Commercial Motor Vehicles: Effectiveness of Actions Being Taken to
Improve Motor Carrier Safety Is Unknown (Letter Report, 07/17/2000,
GAO/RCED-00-189).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed efforts being
undertaken by the Department of Transportation (DOT) Federal Motor
Carrier Safety Administration to reduce the number of truck-related
fatalities, focusing on: (1) the motor carrier administration's overall
strategy for reducing fatalities resulting from crashes involving large
trucks; (2) specific actions the motor carrier administration is taking
to meet this goal; (3) the extent to which the motor carrier
administration has considered additional improvements suggested by the
safety community, industry, and others; and (4) the bases for the motor
carrier administration's estimates for the expected number of lives to
be saved as a result of proposed revisions to its hours of service
rules.

GAO noted that: (1) the motor carrier administration has developed an
overall strategy for improving the safety of commercial motor vehicles
(trucks and buses); (2) this strategy, called the Safety Action Plan,
covers the years 2000 through 2003 and contains 47 initiatives that are
intended to be an initial step in enabling DOT to reach its goal of
reducing fatalities due to crashes involving large trucks by 50 percent
by 2009; (3) these initiatives fall within several broad categories,
including increasing the enforcement of federal safety regulations,
increasing safety awareness, improving safety information and
technology, and improving performance standards for vehicles, drivers,
and motor carriers; (4) however, DOT has not articulated how the
individual initiatives, or sets of initiatives, in the plan will
contribute to reductions in truck-related fatalities; (5) in response to
the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, criticisms by
congressional subcommittees, and recommendations by DOT's Inspector
General, GAO, and others, DOT has taken initial steps toward improving
motor carrier safety; (6) these steps include establishing a new
organizational structure-the motor carrier administration that has
accountability for truck safety and that supports a greater emphasis on
enforcement and compliance; (7) also, DOT appears to be making progress
on some of the individual initiatives in its Safety Action Plan; (8) the
motor carrier administration sought comments on a draft of its Safety
Action Plan from 49 organizations representing industry and the safety
community; (9) it also published proposed revisions to its regulations
that limit the number of hours that drivers of commercial motor vehicles
are permitted to drive before resting; (10) under the proposed rule, DOT
estimates that 115 fatigue-related fatalities would be avoided annually;
(11) DOT recognizes the uncertainty of its estimates but emphasized that
providing drivers with more time for sleep will lessen fatigue and
thereby reduce the number of fatigue-related crashes; and (12) the
reasonableness of DOT's assumptions and the resulting estimate of the
number of lives that could be saved if the proposed rule is adopted,
however, are unknown.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  RCED-00-189
     TITLE:  Commercial Motor Vehicles: Effectiveness of Actions Being
	     Taken to Improve Motor Carrier Safety Is Unknown
      DATE:  07/17/2000
   SUBJECT:  Highway safety
	     Trucking operations
	     Accident prevention
	     Motor carrier operations
	     Traffic accidents
	     Performance measures
	     Strategic planning
IDENTIFIER:  DOT Safety Action Plan
	     DOT Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks
	     Program
	     DOT Large Truck Crash Causation Project
	     OMCHS Performance and Registration Information Systems
	     Management Program

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GAO/RCED-00-189

Resources, Community, and
Economic Development Division

B-284418

July 17, 2000

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
Chairman, Subcommittee on Transportation
and Related Agencies
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman:

In 1998, 5,374 people died on our nation's roads from crashes involving
large trucks (those with a gross weight of at least 10,001 pounds), a figure
largely unchanged from a decade ago. Some fatal crashes are the result of
truck drivers' operating their vehicles while fatigued. The number of
fatigue-related fatalities is not known with any precision. However, there
is widespread agreement that the federal rules governing the hours that
commercial motor vehicle drivers must rest before driving needs to be
revised.

Federal responsibilities for motor carrier safety reside in the Department
of Transportation's (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (the
motor carrier administration), which was created to give motor carrier
safety increased attention and stature within DOT.1 In this regard, DOT has
initiated a number of actions to reduce fatalities, including (1)
establishing a goal to reduce the number of truck-related fatalities by 50
percent by 20092 and (2) proposing changes in the regulations that govern
the amount of time in a day that drivers may work (called "hours of
service"), aimed at allowing them to obtain more rest. However, the proposal
has engendered much critical comment from safety advocates, enforcement
organizations, and industry representatives.

We reported earlier to you on the issue of large truck safety.3 Because of
your continuing concern in this area, you asked us to review efforts being
undertaken by the motor carrier administration to reduce the number of
truck-related fatalities. Specifically, we examined (1) the motor carrier
administration's overall strategy for reducing fatalities resulting from
crashes involving large trucks; (2) specific actions the motor carrier
administration is taking to meet this goal; (3) the extent to which the
motor carrier administration has considered additional improvements
suggested by the safety community, industry, and others; and (4) the bases
for the motor carrier administration's estimates for the expected number of
lives to be saved as a result of proposed revisions to its hours of service
rules.

