Aviation Safety: FAA and the State Department Can Better Manage Foreign
Enforcement Cases (Letter Report, 03/17/94, GAO/RCED-94-87).
In November 1992, a foreign-operated aircraft departing from Miami
International Airport experienced engine failure, ditched into the
Atlantic Ocean, and sank. The aircraft was overweight on takeoff, could
not climb to the proper altitude, and narrowly missed high-rises in a
heavily populated area before it crashed. The operator had no liability
insurance on the aircraft and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
discovered that the plane did not meet international safety standards.
FAA has not effectively managed its enforcement workload, and as a
result, foreign governments and FAA have not acted on all safety
violations that they have referred to one another. This inability to
act was mainly due to the length of time FAA took to process cases,
which FAA attributed to staffing shortages and other priority work.
Furthermore, FAA did not follow up on foreign referrals and,
consequently, could not say which governments were not acting or why.
Delays in processing violations and following up have resulted in cases
being closed without being investigated. FAA found deficiencies that
weakened foreign countries' enforcement capabilities. Overall, 16 of
the 26 countries that FAA assessed between August 1991 and September
1993 did not meet international safety standards. Deficiencies included
a lack of inspectors to look into violations, no technical expertise to
carry out inspection programs, and no regulations for taking enforcement
actions or assessing penalties. The Transportation Department assessed
26 penalties totaling about $1.25 million against foreign carriers
between 1989 and 1992. Only two of the carriers failed to pay up, and
the Department revoked both carriers' operating authority.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-94-87
TITLE: Aviation Safety: FAA and the State Department Can Better
Manage Foreign Enforcement Cases
DATE: 03/17/94
SUBJECT: Commercial aviation
Air transportation operations
Foreign governments
Safety regulation
Safety standards
Airline industry
Regulatory agencies
Fines (penalties)
Crimes or offenses
International cooperation
IDENTIFIER: FAA Compliance and Enforcement Program
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight,
Committee on Public Works and Transportation, House of
Representatives
March 1994
AVIATION SAFETY - FAA AND THE
STATE DEPARTMENT CAN BETTER MANAGE
FOREIGN ENFORCEMENT CASES
GAO/RCED-94-87
Foreign Enforcement Cases
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOT - Department of Transportation
FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
GAO - General Accounting Office
ICAO - International Civil Aviation Organization
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-250303
March 17, 1994
The Honorable Robert A. Borski
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Investigations and Oversight
Committee on Public Works
and Transportation
House of Representatives
Dear Mr. Chairman:
In November 1992, a foreign-operated aircraft departing from Miami
International Airport experienced engine failure, ditched into the
Atlantic Ocean, and sank. The aircraft was overweight on takeoff,
could not climb to the proper altitude, and narrowly missed high-rise
buildings in a heavily populated area before it crashed, jeopardizing
the lives of U.S. residents. The Department of Transportation (DOT)
determined that the operator had no liability insurance on the
aircraft, and DOT took enforcement action by assessing a $6,000
penalty. Also, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) inspected
the carrier and found that it did not meet established international
safety standards.
Both the accident and our November 1992 report about foreign
governments' oversight of foreign carriers that fly into the United
States raised your concern about compliance with safety
regulations.\1 Consequently, you asked us to determine whether (1)
foreign governments acted on enforcement cases that FAA referred to
them and, conversely, FAA acted on enforcement cases that foreign
governments referred to it; (2) FAA had identified enforcement system
weaknesses in its assessments of foreign countries' compliance with
international safety standards; and (3) DOT acted against foreign air
carriers that violated departmental aviation regulations.
--------------------
\1 Aviation Safety: Increased Oversight of Foreign Carriers Needed
(GAO/RCED-93-42, Nov. 20, 1992).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
FAA has not effectively managed its enforcement work load, and as a
result, foreign governments and FAA have not acted on all referred
safety violations. Of the 146 enforcement cases we reviewed that FAA
referred to foreign governments and closed between fiscal years 1990
and 1992, 48 cases were not acted on, primarily because the referral
occurred after statutory time limits or too close to them to
investigate. Likewise, FAA did not act on 22 of 58 cases we reviewed
that foreign governments referred to it, mainly because FAA took too
long in sending the cases to its field offices for investigation.
FAA has taken steps to prevent the recurrence of untimely case
processing, including eliminating the backlog of enforcement cases
and increasing attorney staffing.
