Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Commerce
(Letter Report, 01/01/99, GAO/OCG-99-3).

As part of its Performance and Accountability Series, GAO provided
information on the major management challenges and program risks facing
the Department of Commerce.

GAO noted that: (1) the Bureau of the Census faces a number of
challenges and uncertainties in its endeavor to conduct an accurate and
cost-effective Decennial Census in 2000; (2) taken together, these
challenges and uncertainties have led GAO to conclude that the nation
faces a high risk of an unsuccessful census in 2000--one that is less
accurate and more costly than the 1990 Census; (3) these challenges
include developing an accurate address list, securing an acceptable
level of public cooperation through outreach and promotion initiatives,
and completing field operations effectively and efficiently; (4) in the
weather forecasting area, after substantial delays and cost overruns,
three of the four planned technology modernization programs are now
operational; (5) the final piece of the modernization--the Advanced
Weather Interactive Processing System--is not scheduled to be deployed
until June 1999, and then only with less than full functionality; (6)
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) continues to
own, operate, and plan investments of millions of dollars in its aging
in-house fleet of research and survey ships that are used for acquiring
marine data; (7) although NOAA has increased its outsourcing with the
private sector, universities, and other public entities for these
services, it continues to rely heavily on its old, inefficient fleet;
(8) continuing congressional oversight of the NOAA fleet is needed to
ensure that NOAA is aggressively pursuing cost-effective alternatives
for acquiring marine data; (9) in the financial management area,
Commerce faces several challenges; (10) audits and the Department's own
internal reviews continue to show that: (a) there are numerous areas
where Commerce must improve its financial procedures to comply with
federal accounting standards and to effectively reconcile and close its
books at yearend; and (b) most Commerce bureaus lack effective automated
systems to support sound financial management; (11) the Department
continues to face significant challenges in implementing new computer
systems to meet requirements and make all of its systems year 2000
compliant; (12) the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993
provides an opportunity for the Department of Commerce to improve its
performance and effectiveness and to enhance congressional and executive
branch oversight and decisionmaking for these issues and in other
program and mission support areas; and (13) the Department faces an
especially formidable challenge in developing and presenting effective
and useful Departmentwide strategic and performance plans that both
cover all of its disparate activities and meet other criteria

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  OCG-99-3
     TITLE:  Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department 
             of Commerce
      DATE:  01/01/99
   SUBJECT:  Census
             Weather forecasting
             Financial management
             Risk management
             Accountability
             Information resources management
             Management information systems
             Strategic planning
             Systems conversions
             Federal agency accounting systems
IDENTIFIER:  2000 Decennial Census
             Performance and Accountability Series 1999
             1990 Decennial Census
             NWS Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
             Y2K
             Dept. of Commerce Administrative Management System
             NWS Next Generation Weather Radar
             NWS Next Generation Geostationary Operational Weather Radar
             NWS Automated Surface Observing System
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Performance and Accountability Series

January 1999

MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND
PROGRAM RISKS - DEPARTMENT OF
COMMERCE

GAO/OCG-99-3

Commerce Challenges


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  ASOS - Automated Surface Observing System
  AWIPS - Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
  CAMS - Commerce Administrative Management System
  CFO - Chief Financial Officer
  FFMIA - Federal Financial Management Improvement Act
  FMFIA - Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act
  FSL - Forecast Systems Laboratory
  GOES-Next - Next Generation Geostationary Operational Environmental
     Satellite
  IG - Inspector General
  ITA - International Trade Administration
  NEXRAD - Next Generation Weather Radar
  NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
  NOAA - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
  NPR - National Performance Review
  NWS - National Weather Service
  WFO - Weather Forecast Office

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER



January 1999

The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report addresses the major performance and management challenges
confronting the Department of Commerce.  These challenges are (1)
ensuring a successful 2000 Decennial Census, (2) completing the
National Weather Service (NWS) technology modernization and
associated restructuring, (3) pursuing more cost-effective
alternatives to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
in-house fleet of research and survey ships, and (4) improving
financial management systems and processes.  The report summarizes
GAO's and the Commerce Inspector General's findings on these
challenges, the progress Commerce has made in addressing these
issues, and what needs to be done to resolve or mitigate them. 

The Department of Commerce acknowledges these challenges, has taken
steps to address them, and said that it has actions under way or
planned to successfully resolve them.  However, all of these
challenges are long-standing material weaknesses in the Department's
Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act reports.  Two of them--the
2000 Decennial Census and NWS modernization--remain on GAO's
governmentwide high-risk list.  In this regard, the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993 provides an opportunity for the
Department to improve its performance and effectiveness and to
enhance congressional and executive branch oversight and
decisionmaking for these four challenges and in other program and
mission-support areas.  As GAO has reported, however, using the
Results Act to improve performance and decisionmaking will continue
to be especially challenging for the Department of Commerce because
of the dispersed and varied nature of its programs. 

This report is part of a special series entitled the Performance and
Accountability Series:  Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks.  The series contains separate reports on 20 agencies--one on
each of the cabinet departments and on most major independent
agencies as well as the U.  S.  Postal Service.  The series also
includes a governmentwide report that draws from the agency-specific
reports to identify the performance and management challenges
requiring attention across the federal government.  As a companion
volume to this series, GAO is issuing an update to those government
operations and programs that its work has identified as "high risk"
because of their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement.  High-risk government operations are also identified
and discussed in detail in the appropriate performance and
accountability series agency reports. 

The performance and accountability series was done at the request of
the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Dick Armey; the
Chairman of the House Government Reform Committee, Dan Burton; the
Chairman of the House Budget Committee, John Kasich; the Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Fred Thompson; the
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, Pete Domenici; and Senator
Larry Craig.  The series was subsequently cosponsored by the Ranking
Minority Member of the House Government Reform Committee, Henry A. 
Waxman; the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information and Technology, House Government Reform
Committee, Dennis J.  Kucinich; Senator Joseph I.  Lieberman; and
Senator Carl Levin. 

Copies of this report series are being sent to the President, the
congressional leadership, all other Members of the Congress, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Secretary of
Commerce, and the heads of other major departments and agencies. 

