Department of Energy: National Priorities Needed for Meeting
Environmental Agreements (Chapter Report, 03/03/95, GAO/RCED-95-1).
GAO reviewed the Department of Energy's (DOE) progress in cleaning up
its nuclear weapons complex, focusing on: (1) its use of environmental
agreements with state and federal regulators; and (2) the effectiveness
of its cleanup strategy.
GAO found that: (1) DOE has focused on collecting data and investigating
sites, rather than the actual cleanup of sites; (2) DOE has only put a
small amount of effort into physically cleaning up its nuclear weapons
complex and has yet to complete the cleanup of a major facility; (3)
although DOE is improving its timeliness, it missed over 20 percent of
the milestones it agreed to complete through 1994; (4) DOE is likely to
fall further behind schedule as funding tightens, costs increase, and
more milestones come due; (5) DOE has had difficulty meeting some
milestones because it signed unrealistic agreements with regulators; (6)
DOE has been unable to renegotiate milestones due to past delays in
meeting its commitments; and (7) future progress of DOE cleanup
activities depends on the adoption of a national risk-based strategy
that will maximize the limited resources available for cleanup.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-95-1
TITLE: Department of Energy: National Priorities Needed for
Meeting Environmental Agreements
DATE: 03/03/95
SUBJECT: Nuclear waste management
Radioactive wastes
Nuclear weapons plant safety
Environmental monitoring
Federal facilities
Hazardous substances
Environmental policies
Nuclear waste disposal
Nuclear weapons plants
Safety regulation
IDENTIFIER: EPA National Priorities List
EPA Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System
Superfund Program
DOE Environmental Management Program
DOE Spent Nuclear Fuel Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Secretary of Energy
March 1995
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY - NATIONAL
PRIORITIES NEEDED FOR MEETING
ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS
GAO/RCED-95-1
DOE's Environmental Agreements
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
CERCLA - Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and
Liability Act
DOE - Department of Energy
EM - Office of Environmental Management
EPA - Environmental Protection Agency
ES&H - Environmental, Safety and Health
GAO - General Accounting Office
MEPAS - Multimedia Environmental Pollutant Assessment System
NPL - National Priorities List
RCRA - Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-256136
March 3, 1995
The Honorable Hazel R. O'Leary
The Secretary of Energy
Dear Madam Secretary,
This report is one of a series undertaken by GAO to review the
Department of Energy's (DOE) management, analyze problems and
determine their underlying causes, and identify ways of improving
departmental management processes and structures. Specifically, this
report evaluates the progress made by DOE in cleaning up its nuclear
weapons complex and contains recommendations to you for enhancing the
effectiveness of the Department's cleanup strategy.
As you know, 31 U.S.C. 720 requires the head of a federal agency to
submit a written statement of the actions taken on our
recommendations to the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs and
the House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight not later than
60 days after the date of this letter and to the House and Senate
Committees on Appropriations with the agency's first request for
appropriations made more than 60 days after the date of this letter.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and subcommittees; individual Members of Congress; the
Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.
Please contact me on (202) 512-3841 if you or your staff have any
questions. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
II.
Sincerely yours,
Victor Rezendes
Director, Energy and
Science Issues
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0
PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1
From the 1940s, when the nation began to develop nuclear weapons,
until the late 1980s, the Department of Energy's (DOE) predecessors
and DOE gave little attention to the environmental consequences of
their activities. As a result, many DOE sites are now contaminated
with radioactive and hazardous wastes, and DOE faces the largest,
most complex cleanup task in the country--estimated to cost at least
$300 billion and perhaps as much as $1 trillion.
As part of a general management review, GAO evaluated the progress
made by DOE in cleaning up its nuclear weapons complex and identified
impediments to the task. This report examines DOE's use of
environmental agreements with state and federal regulators, many of
which are legally binding, and recommends changes in DOE's current
approach to cleanup.
BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2
By generating radioactive and hazardous wastes at its facilities
across the nation, DOE contaminated billions of cubic meters of soil
and sediment. Starting in the 1970s, federal and state laws were
enacted to regulate the disposal of such wastes. In general, the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) oversees and enforces DOE's
compliance with federal laws while the states where DOE's facilities
are located oversee and enforce DOE's compliance with state laws.
To bring its weapons complex into environmental compliance, DOE has
negotiated major cleanup agreements for sites on EPA's Superfund
National Priorities List. DOE has also signed agreements with EPA
and state regulators to correct violations at other sites. These
agreements identify activities--generally called "milestones"--and
schedules for achieving compliance, many of which are legally binding
and enforceable. About $1.8 billion of DOE's annual $6 billion
environmental budget is directed at environmental remediation, or
"cleanup."
RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3
DOE has prepared reports, investigated sites, and submitted decision
documents to regulators, but it has put only a small part of its
effort into physically cleaning up its nuclear weapons complex and
has yet to complete the cleanup of a major facility. Although its
recent performance has been more timely, DOE missed more than 20
percent of all milestones through 1994.
DOE has had difficulty meeting some milestones because it signed
unrealistic agreements with regulators. To continue producing
nuclear weapons and avoid prosecution for environmental violations,
DOE made commitments it could not meet, given both budgetary and
technical limitations. Delays in meeting these commitments led
regulators to declare deficiencies and to doubt DOE's credibility.
Adversarial relationships developed, making it hard for both parties
to renegotiate milestones in response to fiscal constraints or new
evidence suggesting that previously negotiated remedies would do
little to reduce risks.
Future progress in cleaning up the weapons complex largely depends on
how effectively DOE and its regulators can set national priorities
and negotiate realistic agreements and milestones under increasingly
restrictive budgets. The current practice of negotiating agreements
for individual sites without considering other agreements or
available resources does not ensure that limited resources will be
allocated to reducing the greatest environmental risks. To its
credit, DOE has begun to identify milestones that may require
revision and to gather data on risks to workers, the public, and the
environment. DOE should be able to use these data to set priorities
across as well as within sites and to further develop a strategy that
will maximize the impact of the resources available for cleanup.
PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4
DOE HAS COMPLETED FEW
CLEANUPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1
DOE has thus far focused largely on activities in the
"characterization" phase of the cleanup process--collecting data and
investigating sites. These activities, while necessary as part of
the agreements between DOE and its regulators, are often lengthy and
can delay "remediation," or the actual cleanup of sites, for years.
About 16 percent of DOE's 856 cleanup projects are now in the
remediation phase. Physical cleanup has been completed for about 13
percent of the projects (or for about 17 percent if projects that
required no action beyond characterization are counted). The
remainder are undergoing characterization. Increasingly, DOE is also
performing "interim actions," or activities related to cleanups that
are not required under agreements with regulators. Such actions
range from posting signs and putting up a fence to removing
contaminated soils. According to DOE, 118 interim actions were
completed in fiscal year 1994 and another 100 are planned to be
completed in fiscal year 1995.
Although DOE is improving its timeliness, it missed more than 20
percent of the milestones it agreed to complete through 1994. Most
of the milestones that it did complete were studies or reports rather
than cleanups, and some were low-priority activities. At the Rocky
Flats facility in Colorado, for example, where DOE officials said
they had tried to maximize the number of milestones they could meet
within budgetary constraints, EPA assessed a penalty against DOE in
1993 for choosing to complete several low-priority documentary
milestones rather than one high-priority cleanup milestone.
Despite recent data showing some improvement in DOE's performance,
the Congress is increasingly questioning the Department's progress.
Furthermore, as limits on funding tighten, as the costs of required
activities increase, and as growing numbers of milestones come due,
DOE is likely to fall farther behind. In 1994, 433 milestones came
due, compared with 23 in 1989.
UNREALISTIC AGREEMENTS HAVE
IMPEDED PROGRESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2
After claiming for years that its Cold War military mission exempted
it from environmental regulation, DOE was, during the late 1980s,
"prodded or dragged to the conclusion" that it would have to consider
the environment "to stay in business to produce [nuclear weapons],"
according to the former under secretary who presided over the signing
of many early agreements with regulators. However, the agreements
that DOE reached were often unrealistic--that is, they were not based
on adequate assessments of conditions at sites or of the Department's
technical capabilities. For example, officials at Rocky Flats, who
feared they would be jailed for environmental violations, signed an
agreement to clean up the facility over a 10-year period even though,
as one of them later told GAO, "any technical person would have known
that we couldn't meet the milestones." Similarly, for the Hanford
Reservation's cleanup in Washington State, a DOE official said "There
was not [then]--and still is not--[any] technology to accomplish this
task. . . ."
In negotiating agreements with aggressive schedules, DOE assumed that
if milestones could not be achieved, changes would be made. However,
DOE has since had difficulty renegotiating some agreements. Given
the Department's history of resistance to environmental regulation,
many regulators have been reluctant to renegotiate, seeing such
requests as evidence of mismanagement rather than as legitimate
responses to new information about conditions at sites or new
understanding of environmental technologies. In light of regulators'
reluctance to renegotiate, DOE has not sought to revise its
commitments to remediate groundwater at 22 sites through "pump and
treat" actions whose estimated life-cycle costs exceed $500 million,
even though DOE now believes most of these actions will do little or
nothing to reduce risks to public health and safety.
DOE has, however, negotiated some more realistic agreements that
promote progress. For example, despite a history of vigorous
conflict with regulators, DOE reached an agreement with the state of
Idaho and EPA that has enabled DOE's Idaho National Engineering
Laboratory to complete more remediation milestones than any other
site in the weapons complex. This agreement establishes a single
regulatory framework for complying with all applicable laws, creates
opportunities for communication between DOE and the regulators, and
supports a "bias for action" that encourages the use of the most
cost-effective methods to remediate the greatest risks.