When conducting foreign country assessments between August 1991
(program implementation) and September 1993, FAA found deficiencies
that weakened foreign countries' enforcement capabilities. Overall,
16 of the 26 countries that FAA assessed did not meet international
safety standards. FAA found such deficiencies as no inspectors to
identify and investigate violations, no technical expertise to carry
out inspection programs, and no regulations for taking enforcement
actions or assessing civil (financial) penalties.
DOT assessed 28 civil penalties totaling about $1.25 million against
foreign carriers between 1989 and 1992. Violators in 26 of these
actions have paid their fines. Two carriers failed to pay the civil
penalties assessed and committed additional violations. DOT
officials revoked both carriers' operating authority, one effective
November 30, 1993, and the other effective February 4, 1994.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
To create a framework for international cooperation in developing
civil aviation, representatives of the United States and 51
additional countries signed the 1944 Convention on International
Civil Aviation, commonly called the "Chicago Convention," and created
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). As of April
1993, ICAO had 178 member countries. In accordance with the
Convention, member countries control their airspace and agree to (1)
comply with international safety standards and (2) ensure that their
aircraft honor other countries' regulations. As a result, U.S.
aircraft must comply with foreign countries' regulations when in
foreign airspace, and foreign aircraft must comply with U.S.
regulations when in U.S. airspace.
Both DOT and FAA regulate carrier operations in U.S. airspace. DOT
regulates consumer and economic aspects of aviation. When DOT finds
a regulatory violation, it takes action to ensure compliance,
regardless of the carrier's home country. Usually the action is
finalized in a consent order agreed to by the carrier concerned.\2
FAA regulates both carrier and crew safety issues and can initiate
enforcement actions against violators of U.S. regulations. When FAA
finds violations, it can take enforcement actions that include
warning letters, civil penalties, suspensions, and revocations, which
generally involve a coordinated effort primarily between FAA's Flight
Standards Service and the Office of Chief Counsel. Among their
responsibilities, Flight Standards inspectors investigate regulatory
violations and forward cases requiring legal enforcement action
(e.g., civil penalties and license revocations) to their regional
counsels, who review the sufficiency of evidence and the
appropriateness of the action recommended.
Regional counsels generally forward certain cases, such as those
involving violations by foreign persons and companies, to the
headquarters Office of Chief Counsel, Enforcement Division's Special
Programs Branch. The Special Programs (formerly known as Enforcement
Litigation) Branch generally refers the foreign cases to foreign
governments, through the Department of State, for action.
When U.S. carriers or crews violate foreign regulations, foreign
governments generally refer the cases, through the Department of
State and its embassies, to FAA's Special Programs Branch. The
Branch forwards the cases to the headquarters Field Programs
Division, which sends them to FAA regional offices. The regions then
send the cases to field inspectors for investigation. However, some
foreign governments and U.S. embassies, when they know which FAA
field office will investigate the violations, bypass FAA's Special
Programs Branch and the Department of State and send enforcement
cases directly to the field office.
--------------------
\2 According to DOT officials, the consent order usually involves a
provision precluding repetition of the same violation and almost
always includes a civil penalty.
IMPEDIMENTS AFFECTING FAA'S AND
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS'
ENFORCEMENT SYSTEMS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Concerns with international agreements, the complexities involved in
interpreting and applying international law, and the sovereign rights
of nations present unique sensitivities to FAA when taking
enforcement actions against foreign carriers. Nevertheless, FAA did
not follow up on enforcement cases that it referred to foreign
governments and those that it received from foreign governments. FAA
took so long to process some enforcement cases that the referrals
occurred after statutory time frames or too close to them for the
foreign authorities to investigate. Similarly, FAA either did not
track or did not timely process some foreign authorities' referrals
to FAA.
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FACED
IMPEDIMENTS IN ADDRESSING
FAA-REFERRED VIOLATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
Between fiscal years 1990 and 1992, FAA closed 320 enforcement cases
against foreign carriers, commercial and private pilots, mechanics,
and passengers. FAA revoked or suspended licenses or assessed civil
penalties in 97 of these cases because the violators had direct U.S.
ties. For example, individuals had a U.S. pilot's license or
residency, and carriers had an agent or representative in the United
States. For the remaining 223 cases, direct ties with the United
States did not exist, and FAA referred the violations to the
appropriate foreign governments for action. Most violations related
to air traffic control deviations; others included insufficient fuel,
unqualified pilots, and such communication problems as an inability
to speak or comprehend English. At least 43 percent of the 223 cases
involved emergency landings, loss of the standard separation with
other aircraft, near air or ground collisions, or accidents. The
aircraft included large transport-category jets, such as Boeing 747s;
smaller general aviation aircraft; and foreign military aircraft.
