plutonium and has fabricated
plutonium metal into components for nuclear weapons.  Because of its
radioactive and toxic properties, plutonium requires special
handling.  In late 1989, operations to process and fabricate
plutonium at Rocky Flats were suspended for various reasons,
including concerns about health and safety.  These operations were
never resumed at the plant, and large quantities of plutonium, in
various forms, are currently stored there.  You asked us to examine
the storage of plutonium at Rocky Flats.  Specifically, you asked us
to provide information on (1) the safety of plutonium storage at the
plant and (2) DOE's current efforts and plans to resolve any problems
with the storage. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

DOE's storage of about 12.8 metric tons\1 of plutonium at the Rocky
Flats Plant raises a number of important, unresolved safety concerns. 
When operations were suspended at the plant in 1989, DOE intended to
restart them within a few months.  As a result, the plutonium was
left in place or was packaged for short-term storage.\2 For example,
plutonium liquids were left in tanks, plastic bottles, or piping. 
However, the operations were never restarted and the plutonium
remains either where it was when the plant shut down or packaged for
what was intended to be temporary, short-term storage.  This
situation has resulted in a number of safety concerns, including
plutonium liquids leaking from pipes and tanks, fire hazards, and
risks of exposing workers to plutonium. 

DOE has recognized these safety problems at Rocky Flats and has taken
numerous corrective actions over the past 2 years.  For example, DOE
headquarters has developed criteria for longer-term plutonium
storage, which should be published in early 1995.  Corrective actions
to address the more immediate problems at the plant are also under
way.  For example, plutonium metals are being inspected and, if
necessary, brought into compliance with fire safety standards. 
However, other important decisions, such as what to do with plutonium
residues (by-products of past operations), have not yet been made. 
As a result, it is difficult to accurately project time frames and
costs for resolving the problems with plutonium storage at the plant. 
In any event, on the basis of the programs DOE currently has under
way or is proposing, resolving these problems will take many years
and will likely cost hundreds of millions of dollars. 


--------------------
\1 A metric ton is 1,000 kilograms, or about 2,200 pounds. 

\2 For the purposes of this report, short-term storage is shorter
than 2 years; long-term storage is longer than 2 years. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

DOE's Rocky Flats Plant is a government-owned, contractor-operated
facility that recovered and reprocessed nuclear materials and
fabricated nuclear and nonnuclear components.  It is located
approximately 16 miles northwest of Denver, Colorado.  For nearly 40
years, the facility's primary mission was to use plutonium to
fabricate "pits," the triggers for nuclear weapons.  Plutonium is a
man-made material produced as a by-product of nuclear reactions.  It
remains radioactive and highly toxic for tens of thousands of years
and must be handled with specialized equipment to protect workers and
prevent the material from dispersing into the environment.\3

Storing plutonium poses problems for DOE.  Plutonium metal reacts
with oxygen, hydrogen, and water vapor.  As a result of these
reactions, plutonium fines and plutonium hydrides are sometimes
formed;\4 they are pyrophoric, having the potential to spontaneously
ignite.  For any prolonged period, therefore, plutonium should be
stored in an oxygen and moisture-controlled environment.  Plutonium
also should not be stored in direct contact with organic materials
such as plastic.  The radiation from plutonium can cause the organic
material to decompose, producing hydrogen and other substances.  The
hydrogen can react with the plutonium to produce plutonium hydrides. 
Finally, although the plutonium metal used in weapons consists mostly
of the isotope plutonium-239, small amounts of other plutonium
isotopes are also present.  One of them, plutonium-241, will decay\5
to americium-241, an isotope that emits a type of radiation that is
more difficult to shield against.  This process can increase the risk
of radiation exposure to workers. 

Because of the radioactive and toxic characteristics of plutonium, it
must be carefully stored.  However, DOE had no criteria for long-term
storage because until 1989, the plutonium at Rocky Flats was
continually being recycled into new weapons.  DOE does have criteria
for short-term storage, including various DOE orders and directives
as well as requirements specific to the sites.  For example, the
containers in which plutonium is stored must be periodically
monitored and checked to control potential fire hazards.  At Rocky
Flats, inspections may be required anywhere from every few hours to
every 2 years or longer, depending on the form of the plutonium and
the container used.  The site-specific requirements also address fire
safety, the labeling of containers, records management, and
criticality safety (preventing a nuclear chain reaction). 