FUTURE PROGRESS DEPENDS ON
ADOPTING A NATIONAL
RISK-BASED STRATEGY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3
To date, DOE's cleanup strategy has been shaped by site-specific
environmental agreements whose priorities and requirements have not
always been consistent with technical or fiscal realities.
Furthermore, although these agreements may have been designed to
allocate resources efficiently at individual sites, under severe
budgetary constraints the use of many separately negotiated
agreements is not well suited to setting priorities among sites. To
establish a baseline for a more comprehensive, risk-based cleanup
strategy, DOE is now evaluating the risks and public concerns
addressed by agreements at individual sites and identifying
milestones that may require revision because they are not technically
feasible or do not address immediate threats to health or the
environment. DOE could use the results of this effort, which are due
to the Congress in June 1995, to set priorities across as well as
within sites and to further develop a national cleanup strategy that
will target the available resources to the highest priorities.
DOE's past efforts to establish priorities and use them to
renegotiate milestones have not been successful--largely because
regulators have distrusted DOE's commitment to environmental
remediation and have questioned DOE's analytical methods.
Consequently, alternatives to the current cleanup program, such as
establishing a separate federal or private entity to manage the
cleanup, may have to be considered if DOE cannot successfully
renegotiate infeasible milestones. Both the Office of Technology
Assessment and the former chief of DOE's cleanup program have argued
for alternatives to the current program. In 1989, GAO testified
before the Congress that a national commission could help DOE develop
a process for establishing a more comprehensive cleanup approach.
RECOMMENDATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5
To enable DOE to target its resources to the sites that present the
greatest risks, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy (1) set
national priorities for cleaning up the Department's contaminated
sites using data gathered during DOE's ongoing risk evaluation as a
starting point and (2) initiate discussions with regulators to
renegotiate milestones that no longer reflect national priorities.
AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6
Although DOE maintained that many factors limit the practicability of
developing a risk-based national strategy, it acknowledged a need to
renegotiate its agreements with regulators in light of new budgetary
and risk-based priorities. Such an approach, DOE now concedes,
approximates a national strategy such as GAO is recommending.
DOE's comments and GAO's responses are presented in appendix I and at
the end of chapters 2, 3, and 4.
INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1
Today, DOE faces the environmental legacy of its predecessors' and
its own production of nuclear weapons. According to a recent DOE
estimate, the cleanup of contamination at over 7,000 sites--at 15
major facilities (see fig. 1.1) and more than 100 smaller facilities
across the nation--will cost at least $300 billion (and perhaps as
much as $1 trillion) and take more than 30 years to complete.
Although DOE's predecessors and DOE long resisted environmental
regulation, the Department committed itself at the end of the Cold
War to achieving compliance with federal and state environmental laws
and to establishing sound waste management practices for the future.
DOE's primary mission is now to complete the single largest
environmental program in history.
Figure 1.1: Major Facilities
in DOE's Nuclear Weapons
Complex
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO's illustration
based on DOE's data.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
HISTORY OF DOE'S WASTE
MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1
For more than 50 years, DOE and its predecessors focused on producing
nuclear weapons, giving relatively low priority to managing waste,
whether hazardous (toxic) or radioactive or both (mixed waste). Many
people in DOE's nuclear weapons complex had been aware of the
problems from the beginning, although they may have underestimated
the severity of the hazards or the difficulty of cleaning up the
contamination. During the Cold War years, when resources were
constrained, production was generally given priority over waste
management, barring an immediate safety hazard. Now, DOE's workforce
is expected to give its highest attention to the cleanup activity
that was long regarded as a secondary concern. At the Hanford
Reservation in Washington State, for example, DOE's contractor
generated radioactive waste without providing adequately for its
disposal or control. Beginning in 1944, the contractor filled
single-shell steel tanks with high-level radioactive liquids. In
1959, officials first identified leaks in the tanks. Since then,
definite or possible leaks have been found in 67 out of 149
single-shell tanks. Estimates of leakage range between 670,000 and
900,000 gallons of waste. Starting in 1971, radioactive liquids were
also placed in 28 double-shell tanks, whose walls have two layers of
steel rather than one (see fig. 1.2). As of December 1992, no leaks
had been detected in these tanks, but the wastes in six of them are
potentially explosive.
(See figure in printed edition.)Figure 1.2: Construction of
Double-Shell Tank at Hanford
Source: DOE.
During the Cold War, DOE's predecessors and DOE operated in secrecy,
largely without environmental guidelines. When environmental laws
were enacted, starting in the 1970s, the energy agencies\1 claimed
exemption from both federal and state provisions on national security
grounds. In 1984, however, a federal district court ruled that the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) applied to
nonradioactive hazardous waste at one of DOE's facilities.\2 DOE
accepted this ruling as applying to all of its nuclear facilities.
Following the court's 1984 ruling, DOE's official policy called for
full cooperation with federal and state environmental regulators, as
well as full compliance not only with RCRA but also with the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
of 1980, as amended (CERCLA, commonly known as Superfund), and other
environmental requirements. DOE has acknowledged that its cleanup of
the nuclear weapons complex is subject to regulation by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the states.
When the Cold War came to an end in 1989 and the demand for nuclear
weapons declined, DOE declared a new mission for the
Department--compliance with environmental laws and the cleanup and
restoration of contaminated sites. To reconcile this new mission
with the old weapons production mission, the previous administration
undertook several initiatives:
In June 1989, DOE announced a 10-point management plan to make
production priorities and environment, safety, and health (ES&H)
priorities compatible. The plan focused on (1) bringing facilities
into compliance with federal, state, and local ES&H laws and
regulations, as well as DOE orders; (2) strengthening safety,
environmental protection, and waste management programs; (3)
resetting priorities for incentives and awards paid to contractors by
emphasizing ES&H requirements, including those associated with state
and federal cleanup laws and compliance agreements; and (4)
establishing a program under which teams of technical
experts--commonly called "Tiger Teams"--performed comprehensive
assessments of compliance with ES&H requirements at DOE facilities.
In August 1989, DOE released its first environmental restoration and
waste management 5-year plan for the weapons complex. This plan set
out an agenda for compliance with existing federal and state laws and
outlined a 30-year goal for cleaning up all inactive waste sites.
In the fall of 1989, DOE created the Office of Environmental
Restoration and Waste Management--now known as the Office of
Environmental Management--to accomplish these goals.
--------------------
\1 The Atomic Energy Commission (1946-75), the Energy Research and
Development Administration (1975-77), and DOE.
\2 Legal Environmental Assistance Foundation v. Hodel, 586 F. Supp.
1163 (E.D. Tenn. 1984).
THE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2
With the creation of the Office of Environmental Management (EM), DOE
consolidated departmentwide responsibility for waste management and
cleanup, giving this mission the attention of top-level management.
EM has grown to spend over $6 billion a year--nearly $1 of every $3
appropriated to DOE. Between 1989 and 1993, DOE received over $23
billion for environmental activities.
EM is responsible for identifying and reducing risks and managing
wastes at 137 facilities in 34 states and territories where weapons
or nuclear energy research and production generated hazardous,
radioactive, or mixed wastes. EM is also responsible for managing
spent nuclear fuel, directing transportation and emergency response
activities, controlling and accounting for materials, and ensuring
safeguards and security. Finally, EM has site management
responsibilities at four facilities where DOE formerly conducted
nuclear operations. At the Hanford Reservation in Washington State,
DOE produced plutonium at the world's first full-scale reactor; at
the Fernald Environmental Management Project in Ohio and at the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory in Idaho, it produced uranium metals
for weapons; and at the Rocky Flats facility in Colorado, it
fabricated the triggers for nuclear weapons. EM may soon become
responsible for cleaning up other DOE installations as they are shut
down or decommissioned for other uses. In fiscal year 1996, EM will
gain additional site management responsibilities at the Savannah
River Site, where DOE produced tritium and plutonium and at the Mound
and Pinellas plants, where DOE produced weapons components.
EM is currently organized around four major activities:
environmental restoration, waste management, facility transition and
management, and technology development. EM has also given priority
to strengthening its relationships with local communities and citizen
review groups.
Through the environmental restoration activity, for which $1.8
billion was made available for fiscal year 1994, DOE assesses and
cleans up past environmental contamination. It decontaminates and
decommissions permanently closed DOE facilities and cleans up soil
and groundwater, seeking to eliminate or reduce risks to prescribed,
safe levels.
Through the waste management activity, for which $3 billion was made
available for fiscal year 1994, DOE treats, stores, and disposes of
all generated waste. The Department plans to dispose of highly
radioactive defense waste in a proposed underground repository, while
it intends to place less radioactive defense waste, contaminated with
long-lived plutonium, in a repository called the Waste Isolation
Pilot Plant, located near Carlsbad, New Mexico.
Through the facility transition and management activity, for which
$671 million was made available for fiscal year 1994, DOE plans and
implements the final disposition of facilities that it no longer
needs for its other operating programs. Because many of these
facilities are contaminated with hazardous and/or radioactive
materials, special controls and monitoring are necessary during and
after closure to protect public health and the environment.
Through the technology development activity, for which $397 million
was made available for fiscal year 1994, DOE carries out applied
research and development to focus, manage, and accelerate the
development and implementation of new and existing technologies to
meet specific requirements of the environmental restoration, waste
management, and facility transition and management activities.
The climate in which DOE now operates is more open and accountable to
the Congress, state and federal regulators, environmental
organizations, and community groups. The shift in dominant missions
from weapons production to cleanup has enabled DOE to operate under
public scrutiny and work with public officials and private groups
across the country.
ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3
DOE's cleanup of the weapons complex is framed by goals and
procedures established primarily under RCRA and CERCLA, as well as
state environmental laws and regulations, most of which were
developed during the past two decades. These laws and regulations
address waste problems at both active and inactive DOE sites.
