Operation Provide Comfort: Review of U.S. Air Force Investigation of
Black Hawk Fratricide Incident (Chapter Report, 11/05/97, GAO/OSI-98-4).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed military
investigations made subsequent to the April 14, 1994, shootdown by U.S.
Air Force F-15 fighters of two Army Black Hawk helicopters over Iraq in
which 26 individuals died.

GAO noted that: (1) the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board conducted
an extensive investigation that complied with evidentiary requirements
and guidelines in collecting and preserving evidence and produced a
report that, with a few exceptions, provided an overview of the factual
circumstances relating to the accident; (2) the report focused on
command and control problems, including individuals' lack of knowledge
of specific procedures, but: (a) did not discuss the F-15 pilots'
responsibility to report to the Airborne Command Element when
encountering an unknown aircraft; and (b) cited a statement that
inaccurately portrayed the Airborne Command Element as not having
authority to stop the incident, even though evidence that the Airborne
Command Element had the authority was available to the Board; (3) the
Board President erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks' use of an
incorrect electronic identification code resulted in the F-15 pilots not
receiving an electronic response; (4) family members and others raised
concerns about a perceived general lack of discipline in the F-15 pilot
community in Operation Provide Comfort and a perceived urgency by the
pilots to engage during the shootdown, but the Board's report and
opinion did not discuss these issues; (5) Operation Provide Comfort
officials stated that the pilots' failure to contact the Airborne
Command Element was the result of a lack of F-15 mission discipline at
the time of the incident; (6) the officials stated that, in their view,
there was no reason for the F-15 pilots' urgency to engage; (7) these
issues are not inconsistent with the Board President's conclusion
regarding the chain of events, but including them in the Board's report
may have raised additional questions about the pilots' actions and the
Airborne Command Element that could have been useful in subsequent
proceedings; (8) during its review of the Aircraft Accident
Investigation Board process, GAO found no evidence of improper or
unlawful command influence; (9) the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ) investigations complied with provisions of the UCMJ and the
Manual for Courts-Martial; (10) GAO found no evidence of improper or
unlawful command influence in the UCMJ investigations, but was unable to
confirm whether the consideration and disposition of suspected offenses
under the UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful command
influence; and (11) the Air Force Chief of Staff took additional
personnel actions after finding that a number of individuals'
performance evaluations had not reflected their failure to meet Air
Force standards.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  OSI-98-4
     TITLE:  Operation Provide Comfort: Review of U.S. Air Force 
             Investigation of Black Hawk Fratricide Incident
      DATE:  11/05/97
   SUBJECT:  Military personnel
             Military courts
             Military aircraft
             Military intervention
             Air warfare
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Operation Provide Comfort
             Iraq
             AWACS
             Black Hawk Helicopter
             F-15 Aircraft
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

November 1997

OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT - REVIEW
OF U.S.  AIR FORCE INVESTIGATION
OF BLACK HAWK FRATRICIDE INCIDENT

GAO/OSI-98-4

Review of USAF Investigation of Fratricide Incident

(600392)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AAI/IFF - Air-to-Air Interrogation/Identification Friend or Foe
     system
  AWACS - Airborne Warning and Control Systems aircraft
  CFAC - Combined Forces Air Component
  CFAC/DO - Combined Forces Air Component Director of Operations
  GAO - U.S.  General Accounting Office
  OSI - Office of Special Investigations
  RCM - Rules for Court-Martial
  TAOR - tactical area of responsibility
  UCMJ - Uniform Code of Military Justice
  USAF - U.S.  Air Force

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-266152.2

November 5, 1997

The Honorable Steve Buyer
Chairman
The Honorable Gene Taylor
Ranking Minority Member
Subcommittee on Military Personnel
Committee on National Security
House of Representatives

The Honorable Mac Collins
House of Representatives

In response to written requests from the Subcommittee and subsequent
discussions with your offices, this report presents the results of
our review of military investigations made subsequent to the April
14, 1994, shootdown by U.S.  Air Force F-15 fighters of two U.S. 
Army Black Hawk helicopters over Iraq in which 26 individuals died. 
We were asked to determine if the Air Force's subsequent Aircraft
Accident Investigation Board investigation of the fratricide had met
its objectives, if the resulting Uniform Code of Military Justice
investigations had followed established guidelines, and if military
officials had improperly or unlawfully influenced these
investigations.  We were also asked to, during our investigation,
consider concerns voiced by victims' family members and others. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Secretaries of the Air Force and the Army, and interested
congressional committees.  Copies will also be made available to
other interested parties upon request. 

If you have questions about this report, please call me or Deputy
Director for Investigations, Donald G.  Fulwider, at (202) 512-7455. 
Major contributors to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Eljay B.  Bowron
Assistant Comptroller General
 for Special Investigations


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
============================================================ Chapter 0


   PURPOSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

On April 14, 1994, two U.S.  Army Black Hawk helicopters and their
crews assigned to Operation Provide Comfort were transporting U.S.,
United Kingdom, French, and Turkish military officers; Kurdish
representatives; and a U.S.  political advisor in northern Iraq. 
Concurrently, a U.S.  Air Force Airborne Warning and Control Systems
(AWACS) aircraft was flying over Turkey to provide airborne threat
warning and control for Operation Provide Comfort aircraft, including
the Black Hawk helicopters.  The pilots of two U.S.  F-15 fighters
patrolling the area misidentified the Black Hawks as Iraqi Hind
helicopters and shot them down, killing all 26 individuals aboard. 

As a result of questions raised by concerned individuals, including
family members of those killed in the fratricide, the House Committee
on National Security held a hearing in August 1995 to examine the
causes of the incident, the resulting investigation by an Air Force
Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, and the judicial actions under
the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) that followed.  After the
hearing, the Committee asked GAO to determine if (1) the Board
investigation of the shootdown had met its objectives, (2) the
subsequent UCMJ investigations had followed established guidelines,
and (3) Department of Defense and/or Air Force officials had
improperly or unlawfully influenced these investigations.  The
Committee also requested that, during its investigation, GAO consider
concerns of victims' family members and others, including corrective
actions taken to help prevent another accident. 

To do so, GAO interviewed over 160 individuals throughout the United
States, Europe, and the Middle East.  They included family members;
involved aircrews; Army and Air Force personnel who had served in
Operation Provide Comfort; Board members, legal staff, and technical
staff; and command personnel responsible for staff assigned to
Operation Provide Comfort.  GAO reviewed its previous work concerning
Operation Provide Comfort and analyzed Board and UCMJ documentation,
including 25 volumes and about 700 pieces of supporting evidence from
the Board, thousands of classified documents, hearing and
court-martial transcripts, and reports of corrective actions taken. 
However, the Department of Defense prevented GAO from interviewing
key officials in the process, including the Convening Officials and
the Inquiry and Investigating Officers.  The Department of Defense
voiced the belief that "any Congressional intrusion" into the UCMJ
deliberative process would compromise the independence of the
military justice system.  GAO did not evaluate the appropriateness of
the disciplinary or corrective actions taken. 


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

In April 1991, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution
688 that demanded that Iraq stop repressing the Kurds in northern
Iraq and called on member nations to help meet the humanitarian needs
of the region.  An emergency relief effort was initiated, named
Operation Provide Comfort.  Military units from the United States and
12 other countries soon joined the effort as a coalition.  The air
forces of four coalition members, including the United States, began
securing the area of northern Iraq above the 36th parallel,
prohibiting Iraqi aircraft from flying north of that parallel--the
"no-fly zone." The coalition also established a security zone for the
Kurds, inside the no-fly zone, into which no Iraqi military could
enter. 

The U.S.  Commander in Chief, Europe, directed the creation of a
Combined Task Force with all coalition members.  By September 1991,
the Combined Task Force organization, headed by U.S.  and Turkish
co-commanders, included a Combined Task Force staff; a Combined
Forces Air Component (CFAC); and a Military Coordination Center.  The
CFAC Commander exercised daily control of the Operation Provide
Comfort flight mission through his Director of Operations (CFAC/DO),
as well as a ground-based Mission Director at the Combined Task Force
headquarters and an Airborne Command Element aboard the AWACS.  The
CFAC/DO was responsible for publishing guidance, including the
Airspace Control Order, for conduct of Operation Provide Comfort
missions.  (The Airspace Control Order was a directive to all
Operation Provide Comfort aircrews that provided rules and procedures
governing Operation Provide Comfort flight operations.) The Military
Coordination Center monitored conditions in the security zone and was
supported by a U.S.  Army helicopter detachment. 

Planes and personnel assigned to Operation Provide Comfort on a
temporary duty basis conducted air operations.  U.S.  air assets
included, among others, AWACS aircraft, F-15 fighters, and Black Hawk
helicopters.  Daily flight operations were referred to as "mission
packages." AWACS aircraft were to (1) control aircraft enroute to and
from the tactical area of responsibility (TAOR), or no-fly zone; (2)
coordinate air refueling; (3) provide airborne threat warning and
control in the TAOR; and (4) provide surveillance, detection, and
identification of all unknown aircraft.  F-15 fighters, as the first
aircraft in the TAOR, were to search--"sanitize"--the area with radar
and electronic measures to ensure that it was clear of hostile
aircraft and then fly orbit to provide air cover for the rest of the
package.  The Army's Black Hawk helicopters flew supply and transport
missions for the Military Coordination Center.  They also provided
transport into the TAOR to visit Kurdish villages and maintain a
visual presence. 

On the day of the incident, two Black Hawks and their crews were
transporting officials inside the TAOR.  Although the AWACS crew
flying support for the day's mission package were aware that the
Black Hawks were in the area, the two F-15 pilots sanitizing the area
were not aware of their presence.  The F-15 pilots received two radar
contacts (helicopters) and stated that they attempted unsuccessfully
to identify them by electronic means.  They twice reported their
unsuccessful attempts to the AWACS but were not informed of the
presence of the Black Hawks in the contact area.  As required, the
F-15 pilots attempted a visual identification of the helicopters. 
However, their attempt, involving a single pass each, was at speeds,
altitudes, and distances at which it was unlikely that they would
have detected the helicopters' markings.  This resulted in the lead
pilot's misidentification of the helicopters as Iraqi Hinds and the
subsequent shootdown of the Black Hawks. 

Later that day, the U.S.  Secretary of Defense ordered an
investigation that resulted in the convening of an Aircraft Accident
Investigation Board, which made information more readily available to
the public than would a Safety Board Investigation.  The Board report
and the required Board President's opinion (see app.  I)--issued May
27, 1994--identified "a chain of events" as the incident's cause: 
beginning with the Combined Task Force's failure to provide clear
guidance to its component organizations, the components'
misunderstanding of their responsibilities, Operation Provide
Comfort's failure to integrate Army helicopter and Air Force
operations, AWACS crew mistakes, and ending with the F-15 lead
pilot's misidentification of the helicopters and the wingman's
failure to notify the lead pilot of his inability to positively
identify the helicopters. 

On the basis of the report, the Secretary of Defense directed
applicable military commands to determine if UCMJ violations had
occurred.  Subsequently, the commands appointed Inquiry Officers and
Investigating Officers to investigate 14 officers.  The UCMJ process
resulted in the following:  one officer was tried by court-martial,
resulting in an acquittal; one officer received nonjudicial
punishment under Article 15, consisting of a letter of reprimand; and
nine others received administrative letters of either reprimand,
admonition, or counseling.  No adverse action was taken against the
remaining three officers. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:3

The primary purpose of an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, in
accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-14 (since replaced by Air
Force Instruction 51-503), is to gather and preserve evidence for
claims, litigation, and disciplinary and administrative needs. 
Within a limited time frame of 42 days, the Board conducted an
extensive investigation that complied with the regulation's
evidentiary requirements and guidelines in collecting and preserving
evidence.  It also produced a "Summary of Facts," or report, that
with a few exceptions provided an overview of the factual
circumstances relating to the accident. 

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report focused on, among
other matters, command and control problems, including individuals'
lack of knowledge of specific procedures.  The report, however, (1)
did not discuss the F-15 pilots' responsibility, under the Airspace
Control Order, to report to the Airborne Command Element when
encountering an unknown aircraft in the TAOR and (2) cited a CFAC
Commander statement that inaccurately portrayed the Airborne Command
Element as not having authority to stop the incident, even though
evidence that the Airborne Command Element had the authority was
available to the Board.  Further, the Board President erroneously
concluded that the Black Hawks' use of an incorrect electronic
identification code in the TAOR resulted in the F-15 pilots not
receiving an electronic response. 

Additionally, at the August 1995 hearing, family members and others
raised concerns about a perceived general lack of discipline in the
F-15 pilot community in Operation Provide Comfort and a perceived
urgency by the F-15 pilots to engage during the shootdown.  The
Board's report and opinion did not discuss these issues.  While an
examination of these issues was not required under Air Force
Regulation 110-14, the regulation did not preclude it; and GAO found
the issues relevant to its inquiry. 

