Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to Catastrophic
Disasters (Letter Report, 07/23/93, GAO/RCED-93-186).
The nation's management of disasters was strongly criticized after
Hurricane Andrew leveled much of South Florida and Hurricane Iniki
devastated the Hawaiian island of Kauai in 1992. Even before these
storms, the federal government's response to major disasters like
Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake drew intense criticism.
The government's response to Hurricane Andrew, in particular, raised
doubts about whether the Federal Emergency Management Agency was capable
of responding to such catastrophes and whether it had learned any
lessons from Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake. GAO has
testified repeatedly in 1993 on the inadequacy of the federal strategy
for responding to disasters. This report summarizes GAO's analyses,
conclusions, and recommendations.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: RCED-93-186
TITLE: Disaster Management: Improving the Nation's Response to
Catastrophic Disasters
DATE: 07/23/93
SUBJECT: Disaster relief aid
Federal/state relations
Relief agencies
Emergency preparedness
Volunteer services
Planning
Storms
Interagency relations
State/local relations
IDENTIFIER: Hurricane Andrew
FEMA Federal Response Plan
Florida
Louisiana
Hawaii
Hurricane Iniki
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
July 1993
DISASTER MANAGEMENT - IMPROVING
THE NATION'S RESPONSE TO
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS
GAO/RCED-93-186
Disaster Management
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
DOD - Department of Defense
EMI - Emergency Management Institute
FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-253822
July 23, 1993
Congressional Requesters
The nation's management of catastrophic disasters was intensely
criticized after Hurricane Andrew leveled much of South Florida and
Hurricane Iniki destroyed much of the Hawaiian island of Kauai in
1992. Prior to these storms, other major disasters, such as
Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake in 1989, also generated
intense criticism of the federal response effort. The Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the lead federal agency for
disaster management, responds to many smaller natural disasters every
year without extensive public scrutiny. Unlike the bulk of the
disasters requiring FEMA to respond, however, catastrophic disasters
overwhelm the ability of state, local, and voluntary agencies to
adequately provide victims with essential services, such as food and
water, within 12 to 24 hours. The response to Hurricane Andrew
raised doubts about whether FEMA is capable of responding to
catastrophic disasters and whether it had learned any lessons from
its responses to Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta earthquake.
Congressional requesters asked us to examine the adequacy of the
federal strategy for responding to catastrophic disasters and to
develop solutions for improving it. Since January of this year, we
have presented the results of our work at hearings before five Senate
and House Committees and Subcommittees.\1 This report summarizes our
analyses, conclusions, recommendations, and matters for congressional
consideration presented at those hearings.
--------------------
\1 Disaster Management: Recent Disasters Demonstrate the Need to
Improve the Nation's Response Strategy. Testimonies sharing this
title were delivered before the Subcommittee on VA, HUD, and
Independent Agencies, Senate Committee on Appropriations
(GAO/T-RCED-93-4, Jan. 27, 1993); Subcommittee on Investigations and
Oversight, House Committee on Public Works and Transportation
(GAO/T-RCED-93-13, Mar. 2, 1993); Subcommittee on Toxic Substances,
Research, and Development, Senate Committee on Environment and Public
Works (field hearing, Apr. 19, 1993); Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs (GAO/T-RCED-93-20, May 18, 1993); and
Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence, Arms Control and Defense
Intelligence, Senate Committee on Armed Services (GAO/T-RCED-93-46,
May 25, 1993).
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The federal strategy for responding to catastrophic disasters is
deficient because it lacks provisions for the federal government to
immediately (1) assess in a comprehensive manner the damage and the
corresponding needs of disaster victims and (2) provide food,
shelter, and other essential services when the needs of disaster
victims outstrip the resources of the state, local, and private
voluntary community. Moreover, the federal strategy--encompassing 26
different agencies--does not promote adequate preparedness when there
is advance warning of a disaster because preparatory activities are
not explicitly authorized until the President has issued a disaster
declaration. These problems were most evident in the immediate
response to Hurricane Andrew in South Florida.