David M.  Walker
Comptroller General of
the United States


OVERVIEW
============================================================ Chapter 0

Although the Department of Commerce is the smallest federal cabinet
department in terms of dollars, with outlays of about $4 billion
annually, its missions are numerous and among the most diverse.  The
Department's wide-ranging efforts in economic development, science
and technology, the census, and weather forecasting have far-reaching
national implications.  Commerce's diverse missions and activities
also have several long-standing performance and management issues. 
The Department's major performance and management challenges are (1)
ensuring a successful 2000 Decennial Census, (2) completing the
National Weather Service (NWS) technology modernization and
associated restructuring, (3) pursuing more cost-effective
alternatives to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
(NOAA) in-house fleet of research and survey ships, and (4) improving
financial management systems and processes. 


   THE CHALLENGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1


      ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL 2000
      DECENNIAL CENSUS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.1

The Bureau of the Census faces a number of challenges and
uncertainties in its endeavor to conduct an accurate and
cost-effective Decennial Census in 2000.  Taken together, these
challenges and uncertainties have led us to conclude that the nation
faces a high risk of an unsuccessful census in 2000--one that is less
accurate and more costly than the 1990 Census.  For example, the
Congress and the administration have yet to agree on the final design
of the census because of congressional concerns over the legal and
methodological issues surrounding the Bureau's planned use of
sampling and statistical estimation.  The Supreme Court is
considering the sampling question and is expected to rule on the case
by mid-1999.  Irrespective of how the controversy over the use of
sampling and statistical estimation is resolved later this year, the
Bureau will have little time remaining to make final census design
changes and implement those changes in time for the census in 2000. 
In that regard, our work has shown that the Bureau faces a number of
formidable challenges to a cost-effective, accurate, and complete
census no matter which basic design option is chosen.  These
challenges include developing an accurate address list; securing an
acceptable level of public cooperation through outreach and promotion
initiatives; and completing field operations effectively and
efficiently, including hiring a capable temporary workforce.  These
questions about key census-taking activities have contributed to
congressional concern over the likelihood of an unsuccessful census. 


      COMPLETING THE NWS
      MODERNIZATION AND ASSOCIATED
      RESTRUCTURING
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.2

In the weather forecasting area, after substantial delays and cost
overruns, three of the four planned technology modernization programs
are now operational.  However, the final piece of the
modernization---the Advanced Weather Interactive Processing System
(AWIPS)--is not scheduled to be deployed until June 1999 and then
only with less than full functionality.  Until AWIPS is fully
deployed and functioning properly, NWS will not be able to take full
advantage of the $4.5 billion investment it has made in the
modernization to date.  Continuing management oversight of AWIPS is
needed to ensure that this final piece of the modernization is
delivered effectively and efficiently and that NWS successfully
completes the associated downsizing and restructuring of its field
offices as planned. 


      PURSUING MORE COST-EFFECTIVE
      ALTERNATIVES TO NOAA'S
      RESEARCH FLEET
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.3

NOAA continues to own, operate, and plan investments of millions of
dollars in its aging in-house fleet of research and survey ships that
are used for acquiring marine data.  For more than a decade, we, the
Commerce Inspector General (IG), the National Performance Review
(NPR), and others have urged NOAA to aggressively pursue more
cost-effective alternatives to its in-house fleet of ships.  Although
NOAA has increased its outsourcing with the private sector,
universities, and other public entities for these services, it
continues to rely heavily on its old, inefficient fleet, which lacks
the latest available technology; and it plans to replace at least
some of these ships.  Greater long-term reliance on outsourcing
raises questions about the continuing viability of the NOAA Corps of
240 uniformed service commissioned officers who manage and operate
NOAA's ships.  Continuing congressional oversight of the NOAA fleet,
as well as the NOAA Corps, is needed to ensure that NOAA is
aggressively pursuing cost-effective alternatives for acquiring
marine data. 


      IMPROVING FINANCIAL
      MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS AND
      PROCESSES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.4

In the financial management area, Commerce faces several challenges. 
Audits and the Department's own internal reviews continue to show
that (1) there are numerous areas where Commerce must improve its
financial procedures to comply with federal accounting standards and
to effectively reconcile and close its books at year-end and (2) most
Commerce bureaus lack effective automated systems to support sound
financial management.  The Department still lacks a single integrated
financial system, adequate internal controls, and accounting and
financial systems that comply with federal laws and regulations.  As
a result, the Department received a disclaimer of audit opinion on
its fiscal years 1996 and 1997 consolidated financial statements. 
Also, the Department continues to face significant challenges in
implementing new computer systems to meet federal requirements and
make all of its systems Year 2000 compliant.  Most Commerce bureaus
also lack the basic financial and performance information they need
to manage their programs, make sound businesslike decisions, and
improve their performance. 


   PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

We, Commerce's IG, and, in some cases, the National Performance
Review have reported on these issues and urged the Department to
resolve them.  All of these issues are long-standing material
weaknesses in the Department's Federal Managers' Financial Integrity
Act reports.  Two of them--the 2000 Decennial Census and NWS
modernization--remain on our governmentwide high-risk list.  The
Department has had some success in addressing these issues and said
that it has actions under way or planned to successfully resolve
them. 

The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act)
provides an opportunity for the Department of Commerce to improve its
performance and effectiveness and to enhance congressional and
executive branch oversight and decisionmaking for these issues and in
other program and mission-support areas.  As we have reported,
however, effectively implementing the Results Act to improve
performance and decisionmaking is especially challenging for the
Department because its efforts are complicated by its numerous and
diverse missions and bureaus, "holding company" nature, and
historically decentralized management approach.  Consequently, the
Department faces an especially formidable challenge in developing and
presenting effective and useful Departmentwide strategic and
performance plans that both cover all of its disparate activities and
meet other criteria in the Results Act and related guidance. 

In this regard, we identified a number of needed improvements in the
Department's strategic and performance plans to date under the
Results Act.  For example, Commerce's plans have not adequately
addressed the major management challenges discussed in this report. 
The Department's September 1997 strategic plan recognized major
management challenges in the Census, NWS technology modernization,
and financial management areas but did not relate them to its
strategic goals and objectives or indicate specifically how and when
the Department expects to overcome these challenges.  Similarly, the
Department's first annual performance plan for fiscal year 1999
identified and discussed major unresolved management challenges in
the Census, NWS modernization, NOAA fleet, and financial management
areas.  However, the plan did not (1) relate these challenges to
specific strategic or performance goals, (2) fully acknowledge their
significance and performance implications, or (3) include performance
goals for corrective actions for those challenges whose resolution is
critical to the Department's mission or could materially impede the
achievement of program goals.  Commerce agrees that its earlier
Results Act plans were lacking in several respects and told us that
its annual performance plan for fiscal year 2000 will contain
improvements in several areas, including the treatment of the four
major management challenges discussed in this report. 