The motor carrier administration has developed an overall strategy for
improving the safety of commercial motor vehicles (trucks and buses). This
strategy, called the Safety Action Plan, covers the years 2000 through 2003
and contains 47 initiatives that are intended to be an initial step in
enabling the Department to reach its goal of reducing fatalities due to
crashes involving large trucks by 50 percent by 2009. These initiatives fall
within several broad categories, including increasing the enforcement of
federal safety regulations; increasing safety awareness; improving safety
information and technology; and improving performance standards for
vehicles, drivers, and motor carriers. However, the Department has not
articulated how the individual initiatives, or sets of initiatives, in the
plan will contribute to reductions in truck-related fatalities. DOT does not
expect to have information for several years that would allow it to estimate
the degree to which its initiatives will reduce truck-related fatalities and
still expects that making such estimates would be difficult. In addition,
the Department has not determined whether it can reasonably expect to
complete all 47 activities with expected budgetary and human resources.
Department officials told us that publication of the motor carrier
administration's Safety Action Plan signals its intent to carry it out and
that the Department expects to examine these resource needs this year.
Because the Department's goal of reducing truck-related fatalities is
extremely ambitious, it is important for the Department to determine how the
actions it is taking will lead to a reduction in the number of truck-related
fatalities and whether it can reasonably expect to carry out the initiatives
in its Safety Action Plan.

In response to the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, criticisms
by this Subcommittee, and recommendations by DOT's Inspector General, us,
and others, the Department has taken initial steps toward improving motor
carrier safety. These steps include establishing a new organizational
structure--the motor carrier administration--that has accountability for
truck safety and that supports a greater emphasis on enforcement and
compliance. Also, the Department appears to be making progress on some of
the individual initiatives in its Safety Action Plan. For example, under its
Large Truck Crash Causation Project, which is intended to result in a
national database on the causes and contributing factors of large truck
crashes, DOT has studied the feasibility of conducting the project and has
selected four pilot sites to test the data-gathering methodology. Testing at
the four pilot sites is expected to begin this July, and a full test (24
sites) is expected to begin in January 2001.

The motor carrier administration sought comments on a draft of its Safety
Action Plan from 49 organizations representing industry and the safety
community. Nine of these organizations provided written comments. We found
that the Department made changes to the plan to address most of the
comments. For example, in response to comments from an organization
representing bus companies, the motor carrier administration added a task to
the plan to gather more safety information on these types of vehicles.

The motor carrier administration recently published proposed revisions to
its regulations that limit the number of hours that drivers of commercial
motor vehicles are permitted to drive before resting. Under the proposed
rule, the Department estimates that 115 fatigue-related fatalities would be
avoided annually. DOT acknowledged that there was uncertainty surrounding
this estimate. According to motor carrier administration officials, this
estimate is based on two primary assumptions: (1) fatigue is either a
primary or secondary factor in 15 percent of fatal large truck crashes and
(2) long-haul and regional drivers' (generally, drivers who travel 75,000
miles or more per year) use of electronic devices that monitor the number of
hours they drive under the proposed rule would result in a 20-percent
decrease in the number of fatigue-related crashes. DOT officials told us
that they did not have a firm analytic basis for either assumption because
of the lack of well-defined data on crash causation. Department officials
said they supplemented their review of available research with their
professional judgment to arrive at these assumptions. DOT recognizes the
uncertainty of its estimates but emphasized that providing drivers with more
time for sleep will lessen fatigue and thereby reduce the number of
fatigue-related crashes. The reasonableness of the Department's assumptions
and the resulting estimate of the number of lives that could be saved if the
proposed rule is adopted, however, are unknown. If DOT's assumptions are
unreasonable, then its estimate of the number of lives that could be saved
as a result of adopting the proposed rule could change markedly. For
example, the Department estimated that if adopting electronic on-board
recorders for long-haul and regional drivers resulted in 5 percent, rather
than in 20 percent, fewer fatigue-related crashes, then 38--not 115--lives
could be saved each year as a result of adopting the proposed rule.

The Department of Transportation commented on a draft of this report and
characterized it as fair and balanced. The Department suggested several
changes to provide added context, such as discussing the difficulty of
estimating lives saved through its safety initiatives and also made a number
of technical and clarifying comments. We incorporated these changes where
appropriate.

According to DOT and industry sources, there are over 500,000 interstate
motor carriers, which utilize about 7.2 million large trucks, and about 9.8
million drivers. In recent years, the numbers of carriers, trucks, and
drivers have been increasing. While the number of truck-related fatalities
has decreased slightly since 1997, it is largely unchanged from a decade ago
(see fig. 1). In addition, the fatality rate--the number of fatalities per
100 million miles traveled by large trucks--has remained fairly constant
over the past several years at about 2.8 deaths per 100 million miles
traveled, after decreasing by over 20 percent between 1989 and 1992.

Note: According to preliminary 1999 data, 5,203 people were killed in
truck-related crashes in 1999. Information on fatality rates for 1999 will
not be available until this fall.

Source: DOT.

The December 1999 Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act established the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration within DOT. It also authorized
additional funding for grants to state agencies to help ensure compliance
with federal and state motor carrier safety rules (primarily through
roadside inspections and compliance reviews4), provided additional
enforcement tools and improvements to the commercial driver's license
program, and required a long-term strategic plan and periodic progress
reports. Other responsibilities of the new administration include collecting
and disseminating safety data concerning motor carriers and identifying,
coordinating, and administering research and development to enhance motor
carrier safety.