In response to GAO inquiries, Operation Provide Comfort officials
stated that the pilots' failure on April 14, 1994, to contact the
Airborne Command Element was the result of a lack of F-15 mission
discipline in Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the incident. 
In addition, Operation Provide Comfort officials stated that, in
their view, there was no reason for the F-15 pilots' urgency to
engage.  These issues are not inconsistent with the Board President's
conclusion regarding the chain of events that led to the
misidentification and shootdown of the Black Hawks.  Including them
in the Board's report, however, may have raised additional questions
about the actions of the F-15 pilots and the Airborne Command Element
that could have been useful in subsequent administrative and
disciplinary actions. 

During its review of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
process, GAO found no evidence of improper or unlawful command
influence.  That review included access to, among others, Board
members, technical advisers, and investigative staff as well as
investigative documents. 

Regarding the questions concerning the subsequent UCMJ process and
improper or unlawful command influence during that process, GAO
determined the following.  UCMJ investigations complied with
provisions of the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial.  Based on a
review of the summary reports of investigation, a statement by the
AWACS Investigating Officer, and stipulations by several of the
officials involved in UCMJ investigations, GAO found no evidence of
improper or unlawful command influence.  However, GAO was unable to
confirm whether the consideration and disposition of suspected
offenses under the UCMJ were the result of improper or unlawful
command influence because the Department of Defense, concerned about
any congressional intrusion into the deliberative process, denied
GAO's request to interview the applicable UCMJ Convening Authorities,
Inquiry Officers, and Investigating Officers. 

Finally, immediately following the accident and as the result of
additional reviews and analyses, the Department of Defense and the
Air Force took hundreds of corrective actions, including insertion of
Black Hawk flight times on the daily Air Tasking Order, to help
prevent a similar shootdown.  The Chief of Staff, Air Force, also
took additional personnel actions, including issuing letters of
evaluation, after finding that a number of individuals' performance
evaluations had not reflected previous administrative actions taken
as a result of the individuals' failure to meet Air Force standards. 


   PRINCIPAL FINDINGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4


      AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
      INVESTIGATION MET OBJECTIVE
      BUT REPORT WAS NOT COMPLETE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.1

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was properly convened and
met the objective as set forth in Air Force Regulation 110-14 of
conducting an extensive investigation that preserved evidence of the
facts surrounding the incident.  The required report, which included
the Board President's opinion, focused on Combined Task Force command
and control problems, among other matters, citing lack of knowledge
of command and control guidance as one reason for the deficiencies of
the AWACS crew and activity by the incident Black Hawk pilots. 
However, the Board report did not discuss or did not properly assess
relevant information available to it regarding three aspects
involving the F-15 pilots and the Airborne Command Element.  Further,
concerning F-15 pilot discipline, Operation Provide Comfort officials
told GAO that mission discipline problems with F-15 pilots did exist
at the time of the incident and they saw no reason for the incident
F-15 pilots' urgency to shoot. 


         F-15 PILOTS' REQUIREMENT
         TO CONTACT AIRBORNE
         COMMAND ELEMENT
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.1

The Board's report did not discuss the F-15 pilots' responsibility,
under the Airspace Control Order, to report any unusual circumstance
or occurrence, such as an unidentified aircraft in the TAOR, to the
Airborne Command Element aboard the AWACS.  The Board had reviewed
this provision of the order and evidence that the pilots knew of the
provision.  The Board report did not discuss the F-15 pilots' failure
to report to the Airborne Command Element because the Board concluded
that the Airborne Command Element had been aware of the F-15s'
intercept of the helicopters.  Therefore, the Board did not consider
the pilots' nonadherence to be a significant cause of the accident. 
According to a Board representative, the nonadherence was an example
of a general breakdown in command and control, and it "may not have
been common practice" for pilots to make this contact.  While the
Board conducted an extensive investigation, it did not know of a
CFAC/DO oral directive given about a week before the shootdown,
reemphasizing the requirement for fighter pilots to report to the
Airborne Command Element.  That directive was the result of an
incident in which F-15 pilots had initially ignored directions from
an Airborne Command Element, concerned about a possible trap, to
"knock off," or stop, an intercept with an Iraqi aircraft. 


         AIRBORNE COMMAND ELEMENT
         HAD AUTHORITY TO STOP
         ENCOUNTER
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.2

Also, the Board cited a CFAC Commander's inaccurate testimony that
the Airborne Command Element had no decision-making authority with
regard to aircraft encounters in the TAOR.  Other testimony--gathered
during the Board's investigation--from more knowledgeable
individuals, including the CFAC/DO who used the Airborne Command
Element as "his eyes and ears" in the TAOR, contradicted that
statement.  Under the Airspace Control Order, the Airborne Command
Element had the authority to stop fighters from engaging hostile or
unknown aircraft in the TAOR. 


         BLACK HAWKS' USE OF WRONG
         ELECTRONIC CODE SHOULD
         NOT HAVE PREVENTED F-15
         PILOTS FROM RECEIVING
         RESPONSE
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.3

The Board President erroneously concluded that the Black Hawks' use
of an incorrect electronic code resulted in the F-15 pilots not
receiving a response when using their electronic Air-to-Air
Interrogation/Identification Friend or Foe (AAI/IFF) systems.  A
subsequent Air Force analysis was inconclusive as to why the F-15
pilots did not receive a response.  However, that analysis--based on
the pilots' testimony regarding their system interrogation
settings--indicated that during certain interrogation sequences, the
F-15 pilots should have received a response regardless of the Black
Hawks' code.  Although the Board reviewed the pilots' testimony, as
well as other information about the IFF system settings and
operation, the Board President drew an erroneous conclusion from the
information. 


         OPERATION PROVIDE
         COMFORT--PERCEIVED
         DISCIPLINE PROBLEM AND
         URGENCY TO FIRE
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 0:4.1.4

Family members and others raised concerns about perceived Operation
Provide Comfort discipline issues not described in the report or the
opinion:  lack of mission discipline by F-15 pilots in general and
the incident pilots' urgency to fire.  Although these issues were not
required to be in the Board's report or opinion, the Board was not
precluded from probing them; and GAO found the issues relevant to its
review. 

In response to GAO's questions, Operation Provide Comfort officials
stated that they had experienced a number of mission discipline
problems with F-15 pilots.  These included the knock-off incident a
week before the shootdown.  Operation Provide Comfort officials also
noted that the rivalry between F-15 and F-16 pilots, normally
perceived as leading to a positive professional competition, had
become more pronounced and intense at the time of the shootdown. 
Further, one command official stated that this rivalry may have led
to the incident F-15 pilots' perceived rush to shoot.  According to
Operation Provide Comfort officials, the Airspace Control Order was
specifically designed to slow a situation, allowing CFAC time to
check it out.  These officials said the F-15 pilots had no need for
haste, as the sighted helicopters had posed no threat to the F-15s or
the mission package. 


      QUESTION OF COMMAND
      INFLUENCE DURING THE
      AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
      INVESTIGATION BOARD PROCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.2

Based on GAO's review of extensive information made available to it
and interviews of Board members and technical and legal advisors, GAO
found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence exerted
during the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process. 


      MILITARY JUSTICE PROCESS AND
      ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.3

The Air Force UCMJ investigations that followed the Aircraft Accident
Investigation complied with provisions in the UCMJ and the Manual for
Courts-Martial.  In accordance with Department of Defense guidelines,
charges are ordinarily forwarded to the accuseds' immediate commander
for initial consideration as to disposition.  Thus, individuals were
considered under UCMJ by two separate commands. 

A command under the U.S.  Air Combat Command investigated seven
officers; one--the AWACS Senior Director--was court-martialed.  He
was found not guilty.  Another--the Commander, 963d Air Control
Squadron--retired.  Four others received letters of reprimand:  one
letter was the result of nonjudicial punishment; the others were
administrative actions.  No action was taken against the CFAC Mission
Director because he was judged blameless in the incident. 

A command under the U.S.  Air Forces in Europe investigated the other
seven officers--five Operation Provide Comfort officials and the two
F-15 pilots.  The pilots received letters of reprimand; two other
officers received less severe letters of admonition, with one--the
Commander, Operation Provide Comfort Combined Task Force--also being
reassigned to a noncommand position; the Director of Operations for
Plans and Policy received a letter of counseling and revocation of a
medal for meritorious service.  No action was taken against the two
remaining officers. 


      QUESTION OF COMMAND
      INFLUENCE DURING THE UCMJ
      PROCESS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.4

GAO found no evidence of command influence, based on a review of
information made available to it--including (1) summary reports of
investigation during the UCMJ process that included the suspected
violations, facts considered, and analysis involved in the decisions
reached; (2) a statement by the Investigating Officer in the AWACS
investigation denying outside influence; and (3) statements by six
cognizant officials denying any improper influence.  In GAO's attempt
to confirm whether the consideration and disposition of suspected
offenses under the UCMJ process were the result of improper or
unlawful command influence, GAO requested access to the Convening
Authorities, Inquiry Officers, and Investigating Officers.  However,
the Department of Defense--saying "any Congressional intrusion into
the deliberative process .  .  .  endangers the actual and perceived
independence of the military justice system"--refused to allow GAO to
interview these military officers, thus limiting GAO's investigation
in this area. 


      AIR FORCE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
      AND TASK FORCE FINDINGS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.5

Within 24 hours of the shootdown, European Command and Combined Task
Force Commanders instituted corrective actions, including
modifications of the Rules of Engagement, addition of helicopter
flight times on the daily Air Tasking Order, and further definition
of AWACS responsibilities. 

When the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, submitted the Board report
to the Secretary of Defense, he noted that the tragic deaths of 26
men and women on the Black Hawk helicopters were attributable to a
series of avoidable errors and the failure of safeguards in place at
the time of the shootdown.  In July 1994, he ordered a review of
Joint Task Force operations with the objectives of strengthening
operational oversight, implementing change, and reviewing AWACS
training and certification procedures. 

An Air Combat Command "Tiger Team" studied AWACS/Airborne command and
control, visual identification, and ground command and control and
made about 140 recommendations in its September 14, 1994, report. 
Concurrently, a special Air Force task force composed of more than
120 people in 6 commands concluded that 2 breakdowns in individual
performance contributed to the shootdown:  (1) The AWACS mission crew
did not provide the F-15 pilots an accurate picture of the situation
and (2) the F-15 pilots misidentified the target. 


      ACTIONS BY THE FLYING
      EVALUATION BOARDS AND THE
      AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:4.6

Flying Evaluation Boards were convened by the Air Force as a result
of the shootdown.  Upon review of the Boards' findings and
recommendations, the Commander, 17th Air Force concluded that the
lead F-15 pilot and the F-15 wingman should remain qualified for
noncombat aviation service.  In a subsequent review, the Commander,
U.S.  Air Forces in Europe (1) concurred with the decisions relating
to the lead pilot and (2) determined that the wingman remain
qualified for aviation service but directed that he be reassigned to
a staff position not involved in flying duties. 

At the request of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Air Force Chief
of Staff reviewed the administrative actions taken in regard to the
Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown.  While the Chief of
Staff determined that a proper balance had been maintained between
command involvement and individual rights, he noted that a number of
performance evaluations were inadequate, as they were inconsistent
with administrative actions taken by higher level commanders. 
Accordingly, he prepared letters of evaluation for seven Air Force
personnel, noting their failure to meet certain Air Force standards,
and took additional action against five of the personnel.  The two
F-15 pilots were disqualified from aviation service for 3 years and
three members of the AWACS crew were disqualified from assignment to
duties involving control of aircraft in air operations for at least 3
years. 


   RECOMMENDATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:5

GAO is making no recommendations. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:6

In written comments on a draft of this report, the Department of
Defense concurred in GAO's conclusions that (1) the Board was
properly convened, complied with the law, and met its objectives; (2)
the military justice investigations that followed the accident
investigation also complied with applicable law; and (3) no evidence
of unlawful or improper command influence existed with respect to the
accident investigation or military justice processes.  Defense agreed
that the few differences between GAO's report and the accident
investigation report would not have affected the Board President's
conclusions.  These comments are reprinted in appendix II. 


INTRODUCTION
============================================================ Chapter 1


   BACKGROUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1


      OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
      MISSION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

In April 1991, and in concert with United Nations Security Council
Resolution 688, military units from a coalition of the United States
and 12 other countries began providing direct emergency care and
assistance to Kurds and other ethnic groups in northern Iraq
following a revolt against the Iraqi government.\1 This emergency
relief effort was named Operation Provide Comfort. 

Coalition forces secured an area of northern Iraq that excluded Iraqi
aircraft above the 36th parallel--the tactical area of responsibility
(TAOR),\2 or no-fly zone--and prepared transit camps within Iraq for
the return of the people who had fled from the advancing Iraqi army. 
To provide a secure environment for the returnees, the coalition
established a security zone within the TAOR into which Iraqi forces
could not enter.  Coalition air forces from France, Turkey, the
United Kingdom, and the United States were assembled to conduct
frequent air operations in the TAOR.  A Military Coordination Center
was established in Zakhu, Iraq, located inside the security zone, to
provide a direct communications link with the Iraqi military,
humanitarian relief agencies, and Kurdish leaders.  Figure 1.1
illustrates the location of pertinent points in and around the TAOR. 