All operations for processing plutonium and fabricating plutonium
components for weapons at Rocky Flats were shut down in late 1989 for
various reasons, including concerns about human health and safety. 
The shutdown continued for more than 2 years as DOE attempted to
develop new safety and management procedures.  However, in February
1992 the President canceled the plant's production mission because of
dramatic reductions in the U.S.  nuclear weapons arsenal.  As a
result, DOE shifted the plant's mission to site cleanup and
environmental restoration, and transferred management responsibility
for the plant from the Office of Defense Programs to the Office of
Environmental Management. 


--------------------
\3 Plutonium has a radioactive half-life of 24,000 years, meaning
that half of the present amount will still exist 24,000 years from
now. 

\4 Plutonium fines are very small pieces of plutonium metal similar
to steel wool; hydrides are compounds formed when plutonium metal
reacts with hydrogen. 

\5 Radioactive decay is a process whereby the unstable atoms of
certain elements naturally change into other elements.  For example,
several isotopes of plutonium are created during the nuclear fission
process, and they will naturally decay into other isotopes that are
also radioactive. 


   PLUTONIUM CURRENTLY STORED
   RAISES SAFETY CONCERNS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

The plutonium currently stored at Rocky Flats poses a number of
safety concerns, including risks of fire and risks of exposing
workers to plutonium as a result of improper packaging and leaking
and deteriorating containers.  This situation occurred because DOE
thought the shutdown would last only a few months and left the
plutonium-bearing materials in pipelines, glove boxes,\6

tanks, or drums--where they were located when operations ceased--or
packaged them for short-term storage.  As of December 1994, about
12.8 metric tons of plutonium was being stored at Rocky Flats in four
basic forms--plutonium metal, plutonium oxides, plutonium contained
in liquids, and plutonium residues. 


--------------------
\6 A glove box is a containment structure fitted with gloves that
allow workers to handle material without touching it. 


      PLUTONIUM METAL
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

The plutonium metal is nearly pure plutonium or is alloyed with other
metals.  It was used to fabricate various parts of nuclear weapons. 
About 6.6 metric tons of plutonium metal, consisting of over 3,000
items, is currently stored in several different buildings within the
Rocky Flats complex. 

When operations ceased at the plant, DOE stored the plutonium metal
in containers (cans made of stainless steel or tin-plated steel) that
(1) were not airtight or (2) had seals that were not designed for
long-term storage.  According to DOE officials at Rocky Flats, the
containers could permit oxygen and/or moisture to enter and react
with the plutonium, possibly creating pyrophoric material.  Also,
according to DOE headquarters officials, oxygen could enter the
containers and create plutonium oxides that could expand and rupture
the containers.  The plutonium has been stored in this manner for
over 5 years.\7

In addition, an undetermined amount of the stored plutonium metals
may be in direct contact with plastic.  The radiation from the
plutonium could react with the plastic and cause hydrogen to form. 
The hydrogen could then react with the plutonium to form plutonium
hydrides, which are pyrophoric.  The plutonium metal was packaged in
plastic because plant officials anticipated restarting operations
within a few months, and they considered plastic to be safe for this
period of time. 

DOE officials at Rocky Flats admit that the plutonium metal is not
stored in compliance with the site's fire safety requirements.  They
believe that some of the plutonium metal is potentially a fire hazard
and are studying the extent of the problem.  The Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board\8 reviewed the storage of plutonium metal at
Rocky Flats and, in October 1993, reported to DOE that many plutonium
items were packaged hastily and are in contact with plastic.  The
Safety Board labeled the storage of the plutonium metal as a
dangerous situation.  In a May 1994 formal recommendation to the
Secretary of Energy, the Safety Board again expressed concern about
the issues surrounding plutonium storage and recommended corrective
actions.  The Safety Board specifically cited storage of plutonium
metal in contact with plastic, stating that it is "well known that
plutonium in contact with plastic can cause formation of hydrogen gas
and pyrophoric plutonium compounds leading to a high probability of
plutonium fires."\9


--------------------
\7 According to DOE and contractor officials at Rocky Flats, recent
inspections of containers of plutonium metal have shown that
oxidation has occurred at a relatively minor rate. 

