Coast Guard: Enforcement Under MARPOL V Convention on Pollution Expanded,
Although Problems Remain (Letter Report, 05/30/95, GAO/RCED-95-143).
As much as 1 million metric tons of garbage and plastics are dumped into
the ocean each year, killing seabirds and marine mammals, creating
safety hazards for shippers and boaters, and polluting shorelines and
beaches. To mitigate this uncontrolled ocean dumping, the United States
became a party to annex V of the International Convention for the
Prevention of Pollution From Ships--known as MARPOL V--which restricts
the discharge of garbage and plastics from ships of signatory countries.
However, Congress has repeatedly expressed concerns about the Coast
Guard's enforcement of MARPOL V provisions. This report discusses the
Coast Guard's progress in enforcing MARPOL V and determines whether
funds that Congress earmarked for 100 enforcement positions are being
used for MARPOL-related ends. This report also describes the Coast
Guard's educational and outreach efforts, which are intended to improve
compliance with MARPOL V.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-95-143
TITLE: Coast Guard: Enforcement Under MARPOL V Convention on
Pollution Expanded, Although Problems Remain
DATE: 05/30/95
SUBJECT: Compliance
Water pollution
Water pollution control
Coast Guard
Marine safety
Marine transportation operations
Inspection
Computerized information systems
Law enforcement personnel
Fines (penalties)
IDENTIFIER: Coast Guard SeaPartners Program
U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone
DOD Civil Military Cooperation Action Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
May 1995
COAST GUARD - ENFORCEMENT UNDER
MARPOL V CONVENTION ON POLLUTION
EXPANDED, ALTHOUGH PROBLEMS REMAIN
GAO/RCED-95-143
Enforcement Under MARPOL V
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
APHIS - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
COTP/MIO - Captain of the Port/Marine Inspection Office
GAO - General Accounting Office
MSO - Marine Safety Office
MARPOL V - International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution
From Ships, Annex V
SEA-KEEPERS -
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-260210
letter date goes here
The Honorable Mark O. Hatfield
Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable Frank R. Lautenberg
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Transportation
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
As much as 1 million metric tons of garbage and plastics enter the
ocean each year, killing seabirds and marine mammals, creating safety
hazards for shippers and boaters, and polluting shorelines and
beaches. To mitigate the uncontrolled ocean dumping of garbage and
plastics, the United States became a party to annex V of the
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution From Ships
(known as MARPOL V), which placed restrictions on the discharge of
garbage and plastics from ships of signatory countries. The Congress
ratified, and the President signed into law, the provisions of MARPOL
V as part of the Marine Plastic Pollution Research and Control Act of
1987. The act charged the Secretary of Transportation, who delegated
his responsibility to the U.S. Coast Guard, with enforcing MARPOL V.
Since the passage of the act, the Congress has repeatedly expressed
concerns about the Coast Guard's enforcement efforts.\1 To enhance
MARPOL enforcement, the Senate Committee on Appropriations provided
for 100 MARPOL enforcement positions beginning in fiscal year 1991.\2
As part of the Senate report that accompanied the Department of
Transportation's 1994 appropriations bill, the Committee requested
that we provide information on the Coast Guard's enforcement of
MARPOL V. Specifically, our report discusses what progress the Coast
Guard has made in its effort to enforce MARPOL V and whether the
positions the Congress funded are being utilized for MARPOL-related
purposes. In addition, the report describes the Coast Guard's
educational and outreach efforts, which are also intended to improve
compliance with MARPOL V.
--------------------
\1 Senate Report on the Department of Transportation and Related
Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1991, Report 101-398 (July 27, 1990);
and Implementation of the Marine Plastic Pollution Research and
Control Act, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Superfund, Ocean, and
Water Protection, Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works
(Sept. 17, 1992).
\2 The report by the Senate Committee on Appropriations provided that
pollution prevention investigation positions be used for the
enforcement of MARPOL (including annexes I, II, and V), the Shore
Protection Act, and the Ocean Dumping Ban Act.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
Although the provisions of MARPOL V became effective on December 31,
1988, the Coast Guard did not begin substantial enforcement efforts
until the early 1990s. Following congressional criticism in 1990 and
1992, and aided by additional personnel, the Coast Guard stepped up
its enforcement efforts. The number of reported cases involving
violations of the MARPOL V regulations has increased steadily from 16
in 1989 to 311 in 1994. Fewer than 10 percent of all cases have
resulted in any penalties being assessed on the violator, although a
significant number are still being processed.
At present, no accurate means exists to determine whether the Coast
Guard is fully utilizing the additional resources that the Congress
provided for enforcing MARPOL. While nearly all of the designated
enforcement positions are filled, the people who occupy them also
perform many other activities unrelated to MARPOL. In addition to
the designated enforcement positions, the Coast Guard spreads its
efforts to enforce MARPOL across many field personnel. However, just
how much time the Coast Guard, in aggregate, spends on MARPOL-related
activities is uncertain because the Coast Guard does not consistently
record time spent on this function.
Education and outreach has become an important part of the Coast
Guard's strategy to achieve compliance with MARPOL. In 1994, the
Coast Guard's education and outreach efforts for MARPOL V expanded
from targeting commercial shippers to include other groups, such as
recreational boaters and fishing vessel operators. Through a program
called SeaPartners, which has been funded by nearly $3 million in
grants from the Department of Defense, the Coast Guard has conducted
more than a thousand community-based activities for boating groups,
port operators, students, and others. A recent Coast
Guard-commissioned evaluation of SeaPartners found that these
activities needed to be better focused. In response, the Coast Guard
is now revising its SeaPartners strategy.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
The Marine Plastic Pollution Research and Control Act of 1987
incorporates the provisions of MARPOL V that make it illegal for U.S.
or foreign ships to discharge any plastics, including synthetic
ropes, fishing nets, and plastic bags, into the ocean and other
navigable waters. In 1989, the Coast Guard first promulgated
regulations to enforce the MARPOL V provisions.\3 These regulations
specify that other forms of garbage, such as food waste and packing
materials, may not be discharged within prescribed limits of U.S.
shorelines.\4 For U.S.-licensed boats above a certain size, the
regulations require operators to post garbage discharge warning
signs, maintain an approved waste management plan, and keep records
of garbage disposal and discharges. For all vessels, U.S. and
foreign, the regulations also set out the MARPOL V provisions against
the illegal discharge of plastic and garbage, as well as the Coast
Guard's inspection procedures and possible penalties for infractions.