We examined 146 of 223 enforcement cases FAA referred to foreign
governments, omitting 77 cases because they were not current or
generally dealt with passenger security violations. FAA referred the
146 cases to 23 countries. Table 1 shows the enforcement disposition
of the cases we examined.
Table 1
Enforcement Disposition for Cases That
FAA Referred to Foreign Countries
Number
of
Case disposition cases
---------------------------------------------------- ------
Action taken 63
No action taken 48
Unable to determine 35
============================================================
Total 146
------------------------------------------------------------
Foreign governments took such actions as imposing fines, suspending
licenses, and sending warning letters for 63 of the 146 (43 percent)
enforcement referral cases but could not act on 48 (33 percent)
referrals. FAA, Department of State, U.S. embassy, and foreign
government officials could not tell us the disposition of the
remaining 35 (24 percent) cases that FAA referred largely because of
their inability to locate or provide documents. Reasons that foreign
governments did not act on FAA referrals are shown in table 2.
Table 2
Reasons Foreign Governments Did Not Act
on FAA Referrals
Number
of
Reason cases
---------------------------------------------------- ------
Statute of limitations precluded action 35
Lacked authority to prosecute 6
Policy limitations precluded action 2
Political or diplomatic sensitivity 2
No violation found 3
============================================================
Total 48
------------------------------------------------------------
Statutes of limitations precluded action against violators in 73
percent of the 48 cases. For example, one country's law prohibits
the government from initiating enforcement actions when more than 1
year has elapsed since the date of the violation. Country officials
informed FAA of this limit in 1988. Nonetheless, FAA referred 34 of
72 enforcement cases to this country after the statutory time limit
or too close to it to investigate. FAA referred 12 cases more than 2
years after the violation occurred. We also found that FAA
enforcement officials were not aware of five other countries'
statutes of limitations.
Four foreign governments lacked authority to prosecute six referred
cases. Most of these cases involved careless or reckless actions by
commercial pilots, resulting in aircraft flying too close to each
other. Four cases involved foreign countries' registered aircraft
flying in the United States. For example, one country's officials
said that its laws do not authorize the government to prosecute
violations of another country's air traffic control regulations. FAA
enforcement officials told us that they were not aware that foreign
governments lacked legal authority to prosecute cases involving their
registered aircraft. These officials pointed out that each ICAO
member country agrees to take enforcement action against regulatory
violations committed with its registered aircraft and should have the
supporting legal authority to carry out that responsibility. For the
remaining two cases, foreign government officials said that they did
not have the authority to prosecute because the aircraft were not
registered in their countries. On the basis of our review of these
two case files, we found that the aircraft were not registered in
these countries and FAA had erroneously referred the violations to
these two countries.
State Department and foreign government officials cited additional
impediments to foreign government action on the remaining seven
cases. Two governments did not act because they have a policy
against prosecuting copilots. (FAA sometimes refers separate cases
against the pilot and copilot for a single incident.) In addition,
State Department officials handled a few cases through diplomatic
rather than enforcement channels because of their sensitivity.
Finally, foreign governments dropped three cases because of such
mitigating circumstances as severe air turbulence.
INADEQUATE FAA AND STATE
DEPARTMENT CONTROLS OVER
ENFORCEMENT CASES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
Neither FAA nor the State Department had established controls for
tracking referrals. FAA's Special Programs Branch does not ensure
that it receives responses from foreign governments indicating the
action taken to correct safety problems. In referring cases to
foreign governments, the Branch asks that it be notified of actions
taken to resolve safety problems. However, the Branch believes that
its responsibility ends with the referral and closes the case file.
As a result, FAA did not follow up on referred cases and could not
tell us the disposition of 183 of 223 cases referred to foreign
governments. We did find in FAA's files 40 responses from foreign
governments indicating action taken or explaining why action was not
taken. We also found an additional eight responses in State
Department files that were not in FAA's files. Furthermore, a
foreign country official provided 15 responses that were addressed to
FAA but were not in FAA's case files. FAA officials could not
explain why these 23 responses were not in the agency's case files.
