Department of Energy: A Framework for Restructuring DOE and Its Missions
(Chapter Report, 08/21/95, GAO/RCED-95-197).
Based on a series of earlier reports, GAO presented its overall view of
the Department of Energy (DOE) and its missions.
GAO found that: (1) in response to changing national priorities, DOE is
restructuring its organization and processes to meet its new
responsibilities ranging from environmental cleanup to industrial
competitiveness, but these reforms do not resolve fundamental issues of
its core missions; (2) DOE has assumed that its existing missions are
still valid and are best managed by DOE, but many critics and
policymakers are considering alternatives to DOE management of certain
missions; (3) each mission should be assessed to see if it fulfills an
inherently governmental role and what federal or private sector
alternatives exist that could accomplish the mission more effectively;
(4) reevaluation of DOE should be considered as part of an overall
governmentwide restructuring effort, since DOE restructuring will affect
other federal agencies; (5) a practical set of evaluation criteria can
be used to evaluate the best organizational structure for each DOE
mission according to such factors as cost-effectiveness, flexibility,
responsiveness, and accountability; and (6) most of the experts
consulted believed that DOE should be streamlined around fewer missions,
while other experts believed it should be eliminated as a Cabinet
department and its responsibilities transferred to other federal
agencies and the private sector.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-95-197
TITLE: Department of Energy: A Framework for Restructuring DOE and
Its Missions
DATE: 08/21/95
SUBJECT: Atomic energy defense activities
Energy research
Federal agency reorganization
Environmental monitoring
Energy supplies
Technology transfer
Agency missions
Strategic planning
General management reviews
Nuclear waste storage
IDENTIFIER: DOE Strategic Alignment Initiative
DOE Strategic Plan
GMR
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Congress
August 1995
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - A FRAMEWORK
FOR RESTRUCTURING DOE AND ITS
MISSIONS
GAO/RCED-95-197
Restructuring DOE and Its Missions
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
DOE - Department of Energy
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
ERDA - Energy Research and Development Administration
GAO - General Accounting Office
M&O - management and operating
NAPA - National Academy of Public Administration
PMA - power marketing administration
R&D - research and development
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-261382
August 21, 1995
To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This report on the need to reevaluate the missions of the U.S.
Department of Energy is the final report in a series of GAO
management reviews of the Department. The series of reports assessed
the Department's management, analyzed problems and determined their
underlying causes, and identified ways in which departmental
management processes and structures could be improved. This final
report discusses GAO's overall observations and emphasizes the
Congress's important role, with the Secretary of Energy, in
fundamentally reevaluating DOE's missions and alternatives.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; interested congressional
committees and subcommittees; individual Members of Congress; and
others. Copies are available upon request.
This work was performed under the direction of Victor S. Rezendes,
Director of Energy and Science Issues, who can be reached at (202)
512-3841. Other major contributors are listed in appendix IV.
Keith O. Fultz
Assistant Comptroller General
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) is at a critical juncture in its
history. The Department's original core missions--to develop and
test nuclear weapons, conduct basic energy research, and set national
energy policy--are being replaced by major new challenges in
environmental cleanup and the commercial applications of science.
However, because of organizational structures and processes inherited
from its emphasis on producing nuclear weapons during the Cold War,
DOE faces a highly uncertain future as the Congress moves to
reevaluate the Department as an institution--both its missions and
its capacity to manage them effectively.
GAO has issued a series of reports on DOE that (1) analyzed
underlying causes for the Department's management problems and (2)
identified ways to improve organizational structures, management
systems, and strategies for the Department's changing priorities.
Building on those earlier reports, this report presents GAO's overall
observations about DOE and its missions.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
Created in 1977 from several diverse agencies, DOE manages the
nation's nuclear weapons production complex and conducts research and
development on both energy and basic science. DOE operates an
elaborate network of facilities, its core being the nuclear weapons
complex--a collection of 17 major facilities in 13 states that
design, develop, test, produce, and now dismantle the nation's vast
nuclear arsenal. About half of DOE's resources are devoted to the
nuclear weapons complex, an allocation that reflects both the buildup
of these weapons through the 1980s and, more recently, the rapidly
escalating cost of nuclear waste management and environmental
restoration. DOE also maintains one of the world's largest networks
of scientific laboratories, comprising nearly 30 sophisticated
laboratories valued at over $100 billion. Budgeted at $17.5 billion
for fiscal year 1995, DOE has nearly 20,000 federal employees and
140,000 contract workers.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
With the recent dramatic changes in national priorities, now is an
ideal time to reevaluate DOE and its missions. DOE has begun to
modify its Cold War organizational structures and processes to meet
newer responsibilities, from environmental cleanup to industrial
competitiveness. However, until a more fundamental reevaluation of
DOE's missions and alternatives is undertaken--including
opportunities to restructure and privatize operations--it is not
clear if the Department and its missions are still needed in their
present form or could be implemented more effectively elsewhere in
the public or private sectors.
Although DOE has begun several reinvention efforts, such as contract
reform and a "Strategic Alignment and Downsizing Initiative" to
improve long-standing management weaknesses, the Department has
assumed that existing missions are still valid and are best managed
by it. For some missions, such as those of the civilian nuclear
waste program, experts have argued that DOE is not the best place to
conduct them. For other missions, such as those of the
power-marketing administrations (e.g., Bonneville and Alaska),
petroleum reserves, and the national laboratories, changing
conditions have led many policymakers (including the Congress) to
seriously consider alternatives to DOE's management.
As a first step in reevaluating DOE, each mission should be assessed
to determine if it fulfills an inherently governmental role and what
alternatives are available in the federal government or private
sector to accomplish it most effectively. Criteria developed by a
former DOE advisory panel can be used to evaluate the best
organizational structure for each Departmental mission according to
such factors as stability, cost-effectiveness, flexibility,
responsiveness, and accountability. Experts GAO consulted, including
former Energy Secretaries, offered many suggestions for restructuring
DOE. Most urged that the Department be streamlined around fewer
missions; a minority recommended eliminating DOE as a Cabinet
department; and none argued for DOE's remaining the same.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
DOE'S CHANGING PRIORITIES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
With the end of the Cold War, DOE's missions have dramatically
changed. Today, DOE is
converting its massive nuclear weapons complex from producing
weapons to cleaning up the environmental consequences;
deciding on the appropriate weapons complex configuration in the
post-Cold War era;
expanding activities for its multibillion-dollar national
laboratories, which are seeking new uses for their
defense-oriented facilities;
attempting to find a way to honor the long-delayed legislative
mandate to develop and operate a civilian nuclear waste
repository;
developing a National Energy Policy Plan; and
continuing traditional core responsibilities in energy policy,
information, and research while defining new roles for itself in
industrial competitiveness and science education.