The Coast Guard enforces compliance with MARPOL V mainly through its
regional network of 47 marine safety offices.\5
Enforcement personnel regularly inspect foreign and U.S.-licensed
vessels for compliance with various safety and pollution regulations,
including MARPOL V. If enforcement personnel find a violation of
MARPOL V during their inspections, they document their findings and
open an enforcement case on the Coast Guard's computer system, the
marine safety information system. The case is then forwarded to the
district office, which reviews it for completeness and the
sufficiency of evidence. If the district office finds the evidence
to be sufficient, it forwards the case to one of three Coast Guard
hearing offices for a civil penalty determination.\6
In addition to the Coast Guard's inspections, inspectors from the
U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service (APHIS) also inspect commercial ships. APHIS inspects a
majority of ships arriving from foreign ports, typically within 24
hours of their arrival, for compliance with U.S. plant and animal
health laws. While APHIS is not required by law to enforce MARPOL V,
it agreed in 1990 to help the Coast Guard do so. If APHIS suspects
that a violation of MARPOL V has occurred, APHIS inspectors are
supposed to notify the local Coast Guard marine safety office.
--------------------
\3 Implementing regulations are found in the Code of Federal
Regulations (33 C.F.R. 151, sections 51 through 77). The
regulations have been amended four times since 1989 (see footnote 7).
\4 Under the MARPOL V regulations, it is illegal to dump plastics or
garbage in U.S. lakes and rivers and within 3 miles of ocean
shorelines. Garbage ground to less than 1 inch square can be
disposed of more than 3 miles from shore (in the ocean); regulations
do not permit the disposal of plastics.
\5 Other Coast Guard field personnel--such as those assigned to small
boat and air stations--are also responsible for the enforcement of
MARPOL V in conjunction with their other responsibilities.
\6 In 1978, the Coast Guard established a civil penalty hearing
procedure whereby cases are decided by Coast Guard hearing officers
who are independent of the command structure. Suspected criminal
violations are referred to the U.S. Attorney's office. Violations
by foreign-flagged vessels that occur outside the U.S. 200-mile
Exclusive Economic Zone are referred to the country where the vessel
is registered.
COAST GUARD ENFORCEMENT HAS
INCREASED, BUT PROBLEMS REMAIN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
The Coast Guard intensified its enforcement of MARPOL V following
congressional criticism in 1990 and 1992 of the Coast Guard's lack of
progress in implementing MARPOL V. More aggressive enforcement,
according to Coast Guard officials, has resulted in a steady increase
in the number of MARPOL V violations found by enforcement personnel.
Even so, the Coast Guard's enforcement efforts have been affected by
factors that affect the ability of its enforcement personnel to
identify violations and adequately support their findings so that
violators are penalized.
Number of MARPOL V Enforcement Cases Has Increased
The Coast Guard has identified an increasing number of violations of
the MARPOL V regulations in recent years. In the first few years of
the program, unless a violation was egregious, Coast Guard officials
in the field said they often allowed violators to correct any
problems and did not take enforcement actions. Since 1992, however,
following increased congressional attention and aided by additional
resources, the Coast Guard has strengthened the MARPOL V regulations
and emphasized the need for personnel to be more aggressive in their
enforcement.\7 Accordingly, the number of enforcement cases involving
violations of MARPOL V has increased from 16 in 1989, the first year
of implementation, to 311 during 1994 (see fig. 1 and app. I for
additional analysis of these violations).\8
Figure 1: Coast Guard's MARPOL
V Enforcement Cases, 1989-94
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: The Coast Guard's marine safety information system.
An increasing number of marine safety offices have initiated MARPOL V
enforcement cases, indicating that the Coast Guard's enforcement
efforts are becoming more widespread. During 1991, two marine safety
offices (New York and Corpus Christi) accounted for more than half of
all enforcement cases, and only 20 of the 47 marine safety offices
had initiated any cases. By 1994, the distribution of cases had
become less concentrated--the five marine safety offices with the
most cases accounted for more than half of all enforcement cases.
Also, 33 marine safety offices had initiated at least one MARPOL V
enforcement case.
--------------------
\7 Since 1989, when the Coast Guard issued interim MARPOL V
regulations, it has strengthened the regulations or their
interpretation on four occasions. In 1990, the Coast Guard required
that an approved waste management plan be aboard U.S.-licensed ships
over 40 feet. In 1991, it required U.S.-licensed ships more than 26
feet in length to post signs listing garbage discharge restrictions.
In 1992, the Coast Guard expanded its jurisdiction over
foreign-licensed vessels from 3 miles to 200 miles off U.S. shores.
In 1994, the Coast Guard required U.S. commercial vessels over 40
feet in length to keep refuse discharge records.
\8 These data are drawn from the Office of Marine Safety's marine
safety information computer system. According to Coast Guard
officials in other offices, the Coast Guard does not collect complete
MARPOL V enforcement data from offices other than marine safety
offices--for example, data on possible violations found by small boat
station personnel.
