Inspectors General: Handling of Allegations Against Senior OIG Officials
(Letter Report, 10/15/96, GAO/OSI-97-1).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the handling of
allegations of misconduct made against senior officials between 1990 and
1995 at the 28 Offices of Inspector General (OIG), focusing on: (1)
whether the President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and
OIG had policies and procedures for handling such allegations; (2)
whether PCIE and OIG followed these policies and procedures in
conducting investigations; and (3) the effect of Executive Order 12993
on the handling of such allegations.

GAO found that: (1) PCIE and its Integrity Committee were generally
effective in reviewing allegations against senior OIG officials and, by
1995, PCIE had resolved problems regarding its of lack of legal or
investigative authority, minimal personnel resources, and incomplete
recordkeeping and case-tracking processes; (2) from 1990 through 1995,
PCIE had no formally adopted written policy or procedures for handling
allegations against IG and Deputy IG, but PCIE did adhere to informal
procedures for initiating both criminal and non-criminal investigations;
(3) 14 of the 28 OIG reviewed had written procedures for handling
allegations of wrongdoing, 12 had informal procedures, and 2 were
developing written procedures; (4) of the allegations that resulted in
investigations, most were conducted in a manner that met PCIE standards
for due professional care, objectivity, and thoroughness; and (5)
Executive Order 12993 increased PCIE legal and investigative authority
while allowing IG, in certain cases, to decide what entity should
investigate allegations against senior OIG officials.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  OSI-97-1
     TITLE:  Inspectors General: Handling of Allegations Against Senior 
             OIG Officials
      DATE:  10/15/96
   SUBJECT:  Accountability
             Fraud
             Internal controls
             Inspectors General
             Conflict of interest
             Ethical conduct
             Administrative remedies
             Investigations by federal agencies
             Internal audits

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Governmental Affairs, U.S.  Senate

October 1996

INSPECTORS GENERAL - HANDLING OF
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST SENIOR OIG
OFFICIALS

GAO/OSI-97-1

Handling of Allegations Against Senior OIG Officials

(600416)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ECIE - Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency
  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  GAO - General Accounting Office
  IG - Inspector General
  OIG - Office of Inspector General
  OSI - Office of Special Investigations
  PCIE - President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-274729

October 15, 1996

The Honorable Ted Stevens, Chairman
The Honorable John Glenn, Ranking Minority Member
Committee on Governmental Affairs
United States Senate

This report responds to your letter of May 9, 1996, and subsequent
discussions, in which you asked us to review the handling of
allegations of misconduct made against senior officials between 1990
and 1995 at the 28 Offices of Inspector General (OIGs) with a
presidentially appointed Inspector General (IG) (see app.  I).  You
were concerned about the effectiveness of the President's Council on
Integrity and Efficiency's (PCIE) and the OIGs' handling of
allegations against senior OIG officials--IGs, Deputy IGs, and
Assistant IGs.  Specifically, you asked that we determine whether the
PCIE or OIGs had policies and procedures for handling such
allegations and whether the allegations, and resultant
investigations, were handled according to these policies and
procedures.  In addition, Executive Order No.  12993, "Administrative
Allegations Against Inspectors General" (see app.  II), was signed on
March 21, 1996; and we noted its effect on the handling of
allegations made against IGs and their senior staff. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

During the period of our review (1990-95), the PCIE had not formally
adopted written policy or procedures for handling allegations against
IGs and Deputy IGs but did adhere to October 1, 1982, draft
procedures ("President's Council on Integrity and Efficiency
Procedures for Investigating Allegations Concerning Certain Senior
Administration Officials") and a 1994 description on how PCIE
processed allegations.  The role of PCIE's Integrity Committee was to
review allegations and refer them, when deemed appropriate, to the
Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section; an appropriate
investigative agency; or the affected agency head for disposition and
resolution. 

Half of the 28 OIGs in our review had written procedures for handling
allegations of wrongdoing by OIG employees; 12 had informal
procedures; and the remaining 2 were developing written procedures. 