MAJOR PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT
ISSUES
============================================================ Chapter 1

Basically, the Department of Commerce is a large "holding company"
composed of 12 operating bureaus, each pursuing disparate programs
and activities that cut across several federal budget functions.  The
Department employs about 40,000 people in numerous offices here and
overseas but has a relatively small annual budget, with outlays of $4
billion in fiscal year 1998.  Its five basic missions are (1)
promoting the development of American business and increasing foreign
trade; (2) improving the nation's technological competitiveness; (3)
fostering environmental stewardship and assessment; (4) encouraging
economic development; and (5) compiling, analyzing, and disseminating
a broad range of economic, demographic, and social data.  Commerce
shares responsibilities for these functions with a number of other
federal departments and agencies.  However, Commerce does not have
exclusive or even lead responsibility for any of these functions. 
With the increased focus on results and accountability accompanying
the Results Act, Commerce has come to symbolize dispersed
responsibility for federal programs, and legislation was proposed and
considered in both the 104th and 105th Congresses to dismantle the
Department. 

Our work, Commerce IG reports, and the Department's own Results Act
plans and internal documents have identified four major performance
and management issues facing the Department.  These issues are (1)
ensuring a successful 2000 Decennial Census, (2) completing the NWS
technology modernization and associated restructuring, (3) pursuing
more cost-effective alternatives to NOAA's in-house fleet of
research/survey ships, and (4) improving financial management systems
and processes.  This report summarizes our and the Commerce IG's
findings on these issues, the progress the Department of Commerce has
made in addressing these issues, and our assessment of what else
needs to be done to resolve or mitigate them.  Where applicable, the
report also indicates how Commerce has responded to National
Performance Review recommendations in these areas and addressed these
performance and management issues in its Results Act strategic and
annual performance plans.  Finally, the report discusses the
Department's ability to use the Results Act to improve its
performance and effectiveness and to enhance congressional and
executive branch oversight and decisionmaking for these issues and in
other program and mission-support areas. 


   ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL 2000
   DECENNIAL CENSUS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

The decennial census is the nation's most comprehensive and expensive
statistical data-gathering program.  Accurate results are critical
because, as required by the Constitution, decennial census data are
used to reapportion seats in the House of Representatives and thus
the allocation of political power in our democracy.  Countless
decisions affecting governments, businesses, and private citizens
also depend on census data.  However, major questions surround the
Census Bureau's ability to conduct a successful census; and, as a
result, the decennial census continues to be a high-risk area. 

The 1990 Census was the most costly in history, yet it produced data
that were less accurate than those from the previous census. 
According to the Bureau, there were about 4.4 million erroneous
enumerations in 1990 (duplications and those otherwise improperly
included), and 8.4 million people were missed.  Moreover, the Bureau
reported that these errors were not evenly distributed across
population groups and that minorities, renters, and rural residents
were more likely to be undercounted.  In addition, broad demographic,
socioeconomic, and attitudinal factors that adversely affected the
cost and accuracy of the 1990 Census may present an even greater
challenge for the Bureau in 2000.  For example, a tightening labor
market may make it difficult for the Bureau to recruit an adequate
workforce, while increasing numbers of nontraditional household and
family arrangements, concerns about privacy, and the number of
non-English-speaking immigrants and undocumented aliens, could make
it more difficult for the Bureau to achieve its mail response rate
goals in 2000. 

In an effort to improve the census in 2000, the Bureau redesigned key
census-taking activities, including new procedures for (1) developing
a complete and accurate address list, (2) increasing the mail
response rate through outreach and promotion, (3) staffing field
operations with a capable workforce, and (4) reducing costs and
improving accuracy through sampling and statistical estimation.  The
Bureau tested these and other census operations during the 1998 dress
rehearsal for the 2000 Census that was held at three sites: 
Sacramento, CA; 11 counties in the Columbia, SC, area; and Menominee
County in Wisconsin, including the Menominee American Indian
Reservation.  The Bureau has developed a program to evaluate the
results of the dress rehearsal and plans on issuing a report in early
1999. 

The Bureau has made progress in addressing some of the problems that
occurred during the 1990 Census and has shown an ability to adapt to
changing requirements.  For example, in June 1997, the Bureau
initiated an effort to redesign its existing procedures for building
its master address file.  The Bureau believes that the new procedures
will allow it to reach its goal of producing an address list that is
99-percent complete and accurate.  Additionally, during the dress
rehearsal, the Bureau raised pay rates at the South Carolina test
site to ensure that it had a large enough pool of qualified
applicants to fill its needs for nonresponse follow-up and later
census operations. 

Nevertheless, uncertainties surround the Bureau's ability to
implement an accurate and cost-effective census in 2000 because the
nature and extent to which sampling will be used in the 2000 Census
still have not been decided.  The Congress, citing legal and
methodological concerns, has not agreed to the Bureau's planned use
of sampling and statistical estimation.  In August and September
1998, federal courts ruled in two separate cases that the use of
sampling in the decennial census is prohibited by the Census Act.\1

The administration appealed the rulings to the Supreme Court, and
oral arguments were held on November 30, 1998.  A decision is
expected by mid-1999. 

In March 1998, the Congress directed Commerce to prepare plans for a
nonsampling census, in addition to efforts it has under way to plan a
sampling-based census.  In response, in April 1998, Commerce issued a
status report on the Bureau's plans.  This report reflected the
"best-guess judgments," based on prior census experience, of the
costs of potential components of a nonsampling plan. 

In addition, the results to date of the dress rehearsal underscore
the fact that questions surround key census-taking activities.  For
example, mail response rates remain problematic, scanning equipment
used to electronically record responses from census questionnaires
experienced system crashes due to software flaws, and local
partnerships--a key component of the Bureau's outreach and promotion
strategy--had limited success.  Moreover, the Bureau's redesigned
procedure for building its master address list has the potential to
improve accuracy.  Although elements of the revised approach have
been used and tested in earlier censuses, the Bureau has neither used
nor tested the elements together, nor in the sequences planned for
2000.  These and other uncertainties have led to congressional
concern over key census-taking operations. 


--------------------
\1 U.S.  House of Representatives v.  U.S.  Department of Commerce,
11 F.Supp.  2d 76 (D.D.C.  1998); Glavin v.  Clinton, 19 F.Supp.  2d
543 (E.D.  Va.  1998). 