Responding to these changing missions and new priorities within
existing organizational structures is a daunting task. For example,
DOE's contract management approach, which it is only now changing,
was first put in place during the World War II Manhattan Project. In
contrast to the past practice of allowing private contractors to
manage and operate billion-dollar facilities with minimal direct
federal oversight (yet reimbursing them for all costs regardless of
their actual achievements), DOE now needs to impose modern standards
for accountability and performance. Also, because management and
information systems were never adequate, DOE has been prevented from
exercising effective contractor oversight. In addition, DOE's
elaborate and highly decentralized field structure is slow to respond
to changing conditions and priorities, fraught with communication
problems, and poorly positioned to tackle difficult issues requiring
a high degree of cross-cutting coordination.
DOE'S REFORMS DO NOT RESOLVE
FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF CORE
MISSIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
DOE is grappling with its long-standing internal management problems
while at the same time realigning itself for changing missions and
priorities among these missions. The Department has launched an
aggressive effort to define its core missions around five "business
lines": industrial competitiveness, energy resources, science and
technology, national security, and environmental quality. DOE is
also identifying ways to reduce overlap and duplication in policy and
administrative functions through its Strategic Alignment and
Downsizing Initiative. In addition, the Secretary has a total
quality management initiative and is increasing stakeholders'
participation in decision-making. These and other reinvention
efforts to modify its management structure, processes, and policies
to pursue changing missions and new priorities reflect a strong
commitment by leadership to improve and will likely strengthen DOE's
capacity to better manage its responsibilities.
However, resolving internal issues without first evaluating and
achieving consensus on missions is not the best approach to
restructuring DOE. For example, although DOE's reinvention efforts
have assumed that existing missions are still valid government
responsibilities and are still best implemented by the Department,
some experts have argued that DOE is not the best place to manage the
civilian nuclear waste mission, which has struggled to meet its goals
under DOE. Some experts have also questioned whether DOE is the best
place to manage the cleanup of defense nuclear waste.
Responsibilities in science education and industrial competitiveness
have raised additional questions among experts about their placement
in the Department.
Once agreement is reached on which missions are appropriate to the
government, a practical set of criteria, such as those developed by a
former DOE advisory panel, can be used to evaluate the best
organizational structure for each mission. These criteria allow for
rating each alternative structure according to its ability to promote
cost-effective practices, attract technical talent, be flexible to
changing conditions, and be accountable to stakeholders. These
criteria could help identify more effective ways to implement DOE's
missions, particularly those that might be privatized or reconfigured
under alternative government organizations. In addition, a panel
convened by the National Academy of Public Administration developed
criteria that could be used to determine if DOE should remain a
Cabinet-level department. These criteria center on such questions as
the following: "Is there a sufficiently broad national purpose for
the Department?" "Are Cabinet-level planning, executive attention,
and strategic focus necessary to achieve the goals of DOE's
missions?" "Would a non-Cabinet-level agency be able to recruit and
retain sufficient technical talent to implement DOE's missions?"
Many experts GAO consulted--including four former Energy Secretaries,
business leaders, and specialists on DOE's issues--believed that
redefining DOE's missions to focus on essential energy activities was
the best way to help the Department achieve future success. Experts
had wide-ranging opinions about the Department's missions. Most
favored streamlining missions, and some suggested major realignments
to other agencies or to new public-private entities. None of the
experts wanted DOE to remain the same, although most preferred that
it continue as a Cabinet-level department. Overwhelmingly, former
DOE executives and energy experts recommended retaining the following
four responsibilities within DOE: energy policy-making, energy
information, the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, and research and
development to increase energy supplies. Most considered moving
weapons-related functions to the Department of Defense and
environmental cleanup to other agencies or a new structure and
sharing the national laboratories with other federal agencies or
perhaps privatizing them.
Because transferring missions and their related statutory
requirements from DOE to other agencies has broad effects,
reevaluating DOE (including proposals to dismantle it) should be
considered as part of an overall governmentwide restructuring effort.
It is imperative that the Congress and the administration form an
effective working relationship on restructuring initiatives.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
Because the Congress is actively examining DOE and its missions, GAO
is not making any recommendations at this time. In other reports in
this series, GAO has made several recommendations to strengthen DOE's
management--for contracting, environmental cleanup, financial and
information management, and the national laboratories.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
DOE commented that it would have welcomed a thoughtful and timely
analysis of options for change within the Department. DOE also
commented that many of its reform efforts were not adequately
recognized by GAO and that the survey of former DOE executives and
other experts reflected outdated opinions.
GAO's intent was to show how changing missions and priorities over
time require a fundamental reassessment of missions and alternatives.
GAO did not set out to develop specific options for DOE. Resolving
internal issues without first evaluating and achieving consensus on
missions is not, in GAO's opinion, the best approach to restructure
DOE. This report provides a framework--drawn from a former DOE
advisory panel--to assess alternatives and points to the need for a
governmentwide approach to restructuring. GAO's purpose in surveying
former DOE executives and experts--all of whom have substantial
knowledge of DOE's operations either as contractors, advisers, or
long-time observers of the Department's performance--was to focus on
fundamental issues related to the Department's missions and
structures. GAO believes that resurveying the experts would serve
little useful purpose because DOE is essentially the same now as it
was when that survey was conducted; its missions and structures have
not changed.
The report has been updated to include the additional reforms
mentioned by DOE, specifically the initiatives by the Galvin Task
Force and the Yergin Task Force on Strategic Energy Research and
Development.