To improve the federal response, the nation needs presidential
involvement and leadership both before and after a catastrophic
disaster strikes. To underscore the commitment of the President,
responsibility for catastrophic disaster preparedness and response
should be placed with a key official in the White House. This would
institutionalize the direct presidential involvement that occurred on
an ad hoc basis in Hurricane Andrew and other recent major disasters.
Furthermore, this organizational arrangement could increase the
levels of attention given to emergency management responsibilities
throughout the government, not just in times of catastrophic
disasters. This responsibility should not be a full-time position
that would effectively duplicate the role of the Director of FEMA,
but the White House official should be sufficiently knowledgeable
about disaster response to guide the federal effort.
Within FEMA, a disaster unit is needed to provide the White House and
the Director of FEMA with information, analysis, and technical
support to improve federal decision-making on helping state and local
governments before, during, and after catastrophic disasters.
Consisting of a core staff located in FEMA and augmented by staff in
other participating federal agencies, the disaster unit would plan
for and respond to a wide variety of catastrophic disasters.
We believe a major reorganization would be necessary in order to
ensure a disaster unit's success in FEMA. Since FEMA was formed 14
years ago by consolidating several agencies from throughout the
federal government, two of its Directorates (whose resources would
form the bulk of a disaster unit) have historically not worked well
together. Institutional and cultural barriers have prevented
effective cooperation between the two Directorates during disasters.
The military can play an important role in responding to catastrophic
disasters. After Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki, the military was
highly effective in providing supplies and services and in
establishing the infrastructure necessary to restore order and meet
the immediate needs of victims. While only the Department of Defense
(DOD) can quickly escalate the federal response when the destruction
and the need for mass care is far greater than first anticipated, the
disaster unit we propose for FEMA--and not DOD--would be in the best
position to determine when such an escalation is necessary. Neither
the responses to Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki nor the experts with
whom we consulted indicated that DOD should have overall management
responsibility for disaster relief and recovery.
Legislative changes may also be needed to foster a more effective
federal response to catastrophic disasters. Current federal law
governing disaster response does not explicitly authorize federal
agencies to undertake preparatory activities before a disaster
declaration by the President, nor does it authorize FEMA to reimburse
agencies for such preparation, even when disasters like hurricanes
provide some warning that such activities will be needed. Federal
agencies may fail to undertake advance preparations because of
uncertainty over whether costs incurred before a disaster declaration
will ultimately be reimbursed by FEMA.
The success or failure of any of these proposed changes in the
national disaster response system will be heavily affected by the
efforts of state and local governments, which are expected to be the
first responders when a disaster strikes. However, these responders
do not have adequate training and funding to respond to catastrophic
disasters on their own. As a result, FEMA needs to use its existing
resources to better prepare state and local governments for
catastrophic disaster response so that they are as effective as
possible.
Finally, FEMA is not organized for and does not carry out the types
of training, exercises, and oversight needed to ensure that
deficiencies in state preparedness are identified and corrected.
While it sets policies, provides funding, and has established limited
exercises and some general training programs for the states, FEMA has
neither established performance standards nor developed a training
and exercise program specifically geared toward enhancing state and
local preparedness for catastrophic disaster response.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
FEMA was established in 1979 to consolidate federal emergency
preparedness, mitigation, and response activities. Its
responsibilities include, among other things, the coordination of
civil defense and civil emergency planning and the coordination of
federal disaster relief. FEMA responds to a wide range of disasters,
including floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, hazardous material
accidents, nuclear accidents, and biological, chemical, and nuclear
attacks.
To cope with disasters, FEMA has primarily (1) enhanced the
capability of state and local governments to respond to disasters;
(2) coordinated with 26 other federal agencies that provide resources
to respond to disasters, such as DOD and the Departments of Health
and Human Services and Housing and Urban Development; (3) given
federal assistance directly to citizens recovering from disasters;
(4) granted financial assistance to state and local governments; and
(5) provided leadership--through grants, flood plain management, and
other activities--for hazard mitigation. FEMA conducts its disaster
response and civil defense activities primarily under the authorities
of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance
Act and the Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, as amended.
