Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport Screeners'
Performance (Chapter Report, 06/28/2000, GAO/RCED-00-75).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the effectiveness of
screening checkpoints at airports, focusing on the: (1) causes of
screeners' problems in detecting dangerous objects and the efforts of
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address these problems; and
(2) screening practices of selected foreign countries and the potential
for using these practices to help improve screeners' performance in the
United States.

GAO noted that: (1) long-standing problems combine to reduce screeners'
effectiveness in detecting dangerous objects, most notably: (a) the
rapid turnover of screener personnel--often above 100 percent a year at
large airports and, in at least one recent instance, above 400 percent a
year; and (b) human factors conditions that have for years affected
screeners' hiring, training, and working environment; (2) a key factor
in the rapid turnover is the low wages screeners receive; (3) screeners
are often paid the minimum wage or close to it and can often earn more
at airport fast-food restaurants; (4) FAA is pursuing several
initiatives to improve the hiring, training, and testing of screeners,
to increase their alertness and more closely monitor their performance,
and to certify the security companies that air carriers retain to staff
screening checkpoints; (5) however, most of these efforts are behind
schedule; (6) FAA has established performance improvement goals for
screeners, but it has not: (a) completed an integrated plan to tie its
various efforts to improve screeners' performance to the achievement of
its goals; and (b) adequately measured its progress in achieving its
goals for improving screeners' performance; (7) passenger screening
procedures in the countries GAO visited are similar to those in the
United States; (8) passengers walk through metal detectors at airport
checkpoints and have their carry-on baggage scanned by X-ray machines or
physically searched by screeners; (9) but there are also some
differences; (10) for example, in most countries, screeners must undergo
more extensive training, screeners receive higher wages and better
benefits, and screening responsibility rests with the government or the
airport, not with the air carriers as it does in the United States; (11)
among the five countries GAO visited--Belgium, Canada, France, the
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--the turnover rate for screeners was
lower--about 50 percent a year or less--and in a joint test conducted by
FAA and one of these countries, screeners' performance was higher; (12)
however, the feasibility of applying these countries' practices to
screening operations in the United States cannot be readily determined;
and (13) given the uncertainty and the fact that FAA has already begun
several efforts to improve screeners' performance, GAO is not making
recommendations to revise current screening practices in the United
States.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-00-75
     TITLE:  Aviation Security: Long-Standing Problems Impair Airport
	     Screeners' Performance
      DATE:  06/28/2000
   SUBJECT:  Airline industry
	     Airports
	     Search and seizure
	     Terrorism
	     Baggage (personal effects)
	     Transportation safety
	     Performance measures
	     Facility security
	     Foreign governments
	     Security services contracts
IDENTIFIER:  FAA Civil Aviation Security Program
	     Belgium
	     Canada
	     France
	     Netherlands
	     United Kingdom
	     FAA Air Carrier Standard Security Program

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GAO/RCED-00-75

6

14

Screening Passengers Is a Key Line of Defense 14

Passenger Screening Is a Shared Responsibility 18

Concerns Over the Effectiveness of Passenger Screening
Are Long-Standing 19

Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 20

Improvements in Screeners' Performance

23

Rapid Turnover and Human Factors Problems Reduce Screeners' Effectiveness 23

Initiatives to Improve Screeners' Performance Under Way,
but Key Aspects Are Behind Schedule 26

More Effective Use of Management Tools Can Help Improve
Screeners' Performance 31

Conclusions 32

Recommendations 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 34

Practices, Turnover, and Performance

35

Screening Practices in the United States and Five Other
Countries Differ 35

Turnover Is Lower in Five Countries, and Performance May
Be Better 40

Conclusions 41

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 42

Appendix I: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

44

45

Table 1: Number of Firearms and Explosive Devices Detected
by Airport Screeners, Calendar Years 1990-99 17

Table 2: Turnover Rates for Screeners at 19 Large airports,
May 1998-April 1999 24

Table 3: FAA's Initiatives to Improve Screeners' Performance 27

Figure 1: Screeners Operating a Typical Security Checkpoint
at an Airport 16

DOT Department of Transportation

FAA Federal Aviation Administration

GAO General Accounting Office

Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division

B-282286

June 28, 2000

The Honorable John McCain
Chairman
The Honorable Ernest Hollings
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation
United States Senate

The Honorable Slade Gorton
Chairman
The Honorable John D. Rockefeller IV
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation
United States Senate

This report responds to your request that we study the performance of
screeners at our nation's airports. The report includes recommendations to
better implement the management and evaluation of FAA's efforts to improve
screeners' performance.

Unless you publicly announce its contents earlier, we plan no further
distribution of this report until 15 days after the date of this letter. At
that time, we will send copies to the appropriate congressional committees;
the Honorable Rodney E. Slater, Secretary of Transportation; the Honorable
Jane F. Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration; the
Honorable Jacob J. Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other
interested parties. We will make copies available to others upon request.

If you or your staff have any questions, please call me or John Schulze,
Assistant Director, at (202) 512-2834. Key contributors to this report are
listed in appendix I.

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D.
Associate Director, Transportation Issues

Executive Summary

The threat of attacks on aircraft by terrorists or others remains a
persistent and growing concern for the United States. According to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the trend in terrorism against U.S. targets
is toward large-scale incidents designed for maximum destruction, terror,
and media impact--exactly what terrorists intended in a 1995 plot to blow up
12 U.S. airliners in a single day. That plot, uncovered by police in the
Philippines, focused on U.S. airliners operating in the Pacific region, but
concerns are growing about the potential for attacks within the United
States.

The United States and other countries have a number of safeguards in place
to prevent attacks against commercial aircraft. Among the most important of
these are the checkpoints at airports where passengers and their carry-on
items are screened for dangerous objects, such as guns, and explosives.
Historically, however, screeners who operate checkpoints in the United
States have had difficulty in detecting dangerous objects, missing as many
as 20 percent during tests, and numerous reports, including two by
presidential commissions, have detailed significant problems with screeners'
performance. Concerned about the effectiveness of screening checkpoints and
of the efforts to improve them, the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation and its Subcommittee on Aviation requested that GAO
examine (1) the causes of screeners' problems in detecting dangerous objects
and the efforts of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to address
these problems and (2) the screening practices of selected foreign countries
and the potential for using these practices to help improve screeners'
performance in the United States.

FAA is responsible for overseeing the safety and security of the nation's
civil aviation system. Since 1973, after a spate of hijackings, the agency
has required that air carriers maintain screening checkpoints to prevent or
deter passengers from carrying dangerous objects aboard aircraft. While the
airlines are responsible for screening activities, they generally contract
with security companies to manage the checkpoints and to provide screeners,
who check over 2 million passengers and their carry-on items each day. The
screeners scan individuals for weapons or other dangerous objects by using
metal detectors, and they examine carry-on baggage using X-ray machines,
explosive detection equipment, and physical searches.

As part of its regulatory oversight of the screening operations, FAA tests
screeners' ability to locate test objects placed in carry-on baggage or
hidden on an FAA agent's person. The agents use standard test objects, such
as guns, during these compliance tests, and FAA can fine an airline if an
object is missed. FAA also tests screeners using more sophisticated
simulated bombs--called improvised explosive devices--that are more
difficult to detect; however, FAA views these tests as a training tool and
does not issue fines when screeners miss the test objects. Concerns have
long existed over screeners' performance in these tests. In 1978, screeners
failed to detect 13 percent of the objects during compliance tests, and in
1987, screeners were missing 20 percent of the objects during the same type
of test. Since 1997, FAA has designated data on test results as sensitive
security information. Consequently, more recent data on test results cannot
be released publicly and are discussed in a separate, limited-distribution
report.1 Nevertheless, FAA acknowledges that screeners' performance in
detecting dangerous objects during its testing is not satisfactory.

Aviation terrorism is a concern not only in the United States but also in
other countries, some of which have had more attacks than the United States,
and virtually all countries conduct preboard screening operations before
allowing passengers to board aircraft. Each country can--and often
does--conduct screening operations in a manner that differs from that of the
United States or of other countries.