   Figure 1.1:  Operation Provide
   Comfort Operations Area

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)


--------------------
\1 The U.S.  Commander in Chief, Europe, directed the creation of a
Combined Task Force with all coalition members.  Members at that time
were the United States, Australia, Belgium, Italy, Canada, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Spain, the Netherlands,
Portugal, and Luxembourg. 

\2 The TAOR was the airspace north of 36 degrees north latitude in
Iraq from which Iraqi aircraft were prohibited. 


      COMMAND STRUCTURE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

The U.S.  Commander in Chief, Europe, delegated operational control
of assigned U.S.  Army and Air Force units to the Combined Task Force
Commander located at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.  The Combined Task
Force Commander also had tactical control of participating Turkish,
French, and British forces; but operational control of those forces
was retained by their parent commands.\3

On July 20, 1991, the Combined Task Force Commander issued an
operations plan governing the conduct of the Operation Provide
Comfort.  The plan delineated the command relationships and
organizational responsibilities within Combined Task Force Operation
Provide Comfort.  The Combined Task Force was headed by U.S.  and
Turkish co-commanders and included a Combined Task Force staff; a
Combined Forces Air Component (CFAC); and the Army component,
including the Military Coordination Center. 


--------------------
\3 Tactical control is the detailed, and usually local, direction and
control of movements and maneuvers necessary to accomplish the
assigned mission.  Operational control is the authority to command
subordinate forces, assign tasks, designate objectives, and give
authoritative direction necessary to accomplish the mission. 


      OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
      AIR OPERATIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3

CFAC coordinated air operations for Operation Provide Comfort.  It
had operational control of air assets--such as Airborne Warning and
Control System aircraft (AWACS) and F-15 and F-16 fighters--and
tactical control of Army helicopters.  The Military Coordination
Center at Zakhu was supported by a Black Hawk helicopter detachment
at Diyarbakir, Turkey.  (See fig.  1.1.) Air operations were
conducted by planes and personnel assigned to Operation Provide
Comfort on a temporary duty basis. 


         FIGHTER AIRCRAFT
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.3.1

Fighter aircraft performed the bulk of the Operation Provide Comfort
flying mission.  A typical "mission package" contained as many as 30
to 40 fighter aircraft and a variety of aircraft with specific
mission capabilities.  The fighters flew two- and four-ship
formations and provided the following capabilities:  visual and
sensor reconnaissance of military targets, defensive counter air
operations, suppression of enemy air defenses, and on-call
precision-guided munitions delivery.  At the beginning of each
mission, no other aircraft was supposed to enter the TAOR until
fighters with airborne intercept radars had searched, or "sanitized,"
the area. 


         AWACS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.3.2

During the daily operations, the AWACS was responsible for (1)
controlling aircraft enroute to and from the TAOR; (2) coordinating
air refueling; (3) providing airborne threat warning and control for
Operation Provide Comfort aircraft operating in the TAOR; and (4)
providing surveillance, detection, and identification of all unknown
aircraft.  The AWACS took off about 2 hours before the rest of the
fixed-wing package and eventually entered an orbit in Turkish air
space slightly north of the TAOR.  (See fig.  1.1.)

The AWACS mission crew was headed by a Mission Crew Commander who had
overall responsibility for the AWACS mission.  The Mission Crew
Commander directly supervised an Air Surveillance Officer; Senior
Director; and various communications, radar, and data processing
technicians.  The Air Surveillance Officer supervised air
surveillance technicians who were responsible for identifying and
monitoring non-Operation Provide Comfort aircraft.  The Senior
Director supervised and directed the activity of the controllers. 
The Enroute Controller was responsible for Operation Provide Comfort
aircraft going to and from the TAOR.  The Tanker Controller was
responsible for coordinating the refueling of Operation Provide
Comfort aircraft.  The TAOR Controller was responsible for Operation
Provide Comfort aircraft in the TAOR.  In addition, a Turkish
controller was present on each AWACS mission flight. 


         MILITARY COORDINATION
         CENTER HELICOPTERS
------------------------------------------------------ Chapter 1:1.3.3

Military Coordination Center Black Hawk helicopters stationed at
Diyarbakir provided air transportation for the Military Coordination
Center liaison team and conducted resupply missions at Zakhu, as
required.  The Black Hawks also used Zakhu as a stage for flying
missions further in the TAOR to visit Kurdish villages, monitored
conditions in the security zone, and conducted search and rescue
missions. 


      THE SHOOTDOWN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.4

On April 14, 1994, two U.S.  Army Black Hawk helicopters and their
crew assigned to the Military Coordination Center were transporting
U.S., United Kingdom, French, and Turkish military officers; Kurdish
representatives; and a U.S.  political advisor in the TAOR.  The
Black Hawks had departed Zakhu enroute to Irbil, Iraq.  (See fig. 
1.1.) At the same time, two F-15s were sanitizing the area that the
Black Hawks were in; and the AWACS was over Turkey providing airborne
threat warning and control.  The AWACS was aware that the Army Black
Hawk helicopters had departed Zakhu and were proceeding east into the
TAOR.  However, the F-15 pilots were unaware that Black Hawk
helicopters were already in the area and were not advised of the
presence of friendly aircraft.  The fighters twice informed the AWACS
that they had unknown radar contacts in the TAOR, and the AWACS had
access to electronic information regarding the presence of friendly
aircraft in the vicinity of the F-15s' reported radar contacts. 
Throughout the incident, the helicopters were unable to hear the
radio transmissions between the F-15 pilots and the AWACS because
they were on a different radio frequency. 

According to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board President's
opinion, when the F-15 pilots were unable to get positive/consistent
electronic responses, they performed a visual intercept with each
making a single identification pass over the Black Hawks to identify
the "unknown" aircraft.  However, the Board President concluded that
the identification passes were carried out at speeds, altitudes, and
distances at which it was unlikely that the pilots would have been
able to detect the Black Hawks' markings.  The pilots said that they
did not recognize the differences between the U.S.  Black Hawk
helicopters with wing-mounted fuel tanks and Hind helicopters with
wing-mounted weapons.  The Board President determined that the pilot
in the lead F-15 aircraft had misidentified the U.S.  Black Hawks as
Iraqi Hind helicopters and the wingman did not confirm, when asked by
the lead pilot, that he had been unable to make a positive
identification.  The flight lead fired a single missile and shot down
the trailing Black Hawk helicopter.  At the lead pilot's direction,
the F-15 wingman fired a single missile and shot down the lead
helicopter.  All 26 individuals aboard the two helicopters were
killed in the fratricide. 


      AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT
      INVESTIGATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.5

When the Combined Task Force Commander learned that the Black Hawks
had been shot down on April 14, 1994, he appointed the former CFAC
Commander to conduct a Safety Board Investigation.\4 The appointee
assembled a staff and began to collect relevant information.  Later
on April 14, the Secretary of Defense ordered an Aircraft Accident
Investigation, which provides more disclosure to the public than does
a safety investigation.  As a result, the safety investigation was
discontinued; and an Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was
convened under Air Force Regulation 110-14, since replaced by Air
Force Instruction 51-503.  The investigation's main objectives were
(1) to gather and preserve evidence for further investigations and
inquiries by conducting a thorough investigation and preparing an
accident report and (2) to determine if possible, through the Board
President's opinion, the accident's main causes. 


--------------------
\4 Air Force Regulation 127-4 (Safety), since replaced by Air Force
Instruction 91-204, establishes the general program for investigating
and reporting all U.S.  Air Force mishaps.  Safety investigations are
conducted to find the cause(s) and take preventive actions.  Since
much of that information is available only from the person(s)
directly involved, a promise of confidentiality is given to all
witnesses; and privileged information is protected from disclosure
outside the Air Force safety community.  Therefore, restrictions are
placed on the dissemination of the information obtained and the
resulting report. 


   OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND
   METHODOLOGY
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

The House Committee on National Security held a hearing in August
1995 related to the April 14, 1994, incident.  Subsequently, the
Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Committee's Subcommittee
on Military Personnel and Representative Mac Collins asked us, not to
reinvestigate the shootdown but, to determine whether (1) the Board
investigation of the Black Hawk shootdown had met its objectives and
goals, (2) subsequent Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ)
investigations had followed established guidelines, and (3) any
Department of Defense and/or Air Force officials had improperly or
unlawfully influenced these investigations.  The Subcommittee also
requested that we consider concerns raised by victims' families and
others.  We did not evaluate the appropriateness of resultant
disciplinary or corrective actions. 

We interviewed family members of the U.S.  victims and others with
concerns about how the military had handled the incident.  In
general, they had questions about the process and results of the
Aircraft Accident Investigation Board and the UCMJ investigations. 
We examined thousands of documents, including over 2,000 classified
documents; interviewed over 160 individuals; and visited localities
in the United States, Europe, and the Middle East. 

To assess compliance with regulations, we reviewed the Aircraft
Accident Investigation Board's report, its exhibits, and applicable
regulations.  We interviewed Board members, both legal and technical
advisors to the Board, accident recovery team members, and many of
those interviewed by the Board concerning their role in the incident. 
In particular, we examined how the Board investigated the incident,
conducted its analyses, and produced its report and the Board
President's opinion.  We also reviewed information developed by the
Inquiry and Investigating Officers under UCMJ and the court-martial
trial transcripts and exhibits. 

To address questions raised by victims' family members and others
regarding the actions of the two F-15 pilots, the AWACS crew, and
command officials, we reviewed the then existing rules of engagement,
operations plan, pertinent orders (Airspace Control Order, Air
Tasking Order, and Aircrew Read Files), and guidance.  We interviewed
F-15 pilots and Air Force officials to determine their understanding
of the existing orders and guidance for fighters in Operation Provide
Comfort.  We questioned these individuals regarding the two F-15
pilots' actions during, and statements concerning, the April 14,
1994, incident.  We also interviewed the F-15 pilots involved in the
shootdown.  Further, we interviewed senior board members of the
Flying Evaluation Boards that were convened.  We reviewed the two
F-15 pilots' flight and military records and interviewed former
instructors and fellow pilots to gain additional insight into their
qualifications and abilities. 

Regarding the Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system and its
operation on April 14, 1994, we reviewed the (1) Airspace Control
Order and the Air Tasking Order authority by which the IFF system was
to be employed; (2) statements of the two F-15 pilots regarding their
operation and responses received from the systems on April 14, 1994;
and (3) subsequent Air Force task force studies.  We also interviewed
other pilots, IFF technicians, and other technical experts to better
understand the limitations and performance of the incident F-15 IFF
systems. 

With regard to AWACS operations, we reviewed the applicable
procedures for AWACS operations on the date of the incident.  We
interviewed crew members aboard the AWACS during the shootdown to
determine their knowledge of the events and their understanding of
the roles and responsibilities of the crew members.  We also
interviewed other AWACS crew members who had served in Operation
Provide Comfort to determine the general understanding among AWACS
crew members of their roles and responsibilities; the commanders and
other command personnel of the 552d Air Control Wing, which operated
the AWACS in Operation Provide Comfort; and Air Combat Command
personnel responsible for identifying and instituting changes in
AWACS operations following the investigations.  To gain an
understanding of command and control issues at the Combined Task
Force, we interviewed personnel who were stationed at Operation
Provide Comfort both before and after the incident. 

With respect to Black Hawk operations, we examined the procedures
used by Military Coordination Center personnel in scheduling
helicopter activities and the Center's integration with the other
Operation Provide Comfort mission components.  In addition, we
interviewed individuals responsible for developing the procedures for
Black Hawk flights; those who prepared the helicopters for their
mission on April 14, 1994; and responsible Combined Task Force
officials.  We also reviewed documents concerning the Combined Task
Force and the Black Hawk helicopters at the Center for Army Lessons
Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.  Further, we interviewed
Combined Task Force and European Command officials and reviewed
directives and files at Incirlik, Turkey, and Stuttgart, Germany. 

Regarding improper or unlawful command influence during the Board's
investigation process, we interviewed the Board President and Deputy,
members, and advisors.  We also contacted the Commander, U.S.  Air
Forces in Europe, who had convened the Aircraft Accident Board
Investigation.  In addition, we reviewed records that cautioned
against unlawful influence. 

Regarding improper or unlawful command influence during the UCMJ
investigations process, we reviewed the record of decisions made by
the Inquiry Officers and Investigating Officers in the UCMJ
investigations to determine whether they were in compliance with
provisions in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial.  These
records of decisions included the suspected violations, the facts
considered, and the analyses used to arrive at the conclusions and
recommendations reached.  The Department of Defense would not allow
us to interview the Convening Authorities or the Inquiry and
Investigating Officers. 

The Department of Defense provided written comments on a draft of
this report.  Those comments concur with our primary conclusions and
agreed that the few differences between our report and the Board
report would not have affected the Board President's conclusions. 

The following chapters discuss the Aircraft Accident Investigation
Board report and subsequent findings, subsequent investigations under
the UCMJ, the results of Flying Evaluation Boards, and corrective
actions taken. 


AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
============================================================ Chapter 2

The congressional requesters asked us, among other points, to (1)
determine if the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board's
investigation had met its objectives, (2) determine whether improper
or unlawful command influence had occurred during the investigation,
and (3) consider concerns raised by victims' family members and
others. 

We found that the Board, in a limited time frame, conducted an
extensive investigation that fulfilled the requirements of Air Force
Regulation 110-14 to obtain and preserve evidence and, with a few
exceptions, to report the factual circumstances relating to the
accident.  Also consistent with the regulation, the Board President
stated his opinion of the accident's causes.  In addition, our
interviews of the Board President and other Board members, as well as
technical and legal advisors, disclosed no evidence of improper or
unlawful command influence during the Board process. 

During our review of the Board's investigation/report and subsequent
Department of Defense reviews, plus our interviews of Operation
Provide Comfort officials and participants, we noted that the Board
report and/or opinion (1) did not discuss the incident F-15 pilots'
responsibility, under the Airspace Control Order, to report to the
Airborne Command Element aboard the AWACS about the unidentified
helicopters; (2) cited a CFAC Commander statement that inaccurately
portrayed the Airborne Command Element as not having authority to
stop the incident; and (3) erroneously concluded that the Black
Hawks' use of an incorrect electronic code prevented the F-15 pilots
from receiving electronic responses from the helicopters. 

Last, victims' family members and others at the August 1995
congressional hearing raised concerns that included possible
discipline problems in the F-15 community in Operation Provide
Comfort at the time of the shootdown and the incident F-15 pilots'
perceived urgency to engage during the shootdown.  While Air Force
Regulation 110-14 did not require the Board to examine these issues,
it did not preclude the examination; and we determined that the
issues were pertinent to our review.  Indeed, discipline problems did
exist in the F-15 community in Operation Provide Comfort, and some
Operation Provide Comfort officials questioned the incident F-15
pilots' haste to engage the unknown helicopters. 


   INVESTIGATION MET OBJECTIVE BUT
   THE REPORT CONTAINED THREE
   DEFICIENCIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1


      BOARD INVESTIGATION/REPORT
      AND PRESIDENT'S OPINION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.1

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense on the day of the
shootdown, the U.S.  Commander in Chief, Europe, ordered the
Commander, U.S.  Air Forces in Europe, to conduct an Aircraft
Accident Investigation.  The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board
was properly convened under Air Force Regulation 110-14.  The Board's
investigation met its goal to obtain and preserve documentary,
testimonial, and physical evidence for possible claims, litigation,
and disciplinary and administrative needs. 

On May 27, 1994, also in accordance with Air Force Regulation 110-14,
the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board issued a 60-page summary
report including the Board President's opinion that, with three
exceptions, provided a summary of the most important facts and
circumstances of the incident.  Those deficiencies--involving the
incident F-15 pilots, the incident Airborne Command Element, and the
Black Hawks' use of an incorrect electronic identification code--are
discussed later in this chapter. 

The Board President's opinion, which was also required by the
regulation and was included in the summary, identified the accident's
causes as a chain of events that began with the lack of a clear
understanding among the Operation Provide Comfort organizations about
their respective responsibilities and culminated with the F-15 lead
pilot's misidentification of the Black Hawks as Iraqi Hinds and the
F-15 wingman's failure to notify the lead pilot that he had not
positively identified the helicopters.  (The Board President's
opinion appears as app.  I.\1 ) The Board report was transmitted
through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense. 


--------------------
\1 A supplement to the Board's report was prepared at the request of
the U.S.  Commander in Chief, Europe.  It was a synopsis of
interviews of individuals who had been AWACS mission crew members in
Operation Provide Comfort before the incident.  The Board President
reviewed the interviews and related documents but did not change his
opinion. 


      COMPOSITION OF THE BOARD
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.2

On April 15, 1994, the Commander, U.S.  Air Forces in Europe,
appointed the Commander, 3d Air Force (a major general), as President
of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.  The other Board
members included a Deputy Board President (an Army colonel), a Chief
Investigator who was an F-15 pilot, an AWACS expert, a Black Hawk
pilot, a Black Hawk maintenance officer, a flight surgeon, a Board
recorder, and a public affairs officer.\2 The Board also included 13
technical advisors and 4 legal advisors (3 Air Force and 1 Army). 


--------------------
\2 The Board President and the Chief Investigator had previous
accident investigation experience. 


      SCOPE OF BOARD'S
      INVESTIGATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1.3

The Board conducted its investigation from April 15 to May 27,
1994,\3 when it issued its report, including 25 volumes of evidence
containing testimony from 137 witnesses.\4 The Board reviewed
directives on command and control; rules of engagement, pertinent
orders (Airspace Control Order, Air Tasking Order, and Aircrew Read
Files\5 ), aircrew preparation, and scheduling; aircraft maintenance
documentation on the involved aircraft; aircrew qualification and
training records and materials; physical and medical examinations;
data on the sequence of events for each of the aircraft, such as
flight plans, communications tapes, and briefing and preflight
preparations; search and rescue activities; and integration of Army
and Air Force operations.  The Board also reviewed classified
documents, video tapes, and magnetic tapes relating to the accident. 
To assess the possible malfunction of the Air-to-Air Interrogation
(AAI) and Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) system components,\6 the
Board commissioned testing of the incident fighters' AAI systems and
the helicopters' transponders.  It also commissioned a filmed
re-creation of the incident with an F-15 fighter approaching a Black
Hawk helicopter at various elevations, distances, and approaches. 


--------------------
\3 Accident investigations are normally completed within 30 days
unless, as in this case, the appointing authority grants an
extension. 

\4 The Deputy Board President (Army), a former Black Hawk commander,
was present at the interviews of the two F-15 pilots.  Although a
second Army Board member and the Army legal advisor were not invited
to be present during these interviews, they were advised that, if
they had questions, they would be asked.  The Black Hawk Board member
recalled reviewing the transcript of the interviews and stated that
all the questions that he would have asked had been addressed. 

\5 (1) The Airspace Control Order provided rules and procedures for
aircrews.  (2) Combined Task Force flying operations for all aircraft
were scheduled in a daily Air Tasking Order, which listed information
pertinent to each day's flight operations, or "mission package," such
as flying times and IFF codes.  In the case of the Black Hawk
helicopters, the notation "as required" was included rather than
specific flying times due to the uncertainty of their schedules.  (3)
Aircrew Read Files, prepared by the CFAC/DO, contained Operation
Provide Comfort policy and guidance information. 

\6 In the AAI/IFF system, the AAI component interrogates an airborne
aircraft to determine its identity; and the IFF component answers.  A
challenging aircraft transmits an interrogation signal via the AAI
component to a target aircraft.  The target aircraft's transponder
system, part of the IFF component, sends back a coded signal.  The
challenging aircraft receives the return signal and processes it
internally.  If the return signal is valid, it appears on the
challenging aircraft's visual display. 


   NO IMPROPER/UNLAWFUL COMMAND
   INFLUENCE FOUND
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Section 104 (a)(2) of the Rules for Court-Martial (RCM), Manual for
Courts-Martial, defines unlawful command influence as an attempt to
coerce or, by any unauthorized means, influence the action of a
court-martial or any other military tribunal or any member thereof,
in reaching the findings or sentence in any case or the action of any
convening, approving, or reviewing authority with respect to such
authority's judicial acts. 

We found no evidence of improper or unlawful command influence
exerted during the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board process. 
The Board members and technical and legal advisors we interviewed
stated that they had had free rein to examine all facets during the
investigation. 

According to the Commander, U.S.  Air Forces in Europe, when the U.S. 
Commander in Chief, Europe, tasked him to convene the Aircraft
Accident Investigation Board, he was told to uncover the facts and
get all the details.  Also according to the Commander, when he
assigned the Board President, he told the president to leave no rock
unturned and bring up every fact during the investigation.  According
to the Board President, his directions to the Board members were to
let the "chips fall" where they may and to hold back nothing.  He
stated that there was "absolutely no command influence" and that the
Board was extremely careful to avoid even the appearance of any
influence. 


   NO DISCUSSION OF F-15 PILOTS'
   REQUIREMENT TO REPORT TO
   AIRBORNE COMMAND ELEMENT WHO
   HAD AUTHORITY TO STOP ENCOUNTER
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Although the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board reported that
incident participants, including the Black Hawk pilots, lacked
knowledge of command and control guidance, such as portions of the
Airspace Control Order, it did not discuss the F-15 pilots'
responsibility under the Airspace Control Order to report to the
Airborne Command Element when encountering an unknown aircraft during
Operation Provide Comfort missions.\7 Further, although it had
evidence to the contrary, the Board, through its report, cited a CFAC
Commander's inaccurate testimony that the Airborne Command Element
had no decision-making authority regarding aircraft encounters in the
TAOR. 

According to the Board's Senior Legal Advisor, the Board did not
report the F-15 pilots' nonadherence to that aspect of the order
because the Airborne Command Element was aware of the intercept; thus
the Board did not consider the pilots' nonadherence to be a
significant cause of the shootdown.  The Senior Legal Advisor stated
that, in the Board's opinion, Operation Provide Comfort management
had allowed operations to degrade to such a point that the Board
report, partly for this reason, focused on command and control
problems. 


--------------------
\7 The report did state that the F-15 pilots had adhered to the
order's requirement to contact the Airborne Command Element before
entering the TAOR. 


      COMMAND AND CONTROL OF
      AIRSPACE OPERATIONS IN
      OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.1

Combined Task Force flying operations were conducted according to an
Airspace Control Order published by the CFAC Director of Operations
(CFAC/DO).\8 The two-volume Airspace Control Order, which provided
the rules and procedures governing all Operation Provide Comfort
aircrews, was required reading for those aircrews.  Volume II
augmented volume I by providing detailed and specific guidance and
procedures for conducting Operation Provide Comfort air operations. 

The CFAC/DO directed the Operation Provide Comfort flight operations
through a ground-based Mission Director at Incirlik Air Base and an
Airborne Command Element\9 aboard the AWACS.  The Airborne Command
Element, according to the Board report, was to act as the "'eyes and
ears' of the CFAC/DO" aboard the AWACS.  In support of this, as
excerpted from the Airspace Control Order, "[the Airborne Command
Element] will contact [the Mission Director] who will then pass the
information to the CFAC/DO" concerning any unusual circumstances,
such as an unidentified aircraft in the TAOR. 


--------------------
\8 The CFAC/DO was responsible for updating the Airspace Control
Order; briefing incoming aircrews on its application; and holding
Detachment Commander meetings twice a week to discuss air-operation
problems and corrective actions. 

\9 In Operation Provide Comfort, the Airborne Command Element was
called the "Duke." During wartime situations, such as Desert Storm,
the Airborne Command Element was a colonel or a general and operated
as the air battle manager.  In Operation Provide Comfort, the
Airborne Command Element was a lieutenant colonel or major and
operated in a reactive mode. 


      REQUIREMENT TO REPORT TO
      AIRBORNE COMMAND ELEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.2

The Board report and Board President's opinion did not address that
the pilots were required to report to the Airborne Command Element in
an "unusual circumstance" as specified by the following excerpt from
volume II of the Airspace Control Order.\10 (For the sake of clarity,
we have used titles in place of code names.)

     "Aircrews experiencing any unusual circumstances/occurrences
     while flying [Operation Provide Comfort] missions will report
     the incident [as soon as possible] to [the Airborne Command
     Element] or [the AWACS crew] if [the Airborne Command Element]
     is unavailable."

The list of six such unusual circumstances/occurrences contained in
the Airspace Control Order included "[a]ny intercept run on an
'Unidentified aircraft.'" According to Operation Provide Comfort
officials, the Airspace Control Order was specifically designed to
slow down a potential engagement to allow CFAC time to check things
out. 

In response to questions we raised, the Board's Senior Legal Advisor
said that the Board had reviewed that provision and evidence showing
that the F-15 pilots had read both volumes of the Airspace Control
Order containing the requirement to contact the Airborne Command
Element for guidance.  He added that the contact-requirement issue
was not significant to the Board because the Airborne Command Element
was aware of the discussion between the F-15 pilots and the TAOR
controller about the intercept.  He also said that the Board
concluded that the F-15 pilots had reason to believe that the
Airborne Command Element was monitoring the conversation and that the
Airborne Command Element was, in fact, aware of the intercept and did
not intervene.\11 Further, the Operation Provide Comfort management,
in the Board's opinion, had allowed operations to degrade to such a
degree that it "may not have been common practice" at the time for
F-15 pilots to contact the Airborne Command Element.  He said that
partly because of this degradation, the Board's focus turned to the
command and control failures that had created an environment that
allowed the incident to occur. 

However, this duty to contact the Airborne Command Element for
directions concerning unusual circumstances had been reemphasized by
an oral directive issued because of an incident about a week before
the shootdown.\12 In that incident, F-15 pilots had initially ignored
an Airborne Command Element's directions to "knock off," or stop, an
engagement with a hostile fighter aircraft they thought was in the
no-fly zone.  The Airborne Command Element overheard the pilots
preparing to engage the aircraft and contacted them, telling them to
stop the engagement because he had determined that the hostile
aircraft was outside the no-fly zone and that he was also leery of a
"bait and trap" situation.\13 After several unsuccessful attempts to
call off the engagement during which the F-15 pilots did not respond
to him, he ordered the pilots to return either to their assigned
patrol point or to base.  The F-15s returned to their assigned patrol
point. 