In the review period, the 72 allegations that the PCIE received and
closed resulted in 14 investigations.\1 None of the investigations
resulted in criminal charges or administrative action.  Of the 35
allegations against IGs, Deputy IGs, or Assistant IGs that OIGs
received and closed, 21 resulted in investigations.  Two of the 21
investigations resulted in letters of reprimand.  Only 21.5 percent
of the PCIE and OIG allegations directly involved an IG or Deputy IG. 
Most of the remaining matters alleged that the senior officials had
condoned a lack of professional judgment or exercised improper
management discretion. 

Of the allegations that resulted in investigations, we found that
most were conducted in a manner that met PCIE standards for
independence, due professional care, objectivity, and thoroughness. 
However, before 1994, PCIE encountered problems that affected the
timeliness of its work because of PCIE's lack of legal and
investigative authority, minimal personnel resources, and limited
record-keeping/case-tracking system.  These problems decreased for
the 1995 cases in our review. 

Executive Order 12993, "Administrative Allegations Against Inspectors
General" (Mar.  21, 1996), formally authorized the PCIE to review
allegations, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
investigate noncriminal allegations, against IGs and certain staff
members.  According to the order, allegations against OIG staff must
be referred to the PCIE's Integrity Committee if, among other
reasons, the staff member is alleged to have acted with the knowledge
of the IG or an objective internal investigation is not feasible. 
Absent such instances, the IGs have the discretion to investigate, or
refer to the PCIE or other entities, allegations against their senior
OIG staff.  While the IGs we spoke with generally agreed that the
order allows them to decide what entity should investigate
allegations against senior OIG officials, several PCIE members
believed that allegations concerning Deputy IGs or Assistant IGs
should automatically be referred to the PCIE so as to preserve the
appearance of independence. 


--------------------
\1 For purposes of this report, we considered all audits, reviews,
inspections, or investigations by the OIGs or other entities to be
investigations.  PCIE did not conduct investigations.  Instead, it
referred the allegations that it received to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the Office of Special Counsel, the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, or an uninvolved OIG for investigation. 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2


      PCIE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :2.1

The PCIE is an interagency council that is charged with promoting
integrity and effectiveness in federal programs.  It was established
by Executive Order No.  12301 in 1981 and was comprised principally
of the presidentially appointed and Senate-confirmed IGs.  Executive
Order No.  12805, signed in 1992, reflected changes that had been
made in the 1978 Inspector General Act (P.L.  95-452), as amended. 
The 1992 Executive Order primarily expanded the PCIE membership to
include the Executive Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE),
which consists of the statutory IGs appointed by the heads of
designated federal entities.  The PCIE is chaired by the Deputy
Director for Management of the Office of Management and Budget.  The
following are also members of the PCIE: 

  -- Vice Chairperson of the ECIE;

  -- an FBI official, as designated by the Director, FBI;

  -- Special Counsel, Office of Special Counsel;

  -- Director, Office of Government Ethics;

  -- Deputy Director, Office of Personnel Management; and

  -- Controller of the Office of Federal Finance Management, Office
     of Management and Budget. 


      PCIE'S INTEGRITY COMMITTEE
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :2.2

In 1982, the PCIE established an informal working group to act as a
clearinghouse for allegations against IGs and their staffs.  The
working group was formally recognized in 1990 as the PCIE Allegations
Review Subcommittee under the Integrity in Law Enforcement Committee. 
The Allegations Review Subcommittee then became the entity for
handling allegations against IGs and their principal deputies. 
Allegations against other staff, including Assistant IGs, were
referred by the Subcommittee to the respective IGs. 

Pursuant to the authority granted by the 1992 Executive Order, the
PCIE established the Integrity Committee in January 1995 to succeed
the Allegations Review Subcommittee.  The Integrity Committee's
responsibility was to receive, review, and refer for investigation
allegations of wrongdoing against IGs and Deputy IGs.  Although the
1992 Executive Order did not designate Integrity Committee
membership, the March 1996 Executive Order No.  12993 stated that the
membership would consist principally of the following: 

  -- the FBI representative to the PCIE, who serves as the
     Chairperson of the Integrity Committee;

  -- the Special Counsel, Office of the Special Counsel;

  -- the Director, Office of Government Ethics; and

  -- three or more IGs, representing both the PCIE and the ECIE. 