Long-standing problems combine to reduce screeners' effectiveness in
detecting dangerous objects, most notably (1) the rapid turnover of screener
personnel--often above 100 percent a year at large airports and, in at least
one recent instance, above 400 percent a year and (2) human factors
conditions that have for years affected screeners' hiring, training, and
working environment. A key factor in the rapid turnover is the low wages
screeners receive. Screeners are often paid the minimum wage or close to it
and can often earn more at airport fast-food restaurants. FAA is pursuing
several initiatives to improve the hiring, training, and testing of
screeners; to increase their alertness and more closely monitor their
performance; and to certify the security companies that air carriers retain
to staff screening checkpoints; however, most of these efforts are behind
schedule. Furthermore, FAA has established performance improvement goals for
screeners, but it has not (1) completed an integrated plan to tie its
various efforts to improve screeners' performance to the achievement of its
goals and (2) adequately measured its progress in achieving its goals for
improving screeners' performance. This report contains recommendations to
better implement the management and evaluation of FAA's efforts to improve
screeners' performance.

Passenger screening procedures in the countries GAO visited are similar to
those in the United States. Passengers walk through metal detectors at
airport checkpoints and have their carry-on baggage scanned by X-ray
machines or physically searched by screeners. But there are also some
differences: For example, in most countries, screeners must undergo more
extensive training; screeners receive higher wages and better benefits; and
screening responsibility rests with the government or the airport, not with
the air carriers as it does in the United States. Among the five countries
GAO visited--Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United
Kingdom--the turnover rate for screeners was lower--about 50 percent a year
or less--and in a joint test conducted by FAA and one of these countries,
screeners' performance was higher. However, the feasibility of applying
these countries' practices to screening operations in the United States
cannot be readily determined. Given this uncertainty and the fact that FAA
has already begun several efforts to improve screeners' performance, GAO is
not making recommendations to revise current screening practices in the
United States.

GAO provided a draft of this report to the Department of Transportation for
its review and comment. GAO met with FAA officials, who were responding for
the Department of Transportation. These officials generally agreed with the
facts presented in the draft report and acknowledged that screeners'
performance needs to improve. The officials agreed with the recommendation
to promptly complete the agency's integrated checkpoint screening management
plan. However, they disagreed with the need to revise FAA' s goal for
reporting improvements in screeners' performance under the Government
Performance and Results Act. GAO continues to believe that its
recommendation is appropriate and consequently did not revise it. FAA
officials also provided technical clarifications, which were incorporated in
the report as appropriate.

Screeners' Performance

Long-standing problems with screeners' performance are attributable to a
number of causes. Foremost among these is the rapid turnover of screeners.
Because turnover occurs so often, few experienced screeners staff the
checkpoints. From May 1998 through April 1999, turnover among screeners at
19 large airports averaged over 125 percent, and one airport reported
turnover of over 400 percent. According to FAA and the aviation industry,
this turnover is largely due to the low pay and few, if any, benefits
screeners receive, as well as the daily stress of the job. It is not unusual
for the starting wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be higher than
the wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport GAO visited,
screeners' wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the starting wage
at one of the airport's fast-food restaurants was $7 an hour.

The human factors associated with screening--those work-related issues that
are influenced by human capabilities and constraints--have also been noted
by FAA as problems affecting performance for over 20 years. Screening duties
require repetitive tasks as well as intense monitoring for the very rare
moment when a dangerous object may be observed. Too little attention has
been given to factors such as (1) individuals' aptitudes for effectively
performing screening duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to
screeners and how well they comprehend it, and (3) the monotony of the job
and the distractions that reduce screeners' vigilance. As a result,
screeners are being placed on the job without having the abilities or
knowledge required to perform the work effectively. Such screeners then find
their duties tedious and unstimulating.

FAA has several initiatives under way to address these problems and improve
screeners' performance. These include

ï¿½ improving the hiring and preparation of screeners through selection tests,
computer-based training, and competency tests;

ï¿½ a system to keep screeners alert and monitor their performance by
periodically projecting images of dangerous objects onto the monitors of the
X-ray machines at checkpoints and recording the screeners' responses; and

ï¿½ a certification program to make screening companies, along with the air
carriers, accountable for the training and performance of the screeners they
employ.

FAA believes these efforts will improve the quality of the personnel hired
for screening positions, provide them with better training, and give the
screening companies greater incentive to retain their best screeners longer
in order to meet FAA's new performance standards for certification. Most of
these efforts, however, are behind schedule. For example, FAA is 2 years
behind schedule in issuing its regulation requiring the certification of
screening companies.

FAA has established annual goals, as required by the Government Performance
and Results Act, for improving screeners' detection of test objects.
However, the agency has lacked an integrated plan that (1) details how its
efforts to improve screeners' performance are related to achieving its
goals, (2) identifies and prioritizes problems with screeners' performance
that require resolving, and (3) provides budget and milestone information
for addressing these problems. FAA has been developing such an integrated
management plan to guide its checkpoint screening improvement efforts, but
although elements of the plan are being implemented, it is not complete.
Furthermore, FAA's method for calculating the achievement of one goal--the
detection of dangerous objects in carry-on bags--does not produce meaningful
results. It combined the results of two separate types of tests--for
detecting standard test objects and for detecting improvised explosive
devices--both of which were performed in fiscal year 1998 and again in
fiscal year 1999. But during 1999, FAA increased the number of tests using
the more easily detected standard objects and decreased the number of tests
using the more difficult-to-detect explosive devices. Consequently, FAA
showed progress toward achieving its goal when, in fact, no progress had
occurred.

Performance

GAO examined preboard passenger screening practices in Belgium, Canada,
France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--five countries recommended
by FAA and industry representatives. GAO found four areas where screening
operations differ from those in the United States: the screeners'
qualifications; the screeners' pay and benefits; the institutional
responsibility for screening; and the stringency of checkpoint screening
procedures.

ï¿½ Most of the countries require that potential screeners undergo lengthier
training, be either citizens or long-term residents, and be individually
certified for screening work.

ï¿½ In most of the countries, screeners receive higher salaries and more
benefits than do screeners in this country. For example, screeners in
Belgium receive wages equivalent to about $14 per hour, and screeners in the
Netherlands receive what they regard as "middle income" wages. In most
countries, the screeners also receive health and/or vacation benefits.

ï¿½ The responsibility for screening rests with either the government or the
airport, not with air carriers, as it does in the United States. Although
security companies are commonly hired to staff screening checkpoints, the
companies report directly to the government or the airport authority.

ï¿½ Some nations direct screeners to "pat down" passengers after metal
detectors go off or at random to increase the screeners' effectiveness. All
five countries allow only ticketed passengers to pass through the
checkpoint, allowing the screeners to be more attentive to a smaller number
of people. Several countries also have a more visible police presence near
their checkpoints.

In addition, turnover for screeners is lower in all five countries than in
the United States. Among these countries, the highest reported turnover rate
was about 50 percent a year, and one country had an annual turnover rate of
less than 5 percent. Furthermore, although the countries did not make data
on the performance of their screeners available to GAO, the performance of
screeners in at least one country was better than in the United States.
Joint testing by FAA and this country, using consistent procedures and test
objects, demonstrated that the other country's screeners were able to detect
the objects at better than twice the rate of U.S. screeners.2 However,
without specific performance data, GAO could not determine whether any of
the differences found in the other countries improve screeners' performance
in those countries or would improve screeners' performance in the United
States.

So that FAA can better implement its efforts to improve screeners'
performance, GAO recommends that the Secretary of Transportation direct the
Administrator of FAA to do the following:

ï¿½ Require that FAA's integrated checkpoint screening management plan be
promptly completed, implemented, continuously monitored and updated, and
periodically evaluated for effectiveness.

ï¿½ For reporting under the Government Performance and Results Act, establish
separate goals for the detection of standard test objects and improvised
explosive devices concealed in carry-on baggage.

GAO provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report
for review and comment. GAO met with officials from FAA, including the
Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, who were responding for
the Department of Transportation. These officials generally agreed with the
facts presented in the draft report and provided technical clarifications,
which were incorporated as appropriate.

FAA officials agreed that the performance of checkpoint screeners needs to
improve and that the agency's integrated checkpoint screening management
plan is not complete. FAA officials agreed with the draft report's
recommendation to promptly complete the plan but added that other than the
program cost data, it is essentially complete. FAA expects to complete the
cost data by the end of 2000. FAA, however, did not concur with the draft
report's recommendation that, for reporting under the Government Performance
and Results Act, it establish separate goals for the detection of standard
test objects and improvised explosive devices concealed in carry-on baggage.
FAA commented that, although it agreed with the intent of the
recommendation, it nevertheless believes that it is reasonable to aggregate
the test results for use in assessing the agency's performance under the
Government Performance and Results Act, since the Department of
Transportation tries to limit the number of goals established under the act.
While GAO agrees that efforts should be made to limit the number of goals,
the measurement information required by the Results Act must nevertheless be
meaningful and provide the agency with a clear picture of its progress
toward meeting its established goals. GAO continues to believe that the
progress shown in meeting FAA's current goal is not meaningful--since it
can, and does, show improved performance when in fact none exists--and that
the goal needs to be revised.