REQUIREMENTS UNDER RCRA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.1
RCRA, as amended, regulates the management of facilities that treat,
store, or dispose of hazardous wastes and the cleanup of hazardous
wastes released from such facilities. Although RCRA does not
regulate radioactive waste, it does, according to a June 1987 DOE
interpretive rule, apply to the hazardous component of mixed waste.
(The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 regulates both radioactive waste and
the radioactive component of mixed waste.)
RCRA requires a permit for a facility to treat, store, or dispose of
hazardous wastes. But before EPA or an authorized state can issue an
operating permit for the facility, the facility must correct or plan
to correct any release of hazardous materials, including any release
from an inactive site. If the facility cannot immediately correct
such a release, the permit must contain schedules for achieving
compliance. These schedules are often contained in compliance
agreements between the regulators and DOE.
REQUIREMENTS UNDER CERCLA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.2
CERCLA provides authority for the cleanup of the nation's inactive or
abandoned waste sites. While federal agencies are required to comply
with CERCLA to the same extent as private entities, moneys from the
cleanup fund authorized by CERCLA (the Superfund) are not available
to them. Instead, federal agencies must pay for cleanups from their
own or other appropriations. In addition, under CERCLA radioactive
materials are considered hazardous substances.
DOE's weapons facilities are subject to CERCLA's procedures,
standards, and methods for identifying, assessing, and remedying
releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants. The
first phase of the remediation process is the preliminary assessment,
during which DOE gathers readily available information on the extent
of contamination at a facility so that EPA can determine whether
emergency action is called for, additional investigation is needed,
or no further action is necessary.
If additional information is needed, the second phase begins and the
site must be inspected. During this inspection, environmental
samples are usually collected. If the results of the inspection
reveal substantial contamination, EPA uses a hazard-ranking system to
identify the site's potential hazard to the environment and public
health; sites assigned a score of 28.5 or more may be added to the
National Priorities List (NPL). Most of the facilities within DOE's
weapons complex have been placed on the list or are being considered
for listing. Currently, 19 DOE facilities are listed. Within 6
months of being listed, a facility--in consultation with EPA--must
begin (1) a remedial investigation, which assesses the extent,
nature, and potential risks of the contamination, and (2) a
feasibility study, which evaluates various remedial alternatives.
Within 180 days after EPA reviews the remedial investigation and
feasibility study, officials at an NPL facility are required to enter
an interagency agreement with EPA for remedial actions. DOE's policy
has been to enter into agreements with regulators as soon as possible
after a site has been placed on the NPL. If a DOE site is not on the
NPL, CERCLA provides that state laws on removal and remedial actions
shall apply.
Interagency agreements provide for enforcement by the parties and
citizens, penalties for failure to comply with the schedule or terms
of the cleanup, and procedures for obtaining funds and resolving
disputes. In addition, interagency agreements provide a means to
integrate a facility's cleanup obligations under CERCLA and under
RCRA. Other CERCLA provisions require health assessments at all NPL
sites and add state environmental standards to the cleanup
requirements for each site.
MULTIPLE REQUIREMENTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.3
A DOE facility that has active and inactive hazardous waste sites may
be subject to requirements under both RCRA and CERCLA because a
federal facility regulated under RCRA may also appear on the NPL if
it meets CERCLA's listing criteria. EPA first included federal
facilities that were subject to RCRA's corrective action requirements
on the NPL in 1989. After being included on the list, such
facilities become subject to the cleanup actions and procedures
specified under CERCLA as well as to the requirements for corrective
action established by EPA or a state regulatory agency under RCRA.\3
--------------------
\3 For more information on the integration of requirements under RCRA
and CERCLA, see Nuclear Cleanup: Difficulties in Coordinating
Activities Under Two Environmental Laws (GAO/RCED-95-56, Dec. 22,
1994).
AGREEMENTS AND MILESTONES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4
DOE has been negotiating agreements to address environmental
violations at most of its major facilities since the mid-1980s. It
has reached interagency agreements with EPA for most of its sites on
the NPL and has entered into agreements with EPA and states to
correct other environmental violations. Of 102 agreements signed
since 1989, 22 have been completed or renegotiated, and 80 remain
active.\4
Both DOE and its regulators use agreements and milestones to set
priorities and schedules at individual sites. In addition, DOE uses
agreements in budgeting as a basis for requesting funding from the
Congress for environmental management activities. DOE reports that
about 80 percent of its cleanup budget is targeted to meet milestones
and satisfy environmental regulations.
Although DOE--and, to a lesser extent, its regulators--uses the
number of milestones completed as a primary measure of its progress
in performing agreements, milestones vary widely in their complexity
and are often not comparable. For example, milestones range from
completing studies or preparing reports to physically cleaning up
contaminated areas. Furthermore, milestones are aggregated at some
sites but not at others. Thus, at Hanford, one milestone requires
DOE to complete six remedial investigations/feasibility studies per
year, while at Rocky Flats, one milestone requires DOE to provide
state regulators with a work plan for a remedial
investigation/feasibility study of a single area or structure, called
an operable unit, within the site.
The scope of a cleanup agreement for an NPL site can be illustrated
by the agreement addressing contamination at the Fernald
Environmental Management Project, located near Fernald, Ohio. The
cleanup of this 1,050-acre facility is organized around operable
units that were defined on the basis of their location or their
potential for the use of a similar cleanup technology. For each
operable unit, a series of milestones defines activities that must be
completed by certain dates. For example, one operable unit, which
covers approximately 37 acres, includes a waste pit containing over
500,000 cubic yards of low-level radioactive waste and mixed waste.
The milestones for this operable unit, which include conducting a
feasibility study (to evaluate the effectiveness of different
treatment methods for stabilizing the waste) and preparing a draft
record of decision (to document the chosen method of cleaning up this
operable unit), were due to EPA in December 1994. Figure 1.3 shows
the milestones associated with completing remedial investigations and
feasibility studies for the entire facility.
Figure 1.3: Fernald Agreement
Milestone Schedule
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: Additional milestones
and an additional operable
unit, known as the
comprehensive operable unit,
address other activities for
the entire facility.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: Adapted from an
illustration in DOE's fiscal
year 1993 site-specific plan
for the Fernald Environmental
Management Project.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
In addition to monitoring the number of agreements and milestones it
has completed, DOE measures its progress in cleaning up sites by
tracking the number of "interim actions" it has taken. Unlike
agreements and milestones, these actions are not negotiated with
regulators but are planned by DOE to deal with immediate problems
encountered in long-range projects. Examples of interim actions
include removing asbestos from a reactor building at Idaho, applying
herbicide to prevent the movement of contaminated tumbleweed at
Hanford, adding security patrols at Oak Ridge to prevent the theft of
contaminated scrap at a quarry, and posting radiological signs at
Fernald.
--------------------
\4 This count is based on a DOE list of federal and state agreements,
dated May 19, 1994. Requirements under these agreements range from
single actions to cleanups of entire sites.
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5
The objective of this report was to identify factors that hamper
progress in the cleanup of DOE's nuclear weapons complex. To obtain
information about internal obstacles to progress, we met with senior
officials and staff in the Office of Environmental Management, which
is responsible for implementing the waste cleanup program. We also
met with senior officials in the Office of Environment, Safety, and
Health, which oversees the cleanup for the Secretary of Energy. In
addition, we interviewed officials at field offices involved, or
anticipating involvement, in major cleanups because these offices
play an important role in implementing EM's program.
To document EM's progress in meeting agreement milestones, we asked
DOE to select data on all milestones due between June 1, 1992, and
May 31, 1993. For each missed milestone, we asked DOE to identify a
root cause of the delay, which we confirmed by reviewing available
documentation. We then sorted these data by site, by cause, and by
field office. For a sample of missed milestones, we discussed the
reasons for the delays with the applicable state and/or EPA
regulators. We also discussed with DOE the data on milestones that
it had collected for 1993 and presented in its Environmental
Management 94 report, as required by the National Defense
Authorization Act for 1994, as well as the results of its Phase II
Milestone Review.
To obtain information about external factors influencing DOE's
progress in managing the cleanup program, we interviewed DOE
contractors; EPA headquarters and regional officials; state
officials; officials from other federal agencies reviewing DOE's
efforts, including the Office of Technology Assessment and the
Congressional Research Service; and stakeholders from environmental
and local citizen groups. We also reviewed reports on DOE programs,
including internal documents assessing the management of specific EM
programs or projects.
We conducted our work between April 1992 and December 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from DOE. DOE
provided us with two letters and an attachment that was too long for
us to reproduce in this report. DOE's letters and our responses
appear in appendix 1, and DOE's comments--including some that
appeared in the attachment--are discussed, as relevant, at the end of
chapters 2, 3 and 4. We also discussed a draft of this report with
state and EPA officials and incorporated their comments where
appropriate throughout the body of the report.
CLEANUP OF DOE'S WEAPONS COMPLEX
HAS BEEN LIMITED
============================================================ Chapter 2
Although DOE has spent significant sums on environmental activities,
it has confined most of its efforts to preassessment or assessment
actions, such as preparing reports, investigating sites, and
submitting documents to regulators. To date, it has not finished
cleaning up any of its major facilities. Overall, "remediation," or
actual physical cleanup, is still a small part of DOE's activity.
DOE'S CLEANUP PROGRESS HAS BEEN
SLOW
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1
On the basis of fiscal year 1994 year-end data, DOE reported that its
environmental restoration program includes 856 projects encompassing
more than 7,000 release sites.\5 Information obtained from
characterizing sites indicates that 689 of these projects will
require remedial action, while another 167 will require
decontamination and decommissioning.\6 DOE's progress in addressing
these projects is as follows:
574, or 67 percent, are in the characterization or assessment phase.