DOE'S CHANGING MISSIONS AND
PRIORITIES
============================================================ Chapter 1
Today's DOE bears little resemblance to the Department that the
Congress created in 1977. Established from many diverse agencies,
DOE manages the nation's nuclear weapons complex and funds research
and development on both energy and basic science through its
multibillion-dollar national laboratories. It manages the five power
marketing administrations (hydroelectric producers, such as
Bonneville) and maintains petroleum reserves for military and
civilian use. To perform these missions, DOE was authorized to spend
$17.5 billion in fiscal year 1995 and has nearly 20,000 federal
employees and 140,000 contract workers.
THE EVOLUTION OF DOE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
The end of the Cold War has dramatically altered DOE's missions and
priorities. Making nuclear weapons, which dominated DOE's budget for
years, has largely given way to environmental cleanup. The national
laboratories are now highly diversified. Furthermore, DOE has new or
expanded missions in industrial competitiveness; science education;
environment, safety, and health; and nuclear arms control and
nonproliferation.
Table 1.1
Comparison of DOE'S Traditional and New
and Emerging Missions
DOE's new and emerging
DOE's traditional missions\a missions
----------------------------- -----------------------------
Nuclear weapons production Dismantling nuclear weapons
Energy and technology Environmental cleanup
research Industrial competitiveness
Energy policy development Environment, safety, and
Civilian nuclear waste health
Nuclear arms control and
nonproliferation
Science education
------------------------------------------------------------
\a DOE also has nominal responsibilities for the Navy's nuclear
reactor program and in the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
Almost from the time of its creation in 1977, DOE has been in
transition. For its first 3 years, DOE's programs emphasized
research and initiatives to cope with a global energy crisis that
disrupted U.S. and world markets and economies. By the mid-1980s,
accelerating nuclear weapons production and expanding space-based
defense research dominated DOE's budget resources. Since the late
1980s, DOE's budget has reflected a growing emphasis on solving a
half-century's environmental and safety problems caused by the
nuclear weapons and research activities of DOE and its predecessors.
With the end of the Cold War, DOE's missions and priorities have
changed dramatically. Today, DOE is
converting its massive nuclear weapons complex from producing
weapons to cleaning up the environmental consequences;
deciding on the appropriate weapons complex configuration in the
post-Cold War era;
expanding activities for its multibillion-dollar national
laboratories, which are seeking new uses for their defense-
oriented facilities;
attempting to find a way to honor the long-delayed legislative
mandate to develop and operate a civilian nuclear waste
repository;
developing a National Energy Policy Plan; and
continuing traditional core responsibilities in energy policy,
information, and research while defining new roles for itself in
industrial competitiveness and science education.
Since 1978, DOE's budget priorities have gradually shifted from
energy policy to defense, and since 1989 they have rapidly shifted
from defense to the environment. (See fig. 1.1) We defined
"missions" as the responsibilities the Department is expected to
perform. We considered DOE's "priorities" as those missions
receiving the highest levels of funding: at first such programs as
energy conservation and renewable resources, more recently
environmental waste and restoration projects. Changes within DOE's
budget have also been notable. For example, weapons production has
given way to dismantling nuclear warheads and explosive testing of
nuclear weapons has ceased.
Figure 1.1: DOE's Changing
Budget Priorities
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Percentages from 1992 to 1995 are presented in 1-year
increments to more clearly show recent trends.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
This is one in a series of reports that identify ways in which DOE
can make and sustain management improvements that will clarify and
meet the Department's fundamental missions. (See the list of related
GAO products at the end of this report.) This report presents overall
observations on DOE's major activities and evolution, including its
missions, changing priorities, and management initiatives.
This report draws on the results of our past, as well as ongoing,
work on various aspects of DOE's operations. Over the past 3 years,
GAO conducted hundreds of interviews with DOE staff in its
headquarters, field offices, and national laboratories. GAO also
interviewed many contractors and policy experts in both the public
and private sectors.
For this report, GAO studied DOE's current management reforms,
particularly contracting and strategic alignment and downsizing
activities. To gain a perspective on DOE and its missions, GAO
surveyed nearly 40 former DOE officials (including four former DOE
Secretaries) and energy and science policy experts from the public,
academic, and private sectors. (See app. I for a list of the
experts we consulted.) This survey was completed by mid-1994, before
the current debate about whether to abolish the Department.
We obtained comments on a draft of this report from DOE. DOE's
comments and our response to them appear in appendix III and are
discussed, as relevant, at the end of chapters 2 and 3.
We conducted our work from December 1993 through June 1995. Our work
was performed in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
DOE'S REFORMS ARE BASED ON
EXISTING MISSIONS
============================================================ Chapter 2
Recognizing that the Energy Department needs to change, current
leadership has set a course to manage DOE's missions more efficiently
and effectively. DOE's Strategic Plan and Strategic Alignment and
Downsizing Initiative, as well as new efforts in contract reform, are
the foundation of the current leadership's vision to improve the
Department. Although these efforts are important and much needed,
they are based on the assumption that existing missions are still
valid in their present form and that DOE is the best place to manage
them.
STRATEGIC PLAN AND STRATEGIC
ALIGNMENT AND DOWNSIZING
INITIATIVE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
The need to better match resources to missions and build a more
integrated department led DOE to publish its Strategic Plan in April
1994. This Plan cited five "business lines" that DOE's leaders
consider the Department's principal missions: industrial
competitiveness, energy resources, science and technology, national
security, and environmental quality. These five missions could
succeed, DOE maintained, only if four critical factors were
integrated with them: communication and trust; human resources;
environment, safety, and health; and management practices.
After the Strategic Plan's release in April 1994, DOE launched a
Strategic Alignment and Downsizing Initiative, which was designed to
reorient the Department's resources and functions around the
Strategic Plan's concepts as well as to streamline operations and
find ways to reduce its budget. (As part of this initiative, DOE
renamed "industrial competitiveness" as "economic productivity" and
"environmental quality" as "weapons site cleanup.") In late 1994,
DOE's Deputy Secretary said that the Strategic Alignment and
Downsizing Initiative promised to "fundamentally alter how we look
and how we conduct business...."\1 On May 3, 1995, the Secretary
announced a variety of actions, such as the following, that resulted
from this initiative:
reducing DOE employment,
consolidating functions,
closing several small offices,
selling surplus materials,
removing the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission from the
Department, and
privatizing the power marketing administrations (PMA), as well as
the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale Reserves.