FAA officials were also concerned that the draft report did not provide
FAA's perspective on the role cultural and other concerns play in countries'
approaches to screening. They noted that what is acceptable to the public
elsewhere may not be acceptable in the United States. The officials said
that FAA must be aware of the need to protect civil liberties and privacy
when considering checkpoint procedures and equipment. The draft report was
revised to include their views. Additionally, these officials commented that
the numbers of airports and screeners in the countries GAO visited are
significantly lower than in the United States, but they provided no
information on how these facts affect screeners' performance, turnover, and
human factors concerns.

Introduction

Although more than a decade has passed since the last bombing of a U.S.
airliner--the 1988 explosion on Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
that killed 270 people--U.S. aircraft are still believed to be a target for
terrorist attacks. According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, trends
in terrorism point toward large-scale incidents designed for maximum
destruction, terror, and media impact--exactly the effect of attacks on
aviation. Recent events show that concern about such attacks is not
unfounded. Philippine police uncovered a plot in 1995 to blow up as many as
12 U.S. airliners in the Pacific region on a single day. Equally ominous is
the fact that terrorist activities are posing a threat domestically. For
example, a suspected terrorist was apprehended in December 1999 while
attempting to enter the country with bomb components, including some small
enough to be brought onto an aircraft. The knowledge and materials to build
explosive devices that are difficult to detect are readily available and, as
a result, the potential for the destruction of aircraft and great loss of
life has increased.

Because of this threat to commercial aviation, the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), which is responsible for the safety and security of
civil aviation in the United States, requires various security measures be
in place at the nation's airports. Over the past 25 years, FAA has directed
that air carriers and airports control access to airport buildings,
facilities, and aircraft; question passengers to better ensure that their
baggage and its contents have been solely under the passengers' control;
scan the checked baggage of certain passengers; and in some cases, match the
checked baggage onboard aircraft with enplaning passengers. Of the various
security measures, one of the most crucial is the screening of passengers
and their carry-on baggage before the passengers board their flights.

In 1973, to counteract the then-growing number of aircraft hijackings, FAA
directed that all passengers be screened, along with their carry-on baggage,
before they board an aircraft. Since that time, all passengers have been
screened at airport checkpoints, and today, screening personnel--termed
screeners--check over 2 million individuals and their bags each day for
weapons, explosives, and other dangerous articles that could pose a threat
to the safety of an aircraft and those aboard it.

Screeners are a key line of defense against the introduction of dangerous
items into the aviation system. All passengers and anyone else who seeks to
enter secure areas at the nation's airports must pass through screening
checkpoints and be cleared by screeners. At all commercial airports in the
United States, screeners

ï¿½ examine carry-on baggage with X-ray machines to locate any dangerous
objects,

ï¿½ scan passengers with metal detectors to identify any hidden metallic
objects, and

ï¿½ conduct physical searches of items, including those that cannot be scanned
by X-ray machines--such as baby carriers or lead-shielded containers--or
bags that have been X-rayed and contain unidentifiable objects that could be
a threat.

In addition to the routine checkpoint process used for screening every
passenger, screeners select carry-on bags at random and search them or use
explosive detection equipment to determine if traces of explosives are
present on the baggage.3 After passing through a checkpoint, a person can
move about freely in the airport's public secured areas. Figure 1 shows
screeners operating a typical checkpoint.

Source: FAA.

Each year, the nation's screeners detect thousands of dangerous objects that
individuals intentionally or inadvertently attempt to carry though
checkpoints. From 1990 through 1999, screeners located nearly 23,000
firearms and numerous explosive devices, resulting in over 9,400 arrests.
Table 1 shows the number of firearms and explosive devices detected each
year.

       Number of firearms detected  Number of explosive devices detecteda
 Year
 1990  2,853                        15
 1991  1,919                        94
 1992  2,608                        167
 1993  2,798                        251
 1994  2,994                        505
 1995  2,390                        631
 1996  2,155                        353
 1997  2,067                        2,764
 1998  1,515                        b
 1999  1,570                        b
 Total 22,869                       4,780

aFAA believes that the data for explosive devices may be misleading because
these items have not been consistently reported. The 1997 data are
particularly unreliable because they include mace or pepper spray canisters,
fireworks, flares, and other items that, while dangerous on an aircraft,
would not likely be used to hijack or damage an airplane. Because of the
inconsistencies and irregularities in the data reported by airports, FAA no
longer reports these data.

bNot available.

Source: FAA.

Screeners do not have police powers and cannot make arrests when they
discover dangerous objects. At larger airports, officers are generally
stationed on the premises and, when summoned to a screening checkpoint, make
arrests as warranted. Smaller airports may not have law enforcement officers
present, but FAA's regulations require that law enforcement personnel be
available to respond to any incidents.

The responsibility for screening passengers and carry-on baggage is shared
by FAA and air carriers. FAA's regulations requiring the screening of
passengers are contained in 14 C.F.R. part 108 and provide basic standards
for the equipment and procedures to be used. Additionally, the regulations
require each air carrier to have an FAA-approved security program that
provides detailed requirements and procedures for screening passengers and
their property. All U.S. carriers have adopted the Air Carrier Standard
Security Program that FAA developed in consultation with the airline
industry. Consequently, all carriers follow similar security procedures.

Furthermore, FAA's regulations establish minimum employment and training
standards for screeners. Among other things, these standards specify that
screeners possess basic aptitudes and physical abilities, including color
perception, visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and motor
skills; know how to read, write, and speak English; and complete 12 hours of
classroom training and 40 hours of on-the-job training. Screeners do not
need to be U.S. citizens or resident aliens, but if they are not, they must
have an authorization from the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service
to work in the United States. Screeners are required to have completed high
school, have an equivalency degree, or have an adequate combination of
education and experience.

Air carriers are responsible for conducting screening operations that meet
FAA's requirements. An air carrier can use its own employees to screen
passengers or contract with another air carrier or a security company to do
the screening in accordance with the air carrier's security program. Some
air carriers use their own employees to operate screening checkpoints. Most,
however, hire independent security firms to do the screening. Currently,
almost 100 security companies, employing an estimated 18,000 screeners, are
operating at U.S. airports. At large airports, several different screening
companies usually operate checkpoints under contract with various airlines.
The air carriers are required by FAA to maintain oversight of the checkpoint
operations and ensure that all of FAA's requirements are met.

FAA is responsible for overseeing and monitoring the effectiveness of
passenger screening and for enforcing compliance with its regulations. As
part of this responsibility, FAA inspects the operation of the checkpoints
and conducts tests of screeners' ability to detect dangerous objects--called
compliance tests. FAA special agents pose as passengers and attempt to get
weapons and other dangerous objects though checkpoints by concealing the
items either in carry-on baggage or on their own bodies. FAA conducts these
tests without notice, using a standard set of test objects, such as guns, or
other objects called improvised explosive devices, that are more difficult
to detect.4 Any time a screener fails to detect a standard test object or
follow the approved procedures during its tests, FAA can issue a violation
to the air carrier responsible for the checkpoint and assess a fine of up to
$11,000. FAA regards improvised explosive devices as a tool for training
screeners to detect devices that mimic those used by terrorists and does not
impose any fines if screeners fail to detect them.

Long-Standing

Concerns have long existed over screeners' ability to detect weapons and
other dangerous objects. In 1978, FAA's tests indicated that 13 percent of
the test objects concealed in carry-on bags passed through X-ray examination
without being detected--a rate that was considered "significant and
alarming" by both FAA and the airline industry at that time. An FAA-industry
task force in 1979 attributed this level of missed objects to personnel
factors such as high employee turnover, low pay, and inadequate training. In
two 1987 reports, we pointed out that about 20 percent of test objects were
still not being identified during the screening process, in large part
because of the same personnel factors--turnover, pay, and training.5

According to additional studies conducted in the mid- to late 1990s by FAA,
the National Research Council, and university researchers, it is evident
that there is room for substantial improvement in airport screening. These
studies continued to point out concerns about screeners' pay, turnover, and
training and the impact of these factors on screeners' performance.
Moreover, some of these studies indicated that screeners' poor performance
was a principal weakness of the passenger screening system.