      THE DECENNIAL CENSUS IS
      STILL AT RISK
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

The Bureau's readiness for 2000 remains an open question.  On the one
hand, to the extent that the dress rehearsal settings allowed, the
Bureau has thus far demonstrated its ability to execute a pilot
census according to its operational timetable and plan.  Further, as
demonstrated by its redesign of the procedures for building its
address list and the apparently timely response to recruiting
difficulties in South Carolina, the Bureau has also demonstrated an
ability to respond to changing requirements.  On the other hand, the
Congress and the administration have yet to agree on the final design
of the 2000 Census.  Although the Bureau is developing plans for a
nonsampling census, little time will remain for the Congress and
other stakeholders to review--and the Bureau to implement--this
approach, if such a design is ultimately selected.  This has
generated uncertainty over the Bureau's ability to conduct a
cost-effective census.  Moreover, the initial dress rehearsal results
show that the Bureau is still facing ongoing and newly emerging
operational challenges at a disturbingly late stage in the census
cycle.  For example, mail response rates remain problematic, and
questions exist about the Bureau's use of technology.  These
challenges have contributed to congressional concern over key
operational aspects of the Bureau's plans. 

Although it may be too late in the census cycle to substantively
redesign key census-taking operations, our work suggests that at
least two actions could help mitigate the risk of an unsuccessful
census.  First, to help ensure that key census-taking activities are
operationally feasible, the Bureau should ensure that its evaluation
of the dress rehearsal is based on rigorous analysis and is issued
promptly.  Moreover, the Bureau should ensure that the evaluation
results are used to refine operations, help set priorities, and
allocate resources as the Bureau enters the final preparations for
the 2000 Census.  Second, consistent with our past recommendation, to
alleviate congressional concerns over the design of the census,
particularly its planned use of statistical sampling and estimation,
the Bureau should provide the Congress and other stakeholders
detailed data on the expected effects of the Bureau's planned
sampling and nonsampling initiatives on costs, accuracy, and other
variables. 


      KEY CONTACTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

J.  Christopher Mihm, Associate Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8676
[email protected]

Laurie E.  Ekstrand, Associate Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8676
[email protected]


   COMPLETING THE NWS
   MODERNIZATION AND ASSOCIATED
   RESTRUCTURING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

The National Weather Service (NWS) began a nationwide modernization
program in the 1980s to upgrade observing systems, such as satellites
and radars, and to design and develop advanced forecaster computer
workstations.  The goals of the modernization are to achieve more
uniform weather services across the nation, improve forecasts,
provide better detection and prediction of severe weather and
flooding, permit more cost-effective operations through staff and
office reductions, and achieve higher productivity.  For example, NWS
plans to reorganize its field office structure from 256 offices (52
Weather Service Forecast Offices and 204 Weather Service Offices) to
121 Weather Forecast Offices (WFO).  As of November 30, 1998, NWS
officials told us that 132 offices had already been closed. 

We designated the NWS modernization program as a high-risk area in
1995.  NWS' system modernization includes four major programs:  the
Next Generation Weather Radar (NEXRAD), the Next Generation
Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES-Next), the
Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS), and the Advanced Weather
Interactive Processing System (AWIPS).  These four programs
collectively have cost about $4.5 billion.  Although modernization of
NWS is nearing completion, it will remain on our high-risk list
because NWS lacks an overall systems architecture and the final piece
of the modernization--AWIPS, the forecaster workstations that will
integrate weather data from NEXRAD, GOES-Next, and ASOS--has not been
deployed. 

In 1995, when we first designated NWS' modernization program as a
high-risk area, NWS reported that the new radars and satellites had
enabled it to generate better data and greatly improved forecasts and
warnings.  In our 1997 high-risk series, we reported that although
the development and deployment of the observing systems associated
with the modernization were nearing completion, unresolved issues
still remained.  These issues concerned the systems' operational
effectiveness and efficient maintenance.  To illustrate, we reported
that the new radars were not always up and running when severe
weather was threatening; and the ground-based sensors fell short of
performance and user expectations, particularly when the weather was
active.  We recommended that NWS correct shortfalls in radar
performance and define and prioritize all ground-based sensor
corrections needed to meet user needs.  NWS addressed some of our
radar and ground-based sensor performance concerns, but other issues
remain.  We recently reported that a NEXRAD located in Southern
California was not consistently meeting NWS' NEXRAD availability
requirement and recommended that NWS correct the problems so that
this radar is available as required.  NWS concurred with this
recommendation and mentioned several planned activities to improve
radar availability. 


      NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE
      LACKS AN OVERALL SYSTEMS
      ARCHITECTURE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.1

As we reported in both our 1995 and 1997 high-risk series, the
technology modernization and evolution of this major systems
initiative have long begged for a comprehensive systems architecture
to guide the effort.  NWS has acknowledged that a technical blueprint
is needed; however, it has made little progress in developing the
architecture.  NWS will continue to incur higher systems development
and maintenance costs and experience reduced performance until the
systems architecture is developed and enforced. 


      DELIVERY OF AWIPS REMAINS A
      CONCERN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.2

The centerpiece of the modernization--AWIPS, the forecaster
workstations that are to integrate observing systems' data and
support forecaster decisionmaking--is far from providing all the
promised capabilities and has been delayed and become more expensive
because of design problems and management shortcomings.  AWIPS, which
is being built in six increments, or builds, is now scheduled to be
deployed in June 1999, but with less than full functionality.  Until
AWIPS is deployed and functioning properly, NWS will not be able to
take full advantage of the $4.5 billion investment it has made in
AWIPS and the other components of the modernization.  For the past
several years, we have reported that serious risks continue to be
associated with AWIPS' costs, schedule, development, and maintenance. 

For example, in March 1998, we testified that AWIPS' cost has been in
flux.  The cost to develop AWIPS was estimated at $350 million in
1985.  A decade later, the figure had risen to $525 million. 
However, in testimony and a report issued in 1996, we pointed out the
inaccuracy of this estimate due to the omission of several cost
factors, including known contract increases.  The Department of
Commerce later committed to a $550 million funding cap.  We testified
in April 1997 that it would be extremely difficult for NOAA to
develop and deploy AWIPS within the $550 million cap if it
encountered any major problems.  Given the size and complexity of the
development--and recognizing that even managed risks can turn into
real problems--such problems are likely to occur.  In accordance with
a recommendation we made in 1996, the department contracted for an
independent cost estimate of AWIPS because there was uncertainty
about whether it could be delivered within the $550 million cap
because of increased software development expenses.  According to the
contractor's February 2, 1998, assessment, the likely costs to
complete builds 4 through 6 will jump by $68 million, to a total cost
of $618 million.  The contractor also noted a likely 9 month schedule
delay. 