DOT's existing hours of service regulations have been in effect in their
current form since 1962. Under these regulations, commercial motor vehicle
drivers in interstate commerce are generally permitted to drive up to 10
hours after 8 consecutive hours off duty. After being on duty for 15 hours
(e.g., 10 hours driving and 5 hours performing nondriving tasks such as
waiting for cargo or loading and unloading cargo), a driver may not drive
without taking 8 consecutive hours off duty. The existing regulations also
provide that if a motor carrier does not operate commercial vehicles every
day of the week, its drivers may not drive more than 60 hours over 7
consecutive days; if the carrier operates commercial motor vehicles every
day, its drivers may not drive more than 70 hours over 8 consecutive days.
The regulations do not require that drivers take uninterrupted time off duty
that would serve as a weekend.

In response to concerns that the current regulations do not provide drivers
with adequate opportunities for sleep (e.g., the 8 hours off duty does not
leave enough time for sleeping, housekeeping on the road, eating, and
recreation) and a statutory mandate to revise the regulations,5 the
Department announced proposed revisions in April 2000 and asked for public
comment.6 The Department believes that the proposed rule is a major
improvement because it is science-based (related to sleep cycles), allows
for an adequate period of sleep, allows for more regular work and off-duty
patterns to coincide with circadian rhythms,7 and reduces the maximum number
of hours a driver can be behind the wheel from 16 to 12 within a 24-hour
cycle. As a result, the Department believes that adopting the proposed rule
would result in better-rested, more alert drivers and would thus reduce
fatigue-related fatalities and injuries.

The proposed rule sets different requirements for different types of
drivers. For example, long-haul drivers would have to have at least 10
consecutive hours off duty in each 24-hour cycle (allowing the opportunity
to obtain a minimum of 8 consecutive hours of sleep daily).8 Of the
remaining 14 hours, they would be able to work 12 hours with 2 hours off
during the work shift. Regional drivers would also have to have at least 10
consecutive hours off duty in each 24-hour period.9 The distinction between
driving time and on-duty time under the existing rules would be eliminated
under DOT's proposal. Weekly on-duty time (both driving and performing other
work activities, such as loading and unloading and waiting for pickup and
delivery) would be limited to 60 hours during a 7-day period for long-haul
and regional drivers, with a requirement that the drivers have between 32
and 56 consecutive hours off duty at the end of each work week.10 Other
requirements would be set for local drivers (drivers whose primary duties
are other than driving).

There are many ways to meet the work and off-duty requirements under both
the current rules and the proposed rule. Two examples of how the proposed
rule ("new drivers" A and B) and the current rules ("current drivers" A and
B) could be met over the course of 2 days are shown in figure 2. New driver
B is presented with a work/rest pattern that is more in line with the body's
circadian rhythm than is current driver B.

Existing and Proposed Hours of Service Rules

Source: GAO's analysis of DOT's current and proposed rules.

to Reducing Truck-Related Fatalities

DOT has developed an overall strategy for improving truck safety called the
Safety Action Plan. However, the strategy does not articulate how the
individual initiatives, or specific sets of initiatives, will contribute to
reductions in truck-related fatalities. Nor has the motor carrier
administration determined whether it has the resources to successfully carry
out the initiatives in its plan.

Specificity on How Initiatives Will Contribute to Reaching DOT's Goal

The motor carrier administration's February 2000 Safety Action Plan, which
contains 47 initiatives that are either planned or under way, is the
Department's blueprint for reducing large-truck-related fatalities. These
initiatives fall within broad categories, including increasing the
enforcement of federal safety regulations; increasing safety awareness;
improving safety information and technology; and improving performance
standards for vehicles, drivers, and motor carriers. According to DOT, these
47 initiatives represent the most important of its many actions to reduce
truck-related crashes. However, the motor carrier administration has not
articulated how individual initiatives or sets of initiatives contained in
the plan will contribute to reducing truck-related fatalities.11

In our June 1999 report to this Subcommittee, we recommended that DOT
prioritize the initiatives in its draft Safety Action Plan according to the
potential for the initiatives to reduce crashes and deaths.12 During a March
2000 hearing before this Subcommittee, the motor carrier administration's
acting deputy administrator stated that the plan is a statement of the
agency's top priorities for the next 3 years and that the highest priority
has been assigned to strengthening targeted enforcement, completing
important rules, improving safety information and technology, and increasing
safety awareness. The motor carrier administration also stated that it has
limited ability to prioritize the initiatives in its Safety Action Plan
according to their potential for reducing truck-related fatalities for two
reasons. First, of the 47 initiatives in the plan, 35 are were mandated by
the Congress, such as establishing consistent nationwide enforcement
penalties (required by the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century).
Four of the initiatives stem from recommendations made by the Department's
Inspector General, our recommendations, and an independent assessment of
DOT's efforts commissioned by the Secretary of Transportation (referred to
as the Mineta review). The remaining eight initiatives were established by
DOT. The Safety Action Plan gives priority to the 35 initiatives mandated by
the Congress.