The Federal Response Plan is FEMA's blueprint for responding to all
disasters and emergencies. The plan is a cooperative agreement
signed by 26 federal agencies and the American Red Cross for
providing services when there is a need for federal response
assistance following any type of disaster or emergency. The present
version of the plan--developed following dissatisfaction with the
response to Hurricane Hugo in 1989--was completed in April 1992.
Hurricane Andrew marked the first time the plan was fully used.
Under this plan, as in the past, the Red Cross is the primary agency
for providing mass care (food and shelter) immediately following a
disaster. It is also responsible for coordinating support for this
function with DOD, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and other
voluntary organizations.
For FEMA to activate the Federal Response Plan and for a state to
receive life-sustaining and other services from the federal
government, the Stafford Act requires a governor to obtain a
presidential declaration that a major disaster or emergency exists.
The governor's request must be based on a finding that the scope of
the disaster or emergency is beyond the state's ability to respond.
After the President declares a disaster, FEMA supplements the efforts
and resources of state and local governments and voluntary relief
agencies, which are expected to be the first responders when a
disaster strikes.
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE ANDREW IN
SOUTH FLORIDA REVEALS
INADEQUACIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Our review of Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki uncovered several problems
with the response efforts, virtually all of which were revealed in
South Florida because of the magnitude of the disaster there: an
economic loss of about $30 billion, the largest loss from a natural
disaster in U.S. history; the destruction of or serious damage to at
least 75,000 homes and 8,000 businesses; and the newly created
homelessness of more than 160,000 people. In Florida alone, federal
assistance is expected to exceed $1.8 billion, making Andrew by far
one of the most costly disasters to which FEMA has ever responded.\2
Under such conditions, we found that the Federal Response Plan is
inadequate for dealing with catastrophic disasters. The plan lacks,
among other things, provisions for a comprehensive assessment of
damages and the corresponding needs of disaster victims. In
addition, the response in South Florida suffered from
miscommunication and confusion of roles and responsibilities at all
levels of government--which slowed the delivery of services vital to
disaster victims.
In contrast, the response to Hurricanes Andrew in Louisiana and Iniki
in Hawaii were more effective. However, greater effectiveness
occurred in part because of changes that were introduced in an ad hoc
manner--such as sending supplies to the island of Kauai before local
officials requested them--rather than as part of an orderly, planned
response to catastrophic disasters. These responses were also more
effective because Hurricane Andrew was less severe when it hit
Louisiana and Hurricane Iniki hit a much less populated area.
--------------------
\2 As this report was being prepared, initial estimates indicated
that damage from the extensive flooding along the Mississippi River
may exceed that from Hurricane Andrew.
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS REQUIRE
PRESIDENTIAL INVOLVEMENT
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
Because the necessary federal response to catastrophic disasters is
so fundamentally different--bigger and more urgent--than to less
severe events, the person or organization directing the federal
response must explicitly and demonstrably have the authority of the
President in managing the disaster. Presidential leadership creates
a powerful, meaningful perception that the federal government
recognizes an event is catastrophic, is in control, and is going to
use every means necessary to meet the immediate mass care needs of
disaster victims. Furthermore, presidential leadership when the
federal government is not engaged in responding to a catastrophic
disaster creates an ongoing sense of the importance of emergency
management responsibilities; this translates into a better commitment
to preparedness and response by all the federal agencies involved.