Furthermore, we reported in our March 1998 testimony that although
AWIPS was planned for full deployment through build 6 in 1999--at 152
locations nationwide--that schedule is now in doubt.  The latest
schedule calls for build 4--actually build 4.2--to be completed in
June 1999, within the $550 million cap.  We testified that the
completion dates for builds 5 and 6 were uncertain because NWS wanted
to ensure that requirements for those modules are not extraneous to
mission needs, in order to minimize future cost increases.  This
reflects a recommendation we made in 1996 for all AWIPS builds.  An
independent review team completed its analysis of builds 5 and 6. 
The team reported in August 1998 that build 5 requirements are
essential to NWS' core mission and that the costs to complete build 5
should range from $20 to $25 million.  The independent team concluded
that build 6 requirements should not be pursued because they
"resemble capabilities desired, rather than requirements." Schedules
for builds beyond 4.2 have not been developed. 

We also testified that the most critical risk factors underlying
questions about AWIPS' future relate to software development. 
Software quality is governed largely by the quality of the processes
used to develop it; however, NWS' efforts to develop AWIPS software
have lacked defined software development processes.  Such processes
are all the more essential because of NWS' increased use of a
software code developed internally at NOAA's Forecast Systems
Laboratory (FSL) in Boulder, Colorado--a research and development
facility that primarily develops prototype systems.  This software
code has not been developed according to the rigorous processes
commonly used to develop production quality code.  Failure to adhere
to these processes may result in unstable software that will continue
to cause cost increases and schedule delays.  The cost assessment
delivered in February 1998 also found risk inherent in the
development of builds 4 through 6 because of the transitioning of
FSL-developed software to AWIPS and the uncertainty surrounding
requirements for these builds.  NWS officials told us that they
continue to strengthen their software development processes for all
government-developed software. 

We testified in March 1998 that another risk area concerns the
network control facility, which provides the ability to monitor and
maintain AWIPS sites across the country from a single location. 
Through build 3, AWIPS was still experiencing difficulty with the
network control facility's ability to detect and respond to problems. 
These problems concerned only a limited number of sites; as more
sites come on line, problems can be expected to increase.  NWS
officials have acknowledged that the poor performance of the network
control facility to date is a prime concern and that neither NWS nor
its contractor has experience in developing the capability for
central maintenance.  As a result, they told us that they obtained
contractors to assist them in this area. 

Finally, we testified that another risk area is whether the AWIPS
builds--and, indeed, all modernization components--will be Year 2000
compliant.\2 AWIPS to date is not Year 2000 compliant.  Build
4.2--set for completion in June 1999--is supposed to make all AWIPS
applications Year 2000 compliant.  Yet even if Year 2000 compliance
ceases to be an issue with build 4.2, NWS' companion modernization
systems--GOES-Next and NEXRAD--will need to be compliant as well
because of the amount of data they interchange.  NWS officials told
us that the major systems interfacing with AWIPS (GOES-Next and
NEXRAD) are already Year 2000 compliant and that in early 1999, they
plan to perform Year 2000 tests on how these systems work together. 

Despite these concerns, NWS reports that it is making considerable
progress on the development and operational testing of the forecaster
workstations, has made system improvements as a result of the
operational tests, and will continue to improve its test processes. 
Although we are encouraged by NWS' efforts to improve testing and its
development progress, the cost, schedule, and technical risks
associated with the workstations need further attention. 


--------------------
\2 Computer systems have long used two digits to represent the year,
such as simply "98" for 1998, to conserve electronic data storage and
reduce operating costs.  In this format, however, 2000 is
indistinguishable from 1900 because both are represented as "00." As
a result, if not modified, systems or applications that use dates or
perform date- or time- sensitive calculations may generate incorrect
results beyond 1999. 


      KEY CONTACTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.3

Joel C.  Willemssen, Director
Civil Agencies Information Systems
Accounting and Information Management
 Division
(202) 512-6408
[email protected]

Laurie E.  Ekstrand, Associate Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8676
[email protected]


   PURSUING MORE COST-EFFECTIVE
   ALTERNATIVES TO NOAA'S RESEARCH
   FLEET
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) continues
to own, operate, and plan investments of millions of dollars in its
aging in-house fleet of ships that support NOAA's programs in
fisheries research, oceanographic research, and hydrographic charting
and mapping.  For more than a decade, congressional committees,
public and private sector advisory groups, the National Performance
Review (NPR), the Commerce IG, and our office have urged NOAA to
aggressively pursue cost-effective alternatives to its
agency-designed, -owned, and -operated fleet for acquiring marine
data. 

Most of NOAA's fleet of research and survey vessels are approaching,
or have passed, their 30-year life expectancies.  This is a
long-standing issue.  Following reports by us and others, Commerce
initially identified the NOAA fleet as a material weakness in its
annual Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) report for
fiscal year 1990.  In 1993 NPR recommended that NOAA experiment with
public/private competitions to help fulfill its minimum number of
days-at-sea requirements.  However, NOAA has experienced significant
difficulties in its efforts to plan and implement solutions, and the
NOAA fleet still remains a material weakness. 

Since 1990, NOAA has developed several fleet replacement and
modernization plans, and each has been criticized by the Commerce IG
for not pursuing alternative approaches strongly enough.  For
example, in a 1996 program evaluation report on NOAA's 1995 fleet
modernization plan, the Commerce IG recommended that NOAA terminate
its fleet modernization efforts; cease investing in its ships;
immediately begin to decommission, sell, or transfer them; and
contract for the required ship services.  According to the Commerce
IG, NOAA's failure to adopt a sound business approach to obtaining
the best fleet services for its programs will continue to expose its
programs to unnecessary costs and risks. 

Historically, NOAA has taken the position that its ships provide
unique services and generally are cost competitive.  More recently,
however, Commerce has taken a more active oversight role in this
area; and NOAA now outsources with the private sector, universities,
and other public entities for more of these services.  According to
the Department, NOAA has decommissioned almost one-third of its fleet
since 1990 and currently outsources for at least 40 percent of its
research and survey needs.  In the fishery research area, for
example, NOAA's plan for the next 10 years calls for outsourcing a
minimum of 47 percent of these requirements; using cooperative state
and foreign programs for another 16 percent; and relying on its
current in-house fleet, or replacement ships, for the remaining 37
percent. 