The Congress recognized the problems with screeners' performance and passed
legislation in the 1990s to improve screening. Following the bombing of Pan
Am Flight 103, the Congress passed the Aviation Security Improvement Act of
1990 to increase the effectiveness of the nation's aviation security system.
The act mandated programmatic and organizational changes to FAA's security
program, including more stringent employment, education, and training
standards for screeners and other airport security personnel. Interest in
aviation security was renewed in 1996 by the crash of TWA Flight 800. In
response, the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security was
established and in its initial and final reports, identified aviation
security as a national issue and made a number of recommendations to improve
it. These recommendations included the purchase and deployment of new
screening technologies and equipment and the development of uniform
performance standards for the training and testing of screeners and the
certification of screening companies. The Congress also enacted two other
laws--the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act of 1997--which, among other things,
authorized and provided funding for implementing many of the security
recommendations contained in the Commission's report.

Despite these efforts, concerns over screeners' ability to detect dangerous
objects remain. Each year, instances occur in which passengers pass through
checkpoints at one airport and are subsequently found to have loaded guns at
screening checkpoints prior to boarding connecting flights at another
airport. Furthermore, screeners' performance in detecting dangerous objects
during FAA tests is still not adequate. Since 1997, data on FAA's test
results have been designated as sensitive security information and cannot be
released publicly; consequently, information on screeners' current
performance cannot be discussed in this report. Nevertheless, FAA has
acknowledged that screeners' detection of dangerous objects during its
testing is unsatisfactory and needs improvement.

Because of the long-standing problems with screeners' performance and
congressional interest in effecting lasting improvements in this
performance, the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Senate
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of its Subcommittee on Aviation requested that we
review the performance of screening personnel and the efforts being made to
improve their performance. We specifically agreed to address the following
key questions:

ï¿½ Since 1990, how accurately have screeners been detecting test objects?

ï¿½ What are the causes of screeners' performance problems and what efforts is
FAA making to address them?

ï¿½ How do selected foreign countries handle screening operations and do they
use practices that could help improve screeners' performance in the United
States?

The first question involves sensitive security information that cannot be
released publicly. Accordingly, our response was published in a separate
limited-distribution report.6 Our response to the two remaining questions
appear in this report.

To obtain an overall perspective on screeners' performance, we reviewed
relevant literature focusing on the causes of performance problems, efforts
to increase screeners' proficiency, and approaches to improving checkpoint
operations. We also reviewed our past reports on aviation security and
reports by the Department of Transportation's Office of Inspector General.

To determine the causes of screeners' performance problems and the status of
FAA's initiatives to improve their performance, we obtained and reviewed FAA
documents that described screening equipment research, development, and
deployment efforts; the relationship of human factors to screeners'
problems; and the development and implementation of FAA initiatives,
including those establishing (1) criteria for selecting screeners, (2)
better testing and training practices, and (3) a program for certifying
screening companies. We also reviewed FAA's goals for improving screeners'
performance and discussed the rationale for these goals and the plans for
measuring progress in achieving them with cognizant FAA officials. We also
met with FAA officials in Washington, D.C., and at FAA's Technical Center in
Atlantic City, New Jersey, to obtain information on the efforts being
undertaken to identify causes of performance problems and to implement
solutions.

Additionally, we met with representatives of five air carriers, seven
security companies, two screening equipment manufacturers, and two aviation
industry associations to obtain their perspectives on the performance of
screeners and the actions being taken to improve performance. We visited
five large airports--Hartsfield Atlanta International Airport; Dallas/Fort
Worth International Airport; Los Angeles International Airport; John F.
Kennedy International Airport; and Seattle/Tacoma International Airport--to
meet with screeners and to discuss screening with air carrier and security
company officials. At each location, we also met with local FAA field office
staff and the airport's FAA Federal Security Manager.

To determine how screening operations are handled in other countries, we
visited Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. We
selected these countries for a variety of reasons, such as recommendations
of FAA and aviation industry officials, the active role these countries have
in international aviation security organizations, and the generally high
level of concern for aviation security in these countries. In each country
we visited, we met with government and airport officials to discuss the
overall institutional framework for passenger screening; the procedures for
conducting screening; the requirements for training and certifying
screeners; and the compensation, benefits, and career opportunities provided
to screeners. We toured major airports in each of these countries and
observed screening checkpoints in operation. In Canada and the Netherlands,
we also met with screeners to learn about the positive and negative aspects
of their jobs. Because of the sensitive nature of security information, we
were unable to obtain data on screeners' performance from these countries.

We conducted our work from April 1999 through June 2000 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

Long-Standing Problems and Program Delays Hinder Improvements in Screeners'
Performance

No single problem causes checkpoint screeners to fail to detect dangerous
objects in carry-on bags or on passengers' bodies. Several long-standing and
long-recognized problems combine to reduce the screeners' effectiveness,
most notably

ï¿½ the rapid turnover among screeners that leaves few experienced personnel
at the checkpoints and

ï¿½ inattention to "human factors" issues, such as the repetitive tasks and
stress involved in the work, individuals' aptitudes for the work, and the
need for adequate training in spotting concealed objects that may be
dangerous.

FAA has several interrelated initiatives under way to improve checkpoint
screeners' performance, including improvements in procedures for selecting
and training screeners, better monitoring and testing of screeners, and a
certification program for screening companies. Although the initiatives hold
promise, they have not been fully implemented and are behind schedule.
Furthermore, FAA has established goals for improving screeners' performance,
but it (1) has yet to complete an integrated management plan to tie its
initiatives to achieving its goals and (2) has not adequately measured its
progress in achieving one of its goals.

Effectiveness

Because the screening equipment at airport checkpoints does not
automatically detect dangerous objects, the effectiveness of the screeners
operating the equipment is vital to maintaining the security of the aviation
system. It is the screeners who must determine whether an image on an X-ray
screen or the triggering of a metal detector's alarm indicates a security
concern and, if so, what action should be taken to resolve the concern. FAA,
the aviation industry, and others have long recognized that checkpoint
screeners are not more successful in their detection of dangerous objects
for several reasons. Two of the primary reasons are the rapid turnover among
screeners and human factors issues.

The rapid turnover among screeners has been a long-standing problem that
affects performance. Turnover was cited as a concern in studies as early as
1979. The studies have found that the high turnover rate means that
checkpoints are rarely staffed by screeners with much experience. For
instance, one study found that about 90 percent of all screeners at any
given checkpoint had less than 6 months' experience.7 At one airport we
visited, we found that, during a 3-month period in 1999, 114 of the 167
screeners (68 percent) hired had quit their jobs. Furthermore, of the 993
screeners trained at this airport over about a 1-year period, only 142 (14
percent) were still employed at the end of that year.

Not only has turnover been an historical problem, but it is worse today than
it was in the past. In 1987, we reported that turnover among screeners at
some airports was about 100 percent in a 12-month period;8 by 1994, FAA was
reporting that the turnover at some airports was 100 percent in a 10-month
period.9 For the 12 months from May 1998 through April 1999, turnover
averaged 126 percent among screeners at 19 large airports, according to data
the airports reported to FAA. Five of the airports reported turnover of 200
percent or more, with one reporting turnover of 416 percent. Table 2 lists
the turnover rates for screeners at 19 large airports during this period.

                                                         Annual

                  City (airport )                       turnover

                                                   rate (percentage)
 Atlanta (Hartsfield Atlanta International)        375
 Baltimore (Baltimore-Washington International)    155
 Boston (Logan International)                      207
 Chicago (Chicago-O'Hare International)            200
 Dallas-Ft. Worth (Dallas/Ft. Worth International) 156
 Denver (Denver International)                     193
 Detroit (Detroit Metro Wayne County)              79
 Honolulu (Honolulu International)                 37
 Houston (Houston Intercontinental)                237
 Los Angeles (Los Angeles International)           88
 Miami (Miami International)                       64
 New York (John F. Kennedy International)          53
 Orlando (Orlando International)                   100
 San Francisco (San Francisco International)       110
 San Juan (Luis Munoz Marin International)         70
 Seattle (Seattle-Tacoma International)            140
 St. Louis (Lambert St. Louis International)       416
 Washington (Washington-Dulles International)      90
 Washington (Ronald Reagan Washington National)    47
 Average turnover                                  126

Source: FAA.

Both FAA and the aviation industry attribute the high turnover to the low
wages screeners receive, the minimal benefits, and the daily stress of the
job. Generally, screeners get paid at or near the minimum wage. We found
that some of the screening companies at many of the nation's largest
airports paid screeners a starting salary of $6 an hour or less, and at some
airports, the starting salary was the minimum wage--$5.15 an hour. It is
common for the starting wages at airport fast-food restaurants to be higher
than the wages screeners receive. For instance, at one airport we visited,
the screeners' wages started as low as $6.25 an hour, whereas the starting
wage at one of the airport's fast-food restaurants was $7 an hour.

