Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (Letter Report, 01/01/99, GAO/OCG-99-18).

As part of its Performance and Accountability Series, GAO provided
information on the major management challenges and program risks facing
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

GAO noted that: (1) NASA's contract management function encompasses
several processes, including financial management and oversight; (2)
both of these processes require accurate and reliable information; (3)
however, NASA lacks adequate systems and processes to oversee
procurement activities and to produce accurate and reliable management
information in a timely manner; (4) characterized as one of the most
challenging engineering feats ever attempted, the International Space
Station Program is expected to culminate in 2004 in a football
field-sized laboratory manned by up to seven crew members; (5) however,
until the space station is completed, NASA will continue to face
challenges in controlling the cost and schedule of the program; (6) in
May 1998, GAO reported that since 1995, the life cycle cost for the
station had increased almost +$2 billion, to $95.6 billion; (7) at the
time of GAO's report, the final assembly date of the station had slipped
from June 2002 to December 2003; (8) NASA and the Department of Defense
(DOD) agreed in 1996 to form joint working groups for aerospace test
facilities to coordinate investments to avoid unnecessary duplication,
coordinate test schedules to spread workload across the facilities, and
develop standardized business processes; (9) however, the agencies'
promise of closer cooperation and the development of a national
perspective on aerospace test facilities remains largely unfulfilled
because NASA and DOD: (a) have not convened most joint test facility
working groups on a regular basis; (b) have competed with each other to
test engines for new rockets; and (c) have not prepared a
congressionally required joint plan on rocket propulsion test
facilities; (10) NASA has made progress in meeting these challenges;
(11) in the contract management area, although it has made some progress
in developing systems to correct contract management weaknesses, NASA
still has not implemented its integrated financial management system;
(12) regarding space station challenges, the final assembly date has
slipped to July 2004; (13) the prime contractor's performance and
Russia's problems with funding its portion contributed to the cost
increase and schedule delay in the space station program; (14) NASA and
DOD have agreed to go beyond cooperative working groups in aeronautics
and jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities; (15) however,
they have not reached agreement on key aspects of a management
organization; and (16) GAO's review of NASA's 1999 annual performance
plan found that the agency did not recognize major management
challenges.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  OCG-99-18
     TITLE:  Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: National 
             Aeronautics and Space Administration
      DATE:  01/01/99
   SUBJECT:  Management information systems
             Interagency relations
             Financial management
             Contract administration
             Cost control
             Schedule slippages
             Space exploration
             Accountability
             Risk management
             Strategic planning
IDENTIFIER:  NASA International Space Station Program
             Russia
             NASA Integrated Financial Management Project Management Plan
             NASA Procurement Quality Assessment Initiative
             Japan
             Canada
             Performance and Accountability Series 1999
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Performance and Accountability Series

January 1999

MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND
PROGRAM RISKS - NATIONAL
AERONAUTICS AND SPACE
ADMINISTRATION

GAO/OCG-99-18

NASA Challenges


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  ISO - International Organization for Standardization
  NASA - National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER



January 1999

The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report addresses the major performance and management challenges
that have limited the effectiveness of the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) in carrying out its mission.  It also
addresses corrective actions that NASA has taken or initiated on
these challenges, including the progress the agency has made in
evaluating its field centers' procurement activities based on
international quality standards and its own procurement surveys. 
Since 1990, we have identified a number of significant management
problems at NASA.  These problems are the results of serious
deficiencies in financial management systems, continuing threats to
the International Space Station Program that translate into higher
program costs, and a lack of closure in the implementation of
cooperative efforts with the Department of Defense regarding
aerospace test facilities. 

To date, NASA has made progress in resolving these challenges.  For
example, in the contract management area--an important activity in
light of the agency's annual procurement budget of over $12
billion--NASA has made progress in developing systems to correct
contract management weaknesses.  However, NASA has not implemented
its integrated financial management system.  Agencywide
implementation is now scheduled for June 1, 2000.  The agency
recognizes that such a system must be implemented to fix a number of
problems, including decentralized, nonintegrated systems with
policies, procedures, and practices that are unique to its field
centers.  Consequently, until corrective actions are completed--such
as a fully operational integrated financial management system--we
believe that NASA's contract management remains a high-risk area. 

