Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer Missions and
Better Management (Chapter Report, 01/27/95, GAO/RCED-95-10).
The Energy Department's (DOE) national laboratories have made vital
contributions to the nation's defense and civilian science and
technology efforts. However, the national laboratories today lack
clearly defined missions and suffer from poor coordination to solve
national problems. As a result, DOE has underutilized the laboratories'
talents to tackle complex issues and these institutions may be
unprepared to meet future expectations. GAO raises questions about the
laboratories' ability to help the United States meet its changing
defense needs at the end of the Cold War and compete against growing
foreign competition in technology.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-95-10
TITLE: Department of Energy: National Laboratories Need Clearer
Missions and Better Management
DATE: 01/27/95
SUBJECT: Energy research
Scientific research
Technology transfer
Laboratories
Nuclear energy
Research and development
Strategic planning
Agency missions
Contract monitoring
General management reviews
IDENTIFIER: GMR
DOE Global Studies Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Secretary of Energy
January 1995
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - NATIONAL
LABORATORIES NEED CLEARER MISSIONS
AND BETTER MANAGEMENT
GAO/RCED-95-10
National Laboratories' Missions and Management
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOE - Department of Energy
GAO - General Accounting Office
R&D - research and development
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-170004
January 27, 1995
The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary
The Secretary of Energy
Dear Madam Secretary:
This review of the national laboratories is part of our general
management review of the Department of Energy. The purpose of this
review is to assess the Department's management, analyze problems and
determine their underlying causes, and identify ways of improving
departmental management processes and structures.
This report contains recommendations to you for improving the
effectiveness of the Department's multiprogram national laboratories.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement of the actions taken on our
recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and
the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight not later than
60 days after the date of this letter and to the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this letter.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and subcommittees; individual Members of Congress; and
other interested parties. We will also make copies available to
others upon request.
Please contact me on (202) 512-3841 if you have any questions. Major
contributors to this report are listed in appendix IV.
Sincerely yours,
Victor S. Rezendes
Director, Energy and
Science Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
The Department of Energy's (DOE) multiprogram national laboratories
have made vital contributions to the nation's defense and civilian
science and technology efforts. Now, these laboratories face many
changes as the nation redefines its defense requirements at the end
of the Cold War and encounters increasing global competition in
technology. These changes have raised questions about whether the
laboratories are focusing their resources on the most important
national priorities and are managed as effectively as possible.
As part of a general management review of DOE, GAO, with assistance
from a panel of experts, assessed the laboratories' current and
future missions and DOE's management of the laboratories.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
DOE's laboratories have combined annual budgets of about $6 billion
and over 50,000 employees. DOE estimates that it has invested over
$100 billion in the laboratories over the past 20 years. Most of the
laboratories were established during or just after World War II as
part of the Manhattan Project, which developed the world's first
atomic bombs. The laboratories have since expanded their missions to
encompass civilian research and development in many disciplines--from
high-energy physics to advanced computing--at facilities located
throughout the nation. The laboratories support DOE programs and
address national needs in science and technology. DOE owns the
laboratories but contracts with universities and private-sector
organizations for their management and operation.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
DOE's laboratories do not have clearly defined missions that focus
their considerable resources on accomplishing the Department's
changing objectives and national priorities. As the manager of this
important research and technology network, DOE has not coordinated
these laboratories' efforts to solve national problems but has
managed each laboratory on a program-by-program basis. As a result,
DOE has underutilized the laboratories' special talents to tackle
complex, cross-cutting issues, and the laboratories may not be
prepared to meet future expectations. Although government advisory
groups have recommended in the past that DOE redefine the
laboratories' missions to meet changes in conditions and national
priorities, DOE has not acted on these recommendations. DOE recently
developed a Strategic Plan intended to integrate its missions and
programs in five major areas, but questions remain about the
Department's ability to lead the laboratories into the future.
DOE's day-to-day management of the laboratories--perceived as costly
and inefficient by laboratory managers--inhibits the achievement of a
productive working relationship between the laboratories and DOE that
is necessary if the laboratories are to move successfully into new
mission areas. Both laboratory and DOE managers believe that more
realistic and consistent priorities are needed to accomplish the
growing oversight and administrative requirements placed on the
laboratories in recent years.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
LABORATORIES NEED CLEAR AND
COORDINATED MISSIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
Over the past decade, several government advisory groups have
emphasized the need for DOE to clarify the laboratories' missions.
Recent events--including dramatic changes in the nuclear arms race,
the demand for technology to solve massive environmental problems,
and the growing international competition facing U.S. industry--have
brought this need into even sharper focus. Taxpayers have invested
heavily in the laboratories, and DOE is responsible for ensuring that
this investment is properly focused on national priorities.
The laboratories' missions are set forth as broad goals and activity
statements rather than as a coordinated set of objectives with
specific implementation strategies for bringing together the
individual and collective strengths of the laboratories to meet
departmental and national priorities. Faced with a "loss of
coherence and focus" at the laboratories, as a 1992 energy advisory
group reported, DOE has failed to develop a coordinated and shared
"vision" for them. Laboratory managers fear that the lack of proper
departmental direction is compromising both their effectiveness in
meeting traditional missions and their ability to achieve new
national priorities.
Part of the problem is that while DOE manages the laboratories
program by program, it does not also manage them as a diversified
research system. This approach prevents the laboratories from fully
capitalizing on one of their great strengths--combining
multidisciplinary talents to solve complex, cross-cutting issues.
For example, research on preventing weapons proliferation requires
combining expertise in nonproliferation and weapons
design--activities that are carried out by different laboratories and
managed by different assistant secretaries. The laboratories believe
that better linkages are also needed among the energy conservation,
fossil fuel, and nuclear energy research areas.
The need for a mechanism to facilitate cross-program coordination has
been cited by past advisory groups and by GAO. DOE did create the
Office of Laboratory Management to coordinate the interests of the
various program offices that interact with the laboratories.
However, the change was not implemented, and the existing office
lacks the authority to resolve disputes among program offices and
reports through two chains of command below the Secretary--an
arrangement that does not promote effective interaction between DOE
and the laboratories.
DOE created an Advisory Board Task Force on Alternative Futures for
the National Laboratories, giving the Secretary another opportunity
to chart a course for the future of the laboratories. The task
force, whose report is due in February 1995, could set the foundation
for developing clear and coordinated missions for the laboratory
network. The success of the task force's efforts will depend, in
large measure, on the extent to which DOE's leaders are now able--as
they have been unable in the past--to achieve consensus among the
laboratories, DOE, and the Congress on future missions for the
national laboratories.
DOE'S MANAGEMENT INHIBITS
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE
LABORATORIES' MISSIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
Laboratory managers view DOE's day-to-day management as costly and
unproductive in meeting the laboratories' missions. Tensions between
laboratory and DOE executives may also be impeding progress toward
reaching a shared vision of the laboratories' future. Laboratory
managers have characterized DOE as a micromanager in many areas,
especially in overseeing the laboratories' compliance with expanding
administrative requirements.
Coping with the new requirements that have accompanied DOE's growing
oversight responsibilities is, according to many of the laboratory
managers we contacted, a major burden that not only increases the
costs of research but also diverts attention from it. Although
laboratory managers recognize the importance of meeting
environmental, safety, and health goals, they expect DOE to set
priorities for their administrative activities and to help them
"balance" their responsibilities in the areas of research and
administration.
DOE and other agencies conduct as many as 400 reviews annually at
some laboratories, according to laboratory sources. One laboratory
manager calculated that there was more than one oversight review a
day in his program. Laboratory managers are concerned about the time
required to prepare for oversight reviews and the loss of the best
researchers' time during reviews. Another manager told GAO that he
spends as much as 40 percent of his working time on oversight
matters. Many laboratory managers expressed concern because they are
held accountable for requirements that do not apply to research
laboratories and do not differentiate between generic and specific
problems.