Second, the Department does not yet know the extent to which the initiatives
in the plan will contribute to reducing large-truck-related fatalities. For
example, under one of the initiatives, the motor carrier administration
plans to obtain data on the causes of large truck crashes, analyze them and,
ultimately, identify interventions that will have the greatest impact on
reducing these crashes. These efforts, when completed, would allow the
Department to better establish priorities. However, useful nationwide data
resulting from this initiative will not be available until at least 2003.
Also, under the evaluation component of its Safety Action Plan, the motor
carrier administration plans to evaluate the overall effectiveness of three
of its programs for reducing truck-related crashes and
fatalities--the roadside inspection program, the compliance review program,
and the traffic enforcement program. However, according to a motor carrier
administration official, for many of the initiatives in the Safety Action
Plan, the Department does not have a plan for evaluating their effectiveness
toward reducing truck-related fatalities.

DOT said that, because very little useful information exists on crash
causation, it is difficult for the Department to quantify how many lives
would be saved by a specific initiative. For example, the Department has no
way of accurately predicting how many fatalities would be avoided by
increasing the number of roadside inspections conducted annually from about
2 million (the current level) to, say, 2.5 million. We agree that the
scarcity of information on crash causation will pose substantial impediments
to determining the degree to which the initiatives will reduce fatalities.
However, as this information becomes available over the next several years,
the motor carrier administration will be in a better position to take action
on our recommendation to prioritize its activities. We also recognize that
estimates of lives saved carry with them some degree of uncertainty;
however, we continue to maintain that the motor carrier administration is
better served by focusing on those activities (or sets of interrelated
activities) with the greatest potential to save lives even if the estimate
of that potential is considered "rough." Our view is consistent with the
Department's recent action to propose revisions to drivers' hours of service
rules, the safety impact of which the Department acknowledges is subject to
uncertainty. (The uncertainty of the safety impact of the Department's
proposed hours of service rule is discussed later in this report.) Finally,
we disagree with the Department that it has little flexibility in deciding
which initiatives to carry out. If the Department can substantiate that one
or more of its initiatives are likely to make marginal or no contribution to
improved safety, it can seek legislative changes.

Resources to Carry Out Its Safety Action Plan

We reported in June 1999 that DOT's Safety Action Plan did not address
whether the Department had sufficient resources to carry out the plan
successfully. For example, in promotional material, the motor carrier
administration cited one of its initiatives--the Performance and
Registration Information Systems Management (PRISM) program--as its premier
enforcement program.13 According to a motor carrier administration official,
the administration had allocated about half of its information systems
budget to this program. However, it had allocated few people to the program.
Because the Safety Action Plan is a significant undertaking, we recommended
that DOT only undertake those activities that it was reasonably sure that it
could complete within available budgetary and human resources.

The motor carrier administration has not yet prepared multiyear estimates of
the resources it is likely to need to carry out its Safety Action Plan but
plans to do so. In response to requirements in the Motor Carrier Safety
Improvement Act of 1999 and the Government Performance and Results Act of
1993,14 the motor carrier administration has prepared an annual performance
plan15 that contains, among other things, estimates of the resources it
needs for fiscal year 2001. According to the head of the motor carrier
administration's strategic planning unit, the motor carrier administration
will assess current and future resource requirements for fiscal years 2001
through 2010 as part of its strategic planning process.16 The motor carrier
administration expects to complete a draft of this plan by this fall and to
issue the final plan around the end of this calendar year.

DOT said that its budget request to the Congress for fiscal year 2001
contains adequate funds and staffing to carry out the Safety Action Plan in
the coming year. In addition, DOT said that publication of the plan
indicates that the motor carrier administration plans to complete all 47
initiatives. Despite the assurance that the Department has estimated its
1-year needs, we find it troubling that DOT did not determine whether it is
likely to have the resources over the long term to successfully carry out
its Safety Action Plan before adopting the plan. For example, an activity
that is relatively inexpensive at its outset could have significantly
greater costs when it is fully implemented in later years. In addition, DOT
has set itself a very ambitious goal of reducing fatalities related to
crashes involving trucks by 50 percent over 10 years. To achieve this goal,
DOT must make over 20 times the annual progress it has made over the past
decade. By not determining whether it can reasonably expect to have the
resources to carry out its plan, DOT could be making a very difficult goal
harder to achieve. We are encouraged that the motor carrier administration
has indicated that it will ultimately carry out our recommendation.

The motor carrier administration has taken some initial steps toward
improving truck safety. These include improved accountability for motor
carrier safety within DOT; increases in DOT's enforcement and compliance
activities; and progress made on some individual initiatives in response to
recommendations made by us and by the Department's Inspector General.

Accountability

To meet the requirements of the December 1999 act, in early January 2000,
the Secretary of Transportation approved the organizational structure for a
new administration within DOT. The Secretary installed the former Acting
Director of the Office of Motor Carrier Safety as the Acting Chief Safety
Officer and, in May 2000, the Secretary appointed an Acting Deputy
Administrator for the motor carrier administration. Also, staff members are
serving in all office director positions on a permanent or acting basis. The
remaining staff of the motor carrier administration have been transferred
from its predecessor organization. Currently, the agency is operating at
previously established funding and staffing levels and receives
administrative support from the Federal Highway Administration.17

The establishment of the motor carrier administration within DOT enhances
accountability and visibility for motor carrier safety because its primary
function is safety and it has been placed on a par with other modal
administrations within the Department. Moreover, the agency's new
organizational structure--which features an Associate Administrator for
Enforcement and Program Delivery (currently, the position is vacant) and an
Office Director for Enforcement and Compliance (currently, the position is
filled on an "acting" basis)--supports a greater emphasis on enforcement and
compliance. In contrast to its predecessor organization, which was within
the Federal Highway Administration, field operations now receive
instructions directly from the Associate Administrator for Enforcement and
Program Delivery, increasing accountability and reducing the potential for
conflicting instructions. In addition, beginning in fiscal year 2001, the
agency will have attorneys and support staff in four regional service
centers whose sole responsibility will be to enforce compliance with truck
safety regulations. Previously, these attorneys performed legal work,
including truck safety work, for the Federal Highway Administration as a
whole.