For 275 projects, preliminary investigations have been conducted, but
full-scale characterization has not begun. For 299 projects,
remedial investigations or similar activities are under way.
109, or 13 percent, have been completely cleaned up. DOE reports
that the physical cleanup has been completed for 17 percent; however,
this calculation includes 33 projects that required no further action
beyond characterization.
140, or 16 percent, are in the remedial design phase or actual
remediation. These include decontamination and decommissioning
projects across the complex. EM plans to complete 16 of these
projects in fiscal year 1995.
--------------------
\5 Release sites are locations contaminated by releases of
radioactive or hazardous waste. A single project can encompass
hundreds of such sites.
\6 These represent nuclear facilities that have been decommissioned
and now require decontamination. More such projects are anticipated
as DOE further downsizes its nuclear production facilities.
DOE FELL BEHIND SCHEDULE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1
DOE missed almost 30 percent of its enforceable agreement milestones
for the period from June 1, 1992, through May 31, 1993.\7 During this
period, 16 out of 21 facilities missed milestones. For example, the
Los Alamos National Laboratory missed 31 out of 42 milestones, and
Rocky Flats missed 8 out of 36. The number of milestones due ranged
from 1 at Weldon Springs to 42 at Los Alamos. At the Hanford site,
activities for characterizing tank wastes have fallen a year behind
schedule.
The delays in completing milestones varied from one facility to
another and ranged from 14 days to 1,095 days. Over 90 percent of
the missed milestones were delayed by 30 days or more. Furthermore,
8 out of the 16 facilities that missed milestones (Hanford, Mound,
Brookhaven, Kansas City Plant, Fernald, Los Alamos, Lawrence
Livermore and Rocky Flats) missed at least one milestone by 365 days
or more.
DOE officials believe that their performance in meeting milestones
has improved. In November 1994, DOE reported that it had missed 21
percent of all its milestones cumulative through the end of fiscal
year 1994.\8
In commenting on a draft of this report, DOE officials also noted
that although the Department has not completed all of its milestones
on schedule, it has performed a number of interim actions that were
not part of its agreements with regulators. These actions have
advanced the physical cleanup at sites, reduced exposure to
contaminants, or contained contaminants; however, they are not
considered final actions. DOE reported that 118 interim actions were
completed in fiscal year 1994 and another 100 are scheduled for
completion in fiscal year 1995.
--------------------
\7 This represents the most recent period for which these data were
made available to us from DOE during our review.
\8 These data are reported from DOE's Progress Tracking System.
MORE, AND MORE COMPLEX,
MILESTONES WILL COME DUE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2
In the coming years, the pace of milestones coming due will
accelerate rapidly. From 1989 to 1994, the number of annual planned
milestones increased over 18-fold--from 23 to 433. By the year 2019,
DOE expects that number to exceed 2,000. Figure 2.1 shows the number
of milestones due each year from 1989 to 1994. For the next few
years, DOE's focus will remain on characterization activities, but by
the turn of the century greater numbers of remedial actions are
expected to come due. These remedial actions involve the design and
construction of physical cleanup projects and are far more
complicated and costly than the characterization activities preceding
them.
Figure 2.1: Enforceable
Milestones Due, 1989-94
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO's presentation of DOE's data.
SLOW PACE OF CLEANUP HAS CAUSED
FRUSTRATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2
Both the Congress and regulators--the states and EPA--have expressed
frustration over the pace of DOE's environmental restoration program.
During the 103rd Congress, DOE's handling of various aspects of the
program was criticized in both houses, and a conference committee
report warned that funding for environmental projects would not be
forthcoming forever.\9
DOE acknowledges that its progress has been slow, but it is pursuing
ways to accelerate its efforts. For example, at the Hanford
Reservation--one of the most contaminated sites within the weapons
complex--the Department is using "expedited response actions" (a type
of interim action) at selected locations. According to DOE, this
approach allows the Department and its contractors to reduce the
amount of time needed for preparatory research before actual cleanups
can begin. In addition, DOE is using an expedited site
characterization process at Hanford that was first demonstrated by
the Argonne National Laboratory in July 1993. This process employs
multiple technologies and a multidisciplinary team to produce
high-quality data for decision-making.
--------------------
\9 "Making Appropriations for Energy and Water Development for the
Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1994, and for Other Purposes,"
Fiscal Year 1994 Appropriations Conference Report (103-305) (Oct.
22, 1993).
SEVERAL FACTORS LIMIT PROGRESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3
Several factors affect the progress of DOE's cleanup program. DOE's
problems are technically complicated because they involve both
hazardous and radioactive wastes. In addition, DOE's sites present a
wide range of risks. Because information about these risks is
limited, calculating cumulative risks and planning site cleanups can
be difficult.
We identified two other important issues that jeopardize DOE's
progress in addressing sites: First, many of DOE's agreements with
regulators are unrealistic; second, DOE's environmental management
strategy is focused too much on setting priorities for individual
sites and not enough on setting priorities for the weapons complex as
a whole.\10
Chapters 3 and 4 discuss these problems.
--------------------
\10 We recently reported on the important role of improved
technologies in cleaning up contaminated sites. See Management
Changes Needed to Expand Use of Innovative Cleanup Technologies
(GAO/RCED-94-205, Aug. 10, 1994).
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4
In commenting initially on a draft of this report, DOE maintained
that GAO had overlooked "the significant number of accomplishments
reflecting real world progress" that the Department's environmental
restoration program had achieved. As noted in chapter 1, DOE
provided us with a lengthy attachment in which it cited its
accomplishments at individual sites. DOE also emphasized its
completion of many interim actions and development of detailed
performance measures for tracking its progress toward six strategic
goals (discussed in ch. 4). In addition, DOE pointed out that the
enforceable legal agreements under which it operates typically
require sites to be characterized before remediation can begin.
Finally, DOE attributed delays during the first 5 years of the
program to "significant start-up activities and reorganization
disruption" and stated that later years should be more productive.
We commend DOE for its accomplishments at individual sites and
acknowledge that both the interim actions it has taken and the
performance measures it has developed represent important steps in
cleaning up the weapons complex. In addition, we recognize that DOE
is required to characterize its waste sites as a first step in
complying with many of its agreements. Nevertheless, DOE has not
moved far beyond characterization, since 67 percent of its projects
are in this phase. Moreover, we are concerned that DOE will
experience further difficulty in meeting its commitments as the
balance of its environmental restoration work shifts from
characterization to cleanup and as both the costs and the technical
complexity of its tasks increase. Proposed reductions in federal
funding for environmental restoration will also affect DOE's ability
to comply with the agreements.
DOE ENTERED INTO UNREALISTIC
INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS
============================================================ Chapter 3
Progress in cleaning up the weapons complex, as measured by DOE's
completion of milestones set forth in agreements with regulators, has
been slow because many agreements have turned out to be unrealistic
and changes have proved difficult and time-consuming to negotiate.
Delays in completing technically complex milestones have created
tensions with regulators, which DOE has tried to mitigate by
emphasizing compliance with other milestones, some of which, in DOE's
view, do not cost-effectively reduce the greatest risks to human
health and the environment. Hence, DOE's emphasis on meeting
milestones has discouraged a strategic focus at many sites. At a few
sites, though, DOE and its regulators have renegotiated agreements
and have developed a more integrated, collaborative, flexible
approach that appears to have assisted them in devising
cost-effective strategies for reducing the greatest environmental
risks.
UNREALISTIC AGREEMENTS HAVE
ROOTS IN DOE'S HISTORY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1
Until the late 1980s, DOE focused primarily on meeting military
production schedules, giving only limited attention to compliance
with environmental standards. As late as 1987, a state critic at a
congressional hearing noted that "DOE's attitude toward compliance
has been as bad as [that of] the worst private sector violators. .
. . [While DOE] now pays lip service to some of the environmental
laws, its compliance with those laws falls short of an acceptable
standard."\11
Responding to pressure from federal and state regulators and the
public, DOE officials hastened to sign unrealistic cleanup agreements
at several sites, including Rocky Flats and Hanford, two of the major
facilities within the weapons complex. A former DOE under secretary
recently acknowledged that DOE "got into the compliance agreements.
. . because we had to stay in production to produce the
requirements for the military." In this official's words, the
Department was "leveraged to be responsive to the environment,
safety, and health concern,"\12 and it entered into agreements
without ensuring that it could meet either their funding requirements
or their schedules. Meanwhile, DOE's regulators pressured DOE to
sign agreements because they had no other means to ensure the
Department's attention to environmental issues.
--------------------
\11 Environmental Issues at Department of Energy Nuclear Facilities,
statement by Anthony J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney General, state of
Ohio, before the U.S. Senate, Committee on Governmental Affairs
(Mar. 17, 1987).
\12 John C. Tuck, "Reflections on Tenure as the Under Secretary,"
Office of the Executive Secretariat, History Division, DOE (Jan. 17,
1993).
THE ROCKY FLATS AGREEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.1
According to DOE regional administrators responsible for Rocky Flats,
political pressure and the fear of prosecution led the Department to
sign a cleanup agreement for the plant before completing basic cost
estimates and project schedules. In June 1989, FBI agents raided
Rocky Flats and spent 3 weeks searching for evidence of deliberate
violations of environmental laws. This raid--the first investigation
of DOE's compliance with environmental laws at any weapons
facility--lent credibility to the charges of environmental
mismanagement that had been leveled against the facility since the
early 1970s and instilled fears of being jailed in Rocky Flats
officials as they completed negotiations for a CERCLA agreement in
1991. DOE officials told us they were "willing to give EPA anything
it wanted." Nevertheless, they said, "the day we signed the
[interagency agreement], any technical person would [have] know[n] we
couldn't meet the milestones." The regulators, however, believed that
DOE had signed the agreement in good faith and could, with proper
management, meet the negotiated milestones. For further discussion
of this issue, see the next section of this chapter.