Laboratory managers also worry that rising research costs--fueled by
the growing costs of complying with administrative requirements--may
be limiting the ability of the laboratories to compete for
opportunities to conduct research sponsored by industry and other
government agencies. This limitation could, in turn, diminish the
ability of the laboratories to build partnerships with industry--the
key to the success of their commercial technology mission.
DOE has begun to institute contract reform efforts. DOE believes
that these efforts, especially the planned use of performance
measures to guide and evaluate laboratory activities, will form a
basis for a more productive management approach that better
integrates the laboratories' mission goals with administrative
requirements.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy, on the basis of the
management issues raised in this report, evaluate alternatives for
managing the laboratories that more fully support the achievement of
clear and coordinated missions, including strengthening the
Department's Office of Laboratory Management.
MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
If DOE is unable to refocus the laboratories' missions and develop a
management approach consistent with these new missions, the Congress
may wish to consider alternatives to the present DOE-laboratory
relationship. Such alternatives might include placing the
laboratories under the control of different agencies or creating a
separate structure for the sole purpose of developing a consensus on
the laboratories' missions.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:7
DOE believes that the new strategic planning process that it put in
place in 1994, together with the task force's upcoming report on the
future of the laboratories, will address many of the issues raised in
this report. The agency also believes that its new contract reform
efforts, emphasizing the use of performance measures to evaluate the
laboratories, will result in a more balanced management approach.
DOE commented that these initiatives should be better reflected in
GAO's report. GAO believes that the initiatives, when implemented,
have the potential to substantially strengthen the agency's overall
management capabilities. However, GAO also notes that past DOE
reforms--including calls by previous task forces for clarifying the
laboratories' missions and prior efforts at contract reform--have not
always led to significant change. GAO has updated its report to
reflect the agency's initiatives.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
The Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible for some of the
nation's largest and most impressive scientific facilities. The
agency's nine national multiprogram laboratories employ more than
50,000 people and have annual operating budgets that exceed $6
billion. DOE estimates that more than $100 billion has been invested
in the laboratories over the past 20 years.\1 The laboratories' work
covers many scientific areas--from high-energy physics to advanced
computing--at facilities located throughout the nation. Although DOE
owns the laboratories, it contracts with universities and
private-sector organizations for their management and operation--a
practice that has made the laboratories more attractive to scientists
and engineers. The laboratory contractors and DOE form unique
partnerships at each site, but the Department remains responsible for
providing the laboratories with their missions and overall direction,
as well as for giving them specific direction to meet both program
and administrative goals.
--------------------
\1 DOE is also responsible for several "single purpose" laboratories.
These facilities concentrate in a particular program area or were
created to pursue a single issue. Although these smaller
laboratories are part of DOE's national laboratory network, we
focused our attention on the nine multiprogram laboratories that
dominate DOE's science and technology activities and budget
resources.
LABORATORIES PROVIDE UNIQUE
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
CAPABILITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
The laboratories provide the nation with unique research and
development (R&D) capabilities. Specifically, the laboratories
enable researchers to work on complex, interdisciplinary problems
that dominate current science and technology;
permit the study of large-scale, high-risk problems that would be
difficult for industry or universities to undertake; and
provide unique research facilities for universities and industry to
use while serving as focal points for research consortia.
DOE's laboratories have made wide-ranging contributions to defense
and civilian technologies. For example, the laboratories have long
produced and applied nuclear isotopes now used in thousands of
diagnostic medical procedures daily. Safer cars and planes have
evolved using computer crash simulation software developed at one
laboratory. In 1994, the laboratories' technological achievements
received 25 of the 100 prestigious "R&D 100 Awards" given annually by
R&D Magazine for the year's most technologically significant
products. Appendix I contains information on the staffing and
funding, as well as the contractor and programmatic emphases, at each
laboratory.
LABORATORIES' MISSIONS HAVE
EVOLVED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
When DOE was created in 1977, it inherited the national laboratories
with a management structure that had evolved from the World War II
"Manhattan Project," whose mission was to design and build the
world's first atomic bombs. From this national security mission, the
laboratories generated expertise that initially developed nuclear
power as an energy source. The laboratories' missions broadened in
1967, when the Congress recognized their role in conducting
environmental as well as public health and safety-related research
and development. In 1971, the Congress again expanded the
laboratories' role, permitting them to conduct nonnuclear energy
research and development. During the 1980s, the Congress enacted
laws to stimulate the transfer of technology from the laboratories to
U.S. industry. DOE estimates that over the past 20 years, the
nation has invested more than $100 billion in the laboratories.
The 1990s have brought the most dramatic changes affecting the
multiprogram laboratories, including the following.
The Soviet Union's collapse has reduced the nuclear arms race,
raising questions about the need to maintain three separate weapons
laboratories.
The weapons laboratories, facing reduced funding in nuclear weapons
research, have diversified their work in order to maintain their
preeminent talent and facilities.
Expectations are growing that all laboratories can and should help
improve the nation's economic competitiveness by working with
industry to develop commercial technologies.
As the laboratories have aged, concerns have arisen about their
ability to maintain their skills in weapons programs. Major
investments will be needed to provide up-to-date facilities and
attract younger scientists.
In light of the general budget austerity facing the federal
government, a stable funding environment is no longer guaranteed, and
the laboratories will increasingly need to show useful results.
These and other forces have accelerated the laboratories'
diversification from defense and nuclear research. For example, the
nuclear weapons laboratories--Los Alamos, Sandia, and Lawrence
Livermore--although created to design, develop, and test nuclear
weapons, now devote less than half of their budgets to work on
nuclear weapons. While these laboratories have been affected most
dramatically by recent geopolitical changes, all DOE laboratories
have been influenced by recent events and are redirecting their
priorities.
The federal government owns the facilities and grounds of the
laboratories and funds the work but has relied on contractors to
manage and operate them. These contracts generally run for 5 years;
however, some of the laboratories have been run by the same
contractor for decades, even since their inception in the early
1940s. The laboratories' history of relative autonomy in daily
research and operational management has led to concerns about their
business practices as well as their attention to environmental,
safety, and health issues.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
The objective of this report was to identify and examine the
principal issues affecting the laboratories' missions and DOE's
approach to laboratory management. The Congress has expressed
considerable interest in these topics over the years, and our prior
work at the laboratories, as well as other studies, has demonstrated
that the laboratories' missions and management are key concerns.
This work was carried out as part of our general management review of
the Department of Energy.
Our work focused on DOE's nine multiprogram laboratories because of
their size and importance as national science and technology
resources. We selected laboratory staff to interview by asking each
laboratory to identify five programs that best represented its
current contributions and future capabilities. (App. II contains
the list of programs the laboratories identified.) From these
programs, we selected three for assessment. This approach allowed us
to examine both the strengths as well as the weaknesses of the
laboratories. When collecting information, we strove to identify and
assess mission and management issues from the experience of the
laboratory managers responsible for directing the programs we had
selected. Our work also focused on each laboratory's technology
transfer activities because of the increased national emphasis on
using the laboratories to enhance U.S. technological
competitiveness.
We collected information about the laboratories' missions and
management from multiple sources with direct knowledge of these
issues. At the laboratories, we interviewed managers who were
responsible for the research programs we had chosen. We also held
discussions with laboratory directors, senior officials responsible
for technology transfer activities, and contractor representatives.
At DOE, we interviewed program managers--Washington-based executives
responsible for the research programs we had selected at the
laboratories--and DOE field office managers, who oversee the
Department's contractors at the laboratories.