"Human factors" refers to the demands a job places on the capabilities of,
and the constraints it imposes on, the people doing it. For screeners, the
human factors issues cited in past studies include the repetitive tasks
screeners perform, the close and constant monitoring required to spot the
rare appearances of dangerous objects, and the stress involved in dealing
with the public, who may dislike being screened or demand faster action to
avoid missing their flights.10 FAA's research has found that too little
attention has been paid to (1) individuals' aptitudes for effectively
performing screening duties, (2) the sufficiency of the training provided to
screeners and how well they comprehended it, and (3) the monotony of the job
and the distractions that reduce screeners' vigilance.

As a result, according to FAA research officials, screeners are placed on
the job who do not have the necessary knowledge, skills, or abilities to
perform the work effectively and who then find the duties tedious and
unstimulating. The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism
and the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security both
concluded that better selection, training, and testing of screeners could
improve their performance. The 1999 National Research Council's report
assessing explosive detection equipment also found that FAA needed to
improve the training, testing, and qualification procedures for the
screeners operating the equipment.

Aspects Are Behind Schedule

FAA has undertaken several separate initiatives that are designed to address
the rapid turnover and human factors problems affecting screeners and thus
improve their performance. These initiatives include

ï¿½ improving the hiring and preparation of screeners through selection tests,
computer-based training, and competency tests;

ï¿½ a system to keep screeners alert and monitor their performance by
periodically projecting images of dangerous objects onto the monitors of the
X-ray machines at checkpoints and recording the screeners' responses; and

ï¿½ a certification program to make screening companies, along with the air
carriers, accountable for the training and performance of the screeners they
employ.

Table 3 summarizes these initiatives and the improvements FAA expects to
result. FAA is making progress with these initiatives, although delays have
occurred.

                   Expected improvement

                   Select         Ensure        Ensure         Increase
                                  screener is
 FAA initiative    candidate with trained and   screener is    pay, and
                   screener                     alert and      reduce
                   potential      ready to      monitored      turnover
                                  perform
 Hiring and
 preparation of
 screeners:
 Selection testing X                                           X
 Computer-based
 training                         X
 Competency
 testing                          X
 Threat image
 projection system                X             X
 Certification of
 screening                        X             X              X
 companies

Through separate initiatives, FAA is attempting to improve the selection of
candidates for screening positions, improve their training, and ensure their
readiness to perform their duties. First, FAA is developing standardized
selection tests to help screening companies identify applicants who have
natural aptitudes for checkpoint screening tasks. FAA's research has shown
that new screeners who lack certain aptitudes are more likely to quit and
that an effective selection process could result in improved performance,
maximum benefit from training resources, greater job satisfaction, and
reduced turnover. The selection tests will assess applicants' spatial memory
and visual perception, among other things. After validating one or more
selection tests, FAA will offer them to air carriers and screening companies
for their use. According to FAA officials, these tests should be helpful to
screening companies, and although they will not be required, FAA officials
are hopeful that screening companies will adopt and use them.

Second, to improve the quality and consistency of screeners' training, FAA
has been deploying computer-based training systems at the nation's airports.
These systems instruct trainees in all aspects of checkpoint screening,
including how to interpret X-ray images of carry-on baggage and how to
screen passengers. FAA believes computer-based training has advantages
because (1) screeners can learn at their own pace and have better
opportunities to develop detection skills, (2) training is more consistent,
and (3) overall training time can be reduced. An FAA study determined that
screeners who had computer-based training detected dangerous objects more
accurately than screeners who had traditional classroom instruction.

FAA is behind schedule in deploying the training systems, however, and those
in place are not being fully used. As of March 2000, FAA had the systems in
place at only 36 of the 79 airports it had expected to equip by the end of
the previous fiscal year. The agency attributes the delay to funding
problems and to a decision to replace 30 of the deployed systems with a
different computer system preferred by the airlines. FAA plans to deploy
systems to another 31 airports by the end of fiscal year 2001. Meanwhile,
the systems already deployed are not being fully used at some airports
because the equipment is located in one screening company's area and other
screening companies do not want to send their personnel to a competitor's
area. We reported on this situation in April 1998,11 and it continues to
exist. An FAA official whose office is responsible for deploying equipment
said that the agency plans, where possible, to deploy future systems to
multiple locations within airports to minimize this problem.

Third, FAA is developing three tests to measure screeners' mastery of
critical job elements. Screeners will be required to take (1) a readiness
test after their initial training and before they begin on-the-job training,
(2) a training test after they complete 40 hours of on-the-job training, and
(3) a review test after they complete required recurrent training. These
tests will help ensure that screeners have the knowledge and skills to
perform their jobs effectively and can perform at a prescribed level. FAA
expects the tests, which will be computer-based, will impose more control
and consistency in training. The agency is developing specific requirements
and guidelines for the tests, but it will not require them until it begins
certifying screening companies in 2002. Thus, it will be several years
before any benefits can be expected from these tests.

Because screeners check thousands of passengers and their baggage yet rarely
see dangerous objects being brought through airport checkpoints, remaining
vigilant is difficult. To help screeners remain alert, train them to become
more adept at detecting harder-to-spot objects such as improvised explosive
devices, and continuously measure their performance, FAA is deploying a
threat image projection system. This automated system is an enhancement to
the X-ray machines used at checkpoints. As checkpoint personnel routinely
scan passengers' carry-on bags, the system occasionally projects images of
dangerous objects, including guns and explosives, on the X-ray machines'
screens. Screeners are expected to identify the generated images as
dangerous objects. The system records the screeners' responses to the
projected images, providing a measure of their performance while keeping
them more alert. By frequently exposing screeners to a variety of images of
dangerous objects on the X-ray screens, the system provides continuous
on-the-job training.

Furthermore, the threat image projection system and analyses of its data are
critical to a number of FAA's efforts to improve screeners' performance. The
data will be used to analyze performance--by individual screener, screening
company, airport, air carrier, or dangerous object--to determine areas of
weakness. The data will also be used to assess and validate the results of
FAA's efforts to improve screeners' performance, such as by allowing the
agency to compare the results of screener selection tests or computer-based
training with on-the-job performance. The data from the system can also be
used to tailor recurrent training to meet individual screeners' needs. In
addition, the system's data are critical to FAA's efforts to establish the
performance standards that screening companies will be expected to meet in
order to be certified.

Deployment of the threat image projection system, however, is behind
schedule. FAA had planned to begin installing 284 units on existing X-ray
machines at 19 large airports in April 1998, but because of hardware and
software problems, FAA changed its plans and decided to purchase new X-ray
machines already equipped with the threat image projection system. As of
March 2000, FAA had deployed 30 of these machines at six large airports for
testing, and beginning in mid-2000, it will begin purchasing and deploying
another 1,380 such machines. FAA expects to have the system in place at the
largest airports by the end of fiscal year 2001 and at all airports by the
end of fiscal 2003. Unfortunately, these delays in the system's deployment
have already impeded another key initiative to improve screeners'
performance--the certification of screening companies.

In response to a mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996
and a recommendation from the 1997 report of the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security, FAA is creating a program to certify the
companies that staff screening checkpoints. As currently proposed, the
certification program will establish performance standards--an action we
recommended in 198712--that the screening companies will have to meet to
earn and retain certification; require that all screeners pass
computer-based tests after initial, on-the-job, and recurrent training; and
require that all air carriers have the threat image projection system on the
X-ray machines at their checkpoints so that screeners' performance can be
measured to ensure that FAA's standards are met. FAA believes that the need
to meet certification standards will give the screening companies a greater
incentive to raise screeners' wages and improve training in order to obtain
better screeners and keep them longer. Most of the air carrier, screening
company, and airport representatives we contacted said they believe
certification has the potential to improve screeners' performance.

FAA plans to issue a regulation establishing the certification program by
May 2001, over 4 years after the passage of the Reauthorization Act and more
than 2 years later than its earlier estimated issuance date of March 1999.
Moreover, before FAA can begin certifying screening companies, it must (1)
complete the installation of the threat image projection system needed to
set standards and measure screeners' performance, (2) review and approve the
screening companies' security programs, and (3) establish a staff to handle
the certification program. Because the threat image projection system will
not be completely installed before the end of fiscal year 2003, FAA is
exploring other ways to set standards and is considering using the results
from its compliance tests in conjunction with available data from the threat
image projection system. According to FAA, the first certifications of
screening companies will not take place until 2002.