FEW ENFORCEMENT CASES HAVE
RESULTED IN PENALTIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Of the 725 MARPOL V cases reported as of February 15, 1995, 69, or
just under 10 percent, have resulted in the assessment of a penalty
against the responsible party.\9
The penalties ranged from a few hundred dollars to $50,000 and
averaged almost $6,200 per case. However, 303, or 42 percent, of the
cases submitted are still in process, including two-thirds of all the
cases initiated in 1994. It is reasonable to assume that some
percentage of the 303 cases still in process will also result in a
penalty assessment and, therefore, that the percentage of cases which
result in a penalty for this time period will likely increase over
time.\10 However, whether the Coast Guard's success in obtaining
penalties is improving over time is not yet known because so many
1993 and 1994 cases are still being processed.
The remaining enforcement cases--those not in process or not having
resulted in a civil penalty--have been administratively settled by
the Coast Guard. These actions include case closure or dismissal,
the issuance of a warning letter, or a referral to the country where
the ship is registered--a procedure known as flag state referral--for
consideration of possible fines or other actions by another country.
--------------------
\9 For additional detail on the nature, status, and disposition of
the 725 violations, see app. I.
\10 For example, comparing the 69 cases that have resulted in a
penalty against the 422 cases thus far completed yields a 16-percent
penalty rate.
COAST GUARD'S ENFORCEMENT
EFFORTS IMPEDED BY SEVERAL
FACTORS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
Several factors impede the Coast Guard's efforts to identify
violations and, once they are identified, efficiently and effectively
process enforcement cases for a civil penalty determination. Among
these factors are (1) the inherent difficulty of enforcing MARPOL V,
(2) the absence of a standardized MARPOL V inspection checklist, (3)
diminished cooperation between the Coast Guard and APHIS, (4)
inadequate feedback on case development, and (5) a burdensome and
ineffective management information system.
ENFORCING THE MARPOL V
REGULATIONS ON GARBAGE
DISCHARGE IS INHERENTLY
DIFFICULT
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.1
To cite a vessel for illegally discharging garbage or plastics,
someone must see the event and report it, or the Coast Guard must
develop strong evidence that such a discharge occurred. It is rare
that Coast Guard personnel or others actually witness a vessel
illegally disposing of plastics or other garbage. A Coast Guard
hearing officer told us that unlike oil or hazardous waste
discharges, discharges of plastics and other garbage usually do not
leave a trail of evidence that can be traced to the offending party.
According to Coast Guard officials in the field, should vessel
operators knowingly choose to violate the MARPOL V discharge
regulations, it is unlikely that they will be caught.
Complicating enforcement efforts is the fact that one key component
of the U.S. MARPOL V regulations--a requirement that vessels
maintain garbage discharge records--does not apply to
foreign-licensed ships.\11 This difference is significant because a
garbage discharge record is one of the key items that the Coast Guard
uses as evidence in enforcement cases to prove that an illegal
discharge has occurred. Equally significant, the Coast Guard can
enforce MARPOL V for foreign vessels only within the U.S. Exclusive
Economic Zone.\12 Demonstrating that a vessel discharged garbage at
sea is difficult; proving that it occurred within U.S. jurisdiction
is even more difficult.
--------------------
\11 The Coast Guard has actively sought to strengthen the MARPOL
treaty within the International Maritime Organization. Members of
this international body have agreed in principal to amend the MARPOL
convention to require garbage discharge and other records similar to
those now in force for U.S. vessels. Final adoption is expected
shortly, according to Coast Guard headquarters officials.
\12 The Exclusive Economic Zone generally extends 200 miles from U.S.
shorelines.
ENFORCEMENT PERSONNEL
LACK A STANDARDIZED
MARPOL V INSPECTION
CHECKLIST
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.2
Because eyewitness accounts of illegal discharges are infrequent, the
Coast Guard often must develop circumstantial evidence that would
lead to a prima facie determination that a discharge violation had
occurred. Proving that a violation has occurred on the basis of
circumstantial evidence is not easy and requires Coast Guard
personnel to conduct a thorough and methodical investigation while on
board a vessel. This includes gathering statements, checking the
ship's food storage and garbage disposal areas, taking photographs,
and examining logbooks and other records.
To help personnel enforce a wide variety of safety and pollution
regulations, the Coast Guard relies extensively on standardized
inspection checklists. The Coast Guard recognizes the importance of
these checklists in helping to identify violations and develop
sufficient evidence to support an enforcement action. However,
according to the Chief of the Marine Environmental Protection
Division, a standardized checklist covering the MARPOL V portion of
vessel inspections has not been developed because of competing
priorities.
In our visits to marine inspection offices, we found a variety of
boarding checklists. For the inspections of foreign vessels, each
office had devised its own checklist, which ranged from lists with a
single reference to MARPOL V to lists containing several pages of
questions and guidance. For inspections of U.S. vessels and foreign
passenger ships, the Coast Guard provides standardized inspection
booklets to its inspectors. However, because these booklets predate
MARPOL V, they do not include any reference to MARPOL V. In some
offices, these booklets have been updated to remind inspectors to
check on compliance with MARPOL V, but updates have not been
standardized among marine safety offices.
The absence of a standard inspection checklist for MARPOL V can
hinder the ability of enforcement personnel to identify violations
and then develop sufficient evidence to support an enforcement
action. During one inspection we witnessed, for example, the port
safety officer used a checklist with only a single reference to
MARPOL V and did not identify violations that his superior later
acknowledged should have been cited. In other marine safety offices,
where more extensive checklists were used, we saw more thorough
examinations, involving extensive inspections of food storage, food
preparation, and garbage disposal areas and a detailed questioning of
the crew on garbage disposal practices. Coast Guard officials
responsible for the MARPOL V program agreed that the inspection
checklist should be standardized and, on the basis of our findings,
told us that they will initiate steps to develop one.