However, we have stated that to achieve real and lasting progress, it will
be important for DOT to demonstrate to the Congress and to the public that
it can follow through on its efforts over the long term to achieve
significant measurable improvements in motor carrier safety.18 Currently,
several key leadership positions, including the Administrator and four
Associate Administrators, are unfilled.19 The longer it takes DOT to fill
these positions with able leaders, the more difficult it will be for the
agency to accomplish the challenging goals it has before it.

Activity

The motor carrier administration is presently carrying out 10 initiatives
under the Safety Action Plan to increase the level of compliance among
high-risk motor carriers with federal safety regulations. Many of these
initiatives stem from criticisms by this Subcommittee and DOT's Inspector
General and from recent legislative changes. In addition, in response to
these criticisms, the motor carrier administration has increased its
compliance and enforcement activities. In April 1999, DOT issued guidance to
its enforcement and compliance staff responsible for truck safety that
called for increasing (1) the number of compliance reviews (from two to an
average of four or five per month) that each staff member would be expected
to conduct and (2) the civil penalties assessed for violations of the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations, in accordance with the
Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century. For example, DOT increased
the number of federal compliance reviews at motor carrier offices by about
30 percent--from 5,147 in fiscal year 1998 to 6,654 in fiscal year 1999.
During the same period, the number of enforcement cases that generally stem
from compliance reviews rose from 2,444 to 2,899--an increase of nearly 20
percent. Also, the amount of civil penalties assessed per case increased by
about 40 percent from an average of $3,750 in fiscal year 1998 to an average
of $5,241 for the second quarter of fiscal year 2000.

Technology

DOT also appears to be making progress with its initiatives on improving
safety information and technology. For example, under its Large Truck Crash
Causation Project, which is intended to result in a national database on the
causes and contributing factors of large truck crashes, DOT has studied the
feasibility of conducting the project and has selected four pilot sites to
test its data-gathering methodology. The pilot program is expected to begin
this July, with the full test (24 sites) expected to begin in January 2001.
The motor carrier administration views this project to be essential to
reaching DOT's long-term goal because the database would allow it to develop
and implement countermeasures to reduce the occurrence and severity of large
truck crashes. As we reported to this Subcommittee last year, having timely,
reliable, and sufficiently detailed information about the causes of these
crashes is essential for developing and implementing truck safety
strategies.20 A separate effort is under way to increase the accuracy and
timeliness of information reported by states on truck crashes. This
information will enhance DOT's ability to target problem carriers based on
crash occurrence.

The Commercial Vehicle Information Systems and Networks (CVISN) program,
another initiative for improving safety information and technology, is
intended to provide enforcement officials with greater access to current
safety and interstate credentials information (e.g., liability insurance and
vehicle titling), the ability to better target problem carriers and
commercial motor vehicles, and the ability to check carriers' safety and
credentials history at the time of registration. The motor carrier
administration's overall goal is to have CVISN deployed in a majority of the
states by September 2003. To date, three states are expected to complete
initial deployment by the end of fiscal year 2000; two states are expected
to achieve initial deployment by the end of fiscal year 2001; and another
five states are in various stages of completing deployment. In addition, 20
states are participating in a series of workshops designed to provide them
with information on how to implement and deploy the CVISN program in their
states. The motor carrier administration plans to have at least 16 of these
20 states reach the initial deployment stage by 2003.

Activities

In March 1999, the Department released its draft Safety Action Plan. The
administration sought comments on the draft from 49 organizations
representing a wide range of interests in the motor carrier industry,
including associations representing truck drivers, carriers, insurance
firms, law enforcement, the motorcoach industry, and safety advocates. Nine
organizations provided a wide range of written comments on the draft plan.21
We found that for most of the issues raised by organizations that commented
on the draft plan, the Department made changes to the plan to address those
comments.

Of the nine organizations that submitted written comments, four were safety
advocacy organizations; the others represented the trucking industry,
commercial truck drivers, the motorcoach industry, law enforcement, and
engineering. These organizations' overall opinions of the draft plan ranged
from praise to condemnation. To a greater or lesser extent, they all
suggested changes.

The motor carrier administration released a revised Safety Action Plan in
February 2000 that contained many changes as a result of the comments it
received on the draft plan. For example, a commercial passenger carrier
organization had commented that the draft plan did not reflect the
differences between trucks and buses. In response, the motor carrier
administration modified its plan by including several specific actions and
references to the commercial passenger carrier industry. As part of an
initiative to increase enforcement of high-risk motor carriers, for
instance, the motor carrier administration included a task to develop a new
methodology for gathering information on commercial passenger operations
(e.g., buses). Also, in response to comments received from a law enforcement
organization, the motor carrier administration added a section to the plan
describing truck safety initiatives at the border with Canada. Officials
from the law enforcement organization told us that they felt that all of
their comments had been addressed in the plan.