The Energy Secretary stated that the alignment and downsizing
actions, excluding privatization of the PMAs and Naval Petroleum and
Oil Shale Reserves, would save $1.7 billion over 5 years. Sale of
the PMAs and Oil Shale Reserves would bring an additional $5.3
billion, with other reforms underway providing the balance of $14.1
billion in savings over 5 years.
--------------------
\1 Memorandum from William H. White, Deputy Secretary of Energy, to
Heads of Department Elements, Nov. 4, 1994.
CONTRACT REFORM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
In 1994, DOE's Contract Reform Team,\2 which was created to identify
basic contracting weaknesses and determine fundamental improvements,
reported that DOE needs to make major changes to its unique
contracting system to accomplish its changing missions. The Team's
basic premise was that DOE's contracting suffers from an
over-reliance on cost-based contracts, a lack of well-defined
performance criteria and measures, and weaknesses in oversight. To
correct these conditions, the Team set goals calling for
more flexibility in contracting by increasing competition and
making wider use of performance measures,
wider use of financial incentives for contractors in return for
having them assume greater risks, and
a willingness to experiment with new types of contracts and
contractors.
The Team made more than 45 recommendations, including a call for more
performance-based management contracts. The Team recommended new
incentives to reduce costs, increased use of fixed-price contracts,
and more objective performance criteria by which DOE's administrators
could judge results. The Team also urged that contracts be competed
more frequently. DOE has started to implement most of these
recommendations and reports that some savings have already been
achieved.
We believe these measures will give DOE a stronger basis for
selecting and evaluating its contractors when deciding and budgeting
its mission needs. The major question surrounding the contract
reform's success will be how effectively the Department will be able
to administer them.
--------------------
\2 Making Contracting Work Better and Cost Less, Report of the
Contract Reform Team, U.S. Department of Energy (Feb. 1994).
REFOCUSING RESEARCH AND THE
NATIONAL LABORATORIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
DOE created a task force to examine options for the future of the
national laboratories.\3 The Task Force's basic findings--that the
laboratories' missions should be redefined and their management
should be improved--are largely consistent with the results of our
work.\4 DOE believes that adopting the Task Force's recommendations
could save up to $1.4 billion.
Perhaps the most far-reaching recommendation made by the Task Force
is to create one or more nonprofit corporations to operate these
laboratories under the direction of a board of trustees that would
channel funding to various laboratories to meet the needs of both
government and nongovernment entities. DOE disagreed with this
recommendation, choosing instead to rely on a board of experts for
advice.
To assess DOE's research and development (R&D) program, the
Department also created what is known as the "Yergin Task Force."\5
Although its June 13, 1995, report advised against cutting R&D
deeply, it concluded that DOE could reduce costs by 15 percent
through management improvements and the application of "best
practices."
--------------------
\3 The Secretary of Energy asked Robert Galvin to chair a task force
to analyze the national laboratories. Its report was officially
titled Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National
Laboratories, Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Task Force on
Alternative Futures for the Department of Energy National
Laboratories (Feb. 1995).
\4 Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions
and Better Management (GAO/RCED-95-10, Jan. 27, 1995).
\5 Energy R&D: Shaping Our Nation's Future in a Competitive World,
Final Report of the Task Force on Strategic Energy Research and
Development, chaired by Daniel Yergin, President of Cambridge Energy
Research Associates (June 1995).
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
DOE has many ambitious programs, and the current leadership has
expended considerable effort toward achieving its new priorities.
Especially noteworthy activities are now under way for contract
reform and strategic alignment, two important areas in which marked
improvements could greatly increase DOE's ability to better manage
its diverse missions more effectively. Even with these improvements
under way, however, DOE has little assurance that its proposed
reforms are the best approach for implementing its missions.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE stated that GAO had
little appreciation for the many reforms undertaken over the past 2
years. Our earlier reports and the draft of this report discussed
DOE's major reforms, except for the report from the Yergin Task
Force, which was not released until after our draft was prepared. We
have expanded our discussion of the work of the Galvin Task Force in
this report, which also was the subject of our testimony before the
Congress in March 1995.\6 We have also expanded our discussion of
DOE's reform efforts to better recognize DOE's actions to date.
This report focuses on the Strategic Plan and Strategic Alignment and
Downsizing Initiative because these had been promoted by DOE to
fundamentally change the Department's way of doing business. While
we believe these efforts are important and much needed, we have
concluded that neither effort was preceded by a fundamental
rethinking of the Department's missions and that neither one made a
case that DOE is the best place to accomplish them.
--------------------
\6 Department of Energy: Alternatives for Clearer Missions and
Better Management at the National Laboratories (GAO/T-RCED-95-128,
Mar. 9, 1995).
REEVALUATION OF DOE'S MISSIONS
============================================================ Chapter 3
While DOE's 1994 Strategic Plan and 1995 Strategic Alignment and
Downsizing Initiative--as well as other reinvention activities--may
lead to a more efficient Department, DOE did not thoroughly
reevaluate its missions. A basic tenet of reinvention is determining
which missions still make sense and where each should be implemented.
Reevaluating missions would help ensure that DOE's Strategic Plan and
Strategic Alignment and Downsizing Initiative (as well as other
reforms) meet the challenges that will face the Department and its
missions. Because a major restructuring of DOE's missions would
affect other agencies and institutions--to the extent they would gain
these missions--reevaluating DOE should ideally be part of a
governmentwide restructuring effort with the Congress and the
administration working together to achieve consensus on DOE's
missions.
The following two questions form an essential framework for
evaluating DOE's missions:
Which missions should be eliminated because they are no longer a
valid government function?
For those missions that are governmental, what is the best
organizational placement of responsibilities?