Although NOAA has made some progress, more needs to be done.  When
NOAA first identified this issue as a material weakness in 1990, it
estimated that the issue would be resolved by 1993.  Today, NOAA has
not committed to a specific completion date but estimates that the
rehabilitation or replacement of its existing fleet could take up to
15 years.  In the meantime, NOAA continues to rely heavily on its
old, inefficient in-house fleet, which does not have the latest
state-of-the-art technology, and plans to replace at least some of
these ships.  Continuing congressional oversight of the NOAA fleet
and another closely related, inseparable issue--the NOAA Corps that
manages and operates the NOAA fleet--could help ensure that NOAA is
aggressively pursuing the most cost-effective alternatives for
acquiring marine data. 


      THE NEED FOR THE NOAA CORPS
      REMAINS QUESTIONABLE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.1

Greater long-term reliance on outsourcing raises questions about the
continued viability of the NOAA Corps that manages and operates the
in-house fleet of ships.  The NOAA Corps comprises about 240
uniformed service commissioned officers who are covered by a
military-like pay and benefits system.  These NOAA Corps officers
also do rotational shore duty in NOAA's five line offices and manage
and fly the NOAA aircraft that are used to penetrate hurricanes and
to carry out other research and surveys.  Like the Public Health
Service Corps, the NOAA Corps performs civilian rather than military
functions. 

In 1995, NPR, noting that the NOAA Corps was the smallest uniformed
military service and that the fleet it commanded was obsolete,
recommended that the NOAA Corps be gradually reduced in numbers and
eventually eliminated.  We reported in October 1996 that the NOAA
Corps generally does not meet the criteria and principles cited by
the Department of Defense for a military compensation system.  We
also noted that other agencies, such as the Navy, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, use
federal civilian employees or contractors to carry out duties similar
to the functions that NOAA assigns to the Corps. 

NOAA developed an ambitious legislative proposal and transition plan
to ï¿½disestablishï¿½ or civilianize the Commissioned Corps, which was
introduced in the 105th Congress, by request, as S.  877, in June
1997.  NOAA's transition plan included 3 basic steps:  (1)
involuntarily retiring the 120 officers with at least 15 years of
service, (2) creating up to 299 new civilian positions in NOAA and
placing the 170 officers not eligible for retirement in these
civilian positions, and (3) filling the remaining civilian positions
with retired officers or other civilian personnel.  The Commerce IG
had serious concerns that NOAA's proposal was inconsistent with
congressional direction on outsourcing for ship services as well as
the NPR recommendation for eventual elimination of the NOAA Corps. 
Further, the IG believed that NOAA's plan would have led to the
conversion of too many officers to civilian positions, thereby
locking in the current organizational structure and limiting
opportunities for outsourcing. 

The Subcommittee on Oceans and Fisheries, Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, held hearings on S.  877 but
did not take action on the bill.  According to Commerce's annual
performance plan for fiscal year 1999, however, NOAA has begun
recruiting civilian replacements for some vacant NOAA Corps
positions.  In June 1998, NOAA announced a new restructuring plan for
the NOAA Corps.  Rather than doing away with the Corps, NOAA's new
plan focuses on the need for a NOAA Commissioned Corps of 240
officers to operate its current ships and aircraft.  It also calls
for a new civilian director of the NOAA Corps and a new recruiting
program.  Thus, the NOAA Corps still exists, and NOAA plans to
increase the number of officers by 15 in fiscal year 1999. 


      KEY CONTACTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.2

L.  Nye Stevens, Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8676
[email protected]

Laurie E.  Ekstrand, Associate Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8676
[email protected]


   IMPROVING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
   SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

The Department of Commerce faces several challenges in the financial
management area.  Audits and the Department's own internal reviews
continue to show that (1) there are numerous areas where Commerce
must improve its financial procedures to comply with federal
accounting standards and to effectively reconcile and close its books
at year-end and (2) Commerce does not have effective automated
systems to support sound financial management. 

The Department still lacks a single integrated financial system,
adequate internal controls, and accounting and financial systems that
comply with federal laws and regulations.  As a result, Commerce
received a disclaimer of opinion on its fiscal years 1996 and 1997
consolidated financial statements.  Also, Commerce continues to face
significant challenges in implementing new computer systems to meet
federal requirements and make all of its systems Year 2000 compliant. 
Most Commerce bureaus also lack the basic financial and performance
information they need to manage their programs and activities and
improve their performance. 

As for fiscal year 1996, Commerce's IG was unable to render an
opinion on the reliability of the Department's fiscal year 1997
consolidated financial statements.  Sufficient documentation could
not be provided to support property, accounts payable, and accrued
expenditures.  Additionally, the IG reported that (1) the
Department's systems could not provide accurate and reliable
financial and performance information, (2) reconciliations of account
balances were not adequately performed, and (3) controls surrounding
cash receipts and accounts receivables were ineffective.  Of the 15
individual Commerce entities or funds audited, 8 received an
unqualified opinion, 3 received an unqualified opinion on their
Statements of Financial Position and a disclaimer on their Statements
of Operations, 2 received a qualified opinion on their Statements of
Financial Position and a disclaimer on their Statements of
Operations, and 2 received a disclaimer of opinion on their overall
financial statements.  According to Commerce's Chief Financial
Officer (CFO), for example, the International Trade Administration's
(ITA) financial management problems are so significant that Commerce
has decided not to have an audit performed of ITA for fiscal year
1998 because significant financial management problems continue. 
Instead, ITA will focus on correcting its financial weaknesses before
it receives another financial audit. 

In his message accompanying the fiscal year 1997 financial
statements, the Department's CFO stated that Commerce must improve
its financial management and noted that only 30 percent of the
Department's budget authority is covered by an unqualified audit
opinion.  However, the Department made progress in this area during
fiscal year 1997 as six bureaus received opinions that were improved
over those that they received for fiscal year 1996.  For example,
Commerce's largest bureau--NOAA--received a qualified opinion on its
Statement of Financial Position for fiscal year 1997, compared to the
disclaimer of opinion that it received on its overall financial
statements for fiscal year 1996. 