FAA forwards enforcement cases to foreign governments through the
Department of State, except for one country. State Department
officials told us that they viewed their role as a conduit of
information between FAA and foreign governments. In sending
enforcement cases, the State Department instructs its embassies to
(1) inform the appropriate government authorities about the safety
problems, (2) ask the foreign government to advise the U.S. embassy
in that country of actions taken to prevent similar incidents in the
future, and (3) report any response to the Department.
We found that the State Department headquarters could not provide
evidence that it sent its embassies 29 of the 154 enforcement cases
FAA sent to the Department. State Department officials could not
explain why they could not locate the records. We also contacted 18
embassies that were sent referrals to determine whether they, in
turn, sent the referrals to foreign authorities. When we inquired
about 53 cases, embassy officials told us that they referred 23 cases
but did not know or were unsure whether they referred 26 cases. We
did not receive embassy responses on four cases. Until we inquired
about its procedures, the State Department did not request that its
embassies follow up with foreign governments about identified
aviation safety problems. In April 1993, a State Department official
told us that the Department revised its procedures to require its
embassies to follow up on FAA referrals if the foreign governments do
not respond to the embassies within 90 days.
FAA DID NOT ADDRESS CERTAIN
VIOLATIONS IDENTIFIED BY
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
We reviewed 58 enforcement cases against U.S. carriers and pilots
that foreign governments referred to FAA--55 from one country and 3
from two additional countries. These violations occurred between
1988 and 1992 and included deviations from assigned routes, excessive
aircraft weight on departure, aircraft with less than the required
amount of fuel on landing, and a departure from the wrong runway
while a car drove across it.
FAA officials told us that they could not provide information on the
disposition of 16 cases (28 percent) because of the agency's
inability to locate investigation records. FAA acted on 20 of the 58
cases (34 percent), issuing 13 warning letters, assessing 5 civil
penalties, and revoking or suspending 2 airman certificates. FAA did
not act on 22 cases (38 percent). Table 3 shows the reasons FAA did
not act on foreign referrals.
Table 3
Reasons FAA Did Not Act on Foreign
Referrals
Number
of
Reason cases
---------------------------------------------------- ------
Too much time elapsed since violation date 11
No violation found 7
Lacked legal authority to prosecute 2
FAA unable to provide explanation 2
============================================================
Total 22
------------------------------------------------------------
FAA field inspectors either did not investigate or terminated their
investigations of 11 cases because too much time had elapsed since
the violation occurred. On average, the foreign government sent the
cases to FAA within 72 days of the violation. However, the Special
Programs Branch took an average of 444 days to acknowledge receipt of
the 11 referrals and to send them to the Field Programs Division.\3
In some instances, Field Programs Division officials returned cases
to the Branch because the violation reports were "simply too old for
effective enforcement action." Division officials said that
processing delays tend to strengthen the violator's case and
deemphasize the seriousness of the violation. The Branch
acknowledged its delay in processing cases and attributed the problem
to such other agency priorities as litigating cases, formulating
enforcement policy, coordinating enforcement actions with the
regions, and staff shortages. However, in August 1992, FAA decided
to close cases in its backlog involving violations prior to August 2,
1990, that were no longer legally prosecutable or had no deterrent
value. Some foreign cases were included in this action.
Subsequently, the Branch Manager said that Branch priorities were
rearranged and attorney staffing increased, thereby allowing Branch
attorneys to address the backlog of foreign referral cases.
FAA could not conclude that a violation occurred in seven cases
because of a lack of supporting evidence or because of insufficient
or conflicting data. FAA also did not act in two cases involving
U.S. pilots because the aircraft were not U.S.-registered and
because FAA lacked the legal authority to prosecute. In the first
case, according to FAA officials, the country of aircraft registry
was responsible for enforcement, and the referring country
misdirected the case to FAA. FAA officials were less certain about
the second referral because although the pilot had a U.S. license,
the aircraft did not have a valid registration from any country. FAA
could not act against the U.S. pilot's violation in international
airspace because the aircraft was not U.S.-registered. Apparently no
country could act because no country could be cited as the country of
registry. Finally, FAA officials could not explain the reason why no
action was taken in two cases because they could not locate the case
files.