The Chief, Public Integrity Section, Criminal Division, Department of
Justice, or the Chief's designee, serves as an advisor to the
committee. 


      OIGS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :2.3

The Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, and one other act\2
established 28 independent IGs in all cabinet departments and larger
federal agencies, as of December 31, 1995.  (See app.  I.) These IGs
are presidentially appointed and subject to Senate confirmation.  IGs
conduct and supervise audits and investigations; recommend policies
to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; and prevent and
detect fraud and abuse in their entities' programs and operations. 
They inform their agency heads and the Congress about agency
problems, recommend corrective actions, and report suspected
violations of federal criminal law found during their investigations
to the Department of Justice.  The independence of presidentially
appointed IGs is protected in various ways, including removal by only
the President who must notify the Congress as to the reasons for
removal. 


--------------------
\2 The Intelligence Authorization Act of 1990 (P.L.  101-193)
established the presidentially appointed Inspector General at the
Central Intelligence Agency. 


   PCIE POLICY AND PROCEDURES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3


      POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR
      HANDLING ALLEGATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

During the period of our review, the PCIE had not formally adopted
written policy or procedures for handling allegations against IGs and
Deputy IGs.  However, informal procedures did exist during the period
for initiating both criminal and noncriminal investigations; and the
PCIE generally adhered to them.  The informal procedures consisted of
(1) the October 1, 1982, draft procedures, entitled "President's
Council on Integrity and Efficiency Procedures for Investigating
Allegations Concerning Certain Senior Administration Officials" and
(2) a description, circulated to the OIG community in early 1994, on
how PCIE processed allegations. 


      PCIE'S REVIEW PROCESS FOR
      ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2

According to PCIE officials, allegations received by PCIE were
assigned to its Integrity Committee for processing and review.  The
committee staff assigned each allegation a sequential number and sent
an acknowledgment letter to the complainant or referring agency.  If
the allegation lacked specificity or was perceived to contain no
criminal or administrative issues, the committee closed the case and
referred the matter to the affected agency for information only. 

For allegations that warranted further review, the Integrity
Committee referred the allegation to the Department of Justice,
Public Integrity Section.  The Public Integrity Section then
determined whether the allegation, if proved, would constitute a
violation of federal criminal law.  If the Public Integrity Section
determined that a criminal investigation was warranted, it could
investigate the allegation itself or refer it to the FBI.  Neither
the Public Integrity Section nor the FBI was obligated to report the
investigation's result to the Integrity Committee because of
potential privacy issues.  However, the committee would generally be
advised informally concerning the status of the referral and
investigation.  If (1) it was determined that a criminal
investigation was not warranted or (2) the Justice Department
investigation substantiated misconduct but prosecution was declined,
the allegation was presented at the next meeting of the Integrity
Committee for an administrative review.  (See fig.  1.)

   Figure 1:  Review Process for
   Allegations Received by PCIE

   (See figure in printed
   edition.)

PCIE's Integrity Committee met quarterly to review allegations
returned by the Public Integrity Section and investigations completed
by the OIGs and other entities.  The committee first determined
whether to refer an allegation or investigative findings to a
specialized agency or an OIG for consideration (see footnote 1) or
close it with a letter to the PCIE Chairman and the complainant. 


         PCIE REFERRED ALLEGATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.1

If the Public Integrity Section or the FBI had substantiated a
criminal allegation against an IG/Deputy IG but the Public Integrity
Section had declined to prosecute, the PCIE Chairman would refer the
investigation's results to the affected agency head for consideration
of administrative action.  If a noncriminal allegation warranted
referral, the Integrity Committee could (1) refer the allegation to
the head of the affected agency for a response; (2) request an
uninvolved OIG, or its staff on detail, to conduct an investigation;
or (3) refer the allegation to an appropriate government-wide agency
for review.  For example, the Special Counsel, Office of Special
Counsel, who as a member of the Integrity Committee participates in
the review of all allegations, could ask that particular allegations
be referred to that office for investigation. 