COOPERATION BETWEEN THE
COAST GUARD AND APHIS
COULD IMPROVE MARPOL V
ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.3
The extent of cooperation between the Coast Guard and APHIS has
varied in some locations. During the first years of MARPOL V
enforcement, APHIS was an important source for identifying MARPOL V
violations. Now, however, cutbacks in APHIS' funding and
uncertainties about the extent of APHIS' role in MARPOL V inspections
have diminished cooperation between the agencies in some locations.
On three separate occasions beginning in 1990, APHIS headquarters has
directed its field units to cooperate with the Coast Guard in
identifying MARPOL V violations. APHIS headquarters provided
criteria for its field units to use as a basis for forwarding copies
of their inspection reports to the appropriate Coast Guard marine
safety office for possible action. During our visits to marine
safety offices, we found instances of substantial cooperation between
the two agencies that had resulted in numerous enforcement cases in
recent years. For example, in one marine safety office, the two
agencies had conducted joint training: APHIS had instructed the
Coast Guard on how to identify Asian Gypsy Moths, and the Coast Guard
had provided MARPOL V training to APHIS.
In other instances, we found that the two agencies had little or
limited contact. For example, in one West Coast marine safety
office, officials said that they tried for several years to develop a
relationship--for example, offering MARPOL V training--with their
local APHIS counterparts but were unsuccessful. A senior APHIS
official said that some Coast Guard units have asked APHIS personnel
to participate in joint boardings and safety inspections, which are
beyond what APHIS has agreed to do. In another location on the East
Coast, we found that a local APHIS office was mailing its inspection
forms with suspected MARPOL V violations to the Coast Guard weeks
after the ships had left port. At our suggestion, APHIS began faxing
copies of inspection reports to the local Coast Guard units on the
same day; this practice will allow the Coast Guard to inspect vessels
suspected of violating MARPOL V before the vessels leave port. Coast
Guard enforcement personnel told us that they believed that the
"personalities" of the local officials involved, coupled with the
fact that APHIS has no formal or regulatory responsibility to enforce
MARPOL V, are key factors that have contributed to the poor
cooperation in some locations.
Efforts to formalize the nature and extent of cooperation between the
two agencies have thus far been unsuccessful. For example, beginning
in 1993 the Coast Guard sought to develop a memorandum of
understanding with APHIS on this issue; however, agreement between
the two agencies has still not been achieved. A senior APHIS
official told us that he believes that a formal agreement is too
"bureaucratic" and is not necessary in this instance. Even without
an agreement, the Chief of the Coast Guard's Marine Environmental
Protection Division said that the Coast Guard will seek to identify
practices found in locations where a productive relationship exists
and apply them to those locations where cooperation has been more
limited.
LACK OF CLEAR CASE
FEEDBACK EXISTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.4
Clear feedback from Coast Guard hearing officers can provide
important information for enforcement personnel in the field on how
to develop sound civil penalty cases that are technically correct and
include complete evidence. If their cases are well prepared,
enforcement personnel can better ensure that cases are not dismissed
for technicalities, that proper civil penalties are assessed, and
that enforcement time is not wasted. To improve the general quality
of cases forwarded for civil penalty proceedings, the Coast Guard's
guidance requires hearing officers to notify district managers about
the final action taken in each case. This notification should
include the rationale the hearing officer used in reaching the
decision, according to the hearing officers' program manager.
However, district offices are not required to forward the hearing
officers' feedback to local units.
Enforcement personnel with whom we talked expressed frustration and
confusion about why many MARPOL V cases are dismissed or why civil
penalties are reduced. Twenty-two percent of all enforcement cases
for the period from October 1, 1991, to December 31, 1994, were
closed or dismissed by the Coast Guard without any enforcement
action. Also, hearing offices' data indicate that for fiscal years
1992-94, the final penalty assessed by the hearing office averaged
less than half the average amount recommended to the hearing office.
Enforcement personnel commented that often they receive untimely
and/or insufficient feedback or rationale from the hearing officers
or district program managers; therefore, the enforcement personnel
learn little from the cases that can be applied to improve future
submissions. For example, enforcement personnel in several marine
safety offices said that it often takes months for their district to
pass on to local units information from hearing officers, reducing
the ability of unit personnel to learn from the feedback. At another
marine safety office, we were told that the unit did not use case
file information as a source of feedback because it was so old by the
time it was returned. Also, hearing officers do not always provide a
rationale for their decisions, according to hearing officers in two
different offices.
In cases in which good feedback has been provided, better case
preparation has occurred. For example, a hearing officer told us
about one marine safety office that had greatly improved the quality
of its cases and the corresponding success rate for adjudicating
MARPOL V violations. Enforcement personnel at this office told us
that the key to the improvement in the quality of its cases stemmed
from following the feedback that the office had received from its
earlier cases and from the subsequent training that its enforcement
personnel received.
The hearing officers' program manager acknowledged that sometimes
cases are dismissed or civil penalties reduced because of incomplete
case development and technicalities. She indicated that there is a
need for good feedback and better case preparation guidance in
general; however, because of other higher priorities, no such
guidance has been prepared.
Hearing officers with whom we spoke are reluctant to provide feedback
on specific cases to the districts or units because of the importance
of maintaining their neutrality as an adjudicator and avoiding the
appearance of assisting in the prosecution of a particular case.
They were amenable, however, to providing more general guidance or
training on good case preparation techniques. In fact, some hearing
officers said they occasionally visit districts to educate
enforcement personnel on this subject, although the frequency of such
visits varies.