FAA's guidance for the Compliance and Enforcement Program directs
both the Office of Chief Counsel and the responsible regional office
to inform foreign aviation authorities about the disposition of
referred enforcement cases. Also, in referring cases to FAA, foreign
authorities frequently asked to be advised of the case disposition,
and FAA, in acknowledging receipt of cases, frequently said that it
would advise the foreign authority of the enforcement actions taken.
Although FAA and one country's enforcement officials established a
direct referral process to more effectively deal with each other,
little, if any, interaction about cases occurs after the referrals.
FAA notified that country's officials about the disposition of only 2
of the 55 cases referred. FAA took no action on either case because
both were too old to investigate.
FAA headquarters officials could not explain why regional offices did
not inform the foreign authorities about case disposition. Chief
Counsel officials said that they did not notify foreign governments
of case disposition because the regional offices did not inform them
of investigation results. An official from one country told us that
the country's regional offices recently started using their working
relationships with FAA's field offices to facilitate enforcement case
processing, including direct field-to-field referrals and more
frequent communication about case development and disposition.
--------------------
\3 Branch officials told us that they send acknowledgement letters to
foreign governments at the same time they forward cases to the Field
Programs Division. Because some transmittal letters to the Division
were not in the Branch's case files, we calculated the average days
using the dates of the foreign government's referral letter to FAA
and FAA's acknowledgement letter.
FAA FINDS ENFORCEMENT
DEFICIENCIES WHEN CONDUCTING
FOREIGN COUNTRY ASSESSMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
As we reported in November 1992, FAA implemented a program in August
1991 to assess whether foreign countries meet international safety
standards and found that 9 of the 15 countries assessed did not.\4
During its country assessments, FAA generally inquires about the
civil aviation authority's organizational structure; number and types
of inspectors; extent of regulations, handbooks, and guidance; pilot
and aircraft licensing; and adequacy of carrier training and
maintenance programs. FAA also asks whether the country's aviation
regulations provide for enforcement actions against violators of
those regulations and comments on general oversight and
organizational weaknesses that hamper the country's enforcement
capability. In some cases, FAA also reports on specific enforcement
deficiencies.
As of September 1993, FAA had assessed 26 countries and found that 10
met international standards and 16 did not. FAA found such
deficiencies as no operations or airworthiness inspectors to
investigate violations, no surveillance program to identify safety
problems, and no technical expertise to carry out a certification and
surveillance program. These deficiencies weakened the countries'
enforcement capabilities. The specific enforcement deficiencies FAA
identified follow:
Civil aviation regulations do not provide for enforcement actions
or penalties (two countries).
The government had limited enforcement expertise since it had no
operations inspectors until just prior to FAA's assessment, or
FAA could not verify that the civil aviation authority had an
enforcement program, thereby causing FAA to question whether
violations were investigated and enforcement action was taken
(two countries).
Enforcement cases were frequently dismissed because responsible
officials were not knowledgeable about aviation regulations and
their potential safety consequences (one country).
FAA was not provided evidence to verify that inspectors identified
violations during routine domestic surveillance (one country).
As previously discussed in our November 1992 report, FAA officials
are helping countries to compensate for the lack of home government
oversight through such means as providing technical assistance to
civil aviation authorities to address the deficiencies found.
--------------------
\4 Aviation Safety: Increased Oversight of Foreign Carriers Needed
(GAO/RCED-93-42, Nov. 20, 1992).
DOT DECIDES TO REVOKE TWO
FOREIGN CARRIERS' OPERATING
AUTHORITY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Carriers that operate without route approval, do not file required
flight data reports, or do not comply with consumer protection
measures violate DOT regulations. Moreover, a foreign carrier's
authority to fly into the United States is specifically conditioned
on compliance with applicable U.S. regulations. Between 1989 and
1992, DOT assessed 28 civil penalties against foreign carriers
totaling $1.25 million. DOT assessed 14 penalties for unauthorized
flights into the United States, 12 for failing to report or
delinquent reporting of required flight information, and 2 for such
consumer issues as false advertising. Violators in 26 of these
enforcement actions have paid their fines.