Upon completion of the agency's follow-up, investigation, or review
of an IG/Deputy IG, the agency head would notify the Integrity
Committee of the results and what action, if any, would be taken
against the subject of the allegation.  If the committee concurred
with the agency's findings, the matter was closed with a letter to
the PCIE Chairman and others as appropriate.  If the Integrity
Committee did not concur with the investigation, the matter was to be
referred back to the agency head, or to another agency, for
appropriate action.  The matter was not closed until the committee
concurred with the agency's investigative findings.  If an IG's
offense constituted a removable violation, the PCIE Chairman would
refer the matter to the President. 

If the subject of an allegation fell below the IG/Deputy IG level,
the Integrity Committee referred the allegation to the IG of the
affected agency or to the agency having authority to conduct
specialized investigations; e.g., an allegation involving a protected
personnel practice (whistleblowing) was referred to the Office of
Special Counsel.  Upon referral, the Integrity Committee closed the
matter with a letter to the PCIE Chairman and others as appropriate. 


         PCIE CLOSED WITHOUT
         REFERRAL
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2.2

If the Integrity Committee determined that an allegation did not
warrant referral for response, it closed the matter with a letter to
the complainant, the PCIE Chairman, and others as appropriate.  It
then referred the allegation and its decision to the affected agency
head for information or for action that the head deemed appropriate. 


   OIG POLICY AND PROCEDURES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Fourteen of the 28 OIGs in our review had written procedures for
handling allegations of wrongdoing by OIG employees.  All but two of
the remaining OIGs had informal procedures.  The two exceptions were
in the process of developing guidelines during our review. 

The OIGs referred all but three allegations involving an IG to the
PCIE.  Those three matters were referred directly to the FBI, a U.S. 
Attorney's Office, or the agency's Office of General Counsel.  Most
of the OIGs referred allegations involving a Deputy IG to the PCIE. 
All but one of the allegations involving an Assistant IG were handled
by either the affected IG or the Deputy IG.  That one matter was
addressed by the Office of Special Counsel. 

Our review of the OIGs' cases showed that their investigations
generally met their policies as embodied in the PCIE standards for
independence and due professional care, including the aspects of
objectivity and thoroughness.  This was true even though in some
instances the allegations made to the OIGs could not be verified
because the information was nonspecific, the source or witness was
unavailable, or a significant amount of time had elapsed between the
alleged incident and the filing of the allegation. 


   PCIE/OIG ALLEGATIONS RECEIVED
   AND CLOSED IN 1990-95 PERIOD
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5


      PCIE ALLEGATIONS
      RECEIVED/CLOSED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.1

We assessed the 72 allegations that the PCIE had received and closed
during the 1990-95 period:  69 against an IG or Deputy IG and 3
against an Assistant IG.  Fourteen of the 72 allegations resulted in
investigations conducted by the FBI (5), the Office of Special
Counsel (3), and various OIGs (6).  These matters included such
allegations as criminal misuse of the telephone and sexual
harassment.  None of the investigations substantiated the referred
allegation, and none resulted in an administrative action. 


      OIG ALLEGATIONS
      RECEIVED/CLOSED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.2

During the 6-year period that we reviewed, the OIGs received and
closed 35 allegations:  22 against an IG or Deputy IG and 13 against
an Assistant IG.  Of the 22 allegations against an IG or a Deputy IG,
14 were referred to PCIE in accordance with then existing procedures. 
The remaining eight were either referred to independent entities or
reviewed within the affected agencies.  Allegations involving
Assistant IGs were handled by the affected OIG or referred to an
independent investigative agency. 

Of the 35 allegations, 21 resulted in investigations.  Eight
allegations against IGs or Deputy IGs were investigated by the agency
head, the IG, or an outside entity.\3 Twelve allegations lodged
against Assistant IGs were investigated by the affected OIG.  One
allegation, also against an Assistant IG, was investigated by the
Office of Special Counsel.  Two of the 21 investigations resulted in
letters of reprimand to the individuals against whom the allegations
were made. 