Performance

The Government Performance and Results Act (Results Act) requires each
federal agency to set multiyear strategic goals and strategies for reaching
them, as well as measure performance toward achieving the goals. The
measurement information is to give the agency and others a clear picture of
its progress toward meeting the established goals. In accordance with this
requirement, FAA included in its 1998 strategic plan goals for measuring its
progress in improving screeners' performance.13 Using the results of its
screener compliance tests as a performance measure, the agency established
goals for increasing the detection of dangerous objects carried by FAA
agents in carry-on baggage and on the body through metal detectors.

In addition to establishing goals, FAA began in early 1999 to develop an
integrated checkpoint screening management plan to help it meet its
improvement goals and better focus its efforts to improve screeners'
performance. According to FAA officials, the plan will (1) incorporate FAA's
screener improvement goals and detail how its efforts relate to the goals'
achievement; (2) identify and prioritize checkpoint and human factors
problems that need to be resolved; and (3) provide measures for addressing
the performance problems, including related milestone and budget
information. Such a plan is needed to provide management with the
information it needs to guide its various planning, research and
development, and equipment deployment efforts; integrate those efforts
toward common achievable goals; and prioritize funding needs. An integrated
plan is also essential to help FAA track the status of its various
initiatives to improve screeners' performance and to take actions to help
keep the agency on schedule.

However, the plan has yet to be completed. During our review, FAA security
officials told us several times that the plan would be completed shortly,
and they provided various completion dates, but the completion dates were
not met. FAA officials told us that elements of the plan are nevertheless
being implemented. For example, FAA consolidated the responsibility for
screening checkpoint improvements under a single program manager responsible
for overseeing the development of the plan and for coordinating screener
improvement efforts at FAA headquarters, FAA field locations, and the
agency's Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey. In addition,
quarterly briefings are provided to the Associate Administrator for Civil
Aviation Security on the status of the initiatives covered in the plan.
Nevertheless, these officials stated that cost data for the plan must still
be developed and they do not expect these data until the end of the year.

FAA acknowledges that it did not approach its Results Act goal for improving
the detection of dangerous objects carried on the body through metal
detectors. It did, however, report almost meeting its goal for improving the
detection of dangerous objects in carry-on baggage. Nevertheless, our
analysis shows that FAA did not use a methodology that provides a consistent
measure of progress toward this goal. Although FAA measured screeners'
detection rates for both standard test objects and explosive devices in
carry-on baggage for both fiscal year 1998 and fiscal year 1999 and then
calculated a combined detection rate for each fiscal year, it modified its
testing in fiscal year 1999. In that year, FAA conducted proportionally
fewer tests using the harder-to-spot improvised explosive devices and more
tests using the more readily spotted standard test objects than it conducted
the year before. As a result, the combined detection rate for fiscal year
1999 was higher than for fiscal year 1998, even though the detection rates
for improvised explosive devices and for standard test objects each declined
during fiscal year 1999. Had FAA conducted both tests in the same
proportions during both fiscal years, the detection rate for fiscal 1999
would have been lower than it was for fiscal year 1998.

FAA security officials said that the choice of objects used during
compliance testing is up to the agents conducting the tests. They also said
security officials had not been aware that proportionally fewer tests would
be done with improvised explosive devices and they had not considered the
impact of this difference. They also said that, when they established the
goals, the agency anticipated a wider deployment of some screener
improvement initiatives, such as the threat image projection and
computer-based training systems. Consequently, FAA officials said they will
likely revise the goals to reflect the improvements in screeners'
performance that they now believe can be attained during the next 3 years.
They do not plan to revise the methodology that aggregates the test results
for carry-on baggage.

Despite concerns about checkpoint screeners' ability to detect and prevent
weapons and explosives from being taken aboard aircraft, long-standing--and
long-recognized--problems affecting screeners' performance, such as rapid
turnover and inadequate attention to human factors, remain. FAA's
initiatives to address these problems may, in the long run, help
considerably; however, the continuing delays in implementing the agency's
two key initiatives--the threat image projection system and the screening
company certification program--are prolonging the time before the public can
have greater assurance that dangerous objects are prevented from being
brought aboard aircraft.

We are encouraged that FAA is taking actions to improve the management of
its screener initiatives. These actions--adopting performance goals to
measure its progress, developing and implementing an integrated plan to
better focus and manage its checkpoint screening improvement initiatives,
and consolidating these initiatives under a single program manager--will be
crucial to guiding the implementation of FAA's initiatives. However, FAA has
operated far too long without a complete integrated plan, and its method for
calculating progress toward improving detection rates does not produce
meaningful results that present a clear picture of progress. Finalizing the
integrated plan would provide a document that FAA management could use to
track the agency's progress in implementing efforts to improve screeners'
performance. Establishing separate goals for the detection of standard test
objects and improvised explosive devices in carry-on baggage would provide a
more meaningful measure of FAA's progress toward improving screeners'
performance.

To better implement FAA's efforts to improve screeners' performance and to
provide a valid basis for evaluating FAA's progress in achieving its
performance goals for screeners, we recommend that the Secretary of
Transportation direct the Administrator, FAA, to take the following actions:

ï¿½ Require that FAA's integrated checkpoint screening management plan, which
ties together the various initiatives for improving screeners' performance,
be promptly completed, implemented, continuously monitored and updated, and
evaluated for effectiveness.

ï¿½ For reporting under the Government Performance and Results Act, establish
separate goals for the detection of standard test objects and improvised
explosive devices concealed in carry-on baggage.

FAA officials generally concurred with the facts presented in our draft
report and agreed that the performance of checkpoint screeners needs to
improve. FAA officials also agreed with our recommendation to promptly
complete the agency's integrated checkpoint screening management plan. FAA
pointed out that the plan is now essentially complete except for cost data,
and that these data are expected to be completed by the end of 2000.
However, they added that the plan is an iterative working document that
changes as projects and activities are added or finished, and in that sense
the plan, when completed, will never be finalized. FAA officials stated that
the latest iteration of the plan is reviewed and approved quarterly at
program meetings with the Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation
Security.

FAA, however, did not concur with the draft report's recommendation that,
for reporting under the Government Performance and Results Act, it establish
separate goals for the detection of standard test objects and improvised
explosive devices concealed in carry-on baggage. FAA commented that,
although it agreed with the intent of the recommendation, it nevertheless
believes that it is reasonable to aggregate the test results for assessments
under the Results Act, since the Department of Transportation, as the
reporting agency, tries to limit the number of goals established under the
act. While GAO agrees that efforts should be made to limit the number of
goals, measurement information required by the Results Act must nevertheless
be meaningful and provide the agency with a clear picture of its progress
toward meeting its established goals. GAO continues to believe that the
progress shown in meeting FAA's current goal is not meaningful--since it
can, and does, show improved performance when in fact none exists--and that
the goal needs to be revised.

Selected Foreign Countries' Screening
Practices, Turnover, and Performance

Aviation security is a problem that the United States does not face alone;
it is a worldwide concern. In fact, far more incidents of aviation terrorism
have occurred in other parts of the world than in the United States. For
instance, during the one-year period ending December 1999, 13 hijackings of
aircraft occurred; none of these incidents took place in the United States
or involved a U.S. airline.

Because of their concern about aviation security, most nations have
procedures for screening passengers and their bags before allowing them
aboard commercial airliners. In visits to five countries, we found that
although passengers are screened there much as they are in the United
States, some practices and policies differ. For example, in most of these
countries we found

ï¿½ more extensive qualifications and training for screeners,

ï¿½ higher pay for screeners,

ï¿½ screening responsibilities assigned to the airport or government, and

ï¿½ more stringent checkpoint operations, such as routine "pat down" searches
of passengers.

We also found that turnover is not as significant a problem in these other
countries as it is in the United States. Furthermore, while data for other
countries screeners' performance in detecting dangerous objects were not
available, a test conducted jointly by FAA and one of the countries showed
that the other country's screeners detected over twice as many test objects
as did U.S. screeners. However, there are no other such tests or other
performance data available to us and without specific performance data, we
could not determine whether any of the differences found in the other
countries improve screeners' performance in those countries or would improve
screeners' performance in the United States.

Differ

FAA security officials and industry representatives familiar with foreign
countries' security operations identified a number of countries that screen
passengers effectively. From among these countries, we selected
five--Belgium, Canada, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom--to
determine if their screening practices differ from those in the United
States.