The Rocky Flats officials who committed DOE to the ambitious cleanup
schedule now believe that the agreement's biggest flaw is its failure
to provide periodic opportunities for DOE and the regulators to
formally reevaluate schedules and revise milestones as changes in
site conditions or funding occur. The cleanup is now expected to
take longer than the 10 years originally allotted for it, and, as of
the summer of 1994, DOE had missed about one-fourth of the
agreement's milestones.
DOE and the regulators have been renegotiating the Rocky Flats
interagency cleanup agreement and have drawn up a draft agreement
that provides for annual discussions of priorities among the parties
and the public, as well as revisions of milestones in response to
budget shifts, new technologies, experience, or other changes. The
regulators believe that, through earlier and greater involvement in
DOE's planning and scheduling, they can help ensure that milestones
are as realistic as possible. However, in November 1994, EPA and
state regulators suspended negotiations because they found DOE
unresponsive to a number of their concerns, including the adequacy of
baseline schedules, the disposition of plutonium, oversight
authority, and the future of the site. Our discussions with
regulators suggest that these concerns are being resolved.
THE HANFORD AGREEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1.2
According to DOE's former Environmental Restoration Assistant
Manager, DOE entered into an unrealistic cleanup agreement at the
Hanford Reservation near Richland, Washington. This tri-party
agreement--so called because it involved DOE, EPA, and the Washington
State Department of Ecology--was signed in 1989 and was DOE's first
cleanup agreement. It established hundreds of milestones, for both
environmental restoration and tank waste remediation, which are to be
completed over 30 years. DOE agreed to some milestones, such as
removing radioactive tritium from groundwater, without knowing
whether the tasks were technically feasible. The former DOE official
told us that "There was not [then]--and still is not--[any]
technology to accomplish this task. . . ." Other activities and
schedules in the Hanford agreement have also turned out to be
unrealistic. For example, technical complications delayed the
completion of one milestone by more than 1,000 days and also
postponed the performance of later milestones in the series.
Because DOE was unable to meet the milestones in the first tri-party
agreement, the parties agreed to renegotiate the agreement. They
completed their revisions in January 1994, after 9 months of
negotiation. Among other things, the new agreement emphasizes
setting aggressive schedules to deal with urgent risks, striving to
lower the cost of the cleanup by $1 billion over the next 5 years,
and creating new opportunities for public involvement. The
regulators allowed DOE to delay some of its milestones in return for
a commitment to act more aggressively to reduce the greatest safety
risks. The new agreement reflects revised views about the relative
seriousness of different waste problems and the realization that new
technologies for treating waste are more difficult to develop than
originally anticipated. The agreement has been praised by federal
and state officials as well as some public interest groups.
However, even the revised milestones may not be realistic. In
September 1994, the Washington State Department of Ecology expressed
increasing concern over the pace of DOE's implementation of the tank
waste remediation system. In addition, in early December 1994, the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board wrote a letter to the
Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management expressing the
Board's concern that the Hanford high-level radioactive waste storage
tank program "is in difficulty." The Board included a memorandum
stating that "the high-level tank characterization program is so far
behind schedule that either a large increase in resources or a new
strategy requiring much less sampling and analysis will be needed. .
. ."
UNREALISTIC COMMITMENTS HAVE
BEEN DIFFICULT TO CHANGE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2
DOE assumed, when it entered into environmental agreements, that it
would be able to revise unrealistic milestones. Agreements contain
provisions for revising schedules; hence, for DOE officials who
described milestones as "best estimates, rather than accurate
predictions," change was to be expected. Regulators, however, have
often viewed agreements as less subject to change. At Hanford, for
example, DOE saw the original tri-party agreement as a general
framework for cleanup, while the state and EPA considered its
milestones as enforceable. Thus, at many DOE sites, the process of
changing an agreement can be long and difficult, according to both
DOE officials and regulators with whom we spoke.
Changes either in the type or scope or in the timing of work to be
performed require the approval of DOE's regulators. Thus, if DOE
wishes to modify a negotiated activity, it is required to submit a
technical justification to the regulators. According to both DOE and
regulatory officials, such a justification is often rejected and has
to be resubmitted several times before an agreement is reached.
Similarly, regulators may refuse to reschedule activities unless they
view the revised dates as acceptable. Again, a time-consuming
exchange of documents may be required for DOE to obtain approval of a
change.
Regulators vary in their willingness to consider changes to
agreements. Generally, they will consider changes if they find DOE's
technical justifications sound, but they also believe that
continually negotiating milestones damages the integrity of their
agreements. To maintain credibility with their constituencies, they
may resist changes. Environmental officials from Washington,
Colorado, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Ohio told us they would
stand firm against any unwarranted changes to an agreement that would
delay their schedule.
When DOE has constructive relationships with its regulators, disputes
are resolved smoothly, but when its relationships are strained,
comparable disputes can take significantly longer to resolve.
According to some waste policy experts, having trusting relationships
with regulators is one of the most important indicators of a
well-managed cleanup operation. At Oak Ridge, for example, where a
measure of trust has existed between DOE and its regulators, EPA was
willing to consider any reasonable proposals for altering scheduled
milestones when it found deficiencies in a remedial investigation
report that DOE submitted. Acknowledging that DOE might not have
anticipated the need for additional fieldwork and reports, EPA
extended DOE's schedule. At Rocky Flats, however, where the
relationship between DOE and its regulators has been more demanding,
EPA and the state of Colorado agreed to extend an initial deadline
but not to postpone subsequent deadlines. Although the regulators
viewed this approach as reasonable, given the extended period of time
between milestones, DOE officials said that it forced them to spend
time applying for extensions that should have been spent performing
technical work. Whereas DOE maintained that it was unable to
complete its milestones on time because of "budget constraints,"
regulators at Rocky Flats believed that DOE either did not request
sufficient funding to meet its deadlines or did not efficiently
manage the funding it received.
RELIANCE ON MILESTONES
DISCOURAGES STRATEGIC FOCUS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3
When DOE has been unable to renegotiate or has not sought to change
unrealistic agreements or milestones, it has sometimes focused more
on compliance than on cleanup. It has spent scarce resources to
demonstrate its willingness to meet its legal commitments even when
its expenditures have not advanced its environmental goals.
At the Hanford Reservation, for example, DOE continued to modify a
facility, known as B Plant, in order to meet an October 1993
milestone, even though DOE studies had consistently shown that the
modification would not meet federal and departmental regulations.
GAO had also concluded, as early as June 1991, that DOE's efforts
were fruitless, yet DOE did not abandon the project until the spring
of 1992. DOE estimated that the project would cost more than $600
million.\13
At Rocky Flats, DOE also focused more on meeting milestones than on
facilitating cleanups. When it found that it did not have sufficient
funds to complete a costly, high-priority milestone on schedule, it
decided to perform several less costly, low-priority milestones
instead. Specifically, in March 1993, it developed work plans for
several sites at Rocky Flats rather than complete the draft of an
investigation/inspection report that was due as part of its
interagency agreement with EPA and the state of Colorado. To
complete the draft, it would have had to conduct expensive fieldwork
to assess the extent to which soil and groundwater had been
contaminated by the leakage of hazardous and radioactive materials
from drums stored at the site during the 1950s and 1960s. According
to a DOE manager at Rocky Flats, "We have been driven to maximize the
number of milestones we meet." The regulators, however, were not
satisfied with DOE's substitution of quantity for quality; they
faulted DOE for mismanagement and recommended a penalty. According
to the regulators, DOE unilaterally decided which milestones to meet
and which to miss, without discussing priorities with them or
acknowledging that it could not complete all of the milestones on
schedule. "If DOE had discussed the problem with us, possibly we
could have found a solution to the problem and possibly we could not
have, but with DOE's approach we never had the opportunity to try,"
said a state regulator.
At 22 projects throughout the weapons complex, DOE has agreed to
implement a groundwater remediation technique called "pump and
treat." This technique--which involves pumping contaminated water out
of the ground, treating it to remove hazardous and other
constituents, and then discharging the treated water to the surface
or injecting it back into the ground--is commonly a part of EPA and
state groundwater cleanup strategies because it is often the only
technique available for attempting to remove contamination from
groundwater. Although it can prevent further degradation and return
groundwater to beneficial uses, it is frequently viewed as an
ineffective technology because its use is scheduled to continue at
some sites for 30 years or more. Moreover, according to DOE, at many
sites the technique does little or nothing to reduce risks to public
health and safety. Over the lives of its projects, DOE expects the
costs of using pump-and-treat techniques to exceed $500 million.
--------------------
\13 For more information on B Plant modifications see Nuclear Waste:
Pretreatment Modifications at DOE Hanford's B Plant Should Be Stopped
(GAO/RCED-91-165, June 12, 1991).
ACTIVITIES AT SAVANNAH RIVER
LACK STRATEGIC FOCUS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.1
At Savannah River, DOE entered into agreements with the state of
South Carolina and with EPA to perform cleanups required under both
RCRA and CERCLA. DOE's implementation of these agreements--and DOE's
relationships with the regulators--reflects the difficulty of
carrying out cleanups efficiently when the parties have entered into
agreements without fully understanding the technical complexity of
the tasks involved, without providing adequately for change in
response to technical or fiscal realities, and without concurring on
key elements, such as the severity of the risk, the benefits of the
negotiated remedy relative to the costs, or the actions needed to
satisfy multiple legal requirements.