--------------------
\3 The outside entities included the FBI, the Office of Special
Counsel, the U.S.  Attorney's Office, and unaffected OIGs. 


      NATURE OF ALLEGATIONS
      INVOLVING SENIOR OIG
      OFFICIALS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :5.3

Of the 107 allegations from the PCIE and the OIGs, 84, or 78.5
percent, were not directly attributed to an IG, a Deputy IG, or an
Assistant IG.  Instead, the allegations identified these officials as
being responsible for alleged misconduct by OIG staff members in such
matters as failure to conduct investigations or improper personnel
actions.  Further, those allegations usually involved the exercise of
professional judgment, management discretion, and the allocation of
investigative resources.  Twenty-three, or 21.5 percent, of the
allegations cited personal misconduct by a senior OIG official. 
Table 1 summarizes the types of allegations against senior OIG
officials received by the PCIE and the OIGs in the 1990-95 period. 



                                Table 1
                
                  Summary of Allegations Made Against
                          Senior OIG Officials

General allegation                              Number         Percent
--------------------------------------  --------------  --------------
Failure to investigate: e.g.,                       23            21.5
 inadequate investigation,
 cover-up of allegations
Improper investigation: e.g.,                       17              16
 abusive techniques,
 inaccurate reporting
Mismanagement: e.g.,                                20              19
 failure to disclose information,
 waste of government resources
Improper personnel action: e.g.,                    24              22
 discrimination in hiring/promotion,
 whistleblower retaliation
======================================================================
Subtotal                                            84            78.5
Personal misconduct: e.g.,                          23            21.5
 misuse of government resources,
 unethical conduct,
 conflict of interest
======================================================================
Total                                              107           100.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------

   PROBLEMS PCIE FACED DURING
   REVIEW PERIOD
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6

The PCIE and its Integrity Committee were generally an effective
mechanism for the review of allegations.  Further, in 1995, the last
year we reviewed, PCIE improved its performance with regard to most
of the problem areas--no legal or investigative authority, minimal
personnel resources, and incomplete record- keeping/case-tracking
practices--that had adversely affected its earlier work and its
overall timeliness.  Most of these problems have also been addressed
with the March 1996 Executive Order. 


      LACK OF LEGAL AND
      INVESTIGATIVE AUTHORITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1

According to the then PCIE Chairman during 1992 testimony before the
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,\4 questions had been raised
as to the "legal powers" of the Integrity Committee.  In April 1990,
some PCIE members had expressed concern over the legal standing of
the Integrity Committee and noted that the committee had been
handling allegations against IGs without a formal charter, policy,
and procedures.  The 1992 testimony also cited a PCIE internal review
that had found that (1) the Allegation Review Subcommittee (the
Integrity Committee's predecessor) lacked authority to participate in
any investigative process; (2) the subcommittee system of sporadic
meetings for decision-making, under which the Integrity Committee's
predecessor had operated, was cumbersome and impeded the effective
and timely resolution of allegations; and (3) the subcommittee system
had led to a situation in which no one party was responsible for the
effective investigation and resolution of allegations against IGs. 

Further, the PCIE had no clear authority to review
allegations--criminal and noncriminal--against IGs and make
appropriate investigative referrals.  In addition, no investigative
agency had the authority to investigate administrative allegations
against IGs who were outside the purview of specific executive branch
agencies (e.g., Office of Special Counsel for alleged prohibited
personnel practices).  In some cases, this lack of clear authority
caused the Integrity Committee difficulty in deciding how to handle
noncriminal matters involving alleged mismanagement.  They dismissed
some allegations as being frivolous, as noted by a PCIE official;
referred some to the head of the affected agency; and referred others
to the affected IG. 