The Commerce IG's fiscal year 1997 Report on Internal Control
Structure stated that 7 of the 10 reportable conditions identified by
the auditors are considered as material weaknesses.  Specifically,
the Department's current financial management systems are not
effective in preparing and reporting the financial results of the
Department and its bureaus.  The report stated that Commerce's
existing financial systems are seriously outdated and fragmented;
unable to provide timely, complete, and reliable financial
information; inadequately controlled; and costly and difficult to
maintain.  The financial systems, as a whole, do not comply with the
requirements of the FMFIA or the Federal Financial Management
Improvement Act of 1996 (FFMIA).  For example, NOAA's financial
accounting system does not substantially comply with FFMIA in that
its financial management systems do not support the preparation of
timely, accurate financial statements. 

Following are the seven material weaknesses at Commerce that the IG's
report cited for fiscal year 1997, all of which were repeat material
weaknesses from fiscal year 1996. 

  -- The Department's financial management should be improved to
     provide accurate and reliable financial and performance
     information. 

  -- The Department's systems should be improved to provide accurate
     and reliable financial and performance information. 

  -- Preparation of the consolidated financial statements should be
     improved. 

  -- Controls surrounding the identification of potential contingent
     liabilities and unasserted claims should be improved. 

  -- Controls surrounding property should be improved. 

  -- Controls surrounding obligations/undelivered orders, accounts
     payable/accrued expenditures, and expenses should be improved. 

  -- Reconciliations should be improved. 

To address concerns with financial management systems, the IG's
report for fiscal year 1997 noted that the Department began
developing the Commerce Administrative Management System (CAMS) in
1992.  CAMS is intended to provide the Department with an effective
internal control environment that meets the requirement for a single,
integrated financial management system.  CAMS was under development
at four Commerce bureaus for several years, and implementation was
delayed considerably.  As a result, the Department overhauled its
approach and focused most of its resources on completing a pilot
implementation of CAMS at the Bureau of the Census by July 1998. 
According to Commerce's CFO, the pilot at Census has been completed,
and a decision has been made to adopt a version of CAMS at Census and
at two major Commerce bureaus--NOAA and the National Institute of
Standards and Technology (NIST).  The systems used for other Commerce
bureaus may vary.  According to the Department's CFO, an integrated
departmentwide financial management system will be implemented by
September 2001 at an estimated total cost of $256 million. 

Given the existing weaknesses in the internal control structure at
Commerce, along with the Department's inability to properly record
and support financial and performance information, however, the IG's
report noted that implementation of the new system(s) raises concerns
about the integrity of the data from the old systems that will be
used to bring the new system(s) on line.  If inaccurate data are
input into the new computer system, the Department could continue to
face data reliability problems, even with the new system(s). 


      KEY CONTACTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4.1

Gregory D.  Kutz, Associate Director
Governmentwide Accounting and Financial
 Management Issues
Accounting and Information Management
 Division
(202) 512-9505
[email protected]

Laurie E.  Ekstrand, Associate Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8676
[email protected]


   USING THE RESULTS ACT TO
   IMPROVE PERFORMANCE AND
   DECISIONMAKING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5

The Results Act is the centerpiece of the statutory framework that
the Congress has put in place in the 1990s to strengthen federal
decisionmaking and accountability and to improve federal
effectiveness and efficiency by promoting a new focus on results,
service quality, and customer satisfaction.  In crafting the Results
Act, the Congress recognized that congressional and executive branch
decisionmaking had been severely handicapped by the absence in many
agencies of the basic underpinnings of well-managed organizations. 
The Results Act is intended to address basic management problems and
deficiencies that have been typical throughout the federal
government. 

The Results Act provides an opportunity for the Department of
Commerce to improve its performance and effectiveness and to enhance
congressional and executive branch oversight and decisionmaking in
the four major management challenge areas highlighted in this report
as well as in other program and mission-support areas.  As we have
reported, however, using the Results Act to improve performance and
decisionmaking will continue to be especially challenging for the
Department for several reasons. 

Because of its "holding company" nature and the diversity of its
missions and functions, the Department historically has not been
managed on the basis of a unified mission and shared goals, strategic
management of the Department has been based in its bureaus, and its
key administrative functions and processes have been decentralized. 
This diversity and lack of a centralized management approach both
complicate and challenge Commerce's efforts to rethink its missions,
goals, and how it does business and to consider alternative
strategies for achieving its goals in the most efficient and
effective manner possible. 

A focus on results as envisioned by the Results Act implies that
federal programs contributing to the same or similar results will be
closely coordinated to ensure that goals and performance measures are
consistent and mutually reinforcing.  Overlap of missions and
functions is a critical problem for Commerce in that it shares
responsibility for major budget functions with at least 14 other
federal departments and agencies and does not have exclusive or even
lead responsibility for any of those functions.  Thus, Commerce must
recognize that its efforts are but one factor among many that may
influence whether, and the degree to which, these program efforts
collectively achieve intended results. 

Good financial, management, and program information are key to the
successful implementation of the Results Act.  Without it,
accountability for performance toward results-oriented goals cannot
be ensured.  However, the Department must contend with three
significant obstacles--antiquated financial management information
systems, weak performance measures, and the conversion of its
information systems to meet Year 2000 requirements. 

Over the years, the Department has accumulated many diverse
responsibilities in a piecemeal fashion, operated with unclear
missions, and lacked an overall coherent and coordinated strategy for
achieving its missions and goals.  Because of this and the other
issues discussed earlier, the Department faces an especially
formidable challenge in developing and presenting focused, useful
Departmentwide strategic and performance plans that both cover all of
its programs and activities and meet other criteria in the Results
Act and related guidance. 

As we have reported, its strategic and performance plans to date
under the Results Act have not adequately addressed the four major
management challenges discussed in this report and have been lacking
in several other respects.  For example, the Department's September
1997 strategic plan recognized major management challenges in the
Census, NWS modernization, and financial management areas but did not
relate them to its strategic goals and objectives or indicate
specifically how and when the Department expects to overcome these
challenges.  Similarly, the Department's first annual performance
plan for fiscal year 1999 identified and discussed major unresolved
management challenges in the Census, NWS modernization, NOAA fleet,
and financial management areas.  However, the plan did not (1) relate
these challenges to specific strategic or performance goals, (2)
fully acknowledge their significance and performance implications, or
(3) include performance goals for corrective actions for those
challenges whose resolution is critical to the Department's mission
or could materially impede the achievement of program goals. 