This report is part of a special series entitled the Performance and
Accountability Series:  Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks.  The series contains separate reports on 20 agencies--one on
each of the cabinet departments and on most major independent
agencies as well as the U.  S.  Postal Service.  The series also
includes a governmentwide report that draws from the agency-specific
reports to identify the performance and management challenges
requiring attention across the federal government.  As a companion
volume to this series, GAO is issuing an update to those government
operations and programs that its work has identified as "high risk"
because of their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement.  High-risk government operations are also identified
and discussed in detail in the appropriate performance and
accountability series agency reports. 

The performance and accountability series was done at the request of
the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Dick Armey; the
Chairman of the House Government Reform Committee, Dan Burton; the
Chairman of the House Budget Committee, John Kasich; the Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Fred Thompson; the
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, Pete Domenici; and Senator
Larry Craig.  The series was subsequently cosponsored by the Ranking
Minority Member of the House Government Reform Committee, Henry A. 
Waxman; the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information and Technology, House Government Reform
Committee, Dennis J.  Kucinich; Senator Joseph I.  Lieberman; and
Senator Carl Levin. 

Copies of this report series are being sent to the President, the
congressional leadership, all other Members of the Congress, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Administrator of
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the heads of
other major departments and agencies. 

David M.  Walker
Comptroller General of
the United States


OVERVIEW
============================================================ Chapter 0

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) conducts
research for the solution of problems of flight within and outside
the Earth's atmosphere and develops, constructs, tests, and operates
aeronautical and space vehicles.  It conducts activities required for
the exploration of space with manned and unmanned vehicles and
coordinates the use of the scientific and engineering resources of
the United States with other nations engaged in aeronautical and
space activities for peaceful purposes.  For example, in December
1998, NASA successfully coupled in orbit the first two elements of
the International Space Station.  Recently, NASA's budget has been
between $13 and $14 billion annually.  NASA spends more than $12
billion annually for goods and services, mostly on contracts with
businesses and other organizations. 

Since 1990, we have identified a number of major management
challenges at NASA.  Currently, three challenges continue to warrant
NASA attention. 


   THE CHALLENGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1


      WEAKNESSES IN CONTRACT
      MANAGEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.1

NASA's contract management function encompasses several processes,
including financial management and oversight.  Both of these
processes require accurate and reliable information.  However, NASA
lacks adequate systems and processes to oversee procurement
activities and to produce accurate and reliable management
information in a timely manner. 


      CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL
      SPACE STATION COSTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.2

Characterized as one of the most challenging engineering feats ever
attempted, the International Space Station Program is expected to
culminate in 2004 in a football field-sized laboratory manned by up
to seven crewmembers.  However, until the space station is completed,
NASA will continue to face challenges in controlling the cost and
schedule of the program.  In May 1998, we reported that since 1995,
the life-cycle cost for the station had increased almost $2 billion,
to $95.6 billion.  At the time of our report, the final assembly date
of the station had slipped from June 2002 to December 2003. 


      FOLLOWING THROUGH ON
      AEROSPACE TEST FACILITIES
      COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1.3

NASA and the Department of Defense (DOD) agreed in 1996 to form joint
working groups for aerospace test facilities to coordinate
investments to avoid unnecessary duplication, coordinate test
schedules to spread workload across the facilities, and develop
standardized business processes.  However, the agencies' promise of
closer cooperation and the development of a national perspective on
aerospace test facilities remains largely unfulfilled because NASA
and DOD (1) have not convened most joint test facility working groups
on a regular basis, (2) have competed with each other to test engines
for new rockets, and (3) have not prepared a congressionally required
joint plan on rocket propulsion test facilities. 


   PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

NASA has made progress in meeting these challenges.  In the contract
management area, it has made progress in developing systems to
correct contract management weaknesses.  NASA still has not
implemented its integrated financial management system.  However,
until NASA's integrated financial management system is operational,
the agency's contract management should remain a high-risk area. 
Regarding space station challenges, since our May 1998 report, the
final assembly date has slipped to July 2004.  The prime contractor's
performance and Russia's problems with funding its portion
contributed to the cost increase and schedule delay in the space
station program.  We are currently reviewing both the cost of and
Russia's involvement with the space station.  As to the promise of
greater cooperation and the development of a national perspective on
aerospace test facilities, NASA and DOD have agreed to go beyond
cooperative working groups in aeronautics and jointly manage their
aeronautical test facilities.  However, they have not reached
agreement on key aspects of a management organization. 