The CFAC/DO issued the resultant oral directive to the F-15
detachment representative at the next Detachment Commander meeting\14
following the incident.  At the meeting, the CFAC/DO listened to the
complaints of the F-15 representative and then told him that the word
of the Airborne Command Element was final.\15 He also told the F-15
representative that the Airspace Control Order was very clear and
must be followed.\16 While the Board did an extensive investigation,
it was unaware of this oral directive. 


--------------------
\10 Volume I of the Airspace Control Order states, "Aircrews
experiencing unusual circumstances/occurrences will pass details to
[the Airborne Command Element] or AWACS." Volume II clarifies the
statement by (1) directing aircrews to first contact the Airborne
Command Element and, if that individual is unavailable, to then
contact AWACS and (2) defining "unusual circumstances/occurrences."

\11 The Airborne Command Element testified to the Board that once he
heard the visual identification call, he was trying to put together a
plan because he was considering the threat of an Iraqi trap.  He
testified that he did not intervene because, in his view, the F-15
pilots were not committed to "anything [engaging the targets]" at the
visual identification point and he had no idea they were going to
react so quickly. 

\12 According to Operation Provide Comfort documents and statements
from Operation Provide Comfort officials, it appears that this
incident occurred on April 7, 1994. 

\13 In such a strategy, a fighter aircraft is lured into an area by
one or more enemy targets and then attacked by other fighter aircraft
or surface-to-air missiles. 

\14 The twice-weekly Detachment Commander meetings were attended by
Detachment Commanders (including fighter squadron Commanders) or
their representatives to discuss operational issues and problems. 

\15 The Dec.  1993 Airspace Control Order, Vol.  I, stated "Direction
from [Mission Director]/[Airborne Command Element] is final."

\16 We were unable to substantiate that the F-15 wingman (who was
also the Squadron Commander) involved in the shootdown was at the
Detachment Commander meeting.  At that time, he was the Squadron
Commander/Detachment Commander.  Operation Provide Comfort officials
told us, on the other hand, that the knock-off incident and
subsequent guidance by the CFAC/DO were well known throughout the
Operation Provide Comfort fighter community. 


      DISCUSSION OF AIRBORNE
      COMMAND ELEMENT'S AUTHORITY
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3.3

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report cited as fact the
former CFAC Commander's testimony\17 that the Airborne Command
Element "had no decision-making authority." The Board justified
citing the statement as fact in its report because it was made by the
Commander, from whom the Board believed all authority for CFAC
operations stemmed.  The Board did not include in its report,
testimony from the CFAC Commander at the time of the shootdown, the
CFAC/DO,\18 a Mission Director, and others with more knowledge of
actual Operation Provide Comfort air operations that contradicted the
former CFAC Commander's reported testimony concerning Airborne
Command Element authority. 

The CFAC/DO told the Board and us that he had delegated
time-sensitive decision-making authority to his Mission Directors and
Airborne Command Elements.\19 He testified to the Board that he had
given the authority to the Airborne Command Element to terminate the
mission package "and bring the entire operation back." He further
told us that the week before the shootdown he had supported the
Airborne Command Element's decision to knock off the F-15 pilots'
intercept and had commended the Airborne Command Element on his
actions.  The Combined Task Force Commander also supported the
Airborne Command Element's decision. 


--------------------
\17 The testimony cited was that of the CFAC Commander who had been
reassigned several days before the shootdown.  The testimony of the
CFAC Commander at the time of the shootdown was that the CFAC/DO
supervised day-to-day Operation Provide Comfort flight operations and
monitored these operations through the Mission Director and Airborne
Command Element, which he characterized as command and control
positions. 

\18 Because the CFAC Commander also served as the 39th Wing Commander
and the 7440th Composite Wing (Provisional) Commander, the CFAC/DO
was, in fact, acting as the CFAC Commander according to the Combined
Task Force Commander. 

\19 A lieutenant colonel and three majors rotated between the Mission
Director and Airborne Command Element positions. 


   BOARD PRESIDENT'S ERRONEOUS
   CONCLUSION THAT BLACK HAWKS'
   USE OF WRONG CODE PREVENTED
   F-15 PILOTS FROM RECEIVING
   RESPONSE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

The Board President's opinion erroneously concluded that the Black
Hawks' use of a wrong code prevented the F-15s from receiving a
response in one of the electronic identification modes.  We agree
with an Air Force analysis, using information that was also available
to the Board, that determined that the F-15 pilots should have
received a response despite the wrong code.  The analysis based its
finding on the manner in which the pilots testified that they had
interrogated the helicopters. 


      BACKGROUND
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.1

During their sanitization sweep, the F-15 pilots, using radar,
located unknown, slow-moving contacts in the TAOR that were
subsequently identified as helicopters.  In an attempt to identify if
the helicopters were friendly, the F-15 pilots interrogated the
aircraft with their AAI/IFF systems.  An F-15's AAI/IFF system can
interrogate using four identification signals, or modes:  I, II, III,
and IV.\20 In the TAOR, the transponders on Black Hawk helicopters
transmit Modes I, II, and IV.  However, two Mode I codes were
designated for use in Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the
incident:  one inside, the other outside the TAOR.  As stated in the
Board report, the Black Hawk pilots were using the Mode I code for
outside the TAOR,\21 and the F-15 pilots' systems were set to the
Mode I code for inside the TAOR.  The Board report and its
President's opinion noted that the Black Hawks' use of the wrong Mode
I code had resulted in the F-15 pilots' failure to receive a Mode I
response. 

The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board took testimony from the
pilots who had flown the same F-15s on flights immediately before and
after the shootdown, in addition to testimony from the incident lead
pilot and wingman, to determine whether they had experienced any
problems with the IFF systems.  All said that they had had no
problems and had successfully interrogated other aircraft using Modes
I and IV.\22

The Board also had operational tests performed on the F-15s' AAI/IFF
components a few days after the incident.  The tests revealed no
problem that would have prevented the lead aircraft from
interrogating and displaying Modes I, II, and IV.  The wingman's AAI
system was found to be capable of interrogating Modes I, II, and IV
and of displaying Mode I and II signals.  However, it could not
display Mode IV signals generated by the test set.  After the
operational testing, the Board removed the AAI components from the
F-15s and sent them to two Air Force laboratories for teardown
analysis.  The laboratory tests were performed without recalibrating
the components, and the reports showed no problems that would have
affected the performance of the equipment. 

Because of weapons impact, the resulting crash, and/or the subsequent
fire, the transponder on one helicopter was completely destroyed. 
The transponder in the other helicopter was partly destroyed and was
sent to a Department of Defense laboratory.  The report of the
teardown analysis of this transponder concluded that it had been on
at the time of the incident but that the testing could not determine
conclusively whether the system had been fully operational at the
time. 


--------------------
\20 Mode I was the general identification signal that permitted the
selection of 32 codes.  Mode II was an aircraft-specific
identification mode allowing the use of 4,096 possible codes.  Mode
III provided a nonsecure friendly identification of both military and
civilian aircraft and was not used in the TAOR.  Mode IV was secure
and provided high-confidence identification of friendly targets.  A
compatible code had to be loaded into the cryptographic system of
both the challenging and the responding aircraft to produce a
friendly response. 

\21 Other Black Hawk pilots told us, as was also mentioned in the
Board report, that they routinely used the Mode I code for outside
the TAOR while operating in the TAOR and no one had advised them that
it was incorrect to do so. 

\22 The lead pilot stated on April 14, 1994, that the initial AAI
contact on the unknown helicopters in the TAOR was a negative Mode I
and a positive Mode IV.  When he testified before the Board, on April
23, 1994, he described the initial positive Mode IV contact as
lasting only a second and attributed it to an AAI system "anomaly."
The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was unable to determine why
the F-15s reportedly did not receive a Mode IV response from the
Black Hawks based on the AAI interrogation of the helicopters that
the F-15 pilots said they made.  We were also unable to make this
determination.

The Commander, U.S.  Army in Europe, after reviewing the Board report
and its president's opinion, objected to one sentence in the opinion
that attributed the unsuccessful Mode IV interrogation to one or more
things, including "both helicopter IFF transponder codes may have
been loaded incorrectly." He added that nothing in the Board report
supported the possibility that the codes had been loaded improperly
and that it was clear the Army crews were not at fault in this
matter.  The U.S.  Commander in Chief, Europe, agreed with his view. 
Although the language in the opinion was not changed, the Commander,
U.S.  Army in Europe, said his concerns were addressed because his
complaint had been included as an attachment to the Board report. 


      F-15 PILOTS SHOULD HAVE
      RECEIVED MODE I RESPONSE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4.2

The Board President's opinion concluded that the Black Hawks had been
using the wrong Mode I code inside the TAOR after they departed Zakhu
for Irbil, Iraq, and that the incorrect code was responsible for the
F-15 pilots' failure to receive a Mode I response when they
interrogated the helicopters.  However, the Air Force special task
force's\23

subsequent review of the IFF component revealed that, based on the
descriptions of the system settings that the pilots testified they
had used on several interrogation attempts, the F-15s should have
received and displayed any Mode I or II\24 response, regardless of
code.  Thus, the helicopters' use of the wrong Mode I code should not
have prevented the F-15s from receiving a response. 

In reaching his conclusion, the Board President relied on the
evidence collected by the Board, which included the pilots' testimony
as well as other information about the IFF system settings and how
the system should perform.  In its report, the Board cited three of
four interrogation attempts about which the lead pilot had testified
on April 23, 1994.  One of the three was performed in a way that
should have displayed any Mode I or II response,\25 as later noted by
the Air Force special task force.  The task force also found that the
additional interrogation attempt described on April 23 was identical
to the one that should have displayed any Mode I or II response.  The
additional interrogation, not reported by the Board, took place
during the period in which the AWACS was receiving friendly Mode I
and II returns from the helicopters at an increasingly frequent
rate\26 and when the lead pilot was closer to the helicopters than
during his initial interrogation attempt at the same settings. 

The Board President recalled discussions about the F-15 IFF-system
settings and said the Board report had included the interrogation
attempts about which the Board was certain.  He told us that because
of the difference between the lead pilot's incident-day statement and
his testimony, it was difficult to determine the number of times that
the lead pilot had interrogated the helicopters. 


--------------------
\23 The Air Force Air Combat Command assembled a task force to
review, among other issues, visual and electronic identification
systems and procedures. 

\24 According to the Airspace Control Order, the primary means of
identifying friendly aircraft in the TAOR were through Modes II and
IV in the IFF interrogation process.  According to the Board report,
the F-15 lead pilot, in his preflight briefing, specified that the
fighter pilots would use Modes I and IV. 

\25 The Board report found that the Black Hawks' transponders were
transmitting the correct Mode II codes specified in the day's Air
Tasking Order. 

\26 According to the AWACS magnetic tape replay of the shootdown, the
AWACS received IFF returns (Modes I and II) from the helicopters at
the same time that the F-15s received no response.  The Board report
stated that beginning approximately 7 minutes before the shootdown,
the AWACS was receiving intermittent IFF returns that increased in
frequency for the next 3 minutes.  The returns then continued
uninterrupted for 2 minutes.  During the final 2 minutes before the
shootdown, according to the Board report, the F-15 and Black Hawk
returns appeared too close together on the AWACS consoles for the
crew to identify the helicopters. 


   A PERCEIVED DISCIPLINE PROBLEM
   AND A PERCEIVED RUSH TO ENGAGE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

Victims' family members and others raised concerns about the lack of
discussion in the Board report concerning the discipline of F-15
pilots in general in Operation Provide Comfort and the F-15 pilots'
perceived urgency to engage during the shootdown.  Although Air Force
Regulation 110-14, under which the Board's investigation was
conducted, did not require the Board to examine such environment
issues, neither did the regulation rule out an examination.  However,
the two issues were relevant to our review. 

According to Operation Provide Comfort officials, the pilots' failure
on April 14, 1994, to contact the Airborne Command Element was a
product of a lack of F-15 mission discipline, as demonstrated by the
incident a week before the shootdown when F-15 pilots initially
ignored Airborne Command Element instructions to "knock off" an
engagement with an Iraqi aircraft.  According to the Combined Task
Force Commander, the pilots' failure was also related to a
rivalry-induced urgency to engage "hostile" aircraft. 


      F-15 PILOTS' PREVIOUS
      PROBLEMS WITH MISSION
      DISCIPLINE ISSUES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.1

The Mission Director during the shootdown and the Airborne Command
Element involved in the knock-off incident told us that they had had
problems with mission discipline issues involving F-15 pilots
assigned to Operation Provide Comfort during the time period leading
up to the shootdown.  The Airborne Command Element stated that on the
evening of the knock-off incident, several F-15 pilots, including the
pilots whom he had ordered to cease their proposed engagement,
approached him and questioned whether he was a "combat player" and
whether Airborne Command Elements were perhaps too conservative. 