DOE NEEDS TO CHANGE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
DOE's structures, systems, and processes are not well matched with
its changing missions and new priorities, as the following examples
show:
DOE's highly decentralized field network, established to manage
nuclear weapons production during the Cold War, has changed
little in terms of contractors or their staffs, even though
mission objectives have shifted dramatically. DOE still employs
many contractors--often the same organizations for decades,
despite changing skill requirements.
Attempts to establish direct accountability among program offices
at headquarters, administrative units, field offices, and the
national laboratories have been especially difficult. Reporting
relationships changed often and sometimes have been confusing.
The emergence of important new missions with cross-cutting
responsibilities, such as those in environment, safety, and
health matters, has resulted in additional redundancies that
further complicate DOE's structures and add to communication and
oversight confusion while causing organizational tensions.
Begun under the Manhattan Project's wartime conditions as an
expedient way to build the world's first nuclear weapons,
management and operating (M&O) contracts have survived for more
than half a century and still persist as DOE's principal way to
conduct its missions. But the Department's M&O contracts have
proven to be both difficult to administer and unsuited to
changing conditions. Decades of relying heavily on contractors
to conduct most of DOE's work, often in strict secrecy and under
minimal oversight, has hampered the Department's ability to
quickly and decisively redirect itself toward new priorities and
new ways to conduct its business.
Management information systems, particularly financial systems to
support contracting oversight, have only recently received
serious attention from DOE's leadership. In addition, the
Department's internal directives have long been characterized as
costly, inefficient, and onerous in their implementation.
DOE has launched many initiatives to resolve some of these issues,
including those aimed at improving its management systems and
internal directives. Of all these efforts, the Strategic Alignment
and Downsizing Initiative, and contracting reform hold the most
potential to influence DOE's future.
EVALUATING DOE'S MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
Clearly, many of DOE's present functions and programs are activities
that only the government can perform, such as stewardship over the
nuclear weapons stockpile. Other activities may qualify as functions
and programs with debatable relevance to inherently governmental
missions.
Even without a complete restructuring, some dismantling has already
occurred within DOE, and additional actions such as the following
have been proposed:
Under the Energy Policy Act of 1992, the federal uranium enrichment
program was transferred to the United States Enrichment
Corporation, a government corporation, with the expectation that
it will be privatized later.
As early as 1989, the Congress held hearings on whether to create a
separate environmental cleanup commission that would be
responsible for DOE's facilities.
The congressional Office of Technology Assessment has developed
cleanup options, including a separate commission to regulate and
enforce cleanup of federal radioactive contamination at federal
facilities. This idea is similar to one supported by DOE's
previous environmental administrator.
A RAND study sponsored by the Defense Department recommended
consolidating within DOD all activities related to U.S. nuclear
weapons.\7
Because of DOE's inability to manage waste storage effectively,
state regulators have called for a separate civilian nuclear
waste agency.
DOE's own study of the future of the national laboratories by the
Galvin Task Force has suggested creating private or
federal-private corporations to manage most or all of them.
Without responding to these and other basic mission issues in a
systematic manner, DOE has little assurance that its current
Strategic Plan and Strategic Alignment and Downsizing Initiative are
the best ways to accomplish its missions. DOE alone cannot make
these determinations. They require a cooperative effort among all
stakeholders with the Congress and the administration responsible for
deciding which missions are needed and how best to implement them.
Those missions that should continue should be analyzed to determine
which public and private sector alternatives would best achieve them.
For example, although over a decade has passed since the Congress
established the repository program for disposing of civilian nuclear
waste and several billion dollars have been spent, siting a
repository seems no closer than when that program was first started.
Last year, 39 Members of Congress called for a presidential
commission to review the nuclear waste program; others have proposed
legislation to change the program; and some experts, including a
former DOE internal advisory panel, have called for moving the entire
program out of the Department.\8
Various types of alternative organizations for administering a
particular mission might include
the present DOE cabinet structure,
another federal subcabinet office,
an independent federal commission,
a mixed government-private corporation, or
a private corporation.
--------------------
\7 An Assessment of Defense Nuclear Agency Functions: Pathways
Toward a New Nuclear Infrastructure for the Nation, National Defense
Research Institute, RAND (MR-442-OSD, 1994).
\8 Managing Nuclear Waste--A Better Idea: A Report to the U.S.
Secretary of Energy, Advisory Panel on Alternative Means of Financing
and Managing Radioactive Waste Facilities (Dec. 1984).
DOE CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING
ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.1
Each of these organizational alternatives has variations that could
be defined more precisely to meet particular needs. The following
criteria, adapted from a former advisory panel that examined DOE's
civilian nuclear waste program, offers a useful framework for
evaluating alternative ways to manage the Department's missions:
Mission orientation and focus: Will the institution be able to
focus on its mission(s) or will it be encumbered by other
priorities? Which organizational structure will provide the
greatest focus on its mission(s)?
Credibility: Will the organizational structure be credible, thus
gaining public support for its actions?
Stability and continuity: Will the institution be able to plan for
its own future without undue concern for its survival?
Programmatic authority: Will the institution be free to exercise
needed authority to accomplish its missions without excessive
oversight and control from external sources?
Accessibility: Will stakeholders (both federal and state overseers
as well as the public) have easy access to senior management?
Responsiveness: Will the institution be structured to be
responsive to all its stakeholders?
Internal flexibility: Will the institution be able to change its
internal systems, organization, and style to adapt to changing
conditions?
Political accountability: How accountable will the institution be
to political sources, principally the Congress and the
President?
Immunity from political interference: Will the institution be
sufficiently free from excessive and destructive political
forces?
Ability to stimulate cost-effectiveness: How well will the
institution be able to encourage cost-effective solutions?
Technical excellence: Will the institution attract highly
competent people?
Ease of transition: What will be the costs (both financial and
psychological) of changing to a different institution?