MARINE SAFETY INFORMATION
SYSTEM IS TIME-CONSUMING
AND INEFFECTIVE
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.5
The Coast Guard's marine safety information system, the system used
to collect and analyze the MARPOL V enforcement data, was frequently
cited by Coast Guard officials as burdensome and ineffectual. We
previously reported on problems with this system, such as hardware
and software problems, untimely and inaccurate information, and user
"unfriendliness."\13 The effect of these problems on enforcing MARPOL
is threefold. First, time spent trying to input data (as much as 10
hours for each violation) takes time away from inspecting ships.
Second, program managers do not have access to data when they need
them in order to monitor or evaluate the performance of marine safety
offices. Collecting needed data by other means can be a laborious
process, resulting in the ineffective use of staff at the unit level.
For example, from March 1992 until October 1994, the Coast Guard--in
an effort to collect accurate data and provide feedback to the
field--tasked each marine safety office to manually collect
enforcement data separately from the system. These data were
reported monthly to program managers in Coast Guard headquarters, who
otherwise would have had to wait 4 to 6 months for the system to
report the same information. Third, the system does not include
complete data on enforcement cases generated by Coast Guard personnel
outside of marine safety offices, such as those cases recorded by
small boat station personnel. In our view, this situation makes
coordination among various Coast Guard units more difficult to
achieve in enforcing MARPOL V.
The Coast Guard is now completing some improvements to the system
that it hopes will overcome the obstacles discussed above. According
to the Chief of the Coast Guard's Marine Environmental Protection
Division, improving the MARPOL component of the data system has been
a high priority in the Coast Guard and is expected to reduce input
time and speed data collection for MARPOL violations. In addition, a
contract was recently let to begin the development of the Coast
Guard's next management information system, according to Coast Guard
headquarters officials. However, this new system will not be in
operation for at least 2 years.
--------------------
\13 Coast Guard: Progress in the Marine Safety Network, but Many
Uncertainties Remain (GAO/RCED-92-206, Aug. 28, 1992).
UTILIZATION OF MARPOL BILLETS
IS UNCERTAIN
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
For fiscal year 1991, the Senate Committee on Appropriations provided
for 100 positions for pollution prevention activities. The Coast
Guard designated 85 of these positions as "MARPOL investigator" or
"coastal pollution enforcement" positions and allocated the remaining
15 positions as a support and training allowance. Coast Guard
documents indicate that all but one of these positions were filled
during 1991 and 1992.
According to Coast Guard officials in headquarters and the field,
MARPOL enforcement efforts are better spread among a number of
personnel in each marine safety office rather than limited to the 85
designated enforcement personnel. As a result, the designated MARPOL
personnel do not spend their time exclusively on MARPOL activities.
We found that some spend less than half their time on MARPOL
activities, while other personnel also perform MARPOL-related duties.
However, we were unable to determine how much time, in the aggregate,
the Coast Guard spends on MARPOL-related activities because its
personnel do not regularly record their MARPOL-related activities.
For example, MARPOL-related time charges actually reported by the
marine safety information system for the 1-year period from July 1,
1993, to June 30, 1994, totaled just less than 12,500 hours (or a
little over the work time of seven full-time equivalent
positions).\14 However, according to Coast Guard officials familiar
with the system, few personnel strictly account for MARPOL time
charges because such accounting has not been required and is viewed
by personnel as burdensome.
The Coast Guard believes a better estimate of the time devoted to
MARPOL each year, including all enforcement and education activities,
is about that of 61 to 66 full-time equivalent staff. However, the
reliability of this estimate is suspect because it is based on an
extrapolation of the time charges of just one marine safety office.
There is no assurance that the situation at this office is
representative of MARPOL enforcement activities at marine safety
offices as a whole, particularly since we noted considerable
differences in the level of MARPOL V enforcement activities among the
offices we visited.
--------------------
\14 The Coast Guard assumes that one annual full-time equivalent
position represents 212 8-hour days, or 1,696 hours.
EDUCATION HAS BECOME AN
IMPORTANT PART OF THE COAST
GUARD'S MARPOL STRATEGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
The Coast Guard has determined that enforcement alone will not
achieve compliance with MARPOL V, and enforcement for some sectors of
the marine community is not viable. Therefore, the Coast Guard has
embarked on an education and outreach effort to improve compliance.
Since the early 1990s, the Coast Guard has conducted MARPOL
education. Initially, education was focused on informing the
maritime industry about the new MARPOL regulations as an extension of
the Coast Guard's enforcement activities--for example, handing out
pamphlets and stickers to commercial shippers and port facility
managers. The emphasis has now expanded to educate recreational
boaters and the commercial fishing industry about maritime pollution.
Because of the high numbers and dispersion of recreational boats and
fishing vessels, enforcement through inspections, patrols, or similar
means is nearly impossible.\15 Education appears to be a reasonable
strategy for this group and one supported by the Center for Marine
Conservation.\16
--------------------
\15 The Center for Marine Conservation estimates that there are 46
million recreational boaters in the United States, while the Coast
Guard reported that almost 45,000 commercial fishing vessels were
registered in the United States in fiscal year 1993.
\16 The Center for Marine Conservation, established in 1972, is a
nonprofit public interest group dedicated to protecting marine
wildlife and conserving coastal and ocean resources.
EDUCATION AND OUTREACH
FUNDED BY A DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE GRANT
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1
In March 1994, the Coast Guard's existing education and outreach
efforts were increased through a $1.28 million grant from the
Department of Defense's Civil Military Cooperation Action Program to
begin a pilot program. The pilot, known as the SeaPartners Campaign,
received another grant of $1.7 million for fiscal year 1995. The
Coast Guard has applied for grant money again for fiscal year 1996,
the last year that the pilot is eligible under this grant program.
After 1996, the Coast Guard plans to fund the campaign internally.