The President's commitment is best underscored by placing
responsibility for catastrophic disaster preparedness and response
with a key official in the White House. The Director of FEMA should
work closely with the designated White House official, during both a
catastrophic disaster and day-to-day operations to ensure that FEMA
and all involved federal agencies are meeting preparedness
requirements for catastrophic disasters. When an event such as
Hurricane Andrew is imminent or has happened, the Director of FEMA
should notify the White House official that (1) a catastrophic
disaster is likely to occur or has occurred; (2) the affected area
will almost surely require a great deal of immediate and long-term
federal assistance; and (3) in the Director's judgment, federal staff
should go to the affected state(s), assess the situation, and, if
necessary, guide the resources needed to meet the immediate mass care
needs of disaster victims.
Ultimately, the choice of the White House official responsible for
disaster management is the President's. However, we believe that two
primary criteria must be used in designating this official: (1) The
official must have sufficient public recognition so that he or she is
perceived as having the authority and attention of the President in
managing the disaster, and (2) the official must have access to and
the confidence of the President. The official's ongoing
responsibility would not be a full-time effort but should ensure
commitment and cooperation across the federal government to
anticipate, prepare for, and respond to catastrophic disasters.
A FEMA DISASTER UNIT WOULD
IMPROVE DECISION-MAKING ON WHEN
TO PROVIDE FEDERAL HELP
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
Given the shortcomings we saw primarily in South Florida, we believe
FEMA needs a disaster unit whose primary mission is planning for and
responding to catastrophic disasters. This unit's mission would be
twofold. First, just before (when there is warning) or immediately
following a disaster, the unit would be charged with such duties as
estimating the extent of damage and relief needs so that key
decisionmakers, such as the governors of the affected states as well
as the President's designee, have the necessary information to
request and direct federal assistance.\3 And second, when not
actively engaged in disaster response, the unit would have an ongoing
responsibility to plan for and predict the effects of a variety of
catastrophic disasters. This unit would consist of a core staff
located in FEMA plus additional staff in participating federal
agencies (such as DOD and the Public Health Service) who would serve
as permanent liaisons to the unit. In order to ensure the commitment
of the entire federal government, both in day-to-day preparation and
during actual disasters, the unit should work closely with the White
House official responsible for disaster management.
This disaster unit should consist of FEMA staff who have disaster
response experience as well as staff and resources from FEMA's
National Preparedness Directorate. In general, the Directorate has
many of the people and resources that could help form the nucleus of
the disaster unit. The Directorate's current rapid response mission
places a premium on people with skills in such areas as strategic and
tactical planning, logistics, command and control, and
communications. Its resources include communications,
transportation, life support, and sophisticated computer- modeling
equipment. Through constant planning and exercising, the Directorate
maintains a high level of readiness and is able to quickly deploy
people and resources from a number of locations to anywhere in the
United States.
In order to successfully develop the capabilities we envision for it,
FEMA's disaster unit must overcome some internal FEMA problems. The
two FEMA Directorates whose resources would form the disaster
unit--National Preparedness and State and Local Programs and
Support--have historically not worked well together, pursuing their
missions in isolation from one another. As a result, we do not
believe anything short of a major reorganization can overcome the
institutional and cultural barriers that have prevented effective
cooperation between the two Directorates.
--------------------
\3 The federal government is explicitly authorized to appraise the
types of relief needed after a disaster is declared. However, as we
pointed out in an earlier report, Disaster Assistance: Federal,
State, and Local Response to Natural Disasters Need Improvement
(GAO/RCED-91-43, Mar. 6, 1991), legislative action may be needed to
deploy staff to a disaster area prior to a major disaster
declaration.
GREATER RELIANCE ON DOD FOR
MASS CARE COULD STRENGTHEN THE
FEDERAL RESPONSE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
For all but the most severe catastrophic disasters, the Red Cross and
its large network of volunteers may be well suited to provide mass
care and coordinate the efforts of other federal agencies, as was the
case with Hurricane Andrew in Louisiana. In South Florida, the Red
Cross also responded to the needs of Hurricane Andrew's
victims--sheltering those who evacuated South Florida and providing
some mass care after the storm. However, the enormous gap between
the immediate need and available private voluntary resources in South
Florida was inevitable for a disaster of this magnitude.