Two violators are seriously delinquent in paying their assessed
penalties. DOT's consent order in January 1991 with one carrier for
reporting violations included a $16,000 civil penalty. By April
1991, the carrier was delinquent on its payment schedule and had
additional reporting violations. As of September 1993, this carrier
had not flown into the United States since February 1993 but
continued to file required monthly reports as if it planned to resume
U.S. operations. In the second instance, DOT issued a consent order
in April 1992 for 71 unauthorized operations; in which the carrier
agreed to a $125,000 civil penalty. By May 1992, the carrier had
failed to meet the payment terms. By December 1992, the carrier had
only made partial payment and had committed additional reporting
violations. The carrier flew into the United States in September
1993.
DOT used the methods prescribed in the Federal Debt Collection Act to
collect payments from the two delinquent carriers, including using a
collection agency and referring the cases to the Department of
Justice. However, DOT's efforts were unsuccessful. DOT warned both
carriers that if they did not pay by February 26, 1993, DOT would
revoke their authority to operate into the United States. The U.S.
embassies, at DOT's request, informed the first carrier's government
in January 1992 and again in February 1993 and the second carrier's
government in February 1993 that DOT would revoke the carriers' U.S.
authority if they did not pay their outstanding balances. DOT
officials told us that they proceeded cautiously in initiating
revocation actions because of ongoing bilateral negotiations with one
country and tax obligations owed to the United States by the other
country's carrier. Furthermore, revoking a carrier's authority for
civil penalty delinquency would set a precedent, and DOT wanted to be
certain it could withstand any challenges to the revocation. DOT
revoked both carriers' operating authority, one effective November
30, 1993, and the other effective February 4, 1994.
CONCLUSIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
Although foreign enforcement of aviation safety regulations is a
sensitive issue, deficiencies in the enforcement referral process
demonstrate that FAA and foreign governments cannot and do not always
address referred safety problems. Although governments acted on some
FAA-referred enforcement cases, they did not act on others. In
extreme cases, some governments did not have the personnel,
regulations, or procedures to implement an enforcement program.
Foreign governments' and FAA's inability to act can mainly be
attributed to the length of time FAA took to process cases, which FAA
attributed to staffing shortages and other priority work.
Furthermore, FAA did not follow up on foreign referrals and,
consequently, could not identify which governments were not acting or
why. Delays in processing violations and following up have resulted
in cases being closed without being investigated, giving the
impression that FAA is not serious about enforcement.
Instead of enhancing the enforcement referral process, the State
Department viewed its responsibilities as being a conduit and served
a limited role in ensuring that safety problems were addressed. The
State Department--headquarters and embassies--could not demonstrate
that it delivered all FAA-referred violations to responsible foreign
officials. Furthermore, the Department rarely followed up. As a
result, some governments may not have been able to address the safety
problems.
Foreign governments and FAA are not working closely to ensure that
violations are addressed. One reason some foreign governments gave
for not acting was that they lacked the legal authority to prosecute
certain cases, even though the aircraft involved were registered in
their countries. That reason, however, contradicts the Chicago
Convention, in which the signatories agreed to take enforcement
responsibility for their registered aircraft. FAA itself has an
obligation to investigate and enforce foreign violations by U.S.-
registered aircraft and did not always do so because of case
processing delays.
Although foreign carriers' operating authority is specifically
conditioned upon compliance with U.S. regulations, DOT acted
cautiously in initiating revocation action against two carriers
delinquent in their payment obligations in part because of its
concerns in setting a precedent. Now that DOT has established the
precedent, it should be better prepared to handle similar cases in
the future.
RECOMMENDATIONS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
We recommend that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Administrator, FAA, to (1) determine the final disposition of
enforcement cases referred to foreign governments, (2) inform foreign
governments of the disposition of enforcement cases that they refer
to FAA, and (3) raise to ICAO's attention the legal or policy
impediments that affect FAA's and foreign countries' enforcement
capabilities.
In addition, we recommend that the Secretary of Transportation and
the Secretary of State work together to reach agreement on the best
way to facilitate FAA's efforts to address regulatory violations,
including (1) developing direct contacts between FAA and foreign
aviation authorities, where appropriate and when countries are
willing to do so; (2) ensuring that foreign governments are apprised
of violations in sufficient time to act within the appropriate
statute-of-limitation period; and (3) following up to determine
whether foreign governments addressed safety violations and ensuring
that responses are communicated to FAA.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR
EVALUATION
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
As requested, we did not obtain written agency comments on a draft of
this report. We did, however, discuss the findings and
recommendations with DOT's Assistant General Counsel for Aviation
Enforcement and Proceedings; DOT's Chief, Foreign Carrier Licensing
Division, Office of International Aviation; FAA's Deputy Director,
Flight Standards; FAA's Manager, Special Programs Branch, Office of
the Chief Counsel; and other DOT and FAA officials. We also
discussed the findings and recommendations with the State
Department's Director and Deputy Director, Office of Aviation
Programs and Policy; and other State Department officials.