We visited these five countries to observe their screening practices. In
general, much of what these countries do to screen passengers is similar to
what is done in the United States. All five countries examine the contents
of carry-on bags by using X-ray machines or physical searches and scan
passengers by using metal detectors. But important differences exist in (1)
screeners' qualifications, (2) the pay and benefits screeners receive, (3)
the assignment of responsibility for screening, and (4) the operation of
screening checkpoints.

Most of the countries we visited had more stringent requirements for hiring
and training individuals to become screeners. In the United States, FAA
requires that to be hired as a screener, a person must have a high school
education or a combination of adequate education and experience; pass a
background check; and be able to read, write, and speak English. A screener
is not required to be a citizen or to have established residency. Most of
the countries we visited had similar education and background check
requirements; however, in some countries, a screener must either be a
citizen of the country or have resided in the country for a specific length
of time. Belgium requires screeners to be citizens and to be fluent in both
French and Dutch. The Netherlands requires screeners to have resided in the
country for at least 5 years and to be fluent in both Dutch and English.
France requires screener candidates to be citizens of a European Union
country; because of the close cooperation among police within the European
Union, French officials believe this requirement provides assurance that
they can obtain adequate background checks. Canada's requirements are
similar to those in the United States. Canada requires screeners to be
citizens or permanent residents with valid employment authorization
documents, and screeners must be able to read, write, and speak either
French or English.

The training required to become a screener is more extensive in four of the
five countries. FAA requires that screeners in the United States receive 12
hours of classroom training, followed by at least 40 hours of on-the-job
training. In contrast, other countries generally require more training. The
Netherlands requires candidates for screening positions to train first and
become certified as general security officers and then take specialized
training to be certified as checkpoint screeners. In the Netherlands, the 40
hours of specialized training for screeners includes classroom work,
computer-based training, and role-playing. This is followed by 2 months of
on-the-job training and 24 hours of additional training each year for
screeners to maintain certification. In Belgium, the basic training for
certification as checkpoint screeners includes 40 hours of training on
aviation issues. In addition, Belgium requires training in various aviation
security topics, such as operating X-ray machines, ranging from 4 to 64
hours. Canada requires 20 hours of classroom training in addition to 40
hours of on-the-job training. After completing the training, Canadian
screeners are certified by the government. Once certified, screeners must
pass written and practical tests every 2 years to be recertified. In France,
screeners must complete 60 hours of training followed by 20 hours of
on-the-job training, coupled with tasks such as checking tickets or doing
guard duty. These assignments give the screening company opportunities to
observe and evaluate new staff and provide additional training if necessary.
After completing on-the-job training, new screeners must pass tests
administered by the French government.

Another major difference between the United States and most of the other
countries we visited is the level of compensation screeners receive. As
discussed in chapter 2, screeners in the United States are generally paid at
or only slightly above the minimum wage of $5.15 an hour and receive minimal
benefits. In the European countries we visited, screeners' pay and benefits
are higher. For example, Belgian officials said screeners are paid the
equivalent of about $14 to $15 per hour and they receive benefits, such as
health care, as required by Belgian law. In the Netherlands, screeners
receive a minimum salary, based on a collective labor agreement, that is
equivalent to about $7.50 per hour, which Dutch screeners said is at least
25 percent higher than what fast-food restaurants pay and is sufficient to
support a middle-income lifestyle. In addition, they receive health care,
retirement, and vacation benefits. At one screening company in France
screeners earn a starting salary equivalent to about $5.80 per hour with an
extra month salary for staying 1 year. In the United Kingdom screeners earn
the equivalent of about $8 per hour. Governments in both nations also
provide health benefits. In Canada, the starting wage for a screener is the
equal to about $5.34 per hour in U.S. funds, more than the starting salary
at an airport fast-food restaurant. All Canadian screeners receive health
benefits from their provincial governments, and many employers offer
additional subsidized health insurance plans. The Canadian government
requires that all employers provide paid vacations and paid holidays.

Most of the five countries we visited do not make air carriers responsible
for screening passengers as the United States does and so have more
centralized screening operations. At some major U.S. airports, such as John
F. Kennedy International and Los Angeles International, airlines may employ
four or five different screening companies to operate the checkpoints in
their areas of the airport. By contrast, most of the countries we visited
assigned the responsibility for screening to the government or to the
airport authority, putting one entity in charge of screening for an entire
airport. In Belgium, France, and the United Kingdom, the airports are
responsible for screening. In Belgium, the airport authority, once a
government entity and now private, is responsible for hiring and managing
screeners. In France, an airport authority can hire one or more security
companies approved by the Ministry of the Interior. The police and customs
officials supervise the security companies and their screeners, examining
turnover rates and wages, analyzing incident reports, and testing screeners.
In the United Kingdom, the airport company itself may contract the screening
operations to one or more security companies or choose, as the two largest
airports near London have done, to hire screeners directly and manage their
work.

In the Netherlands, the government is currently responsible for passenger
screening. It employs a security company to conduct the screening
operations, and the Dutch Royal Marechaussee--a national police
force--oversees the operations. However, the Netherlands is preparing
legislation under which the responsibility for implementing checkpoint
screening will be transferred to the airport. In Canada, screening
responsibility is vested in the air carriers, just as it is in the United
States.

According to officials in some of these countries, assigning the
responsibility for screening passengers to organizations other than airlines
makes a significant difference. They said that air carriers have economic
pressures that airports and governments face to a lesser degree. As a
result, they said, airports or governments can provide better training and
pay better wages than air carriers can. According to officials in the United
Kingdom, when an airport hires screeners directly, the screeners can be
given a range of security duties beyond staffing the checkpoints and have a
greater opportunity for career development. British officials noted that the
varied duties and career opportunities improve motivation and performance.
Some foreign government and airport officials also pointed out that when
several air carriers and security companies are handling screening within
one airport, as is the case in the United States, responsibility is
fragmented, uniformity is lacking, and competition among the security
companies to be the low bidder for the air carriers' screening business puts
downward pressure on screeners' wages, making it difficult to attract and
retain good screeners.

We observed three differences in procedures that made screening more
stringent at airports in the countries we visited. First, to help determine
if dangerous items are present, screeners in some countries physically
search passengers if they set off metal detector alarms. In the United
States, screeners use hand-held metal detectors to identify potentially
dangerous objects but generally avoid physically touching the passengers. In
contrast, screeners in three countries--Belgium, the Netherlands, and the
United Kingdom--routinely "pat down" passengers when the alarms on
walk-through metal detectors go off. Officials in these countries told us
that if an alarm goes off as a passenger walks through a metal detector,
screeners are required to physically search the passenger immediately to
determine if a dangerous object is present. Officials from these countries
said screeners there do not routinely use hand-held metal detectors because,
if not used properly, they can fail to detect metal objects. Dutch officials
added that a hand-held metal detector can leave the impression that an item
such as a belt buckle has caused the alarm, whereas a weapon could be hidden
behind the buckle and not be detected by a screener unless touched.
Additionally, in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, screeners will
randomly select passengers to be physically searched even though they did
not set off alarms. The random searches are conducted because nonmetallic
objects can pose a substantial threat to the security of an aircraft; the
searches may not only turn up specific items but also deter passengers from
attempting to carry these items onto an aircraft.

The second difference in checkpoint operations we observed is that only
ticketed passengers are screened and allowed to proceed beyond the
checkpoints in all five countries. At most U.S. airports, nonpassengers as
well as passengers are allowed though checkpoints and into the secure areas
of airports. Officials from some other countries gave a number of reasons
for limiting access to checkpoints. Most significant, limiting access to
passengers reduces the number of people entering secure areas and
consequently reduces the risk that a dangerous object will be brought onto
an aircraft. Officials in some countries pointed out that a terrorist could
have unticketed accomplices carry components of a bomb through a checkpoint
and then assemble the pieces once inside the secure area. These officials
also noted that limiting the number of people passing through the
checkpoints reduces the burden on screeners, allowing them to be more
thorough and minimizing screening costs.

The third difference in how checkpoints are operated is the more visible
presence of police and military security personnel. At large airports in the
United States, a police presence is required to respond to alerts from
checkpoints within 5 minutes. But although uniformed police are stationed in
the larger U.S. airport complexes, they are generally not posted at the
screening checkpoints. At large airports in the countries we visited, police
or military personnel are either at the checkpoints or posted visibly
nearby. For example, at Belgium's main airport, police maintain a constant
presence in one of two glass-enclosed rooms directly behind the checkpoints.
In France and the United Kingdom, armed security forces--often carrying
automatic weapons--patrol at or near the checkpoints. In the Netherlands,
armed security forces are posted at screening checkpoints for flights that
are deemed high risk--a category that includes flights to the United States.