For such disasters, DOD is the only organization capable of
providing, transporting, and distributing sufficient quantities of
the items needed:
DOD has, for example, trained medical and engineering personnel,
mobile medical units, storehouses of food and temporary
shelters, contingency planning skills, command capability, and
other requirements for mass care, as well as the transportation
to deploy these resources. A buildup of response capability in
other organizations, such as FEMA, would be redundant.
Catastrophic relief activities mirror some of DOD's wartime support
missions. Soldiers are trained for similar missions, and
catastrophic disaster relief provides soldiers with additional
training.
Catastrophic disaster responses, such as those for Hurricane
Andrew, are smaller than many military operations and do not
significantly affect DOD's military readiness in the short term.
While we clearly see a major role for DOD in providing mass care, we
do not advocate turning over the entire disaster response, relief,
and recovery operation to the military. DOD's role in disaster
response needs to remain under the direction of a civilian authority
outside of the Department for two important reasons. First, DOD's
foremost responsibility is to deal with those military matters
affecting national security; a full-time DOD mission of managing
disaster preparedness and relief could detract from the Department's
primary responsibility. Second, DOD officials strongly believe, and
we agree, that assuming overall management responsibility could
create the impression that the military is attempting to make or
direct domestic policy, which runs contrary to principles that have
guided the military's role in the United States. Throughout our
review, military officials repeatedly emphasized their willingness to
work for and support a civilian-led disaster response.
In our January 1993 testimony, we noted that the effect of using the
military for catastrophic disaster response on its primary
responsibilities would be less of an obstacle if DOD had full
authority to activate the Reserves. Currently, DOD may ask the
Reserves to volunteer for disaster relief operations but may require
them to serve for these operations only in limited circumstances. We
recommended that the Congress consider removing these statutory
restrictions.\4
--------------------
\4 For more information on the role of the military, see Disaster
Assistance: DOD's Support for Hurricanes Andrew and Iniki and
Typhoon Omar (GAO/NSIAD-93-180, June 18, 1993).
FEDERAL AGENCIES NEED EXPLICIT
AUTHORITY TO PREPARE BEFORE
DISASTERS ARE DECLARED
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7
Federal response time could be reduced by encouraging agencies to do
as much advance preparation as possible prior to a disaster
declaration. When there is early warning, as there is for
hurricanes, DOD and other federal agencies need to mobilize resources
and deploy personnel before the catastrophe strikes. However,
current law does not explicitly authorize such activities.
Therefore, federal agencies may fail to undertake advance preparation
because of uncertainty over whether FEMA will request their
assistance and whether costs incurred before a disaster declaration
will ultimately be reimbursed by FEMA. For example, DOD officials
told us that they take some actions to prepare for a disaster when
there is warning--such as identifying quantities, locations, and
transportation requirements for mass care supplies--but they take no
additional measures because the Department might have to pay for the
expenses if FEMA ultimately does not request its assistance.
FEMA DOES NOT ADEQUATELY
PREPARE STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS FOR CATASTROPHIC
DISASTER RESPONSE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8
Fewer federal resources are needed to respond to a catastrophic
disaster if state and local governments' response capabilities are
greater. We believe that FEMA could do more to ensure that state and
local governments prepare for catastrophic disaster response. Our
review uncovered shortcomings both in the way FEMA helps state and
local governments train and conduct exercises in anticipation of
catastrophic disasters and in the way it monitors state and local
preparedness.
Our March 1991 report on Hurricane Hugo and FEMA's own report\5
recognized a number of training deficiencies. These included the
need to provide state and local governments with training
specifically geared towards developing such necessary skills for
responding to catastrophic disasters as assessing damage and
estimating the amount of mass care needs. However, state and local
officials have not received such training.
FEMA officials told us that its Emergency Management Institute (EMI)
is developing courses to enhance state and local officials' ability
to respond to catastrophic disasters. However, EMI officials told us
that they delayed development of many disaster response courses until
the April 1992 completion of the Federal Response Plan. Because such
courses usually require about 2 years to develop, most were not
available in time for Hurricane Andrew.