DOT officials generally agreed with the facts contained in the
report. However, a Foreign Carrier Licensing Division official
provided an update regarding DOT's effort to revoke the authority of
a foreign carrier delinquent in its payment obligations, which we
incorporated in the report.
FAA's Special Programs Branch Manager told us that in 1991, the
Branch began to process foreign case referrals within 30 to 60 days
of receipt, thereby correcting the problem of untimely referrals.
Furthermore, the Branch Manager said that Branch priorities were
rearranged and attorney staffing increased, thereby allowing Branch
attorneys to address the backlog of foreign referral cases. Data
that FAA provided during our review to illustrate case processing
timeliness showed that of 24 enforcement cases that foreign
governments referred to FAA beginning in 1991 through August 1992,
14, or about 60 percent, were not referred to the field for
investigation within 2 months of the referral. However, the Branch
did meet its specified processing time frame for the five cases
referred between September 1992 and September 1993. As long as the
Branch continues to process foreign case referrals within 30 to 60
days of receipt, case processing timeliness should improve. This, in
turn, should enhance the prospects of FAA field inspectors' or
foreign governments' receiving the referrals in sufficient time to
act.
The Special Programs Branch Manager was concerned with the statement
in the report that FAA was unaware that certain countries lacked the
requisite authority to prosecute their airmen for committing
violations over or within U.S. airspace. According to the Branch
Manager, we implied that lacking such knowledge negatively impacts
FAA's enforcement responsibilities. This FAA official added that a
lack of authority is uniquely a problem of the foreign governments.
We explained that during our review, we found that FAA did not
routinely follow up to determine case disposition and, consequently,
was not aware that certain countries did not act or why they did not
act. We believe that part of FAA's enforcement responsibility
includes determining the disposition of enforcement cases referred to
foreign countries, which is necessary to ensure that FAA-cited
regulatory violations are addressed. We also believe that FAA has an
obligation to clarify with an ICAO member its position and rationale
for asserting a lack of authority to take enforcement action on
referred cases, especially since member countries are obligated to
act. If FAA finds that a member country does not comply with ICAO,
then FAA should notify ICAO.
The Special Programs Branch Manager also said that the Branch must
rely on the State Department to determine enforcement case
disposition. The Branch initially asks that it be notified of the
actions taken to resolve the safety problems that are the subject of
a referral. The Branch Manager said that FAA did not believe that it
should prod the State Department to handle referrals to foreign
governments more expeditiously. The official said that FAA would
welcome the opportunity to meet with State Department officials to
formulate a plan of action that ensures that FAA is timely informed
of case disposition. We believe that FAA should follow up with the
State Department to ensure that referrals to foreign governments are
handled expeditiously. At the completion of our review, a State
Department official told us that enforcement case tracking would have
been better had FAA shown more interest in following through on
referred cases.
State Department officials said that they found the report to be
accurate and agreed with the recommendation made to the Department.
Both State Department and FAA officials made technical suggestions
for clarifying the report, and we have incorporated them where
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :8.1
We conducted our review between December 1992 and February 1994 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
Our objectives, scope, and methodology are discussed in appendix I.
Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 30 days after the date of this
letter. At that time, we will send copies to the Secretaries of
Transportation and State; the Administrator, FAA; and the Director,
Office of Management and Budget. We will also make copies available
to others upon request.
This work was performed under the direction of Kenneth M. Mead,
Director, Transportation Issues, who can be reached at (202)
512-2834. Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix
II.
Sincerely yours,
Keith O. Fultz
Assistant Comptroller General
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
=========================================================== Appendix I
The Chairman, Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, House
Committee on Public Works and Transportation, asked us to determine
whether (1) foreign governments acted on enforcement cases that the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) referred to them and,
conversely, whether FAA acted on enforcement cases that foreign
governments referred to it; (2) FAA's assessments of foreign
countries' compliance with international safety standards identified
enforcement system weaknesses; and (3) the Department of
Transportation (DOT) acted against foreign air carriers that violated
departmental aviation regulations. Due to the sensitivities involved
with FAA's foreign country assessment program, we agreed with the
Subcommittee not to name countries or air carriers in our report.