To validate and refine our findings, we conducted two focus groups.
The first group, which met with our staff in Chicago, consisted of
one program manager from each of the nine laboratories. A second
group, comprising program managers from DOE headquarters, met with
our staff in Washington, D.C.
To obtain independent views about the laboratories' missions and
management, we interviewed experts and industry representatives who
were not associated with the laboratories. In addition, the National
Academy of Public Administration assisted us in convening a panel of
experts with backgrounds in (1) managing research in government and
industry and (2) science and technology policy. Table 1 lists the
panelists and their relevant professional experience.
Table 1
GAO's Panel of Energy Experts
--------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Lewis Branscomb, Chair Albert Pratt Public Service Professor,
John F. Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University; Director, Science,
Technology, and Public Policy Program.
Formerly: Vice President and Chief
Scientist, IBM; Director, National
Bureau of Standards; Chairman, National
Science Board.
Erich Bloch Distinguished Fellow, Council on
Competitiveness.
Formerly: Director, National Science
Foundation; Member, Committee on
Computers in Automated Manufacturing;
Vice President, Technical Personnel
Development, IBM; Vice President and
General Manager, IBM, East Fishkill,
N.Y.
Sydney Drell Deputy Director, Stanford Linear
Accelerator.
Formerly: Co-Director, Stanford
University Center for International
Security and Arms Control; Executive
Head, Department of Theoretical
Physics, Stanford University.
Harry Finger Consultant.
Formerly: President and CEO, U.S.
Council for Energy Awareness; Vice
President for Strategic Planning and
Development Operations, and General
Manager, Center for Energy Systems,
General Electric Company; Assistant
Secretary for Research and Technology,
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development; Associate Administrator
for Management and Director, Space
Power and Nuclear Systems, National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.
Donald Kerr Executive Vice President, Science
Applications International
Corporation.
Formerly: President, EG&G; Director,
Los Alamos National Laboratory;
Assistant Secretary for Energy
Programs, Department of Defense.
Roland Schmitt Consultant.
Formerly: President, Rensselaer
Polytechnic Institute; Senior Vice
President, Science and Technology,
General Electric; Senior Vice
President, Corporate Research and
Development, General Electric.
Robert White President, National Academy of
Engineering; Vice Chairman, National
Research Council.
Formerly: President, University
Corporation for Atmospheric Research;
Administrator, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration; Chief, U.S.
Weather Bureau.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
We also reviewed information and analyses from the laboratories, DOE,
the Congress, industry, and independent experts, as well as
legislative proposals and testimony, DOE documents, budget materials,
and previous studies conducted by government and private
organizations.
In analyzing information, we compared and contrasted views about
laboratory mission and management issues. We found considerable
agreement among all types of respondents on both topics. To give the
reader concrete illustrations of how mission and management issues
were viewed, we have used quotations from sources we interviewed
throughout this report.
We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from DOE. The
agency's comments and our evaluation are presented in appendix III
and at the end of chapter 5.
We conducted our work from July 1992 through December 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
THE LABORATORIES NEED THEIR
MISSIONS CLARIFIED
============================================================ Chapter 2
As the manager of the laboratories, DOE has not clarified how the
laboratory system can and should meet national priorities. Although
research programs set laboratory priorities to meet their own goals,
DOE has not used the laboratories as a coordinated network of talent
and facilities to meet missions that cut across programs. This
approach not only inhibits the development of clear and coordinated
missions for the multiprogram laboratories but also fails to draw
upon the laboratories' expertise in multiple disciplines to solve
complex, cross-cutting problems in science and technology.
These concerns are not new. In the past, many advisory groups
emphasized the need to clarify and redefine the laboratories'
missions. Although DOE recently developed a Strategic Plan and
processes intended to integrate the Department's missions and
programs in five major areas, questions remain about DOE's overall
capacity to lead the national laboratories into new mission areas.
LABORATORIES' MISSIONS ARE
UNCLEAR
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
DOE's multiprogram laboratory system, as well as the individual
laboratories, needs missions that are clear and coordinated with
DOE's overall program goals in order to organize the system's efforts
as effectively as possible. The clearer the mission, experts
believe, the better the performance will be. In 1992, the Advisory
Board to the former Secretary of Energy expressed the importance of
clear missions as follows:
Each national laboratory must have clearly defined, specific
missions which support the over-arching missions of DOE to
ensure the best technical and management performance and the
greatest value to the nation.\2
Only with clear missions, experts believe, can implementation
strategies or "road maps" be developed that describe how each mission
will be accomplished and guide each organization's day-to-day
operations.
We found that the multiprogram laboratories--both individually and as
a group--do not have either clearly defined missions or specific
implementation strategies that bring together laboratory resources to
focus on accomplishing departmental objectives and national goals.
Although current mission statements for the laboratories describe
their ability to conduct research in defense, energy, and
environmental cleanup; to transfer technology to industry; and to
perform basic research, these activities have not been translated
into overall missions for the laboratory system and specific missions
for each laboratory. For example, one laboratory manager expressed
concern to us that all laboratories have "generic" mission statements
that tend to look remarkably similar. Laboratory managers frequently
made comments to us such as "we don't really have a mission . . ."
and "The laboratories must have a vision and goal toward which they
can work." An expert we consulted expressed the current situation as
follows:
[We] have not seen crisp, specific mission statements from
individual laboratories, nor specific mission statements that
would cover all DOE's laboratories. Furthermore, DOE has not
been able to describe the mission of the laboratories, nor are
the laboratories' missions defined in any piece of legislation.
. . .It is not possible to run a $6 billion organization
without specific mission statements.
Laboratory managers we spoke with were also concerned that the
Congress, DOE, and the laboratories do not share a "common vision" of
the laboratories' missions. Such a common vision among the key
"stakeholders" is crucial if the laboratories are to use their
resources most effectively to support departmental programs and
national goals--the main purpose of the laboratories' existence.
Developing clear and more coordinated missions is particularly
important, given the growing expectation that the laboratories will
work together toward achieving national security, energy,
environmental, and commercial technology goals. (Ch. 4 contains the
opinions of our panel of experts on suitable missions for the
national laboratories.)
The responsibility for developing the common vision rests with DOE.
However, laboratory managers believed that DOE headquarters and
operations offices have divergent views of the laboratories and their
goals, and DOE has not been able to develop a consensus with the
Congress on the future of the laboratories.
--------------------
\2 Secretary of Energy Advisory Board Task Force on the Department of
Energy's National Laboratories, final report, July 1992.
CLEAR AND COORDINATED MISSIONS
WOULD HELP THE LABORATORIES
ADDRESS CROSS-CUTTING ISSUES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
Without a coordinated set of laboratory missions, DOE is unable to
address issues that require cooperation and coordination across its
many mission areas. This not only inhibits cooperation among
research programs but also keeps DOE from using its laboratories to
achieve departmental missions.
Laboratory and DOE managers are concerned that DOE has not built on
its individual programs to encourage valuable cross-program and
cross-laboratory interactions, which are essential to meeting both
current and future missions. Both laboratory and DOE program
managers describe DOE's management as "fractured" and not
particularly adept at combining the expertise of various program
areas to tackle cross-disciplinary problems. Laboratory managers
cited difficulties DOE has in establishing bridges between its basic
science programs and applied science groups. Developing clear and
coordinated missions--and strategies to implement them--would provide
the necessary bridges between and among the laboratories on
cross-cutting projects, according to many laboratory and independent
experts.
Many laboratory managers believe that DOE and its laboratories lack
effective coordinating mechanisms--among the most serious challenges
facing the Department as an organization. One manager described as a
"horrible problem" the limited emphasis on cross-program
coordination.