Besides the differences in checkpoint operations, other major differences
distinguishing screening in the countries we visited and the United States
are turnover rates and perhaps performance. While officials were reluctant
to give us detailed data on turnover rates for screeners, they did say that
the rates were significantly lower there than in the United States.
According to officials from these countries, their annual screener turnover
rates were about 50 percent or less. The lowest turnover rate was in
Belgium, where officials at the country's main airport said that it was less
than 4 percent last year. In contrast, turnover rates in the United States
averaged 126 percent annually at 19 large airports.

Additionally, screeners in these countries may perform better in detecting
dangerous objects. Because of security concerns, foreign country officials
would not provide performance data during our visits. Consequently, little
information is available to compare the effectiveness of the five countries'
screening operations with those in the United States. However, we did find
that in 1998, FAA and one of the countries we visited jointly tested
screeners' performance using the same objects and procedures at one or more
airports in each country. In these tests the detection rate for screeners in
the other country was more than twice as high as the rate for screeners in
the United States.

FAA has recognized that other countries have different screening practices
that may lead to better performance by screeners. In its 1999 proposed rule
for the certification of screening companies, FAA noted that experience in
other countries seems to indicate that higher compensation and more training
may result in lower turnover rates and more effective performance. FAA also
noted that the United States can strengthen its screening practices in many
areas, several of which--including performance and screeners' work
environment--are addressed in its proposed screener certification program.
Finally, FAA pointed out that U.S. air carriers and screening companies may
want to pursue factors such as more training, higher pay, and more
experience to achieve higher performance.

Some Members of Congress have also recognized that the practices of other
countries, particularly their training of screeners, may improve screeners'
performance. Consequently, legislation was recently proposed to increase
screeners' training requirements. Under this proposal (S.2440), introduced
in April 2000, screeners would be required to have 40 hours of classroom
instruction, plus 40 hours of practical training, before being qualified to
provide screening services. As of May 2000, the Senate was still considering
this legislation.

At this time, FAA is not considering any changes in U.S. screening practices
based on the experiences of other countries. FAA looked at one of the
differences we identified--the assignment of responsibility for conducting
screening operations--and considered shifting it away from air carriers.
However, FAA concluded in a 1999 report to the Congress that there was a
lack of consensus in the civil aviation community on any changes in the
current system of shared security responsibilities and therefore no change
should be made. In other areas, FAA expects to conduct research and examine
operational data, both domestically and in conjunction with foreign
governments, to determine how various factors affect screeners' performance
and retention.

FAA officials noted that some of the screening practices of other countries
reflect cultural and other differences between these countries and the
United States. In their view, such practices would not be acceptable in this
country. They pointed in particular to the routine and frequent patting down
of passengers, which they believe the American public would not tolerate.
The FAA officials said that protecting an individual's civil liberties and
taking into account the American public's low tolerance for what may be
perceived as invasions of privacy are high priorities when considering
checkpoint procedures and equipment.

Although insufficient information is available to make broad statements on
key measures of performance in detecting dangerous objects, other countries
may have better approaches to conducting screening activities. The root
causes of screeners' problems in this country--frequent turnover and
inadequate attention to human factors concerns such as training--do not
appear to be as prevalent in some other countries. Furthermore, as indicated
in the one instance of joint testing between the United States and another
country, the detection of dangerous objects may also be better in other
countries. What is not clear, however, is the extent to which each of the
different practices identified limits turnover and human factors concerns
and improves screeners' performance. Although certain practices, such as
higher pay and benefits, can be assumed to reduce turnover and improve job
satisfaction, there are no data to determine the impact on turnover and
performance of practices such as physical searches of passengers,
limitations on access to checkpoints, or the assignment of screening
responsibility to airports.

In light of the (1) limited data on the impact of other countries' screening
practices on screeners' turnover and performance, (2) FAA's ongoing efforts
to improve screeners' performance, and (3) legislation proposed to increase
screeners' training requirements, we do not believe it is necessary to add
or revise other screening practices at this time. FAA's initiatives, such as
the screening company certification program and the implementation of
performance standards for screeners, may improve screeners' performance.
However, if these initiatives do not bring about satisfactory improvements
or if progress is too slow, it may be necessary to consider pursuing some of
the strategies and practices other countries use to operate screening
checkpoints.

FAA officials said that the draft report did not provide their perspective
on the role of cultural and other concerns in countries' screening practices
and the public's acceptance of these practices. They noted that what is
acceptable to the public elsewhere may not be acceptable in the United
States. The officials said that FAA must be aware of the need to protect
civil liberties and privacy when considering checkpoint procedures and
equipment. We revised the draft report to include their views. They added
that there are fewer airports and screeners in these countries than there
are in the United States. However, they provided no information on how these
factors affect screeners' performance and turnover or on how they influence
human factors concerns.

GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments

Gerald L. Dillingham, Ph.D. (202) 512-2834

John R. Schulze (202) 512-2834

In addition to those named above, Leslie D. Albin, J. Michael Bollinger, A.
Donald Cowan, Elizabeth R. Eisenstadt, Curtis L. Groves, David K. Hooper,
Barry R. Kime, and Daniel J. Semick made key contributions to this report.

Related GAO Products

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities Still Exist in the Aviation Security
System (GAO/T-RCED-AIMD-00-142, Apr. 6, 2000).

Aviation Security: Slow Progress in Addressing Long-Standing Screener
Performance Problems (GAO/T-RCED-00-125, Mar. 16, 2000).

Aviation Security: FAA's Actions to Study Responsibilities and Funding for
Airport Security and to Certify Screening Companies (GAO/RCED-99-53, Feb.
25, 1999).

Aviation Security: FAA's Deployments of Equipment to Detect Traces of
Explosives (GAO/RCED-99-32R, Nov. 13, 1998).

Aviation Security: Progress Being Made, but Long-Term Attention Is Needed
(GAO/T-RCED-98-190, May 14, 1998).

Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Underway, but
Completion Will Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102, Apr. 24, 1998).

Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening Performance
Standards (GAO/RCED-87-182, July 24, 1987).

Aviation Security: FAA Preboard Passenger Screening Test Results
(GAO/RCED-87-125FS, Apr. 30, 1987).

(348159)

Table 1: Number of Firearms and Explosive Devices Detected
by Airport Screeners, Calendar Years 1990-99 17

Table 2: Turnover Rates for Screeners at 19 Large airports,
May 1998-April 1999 24

Table 3: FAA's Initiatives to Improve Screeners' Performance 27

Figure 1: Screeners Operating a Typical Security Checkpoint
at an Airport 16
  

1. Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Difficulty Detecting
Dangerous Objects (GAO/RCED-00-159 , June 2000).

2. The results of these tests and the identity of the participant country
are sensitive security information and cannot be released publicly.

3. FAA had deployed this equipment, referred to as explosive trace
detectors, to 84 domestic airports as of April 2000, and it plans
deployments to additional airports.

4. Improvised explosive devices consist of simulated explosives and various
modular, off-the-shelf components.

5. Aviation Security: FAA Preboard Passenger Screening Test Results
(GAO/RCED-87-125FS , Apr. 30, 1987) and Aviation Security: FAA Needs
Preboard Passenger Screening Performance Standards (GAO/RCED-87-182 , July
24, 1987).

6. Aviation Security: Screeners Continue to Have Difficulty Detecting
Dangerous Objects (GAO/RCED-00-159 , June 2000).

7. Development of Decision-Centered Interventions for Airport Security
Checkpoints (DOT/FAA/CT-94/27, Aug. 1994); Review of the Literature Related
to Screening Airline Passenger Baggage (DOT/FAA/CT/94/108, Oct. 1994).

8. Aviation Security: FAA Needs Preboard Passenger Screening Performance
Standards (GAO/RCED-87-182 , July 24, 1987).

9. DOT/FAA/CT94/108.

10. Reports on the human factors involved in checkpoint screening go back 20
years; among the most recent are those of the President's Commission on
Aviation Security and Terrorism, 1990; the White House Commission on
Aviation Safety and Security, 1997; and the National Academy of Sciences
Assessment of Technologies Deployed to Improve Aviation Security, 1999.

11. Aviation Security: Implementation of Recommendations Is Under Way, but
Completion Will Take Several Years (GAO/RCED-98-102 , Apr. 24, 1998).

12. GAO/RCED-87-182 , July 24, 1987.

13. FAA views specific data relating to these goals, as well as other
information relating to screeners' detection rates, to be sensitive security
information that cannot be publicly released.
*** End of document. ***