GAO'S OBSERVATIONS ON USING
EVALUATION CRITERIA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.2
Deciding the best place to manage specific DOE missions involves
assessing the advantages and disadvantages of each alternative
institution on the basis of its potential to achieve that mission and
improve efficiency. Potential efficiency gains (or losses) that
might result from transferring a part of DOE to another agency need
to be balanced against the policy reasons that first led to placing
that mission in DOE. While the substantial short-term costs of a
transfer may be offset by long-term gains in efficiency, in some
cases shifting a mission would likely become a contentious exercise,
especially with DOE's major responsibilities for the nuclear weapons
complex and its cleanup. For example, transferring the nuclear
weapons complex to the Defense Department would require carefully
considering many management and policy issues. Because of the
apparently declining strategic role of nuclear weapons, some experts
argue that in the long term consolidating all nuclear weapons
activities within DOD is the best option for maintaining the
infrastructure for nuclear weapons. Others argue, however, that
civilian agency control over nuclear weapons has functioned well and
should continue. Some experts advocate creating a new federal agency
for weapons production.
Similarly, moving the responsibility for cleaning up DOE's defense
facilities to another agency or to a new institution, as proposed by
some experts, requires close scrutiny. For example, a new agency
concentrating its focus on cleanup exclusively would not need to
allocate its resources for competing programs. Furthermore, such an
agency could maximize federal research and development investments by
achieving economies of scale in technology. On the other hand,
separating cleanup responsibility from the agency that created the
waste may limit its incentives to reduce waste and to promote other
environmentally sensitive approaches. In addition, considerable
startup time and costs would accompany a new agency, at a time when
the Congress is interested in reducing the federal government.
Shifting responsibility to an existing agency, such as the EPA or
DOD, also raises complications from the effects of assuming new
responsibilities.
NEED FOR A GOVERNMENTWIDE
PERSPECTIVE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.3
Because transferring missions and their related statutory
requirements from DOE to other agencies will have far-reaching
effects, any proposal to dismantle DOE should be considered as part
of an overall governmentwide restructuring effort. It is imperative
that the Congress and the administration form an effective working
relationship on restructuring initiatives.\9
--------------------
\9 The Comptroller General of the United States recently testified on
the need for an integrated approach to government reorganization.
See Government Reorganization: Issues and Principles
(GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-95-166, May 17, 1995).
DOE'S FUTURE AS A
CABINET-LEVEL DEPARTMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2.4
Streamlining DOE's missions raises the question of whether, in a
reduced form, it should remain a Cabinet-level department. To help
answer this question, a NAPA panel has developed 14 criteria for
determining if an agency is appropriate for Cabinet status.\10 The
following three criteria directly apply to any decision that might be
made about today's DOE.
Is there a sufficiently broad national purpose for the Department?
Integrating national energy policy was the dominant reason for
creating DOE in 1977 and remains a core mission that would
become critical in the event of another oil supply disruption.
As much as any other Cabinet-level issue, energy policy directly
affects all Americans and the U.S. economy.
Are Cabinet-level planning, executive attention, and strategic
focus necessary to achieve DOE's missions? We have previously
recommended that DOE develop a strategic approach to managing
its changing missions and believe this is essential to its
future success.\11 The federal role in both energy policy and
environmental restoration of the nuclear weapons complex will
likely continue to be long-term national priorities.
Would a non-cabinet-level agency be able to recruit and retain
sufficient technical talent to implement DOE's missions? Most
of DOE's technical work is performed by contractors, and this
source of talent is unlikely to be lost to any federal
management entity. Cabinet status provides only marginal
benefits for recruiting these specialists.
--------------------
\10 Evaluation of Proposals to Establish a Department of Veterans
Affairs, National Academy of Public Administration (Mar. 1988). See
app. II for a complete list of these criteria.
\11 Department of Energy: Management Problems Require a Long-Term
Commitment to Change (GAO/RCED-93-72, Aug. 31, 1993).
EXPERT OPINIONS ON DOE'S
MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
To gain perspective on DOE and its missions, we asked experts on
energy policy and former DOE executives about the need and proper
place for the Department's missions. We received responses from 35
individuals. Although 12 respondents had DOE experience (including
four former Energy Secretaries), there was little difference between
their responses and those from the others. In addition, two other
individuals offered opinions on their views about DOE's future and
its missions. Former President Jimmy Carter, under whose
administration DOE was created, also sent comments on the Department
and its development.
All respondents agreed that DOE needs to change, beyond simply
streamlining operations, and no one believed that the Department
should remain as it is today. A majority also believed that DOE
should remain a Cabinet department but with attention refocused on
its original core missions, which were identified by most respondents
as energy policy-making; energy information; energy-supply research
and development; and operation of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve as
an instrument of energy policy.
Our respondents were divided about evenly over whether to keep
certain missions within the Department, move them elsewhere, or sell
them to private administrators. (See fig. 3.1.) For example, the
power marketing administrations now within the Department could be
managed by other institutions. But a clear majority favored moving
the remaining nonenergy missions from DOE or sharing a few of them
with other departments and agencies. A decisive majority favored
shifting DOE's new mission to improve U.S. industrial
competitiveness to the Commerce Department--especially its National
Institute of Standards and Technology.
Figure 3.1: Results of Survey
of Experts' Opinions on
Accomplishing DOE's Missions
(See figure in printed
edition.)
There was no clear consensus on where to locate the various basic
research functions now performed by the national laboratories. About
half of our respondents favored retaining these functions within DOE
but with the laboratories restructured along clearer mission lines.
Others expected more direction and focus if many basic research
functions were moved to the National Science Foundation or divided
among different non-DOE agencies. The majority of respondents
indicated that science education and some basic research functions
now performed by the national laboratories should be moved from DOE
to the National Science Foundation.
The majority of respondents also preferred that nuclear weapons
cleanup and waste management for active nuclear weapons sites should
be moved from DOE to the Defense Department or to a new federal
agency. "The Energy Department should get out of the weapons and
weapons cleanup business," said one respondent. "DOD has many
program managers familiar with handling large programs. DOE has
none. The weapons were made for DOD--they should now handle the
cleanup." But other respondents favored DOE's continued role in
cleanup because of its traditional expertise. For civilian nuclear
waste, some favored DOE's continued management, but more preferred to
place these facilities under other federal or federal-private
institutions.
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
Now is an ideal time to fundamentally reevaluate DOE and its
missions. While current reform efforts will strengthen DOE's
management capacity, such efforts will not likely make DOE an
effective, integrated department because of the problems inherent in
managing so many disparate missions. None of the former DOE
executives or energy experts we surveyed favored keeping the Energy
Department as it is today.