NASA's corrective actions on its management challenges should be
viewed in the context of its efforts to respond to the Government
Performance and Results Act of 1993.  In a case in point, our review
of NASA's 1999 annual performance plan found that the agency did not
recognize major management challenges and associated corrective
actions.  NASA has indicated that it will continually improve the
content of its annual performance plan. 


      KEY CONTACTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

Louis J.  Rodrigues, Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues
National Defense and International
 Affairs Division
(202) 512-4841
[email protected]

Allen Li, Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues
National Defense and International
 Affairs Division
(202) 512-4841
[email protected]


MAJOR PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT
ISSUES
============================================================ Chapter 1

Over the years, we have documented major management problems in NASA. 
This report summarizes our findings concerning several weaknesses in
NASA's contract management, the challenges NASA faces controlling the
space station's cost and schedule, and the efforts by NASA and DOD to
coordinate their aerospace test facilities. 


   WEAKNESSES IN CONTRACT
   MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

NASA spends more than $12 billion annually for goods and services,
mostly on contracts with businesses and other organizations.  To
adequately manage these expenditures, NASA requires systems and
processes to oversee procurement activities and to routinely produce
accurate and reliable management information.  In 1990, we identified
NASA's contract management as an area at high risk.  At that time, we
began a special effort to review and report on federal program areas
that our work had identified as high risk because of vulnerabilities
to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.  In 1992, we reported that
the agency had ineffective systems and processes for overseeing
contractors' activities and that NASA field centers had failed to
comply with contract management requirements. 

In July 1998, we reported that NASA was developing systems to provide
it with the oversight and information needed to improve its contract
management.  In addition, we reported that NASA had made progress
evaluating its field centers' procurement activities based on
international quality standards and its own procurement surveys.  We
also reported, however, that NASA had delayed implementation of its
integrated financial management system and not implemented its new
system for measuring procurement performance. 


      NASA DELAYED IMPLEMENTATION
      OF INTEGRATED FINANCIAL
      MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

In its August 1997 Integrated Financial Management Project Management
Plan, NASA stated that its financial management environment comprised
decentralized, nonintegrated systems with policies, procedures, and
practices that are unique to its field centers.  NASA stated that for
the most part, data formats were not standardized, automated systems
are not interfaced, and on-line financial information was not readily
available to program managers.  In addition, NASA pointed out, the
cost to maintain these systems was high since both data and software
were replicated at each field center. 

NASA's new integrated financial management system is intended to fix
these problems.  It offers the promise of providing reliable and
timely information.  However, its implementation has been delayed. 
In May 1998, NASA and its contractor, KPMG Peat Marwick LLP, signed a
contract modification delaying initial implementation of the
financial management system at Marshall Space Flight Center and
Dryden Flight Research Center from October 1, 1998, to June 1, 1999. 
The modification also postponed agencywide implementation from July
1, 1999, to June 1, 2000. 

According to a NASA official, KPMG has had difficulties upgrading its
software to support new technologies and to meet all federal
requirements.  These difficulties have been especially prevalent in
two systems that are directly related to contract management, namely,
the core financial and procurement systems.  The core financial
system, according to NASA, is the "backbone" of the integrated
financial management system and is to provide common processing
routines, including budget execution and funds control; support for
common data for critical financial management functions affecting the
entire agency; and maintenance of the required general ledger control
over financial transactions and resource balances.  In addition, it
is to provide data for the measurement of financial performance,
analysis, full cost management, financial reporting, and preparation
of financial statements.  The procurement system, according to NASA,
will support an end-to-end acquisition process.  Specifically, it
will prepare and track the status of procurement requests, purchase
orders, and contracts; record and validate the receipt of goods and
services; and provide information to the core financial system. 


      NASA IS IMPLEMENTING ITS NEW
      SYSTEM FOR MEASURING
      PROCUREMENT PERFORMANCE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

In response to our March 1997 report on NASA's contract management
and our observation on the agency's need to produce accurate and
reliable procurement-related information, a NASA official stated in
an August 27, 1997, letter that NASA was "actively working on
performance measures in order to determine our metric needs and how
best they can be used to measure performance." In an October 3, 1997,
letter, a NASA official stated that NASA's Procurement Quality
Assessment Initiative would involve "the development of measurable
performance metrics, the benchmarking of these metrics," and the
development of both NASA Headquarters and agencywide procurement
customer surveys.  According to a NASA official, the purpose of the
metrics initiative is to determine a family of performance metrics
that will help procurement managers measure and improve the
performance of their organizations.  The purpose of the customer
survey is to periodically assess customer satisfaction with field
centers' procurement office support in areas of timeliness, quality,
and service. 