Other organizations, however, did not believe that their comments were
adequately addressed. For example, one safety advocacy organization stated
that the revised plan inadequately addresses a variety of issues, including
the rating of motor carriers on safety performance, the amount of time
needed to acquire safety data, and the need for more new safety-related
technology.

Validity of Key Assumptions

In May 2000, the motor carrier administration published proposed changes to
the current regulations that limit the number of hours operators of large
trucks are permitted to drive before resting. The motor carrier
administration estimates that the proposed rule would result in 115 fewer
fatigue-related fatalities each year.22 DOT acknowledged that this estimate
was subject to uncertainty. According to motor carrier administration
officials, this estimate was based on two critical assumptions: (1) that 15
percent of truck-related fatal crashes are fatigue-related and (2) that the
proposed rule would reduce fatigue-related deaths by 20 percent annually for
those carriers that are required to install electronic on-board recorders.
We found, from discussions with motor carrier administration officials, that
DOT supplemented its review of the information on truck crashes with its
judgment in quantifying these two assumptions.23

Based on Research and Professional Judgment

According to motor carrier administration officials, to establish the
baseline estimate for the percentage of large-truck-related fatal crashes
that involve a fatigued truck driver, the motor carrier administration,
among other things, reviewed several studies on the number of such crashes
and analyzed differences in the estimates. Overall, these estimates ranged
from a low of 0.24 percent (from police accident reports) to a high of 40
percent (from a study of single vehicle crashes at night). DOT officials
believed that neither figure represented a reasonable amount. We were told
that DOT officials relied on a report that indicates that the amount of
large truck crashes that involve fatigue range from 2.8 to 6.1 percent and,
based on their professional judgment, selected the midpoint--4.5 percent.

In addition, DOT officials believed that other crashes may have been the
indirect result of fatigue. For example, we were told that research suggests
that about 25 to 50 percent of fatal crashes involved "recognition failure"
(e.g., inattention or "looked but did not see"). In these cases, DOT
reasoned that fatigue may have indirectly contributed to the crashes. Using
their professional judgment, DOT officials estimated that 10 percent of
fatal crashes were indirectly related to fatigue. DOT then summed the
percentages of crashes estimated to be directly (4.5 percent) and indirectly
(10 percent) caused by fatigue and added 0.5 percent (to round up to a whole
number) to arrive at its estimate of 15 percent as the proportion of fatal
large truck crashes that are related to fatigue.

Using 5,035 as the number of people who die each year in large-truck-related
crashes, the motor carrier administration estimated that about 755 of the
deaths (15 percent of 5,035) involved fatigue.24 Of these 755
large-truck-related fatalities, the motor carrier administration estimates
that 298 involved long-haul truck drivers, 215 involved regional truck
drivers, and 242 involved other types of truck drivers (e.g., local
drivers).25

Based on DOT Officials' Professional Judgment

The second key assumption underlying the estimated number of fatalities that
would be avoided under the proposed rule is that long-haul and regional
truck drivers would experience a 20-percent decrease in fatalities annually
(compared with a 5-percent decrease for other types of truck drivers covered
by the rule). DOT believes that long-haul and regional drivers will
experience a greater decrease in the number of fatalities because the new
rule would require them to have their trucks equipped with electronic
on-board recorders that monitor the number of hours they drive.26 The
Department believes that the on-board recorders will allow enforcement
personnel, such as state police, to determine whether a driver has violated
the hours of service rule. As a result, the motor carrier administration
believes that long-haul and regional truck drivers are more likely to comply
with the Department's hours of service regulations and, in turn, have fewer
fatigue-related fatal crashes.

Motor carrier administration officials told us that there is little research
and on-road testing on which to base an estimate of the safety impact of
requiring on-board recorders. However, they cited surveys of drivers that
found that 40 to 75 percent of drivers may have violated the hours of
service rules, depending on the definition of violation used. Moreover, they
stated that while the proposed rule will not eliminate hours of service
violations, the use of electronic on-board recorders will make violations
more difficult to mask. DOT did not have an analytic basis for its estimate
but used its judgment to designate a 20-percent reduction in fatalities as
resulting from the requirement that electronic on-board recorders be
installed on certain large trucks. DOT officials told us that DOT believed
the 20-percent amount to be "in the ballpark," given its findings about
potentially widespread violations of the current hours of service rules.

Sensitive to the Assumptions Chosen

DOT acknowledged that its estimate of the number of fatalities that would be
avoided as a result of the proposed rule is difficult to predict because of
the lack of definitive data on crash causation. DOT assessed how estimates
of lives saved could change if different assumptions were used. For example,
if the assumption for the percentage of fatal large truck crashes that
involve fatigue was 7.5 percent rather than 15 percent, the estimated number
of fatalities avoided annually would be reduced to 48 instead of 115.
Similarly, if long-haul and regional truck drivers experience the same
amount of decline in fatal fatigue-related crashes as that expected of other
truck drivers (5 percent), the number of fatalities avoided annually would
only be 38--a 67-percent decrease from the estimate of 115.