DURING 1994, SEAPARTNERS
GENERATED CONSIDERABLE,
ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT UNFOCUSED,
ACTIVITY
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2
The Coast Guard initiated the SeaPartners Campaign with a wide range
of activities. To design the campaign, the Coast Guard worked with
the Center for Marine Conservation as well as many federal, state,
and local agencies. In June 1994, Coast Guard headquarters sponsored
training for active-duty personnel and reservists to help them
undertake public outreach and education at their home units.\17
Following the training, the participants returned to their home units
and began educating a wide range of audiences, from other Coast Guard
personnel to grade school children, on marine pollution. The Coast
Guard estimates that by September 1994, the campaign had reached
about 175,000 people through 1,180 separate activities in various
parts of the country.
During our visits to marine safety offices, we noted considerable
support and enthusiasm for the SeaPartners program among Coast Guard
personnel. The offices were supporting a wide variety of educational
activities, and personnel said that they were receiving positive
feedback from the public. Just how the program is contributing to
MARPOL V enforcement is unknown, however, because no good measure of
this has been developed.
In 1994, the Coast Guard commissioned an outside evaluation of
SeaPartners. The evaluation determined that while the campaign
generated considerable activity, its mission needed to be clarified
and its activities needed to be better targeted.\18 While concluding
that the pilot had great potential to make substantial contributions
to protecting the marine environment, the report noted that
SeaPartners was so broadly defined that there were "misperceptions,
confusion, and a lack of common understanding about the program's
goals, objectives, and mission and appropriate ways to achieve the
program's intended outcome." The report made 31 recommendations on
ways to strengthen public outreach. The Coast Guard agreed with the
report's recommendations and has revised its strategy for SeaPartners
in fiscal year 1995. The new strategy clarifies SeaPartners'
mission, targets activities toward more traditional port community
audiences, and develops ways to measure the campaign's effects.
--------------------
\17 In 1994, the pilot program was staffed by 259 reservists and 49
active duty personnel.
\18 A.T. Kearney, Inc., Results of the SEA-KEEPERS Campaign Pilot
Months (April Through September 1994), Final Report, November 1994
(Alexandria, Va.).
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
The Coast Guard has made progress in its enforcement of MARPOL V
through heightened awareness at the unit level and the development of
a broader-based education and outreach program. It still faces a
number of formidable obstacles to further enhance enforcement in this
area, however. We believe that improving the ability of its
personnel to identify violations and better substantiate them in
their enforcement actions is critical to achieving this end. Doing
so would involve improving procedures for vessel inspections,
establishing a better working relationship with APHIS, and providing
useful and timely feedback to units. It is also important that the
Coast Guard continue its efforts to improve its education and
outreach program for MARPOL V and its management information system
used to monitor the performance of field units in achieving MARPOL V
enforcement.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard to do the following:
Develop and put into force a standardized MARPOL V inspection
checklist for use by its enforcement personnel. Doing so will
improve the Coast Guard's ability to identify and properly
document violations.
Develop procedures to ensure that case feedback from hearing
officers, including the rationale for decisions made, is
provided to districts and forwarded to local units in a timely
manner.
Explore with the Administrator of APHIS areas of mutual interest
and ways to improve cooperation between the U.S. Coast Guard
and APHIS on enforcing MARPOL V.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
We provided copies of a draft of this report to the Coast Guard and
the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, U.S. Department of
Agriculture, for their comments. We discussed the information in the
draft report with Coast Guard officials, including the Chief of the
Marine Environment and Protection Division. We also discussed the
draft report with the Assistant to the Deputy Administrator, Plant
Protection and Quarantine Service, Animal and Plant Health Inspection
Service. These officials agreed with the facts as presented, but the
Coast Guard contended that the content and tone of the draft did not
give the Coast Guard adequate credit for the positive results that it
has achieved and the efforts that it has made to improve the program.
We have modified the final report where appropriate to recognize
improvements to the program. The Coast Guard agreed with our
recommendations for a standardized checklist and procedures to ensure
case feedback from hearing officers. It disagreed with our proposed
recommendation that the Secretaries of Transportation and Agriculture
should intercede, if necessary, to ensure cooperation between the
Coast Guard and APHIS. We agree that cooperation could be sought at
a lower level and have revised the recommendation to encourage the
Commandant of the Coast Guard and the Administrator of APHIS to
explore ways to improve their cooperation.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1
We conducted our work between June 1994 and April 1995 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards. During that
time, we contacted Coast Guard field and headquarters offices, met
with interested outside parties, and analyzed the Coast Guard's
violation data. Details of our scope and methodology are provided in
appendix II.
As agreed, unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan
no further distribution of the report until 7 days from the date of
this letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretary of
Transportation; the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard; the Secretary of
Agriculture; the Administrator of the Animal and Plant Health
Inspection Service, U.S. Department of Agriculture; the Director,
Office of Management and Budget; and other interested parties. We
will make copies available to others on request.
Please call me at (202) 512-2834 if you have questions. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix III.
Kenneth M. Mead
Director, Transportation Issues
ANALYSIS OF MARPOL V VIOLATIONS
AND ENFORCEMENT RESULTS
=========================================================== Appendix I
Our analysis of MARPOL V enforcement data is drawn from two data
sets. The first are enforcement data from cases initiated by marine
safety offices (MSO). The second set are data for only those cases
processed by hearing offices for civil penalty determination, but
from all sources, including law enforcement and boating safety
personnel.
MARINE SAFETY OFFICE
ENFORCEMENT DATA
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
MSOs' MARPOL V enforcement data span the period from October 1, 1991,
to December 31, 1994 (fiscal years 1992, 1993, 1994 and the first
quarter of 1995). A total of 725 enforcement cases were reported
during this period. The sections below discuss the status of these
cases as of February 15, 1995.