In May 1998, the NASA Headquarters Office of Procurement forwarded a
draft of customer survey to the senior procurement officers at its
field centers for comment.  The final version of the survey was
approved in October.  The customer survey is presently undergoing
in-house testing prior to dissemination to the center procurement
customers in early January 1999.  A NASA official said that the
customer survey will be conducted annually. 

In August, the agency circulated a draft metrics report for review
and comment by NASA's senior procurement officials at its field
centers.  The final metrics report was approved by the Acting
Associate Administrator for Procurement on November 19, 1998, and
transmitted to the centers' senior procurement officials the same
day.  In the transmittal memorandum, he said that the revised system
of procurement measures will be implemented effective fiscal year
1999. 


      NASA HAS MADE PROGRESS IN
      EVALUATING PROCUREMENT AT
      ITS FIELD CENTERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3

NASA requires a quality management system for itself and its
suppliers that, at a minimum, complies with the International
Organization for Standardization (ISO) 9000 series of standards,
which includes a standard for purchasing.  The ISO 9000 series
consists, in part, of 20 quality management and assurance standards. 
The general purchasing standard states that the supplier (for
example, NASA's field centers' procurement offices) shall establish
and maintain documented procedures to ensure that purchased products
conform to specified requirements.  To this end, NASA has hired
contractors to annually evaluate its field centers' compliance with
these standards. 

To prepare for ISO 9000 certification, the field centers' personnel
conduct internal audits, including audits of the centers' compliance
with the purchasing standard.  To date, NASA's contractors have
certified Johnson Space Center, Johnson's White Sands Test Facility,
Marshall Space Flight Center, and Kennedy Space Center as having
complied with the ISO 9000 standards.  All field centers are to be
certified by the end of fiscal year 1999. 

NASA Headquarters also conducts procurement management surveys of its
field centers' procurement activities.  Before 1998, such surveys
were performed in addition to the field centers' own procurement
self-assessments, which are now being replaced by the ISO
9000-related internal audits.  NASA plans to survey either Goddard or
Johnson field center each year because each of these centers has the
largest amounts of procurement activity and to survey other centers
at least once every
3 years.  NASA Headquarters completed surveys at Dryden, Goddard,
Langley, and Stennis field centers in fiscal year 1997 and at
Johnson, Lewis, and Marshall field centers in fiscal year 1998. 
Also, the Langley field center was resurveyed in fiscal year 1998. 

In April 1998, NASA's procurement officers agreed that a combination
of ISO 9000 external and internal audits and procurement surveys
should provide sufficient confidence in the soundness of NASA's
procurement system.  They also agreed to periodically sample for
review a random number of procurement actions.  On September 30,
1998, NASA's Acting Associate Administrator for Procurement issued
guidance to the procurement officers for the random reviews.  The
guidance stated that, at a minimum, the random reviews should be
performed semiannually. 


      CONTRACT MANAGEMENT SHOULD
      REMAIN A HIGH-RISK AREA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.4

NASA has made progress in correcting weaknesses in contract
management.  However, a critical component of evaluating NASA's
ability to manage contracts is the establishment of a financial
management system and its integration with full cost accounting. 
Until the financial management system is operational, performance
assessments relying on cost data may be incomplete.  Because
implementation of the financial management system has been delayed,
we believe that NASA's contract management should remain a high-risk
area.  We will continue to monitor NASA's future progress in the
contract management area. 


   CONTROLLING INTERNATIONAL SPACE
   STATION COSTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

NASA and its international partners--Japan, Canada, the European
Space Agency, and Russia--are building a space station as a
permanently orbiting laboratory to conduct research on materials and
life sciences, to observe the earth, and to provide for commercial
purposes under nearly weightless conditions.  In December 1998, NASA
astronauts successfully coupled in orbit the first two elements of
the space station. 

Since the space station project was first approved in the mid-1980s,
NASA has had to redesign the station several times to meet decreasing
budgets.  The most recent major redesign was in 1993.  At about the
same time, the Russians became a partner in the program.  Since 1993,
NASA and its partners have made progress in developing and
constructing space station elements, and early flight hardware has
been delivered to U.S.  and Russian launch sites. 