Impact Estimate

Industry and safety representatives are critical of DOT's estimates of the
expected safety impacts of the proposed rule. For example, representatives
of a trucking industry association we spoke with believe that the estimate
of 15 percent of fatal truck crashes being fatigue-related is too high. They
assert that studies show that less than 15 percent of these crashes are
related to fatigue. Moreover, these officials believe that, with the
exception of drivers who drive more than 14 hours per day, the electronic
on-board recorders will not lead to greater compliance with the hours of
service regulations and, therefore, will have little impact on safety. As a
result, the officials believe that the motor carrier administration has
overestimated the number of fatalities that will be avoided under the
proposed rule. Furthermore, officials representing motorcoach operators
(primarily bus companies) told us that that the motor carrier administration
included the motorcoach industry in the proposed rule, along with the
trucking industry, without taking into account that the motorcoach industry
has a small number of fatal accidents annually and even fewer that are
related to fatigue. Moreover, these officials told us that the proposal is
based on scant motorcoach research; however, it is likely to have
significant costs for the industry.

A representative of a safety advocacy group also raised concerns about the
limited justification the motor carrier administration provided to support
its baseline estimate of the percentage of fatal truck crashes that involve
a fatigued truck driver and its estimate of the safety benefit that would
result from requiring trucks driven by long-haul and regional drivers to be
equipped with electronic on-board recorders. Although DOT's proposed rule
emphasizes rest, officials representing safety advocacy groups also
expressed concern about the proposal to permit truck drivers to drive more
hours consecutively (e.g., up to 12 within a 24-hour period) despite some
research that indicates that driving performance decreases after 8 to 10
hours of driving.

DOT emphasized that providing drivers with more time for sleep will lessen
fatigue and thereby reduce the number of fatigue-related crashes.
Recognizing the uncertainty associated with its estimates of the expected
safety impacts of its proposed rule, the agency is seeking comments on all
of these estimates as part of the process of moving forward to a final hours
of service rule.

Revisions to the Department's hours of service rules are clearly an
important part of its goal for reducing truck-related fatalities. They are
important because the expected number of lives to be saved if the proposed
rule is adopted represents nearly half of the annual reduction in fatalities
that must be achieved to reduce truck-related fatalities by 50 percent by
2009. The Department has recognized the uncertainty surrounding its
estimates of the safety benefits of its proposed rule and has asked for
comments on the reasonableness of these estimates.27 Attaining additional
insights could be useful to the Department in understanding the expected
benefits from revising the existing hours of service rules.

We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this report for
its review and comment. We met with the Director of the motor carrier
administration's Office of Policy, Plans, and Regulations, who provided us
with comments. Overall DOT stated that the draft report was fair and
balanced. DOT had three overarching comments. First, it believed that the
report should reflect the fact that estimating the prospective impact of its
Safety Action Plan initiatives on reducing truck-related fatalities would be
a very difficult task. Second, our report should recognize that the
Department has requested adequate resources to carry out its Safety Action
Plan initiatives in fiscal year 2001 and that, by publishing the plan, it
has stated its intent to carry out the actions described in the plan. Third,
DOT recognized the uncertainty of its estimates of fatality reductions
contained in its proposed hours of service rule and that this uncertainty
stems from a lack of well-defined data on crash causation. However, the
Department believes that increasing the time available for truck drivers to
sleep will lessen fatigue and therefore save lives. DOT also said one of the
expressed purposes of its notice of proposed rulemaking was to seek comments
on its fatality reduction estimates. We incorporated these comments into
this final report. In addition, the Department offered a number of technical
and clarifying comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.

To obtain information on the Department's overall strategy for reducing
fatalities related to crashes involving large trucks by 50 percent by 2009
and on the actions DOT is currently undertaking to reduce the number of
these fatalities, we reviewed the motor carrier administration's February
2000 Safety Action Plan, which covers the period 2000-2003, the fiscal year
2001 Performance Plan, and other available documentation. We also
interviewed motor carrier administration officials, including the Office
Director, Policy, Plans, and Regulations and the Acting Office Director,
Enforcement and Compliance. To obtain information on the views of the
highway safety community and the motor carrier industry, we reviewed their
written comments on the draft Safety Action Plan and interviewed officials
of several of those organizations. Organizations that we contacted for this
and other portions of our work were Common Cause, Advocates for Highway
Safety, the American Trucking Associations, the National Private Truck
Council, the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance, the United Motorcoach
Association, and the American Bus Association.

To obtain information on the bases the motor carrier administration used for
estimating the safety impact of its proposed revisions to the regulations
governing the amount of time drivers of commercial motor vehicles are
permitted to drive before resting, we reviewed the notice of proposed
rulemaking for hours of service for commercial motor vehicle operators and
the preliminary regulatory evaluation for the proposed rule. In addition, we
interviewed motor carrier administration officials responsible for
developing the rule and preparing the estimate of the number of fatalities
that are expected to be avoided annually under the proposal. We also
interviewed representatives of the industry and the safety community to
obtain their views on the bases the motor carrier administration used to
develop its estimate of the impact that its proposed rule will have on
safety.

We performed our work from November 1999 though July 2000 in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to congressional committees and
subcommittees responsible for transportation issues; the Honorable Rodney E.
Slater, Secretary of Transportation; the Honorable Clyde Hart, acting Deputy
Administrator, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration; the Honorable
Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget; and other interested
parties. We will make copies available to others on request.