To illustrate the difficulties in combining expertise from different
programs to achieve core missions, several laboratory managers cited
the fragmented research on preventing the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. Although solutions to proliferation problems require
expertise in identifying the effects of weapons, the nonproliferation
and weapons missions are carried out in different laboratories and
are managed by different assistant secretaries. Laboratory managers
also cited weak links among the energy conservation, fossil fuel, and
nuclear energy research programs as having limited DOE's progress in
commercializing energy technologies.
When DOE and the laboratories have successfully combined their
multidisciplinary resources, impressive results have occurred. For
example, laboratory managers attributed the rapid progress toward a
coordinated understanding of global environmental change in DOE's
Global Studies Program to the use of nine laboratories' diverse
capabilities. According to another laboratory manager,
cross-laboratory cooperation in the fusion energy program is leading
to a long-range strategy to guide research. These examples
illustrate the potential for greater collaboration on technical
issues that require multidisciplinary talent.
MISSION UNCERTAINTY IS A
PERSISTENT PROBLEM
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
Concerns about the need to update and clarify the laboratories'
missions are long-standing. Past studies and reviews of the
laboratories have all reached the same conclusion, as the following
examples show:
In 1983, the White House Science Council Federal Laboratory Review
Panel issued a report (commonly known as the Packard Report)
addressing all federal laboratories.\3 The report found that while
some of the laboratories, particularly DOE's, had clearly defined
missions for parts of their work, most activities were fragmented and
unrelated to the laboratories' main responsibilities. This report
recommended that all parent agencies review and redefine the missions
of their laboratories.
In 1992, a DOE Secretary of Energy Advisory Board found that the
broad missions the laboratories were addressing, coupled with rapidly
changing world events, ". . . ha[d] caused a loss of coherence and
focus at the laboratories, thereby reducing their overall
effectiveness in responding to their traditional missions as well as
new national initiatives. . . ." The Board identified the most
important cause of the stress between DOE and its laboratories as ".
. . the lack of a common vision as to the missions of the
laboratories. . . ."\4
A 1993 report of an internal DOE task force on laboratory missions
reported that the missions "must be updated to support DOE's new
directions and to respond to new national imperatives. . . ."\5
None of these past studies and reviews has resulted in overall
consensus about the future missions of the multiprogram laboratory
system, raising questions about DOE's capacity to provide a vision
for this system. A 1982 DOE Energy Research Advisory Board task
force provided some insights into this question.\6 The Advisory Board
acknowledged the impressive nature of the research and development
conducted throughout the system but noted that certain weaknesses
prevented the laboratories from achieving their full potential. The
Advisory Board found, for example, that structural problems and
fragmented programs required the laboratories to interact with DOE on
an excessive number of levels. The Advisory Board recommended that
DOE designate a high-level official to focus solely on the
laboratories. DOE did not follow the Advisory Board's
recommendations. In early 1993, however, DOE created an Office of
Laboratory Management whose purpose was, in part, to coordinate the
interests of the various DOE program offices that interact with the
laboratories on a program-by-program basis. However, according to
DOE officials, the plan was not implemented, and the existing office
does not coordinate laboratory activities for all program offices and
does not report directly to the Secretary.
We called attention to the limitations of DOE's program-by-program
approach to directing its laboratories as early as 1978, after
reviewing the laboratories' contributions to nonnuclear energy, a
critical policy issue at that time.\7 The laboratories' activities in
this area were limited by several factors. First, DOE's
organizational alignment created obstacles; specifically, the
laboratories reported to three different senior officials. This
arrangement focused the efforts of the laboratories on particular
programs and eroded their abilities to pursue research on topics
cutting across several areas, such as nonnuclear energy. Second, the
roles of the laboratories were determined in a piecemeal way so that
each laboratory was given small, fragmented responsibilities. We
recommended that DOE align the laboratories under a separate
high-level office that was not responsible for specific programs.
In the absence of an overall mission strategy for the laboratories,
individual research program goals are emphasized, sometimes at the
expense of broader DOE and laboratory missions. One laboratory
manager noted:
Most of what we do is determined from the bottom-up . . . in
other words, the program level in DOE--and DOE program managers
don't [care] about what the [laboratory's] missions are. They
want to know where the talent is, and they want to know where
the capability is, and that's where they put their work.
A DOE operations office manager said that the Department's
program-oriented approach toward the laboratories fails to recognize
DOE's "corporate" responsibility for them. Another manager cited the
need for DOE to develop a strategic approach to the laboratories.
Laboratory managers pointed out that DOE's approach to the
laboratories through individual research programs has not effectively
linked the laboratory system's collective resources to DOE's
missions. A laboratory manager described DOE as increasingly focused
on individual programs; its management is concentrated at the
assistant secretary level, even though many projects do not fall
within any one assistant secretary's program responsibilities.
--------------------
\3 Report of the White House Science Council, Federal Laboratory
Review Panel, Office of Science and Technology Policy, May 15, 1983.
\4 Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, Final Report, 1992.
\5 Changes and Challenges at the Department of Energy Laboratories,
Final Draft Report of the Missions of the Laboratories Priority Team,
1993.
\6 The Department of Energy Multiprogram Laboratories, A report of
the Energy Research Advisory Board to the Department of Energy, Sept.
1982.
\7 The Multiprogram Laboratories: A National Resource for Nonnuclear
Energy Research, Development and Demonstration (EMD-78-62, Mar. 22,
1978).
DEBATE ON DEVELOPING MISSIONS
FOR THE LABORATORIES IS GROWING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
How best to develop missions for the laboratories--and how best to
manage them--is the subject of growing debate in the scientific
community and was discussed by our panel of experts. For example,
proposals suggested or debated during our review included the
following.
Convert some laboratories, particularly those working closely with
the private sector, into independent entities.
Transfer the responsibility for one or more laboratories to another
agency, whose responsibilities and mission are closely aligned with a
particular DOE laboratory.
Create a "lead lab" arrangement, under which one laboratory is given
a leadership role in a mission or technology area and other
laboratories are selected to work in that area.
Consolidate the responsibility for research, development, and testing
on nuclear weapons within a single laboratory.
While we have not analyzed these alternatives, each has advantages
and disadvantages and needs to be evaluated in light of the
laboratories' capabilities for designing nuclear weapons and pursuing
other missions of national and strategic importance. Furthermore,
the government may still need facilities dedicated to national and
defense missions, a factor that would heavily influence any future
organizational decisions. Important budgetary considerations also
accompany each alternative.
An expert panelist advised caution in restructuring the laboratories,
expressing concern that decades of national investment in these
facilities have produced important assets that, if dispersed, could
take many years and billions of dollars to reassemble.
THE PREVIOUS CONGRESS TOOK SOME
ACTION ON LABORATORY MISSION
AND MANAGEMENT ISSUES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5
The previous Congress was also active in the debate on the
laboratories' missions. For example, a House bill introduced in 1993
defined future missions for DOE's laboratories and suggested methods
for measuring progress toward goals, along with incentives for
improving the overall quality of research at the laboratories. This
proposed legislation also sought to require more rigorous evaluation
of the laboratories, articulated several missions for them (such as
advancing nuclear science and technology for national security
purposes), and advocated that they work with private industry to
develop environmental technology and technology transfer activities.
A bill passed by the Senate in 1993 contained similar provisions and
was designed to sharpen the laboratories' focus on technology
transfer and cooperative research agreements. This bill would have
required the laboratories to allocate 20 percent of their budgets to
partnerships with industry and academia.