\8 The Safety Board was created by the Congress in 1988 (P.L. 
100-456) to provide independent health and safety oversight of DOE's
defense nuclear facilities.  The Safety Board conducts investigations
and makes recommendations to the Secretary of Energy and the
President. 

\9 A more complete discussion of the Safety Board's concerns is
contained in Plutonium Storage Safety at Major Department of Energy
Facilities, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Technical Report
(DNFSB/Tech-1, Apr.  14, 1994). 


      PLUTONIUM OXIDE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

Plutonium oxide is formed when plutonium metal oxidizes (similar to
iron rusting).  This material was formed during past production
operations or as a result of plutonium metal reacting with air. 
About 3.2 metric tons of plutonium oxide are stored at Rocky Flats in
more than 3,000 containers.  At the time operations were shut down in
1989, approximately 97 percent of the plutonium oxides had been
thermally treated to remove pyrophoric components.  Once plutonium
oxide is thermally treated and properly sealed, it is better suited
for longer-term storage. 

The remaining 3 percent of the oxide, which has not been thermally
treated, is stored in stainless steel cans in glove boxes with inert
atmospheres.  Heat detectors and alarms were placed in the glove
boxes as required to detect spontaneous ignitions.  According to DOE
officials at the plant, some of these cans probably contain oxides
mixed with small plutonium fines.  The potential risk in storing
these cans involves breach of containment and dispersal of the
plutonium oxide within the glove box.  Contractor officials at Rocky
Flats state that without some external stimulus, the danger of
spontaneous ignition of the plutonium oxide that has not been
thermally treated is minimal.  They informed us that the containers,
along with the reduced oxygen atmosphere in the glove boxes where the
containers are stored, greatly reduce the potential for fire. 


      PLUTONIUM IN LIQUIDS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3

About 30,000 liters of liquid solutions, containing about 0.1 metric
tons of plutonium, are stored at Rocky Flats.  When Rocky Flats was
operating, the liquids were routinely processed to recover the
plutonium and were not generally stored for long periods of time. 
When Rocky Flats was shut down, the liquids were contained in plastic
containers, tanks, and pipelines in several buildings, where they
currently remain. 

Since the shutdown, there have been 29 reported leaks as a result of
plutonium interacting with plastic bottles and natural deterioration
of the piping and tanks.  One of the most serious of these leaks was
the rupture in July 1993 of an overhead oxalic acid line that sprayed
plutonium-contaminated liquid over a radius of 6 to 7 meters.  No
contamination of personnel was reported, and the area has since been
decontaminated. 

In April 1993, the Los Alamos Technology Office at Rocky Flats, a
contractor to DOE, conducted a study to determine the hazards of
continuing to store plutonium-bearing liquids at Rocky Flats.\10 The
Los Alamos Technology Office concluded that the plutonium stored in
tanks and bottles in seven of the Rocky Flats buildings presents a
safety hazard from leaks and/or spills and the associated increased
risk of workers being exposed to radiation.  The study states that as
the containers age, the incidence of spills and leaks will increase
and could result in increased exposure of workers.  The study
concluded that continued storage of the plutonium solutions was
inadvisable and recommended converting them into solid form
"promptly." In a June 1994 DOE headquarters review, officials found
the plutonium solutions in plastic bottles to be particularly
hazardous because the plastic was becoming brittle from reacting with
plutonium. 

According to staff of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board,
another important risk arising from continued storage of plutonium
solutions in deteriorating equipment is accidental criticality--that
is, an accidental nuclear chain reaction.  The staff points out that
as the equipment and infrastructure deteriorate, it will become more
difficult to take representative samples, control the chemistry of
the solutions, and move the solutions from one place to another.  The
staff believes that this awkwardness and uncertainty will tend to
make accidental criticality more likely. 


--------------------
\10 Plutonium and Uranium Solutions Safety Study, Los Alamos
Technology Office at Rocky Flats (LA-UR-93-3282, Oct.  1993). 


      PLUTONIUM RESIDUES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.4

The fourth category of plutonium stored at Rocky Flats is 2.9 metric
tons of plutonium contained in about 100 metric tons of residues. 
These residues, the by-products of past production operations,
consist of ash, salts, slags, graphites, and other materials.  They
are contained in over 20,000 packages in 5,000 metal drums located in
various buildings at Rocky Flats.  If operations had been restarted
at Rocky Flats, much of the residues could have been reprocessed to
recover the plutonium. 