The Department agrees that its earlier Results Act plans were lacking
in several respects and seems committed to improving the quality and
usefulness of its future plans.  At their request, we met with
Commerce officials on several occasions to discuss how the Department
could improve its fiscal year 2000 annual performance plan. 
According to the Department, its 2000 performance plan will be more
reader friendly, more focused than its earlier plans, contain fewer
strategic goals and performance measures but will contain more
outcome-oriented performance goals, provide more specifics on how it
will verify and validate its actual performance, and include more
complete and effective discussions of crosscutting programs and the
four major management challenges that are discussed in this report. 

Even with these enhancements, however, we believe that the Department
of Commerce will continue to face a significant management challenge
in using the Results Act to improve its performance and to facilitate
better congressional and executive branch oversight and
decisionmaking in these and other program and mission-support areas. 
The Congress may wish to hold hearings on Commerce's implementation
of the Results Act to explore the implementation issues and four
major management challenges highlighted in this report and to reach
agreement with the Department on its missions and priorities,
strategic and performance goals, and the measures to be used in
judging its success in achieving those goals and meeting these major
management challenges. 



      KEY CONTACTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5.1

L.  Nye Stevens, Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8676
[email protected]

Laurie E.  Ekstrand, Associate Director
Federal Management and Workforce Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8676
[email protected]


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 2


   ENSURING A SUCCESSFUL 2000
   DECENNIAL CENSUS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

Decennial Census:  Preliminary Observations on the Results to Date of
the Dress Rehearsal and the Census Bureau's Readiness for 2000
(GAO/T-GGD-98-178, July 30, 1998). 

Decennial Census:  Overview of Historical Census Issues
(GAO/GGD-98-103, May 1998). 

2000 Census:  Preparations for Dress Rehearsal Leave Many Unanswered
Questions (GAO/GGD-98-74, Mar.  26, 1998). 

Decennial Census:  1990 Results Show Need for Fundamental Reform
(GAO/GGD-92-94, June 9, 1992). 


   COMPLETING THE NWS
   MODERNIZATION AND ASSOCIATED
   RESTRUCTURING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

National Weather Service:  Sulphur Mountain Radar Performance
(GAO/AIMD-99-7, Oct.  16, 1998). 

National Weather Service:  Budget Events and Continuing Risks of
Systems Modernization (GAO/T-AIMD-98-97, Mar.  4, 1998). 

Weather Service Modernization:  Risks Remain That Full Systems
Potential Will Not Be Achieved (GAO/T-AIMD-97-85, Apr.  24, 1997). 

Weather Satellites:  Planning for the Geostationary Satellite Program
Needs More Attention (GAO/AIMD-97-37, Mar.  13, 1997). 

Weather Forecasting:  Recommendations to Address New Weather
Processing System Development Risks (GAO/AIMD-96-74, May 13, 1996). 

Weather Forecasting:  Systems Architecture Needed for National
Weather Service Modernization (GAO/AIMD-94-28, Mar.  11, 1994). 


   PURSUING MORE COST-EFFECTIVE
   ALTERNATIVES TO NOAA'S
   FLEET/CORPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Issues on the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's
Commissioned Corps (GAO/GGD-98-35R, Dec.  2, 1997). 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:  Issues on the
Civilianization of the Commissioned Corps (GAO/T-GGD-98-22, Oct.  29,
1997). 

Federal Personnel:  Issues on the Need for NOAA's Commissioned Corps
(GAO/GGD-97-10, Oct.  31, 1996). 

Research Fleet Modernization:  NOAA Needs to Consider Alternatives to
the Acquisition of New Vessels (GAO/RCED-94-170, Aug.  3, 1994). 


   IMPROVING FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
   SYSTEMS AND PROCESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

Results Act:  Observations on the Department of Commerce's Annual
Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 1999 (GAO/GGD-98-135R, June 24,
1998). 

Managing For Results:  Agencies' Annual Performance Plans Can Help
Address Strategic Planning Challenges (GAO/GGD-98-44, Jan.  30,
1998). 

The Results Act:  Observations on Commerce's June 1997 Draft
Strategic Plan (GAO/GGD-97-152R, July 14, 1997). 

Federal Management:  Addressing Management Problems at the Department
of Commerce (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-97-115, May 14, 1997). 


   USING THE RESULTS ACT TO
   IMPROVE PERFORMANCE AND
   DECISIONMAKING
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

Managing For Results:  An Agenda To Improve the Usefulness of
Agencies' Annual Performance Plans (GAO/GGD/AIMD-98-228, Sept.  8,
1998). 

Results Act:  Observations on the Department of Commerce's Annual
Performance Plan for Fiscal Year 1999 (GAO/GGD-98-135R, June 24,
1998). 

Managing For Results:  Agencies' Annual Performance Plans Can Help
Address Strategic Planning Challenges (GAO/GGD-98-44, Jan.  30,
1998). 

The Results Act:  Observations on Commerce's June 1997 Draft
Strategic Plan (GAO/GGD-97-152R, July 14, 1997). 

Federal Management:  Addressing Management Problems at the Department
of Commerce (GAO/T-GGD/AIMD-97-115, May 14, 1997). 


PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
SERIES
============================================================ Chapter 3

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  A Governmentwide
Perspective (GAO/OCG-99-1)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Agriculture (GAO/OCG-99-2)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Commerce (GAO/OCG-99-3)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Defense
(GAO/OCG-99-4)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Education (GAO/OCG-99-5)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Energy
(GAO/OCG-99-6)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Health
and Human Services (GAO/OCG-99-7)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Housing
and Urban Development (GAO/OCG-99-8)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of the
Interior (GAO/OCG-99-9)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Justice
(GAO/OCG-99-10)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Labor
(GAO/OCG-99-11)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of State
(GAO/OCG-99-12)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Transportation (GAO/OCG-99-13)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of the
Treasury (GAO/OCG-99-14)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Veterans Affairs (GAO/OCG-99-15)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Agency for
International Development (GAO/OCG-99-16)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Environmental
Protection Agency (GAO/OCG-99-17)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (GAO/OCG-99-18)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (GAO/OCG-99-19)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Social Security
Administration (GAO/OCG-99-20)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  U.S.  Postal Service
(GAO/OCG-99-21)

High-Risk Series:  An Update (GAO/HR-99-1)





The entire series of 21 performance and accountability reports and
the high-risk series update can be ordered by using the order number
GAO/OCG-99-22SET. 


*** End of document. ***