According to CFAC officials, the F-15 pilot community was "very
upset" about the intervention of the Airborne Command Element during
the knock-off incident and felt he had interfered with the carrying
out of the F-15 pilots' duties. 

The Airborne Command Element from the knock-off incident also told us
that so many flight discipline incidents had occurred that CFAC held
a group safety meeting in late February or early March 1994 to
discuss the need for more discipline.  The flight discipline issues
included midair close calls, unsafe incidents when refueling, and
unsafe takeoffs.  The Combined Task Force Commander said that he had
recognized a potential supervisory problem with the F-15 Detachment
because no F-15 pilots were on the Combined Task Force staff.\27 He
had made several unsuccessful requests to the Commander, 17th Air
Force, to have an experienced F-15 pilot--on flying status--assigned
to the Combined Task Force staff.  According to the Combined Task
Force Commander, the 17th Air Force Commander told him that the
available number of F-15 slots was limited and one could not be
spared for Operation Provide Comfort.  We noted, however, that as
part of the corrective actions taken following the shootdown, an F-15
pilot was assigned to the Combined Task Force staff. 

Further, the shootdown occurred, according to the CFAC/DO's statement
to us, because of a lack of training and aircrew discipline in
following established guidelines on the part of the two F-15 pilots
involved in the incident.  He stated, "[t]he pilots made a terrible
mistake" and with greater discipline--coupled with the multiple
safeguards designed to prevent such an incident--this fratricide may
have been avoided. 


--------------------
\27 The CFAC Assistant Director of Operations told us there was very
little F-15 oversight in Operation Provide Comfort at the time of the
shootdown.  He explained that an F-15 pilot was needed on the
Combined Task Force staff to help communicate with the F-15 group
because contentious issues involving F-15 actions had become common
topics of discussion at Detachment Commander meetings.  He said that
CFAC tried to have a certified F-15 pilot assigned to the Combined
Task Force staff, but U.S.  Air Forces in Europe did not support such
an assignment.  He also said that an F-15 pilot was assigned to the
staff after the shootdown, which "paid big dividends."


      PILOTS' PERCEIVED URGENCY TO
      ENGAGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5.2

The Combined Task Force Commander and other Operation Provide Comfort
officials acknowledged that a rivalry existed between the F-15 and
F-16 communities, including those in Operation Provide Comfort
detachments.  Operation Provide Comfort officials told us that while
such rivalry was normally perceived as healthy and leading to
positive professional competition, at the time of the shootdown the
rivalry had become more pronounced and intense.  The Combined Task
Force Commander attributed this atmosphere to the F-16 community's
having executed the only fighter shootdown in Operation Provide
Comfort and all shootdowns in Bosnia. 

In the opinion of the Combined Task Force Commander, the shootdown
pilots' haste was due in part to the planned entry of two F-16s into
the TAOR 10 to 15 minutes after the F-15s.  He said that if the F-15
pilots had involved the chain of command, the pace would have slowed
down, ruining the pilots' chances for a shootdown. 

Further, CFAC officials stated that the Airspace Control Order was
specifically designed to slow down a potential engagement to allow
CFAC time to check things out.\28 They said that the presence of the
helicopters, which were flying southeast away from the security zone,
posed no threat to the mission and there was no need for haste.  For
example, the Mission Director stated that, given the speed of the
helicopters, the fighters had time to return to Turkish airspace,
refuel, and still return and engage the helicopters before they could
have crossed south of the 36th parallel.  According to the F-15
Squadron Operations Officer at the time of the shootdown and the
Board's Senior Legal Advisor, the tactical environment did not
warrant a rush to judgment.  The Operations Officer added that the
F-15 pilots had acted too hastily and should have asked more
questions.  The Senior Legal Advisor said that, in his opinion, the
pilots had an unnecessarily aggressive attitude toward the intercept
and shootdown. 

The lead incident pilot told us that he was concerned about going low
to check out the unknown aircraft.  His primary concerns at the time
were (1) being fired on from the ground, (2) flying into the ground,
and (3) a possible air threat.  Because of these concerns, he
remained high for as long as possible and dropped down briefly for a
visual identification that lasted, according to the lead pilot,
"between 3 and 4 seconds." He told us that he saw no Iraqi flag on
the helicopters and that the helicopters were not acting in a hostile
manner.  He assumed they were Iraqi Hinds because they were in the
middle of Iraq, although he acknowledged that they could have been
Syrian or Iranian Hinds. 

The incident wingman told us that his visual identification was not
as close to the helicopters as was the lead pilot's.\29 His visual
identification lasted "between 2 and 3 seconds." He said, in
hindsight, "We should have taken another pass; but at the time, I was
comfortable with the decision."


--------------------
\28 The Airborne Command Element at the time of the shootdown
testified to the Board that he was surprised at the speed of the
engagement, noting that he thought the F-15 pilots would have at
least told the AWACS of their intentions or asked for guidance.  This
testimony was not included in the Board report.  Also, not included
in the Board report was testimony from the former CFAC Commander that
decisions concerning "out of the ordinary" occurrences while on
missions were to be pushed up the chain of command, to the CFAC/DO
level or higher. 

\29 The Board report found that the F-15s' identification passes had
been accomplished at speeds, altitudes, and distances where it was
unlikely that the pilots would have been able to detect the Black
Hawks' markings. 


   CONCLUSIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6

The Board report and Board President's opinion would have presented a
more complete record of the incident's events had they discussed the
incident F-15 pilots' requirement to report to the Airborne Command
Element, accurately assessed the Airborne Command Element's
authority, not concluded that the Black Hawks' use of an incorrect
code had prevented Mode I electronic responses from the helicopters,
and addressed F-15 pilot discipline issues.  This more complete
information, in turn, may have raised additional questions about the
actions and inaction of the F-15 pilots and the Airborne Command
Element and, therefore, could have influenced subsequent disciplinary
or corrective actions.  However, if the information had been
included, it would not have affected the Board President's
conclusion:  that a chain of events, whose final actions were the
lead pilot's incorrect identification and the wingman's failure to
clarify his lack of identification, caused the fratricide.  Further,
it is difficult to predict if the incident's outcome would have
differed had the F-15 pilots contacted the Airborne Command Element
directly. 


THE MILITARY JUSTICE PROCESS AND
ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS
============================================================ Chapter 3

The congressional requesters also asked us to (1) determine whether
military justice investigations, conducted after the Aircraft
Accident Investigation Board completed its work, had complied with
provisions in the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ);\1 (2)
determine if improper or unlawful command influence had been exerted
during the UCMJ process; and (3) answer general questions raised by
family members and others regarding actions taken following the
investigations. 

First, we found that the subsequent UCMJ investigations complied with
provisions in the UCMJ and the Manual for Courts-Martial. 
Preliminary inquiries, under the Rules for Court-Martial (RCM), were
conducted into the actions of 14 officers.  The Air Force used two
separate investigative paths, one for seven AWACS-related officers
and the other for the two F-15 pilots and five Operation Provide
Comfort officials.  The former were investigated by a command
separate from the one to which they were assigned.  This command
developed evidence beyond the material contained in the Board's
report.  As a result of the preliminary inquiry, charges were
preferred against four AWACS crew members and the Airborne Command
Element.  An Investigating Officer investigated these charges under
Article 32, UCMJ; one officer was determined to be blameless; and the
Commander, 963d Air Control Squadron retired as a Lieutenant Colonel
although he had been selected for promotion.  After the Article 32
investigation, one officer--the Senior Director of the AWACS
crew--was tried by general court-martial and acquitted, and one
officer received nonjudicial punishment in the form of a letter of
reprimand.  The remaining three officers received administrative
letters of reprimand. 

On a separate path, the actions of the two F-15 pilots and five
Operation Provide Comfort officials were reviewed under RCM in a
preliminary inquiry conducted by the pilots' Wing Commander.  The
Wing Commander relied on the Board report and filed
dereliction-of-duty and negligent homicide charges against the F-15
wingman that were the focus of an Article 32 investigative hearing.\2
Subsequently, charges against this pilot were dropped; however, he
later received a letter of reprimand.  Administrative action was
taken against four other officers:  the lead pilot received a letter
of reprimand, two other officers received letters of admonition, and
one received a letter of counseling.  No action was taken against the
remaining two officers. 

The Air Force also convened Flying Evaluation Boards for the two F-15
pilots involved in the shootdown.  In addition, 16 months after the
incident and 6 days after the House Committee on National Security
hearing, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force found that a number of
performance evaluations of personnel involved in the incident (1)
were inconsistent with administrative actions taken by higher-level
commanders and (2) failed to reflect that some officers had not met
Air Force standards.  Accordingly, the Chief of Staff prepared
negative letters of evaluation regarding seven officers involved in
the shootdown and implemented additional actions against five of
them. 

Second, based on our review of the summary reports of investigation
and statements made by cognizant officials, we found no evidence of
improper or unlawful command influence in the investigative or
judicial process.  However, we were unable to complete our
investigation and determine whether the consideration and disposition
of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of improper or
unlawful command influence.  Department of Defense officials would
not allow us to interview the key officials--Convening Authorities,
Inquiry Officers, and Investigating Officers--involved in the UCMJ
investigations. 


--------------------
\1 UCMJ, 10 USC ï¿½ 801 et seq., governs the conduct of military
personnel.  It contains both substantive and procedural law
applicable to the military justice process and administration.  It
also describes the system of military courts, defines offenses,
authorizes punishment, and provides statutory due-process safeguards. 

\2 The Wing Commander also preferred charges against two of the five
Operation Provide Comfort officials.  Following further analysis,
these charges were not investigated at an Article 32 investigative
hearing. 


   UCMJ PROCESS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:1

On July 12, 1994, the Secretary of Defense approved the Aircraft
Accident Investigation Board report.  The Secretary of the Air Force
thereafter forwarded the report to the Commander, Air Combat Command,
and the Commander, U.S.  Air Forces in Europe, as well as to the
Commander, U.S.  Army in Europe, for appropriate action under the
UCMJ and any administrative actions.  Thus, the Air Force UCMJ
investigations followed two separate paths--through Air Combat
Command (AWACS-related personnel) and U.S.  Air Forces in Europe
(Combined Task Force Operation Provide Comfort personnel and F-15
pilots). 

The AWACS mission crew and 963d Squadron Commander involved in the
shootdown were assigned to the 552d Air Control Wing, which was under
the jurisdiction of the 12th Air Force.  However, the Staff Judge
Advocate to the 12th Air Force had served as Legal Advisor to the
Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.  As a result, the Air Force
considered him disqualified from conducting an RCM investigation or
serving as staff judge advocate to the Convening Authority during the
disciplinary review. 

Therefore, the Commander, Air Combat Command, designated the
Commander of the 8th Air Force as the court-martial Convening
Authority.\3 The Commander, 8th Air Force, appointed an Inquiry
Officer to conduct an RCM 303\4 inquiry regarding the actions of
seven officers under Air Combat Command's command.  The seven
officers were the CFAC Mission Director, Airborne Command Element,
963d Squadron Commander, AWACS Mission Crew Commander, AWACS Senior
Director, AWACS Enroute Controller, and AWACS TAOR Controller.  On
July 18, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed an Inquiry Officer
to conduct the RCM 303 investigation. 

The Commander, U.S.  Air Forces in Europe, designated the Commander
of the 17th Air Force as the court-martial Convening Authority.  On
July 22, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed an Inquiry Officer
to conduct a preliminary inquiry under RCM 303 into the roles of the
following seven officers in the shootdown:  Combined Task Force
Commander, CFAC Commander, CFAC/DO, Combined Task Force Director of
Plans and Policy, Combined Task Force Intelligence Officer, and the
two F-15 pilots.  The F-15 pilots were assigned to the 53d Fighter
Squadron at Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany.  The Inquiry Officer was
the Commander of the 52d Fighter Wing at Spangdahlem Air Base to whom
the F-15 pilots' squadron reported. 

The Commander, U.S.  Army in Europe, directed the Judge Advocate,
U.S.  Army in Europe, to determine whether administrative or
disciplinary action was warranted against any Army personnel for
their role in the incident.  The actions of one person--the Combined
Task Force Chief of Staff (an Army colonel)--were considered as
possible for review. 


--------------------
\3 The Convening Authority is a commissioned officer in command who
is authorized to convene courts-martial.  A commander may administer
nonjudicial punishment upon military personnel of that command under
Article 15, UCMJ.  (Nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 is
generally appropriate when administrative corrective measures are
inadequate and a trial by court-martial is not necessary.) Charges
are ordinarily forwarded to the accuseds' immediate commander for
initial consideration as to disposition.  However, a superior
commander may withhold a subordinate commander's disposition
authority.  Unless the authority is withheld by a superior commander,
each commander has independent discretion to determine disposition
under RCM 306. 