ENFORCEMENT TRENDS SINCE
OCTOBER 1, 1991
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.1
The number of enforcement cases initiated by MSOs have generally
followed an upward trend (see fig. I.1). The main exception was in
the third and fourth quarter of 1993, when the number of cases
initiated fell before starting back up in 1994.
Figure I.1: MARPOL V
Violations by Quarter
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Cases reported from Oct. 1, 1991, through Dec. 31, 1994.
DISPOSITION AND STATUS OF
ENFORCEMENT CASES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.2
Final action has been taken on 422 of the 725 enforcement cases (58
percent), while 303 remain in process. The greatest portion of
completed cases (157 cases) were administratively closed by the MSO
or district offices, or dismissed by the hearing office for
insufficient evidence (see fig. I.2). Another 129 cases were
referred to the responsible party's flag state for action because
U.S. jurisdiction could not be proven or was not applied. In only 9
out of the 129 referrals did the flag state ultimately fine the
responsible party. A State Department official told us that flag
state referrals are typically marginal cases that are short on
evidence. Another 67 enforcement cases were closed with a warning
letter to the responsible party, while 69 cases resulted in a
penalty.
Figure I.2: Disposition and
Status of MARPOL V Enforcement
Cases
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Cases reported from Oct. 1, 1991, through Dec. 31, 1994.
TRENDS IN PENALTY AMOUNTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.3
An analysis of the 69 enforcement cases that have thus far resulted
in a penalty shows that the average has generally risen from $4,250
in 1989 to $8,750 in 1994 (see fig. I.3).\19 The increasing number
of enforcement cases from 1989 to 1992 caused the total amount of
penalties to increase. The drop in total penalties after 1992, shown
in figure I.3, reflects the fact that a high percentage of cases
initiated in 1993 and 1994 are still in process.
Figure I.3: Total and Average
Penalties Assessed
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Penalties assessed for cases reported from Jan. 1, 1989,
through Dec. 31, 1994.
--------------------
\19 While outside of the detailed MSO data set used elsewhere, civil
penalty and enforcement case totals for 1989 through 1991 were taken
from Coast Guard documents. Penalty amounts include one violation
that resulted in a criminal penalty assessment imposed by the
Department of Justice.
DISTRIBUTION OF ENFORCEMENT
CASES AMONG DISTRICT OFFICES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.4
Enforcement cases are not distributed evenly among district offices,
as figure I.4 indicates. District 8, which includes MSOs bordering
the Gulf of Mexico, has accounted for more than one-fourth of all
cases. Districts 7 (Southeastern U.S. and Puerto Rico) and 14
(Hawaii and Guam) together have accounted for over 30 percent.
Districts on the East (1 and 5) and West Coasts (11 and 13) have
accounted for comparatively fewer, while inland districts (2 and 9)
have accounted for the fewest number of cases.
Figure I.4: MARPOL V
Enforcement Cases by District
Office
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Cases by district office from Oct. 1, 1991, through Dec. 31,
1994.
TYPES OF VIOLATIONS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.5
Most of the enforcement cases, as shown in figure I.5, were based on
violations of regulations prohibiting the discharge of plastic or
garbage. Less serious infractions, such as failure to post a garbage
sign or maintain a waste management plan, have been cited less
frequently.
Figure I.5: MARPOL V
Enforcement Cases by Type of
Violation
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Violations from Oct. 1, 1991, through Dec. 31, 1994.
Civil penalties were assessed more often for cases where garbage or
plastic was discharged. Of the 69 enforcement cases that resulted in
a penalty, 84 percent (58 violations) were discharge cases. These 58
discharge violations also accounted for 98 percent of the total
penalty dollars assessed.
FLAG STATE ENFORCEMENT CASES
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1.6
A majority of the enforcement cases involved ships licensed (or
"flagged") in other countries, although as figure I.6 also shows, 4
out of 10 cases were for U.S.-licensed vessels. The Coast Guard
conducts more inspections of U.S. ships than foreign ships--38,303
boardings of U.S. ships versus 16,021 boardings of foreign ships in
fiscal year 1993. Vessels flagged by Panama, Liberia, and the
Bahamas, often referred to as flags of convenience because the owners
are not citizens of the flag state, accounted for the highest
percentages of foreign-flag enforcement cases.
Figure I.6: MARPOL V
Enforcement Cases by Flag State
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Enforcement cases by flag state from Oct. 1, 1991, through
Dec. 31, 1994.
HEARING OFFICES' DATA ON
DISPOSITION OF CASES
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
The Coast Guard's Division of Maritime and International Law
maintains its own set of MARPOL V enforcement data drawn from the
marine safety information system. The division provided us with data
covering all cases submitted to the Coast Guard's three hearing
offices in fiscal years 1992 through 1994. Legal staff use these
data to monitor hearing offices' disposition of civil penalty cases.
Unlike the MSOs' data, which are organized by enforcement case, these
data are organized by citation charge, that is, the section of the
regulation found to be in noncompliance. Some enforcement cases may
involve more than one charge. For each charge, the data include the
civil penalty amounts recommended to the hearing office by the
district program managers, preliminary civil penalty assessment
amounts set by hearing officers prior to a civil penalty hearing, and
final civil penalty assessment amounts. Hearing officers may decide,
on the basis of the evidence, to dismiss a charge, issue a warning
letter, or impose a final penalty. In some instances, the party may
decide to pay the preliminary penalty amount rather than going
through the hearing process.
We focused our analysis on those charges that hearing officers had
closed in fiscal years 1992 through 1994, omitting any that were
still in process. In all, 928 charges were resolved during the
3-year period. Of these, just over half resulted in a dismissal or
warning letter (see fig. I.7). Of the remainder, equal percentages
of charges (24 percent) were settled through a preliminary assessment
or a final penalty assessment.