We reviewed U.S. and international aviation laws and DOT and FAA
regulations, policies, and procedures governing foreign air carriers
and crews, particularly those related to enforcement, and discussed
them with DOT and FAA headquarters officials. In addition, we
discussed our work with DOT Office of Inspector General officials and
reviewed its reports on FAA's enforcement program. We also
interviewed DOT, FAA, and Department of State officials in
Washington, D.C.; FAA Eastern Region officials in New York, N.Y.;
U.S. embassy officials in Ottawa, Canada, and Mexico City, Mexico;
Transport Canada headquarters officials in Ottawa, Canada; and
officials in the Mexican Civil Aviation Authority, Mexico City, to
understand their roles and responsibilities and the enforcement
process. We visited Canada and Mexico because these countries had
the largest number of enforcement cases and FAA's Eastern Region
because it handles all referrals from the eastern half of Canada.
We identified 320 enforcement cases against foreign carriers,
commercial and private pilots, mechanics, and passengers that FAA
closed between fiscal years 1990 and 1992. Of these cases, FAA acted
directly on 97 and referred 223 to foreign governments for action.
FAA sent 154 cases through the Department of State and the remaining
69 directly to Canadian aviation officials. We focused on the 223
referred closed cases to determine the actions foreign government
officials took to remedy the safety problems. We found 48 foreign
government responses to the 223 referrals--40 in FAA's Special
Programs Branch files and 8 in State Department files (that were not
in FAA's files)--that indicated the action taken or explaining why
action was not taken. We asked State Department officials to assist
us in determining whether foreign governments acted on the remaining
175 cases. State Department officials agreed to assist us but asked
that we limit the number of cases to minimize the burden on embassy
personnel and foreign government officials. We agreed and omitted 77
cases because they were not current or generally dealt with passenger
security violations. Of the remaining 98, we discussed 45
enforcement cases with Canadian officials and 19 cases with Mexican
and U.S. embassy officials and sent questionnaires on 34 other cases
to U.S. embassies in 17 other countries. Department of State
officials assisted us in developing and processing the
questionnaires. Overall, we analyzed these 98 cases, plus the 48
cases that had a response in the files, for a total of 146
enforcement cases that FAA referred to foreign governments.
Furthermore, we identified and reviewed 58 enforcement cases referred
to FAA from foreign countries to determine whether FAA acted on
violations that U.S. carriers and pilots committed outside the
United States. We identified these cases primarily using FAA's
Special Programs Branch records of cases closed between fiscal years
1990 and 1992 and FAA acknowledgement letters to foreign governments.
In addition, we reviewed FAA headquarters Field Programs Division's
log of foreign referrals to identify additional cases.
We examined trip reports and related documents to determine whether
FAA's foreign country assessments identified enforcement system
weaknesses. We discussed country assessments with FAA headquarters
and New York field office officials to better understand their
findings and conclusions. Also, we interviewed DOT Foreign Carrier
Licensing Division officials and obtained pertinent documents to
determine how the country assessments impact foreign carrier
licensing issues.
To determine whether DOT acted against foreign air carriers that
violated DOT regulations, we interviewed DOT Aviation Enforcement and
Proceedings officials and reviewed consent orders DOT issued against
foreign carriers from 1989 through 1992. At our request, DOT's
Accounting Services Division officials identified foreign carriers
delinquent in paying assessed penalties. We then reviewed pertinent
documents to determine the process DOT followed to collect delinquent
debts. Finally, we discussed with officials of DOT's Offices of
International Aviation and Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings the
actions that DOT can take against foreign carriers that do not pay
assessed penalties.
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================== Appendix II
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY, AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:1
Allen Li, Associate Director
Mary Ann Kruslicky, Assistant Director
Roy K. Judy, Assignment Manager
PHILADELPHIA REGIONAL OFFICE
-------------------------------------------------------- Appendix II:2
Joseph A. Kredatus, Evaluator-in-Charge
Rosalyn G. Millman, Evaluator
H. Cheryl Rusten, Evaluator