In addition, according to the 1992 hearing, the FBI had no statutory
authority to conduct noncriminal investigations for the PCIE. 
Current and former members of the Integrity Committee told us that
the PCIE's lack of authority to deal with noncriminal issues had
continued to be a problem.  However, the March 1996 Executive Order
clearly vests the authority to conduct all investigations requested
by PCIE with the FBI. 

In addition, in 1982 a Department of Justice counsel questioned
whether one IG office had the authority to investigate another. 
Further, at the 1992 hearing, a PCIE official opined that the
Inspector General Act authorized IGs to investigate allegations of
misconduct only when the allegations involved fraud, waste, or abuse
in their particular department or agency.  However, according to a
former Chairman of the Integrity Committee, nothing precludes OIG
personnel from being detailed from one agency to another to
investigate an IG on a reimbursable basis for noncriminal matters. 
An alternative consideration was to use investigative staff from an
agency with government-wide authority, such as the Office of
Personnel Management.  The 1996 Executive Order authorizes the
Integrity Committee, through its FBI representative, to request an
OIG's assistance in an investigation. 


--------------------
\4 The Integrity and Effectiveness of the Offices of Inspector
General, Hearing before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
May 20, 1992. 


      RESOURCES PROBLEM IMPROVED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.2

Prior to 1994, an FBI agent, whose duties included part-time support
to PCIE, reviewed incoming allegations, referred them to the
Department of Justice, and set the agenda for the Integrity
Committee.  This lack of sufficient support resulted in delays in
processing, filing, and tracking the allegations.  Currently, an FBI
agent and an FBI analyst provide full-time support to the PCIE. 


      RECORD-KEEPING AND CASE
      TRACKING TO BE IMPROVED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.3

As PCIE officials testified in 1992, the PCIE had no central,
complete file on actions taken to resolve allegations.  During our
review, we found, for example, that when the Integrity Committee
referred any matter to another agency without requesting a response,
the committee generally closed its case file and lost oversight of
the matter.  The record showed that the Integrity Committee referred
43 of the 72 allegations we reviewed to various agencies and received
agency responses regarding 8 of the allegations.  Thus, the official
PCIE files seldom reflected the final action taken by the agency,
making it difficult for anyone who wished to determine the final
outcome of an allegation. 

However, according to the Chairman of the Integrity Committee, the
PCIE's draft procedures to implement the 1996 Executive Order will
require an affected agency to acknowledge all referrals and to report
back to the committee, stating whether any action has been taken.  In
addition, we noted that the 1996 Executive Order requires that "[a]ll
records created and received pursuant to this order are records of
the Integrity Committee and shall be maintained by the FBI." In
contrast to this requirement, the PCIE Chairman, in commenting on a
draft of our report, stated that PCIE's draft procedures will require
agencies that receive referred allegations to maintain the
investigative files after providing the resulting investigative
report to the Integrity Committee.  However, with such a procedural
requirement, the PCIE would still not have a central, complete file
on actions taken to resolve allegations. 

During our review of the records, we noted another possible problem
related to the investigations of individuals who had left office and
the lack of record-keeping regarding the allegations against them. 
In four cases, the Integrity Committee and/or the affected OIG
declined to follow up allegations, according to OIG officials,
because the subject of an allegation had left office and was not
subject to any administrative or adverse personnel action.  One IG
stated the belief that such allegations should be investigated. 
Further, we determined that with no centralized record-keeping system
to track the subjects of allegations, the PCIE had no effective way
to determine who the subjects were, what the allegations were, or how
long the allegations had been awaiting PCIE action.  Further, the
allegations could not be chronicled for trend analysis or a reference
check if an individual were to be considered for future federal
positions.  According to the Chairman of the Integrity Committee, the
draft procedures for implementing the 1996 Executive Order will
establish a system to identify PCIE-related documents maintained in
the FBI's centralized record-keeping system. 


      TIMELINESS PROBLEM IMPROVED
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.4

Between 1990 and 1994, the PCIE, through its review committees, took
an average of 18 months from receipt of an allegation to referral or
closure.  In 1995, after the Integrity Committee had received
additional support, the average time was reduced to 5 months. 