According to our survey of experts' opinions and other reports we
have recently issued in this series, many of DOE's missions could be
performed either by private institutions or by other government
agencies. To the extent some of DOE's missions might best be
transferred to other federal entities, a careful evaluation of the
costs and effects of such changes would have to be made, including
the effects on the gaining agency. For this reason, a major
restructuring of DOE should ideally be part of a governmentwide
restructuring effort.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
DOE commented that it would have welcomed a thoughtful and timely
analysis of options for changing DOE, that our survey of former DOE
executives and other experts reflected outdated opinions, and that
DOE is still the best institution to fulfill its current missions.
Our intent has been to show how changing missions and priorities over
time now require a fundamental reassessment of DOE's missions and
alternatives to achieve them. Resolving internal issues without
first evaluating and achieving consensus on missions is not, in our
opinion, the best approach to restructuring DOE. While not providing
specific options for DOE, the report does offer a framework to assess
alternatives (drawn substantially from a former DOE advisory panel)
and points to the need for a governmentwide approach to
restructuring. Reevaluating DOE is an effort that involves the
Congress and the administration working together to achieve consensus
on what the Department should be in the future and where its missions
should best be accomplished.
Our purpose in surveying former DOE executives and experts was to
focus on fundamental issues related to the Department's missions and
structures. Most or all of the survey respondents had substantial
knowledge of DOE operations, either as contractors, advisers, or
long-time observers of DOE's performance. Resurveying the experts
would serve little useful purpose because DOE is essentially the same
now as it was when we conducted our survey--its missions and
structures have not changed, nor have its major reforms been
substantially implemented.
We are unaware of any evidence to support DOE's contention that it
can perform inherent government responsibilities "better than through
any alternative organizational arrangement."
EXPERTS CONSULTED BY GAO
=========================================================== Appendix I
Current and Former Research and Academic
Government Officials Institutions Other Private Sector
------------------------- ------------------------- --------------------------
Jimmy Carter John Ahearne Harold Finger, consultant,
Former President of the Former Nuclear Regulatory former nuclear industry
United States Commission Chairman executive
Exec. Dir., Sigma Xi
John S. Herrington Lewis Branscomb Glenn Schleede
Former Secretary of Professor New England Energy Inc.
Energy Harvard University-J.F.
Kennedy School
James D. Watkins Jacob Scherr David Packard
Former Secretary of National Resources Hewlett-Packard Co.
Energy Defense Council
Donald Hodel Roger Noll Alex Radin
Former Secretary of Professor Radin Assoc.
Energy Stanford University Former President,
American Public Power
Association
James Edwards Elihu Bergman J. Robinson West
Former Secretary of Americans for Energy Petroleum Finance Co.
Energy Independence
Henry Lee Alan Dean Alvin Alm
Professor National Academy of Science Applications
Harvard University-J.F. Public Administration International Corp.
Kennedy School
Richard Farmer Edward Teller William Carey
Congressional Research Hoover Institution Carnegie Corp.
Service
Jan Mares Phillip Verleger Charles Ebinger
Former DOE executive Institute for International Resources
International Economics Group
Leo Duffy Howard Ris Wil Lepkowski
Former DOE Assistant Union of Concerned Chemical & Engineering
Secretary Scientists News
Alan Crane John Deutch Mason Willrich
Office of Technology Professor, Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Assessment Massachusetts Institute
U.S. Congress of Technology
Lew Allen, Jr. Malcolm Weiss Terry Lash
Jet Propulsion Laboratory Massachusetts Institute consultant
of Technology
Robert Fri Theodore Taylor
Resources for the Future consultant
R.E. Balzhiser William Perkins
Electric Power Research Potomac Communications
Institute Group
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The experts' affiliations represent those at the time they
completed our survey in July, 1994.
CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING
CABINET-LEVEL STATUS
========================================================== Appendix II
The following criteria were developed by a panel of the National
Academy of Public Administration as an aid to deciding whether a
government organization should function as a Cabinet department.
1. Does the agency or set of programs serve a broad national goal or
purpose not exclusively identified with a single class, occupation,
discipline, region, or sector of society?
2. Are there significant issues in the subject area that are not now
adequately recognized or addressed by the existing organization, the
President, or the Congress that would be better assessed or met by
elevating the agency to a Cabinet department?
3. Is there evidence of impending changes in the type and number of
pressures on the institution that would be better addressed if it
were made a Cabinet department? Are these changes expected to
continue into the future?
4. Would a Cabinet department increase the visibility and thereby
substantially strengthen the active political and public support for
actions and programs to enhance the existing organization's goals?
5. Is there evidence that becoming a Cabinet department would
provide better analysis, expression, and advocacy of the needs and
programs that constitute the agency's responsibilities?
6. Is there evidence that becoming a Cabinet department would
improve the accomplishment of the existing agency's goals?
7. Is a Cabinet department required to better coordinate or
consolidate programs and functions that are now scattered throughout
other agencies in the executive branch?
8. Is there evidence that a Cabinet department (with the increased
political authority of a centralized Secretary's office) would result
in a more effective balance within the agency, between integrated
central strategic planning and resource allocation, and the direct
participation in management decisions by the line officers who are
responsible for directing and managing agency programs?
9. Is there evidence of significant structural, managerial, or
operational weaknesses in the existing organization that could be
corrected by elevation to a Cabinet department?
10. Is there evidence that there are external barriers and
impediments to timely decision-making and executive action that could
be detrimental to improving the efficiency of the existing agency's
programs? Would elevation to a Cabinet department remove or mitigate
these impediments?
11. Would elevation to a Cabinet department help recruit and retain
better qualified leadership within the existing organization?
12. Would elevation to a Cabinet department promote more uniform
achievement of broad, cross-cutting national policy goals?
13. Would elevation to a Cabinet department strengthen the Cabinet
and the Executive Office of the President as policy and management
aids for the President?
14. Would elevation to a Cabinet department have a beneficial or
detrimental effect upon the oversight and accountability of the
agency to the President and the Congress?