FURTHER EFFORTS ARE UNDER WAY
TO CLARIFY THE LABORATORIES'
MISSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6
Recognizing the important role that the multiprogram laboratories
should play in accomplishing departmental goals and national
priorities, DOE is making another attempt to define the laboratories'
missions. In February 1994, the Secretary commissioned an
independent task force to address the appropriate roles of DOE's
laboratories. Chaired by the former chief executive officer of
Motorola Corporation, this task force--the Secretary of Energy
Advisory Board Task Force on Alternative Futures for the Department
of Energy National Laboratories--is charged with, among other things,
examining "alternative scenarios for future utilization of these
laboratories for meeting national missions." The task force's charter
encompasses examining the future roles and responsibilities of the
national laboratories, including questions about their accountability
and consolidation. The task force's report to the Secretary is
expected by February 1995.
DOE has also initiated a strategic planning process that it believes
will form a framework for coordinating the laboratories' missions
with the agency's goals and objectives.\8 DOE's Strategic Plan will
focus the agency's efforts on five main areas: preserving national
security, conserving energy resources, promoting environmental
protection, applying science and technology to national needs, and
encouraging industrial competitiveness. Strategic plans have also
been developed for each of these areas. In addition, DOE has begun a
major reorganization effort, which is designed to follow the
structure of its new Strategic Plan. Reorienting existing programs
and the laboratories to best address these areas remains the
Department's challenge.
--------------------
\8 Strategic Plan: Fueling a Competitive Economy. U.S. Department
of Energy, DOE/0108, Apr. 1994.
A MORE EFFECTIVE MANAGEMENT
APPROACH WILL PROMOTE MISSION
SUCCESS
============================================================ Chapter 3
Laboratory managers see DOE's management of the multiprogram
laboratories as costly and inefficient, creating tensions that impede
the development of clear and coordinated missions for the
laboratories and action steps that lead toward achieving these
missions. According to laboratory managers, DOE micromanages the
laboratories, particularly in overseeing their compliance with
growing numbers of administrative requirements. Laboratory managers
fault DOE for failing to set priorities or provide guidance about how
to satisfy both research goals and administrative requirements.
Experts we consulted, as well as many laboratory and DOE managers,
expressed concern that without a more effective management
relationship between DOE and the laboratories, rising research costs
may price the laboratories out of collaborative research with
industry--a new mission area in which the laboratories are expected
to make major contributions.
DOE DOES NOT BALANCE RESEARCH
AND ADMINISTRATIVE OBJECTIVES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
In addition to meeting their research and technology objectives,
laboratory managers are responsible for satisfying a wide variety of
administrative requirements in areas such as procurement; travel;
human resources; and environment, safety, and health. Prompted by
criticism of its business practices and past inattention to
environment, safety, and health issues, DOE has greatly increased its
oversight of the laboratories during recent years.
Coping with the new requirements that have accompanied DOE's expanded
oversight is, according to a consensus of laboratory managers, a
major burden that not only increases research costs but also diverts
attention from basic research. Although laboratory managers
recognize the importance of meeting administrative
goals--particularly in the area of environment, safety, and
health--they want DOE to set priorities for their administrative
activities and help them balance research and administration.
ADMINISTRATIVE REQUIREMENTS
HAVE PROLIFERATED
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
Administrative requirements increased under the former Secretary of
Energy, largely in response to the well-publicized call for greater
attention to the environment, safety, and health throughout the
nuclear weapons complex. Thus, over 70 percent of the requirements
listed in DOE's 1993 Directives Checklist are new or have been
revised since 1989. A DOE operations office manager estimated that
DOE has about 8,400 environment, safety, and health requirements.
Directives define required actions to meet certain objectives; these
actions range from preparing reports to conducting inspections. Both
laboratory and DOE operations office managers who administer
directives told us they were "numb" from the proliferation of
requirements. According to a consensus of both laboratory and DOE
managers, the laboratories have been overwhelmed, not only by the
volume of new requirements but also by their detail and by
inconsistent guidance for implementing them.
Closely related to the proliferation of administrative requirements
has been the equally aggressive expansion of oversight activity.
Oversight--or the assessment of how well managers handle the programs
and requirements for which they are accountable--is critical to the
operation of federal programs and is a key management responsibility.
Despite its vital role, laboratory managers, the experts on our
panel, and DOE managers agreed that sharply increased oversight in
recent years has not been an effective management approach for DOE.
DOE and other agencies conduct as many as 400 reviews annually at
each laboratory. One laboratory manager calculated that his program
was reviewed more than once a day in 1992. Laboratory managers
deplored the enormous amount of time required to prepare for
oversight reviews, adding that the impact of losing the best
researchers' time during reviews is difficult to quantify. Many
scientists have become discouraged by administrative chores. One
manager complained that administrative oversight consumed as much as
40 percent of his working time, and many managers questioned whether
DOE's expanded oversight has produced benefits commensurate with its
costs.
Oversight reviews of the laboratories have been particularly
burdensome because they have been inconsistent. Laboratory managers
deal with three large bureaucracies--DOE headquarters, DOE operations
offices, and contractors. Each interprets DOE's oversight
requirements, which, in turn, sometimes conflict. One manager
expressed the problem this way:
There are myriad rules and regulations that require a
substantial amount of interpretation. In the absence of a
single environment, safety, and health oversight organization,
every laboratory will have a different level of compliance
because each field office has a different interpretation of
environment, safety, and health rules.
REQUIREMENTS DO NOT REFLECT
LABORATORY CONDITIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
Both laboratory and DOE managers say they are held accountable for
requirements that do not reflect problems in research laboratories or
do not differentiate between general and isolated problems.
According to the managers, many environment, safety, and health
requirements are appropriate for problems and operations at weapons
production facilities, not at laboratories. A laboratory manager
explained the effect of inappropriate requirements on research:
We end up treating very simple chemical experiments as if people
were working with commercial nuclear reactors. . . our costs
have gone right through the roof and our staff's ability to turn
out the volume has decreased dramatically.
Many laboratory managers also said that they had been held
accountable for problems that occurred at another
location--experiencing what a DOE operations office manager described
as "battalion punishment." For example, frozen pipes at one facility
resulted in a directive to all laboratories, including those in warm
climates. A laboratory manager explained:
If lab A screws up--say environmental health or quality
assurance--[DOE] headquarters decides that everybody's guilty
and we're then overrun with sieges and inspections. Instead of
going back to that laboratory and trying to understand why that
went bad, we're all condemned by the same punishment.
Meeting all of these responsibilities presents a significant
challenge, especially as budgets decline. Yet laboratory managers
maintained that DOE has provided little guidance or assistance in
setting priorities to help them balance their responsibilities.
Part of the problem, according to many laboratory managers, stems
from the existence within DOE of parallel research and administrative
reporting and oversight systems. Decisions are made about
requirements in one area without assessing their impact on the other,
and research and administrative compliance programs each have
different reward structures. A laboratory manager also noted that no
one takes responsibility for resolving conflicts between the two
systems. As one senior laboratory manager explained to us:
There is a split in DOE between the people who run programs and
those who issue regulations. . . .Funds tend to come in at
the bottom to scientists, while regulations tend to come in at
the top of the organization . . . often the scientists do not
understand the rationale for regulations.
COSTS PRESENT A MAJOR ISSUE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.3
Managers at the laboratories, in DOE programs, and at DOE operations
offices were troubled by the costs associated with achieving the
Department's administrative goals. Although little information or
analysis has been completed on this issue, DOE's administrative
compliance approach has had two results, according to both DOE and
laboratory managers. First, it has been costly. Second, it has
raised research costs and reduced the laboratories' ability to
compete with universities for research sponsored by industry and
other government agencies.
For example, a laboratory manager told us that operating a reactor
costs significantly more under DOE's safety regulations than under
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's regulations for non-DOE reactors.