The continued storage of the residues has raised concerns about
potential safety risks.  The drums contain a variety of corrosive,
flammable, and possibly reactive materials.  A September 1993 study
by the plant's contractor identified the predominant safety risks
with the residues as gas generation, loss of contamination
containment, corrosion of drums and residue packaging, and formation
of pyrophoric or unstable compounds.\11 Gas generation in residue
drums can result in pressurization of the drum or packages in the
drum through an accumulation of hydrogen.\12 The study concluded that
although stored residues pose no imminent danger, the potential
safety risks are sufficiently real to warrant further study. 

A June 1994 DOE headquarters review found a number of potential
problems with the storage of residues.  These included fire hazards,
radiation exposure, and gas buildup in the drums.  Headquarters
officials who participated in this review expressed their concern
about the lack of effort to resolve these problems, some of which
have been documented for many years.  The Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board has also reviewed the storage of plutonium residues at
Rocky Flats and concluded that it is a "significant immediate safety
issue." The Safety Board is concerned that some of the material could
explode if the storage drums were dropped, punctured, or otherwise
roughly handled.  The Safety Board also believes that spontaneous
chemical reactions are possible in some of the drums and that the
materials in many of the drums have not been well characterized.  The
Safety Board formally recommended in 1994 that all unstable plutonium
residues be processed to stable forms within 2 to 3 years. 


--------------------
\11 Evaluation of Residue Drum Storage Safety Risks, EG&G Rocky
Flats, Inc.  (93-RF-12968, Sept.  27, 1993). 

\12 Some drums have been equipped with vents to prevent gas buildup. 


   DOE'S PLANS FOR REDUCING
   STORAGE PROBLEMS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

DOE is addressing the problems with plutonium storage at Rocky Flats. 
DOE headquarters has begun a number of efforts, including developing
uniform national criteria for the handling and storage of plutonium
metals and oxides.  The operating contractor at Rocky Flats has also
begun corrective actions to address many of the more immediate
problems. 


      HEADQUARTERS' EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1

Because of concerns about plutonium storage at DOE facilities, in May
1993 the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs began
looking into the problems.  The Office recognized that criteria for
long-term storage of plutonium did not exist and that current
short-term storage raised safety concerns.  This effort led to the
drafting of national criteria for handling and storing plutonium
metals and oxides. 

The national criteria for storage have been incorporated in a DOE
technical standard that should be published in early 1995.  The
criteria establish specific guidelines for DOE facilities to
follow.\13 The criteria specify that the stored plutonium be either
solid metal or oxide (powder or solid) and that it be retrievable for
future use.  The criteria also specify the maximum permitted
quantities of plutonium per container.  Furthermore, the criteria
require that

plutonium metal be stored in a size and configuration that makes it
less prone to being pyrophoric,

no plastic or organic materials be in direct contact with stored
plutonium,

plutonium be encased in two protective barriers meeting stringent
storage and/or transportation criteria, and

plutonium oxides be thermally treated to remove pyrophoric materials
and minimize moisture content, and then be packaged so that the
oxides do not reabsorb any moisture. 

DOE officials believe that if these criteria are used, plutonium
metals and oxides can be safely stored for 50 years. 

A number of other, potentially significant efforts are under way at
DOE headquarters, but it is not yet clear how they will interface
with each other or when they will be implemented.  For example, in
June 1994 DOE issued a notice of intent to prepare a programmatic
environmental impact statement (PEIS) for long-term storage and
disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials.  The PEIS will be
used to make decisions on the long-term storage of such materials
(plutonium and enriched uranium) and on alternatives for disposing of
surplus plutonium.  DOE expects to complete the PEIS in the spring of
1996. 

DOE headquarters is also just completing an environmental safety and
health vulnerability assessment for plutonium that looked at concerns
about plutonium storage at DOE facilities nationwide.\14 Each
facility is required to develop action plans to address the
vulnerabilities specific to its location.  DOE expects this study to
be completed early in 1995.  Finally, DOE headquarters has developed
an implementation plan to address concerns about plutonium storage at
Rocky Flats and other sites identified by the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board.  According to DOE officials, the actual work
plan to correct the deficiencies noted by the Safety Board is not
likely to be completed until mid-1995.  Again, it is not yet clear
how all of these activities will be factored into the Department's
decision-making process. 