Although FEMA funds numerous state disaster exercises, most state
officials believe that these do not adequately prepare them to
respond to catastrophic disasters because (1) there are too few such
exercises; (2) too few federal representatives participate; and (3)
there is often a failure to act on the weaknesses these exercises
identify. Even the large-scale exercises FEMA conducted identified
problems that went uncorrected and thus reoccurred in the response to
Hurricane Andrew.
FEMA headquarters does not monitor state performance, even though it
sets policies and establishes training programs for states. Regional
officials told us that headquarters has neither established
performance standards nor developed a program for evaluating state
and local preparedness for catastrophic disaster response.
Therefore, the regions have no uniform national standards that can be
used to judge state and local readiness. By creating performance
standards and then evaluating how well state and local governments
meet them, FEMA can increase accountability for all participating
agencies.
--------------------
\5 Response to Hurricane Hugo and the Loma Prieta Earthquake:
Evaluation and Lessons Learned, FEMA, May 1991. (Although published
in 1991, this report was not made available to the public until Jan.
1993.)
GREATER FLEXIBILITY WITH FEMA
GRANTS WOULD INCREASE
EFFECTIVENESS OF STATES'
RESPONSE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9
FEMA provides state and local governments with approximately $100
million annually in civil defense grants. These grants could be used
much more effectively to help develop state and local governments'
emergency response capabilities. The grants were originally intended
to develop a civil defense capability in the event of a nuclear
attack. In 1981, amendments to the Civil Defense Act directed FEMA
to permit states to spend civil defense funds on a dual-use
approach.\6 However, many state and local officials told us that FEMA
had not changed the civil defense programs enough because (1) nuclear
defense concerns still predominate FEMA's review of grant
applications; (2) FEMA very closely controls the types of activities
that qualify for civil defense funding; and (3) civil defense funding
generally does not correspond to state and local governments'
disaster response priorities. FEMA officials are aware of the
benefits that increased flexibility would provide state and local
entities and are considering merging the multiple grant programs into
broader categories to enable a more diversified use of the funds.
Some civil defense programs have been suspended for the current year
while awaiting the results of FEMA's study of civil defense
requirements. Furthermore, in its fiscal year 1994 budget, FEMA
proposed allowing a much more diversified use of grant funds by state
and local governments.
--------------------
\6 Under a dual-use or all-hazards approach, states may use civil
defense funds to prepare for natural disasters to the extent that
such use is consistent with, contributes to, and does not detract
from attack-related civil defense preparedness.
CONCLUSIONS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10
Improving the nation's response capability to catastrophic disasters
is essential. We may well face disasters or emergencies that could
affect even more people than Hurricane Andrew did. As devastating as
this disaster was to South Florida, experts agree that we were
fortunate it was not far worse both in terms of the loss of life and
monetary damage. These experts also predict that we are entering a
period of increased hurricane activity and that we need to take
action today at the local, state, and federal levels to prevent
greater loss of life and property.
The problems we found with the federal strategy for catastrophic
disasters--such as inadequate damage and needs assessments,
miscommunication, unclear legislative authority, and unprepared,
untrained state and local responders--are more systemic than
agency-specific. Thus, they require solutions that cut across
agencies and levels of government.
Presidential leadership and an immediate, massive response to a
catastrophic disaster are key elements in a successful effort to
meeting victims' immediate, life-sustaining needs. While the
military clearly needs to play a pivotal role in this response, there
are convincing arguments against assigning DOD lead responsibility
for the federal government's entire disaster preparedness, response,
and relief operations.
Although we focused primarily on the federal role in responding to
catastrophic disasters, we emphasize that state and local governments
are integral parts of an effective national disaster response system.
The success or failure of any changes in the federal role in that
system will always be heavily affected by the efforts of state and
local responders.