A DOE operations office manager added that it would cost billions
more than is currently spent to be in full compliance with all rules
and regulations at several laboratories, even though these
laboratories have lower-priority problems. Laboratory and DOE
managers agreed that DOE has not provided the funding required to
achieve compliance, particularly with environment, safety, and health
regulations. A DOE operations office manager noted that no
additional funds had been received at one laboratory where
expenditures of more than $1 billion would be required to correct
environment, safety, and health problems.
Managers also expressed considerable concern that DOE's
administrative compliance approach has raised research costs,
limiting the laboratories' ability to compete for research funded by
industry and other government agencies. For example, one research
organization reported that renewing its contract with a laboratory
would cost up to 3 times more than its previous contract. Laboratory
and DOE managers and experts agreed that universities--the
laboratories' main competitors for research--need not meet many of
the requirements that DOE imposes. An expert expressed concern that
increases in the costs of research could adversely affect the
laboratories' commercial technology mission, pointing out that
There is a trend toward imposing the full range of government
procurement requirements on the laboratories, and this could
kill government-industry cooperation. . . .For industry to
find cooperative research agreements with laboratories a viable
option, laboratory costs must be fully competitive.
Laboratory and DOE managers and an expert on our panel believe that
administrative programs should be cost-effective and have priorities
for compliance so that resources can be concentrated on the most
significant risks. However, DOE has not systematically set
priorities for its administrative requirements, and cost-benefit
analyses have not been used to assess risks.
DOE HAS BEGUN TO ADDRESS
OVERSIGHT ISSUES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.4
DOE has begun to streamline the directives system and correct other
oversight problems. Also, the Department is now seeking to avoid
duplicative or unnecessary oversight reviews and is more careful
about overloading laboratories with such reviews. In addition, DOE
has begun to implement "total quality management" and is developing
performance measures to guide its evaluation of the laboratories'
management. DOE believes that these efforts should help both it and
the laboratories balance their research and administrative goals more
effectively in the future.
DOE'S CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIPS
INHIBIT CHANGE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
DOE's "management and operating" contracts with the academic
institutions that operate most of the multiprogram laboratories pose
a further stumbling block both to a more favorable relationship
between the Department and the laboratories and to a reduction in
DOE's oversight. Under these contracts, a contractor assumes
responsibility for managing and operating a facility but incurs only
limited liability. DOE pays virtually all of the contractor's costs
except those resulting from willful misconduct or bad faith by top
management or those designated as unallowable. Furthermore, under
its contracts with the laboratory contractors, most of which are
nonprofit or academic institutions, DOE has limited financial
incentives for influencing the contractor's actions: It cannot
adjust the fee that it pays to these contractors because it has
historically negotiated a fixed fee with them that is not tied to
their performance. In contrast, DOE pays its for-profit contractors
a fee, called an "award fee," that is based on its assessment of
their performance. The tensions created by the arrangements between
DOE and its nonprofit contractors have raised questions about whether
DOE's current contracting approach is effective for managing the
laboratories. DOE and various oversight groups, including GAO, have
expressed concerns about the laboratories' past business practices
and have called for changes in contracts that better reflect the
needs of the laboratories and the requirements of DOE.
DOE is changing its relationship with contractors. Under its
contract reform initiative, contractors will be evaluated on the
basis of performance measures--a process that DOE believes will
better enable it to hold contractors accountable for results.\9 In
addition, according to DOE staff, the use of performance measures
will lead to a more rational, risk-based approach toward compliance
with the increased number of requirements placed on the laboratories
in recent years.
We support DOE's contract reform efforts and believe that, once
implemented, they offer opportunities for substantially improving the
way the agency does business with its contractors, including its
laboratory contractors. We are concerned, however, that the scope of
DOE's current contract reform may not address all the major
management problems that characterize the agency's relationship with
the laboratories. For example, it is uncertain how contract reform
will resolve the proliferation of laboratory oversight activities,
which poses a major problem for laboratory managers. Furthermore, it
could take many years for contract reform to take effect, given the
multiyear time frame for existing contracts.
--------------------
\9 We have reported on performance-based contracting in Department of
Energy: Challenges to Implementing Contract Reform (GAO/RCED-94-150,
Mar. 21, 1994).
EXPERTS SEE FUTURE MISSIONS AS
EXTENSIONS OF CURRENT MISSIONS
============================================================ Chapter 4
Our panel of experts and other experts believe that, with proper
mission focus and management direction, the multiprogram laboratories
can make vital contributions in many areas important to DOE and the
nation. According to the panel, the highest-priority missions for
the laboratories are national defense, energy, the environment, and
commercial technology. While the laboratories have already made
contributions in these areas--such as effective weapons systems,
energy conservation programs, environmental cleanup techniques, and
commercialized technologies--our panel concluded that clarifying and,
in some cases, redefining the current missions for the laboratory
system as a whole would enhance the value of the laboratories.
NATIONAL SECURITY WORK WILL
CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTANT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
Our panel of experts agreed that the laboratories' national security
work will continue to be important. Until the Department of Defense
has decided whether to support defense work at the laboratories and
DOE's missions are clear, the defense roles of Los Alamos, Sandia,
and Lawrence Livermore are unclear. However, several panelists
anticipated a defense mission with new and continuing objectives that
would use these three laboratories' nuclear weapons competence and
other laboratories' experience.
In nuclear weapons technologies, several of the experts on our panel
predicted that the laboratories' missions would continue to shift
from designing weapons to overseeing and dismantling the nuclear
stockpile, verifying international nuclear treaties, and conducting
research on nonproliferation. Because the Department is
substantially responsible for overseeing the weapons stockpile, it
will require the laboratories' unique competencies. Ensuring that
stockpiled nuclear weapons are reliable and safe is a major
responsibility that will persist as long as the nation needs to
sustain a nuclear stockpile, a panelist pointed out.
The defense mission also makes the laboratories responsible for
overseeing the dismantling of nuclear weapons in accordance with the
nation's international treaty obligations--a task that will take
decades to complete at the current pace, a laboratory director
pointed out. According to a laboratory director, the United States
and Russia each estimate that they can dismantle only 2,000 weapons a
year. The current U.S. stockpile contains many thousands of
weapons.
The proliferation of nuclear technology and materials will be an
increasingly important national concern. As a DOE manager noted, a
growing number of nations are now able to make nuclear weapons, and
more have the political will to develop them. Our panel of experts
concurred that the laboratories have unique knowledge to address
these issues. For example, the laboratories already have experience
in detecting clandestine nuclear weapons programs, locating
terrorists' weapons, responding to nuclear weapons emergencies, and
identifying the origin of nuclear materials and weapons.
LINKS BETWEEN ENERGY AND
ENVIRONMENTAL MISSIONS ARE
NEEDED
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
Energy and the environment are areas in which the laboratories have
already made useful contributions. However, our panel of experts
suggested that the laboratories could enhance their contributions by
linking their missions in these areas to focus on energy-related
environmental problems--an increasingly important issue, according to
a DOE secretarial advisory board. This linkage would demonstrate the
effect of research in one area on work in another, an important
consideration because energy development and use underlie most of the
nation's serious environmental problems. For example, the use of
electric vehicles would reduce emissions of hydrocarbons but create
problems in disposing of batteries. Similarly, the production of
commercial nuclear power reduces some air quality problems but
creates a need for technologies to dispose of radioactive wastes. As
a panelist pointed out, linking energy and environmental research
would draw upon the laboratories' ability to address
cross-disciplinary problems. This linkage would benefit research in
both areas and enhance the ability of DOE and the laboratories to set
research and policy priorities.