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact me
at (202) 512-2834. Key contributors to this report were Leonard Ellis, James
Ratzenberger, and Charles E. Wilson, Jr.

Sincerely yours,

Phyllis F. Scheinberg
Associate Director,
Transportation Issues

(348199)

Figure 1: Fatalities From Large Truck Crashes and Fatality Rates, 1989-1998
7

Figure 2: Examples of Drivers' On-Duty and Off-Duty Requirements Under
Existing and Proposed Hours of Service Rules 10
  

1. The Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act of 1999, P.L. 106-159, Dec. 9,
1999. Previously, these responsibilities rested with DOT's Federal Highway
Administration.

2. The goal of reducing truck-related fatalities has been incorporated into
DOT's fiscal year 2001 performance plan. Such plans are required by the
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993.

3. Truck Safety: Motor Carriers Office Hampered by Limited Information on
Causes of Crashes and Other Data Problems (GAO/RCED-99-182 , June 29, 1999).
See also Commercial Motor Vehicles: Significant Actions Remain to Improve
Truck Safety (GAO/T-RCED-00-102 , Mar. 2, 2000).

4. Compliance reviews are on-site reviews of motor carriers' compliance with
federal safety regulations.

5. The ICC Termination Act of 1995 required the Federal Highway
Administration to modify its existing hours of service regulations to
incorporate methods of reducing fatigue-related incidents such as crashes.

6. The proposed rule was published in the Federal Register on May 2, 2000.

7. A circadian rhythm is a self-sustained biological rhythm that normally
has a period of approximately 24 hours.

8. Long-haul drivers are away from their home base for more than 3 days at a
time and generally travel over 100,000 miles a year.

9. Regional drivers are away from their home base 3 or fewer days at a time
and generally travel between 75,000 and 100,000 miles per year.

10. The proposed regulations would allow for some variation for long-haul
drivers on trips requiring 2 or more consecutive work weeks away from the
normal work reporting location.

11. Subsequent to the plan's issuance, DOT published in the Federal Register
a proposed change to its hours of service rule. DOT estimated that 115 lives
could be saved each year if the proposed rule is adopted.

12. See GAO/RCED-99-182 and GAO/T-RCED-00-102 .

13. PRISM links state motor vehicle registration and licensing programs with
DOT's commercial vehicle safety efforts and is intended to improve safety by
providing states with information that would allow them to suspend or revoke
registrations for motor carriers with poor safety performance.

14. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 requires that
executive agencies prepare multiyear strategic plans, annual performance
plans, and annual performance reports. The strategic plans are to include a
mission statement, general goals and objectives, and the strategies the
agency will use to achieve those goals and objectives.

15. Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Fiscal Year 2001
Performance Plan (Feb. 2000).

16. The strategic plan is expected to contain a plan and schedule for, among
other things, reducing the number and rates of crashes, injuries, and
fatalities involving commercial motor vehicles and numeric or measurable
goals that would enable the motor carrier administration to assess its
progress toward accomplishing its goals for large truck safety. Typically, a
strategic plan would be prepared before an annual performance plan. However,
because the Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act was recently enacted, the
agency prepared the fiscal year 2001 annual performance plan even though a
strategic plan has not yet been developed.

17. The 1999 Motor Carrier Safety Improvement Act prohibits the motor
carrier administration from increasing, before fiscal year 2001, the number
of headquarters staff beyond the number transferred from the Federal Highway
Administration in fiscal year 2000.

18. GAO/T-RCED-00-102 .

19. The four Associate Administrators are for administration; research,
technology, and information management; policy and program development; and
enforcement and program delivery.

20. GAO/RCED-99-182 .

21. To find out why more organizations did not provide comments, we
contacted five organizations that did not submit comments on the draft plan.
These organizations told us that they either had no problems with the plan,
did not recall seeing the draft plan, or could not take the time to submit
comments.

22. As discussed in this section, DOT estimated that the number of
fatigue-related fatalities annually were 298, 215, and 242, respectively,
for long-haul, regional, and all other drivers. DOT estimated that its rule
would result in a 20-percent reduction in fatalities for long-haul and
regional drivers (because of the adoption of electronic on-board recorders)
and a 5-percent reduction for all other drivers. Thus, (0.2)(298) +
(0.2)(215) + (0.05)(242) = 115. The motor carrier administration also
estimates that the proposed changes would avoid 2,995 injuries annually and
would result in discounted benefits of $6.8 billion, discounted costs of
$3.4 billion, and discounted net benefits of $3.4 billion.

23. We did not review the research on which DOT based its rulemaking or how
DOT interpreted it and applied its findings. As a result, we did not assess
the merits of its efforts or whether the judgments it applied were
reasonable in estimating the expected safety impact of the proposed rule.

24. The Department derived 5,035 by multiplying the number of trucks
involved in fatal crashes, 4,577 (from the Trucks Involved in Fatal
Accidents database, 1991-1996), times 1.1--the ratio of fatalities to fatal
crashes between 1988 and 1997.

25. The motor carrier administration allocated the 755 truck-related
fatalities among these three groups based on information obtained from the
Trucks Involved in Fatal Accidents database, which contains information on,
among other things, truck trip distances.

26. DOT estimated that the on-board recorder requirement would cost the
industry about $1 billion over 10 years.

27. The comment period closes October 30, 2000.
*** End of document. ***