To comply with the terms of a 1992 RCRA permit, DOE agreed to address
groundwater contamination associated with currently inactive seepage
basins that had been contaminated by the Department's operations.
The regulators gave DOE 3 years to develop an implementable solution.
In the absence of a more appropriate cleanup technology, DOE agreed
to conduct pump-and-treat operations. However, as DOE explained to
the regulators, it was reluctant to proceed with an activity that, in
its view, would have limited benefits and high costs. DOE estimated
that this project would cost over $32 million to construct, and it
anticipated that the project would continue for 30 years or more, at
an annual operating cost of $4 million to $6 million.
Subsequently, DOE determined from an interim assessment of risks at
the site that the contaminated groundwater posed no imminent off-site
risk and that any risk to persons at the site could be controlled
without conducting pump-and-treat operations. DOE then proposed
controlling access to the site and managing the contamination until a
more effective remedy could be developed. The regulators rejected
DOE's proposal, maintaining that DOE's assessment was based on faulty
reasoning and a questionable interpretation of environmental models.
Although DOE challenged the regulators' insistence on the
pump-and-treat remedy for 2 years, it decided in 1994 to demonstrate
its willingness to cooperate with the regulators by fully
implementing the agreement.
At Savannah River, as at many other sites, DOE faces the challenge of
coordinating the activities that are required under both RCRA and
CERCLA.\14 Here, DOE is continuing the cleanup activities that it
began to meet RCRA's requirements and is coordinating its performance
of CERCLA's requirements with these ongoing efforts. Thus, in
addition to conducting the pump-and-treat project required under the
1992 RCRA permit, DOE is preparing CERCLA documentation for the
project and is expecting public comments on the documentation.
Elsewhere at Savannah River, a disagreement has arisen between DOE
and its regulators over the need to prepare additional
documentation--at an estimated cost of $33,000--to demonstrate that,
in cleaning up a facility under RCRA, DOE also complied with
requirements under CERCLA. Essentially, this documentation would
modify paperwork prepared under RCRA to suit formats used under
CERCLA; it would not entail additional cleanup work or disclose new
information. Whereas South Carolina and EPA regional officials
believe that DOE could use a simpler, less expensive approach to
satisfy CERCLA's requirements, DOE officials at Savannah River
believe that the documentation is necessary to complete the
administrative record. Since over 200 other sites at Savannah River
are awaiting cleanups under RCRA, DOE's approach, if extended to all
of the cleanups, could prove costly.
To expedite cleanups at Savannah River, DOE and its regulators have
instituted a 3-year project planning process to coordinate activities
with DOE's budget process. According to EPA regulators for the site,
milestones and deliverables are negotiated annually on the basis of
environmental priorities, DOE funding levels, and input from
stakeholders. This approach may provide the flexibility and
coordination that are needed to facilitate cleanups at the site.
--------------------
\14 See Nuclear Cleanup: Difficulties in Coordinating Activities
Under Two Environmental Laws (GAO/RCED-95-66, Dec. 22, 1994).
INTERNAL REVIEW IDENTIFIES
AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3.2
Recently, EM undertook a three-phase review of enforceable agreement
milestones that has, thus far, largely supported GAO's findings. The
first phase showed that most "vulnerable" (likely to be missed)
milestones were (1) study related, unrealistic, or not logistically
implementable or (2) could be better coordinated with other programs.
During the second phase, a "technical review team" of independent
contractors analyzed vulnerable milestones at four weapons-complex
facilities (Brookhaven National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory, the Mound Plant, and the Savannah River Site) in
the spring of 1994.\15 After analyzing 139 vulnerable milestones, the
team observed that "milestones do not necessarily reflect an
effective strategic approach to environmental restoration." According
to the team, completing milestones becomes an end in itself rather
than a tool for meeting environmental goals and requirements. In
addition, "milestones act as drivers of the work that will be
required rather than reflecting the most strategic approach to an
environmental restoration program." The team further observed that
DOE needs a strategy that sequences activities to maximize progress
and use resources cost-effectively. Funding limitations were viewed
as the primary cause for missing negotiated milestones and explained
the frequent need to renegotiate. The team did not extrapolate its
findings from the four facilities to the weapons complex as a whole;
however, its results are consistent with our observations at other
DOE sites.
As phase III of this effort, DOE is planning a pilot project to
improve its approach to interagency agreements. This project will
include work with EPA regional officials and state officials to
develop a technical strategy for cleaning up a facility. Although
the project was originally planned to include three sites recently
added to the NPL, its scope was reduced to one site. At the time of
our review, DOE had not obtained formal commitments from the relevant
EPA regional office and state agency to participate in the pilot
project or finalized detailed plans for it.
--------------------
\15 Phase II Milestone Review: An Analysis of Four DOE Sites, final
report by Project Performance Corp.; The Cadmus Group, Inc.; and CH2M
Hill, Inc. (Apr. 1994).
AGREEMENTS CAN ADVANCE CLEANUPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4
Although the progress of environmental cleanup has been limited at
most facilities within DOE's weapons complex, the Idaho National
Engineering Laboratory has completed more remediation milestones than
any other facility. The geology of the site and the nature of the
contamination have influenced this progress, but so, too, has the
cleanup agreement. This agreement integrates federal and state goals
and requirements, recognizes the need for change, and balances costs
and benefits.
The Federal Facility Agreement and Consent Order for the Idaho
National Engineering Laboratory, signed in December 1991, is designed
to serve as a single "road map" for all cleanup activities at the
site. All parties have agreed to use the CERCLA process for cleanup,
specifying that complying with CERCLA will satisfy RCRA and state
hazardous waste cleanup requirements. The regulators and DOE told us
that the intent of this integrated agreement is to allow the parties
to select the best cleanup approach for each unit, regardless of
statute.
The Idaho agreement is flexible. Its action plan states that no
reasonable amount of investigation can resolve all uncertainty and
that once remedial actions have been initiated, they must be allowed
to change. The agreement encourages the timely selection of
remedies, flexibility for remedial action, and the adoption of
alternative solutions in response to new information discovered
during investigations.
The Idaho agreement encourages the parties to consider the
cost-effectiveness of remedies designed to reduce risks at sites.
The accompanying action plan gives project managers the flexibility
to prioritize and organize work so as to maximize the benefits that
can be achieved with available funds. Furthermore, the document
supports a "bias for action" through minimizing the duplication of
analyses and documentation, expediting the cleanup process as much as
possible, and providing the necessary flexibility to reach an early
determination on a unit when there is sufficient information.
After the Idaho agreement went into effect, one of the first planned
remedial investigations at the site was for the Test Reactor Area.
This area houses test reactors and extensive support facilities for
studying the effects of radiation on materials, fuels, and equipment.
Sites within this area that were investigated included pits, tanks,
rubble piles, ponds, cooling towers, wells, french drains, and
spills. The U.S. Geological Survey had been collecting data on
groundwater at the Idaho site since the 1950s, when the facility was
put into operation. Although these data had not been collected under
the CERCLA agreement, the parties agreed that, because the data had
been collected consistently for 40 years, they were useable along
with data collected more recently under a previous RCRA consent
order. The decision to use the available data eliminated the need
for a work plan and further field data collection and analysis. As a
result, a remedy was selected for the site about a year ahead of
schedule.
Analysis of the data showed that groundwater and a percolation pond
were contaminated. The parties considered a variety of remedies,
ranging in estimated cost from about $6 million to more than $43
million, but decided, ultimately, that there was no need to remediate
the groundwater. Because (1) DOE had previously reduced or
eliminated the sources of contamination, (2) the levels of
contamination were declining, and (3) no people were living in the
area, the parties agreed to consolidate the contaminated sediments in
the percolation pond and place a soil cap on top. According to the
parties, the costs of implementing a groundwater remedy were not
worth the possible benefits.
The parties' ability to reach a potentially controversial decision
was attributed to the teamwork and bias for action articulated in the
Idaho agreement. Particularly for the state, the decision was not
easy to support because the public was concerned about the possible
contamination of the aquifer, on which the agricultural community
depends. To facilitate decision-making for all parties, both DOE and
its regulators were trained in, and extensively reviewed, models and
risk assessments for the site. According to all parties, the
regulators' unusually extensive involvement in DOE's decision-making
helped them to arrive at mutually satisfactory results, which they
could then jointly present to the public.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5
In its detailed comments on a draft of this report, DOE disagreed
with our interpretation of the statement that "milestones do not
necessarily reflect an effective strategic approach to environmental
restoration," which we quoted from the independent contractors' Phase
II Milestone Review. DOE indicated that "strategic" in this context
referred to a site-specific rather than a national scheme. While the
contractors may have derived their support for this statement from
the four sites studied, we believe that the statement can also be
applied to other sites within DOE's weapons complex. In addition, as
we discuss in the next chapter, we believe that the statement can be
applied across, as well as within, sites.
DOE suggested that our discussion of the groundwater remediation
project at Savannah River was anecdotal. As we explained in the
report, our discussion was based on the documentation we received not
only from the DOE headquarters and field officials responsible for
this project but also from the regulators at both EPA Region IV and
the State of South Carolina's Department of Health and Environmental
Control. We obtained information from correspondence between EPA and
DOE and between the Department of Health and Environmental Control
and DOE, from the baseline risk assessment, and from a wide range of
studies, memorandums, and other documentation dating as far back as
December 1990. In addition, regulatory officials who oversee this
work, at both EPA and the state, reviewed the draft report and
provided us with their comments, which we incorporated throughout the
text. These regulatory officials' comments suggested that we had
reasonably depicted the situation. According to DOE, "the GAO draft
report seems to suggest there is no correct option" for cleaning up
the groundwater at Savannah River. Our point in describing the
contentious situation at this site was to illustrate the
complications arising from differences between DOE and its regulators
on interpretations of risk, analyses of costs and benefits, legal
commitments, and jurisdictional issues. Our purpose was not to
suggest "a correct option."