Figure I.7: Hearing Offices'
Final Dispositions of MARPOL V
Enforcement Cases
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Dispositions from Oct. 1, 1991, through Sept. 30, 1994.
HEARING OFFICES' CIVIL
PENALTY ASSESSMENTS
------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2.1
Total recommended and preliminary civil penalty amounts increased
substantially during fiscal years 1992-94 (see fig. I.8). In fiscal
year 1994, for example, units recommended $753,746 in total civil
penalties, a 73 percent increase over the previous year. By
comparison, the final civil penalties assessed have not increased as
dramatically--indeed, totals declined somewhat for fiscal year 1994.
Figure I.8: Total Civil
Penalty Amounts
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Penalty amounts from Oct. 1, 1991, through Sept. 30, 1994.
Examining the average civil penalty amounts for just the charges in
which a penalty was imposed (excluding charges resulting in dismissal
or a warning letter) also shows a substantial decline between
recommended and final civil penalty amounts for fiscal years 1992-94
(see fig. I.9). For the 3-year period, the average final civil
penalty was more than 50 percent less than the average penalty
recommended to the hearing office. Hearing officers said that units
establish civil penalty amounts strictly based on guidance from
headquarters and without knowing the violator's side of the story.
The hearing officers, after reviewing rebuttals and other information
from the vessel operator or owner, frequently reduce a civil penalty
based on a much broader knowledge base than unit personnel have when
they initially recommend a civil penalty.
Figure I.9: Average Civil
Penalty per Charge
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Penalty averages from Oct. 1, 1991, through Sept. 30, 1994.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
========================================================== Appendix II
To evaluate the Coast Guard's efforts to enforce MARPOL V, we
conducted work at Coast Guard headquarters and at numerous field
locations. At Coast Guard headquarters in Washington, D.C., we
interviewed and obtained documents from program managers in the
Office of Marine Safety, Security, and Environmental Protection, the
office responsible for implementing the Coast Guard's MARPOL V
program. We also met with Coast Guard officials in the Office of
Chief Counsel, the Office of Navigation Safety and Waterway Services,
and the Office of Law Enforcement and Defense Operations, which also
are charged with enforcement responsibility.
In the field, we visited 4 of the Coast Guard's 10 district offices
to understand their role in enforcement and all three of the Coast
Guard's hearing offices (Atlantic North, Atlantic South, and Pacific
Area) to discuss the civil penalty process. We also visited 9 of the
Coast Guard's 47 MSOs, which are responsible for enforcing MARPOL V
in U.S. ports. The MSOs we visited were judgmentally selected on
the basis of MARPOL V case activity (high and low activity) and to
achieve a broad geographical representation among offices on the
East, West, and Gulf Coasts. At the MSOs, we participated in vessel
inspections in addition to meeting with enforcement personnel. Table
II.1 provides a list of the MSO and district offices visited as part
of our review.
Table II.1
Marine Safety Offices and District
Offices Visited as Part of This Review
District office Marine safety office
----------------------------- -----------------------------
District 1 MSO Boston
(Boston)
COTP/MIO\a New York
MSO Portland, Maine
District 8 MSO New Orleans
(New Orleans)
MSO Corpus Christi
District 11 MSO San Francisco
(Los Angeles/Long Beach)
MSO Los Angeles/Long Beach
District 13 MSO Puget Sound
(Seattle)
MSO Portland, Oregon
------------------------------------------------------------
\a Captain of the Port/Marine Inspection Office.
A significant part of our evaluation consisted of analyzing the Coast
Guard's enforcement case data. Our analysis was based largely on
data from the Coast Guard's marine safety information system on
MARPOL V enforcement cases initiated by MSOs for the period from
October 1, 1991, through December 31, 1994. These data included the
date, MSO, ship name, type of vessel, licensing country, type(s) of
violation(s), current status and, if applicable, penalty amount for
each violation case. Another set of MARPOL V data came from the
Office of Chief Counsel and included only those enforcement cases
that reached the hearing office for civil penalty determination in
fiscal years 1992 through 1994. While excluding the significant
number of cases that were closed or referred elsewhere before
reaching the hearing office, it included cases reported by law
enforcement and boating safety personnel. We did not audit the
accuracy of any of the Coast Guard's enforcement data, although we
did attempt to eliminate duplicate entries and erroneous entries.
Appendix I discusses the analysis of each of these sets of data.
In addition to our work at the Coast Guard, we met with officials
from other federal agencies and outside entities familiar with MARPOL
V. We interviewed officials from the Department of Agriculture's
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, the Environmental
Protection Agency, the Center for Marine Conservation, and the
National Marine Board. We also reviewed reports on the MARPOL V
program by the Department of Transportation's Inspector General,
outside consultants, and congressional committees.
To assess the Coast Guard's utilization of MARPOL personnel
resources, we determined if the Coast Guard had assigned personnel to
these dedicated positions and, to the extent possible, the range of
their duties and responsibilities. We examined the Coast Guard's
records for indications of the amount of time spent on MARPOL-related
activities.
To describe the Coast Guard's educational and outreach efforts
pertaining to MARPOL V, we met with Coast Guard officials in
headquarters and in the field. We identified the Coast Guard's
strategy for this effort and how it was being implemented. At the
nine MSOs we visited, we reviewed the specific actions being taken in
their educational outreach. We also discussed the Coast Guard's
efforts with the Center for Marine Conservation, which has been
active in this area for many years. We reviewed an outside
consultant's report on the education program, discussed its findings
and recommendations with responsible Coast Guard officials, and
ascertained what the Coast Guard was doing in response.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION
Paul Aussendorf
Gerald Dillingham
Steve Gazda
Dawn Hoff
Stan Stenersen
Charles Sylvis
Randy Williamson