Our panel of experts agreed that the laboratories have an important
energy research mission. One panelist described it as perhaps their
principal mission because developing energy sources and efficient
uses of energy is vital to the nation's economy. However, another
panelist maintained that although the laboratories' energy mission is
broad, it has become fuzzy. Panelists also noted that despite
substantial investment, the laboratories' energy research has been
disappointing. One panelist noted that the nation has been unable to
decide on an energy policy to guide the laboratories' work. DOE has
produced several different national energy strategies over the years,
each with different priorities, making long-term planning for the
laboratories difficult. Despite these conditions, however, panelists
agreed that a redirected energy mission would serve the United States
very well and provide opportunities for large-scale interactions
between industry and government. One panelist urged DOE to consider
the laboratories' experience, encourage closer laboratory-industry
interactions to define priorities, and focus on path-breaking,
high-risk, cross-industry research with the potential for major
payback in 10 to 20 years.
The laboratories' environmental mission has been more implicit than
explicit, according to one panelist. Although the laboratories have
been developing environmental technologies, the scope of their
environmental mission has not been clear. However, several of the
panelists envisioned that the laboratories could make unique
contributions, particularly in environmental technology--an area
where other federal agencies have limited experience--and in nuclear
waste disposal. Significant contributions may also stem from the
laboratories' ability to model environmental impacts with their
advanced computing facilities. Several panelists believed that
greater coordination between DOE and the Environmental Protection
Agency would be needed to maximize the value of this type of
laboratory work.
A laboratory director emphasized to us that through their basic
research competencies the laboratories can make a major contribution
to solving environmental challenges, but their strengths have been
underutilized. According to the director, "Waste remediation cannot
continue on its present course without `bankrupting the country'
because it is being done without a knowledge base."
As a laboratory manager noted, developing a basic understanding of
underlying problems before developing waste cleanup technologies is
important. If the basic science is not understood, environmental
remediation problems may elude solution, just as efforts to cure
cancer during the 1970s were unsuccessful because not enough was then
known about basic cancer virology.
LABORATORIES CAN CONTRIBUTE TO
COMMERCIAL TECHNOLOGY MISSION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
Our panel of experts agreed that a commercial technology mission for
the laboratories is legitimate and important. However, several
panelists and other experts we consulted maintained that this mission
should be broadly conceived--that is, it should emphasize research
and development that can benefit all U.S. industries and should be
integrated with other laboratory missions rather than become a
central mission.
According to panelists, the principal reason for enlisting the
laboratories in improving the nation's global competitive position is
that they are building the intellectual foundation that allows the
nation's economy to prosper. A laboratory director pointed out that
U.S. industry has sometimes been at a disadvantage because
public-private research is better coordinated in other countries.
There was considerable agreement among both the experts on our panel
and other experts we consulted about the need to change the
laboratories' current focus on transferring existing technology to
industry on a project-by-project basis. Industry, expert, and
government sources concurred that the technology mission would be
more productive if it supported
nonproprietary research that could help all industries compete;
technology research as an integral part of the national security,
energy, and environmental missions;
long-term cooperative research relationships between the laboratories
and industry; and
training in science for future progress in technology.
According to a panelist, nonproprietary research that can benefit all
industries is important but has been underfunded and conducted
without focus. The panelist emphasized that the government can
usefully and appropriately support research that underpins a broad
array of specific technology applications in many different
industries, stopping short of supporting proprietary technology that
companies themselves should fund. For example, experts noted that
laboratory research to improve the U.S. transportation system could
enhance U.S. manufacturers' ability to compete. Similarly, a
panelist noted that laboratory work on advanced computer-aided design
tools could improve productivity throughout the U.S. manufacturing
sector.
Although a commercial technology mission is important, laboratory
managers, industry representatives, and experts cautioned that
developing technology should not become the laboratories' primary
mission or reason for existence. The officials described the
challenge as defining a broad technology mission that supports
long-term relationships between the laboratories and industry while
sustaining the laboratories' other missions and abilities. For
example, the laboratories develop technology through other missions
that have technological needs of their own. Sustaining the
laboratories' basic research is also important. Laboratory managers
observed that a balance is needed between basic and applied research
in order to avoid "eating the seed corn" that leads to new
technologies. In addition, not all programs--such as high-energy
physics--lend themselves to cooperation with industry. A laboratory
manager said that with only a technology transfer mission, the
laboratories would be out of business in 5 years.
Several of the experts on our panel encouraged laboratories and
industry to develop long-term cooperative research relationships that
can allow each party to better understand the other's needs and
increase the potential for results.
Panelists and other experts we consulted agreed that training in
science and mathematics is essential to the nation's future
competitiveness in high-technology products and services and that
helping train students is important to a commercial technology
mission. Several panelists also urged that, to enhance industry's
ability to produce marketable innovations, the laboratories expand
their training programs to include mid-career technical retraining
for industry personnel.
IMPLEMENTING A COMMERCIAL
TECHNOLOGY MISSION POSES
SPECIAL PROBLEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3.1
Working with industry on a commercial technology mission at the
laboratories presents special challenges for DOE and laboratory
management. Although some laboratories have considerable experience
in working with industry, broad-scale cooperation represents a new
venture for the laboratories. DOE has begun to work with the
laboratories and industry to develop a strategic plan for technology
partnerships. However, successful implementation of this new mission
requires clearly defined roles for the laboratories and DOE,
realistic expectations about the laboratories' potential to improve
U.S. competitiveness, encouragement to experiment, well-defined
mission objectives, and closer links between the laboratories and
industry to ensure that the laboratories' work reflects the market's
needs.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
============================================================ Chapter 5
U.S. taxpayers have a significant investment in the national
laboratory network. DOE has a major responsibility to ensure that
work at the laboratories is properly focused and intelligently
managed so that the laboratories can make maximum contributions to
national priorities. Achieving these goals requires two efforts:
First, senior leadership needs to develop clear missions and
implementation strategies that treat the laboratories as a
coordinated set of facilities; second, DOE needs to adopt a
management approach that supports the laboratories' achievement of
their research missions and administrative responsibilities.
DOE has not been able to develop a consensus among laboratory and
government leaders on appropriate missions for the national
laboratories, even though past studies and special task forces have
called for such action. Furthermore, the Department's management
approach impedes progress toward current goals, raising questions
about DOE's overall capacity to achieve these important objectives.
The results from the Secretary's Advisory Board Task Force on
Alternative Futures for the National Laboratories could set the
foundation for developing clear and coordinated missions for the
national laboratory network. The success of these results can best
be measured by the extent to which they help shape a consensus among
key stakeholders: the Congress, DOE, and the laboratories. Such a
consensus on the future missions for the national laboratories has
not resulted from past advisory board recommendations.
DOE's ongoing contract reform efforts--especially the planned use of
performance measures to guide and evaluate the laboratories'
activities--could form a solid basis for an improved management
approach that supports the laboratories' mission goals and
administrative requirements. These goals will be difficult to
achieve, however, given current management practices and the
contracting constraints under which both DOE and the laboratories
operate. For these and other reasons, experts are beginning to
question where alternative forms of laboratory management should be
considered.
As public debate on the future of the laboratories grows--for
example, the Congress, in a previous session, proposed legislation
setting specific missions for the laboratories--DOE's leaders cannot
afford to delay efforts to define clear and coordinated missions and
to implement a management approach that supports these missions.
Indeed, if the laboratories do not begin to function more as a
system, it may be necessary to consider alternatives to the present
DOE-laboratory relationship. Above all, strong DOE leadership is
needed to establish a shared vision about the laboratories' expected
contributions. DOE leadership is especially important to
implementing the new commercial technology mission. There are
encouraging signs that DOE is committed to involving industry in this
implementation and improving its access to the laboratories.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:1
We recommend that the Secretary of Energy evaluate alternatives for
managing the laboratories that more fully support clear missions,
achieve results by linking the laboratories' activities to DOE's
missions, and maximize the laboratories' resources. Such a strategy
could start by addressing the many management issues raised in this
report and should be consistent with DOE's major efforts to reform
contract management. The strategy must also support goals for DOE
and the laboratories to comply with environment, safety, and health
initiatives. To help achieve this goal, the Secretary should
strengthen the Office of Laboratory Management by providing it with
sufficient resources and authority to facilitate cooperation with the
laboratories and resolution of management issues across all DOE
program areas.