Between its inception in January 1990 and December 1995, PCIE's
Integrity Committee and its predecessors received and closed a total
of 72 allegations concerning the IGs and Deputy/Assistant IGs.\5
Twenty-nine of the 72 cases were closed without a PCIE request for
further investigation or review, after (1) the Public Integrity
Section's determination that no criminal investigation was warranted
and (2) a review by the Integrity Committee.  We noted that in 33, or
about 46 percent, of the cases, time lapses of over 12 months
occurred between these steps in the PCIE review process. 


--------------------
\5 Thirteen additional allegations received during the same time
period were still open and/or pending investigation.  Thus, we did
not include them in our review. 


   THE 1996 EXECUTIVE ORDER
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :7

Executive Order No.  12993 was signed in March 1996.  The order was
promulgated to further define and strengthen the authority and
responsibility of the Integrity Committee, which was established by
the PCIE and the ECIE pursuant to the authority granted by Executive
Order No.  12805, signed in May 1992.  The 1996 order grants the
Integrity Committee the authority to receive, review, and refer
allegations of "wrongdoing [by] IGs and .  .  .  certain staff
members of the OIGs.  .  .  ." to other executive branch agencies for
investigation.  Further, the order authorizes the Director of the
FBI, through the Director's designee serving as Chairperson of the
Integrity Committee, to investigate, as warranted, noncriminal
allegations against the IGs and certain OIG staff members. 

Under the 1996 Executive Order, responsibility for investigating
allegations against OIG staff remains with the affected IG.  However,
the IGs must refer such allegations to PCIE's Integrity Committee if
a senior staff member is alleged to have acted with the affected IG's
knowledge or if the subject allegation is related to an allegation
against the IG.  In addition, the order provides that IGs shall refer
allegations against a senior staff member to the Integrity Committee
after determining "that an objective internal investigation of the
allegation, or the appearance thereof, is not feasible" and that
"review of the substance of the allegation cannot be assigned to an
agency of the executive branch with appropriate jurisdiction over the
matter."

According to the March 1996 Executive Order, the Integrity Committee,
with the PCIE Chairman, shall establish the policies and procedures
necessary to conduct investigations and report activities. 
Currently, the Vice Chairperson of the PCIE and representatives of
the Integrity Committee are working to establish those policies and
procedures. 


   IGS' PERCEPTIONS REGARDING 1996
   EXECUTIVE ORDER
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :8

The IGs we talked with expressed support for the 1996 Executive
Order, stating that its provisions strengthened the position of the
Integrity Committee.  Generally, the IGs believed that the provision
giving the FBI the authority to initiate inquiries into noncriminal
allegations will provide the independence desired by all concerned. 

The IGs generally agreed that it is critical that they retain the
discretion, which they believed the order allows, to determine if an
investigation of OIG officials can be done in-house, referred to the
FBI, or done with the assistance of another IG.  However, several
PCIE members believed that allegations against OIG senior staff--the
Deputy IG and/or Assistant IGs--should automatically be referred to
PCIE for review to preserve the appearance to outside interests that
any resultant investigation was independent.  Others believed that
their right of first refusal regarding such allegations was essential
to their position.  All IGs stated that if an allegation appeared to
present a potential conflict, they would immediately refer it to the
PCIE. 

How to act on allegations of noncriminal wrongdoing by an IG
involving mismanagement of an office or inappropriate/inadequate
conduct of an investigation remains under debate within the IG
community.  The IGs generally agree that procedures for assessing
such allegations, being developed to implement the 1996 Executive
Order, must provide for a screening process to avoid pursuit of
allegations that lack specificity or credibility. 

Among other issues concerning the Executive Order's implementation
that caused much IG discussion were (1) the dissemination of
investigative reports about an IG to the head of the agency and (2)
the notification of subjects of the investigation.  Several of the
IGs were concerned that notifying the agency head about
investigations of the agency's IG may cause a strain in their
relationship and may raise concerns regarding the IG's independence. 
The IGs were concerned that even though the allegations were
unfounded, the agency head could use the information at a later date
to seek the IG's removal.  In addition, the IGs favored a procedure
whereby (1) the IG being investigated is made aware of the
investigation and (2) the IG and the complainant are made aware of
the investigation's outcome.  The IGs believed that such a procedure
would both serve to protect an IG against unjust actions by the
agency head and to defend an IG if allegations arose that the matter
had not been reviewed and investigated. 


   AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :9

On October 8, 1996, PCIE members, including the Chairman, provided us
with oral comments on a draft of this report.  They were in general
agreement with the contents of the draft but requested that we ensure
that any restatement of the March 1996 Executive Order in the report
be precise concerning the order's specific provisions.  Where
appropriate, to address PCIE concerns, we have clarified our
discussions. 


   METHODOLOGY
----------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10

We conducted our work between May and August 1996.  We obtained
information from the PCIE and the OIGs having presidentially
appointed IGs regarding their formal or informal policies,
procedures, and practices for reviewing and investigating allegations
against senior OIG officials and reviewed the PCIE's and the OIGs'
policies and procedures. 

Although we did not evaluate all OIG policies and procedures, we
noted certain common elements for those we reviewed.  All shared, for
example, the requirement that any allegations concerning IGs and
Deputy IGs be automatically referred to the PCIE.  They also all
required that allegations involving the appearance of a conflict of
interest for other senior OIG staff be referred to the PCIE for
action. 

Our review included all allegations that had been referred or
reported directly to the PCIE or an OIG between January 1990 and
December 1995.  These included the 107 closed cases from this period
that involved a senior OIG official. 

We gathered data, including the number, types, and results of the
reviewed allegations.  We reviewed PCIE and OIG investigative files
and activity logs to determine whether allegations presented had been
properly documented and handled according to policies and procedures. 
We accessed all investigative materials to assess the thoroughness,
objectivity, and independence of the overall investigative effort for
each case. 

We interviewed current and former members of the PCIE Integrity
Committee; OIG officials and case agents; Department of Justice,
Public Integrity Section staff; FBI staff assigned to support the
Integrity Committee; senior officials at 15 judgmentally selected
OIGs; and others with information relevant to our review. 

We also assessed the status of the PCIE's draft guidelines to
implement the 1996 Executive Order for handling allegations against
senior OIG staff. 


--------------------------------------------------------- Letter :10.1

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees and the Chairman of PCIE.  We will also make copies
available to others upon request.  If you have questions regarding
the information in this report, please call me or Assistant Director
Barney Gomez of my staff at (202) 512-6722.  Major contributors to
this report are listed in appendix III. 

Donald J.  Wheeler
Acting Director


ENTITIES HAVING PRESIDENTIALLY
APPOINTED INSPECTORS GENERAL, AS
OF DECEMBER 31, 1995
=========================================================== Appendix I

Agency for International Development
Central Intelligence Agency
Corporation for National Service
Department of Agriculture
Department of Commerce
Department of Defense
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Department of Health and Human Services
Department of Housing and Urban Development
Department of the Interior
Department of Justice
Department of Labor
Department of State
Department of Transportation
Department of the Treasury
Department of Veterans Affairs
Environmental Protection Agency
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
Federal Emergency Management Agency
General Services Administration
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Personnel Management
Railroad Retirement Board
Small Business Administration
Social Security Administration
United States Information Agency




(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix II
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO.  12993, MARCH
21, 1996
=========================================================== Appendix I



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)



(See figure in printed edition.)


MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT
========================================================= Appendix III

OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Barney L.  Gomez, Assistant Director for Health and General Crimes
Kenneth G.  Feng, Senior Investigator
Ned M.  Friece, Senior Investigator
M.  Jane Hunt, Senior Communications Analyst

ACCOUNTING AND INFORMATION
MANAGEMENT DIVISION, WASHINGTON,
D.C. 

Jackson W.  Hufnagle, Assistant Director
Clarence A.  Whitt, Senior Evaluator

OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL,
WASHINGTON, D.C. 

Barbara C.  Coles, Senior Attorney

*** End of document. ***