--------------------
\13 DOE Standard:  Criteria for Storage of Plutonium Metals and
Oxides (DOE-STD-3013-94, Dec.  1994). 

\14 Plutonium Working Group Report on Environmental, Safety and
Health Vulnerabilities Associated with the Department's Plutonium
Storage, U.S.  Dept.  of Energy (DOE/EH-0415, Draft, Sept.  1994). 


      DOE'S AND CONTRACTOR'S FIELD
      INITIATIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2

The Rocky Flats operating contractor has initiatives under way to
address many of the more immediate problems with plutonium storage at
the plant.  To address the concern that the plutonium metal is not in
compliance with fire safety requirements, the contractor issued a
draft management plan in July 1993.\15 Two key purposes of the plan
are (1) to identify the risks in continuing to store plutonium metal
and in performing corrective actions and (2) to prepare detailed site
plans to bring the plutonium into compliance with the plant's
existing fire safety requirements.  The key component in implementing
this plan is to inspect a sample of 10 percent of the containers in
which the plutonium metal is stored to characterize the nature and
extent of the problems. 

The draft plan was approved by the operating contractor in November
1993, and the sampling began in February 1994.  As the containers are
inspected, they will be brought into compliance with existing fire
safety requirements by removing from the plutonium metal any
pyrophoric material and/or any organic material, such as plastic, and
then repackaging the metal.  Contractor officials at Rocky Flats
believe the sampling will be completed by September 1995, at a total
cost of $7.4 million.  These officials believe it would likely cost
an additional $4.5 million and take 2 years to bring the remaining
plutonium metal into compliance with fire safety standards.  However,
this does not include the cost to package the plutonium metal in
accordance with DOE's new criteria for long-term storage (encasement
in two protective barriers). 

To address the risk of fire from containers of plutonium oxide that
also contain plutonium metal fines, the operating contractor proposes
to resume thermal stabilization operations in one of the Rocky Flats
buildings.  In February 1994, DOE completed an environmental
assessment for resuming thermal stabilization operations and found no
significant environmental problems.\16 In November 1994, the
contractor received approval from the Secretary of Energy to resume
thermal stabilization and is initiating the actions required to start
work by January 1995. 

Contractor officials estimate that thermally stabilizing the
pyrophoric plutonium oxide could take until the end of fiscal year
1997 to complete and will cost about $4.5 million.  This
stabilization will bring the oxides into compliance with existing
fire safety requirements at the site, but not the new storage
criteria.  According to DOE headquarters officials, the proposed
stabilization efforts will not meet the criterion on moisture
content.  Rocky Flats currently does not have a facility where it can
stabilize the oxides, allow them to cool, and then repackage them in
a moisture-free environment to meet this criterion.  According to
contractor officials, it will cost about $30 million to purchase the
necessary equipment and stabilize all the oxides.  They believe this
stabilization effort could begin in early 1998 and take 5 years to
complete.  However, as with the plutonium metal, this amount does not
include the cost to package the oxides in accordance with DOE's new
criteria for long-term storage. 

To address the safety concerns about liquids containing plutonium,
the Rocky Flats contractor has implemented a Solution Stabilization
Program.  The major efforts under this program are two separate plans
to remove both high-level and low-level solutions from tanks, piping,
and bottles in the two buildings with the more severe problems.  The
two plans were issued in January 1994.  The plans describe several
processes to be used to either (1) solidify the low-level solutions
and package them for disposal under the program for low-level wastes
or (2) extract the plutonium from the high-level solutions so the
remaining solutions can be solidified for disposal under the program
for low-level wastes.  The Solution Stabilization Program, including
efforts under both of these plans, is scheduled for completion by the
end of fiscal year 1999, at an estimated total cost of between $122
million and $144 million. 

DOE has been studying what to do with plutonium-bearing residues for
many years.  In September 1992, we reported that addressing the
problems with these residues could cost from about $650 million to
$1.5 billion, depending on whether the plutonium they contain is
recovered or the residues are disposed of as waste.\17 At that time,
DOE had a number of initiatives under way that it expected would lead
to an overall strategy for plutonium that would specify, among other
things, how much plutonium would be recovered from existing residues
and how the remainder would be disposed of.  DOE still has not
developed that strategy.  In the interim, operating contractor
personnel inspect the drums of residues weekly.  The inspections
include checking for pressurization, drum or vent corrosion, and
other signs of degradation.  As problems are observed, corrective
actions are taken. 