Finally, in commenting on the draft report's statement that
cooperation among EPA, the state, and DOE at the Idaho site gave the
three parties a decision that they could "take to the public with a
united front," DOE said that GAO had portrayed these government
agencies as giving the public a "hard sell." We disagree with this
interpretation. In fact, the public's support in implementing the
decision suggests that cooperation between the regulators and DOE can
extend to the public as well.
FUTURE CLEANUP PROGRESS DEPENDS ON
A NATIONAL STRATEGY
============================================================ Chapter 4
As the preceding chapters have shown, progress in cleaning up
individual facilities has depended greatly on DOE's ability to
negotiate realistic agreements with regulators. When technical
difficulties have arisen or when DOE has been unable to either obtain
or manage the funds needed to implement milestones on schedule,
progress has faltered and tensions between DOE and its regulators
have increased. Typically, renegotiation has then proved
time-consuming and difficult, further delaying progress. But when
DOE and its regulators have been able to coordinate commitments and
devise cost-effective cleanup strategies, as they have at INEL, then
progress has occurred.
Today, pressures on the federal budget are increasing, and funding
for environmental restoration is becoming more difficult to obtain.
At the same time, growing numbers of costly cleanup milestones are
scheduled to fall due. As the gap widens between the costs of
cleanup and the funds available for it, the need grows for DOE and
its regulators to adopt a national risk-based cleanup strategy. Such
a strategy would enable DOE and its regulators to set priorities
across as well as within sites and create a framework for agreeing on
remedies that are both effective and affordable. Such a strategy
would likely require DOE and its regulators to renegotiate some
agreements, deferring infeasible milestones until technological
solutions could be found and postponing lower-priority milestones
until more urgent risks could be addressed.
DOE has developed goals and is conducting studies as a basis for
setting cleanup priorities and establishing a national cleanup
strategy. In the past, DOE also tried to set priorities, but the
systems it devised proved unworkable, in large part because they
required considerable subjective judgment and were not explicitly
linked to DOE's various agreements with EPA and states. If DOE can
apply the lessons learned in effectively negotiating priorities at
individual facilities to the weapons complex as a whole, it may be
more successful now than it was in the past. But DOE will again be
dealing with state and regional regulators whose perspectives and
objectives may not extend to the nation as a whole. And regulators
who have found DOE uncooperative in the past may be inclined to view
national priority-setting as an attempt to circumvent existing
commitments. In short, competing priorities and questions about
DOE's credibility may again impede efforts to establish a national
cleanup agenda, and an alternative approach may be required to
achieve progress.
DOE HAS BEGUN TO DEVELOP A
CLEANUP STRATEGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1
As shown in table 4.1, DOE has developed six goals that, along with a
series of operational approaches and performance measures, make up
its "national strategy." The first two goals--managing and
eliminating environmental risks and removing threats to human health
and safety--direct DOE toward a risk-based strategy. The third goal,
calling for managerial and financial control, is consistent with our
recommendations (largely presented in other reports) that DOE improve
its contract management. It is also consistent with the need
(discussed in this report) to develop cost-effective solutions to
environmental problems. The fourth goal, to become more
outcome-oriented, should help redirect DOE's emphasis to give
managers greater incentive to focus on achieving environmental
results. The importance of the fifth goal--to develop technological
solutions to environmental problems--has been demonstrated in this
report's discussions of issues, such as groundwater contamination,
that may pose significant health risks but currently have few
satisfactory technological remedies. The final goal, calling for the
development of strong partnerships between DOE and its stakeholders,
is critical if DOE is to overcome its history of adversarial
relationships with regulators and the public and establish sufficient
credibility to set national priorities and negotiate mutually
acceptable agreements.
Table 4.1
DOE's Environmental Management Goals
Goal number Goal description
----------------------------- -----------------------------
1 Manage and eliminate the
urgent risks and threats in
the DOE system.
2 Provide a safe workplace that
is free from fatalities and
serious accidents and
continuously reduce injuries
and adverse health effects.
3 Change the system so that it
is under control managerially
and financially.
4 Be more outcome-oriented.
5 Focus technology development
on major environmental
management issues while
involving the best talent in
DOE and in the national
science and engineering
communities.
6 Develop strong partnerships
between DOE and its
stakeholders.
------------------------------------------------------------
Source: DOE.
DOE is conducting studies on a number of fronts to support its
national strategy. These studies should provide the Department with
information about the resources needed to meet its legal commitments,
the health and safety concerns associated with spent nuclear fuel,
and the occupational and environmental risks found at its sites. For
example, the Office of Environmental Management's Strategic Planning
and Analysis Office, established in the spring of 1994, is developing
a total program cost estimate, called the "Baseline Environmental
Management Report." This report, which is due to be completed in
March 1995, will systematically analyze the potential life-cycle
costs of meeting all of the Department's existing legal commitments,
as well as of addressing risks posed by other hazardous and
radioactive waste and materials within the DOE system.
In addition, DOE has worked with state and EPA regulators to develop
draft mixed waste site treatment plans identifying how individual
sites will treat mixed hazardous and low-level radioactive wastes.
DOE also promises a "national mixed waste treatment strategy" in
1995, which will be based on these site-specific plans. DOE created
the Spent Nuclear Fuel program in 1994 to integrate its existing
spent nuclear fuel activities and improve its oversight and control.
Finally, the Office of Integrated Risk Management is conducting a
"risk evaluation program" to study human health and environmental
risks, including risks to workers, that exist at and around
facilities. This evaluation program will provide a mechanism for
systematically assessing hazards to health and the environment.
DOE'S EFFORTS TO DATE HAVE
LIMITATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2
The program goals and analytical studies that form DOE's national
strategy should provide the Department with direction and information
for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of cleanups at
individual sites. The studies should also generate some of the data
needed to compare risks within sites and begin to establish
priorities among them. However, DOE has not yet taken steps to
compare risks across sites or to involve regulators and the public in
its efforts to set national cleanup priorities.
DOE's previous efforts to set cleanup priorities received much
criticism. In June 1986, DOE's Environment, Safety, and Health
organization initiated a 3-year, $60 million environmental survey to
identify and prioritize environmental problems in and around DOE's
operating facilities using the Multimedia Environmental Pollutant
Assessment System (MEPAS). This system uses models to show how
contaminants could be released into the environment, how they could
move through environmental media (e.g., soil, water, air) to humans,
and how they could pose risks to humans. The Natural Resources
Defense Council criticized MEPAS for failing to consider multiple
contaminants or to identify the "most exposed individual," and it
criticized DOE for failing to involve the public in the development
of MEPAS. In July 1989, DOE's Inspector General reported inadequate
documentation for the environmental findings and unsubstantiated
management decisions for about 15 percent of the survey's findings.
DOE introduced another priority-setting effort in EM's 1990 5-year
plan. This four-level system proposed to allocate funds to
environmental restoration and waste management activities in the
following order:
Activities necessary to prevent near-term adverse impacts to workers,
the public, or the environment.
Activities required to meet the terms of agreements between DOE and
local, state, and federal agencies.
Activities required for compliance with external regulations but not
included in priority 1 or priority 2.
Activities that are not required by regulation but would be
desirable.
The Office of Technology Assessment reported that although most of
DOE's activities fell into some portion of the first two categories,
there was "little or no guidance for ranking activities within those
major categories (or indeed any category)." According to a National
Research Council report, the four-priority system was recognized as
an interim approach to establishing priorities for future
environmental restoration activities.
Additionally, DOE began developing a risk-based priority-setting
system for its environmental restoration program budget in
consultation with interested parties. The purpose of this system was
to provide a "formal analytical decision-aiding tool addressing
health and safety risks as well as social, technical, economic, and
policy issues." A Technical Review Group asked by DOE for its
evaluation of the system concluded in a 1991 report that "it has
major limitations in what it can accomplish even with perfect input"
and while it "can play an important role in ordering priorities . .
. it is inappropriate for determining the budget for environmental
restoration." The Advisory Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety
further rejected the system, concluding that it "does not provide a
national ranking of cases at all DOE installations" and that the
"methodology relies extensively on expert opinion to substitute for
the lack of data and analysis." Following these criticisms, DOE
suspended all work on this system in 1992.
DOE is now conducting a "qualitative evaluation" of the risks and
public concerns arising from conditions covered by compliance
agreements. According to DOE officials responsible for this effort,
it uses existing sources of information on individual sites to
identify (1) public concerns, (2) existing risks, and (3) legal and
other commitments made with regulators. DOE expects to publish this
information in a June 1995 report to the Congress. And DOE expects
this report to provide another "baseline" of information about
existing risks. Ultimately, DOE expects to use these baselines to
develop a framework for environmental management decision-making that
it believes will enable it to balance competing cleanup requirements
with limited federal funds.
By presenting the results of its information-gathering efforts to
stakeholders at individual sites and seeking their participation in
assessing these results, DOE might be able to bolster its credibility
with stakeholders and lay the foundation for working relationships
that could ultimately advance its priority-setting agenda.
As DOE has found from past efforts, developing a cleanup strategy
based on national priorities is a complicated process. The Advisory
Committee on Nuclear Facility Safety recommended in November 1991
that the Department set priorities for cleanup on the basis of
land-use plans, designating which parts of DOE sites might eventually
be released for unrestricted use, which parts might be released for
restricted use, and which parts might never be released for any
purpose. The Committee added that "taxpayers cannot afford to return
all of DOE's contaminated land to pristine conditions." EPA suggested
that priority setting can be influenced by factors such as the
effects of wastes on the environment and human health, the
anticipated effect of remediation on economic development,
considerations of environmental justice, the impact of delaying
action on the environment, the importance of preserving historical
and cultural resources, and the attainment of geographic equity in
the distribution of resources for cleanups.