We have concluded that the nation's disaster response
strategy--particularly for devastating, catastrophic disasters--needs
substantial, across-the-board improvement. Accordingly, over the
course of the hearings cited earlier, we made recommendations aimed
at improving not only the federal response but also the effectiveness
of federal assistance to better prepare state and local governments
as well. Furthermore, we addressed the specific legislative
restrictions that we found inhibit a more proactive, effective
response.
RECOMMENDATION TO THE PRESIDENT
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :11
To ensure vital presidential leadership for catastrophic disasters,
the President should
designate a senior official in the White House to oversee federal
preparedness for and responses to catastrophic disasters. This
official should not only monitor the initial federal response to
catastrophic disasters but also have ongoing responsibility for
oversight of FEMA and other federal agencies' efforts to plan,
prepare for, and respond to such disasters.
RECOMMENDATIONS TO FEMA
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :12
The federal government needs to develop a capability to respond to
catastrophic disasters. Accordingly, FEMA should take a number of
steps:
Establish a disaster unit headquartered in FEMA. This unit would
be composed of a core of FEMA staff and would be augmented by
resources and staff from other key federal agencies. The unit
would--using analyses of state and local governments' capability
and preparedness to respond to catastrophic disasters--predict,
plan for, and assess the damage resulting from catastrophic
disasters. The unit would also translate its damage assessments
into estimates of immediate response needs, including the extent
to which FEMA and the other federal agencies can meet those
needs. It also would provide up-to-date information to the
White House so that the President's designated official would be
able to effectively oversee the federal response. On the basis
of its assessments and needs determinations, the unit would make
concrete recommendations to the governor of the affected state
regarding the amount, type, and cost of federal assistance that
should be sought. The disaster unit should direct any needed
federal relief effort.
Improve its catastrophic disaster response capability by using
existing authority to aggressively respond to catastrophic
disasters, assessing the extent of damage, and then advising
state and local officials of identified needs and the federal
resources available to address them, as well as the extent to
which DOD resources will be needed to supplement those of the
Red Cross in meeting mass care needs.
Enhance the capacity of state and local governments to respond to
catastrophic disasters by (1) continuing to give them increased
flexibility to match grant funding with individual response
needs, (2) upgrading training and exercises specifically geared
towards catastrophic disaster response, and (3) assessing each
state's preparedness for catastrophic disaster response.
MATTERS FOR CONGRESSIONAL
CONSIDERATION
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :13
The Congress should consider
giving FEMA and other federal agencies explicit authority to take
actions to prepare for catastrophic disasters when there is
warning and
removing statutory restrictions on DOD's authority to activate
Reserve units for catastrophic disaster relief.
AGENCY COMMENTS
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :14
We have discussed our findings and recommendations with such top FEMA
officials as the Director and Deputy Associate Directors for National
Preparedness and State and Local Programs and Support throughout the
course of our review. They have generally agreed with our findings
and recommendations and have begun taking actions to address them.
These include a proposal in FEMA's fiscal year 1994 budget request to
restructure various resources into a Federal Planning and Response
Activity, which FEMA officials described to us as "in essence or
close to" our recommendation that FEMA form a disaster unit. In
addition, FEMA's State and Local Programs and Support Directorate
told us it is revising and updating its training and exercises for
federal, state, and local responders on the basis of the lessons
learned from recent catastrophic disasters; developing methods to
better determine state and local preparedness for disaster response;
and seeking clarified legislative authority when a catastrophic
disaster is predicted.
FEMA's recent initiatives are a good start toward improving its
response to future catastrophic disasters. However, some of the
improvements necessary in the overall federal response are outside of
FEMA's control. Presidential action is needed to strengthen
leadership for the federal response by designating a key White House
official to oversee preparedness and response activities.