--------------------
\15 Management Plan for Resolution of the Safety Issues Associated
with the Storage of Plutonium, EG&G Rocky Flats, Inc.  (93-RF-13799,
Rev.  3, Nov.  8, 1993). 

\16 Draft Environmental Assessment:  Resumption of Thermal
Stabilization of Plutonium Oxide in Building 707, Rocky Flats Plant,
Golden, Colorado, Rocky Flats Plant, DOE (DOE/EA-887, Sept.  1993). 

\17 Nuclear Materials:  Removing Plutonium Residues From Rocky Flats
Will Be Difficult and Costly (GAO/RCED-92-219, Sept.  4, 1992). 


   CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5

DOE faces a variety of important, unresolved safety problems with
plutonium storage at the Rocky Flats Plant.  DOE has recognized these
problems and has a number of efforts under way at headquarters and at
the plant.  However, important decisions--such as what to do with the
plutonium residues--still need to be made.  As a result, it is
difficult to accurately estimate the time frames and total cost for
resolving the concerns.  In any event, fully implementing the
programs DOE has under way and is proposing will take many years and
will likely cost hundreds of millions of dollars. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

As requested, we did not obtain written agency comments.  However, we
did discuss the facts in this report with officials in DOE's Office
of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs and Office of the
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.  We also discussed
the facts with DOE officials at Rocky Flats and with the Rocky Flats
operating contractor.  They generally agreed with the facts
presented; we made certain changes in response to their comments,
including updating data on the costs and schedules for certain
programs.  The DOE and contractor officials at Rocky Flats emphasized
to us that they consider the issues raised in this report to be very
important and believe they have initiated an aggressive program to
resolve the concerns.  We also discussed the facts in this report
with the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and, at the Safety
Board's suggestion, made a number of technical changes concerning the
properties of plutonium. 


---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

We performed our work between May 1993 and December 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Appendix I provides a discussion of our objectives, scope, and
methodology. 

As arranged with your office, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report
until 30 days from the date of this letter.  At that time, we will
send copies to the appropriate congressional committees; the
Secretary of Energy; and the Director, Office of Management and
Budget.  We will also make copies available to others upon request. 

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me on (202)
512-3841.  Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
II. 

Sincerely yours,

Victor S.  Rezendes
Director, Energy and
 Science Issues


OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I

As requested by the Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, the
objectives of this review were to provide information on (1) the
safety of plutonium storage at the plant and (2) DOE's current
efforts and plans to resolve any problems with the storage. 

To determine how plutonium is stored at Rocky Flats, we interviewed
DOE and contractor officials at the site about the quantity of
material stored, its location, and the manner of its storage.  We
observed locations where plutonium is stored and obtained and
reviewed studies and documents on plutonium storage at Rocky Flats
and the hazards posed by it.  We also examined the extent of
compliance with requirements and criteria for storing plutonium.  We
obtained applicable federal requirements, DOE orders, and the
operating contractor's site-specific implementing procedures.  We
reviewed a variety of safety-related reports done by other
organizations--including DOE headquarters, DOE contractors, and the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board--and interviewed the
cognizant officials.  We then met with DOE and contractor officials
at the site and discussed the findings in these other reports. 

To determine ongoing and planned actions to resolve the storage
problems, we interviewed DOE and contractor officials at the site and
obtained and reviewed existing studies and plans.  We obtained copies
of pertinent documents and interviewed DOE headquarters officials
responsible for (1) developing criteria for long-term plutonium
storage, (2) performing the programmatic environmental impact
statement on long-term storage and disposal of plutonium and other
materials, and (3) performing the nationwide environmental safety and
health vulnerability assessment for plutonium.  We met with officials
of the Safety Board and discussed their concerns and the corrective
actions they had recommended for Rocky Flats, and attended meetings
between the Safety Board and DOE on the Department's plans for
implementing the corrective actions. 


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II

ENERGY AND SCIENCE ISSUES

Bernice Steinhardt, Associate Director
Mary A.  Crenshaw
Michael F.  Duffy
William F.  Fenzel
John D.  Gentry
Kenneth E.  Lightner, Jr.
Emmanuel S.  Olona