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
========================================================== Appendix II
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Energy's letter
dated June 22, 1995.
GAO COMMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
1. Our intent in this report is to show how DOE's changing missions
and priorities over time require a fundamental reassessment of its
missions and structure. We did not set out to develop specific
options for DOE. Resolving internal issues without first evaluating
and achieving consensus on missions is not the best approach to
restructuring DOE. This report provides a framework to assess
alternatives--drawn substantially from a former DOE advisory
panel--and points to the need for a governmentwide approach to
restructuring DOE.
Our purpose in surveying former DOE executives and experts was to
focus on fundamental issues related to missions and structure.
Almost all of our respondents had substantial knowledge of DOE's
operations, either as contractors, advisers, or long-time observers
of DOE's performance. We did not ask respondents to comment on the
Department's management reforms.
Officials directly responsible for the conduct of DOE's Strategic
Alignment and Downsizing Initiative--the Department's major
restructuring reform effort--advised us that they assumed existing
DOE missions were still valid. They did not, as part of the analysis
conducted for the Initiative, fundamentally reassess missions or
evaluate alternatives to accomplish them. Furthermore, we are aware
of no evidence to support DOE's contention that it can perform
inherent government responsibilities "better than through any
alternative organizational arrangement."
2. We agree that reforms underway at DOE are important and
impressive efforts. The draft report that DOE reviewed discussed
these reforms. We described some of DOE's reforms as "important
areas where marked improvements could greatly increase DOE's ability
to better manage its diverse missions more effectively."
We have updated our report to include the additional reforms DOE
mentions, specifically the Galvin Task Force on the national
laboratories and the Yergin Task Force on Strategic Energy R&D (which
was completed after our draft was prepared).
We agree with DOE's characterization of these reforms for what they
are: "major undertakings to fundamentally improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the Department." However, according to our
examination of the reform efforts, although they were designed to
improve operations, they did not entail a fundamental reevaluation of
DOE's missions.
3. DOE correctly points to proposals it initiated for privatizing
power marketing administrations, the Naval Petroleum and Oil Shale
Reserves, and separating the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
from DOE. However, these proposals were products of the Strategic
Alignment and Downsizing Initiative, whose activities appeared to
center on streamlining existing operations. Senior advisers to the
Secretary and officials directly responsible for the leadership of
this Initiative told us that as part of the Initiative, they did not
fundamentally reassess missions or evaluate alternatives to
accomplish them. More importantly, as we pointed out, while the
reforms are useful and needed, they do not address fundamental
decisions about DOE's missions. Only the Congress working with the
administration can decide which missions are still needed and how
best to implement them.
4. DOE's plan to reduce its staff by 27 percent while simultaneously
achieving billions in productivity savings is a very ambitious
undertaking. We certainly applaud these and other efforts at
budgetary savings and reform. However, the impact of dramatic
changes in the budgets of its missions, especially reduced staff, is
highly uncertain. According to the information contained in DOE's
Strategic Alignment and Downsizing Initiative and other sources, it
is unclear whether DOE will be truly managing its missions with fewer
resources or performing fewer missions to achieve its budgetary
goals.
5. We use "missions" to describe the many diverse activities
conducted by DOE. While "science education" is an activity that
receives a small budget, DOE lists it as one of five "goals" in its
Science and Technology business line. DOE engages in many important
activities not necessarily associated with large budgetary
amounts--energy policy being but one.
In our budgetary chart (see fig. 1.1), we included the cleanup of
nuclear waste within environment, safety, and health activities to
limit the list to broad categories. We have corrected the reference
to "science policy" as "science education."
6.Resurveying the experts would serve little useful purpose because
DOE is essentially the same now as it was when we conducted our
survey. Its missions and structures have not changed nor have its
major reforms been substantially implemented.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Bernice Steinhardt, Associate Director
Gary R. Boss, Assistant Director
William Lanouette, Evaluator-in-Charge
Diane Raynes, Senior Evaluator
Fran A. Featherston, Survey Researcher
RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 1
Department of Energy: Alternatives for Clearer Missions and Better
Management at the National Laboratories (GAO/T-RCED-95-128, Mar. 9,
1995).
Nuclear Weapons Complex: Establishing a National Risk-Based Strategy
for Cleanup (GAO/T-RCED-95-120, Mar. 6, 1995).
Department of Energy: National Priorities Needed for Meeting
Environmental Agreements (GAO/RCED-95-1, Mar. 3, 1995).
Department of Energy: Research and Agency Missions Need Reevaluating
(GAO/T-RCED-95-105, Feb. 13, 1995).
Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions
and Better Management (GAO/RCED-95-10, Jan. 27, 1995).
Department of Energy: Need to Reevaluate Its Role and Missions
(GAO/T-RCED-95-85, Jan. 18, 1995).
Department of Energy: Management Changes Needed to Expand Use of
Innovative Cleanup Technologies (GAO/RCED-94-205, Aug. 10, 1994).
Department of Energy: Challenges to Implementing Contract Reform
(GAO/RCED-94-150, Mar. 24, 1994).
DOE's National Laboratories: Adopting New Missions and Managing
Effectively Pose Significant Challenges (GAO/T-RCED-94-113, Feb. 3,
1994).
Financial Management: Energy's Material Financial Management
Weaknesses Require Corrective Action (GAO/AIMD-93-29, Sept. 30,
1993).
Department of Energy: Management Problems Require a Long-Term
Commitment to Change (GAO/RCED-93-72, Aug. 31, 1993).
Energy Policy: Changes Needed to Make National Energy Planning More
Useful (GAO/RCED-93-29, Apr. 27, 1993).
Energy Management: High-Risk Area Requires Fundamental Change
(GAO/T-RCED-93-7, Feb. 17, 1993).
Nuclear Weapons Complex: Issues Surrounding Consolidating Los Alamos
and Livermore National Laboratories (GAO/T-RCED-92-98, Sept. 24,
1992).
Department of Energy: Better Information Resources Management Needed
to Accomplish Missions (GAO/IMTEC-92-53, Sept. 29, 1992).
High-Risk Series: Department of Energy Contract Management
(GAO/HR-93-9, Dec. 1992).