\4 An RCM 303 is a preliminary inquiry into suspected offenses to
gather all reasonably available evidence that bears on guilt or
innocence and that relates to mitigating, extenuating, or aggravating
circumstances.  The appropriate commander determines what, if any,
adverse administrative or judicial actions should be taken against
personnel accused or suspected of committing offenses, triable by
court-martial, that are referred for consideration under RCM 306. 


   AIR COMBAT COMMAND'S UCMJ
   ACTIONS AGAINST AWACS AND
   RELATED OFFICERS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:2

On July 18, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed legal, F-15, and
AWACS advisors to assist the Inquiry Officer.  The investigation was
conducted from July 18 to August 18, 1994.  The inquiry team obtained
testimony from AWACS personnel, flew in an AWACS, observed simulated
Operation Provide Comfort missions, and interviewed senior directors
and controllers not on the incident flight. 

The Inquiry Officer prepared a 77-page report, largely consisting of
an analysis of the charges against the officers, with 2 volumes of
supporting material.  The report also reflected the Inquiry Officer's
logic for selecting the appropriate articles of the UCMJ that might
be applicable to the actions of the AWACS-related personnel,
including manslaughter, negligent homicide, and dereliction of duty. 
The Inquiry Officer said that voluntary or involuntary manslaughter
charges would be inappropriate against the AWACS-related officers for
their involvement in the shootdown.  The Inquiry Officer concluded
that negligent homicide charges could be made against some of them
for their involvement in this matter; but he recommended against this
course of action, because "the occurrence of an independent,
unforeseeable, intervening act, namely the incorrect identification
of the helicopters by the F-15 pilots .  .  ." would not support a
conviction for negligent homicide. 

On August 30 and 31, 1994, the Inquiry Officer preferred
dereliction-of-duty charges against the following AWACS-related
officers:  the Airborne Command Element, the Mission Crew Commander,
the Senior Director, the Enroute Controller, and the TAOR Controller. 
No charges were preferred against the 963d Airborne Air Control
Squadron Commander or the Mission Director.  The Inquiry Officer
concluded that no adverse action should be taken against the Mission
Director because he had not failed to take any required actions. 

On September 7, 1994, the Convening Authority appointed an Article
32, UCMJ, Investigating Officer, who was assigned to the U.S.  Air
Force Trial Judiciary,\5 to examine the charges against the five
charged officers, in accordance with RCM 405.  The Convening
Authority directed the Investigating Officer to inquire into the
truth of the matters set forth in the charges, secure information to
determine what their disposition should be, and issue a report and
advisory recommendations.  The Investigating Officer held a joint
Article 32 investigative hearing involving all five officers from
October 11 to October 26, 1994.  Forty-eight witnesses testified at
the hearing; and the government and defense attorneys entered 271
exhibits, including 54 classified exhibits, into the hearing record. 
The Investigating Officer issued his report on November 12, 1994, and
recommended that the dereliction-of-duty charge against the Senior
Director be referred to a general court-martial.  He also recommended
that the Enroute Controller receive nonjudicial punishment under
Article 15, UCMJ, and that the charges against the remaining three
officers be dismissed. 


--------------------
\5 Investigating officers should be an officer in the grade of major,
lieutenant commander, or higher, or one with legal training.  In this
case, a military judge outside the chain of the Convening Authority's
command was appointed. 


   U.S.  AIR FORCES IN EUROPE'S
   UCMJ ACTIONS AGAINST OPERATION
   PROVIDE COMFORT OFFICIALS AND
   F-15 PILOTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:3

In his appointment letter, the Commander, 17th Air Force, directed
the RCM 303 Inquiry Officer to (1) determine if any of the seven
officers (Combined Task Force Commander and staff and two F-15
pilots) had committed acts related to the shootdown that amounted to
offenses punishable under the UCMJ, (2) recommend disposition of any
offense and whether administrative actions were warranted, and (3)
file charges if warranted.  He also appointed two legal advisors and
a technical advisor to assist the Inquiry Officer.  The Inquiry Team
reviewed the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report and
supporting documentation.  It neither obtained oral testimony nor
collected any additional evidence; instead, it relied on witness
interviews conducted by the Board. 

On August 29, 1994, the Inquiry Officer issued a 66-page report on
his investigation.  The report identified the following as "possible"
offenses:  dereliction of duty by all seven officers, involuntary
manslaughter by the F-15 pilots, and negligent homicide by all the
officers except the Intelligence Officer.  After concluding that
three officers had committed violations under the UCMJ, the Inquiry
Officer preferred dereliction-of-duty charges against two Operation
Provide Comfort senior officers and dereliction-of-duty and negligent
homicide charges against one F-15 pilot, the wingman. 

On September 8, 1994, the Commander, U.S.  Air Forces in Europe,
appointed an Article 32 Investigating Officer,\6 who was assigned to
the U.S.  Air Force Trial Judiciary, European Circuit, to investigate
the charges against the F-15 wingman.\7 In accordance with RCM 405,
Manual for Courts-Martial, the Commander directed the Investigating
Officer to inquire into the truth of the matters set forth in the
charges by the Inquiry Officer, secure information to determine what
disposition should be made of the charges, and issue a report with
advisory recommendations.  The Investigating Officer held an Article
32 hearing on November 7-9, 1994.  The government attorneys called
one witness--the F-15 flight leader\8 --and entered 18 exhibits into
the hearing record.  The exhibits included (1) the transcript of the
F-15 wingman's taped account of the shootdown made in the cockpit
approximately 45 minutes after the shootdown, (2) the wingman's
testimony before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, and (3)
the flight leader's testimony during the investigation of the
aircraft accident and the AWACS Article 32 hearing.  The defense
attorneys called no witnesses and entered 116 exhibits into the
hearing record, including a prepared statement read by the wingman
during the hearing and a detailed, 102-page factual and legal
presentation of his theory of the case. 

The Investigating Officer issued his report on November 12, 1994, and
recommended dismissal of the charges against the wingman.  His
analysis focused on whether the lead pilot had called the AWACS
announcing the engagement before or after the wingman responded to
the lead pilot's directive to confirm whether the helicopters were
Iraqi Hinds.  He concluded that if the call was made before the
wingman's response, the lead pilot had relieved the wingman of the
duty to independently identify the helicopters.  Based on his review
of the pilots' testimony\9 and the wingman's experience, he concluded
that it was more likely that the lead pilot's engagement announcement
had preceded the wingman's alleged "nonresponsive" confirmation.\10


--------------------
\6 In this case, a military judge outside the chain of the Convening
Authority's command was appointed as Investigating Officer. 

\7 The charges against the two senior officers were dismissed; and,
thus, Article 32 investigations were not conducted. 

\8 Captain Eric A.  Wickson, the flight leader, was granted
testimonial immunity for the purpose of testifying at the wingman's
(Lieutenant Colonel Randy W.  May) Article 32 investigative hearing. 
Captain Wickson could still be charged, based on all evidence
obtained from sources other than his testimony at these proceedings. 

\9 The Investigating Officer found that the wingman consistently
stated on three occasions (in the cockpit 45 minutes after the
incident, in his Aircraft Accident Investigation Board testimony, and
in his Article 32 hearing) that the lead pilot had overridden the
confirmation directive.  He also considered that the lead pilot,
during his Article 32 testimony, had begun to discount significantly
his need for the wingman's confirmation. 

\10 The Aircraft Accident Investigation Board and the RCM Inquiry
Officer concluded that the wingman's "Tally two" response led the
lead pilot to believe reasonably that the wingman had independently
seen two Iraqi Hind helicopters.  The wingman has stated that the
"Tally two" response merely confirmed his sighting of two
helicopters, not identification of the helicopters. 


   UCMJ ACTIVITIES CONCERNING
   COMBINED TASK FORCE CHIEF OF
   STAFF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:4

On September 30, 1994, the Judge Advocate, U.S.  Army in Europe,
advised the Commander, U.S.  Army in Europe, that consideration was
warranted concerning whether the Combined Task Force Chief of Staff
was responsible for the breakdown in staff communication that had
been cited in the Board report.  After reviewing the relevant Board
testimony and other evidence, however, he recommended that no adverse
action be taken against the officer because he had (1) focused his
attention according to the Combined Task Force Commander's direction,
(2) had neither specific direction nor specific reason to inquire
into the transmission of information between his Director of
Operations for Plans and Policy and the CFAC, (3) been the most
recent arrival and the only senior Army member of a predominately Air
Force staff and therefore generally unfamiliar with air operations,
and (4) relied on experienced colonels under whom deficiencies had
occurred. 


   ACTIONS BY FLYING EVALUATION
   BOARDS AND AIR FORCE CHIEF OF
   STAFF
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5

The Flying Evaluation Boards\11 convened as a result of the
shootdown, made findings concerning the proficiency, professionalism,
care, and judgment of the two pilots, and made recommendations
concerning their suitability for future aviation responsibilities. 
Upon review of the Boards' findings and recommendations, the
Commander, 17th Air Force determined that both pilots should be
reassigned to noncombat aircraft.  He further recommended that the
F-15 lead pilot, Captain Eric A.  Wickson, should be assigned next as
an instructor pilot in basic flight training.  The Commander, U.S. 
Air Forces in Europe concurred with this determination and also
concluded that the F-15 wingman, Lieutenant Colonel Randy W.  May\12
should be reassigned to a nonflying aviator staff position. 

On the basis of his review of administrative actions taken by
higher-level authorities regarding Air Force personnel involved in
the shootdown, the Air Force Chief of Staff determined that the
personnel records of some involved personnel did not reflect their
failure to meet Air Force standards.  Accordingly, for seven of those
involved in the incident, he wrote letters of evaluation that
addressed how each of the officers had failed to meet these standards
and took additional action against five officers. 


--------------------
\11 If questions arise regarding a pilot's fitness to continue
flying, a commander may convene a Flying Evaluation Board.  That
board conducts a hearing in which the pilot can present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses.  After considering evidence concerning the
pilot's professional qualifications and evaluating the pilot's
ability to perform future flying duties, the Flying Evaluation Board
issues an advisory recommendation to the convening commander.  (Air
Force Regulation 60-13)

\12 Lieutenant Colonel May retired as a Major, the last grade at
which, as determined by the Secretary of the Air Force, he had
performed satisfactorily. 


      FLYING EVALUATION BOARDS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5.1

On January 20 and 25, 1995, the Commander, 17th Air Force, appointed
separate Flying Evaluation Boards for Captain Wickson and Lieutenant
Colonel May.  Each board consisted of a senior board member and two
board members, all of whom were pilots; a legal advisor; a recorder;
and a reporter.  The Commander, 17th Air Force, directed the two
senior board members to make special findings on whether the pilots
had shown lack of judgment in performing their duties on April 14,
1994, and whether they were unsuited for duty in a combat aircraft
role.  The Commander, 17th Air Force, also directed the boards to
make recommendations on whether the pilots had potential to continue
flying. 


      EVIDENCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5.2

Captain Wickson's Flying Evaluation Board was held on February 6,
1995; and Lieutenant Colonel May's, on February 9-10, 1995.  The
pilots were the only witnesses in their Flying Evaluation Board
hearings.  The government and defense attorneys submitted eight
volumes of evidence in the Wickson hearing and seven volumes of
evidence in the May hearing, including the Aircraft Accident
Investigation Board summary of facts and executive summary; the
Operation Plan for Operation Provide Comfort; the Aircrew Read File;
each pilot's testimonies before the Aircraft Accident Investigation
Board and Article 32 hearings; the transcript of Lieutenant Colonel
May's aircraft videotape of the incident; a Kurdish citizen's
videotape of the incident; and each pilot's medical and training
records, ratings, and awards. 

On April 5, 1995, the Commander, U.S.  Air Forces in Europe,
concurred with the boards' recommendations that Lieutenant Colonel
May and Captain Wickson remain qualified for aviation service.  He
also directed that Lieutenant Colonel May be reassigned to a staff
position not involving flying duties and that Captain Wickson be
reassigned to flying duties (1) as an instructor in basic flying
training or (2) in other noncombat aircraft. 


      AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF
      ACTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:5.3

On July 25, 1995, the Secretary of the Air Force requested that the
Air Force Chief of Staff review the administrative actions taken in
regard to the Air Force personnel involved in the shootdown.  On
August 9, 1995, the Air Force Chief of Staff advised the Secretary of
the Air Force of the actions he had taken. 

The Chief of Staff said that the military justice process had worked
as it was supposed to after the incident and that he was comfortable
with the military justice actions taken.  He concluded that a proper
balance between command involvement and individual rights had been
maintained throughout the military justice process.  Further, the
administrative actions taken by commanders were within an appropriate
range of options available to them.  However, he said that a number
of performance evaluations of involved personnel were inadequate
because they were inconsistent with administrative actions taken by
higher-level commanders and failed to reflect that the ratees had not
met Air Force standards.  Accordingly, pursuant to authority granted
him by the Secretary of the Air Force, he prepared the following
letters of evaluation regarding seven of the Air Force personnel
involved in the shootdown and implemented additional actions against
five. 

  -- Combined Task Force Commander, Brigadier General Jeffrey S. 
     Pilkington.  A letter of evaluation addressed his failure to
     meet Air Force standards and became a permanent part of his
     record. 