MATTER FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:2
If DOE is unable to refocus the laboratories' missions and develop a
management approach consistent with these new missions, the Congress
may wish to consider alternatives to the present DOE-laboratory
relationship. Such alternatives might include placing the
laboratories under the control of different agencies or creating a
separate structure for the sole purpose of developing a consensus on
the laboratories' missions.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 5:3
DOE officials believe that they are taking a number of actions that
address our concern about DOE's leadership in providing mission focus
for the national laboratories. Specifically, in its letter to GAO,
and in discussions with us, DOE cited its new strategic planning
process, which resulted in a Strategic Plan that, in turn, is
supported by five separate plans covering each of the Department's
core "business lines." DOE anticipates that this process, together
with the upcoming report expected from the Secretary's Energy
Advisory Board Task Force on Alternative Futures for the
Laboratories, will provide the means through which the Department
will exercise new leadership for its national laboratories.
GAO is encouraged by these initiatives. Coupled with the
Department's contract reform efforts, they should, once fully in
place, strengthen DOE's ability to improve its own management as well
as provide a foundation for refocusing the laboratories' missions.
The outcome of these efforts bears close monitoring by the Congress.
Our optimism is tempered, however, by DOE's having reorganized before
and having had planning efforts in the past. Furthermore, DOE has
not used the recommendations of past advisory groups to refocus the
laboratories or improve its management of them.
DOE expressed concern that our report would force "tight
mission-driven parameters" for the laboratories, which would inhibit
the laboratories' flexibility in conducting fundamental research. We
are not suggesting that DOE narrow the laboratories' missions.
Instead, we believe that DOE should clarify mission-focused research
and development within its laboratories and coordinate these
activities among them. The need to clarify and focus the
laboratories' missions reflected a widespread consensus among the
laboratory and DOE managers, as well as among the experts, with whom
we spoke.
PROFILES OF DOE'S NATIONAL
LABORATORIES
=========================================================== Appendix I
(Dollars in millions)
Laboratory/ Actual budget Staff (FY Program
location (FY 1994) 1994) emphases Contractor
--------------- -------------- ------------ --------------- ----------------
Argonne/ $614 5,083 Basic energy University of
Argonne, sciences, Chicago
Illinois nuclear
engineering,
environmental
science and
technology
Brookhaven/ $408 3,417 High-energy Associated
Upton, and Universities,
New York nuclear Inc.
physics, basic
energy sciences
Idaho $911 7,823 Reactors, Lockheed Idaho
Engineering/ environmental Technologies
Idaho Falls, restoration, Company
Idaho waste
management
Lawrence $282 3,129 Basic energy University of
Berkeley/ sciences, California
Berkeley, nuclear and
California high-energy
physics,
biological and
environmental
research
Lawrence $965 7,321 Defense, University of
Livermore/ energy, high- California
Livermore, performance
California computing,
lasers
Los Alamos/ $1,075 7,024 Defense, University of
Los Alamos, applied California
New Mexico research in
nuclear
deterrence and
security
Oak Ridge/ $577 4,714 Basic energy Martin Marietta
Oak Ridge, sciences, Energy Systems
Tennessee conservation,
renewable
energy
Pacific $532 4,383 Environmental Battelle
Northwest/ restoration, Memorial
Richland, waste Institute
Washington management,
energy research
Sandia/ $1,304 8,494 Defense, Martin Marietta
Albuquerque, nuclear Corporation
New Mexico weapons and
safety
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: The information for this appendix was supplied by DOE
operations offices and the national laboratories.
LABORATORY PROGRAMS WE REVIEWED
========================================================== Appendix II
Laboratory Programs submitted by laboratory
--------------------------------------- ---------------------------------------
Argonne �Integral Fast Reactor\a
�Operation and Research at the Tandem
Linac Accelerator System
�Electrochemical Dezincing of Scrap
Galvanized Steel
�Atmospheric Radiation Measurement\a
�Advanced Photon Source\a
Brookhaven �High-Energy Physics\a
�National Synchrotron Light Source\a
�Relativistic Heavy Ion Physics
�Structural Biology\a
�High Flux Beam Reactor
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory �Buried Waste Integrated
Demonstration Program\a
�ICPP Spent Fuel and Waste Management
Technology Development\a
�Power Reactors\a
�Biotechnology
�Space Nuclear Power and Propulsion
Lawrence Berkeley �Advanced Light Source\a
�Advanced Battery Consortium\a
�Solenoidal Tracker at RHIC
�Human Genome Center
�Center for Advanced Materials\a
Lawrence Livermore �Nuclear Weapons Research,
Development, and Testing\a
�Nonproliferation, Arms Control, and
International Security\a
�Fusion\a
�AVLIS
�Environmental Technologies
Los Alamos �Waste Treatment
�Above Ground Experiments\a
�Human Genome Center\a
�High Temperature Superconductors
�High Performance Computing and
Communications\a
Oak Ridge �Basic Energy Sciences\a
�Conservation and Renewables\a
�Fusion\a
�Biology and Environmental Research
�Advanced Neutron Source
Pacific Northwest �Environmental Restoration and Waste
Management\a
�National Security and Defense
Technology\a
�Energy
�Scientific Research\a
�Technology Transfer
Sandia �Complex 21
�Nonproliferation and Verification\a
�Microelectronics and Photonics
Center\a
�Environmental Programs\a
�Combustion Research
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\a We discussed these programs with managers and staff. We selected
these programs from those that each laboratory identified as best
representing its future direction.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
========================================================== Appendix II
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 2.
(See figure in printed edition.)
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Energy's letter
dated January 24, 1995.
GAO'S COMMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
1. While we discussed most of these initiatives in the draft report,
we updated the final report to reflect DOE's progress in these areas.
We generally agree that DOE's initiatives, especially those in
strategic planning and contract reform, will strengthen the
Department's capacity to manage. We also agree that the initiatives
have potential for helping DOE refocus the missions and improve the
management of its laboratories. However, these initiatives have not
yet been implemented. Furthermore, many of the contract reforms will
take years to be fully implemented. Thus, the outcome of the
initiatives, while promising, is very uncertain. We also caution
that DOE has had planning systems in the past, has reorganized many
times, and has tried to institute reforms in prior years--all without
significant success. Additionally, as we discussed extensively in
the report, prior advisory groups recommended that DOE refocus its
laboratory missions and improve its management of them, yet DOE
failed to take significant action.
2. We agree that one of the strengths of the multiprogram
laboratories is their ability, as discussed in our report, to combine
their multidisciplinary talents toward tackling large, complex
problems. Our discussion of the need for more clarity in mission
focus aims to facilitate, not hinder, more laboratory interactions in
complex activities. We are not suggesting "forcing" the laboratories
into "tight mission-driven parameters." Rather, we urge that DOE
improve and expand its ability to integrate mission-focused research
and development within and among its laboratories. The need for more
mission clarity and focus reflected a widespread consensus among
laboratory and DOE managers, as well as experts with whom we
consulted.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix IV
Bernice Steinhardt, Associate Director
Gary R. Boss, Assistant Director
Allison Ingram, Assignment Manager
Libby Halperin, Evaluator-in-Charge
William J. Lanouette, Senior Evaluator
John Richter, Senior Evaluator
Leigh Nachowicz, Evaluator