As DOE moves from theory to application--from developing a national
cleanup strategy to implementing that strategy at individual
facilities--it needs to retain its stakeholders' involvement.
Otherwise, stakeholders may view the strategy as an attempt to
circumvent existing agreements. Existing forums, designed to bring
DOE together with stakeholders, are available to facilitate the
implementation of a national strategy. For example, Site Specific
Advisory Boards have been established to bring DOE together with EPA,
states, and localities, and a Federal Environmental Restoration
Dialogue Committee already exists. According to regulators, these
groups have a historical understanding of DOE's missions and
environmental liabilities and could significantly assist the
Department in prioritizing and executing cleanups.
DOE MAY NEED HELP IN SETTING
NATIONAL PRIORITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3
If DOE is not able to develop strong partnerships with stakeholders
and persuade them both (1) to give higher priority to national than
to local, state, or regional priorities and (2) to overcome their
distrust of DOE, then DOE may need assistance in establishing a
national cleanup agenda. Several alternative approaches to managing
the cleanup have been suggested, including the following:
The Office of Management and Budget, in congressional testimony by
its deputy director, said that the federal government must develop a
comprehensive governmentwide strategy that is based on projected
future land use, risk assessment, and cost-benefit estimation. Such
a strategy would involve multiple agencies--such as the Department of
Defense and the Department of the Interior, as well as DOE--and would
set priorities for cleanup across agency lines.
Some environmentalists have said privately that EPA should not only
oversee but also directly manage cleanups at DOE installations and,
perhaps, at other federal sites.
Both the Office of Technology Assessment and the former chief of
DOE's cleanup program have argued that DOE, acting alone, cannot make
progress in cleaning up the weapons complex. Both urged the creation
of a separate entity to manage important aspects of the cleanup. The
Office recommended the establishment of a new organization to direct
and coordinate risk and health studies; the former official believed
a new government corporation with continuity of leadership and
direction could more effectively manage federal facility cleanups.
Creating a separate entity to manage DOE's and/or all of the federal
government's cleanups could have both advantages and disadvantages.
Such an entity might be able to target resources effectively across
all agencies and achieve certain efficiencies (e.g., in contracting
and technology development). In addition, such an entity could allow
more private-sector participation and could be designed to respond
more rapidly than a federal agency to changing market conditions.
Precedents for public-private partnerships have existed since the
18th century, when colonial legislatures first granted private
corporations special privileges to pursue objectives deemed to be in
the public interest. "Government corporations" have also been
created with both public and private financing. Recently, for
example, DOE and the U.S. Enrichment Corporation restructured the
federally owned uranium enrichment enterprise to allow more
private-sector participation. If organized and managed soundly,
these entities, whose operating responsibility is set by the Congress
and the administration, can be valuable tools of modern government.
The potential benefits of creating a separate entity to manage
federal facility cleanups need to be balanced against the possible
costs, including the following:
Organizing and funding a new agency would require start-up time and
be likely to invite opposition from those who are reluctant to create
a new bureaucracy, especially when the federal budget is running a
deficit.
Developing the legislation to authorize the establishment of a
government corporation would involve the Congress and the
administration in time-consuming discussions about the corporation's
accountability, budgeting, personnel, and relations with government
agencies.
Creating a new bureaucracy would lead inevitably to the loss of
momentum gained by the agencies that were formerly responsible for
the cleanups.
Removing the responsibility for cleanup from the federal agencies
that first created the environmental problems might diminish the
agencies' resolve to conduct aggressive ongoing waste management.
Many other issues would have to be considered before a separate
entity or alternative cleanup structure could be established. But
unless DOE is able to renegotiate its unrealistic agreements--with or
without a national strategy--then the Congress may have to consider
alternatives to the present cleanup structure.
In 1989, the House Committee on Energy and Commerce proposed that a
national commission be established to recommend to the President and
the Congress (1) a process for setting national priorities for
environmental remediation activities at DOE's nuclear facilities and
(2) sources and methods of funding those activities, among other
things. At that time, we testified that "information and
recommendations developed by the commission could help to clarify
issues and form the basis for a national consensus in developing a
comprehensive approach to cleaning up DOE's facilities."\16
--------------------
\16 Enormous Modernization and Cleanup Problems in the Nuclear
Weapons Complex (GAO/T-RCED-89-11, Feb. 23, 1989).
CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4
Cleaning up contamination at DOE's facilities will not be easy
because the risks to public health and the environment are large, the
solutions to some problems are as yet unknown, the relationships
between DOE and its stakeholders are often strained, and the gaps
between the costs of the cleanups and the funds available for them
are wide. The Congress has warned DOE that future funding levels may
not meet all of the Department's existing commitments and that
risk-based priorities should be established for cleanups.
To its credit, DOE has begun to collect the data needed to evaluate
and compare risks at each site and to identify milestones that may
require renegotiation. Using these data, DOE and its stakeholders
can begin to balance environmental risks with available cleanup
resources across sites. Although DOE's past efforts to reach
agreement with regulators and the public on nationwide priorities
have not succeeded, recent progress in forging working relationships
with stakeholders and accomplishing environmental goals at some sites
suggest some opportunity for success in the future.
If DOE cannot renegotiate unrealistic milestones and attain a higher
level of progress, alternatives to the present cleanup program may
have to be considered. Both the Office of Technology Assessment and
the former chief of DOE's cleanup program have argued that DOE alone
cannot make progress in cleaning up the weapons complex. GAO
previously testified that a separate commission could help DOE
develop a more comprehensive process for setting national priorities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Energy (1) set national
priorities for cleaning up its contaminated sites using data gathered
during the Department's ongoing risk evaluation as a starting point
and (2) initiate discussions with regulators to renegotiate
milestones that no longer reflect national priorities.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:6
In responding initially to a draft of this report, DOE said that it
believed its internal efforts represented an appropriate national
strategy for addressing environmental needs within the weapons
complex and that a number of "impediments" made GAO's approach
"unworkable." These included the significant changes to CERCLA that
would be necessary, the lack of reliable risk data on which to base a
national priority scheme, and the need to ensure that decisions are
broadly based, reflecting not only DOE's priorities but also those of
regulators and other stakeholders.
We believe that our recommendation to set national priorities remains
valid. Given expected budgetary shortfalls, DOE needs a process for
allocating limited funds among sites. Currently, DOE does not
compare the risks at one site with those at another. We believe that
DOE can allocate its cleanup budget effectively only if it has
current information for comparing risks across sites.
Following the administration's recent announcement of changes in
budgetary priorities, DOE advised us, in a second letter, that it
would be seeking to renegotiate milestones in existing agreements as
we recommended. DOE also acknowledged that it would need to develop
the kind of risk information "necessary to make tough tradeoffs among
many compelling environmental, safety, and health problems."
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY
============================================================ Chapter 4
See comment 1.
(See figure in printed edition.)
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 2.
See comment 3.
(See figure in printed edition.)
See comment 4.
See comment 5.
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Energy's (DOE)
letters dated December 28, 1994, and December 5, 1994. DOE's
December 5, 1994, letter also included an attachment with extensive,
detailed comments. Because of its volume, this attachment has not
been reproduced in this appendix; however, responses to DOE's
comments, including comments in the attachment, appear throughout the
report and, as relevant, at the end of individual chapters.
GAO'S COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:7
1. We disagree that a national strategy incorporating risk as one of
its criteria for decision-making is impractical. Although we
recognize that such a strategy requires difficult choices and
introduces controversy into a complicated decision-making process, it
is necessary, given expected shortfalls in the federal budget. As F.
Henry Habicht, former deputy administrator of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency said at a 1992 conference about risk-based national
environmental priorities, ". . . my experience at EPA persuades me
that comparative risk assessment--rough as it is--must be important
in shaping a future environmental policy that is principled and
cognizant of the realities of the fiscal world." Because the success
of risk-based priority-setting depends on the systematic collection
of meaningful data, it is important to build a process for
incorporating information about comparative risks and stakeholders'
concerns into decisions about how resources should be allocated among
sites.
2. In chapters 1 and 4, we included more recent information on the
range of DOE's activities, and in chapter 2 we expanded our
discussion of DOE's progress, citing the number of interim actions
DOE has completed.
3. We appreciate the complexity of the Environmental Management
program and have included more discussion of its parts in our report.
In addition, we include in our discussion of "cleanup" activities
that extend beyond the environmental restoration component of EM's
responsibilities.
4. We describe the Office of Environmental Management's existing
"national strategy" in chapter 4 of the report. We acknowledge that
the program goals and analytical studies that make up DOE's national
strategy may provide the Department with direction and information
for improving the efficiency and effectiveness of its cleanup program
on a site-by-site basis. However, in our view, DOE's current
approach does not constitute a sound basis for setting priorities
across sites. As DOE begins to renegotiate its compliance agreements
to meet current budget realities, it will need a strategy that allows
it to allocate resources across all sites, not just within particular
sites.
5.The report now contains supplemental information provided by DOE.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C.
Bernice Steinhardt, Associate Director
Gary R. Boss, Assistant Director
Diane B. Raynes, Evaluator-in-Charge
Ruth-Ann Hijazi, Senior Evaluator
William Lanouette, Senior Evaluator
Mary K. Colgrove-Stone, Evaluator
Gregory D. Mills, Evaluator
Karen D. Wright, Evaluator
Duane Fitzgerald, Nuclear Engineer
Fran Featherston, Senior Social Science Analyst
Elizabeth R. Eisenstadt, Communications Analyst