  -- CFAC Commander, Brigadier General Curtis H.  Emery.\13 A letter
     of evaluation was placed in his permanent record to reflect his
     failure to meet Air Force standards. 

  -- F-15 Wingman, Lieutenant Colonel Randy W.  May.  A letter of
     evaluation was placed in his officer selection record to reflect
     his failure to meet Air Force standards.  He was disqualified
     from aviation service for 3 years. 

  -- F-15 Lead Pilot, Captain Eric A.  Wickson.  A letter of
     evaluation was placed in his officer selection record to reflect
     his failure to meet Air Force standards.  He was disqualified
     from aviation service for 3 years based on his demonstrated lack
     of judgment associated with flight activities. 

  -- AWACS Senior Director, Captain Jim Wang.  A letter of evaluation
     detailing his failures to meet Air Force standards was included
     in his officer selection record and disqualified him from
     assignment to duties involving control of aircraft in air
     operations for at least 3 years. 

  -- AWACS Enroute Controller, Captain Joseph M.  Halcli.\14 A letter
     of evaluation reflecting his failure to meet Air Force standards
     was placed in his officer selection record and disqualified him
     from assignment to duties involving control of aircraft in air
     operations for at least 3 years. 

  -- AWACS TAOR Controller, First Lieutenant Ricky L.  Wilson.\15 A
     letter of evaluation reflecting his failure to meet Air Force
     standards was placed in his officer selection record.  It
     recommended that he not be assigned to duties involving control
     of aircraft in air operations for at least 3 years. 


--------------------
\13 At the time of the incident, Brigadier General Emery was a
Colonel. 

\14 At the time of the incident, the AWACS Enroute Controller was a
First Lieutenant. 

\15 At the time of the incident, the AWACS TAOR Controller was a
Second Lieutenant. 


   THE QUESTION OF COMMAND
   INFLUENCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 3:6

Our review of the summary reports of investigation during the UCMJ
process and statements by officials knowledgeable of that process
revealed no evidence of command influence.  However, we were unable
to confirm that the consideration and disposition of suspected
offenses under UCMJ had not been subject to unlawful command
influence because we were denied our request to interview applicable
UCMJ Convening Authorities, Inquiry Officers, and Investigating
Officers. 

The Investigating Officer in the AWACS Article 32 hearing stated that
he had not been subject to command influence during the proceedings. 
The counsel for the Senior Director, Captain Wang, had filed a motion
to dismiss the charges against the Senior Director based on an
allegation of unlawful command influence by the Secretary of Defense
on the Secretary of the Air Force.  In response to that motion, six
officials provided either a Stipulation of Expected Testimony, a
memorandum, or an affidavit stating that they had neither been the
subject of improper command influence nor taken action to improperly
influence military justice officials.  These officials were the
Secretary of the Air Force; Air Force Chief of Staff; Commander, Air
Combat Command; Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, Headquarters Air Combat
Command (Legal Advisor to the RCM 303); the RCM 303 Inquiry Officer;
and the General Court-Martial Convening Authority, the Commander, 8th
Air Force.\16 The convening judge denied the motion, ruling that the
defense had failed to meet its burden of establishing at least the
appearance of unlawful command influence.  Further, to address the
question of command influence in the case of the Senior Director,
Captain Wang's military attorney told us that he interviewed the
Secretary of the Air Force about whether she or the Secretary of
Defense had intervened in the court-martial.  The attorney was
satisfied that neither of them had exercised command influence during
the UCMJ process. 

However, our request to the Air Force and the Department of Defense
to interview military officials involved in the Black Hawk UCMJ
proceedings was denied.  These officials included the Convening
Authorities, RCM 303 Inquiry Officers, and Article 32 Investigating
Officers for investigations by both the Air Combat Command and the
U.S Air Forces in Europe.  The Department of Defense voiced the
belief that "any Congressional intrusion into the deliberative
process .  .  .  endangers the actual and perceived independence of
the military justice system." We assured the Air Force that we would
ask those officials only about the presence of unlawful command
influence and would not intrude into the deliberative processes they
had used in the proceedings, but we were denied access to those
decision-makers who might have knowledge of possible influence. 
Consequently, we were unable to confirm whether the consideration and
disposition of suspected offenses under the UCMJ were the result of
improper or unlawful command influence. 


--------------------
\16 Similar stipulations were not provided by the three officials
involved in the U.S.  Air Forces in Europe UCMJ investigations of
five Operation Provide Comfort officials and two F-15 pilots. 


CORRECTIVE AND OTHER ACTIONS BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE
AIR FORCE AFTER THE SHOOTDOWN
============================================================ Chapter 4

In accord with concerns voiced by victims' family members and others,
we also looked at the corrective and other actions taken after the
shootdown.  Military officials took immediate actions to help ensure
that the Black Hawk accident was not repeated.  Further, after the
issuance of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report, the
European Command; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Air Combat
Command; and the Air Force instituted a large number of corrective
actions.  These actions included modification of the Rules of
Engagement; inclusion of Black Hawk flight times on the Air Tasking
Order; reviews of command structure and operations, plus operating
doctrines and procedures; revision of AWACS training programs and
certification procedures; and modifications of visual and electronic
identification training. 

In transmitting the Board report to the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff made the following observation: 

"For over 1,000 days, the pilots and crews assigned to Operation
Provide Comfort flew mission after mission, totalling over 50,000
hours of flight operations, without a single major accident.  Then,
in one terrible moment on the 14th of April, a series of avoidable
errors led to the tragic deaths of 26 men and women of the American
Armed Forces, United States Foreign Service, and the Armed Forces of
our coalition allies.  In place were not just one, but a series of
safeguards--some human, some procedural, some technical--that were
supposed to ensure an accident of this nature could never happen. 
Yet, quite clearly, these safeguards failed."

According to an Air Combat Command official who was familiar with the
Board's report and who participated in the Command's UCMJ
investigations, over 130 separate mistakes were involved in the
shootdown.  A discussion follows of some corrective actions spawned
by the shootdown and the Aircraft Accident Investigation report. 


   IMMEDIATE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:1

Beginning April 15, 1994, the European Command and Combined Task
Force Commanders instituted immediate corrective actions designed to
prevent a recurrence of the shootdown.  The actions included, among
others, modification of the Rules of Engagement, to restrict
procedures for engaging Iraqi helicopters; inclusion of Black Hawk
flight times on the Air Tasking Order; requirement for verbal
confirmation of a positive IFF Mode IV check on all Operation Provide
Comfort aircraft prior to their entry into the TAOR; reorganization
of the Combined Task Force to designate one U.S.  Air Force Colonel
exclusively as the Commander, CFAC; further definition of AWACS
responsibilities for coordination of air operations; placement of
radios on Black Hawk flights to enable communication with fighter
aircraft; and painting of white recognition stripes on the Black Hawk
rotor blades to enhance their identification from the air. 


   EUROPEAN COMMAND'S OPERATIONS
   ASSESSMENTS AND CORRECTIVE
   ACTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:2

In response to a directive from the Deputy U.S.  Commander in Chief,
Europe, an Air Force/Army team assessed Operation Provide Comfort's
mission, organization, and operations.  The assessment was conducted
from May 31 to June 8, 1994, and placed particular emphasis on the
adequacy of European Command guidance and oversight; the Combined
Task Force command structure and organization, manning, and support;
and operating doctrine and procedures.  The assessment team flew
missions with F-15, Black Hawk, and AWACS units; interviewed key
personnel and random unit personnel; and reviewed organizational
plans, procedures, and directives.  The team issued a 59-page
classified report that contained over 40 recommendations for
operations improvements.  During October 14-22, 1995, a second team
conducted another operational assessment of Operation Provide Comfort
and made 166 additional recommendations in a classified report.  A
number of recommendations made by both teams have been implemented. 


   JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF'S
   CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:3

On July 7, 1994, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with the
approval of the Secretary of Defense, directed that (1) all
Commanders in Chief review their Joint Task Force operations to
ensure that they were conducted in accordance with published joint
doctrine; (2) the Commanders in Chief establish a program of regular
oversight of all their Joint Task Force operations; and (3) his staff
review the curricula of all appropriate professional military
education institutions to ensure proper emphasis on Joint Task Force
organization, procedures, and operations.  The Chairman also
recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force Chief
of Staff to review the adequacy of AWACS training programs and
certification procedures, develop a retraining program based on the
lessons learned from the shootdown, and ensure that all mission
aircrews underwent this training.  The Chairman further convened a
conference of the Joint Chiefs and all Commanders in Chief on
September 15, 1994, to discuss actions being taken to prevent a
recurrence of the shootdown. 

On October 6, 1994, the Chairman advised the Secretary of Defense
that all Commanders in Chief had completed reviews of their joint
operations, aggressively implemented changes where required, and
established programs to ensure regular oversight of those operations. 
Further, the Joint Staff found shortcomings in how Joint Task Force
operations had been addressed in professional military education
systems.  According to the Chairman, each of the shortcomings was
being addressed and corrections implemented. 


   AIR COMBAT COMMAND'S--TIGER
   TEAM'S--CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:4

At the direction of the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of the Air Force tasked the Air
Combat Command to investigate the specific operational issues
identified in the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report.  The
Air Combat Command assembled a "Tiger Team" consisting primarily of
Air Combat Command headquarters staff augmented with representatives
from the 8th Air Force, Air Force Weapons Center, Air National Guard,
and the 552d Air Control Wing.  The team divided into three groups: 
AWACS/Airborne command and control, visual and electronic
identification, and ground command and control.  The three groups
used the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board report as a frame of
reference and identified 90 issues, which they studied in depth.  The
Air Combat Command Tiger Team issued its report on September 14,
1994, making about 140 recommendations, most of which had been
completed or were underway when the report was issued.  The report
also proposed six recommendations for consideration by the Air Staff
or the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 


   AIR FORCE SPECIAL TASK FORCE
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5

Concurrent with the Air Combat Command tasking, the Secretary of the
Air Force appointed an Air Force special task force to assist all Air
Force commands in identifying potential problem areas and
implementing appropriate corrections.  The task force effort, which
included the Air Combat Command Tiger Team work, involved over 120
people and over 30,000 hours in 6 major Air Force commands and Air
Force Headquarters.  The task force's primary emphasis was to
determine if the shootdown was an isolated incident or indicative of
a bigger problem.  It issued its report to the Secretary of Defense
on September 30, 1994.  The report concluded that the incident was
not indicative of a larger Air Force problem and that the following
two breakdowns in individual crew performance had contributed to the
incident:  (1) the AWACS failed to build and provide an accurate air
picture and (2) the F-15 pilots misidentified the target. 

The report also recommended a one-time retraining and recertification
program for all AWACS aircrews and a plan to reduce the temporary
duty of AWACS crews to 120 days per year.  The report concluded that
the Air Force had corrected, or was in the process of correcting,
training programs to address the shortcomings noted. 


      AIR COMBAT COMMAND UPDATES
      ON CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 4:5.1

On July 27, 1995, the Commander, Air Combat Command, informed the Air
Force Chief of Staff that the Air Combat Command had completed a
majority of the Tiger Team recommendations and that efforts were on
target in achieving the desired results.  He said that all AWACS
crews had been recertified by October 13, 1994, and that the
certification process was being applied to all AWACS crews deploying
to any location.  He further stated that AWACS temporary duty rates
had been decreased from 166 to 135 days per year from January 1995 to
July 1995.  He also said that Air Combat Command planned to increase
the number of AWACS crews.\1

However, he noted that the Air Combat Command was continuing to work
on the following three areas:  computer-based training devices,
visual identification, and electronic identification.  For example,
he stated that the Air Combat Command had updated visual
identification training material, provided computer hardware for the
Air Force-improved computer-based training developed by an Air Force
contractor, and distributed the material to all Air Combat Command
fighter units.  The Commander, Air Combat Command, noted that the new
product was an improvement over previous training materials (35MM
slides and video) but that it did not fully meet the Command's needs. 
He said that the Air Combat Command, in conjunction with the Air
Education and Training Command, was pursuing an enhanced visual
training program that would expand capabilities and allow aircrews to
view three-dimensional or animated images against a variety of
backgrounds from multiple aspects in all configurations and
camouflage paint schemes.  This new program was distributed to all
Air Combat Command units in January 1996. 



(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix I

--------------------
\1 By August 1996, the number of AWACS crews had been increased to 40
from the 28 available at the time of the shootdown. 


AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION
BOARD PRESIDENT'S OPINION
============================================================ Chapter 4



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
============================================================ Chapter 4


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III

Barbara W.  Alsip; Neyla Arnas; Fred Chasnov; Richard E.  Chervenak;
Barbara C.  Coles; Donald G.  Fulwider; Robert J.  Gettings; Joan M. 
Hollenbach; M.  Jane Hunt; Woodrow H.  Hunt, Jr.; Shelia A.  James;
Paul E.  Jordan; James M.  Lager; William E.  McDaniel, II; Richard
C.  Newbold; and Carin M.  Wyche. 


*** End of document. ***