Furthermore, legislative action is needed to improve all federal
agencies' preparedness when there is warning of a disaster and to
allow DOD to activate Reserve units for catastrophic disaster relief.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :15
To examine the nation's response strategy for catastrophic disasters,
we reviewed FEMA's organizational structure and disaster response
activities. We also reviewed the federal, state, local, and
volunteer response to Hurricane Andrew in Florida and Louisiana and
Hurricane Iniki in Hawaii. Most of our work focused on South Florida
because of the tremendous amount of damage resulting from Hurricane
Andrew. At each location we met with representatives from state and
local emergency management organizations. We also consulted with a
panel of experts who represented a cross section of views on disaster
response. These experts included a number of former federal agency
heads and other high-level officials from DOD, FEMA, and FEMA's
predecessor agencies; an emergency medical program director; state
emergency management directors; and members of academia specializing
in intergovernmental relations during disaster response.
We focused our review on the immediate response to catastrophic
disasters. Therefore, we addressed neither long-term recovery
activities for catastrophic disasters nor any aspect of the response
to less severe disasters, which comprise the bulk of FEMA's response
activities.
--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :15.1
We are sending copies of this report to the President, interested
congressional committees, the Director of FEMA, and the Secretary of
Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
This work was performed under the direction of Judy A.
England-Joseph, Director of Housing and Community Development Issues,
who can be reached at (202) 512-7631 if you or your staff have any
questions. Other major contributors to this report are listed in
appendix I.
J. Dexter Peach
Assistant Comptroller General
List of Requesters
The Honorable Barbara A. Mikulski
Chair, Subcommittee on VA, HUD,
and Independent Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
United States Senate
The Honorable John Glenn
Chairman, Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable J. James Exon
Chairman, Subcommittee on Nuclear Deterrence,
Arms Control, and Defense Intelligence
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate
The Honorable Donald Riegle
Chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Paul Sarbanes
Chairman, Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs
United States Senate
The Honorable Robert A. Borski
Chairman
The Honorable James M. Inhofe
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Investigations
and Oversight
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
House of Representatives
The Honorable Earl Hutto
Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness
Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
The Honorable John Conyers
Chairman, Legislation and
National Security Subcommittee
Committee on Government Operations
House of Representatives
The Honorable John Breaux
United States Senate
The Honorable Conrad Burns
United States Senate
The Honorable Robert Graham
United States Senate
The Honorable John Kerry
United States Senate
MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
=========================================================== Appendix I
RESOURCES, COMMUNITY AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT DIVISION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:1
Stanley Czerwinski, Assistant Director
Paul Bryant, Senior Evaluator
Jeffrey Itell, Senior Evaluator
William MacBlane, Senior Evaluator
Margaret J. Reese, Senior Evaluator
Mary E. Roy, Senior Evaluator
Cheryl L. Kramer, Evaluator
Valerie A. Rogers, Evaluator
NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:2
Henry L. Hinton, Jr., Director of Planning
Robert J. Lane, Assistant Director
Richard Dasher, Senior Evaluator
Merrie C. Nichols-Dixon, Senior Evaluator
William J. Rigazio, Senior Evaluator
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:3
Martin E. Sloane, Assistant General Counsel
Karen Keegan, Senior Attorney
John T. McGrail, Senior Attorney
OFFICE OF INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT AND COMMUNICATIONS
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:4
James H. McGinness, Manager, Video Communications Branch
Douglas A. Manor, A/V Production Specialist
Felix E. Westwood, A/V Production Specialist
ATLANTA REGIONAL OFFICE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:5
James Martin, Regional Manager
Ray B. Bush, Regional Management Representative
Rod Worth, Regional Management Representative
Signora J. May, Senior Evaluator
John W. Nelson, Senior Evaluator
Zachary R. White, Evaluator
Maria B. Warkentine, Evaluator
Bonnie K. Wrenn, Evaluator
Sally Gilley, Evaluator
Sylvia Diaz, Evaluator
Harry Jobes, Evaluator
Troy Thompson, Evaluator
FAR EAST OFFICE
--------------------------------------------------------- Appendix I:6
Kenneth F. Daniell, Evaluator