In September 1997, we reported that the cost and schedule performance
of the station's prime contractor had continued to steadily worsen
and that program financial reserves for contingencies had
deteriorated, principally because of program uncertainties and cost
overruns.  We also reported that NASA had questioned the accuracy of
the prime contractor's reported estimate of a cost overrun at
completion.  On the basis of an internal review, the prime contractor
more than doubled its estimate of the total cost growth at contract
completion, from $278 million to $600 million.  We also reported that
NASA had become concerned with Russia's ability to provide steady and
adequate funding to meet its commitments. 

In May 1998, we reported that the life-cycle cost estimate to
develop, operate, and decommission the station had increased by about
$2 billion since 1995, to about $95.6 billion.  The major component
of this increase was in the development cost of the station, which
increased from $17.4 billion to $21.9 billion.  The increase in
development cost was offset by a dramatic reduction in NASA's
estimate of the shuttle support costs for the station.  We also
reported that the final assembly date of the station had slipped from
June 2002 to December 2003 and a number of potential program changes
could further increase costs, including additional schedule delays
and the need for more shuttle launches.  In addition, we continued to
report that station financial reserves might be inadequate,
considering that the development phase was still about 6 years from
completion. 

Since May 1998, the program has continued to face cost and schedule
challenges and the effects of funding shortfalls in Russia.  NASA
continues to identify cost growth and limited reserves as major
program concerns and is now giving added attention to problems with
contractors other than prime contractors.  Regarding the prime
contractor's performance, its latest estimate of a cost overrun at
completion has increased from $600 million to over $780 million.  In
addition, the concerns we expressed in May 1998 regarding potential
threats to the program have, in fact, occurred.  For example, in
October 1998, NASA and its partners revised the official assembly
sequence, adding additional shuttle flights and extending the final
assembly date of the station to July 2004. 

Regarding Russia's funding shortfalls, in September 1998, NASA sought
congressional support for its plan to transfer $60 million from
within the agency to the Russian Space Agency in return for goods and
services, to help ensure the timely completion of Russian components. 
NASA also said that the Russian Space Agency could need an additional
$600 million in funding transfers.  As an added consequence of
Russia's funding problems, NASA has identified more than $500 million
in new U.S.-built hardware and shuttle modifications to lessen
dependence on Russia during station assembly and operations.  The
total amount of U.S.  funds that will ultimately be needed to support
Russian participation is uncertain at this time. 

With the exception that NASA assumes the space station partners will
meet their own schedules, the agency's performance plan responding to
the Results Act does not explain how NASA will address external
factors that could affect performance.  This is particularly
important for budgetary programmatic priorities, such as the space
station, which could consume a large portion of future resources and
affect implementation of other NASA programs. 

On the basis of a request from the Chairs of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the Committee's
Subcommittee on Science, Technology and Space, we are pursuing both
the cost of and Russia's involvement with the space station program. 


   FOLLOWING THROUGH ON AEROSPACE
   TEST FACILITIES COOPERATIVE
   EFFORTS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

NASA is cooperating with DOD to address issues of mutual interest
regarding investment in, and use of, aerospace test facilities.  This
cooperation was initiated under the auspices of the joint NASA/DOD
Aeronautics and Astronautics Coordinating Board.  In April 1996, NASA
and DOD agreed to form joint working groups, called alliances, for
six types of major test facilities:  wind tunnels, aeropropulsion
test cells, rocket engine test stands, space environmental simulation
chambers, arc-heaters, and hypervelocity gas guns and ballistic
ranges.  The working groups were formed to coordinate investments to
avoid unnecessary duplication, coordinate test schedules to spread
the workload across facilities, and develop standardized and common
business processes.  In September 1996, the Congress added to this
effort by requiring NASA and DOD to prepare a joint plan on rocket
propulsion test facilities. 

In March 1998, we reported that the agencies' promise of closer
cooperation and the development of a national perspective on
aerospace test facilities remained largely unfulfilled because NASA
and DOD (1) had not convened most test facility working groups, (2)
have competed with each other to test engines for new rockets, and
(3) had not prepared a congressionally required joint plan on rocket
propulsion test facilities.  We also reported that although NASA and
DOD had agreed to go beyond cooperative working groups in aeronautics
and jointly manage their aeronautical test facilities, they had not
yet reached agreement on key aspects of a management organization. 

NASA and DOD took 20 months to negotiate and sign agreements formally
establishing the six test facility-related cooperative working
groups.  During that time, only the space environmental simulation
working group met regularly and conducted business.  The already
established rocket propulsion working group met only once during this
period, despite a desire by some members to meet regularly.  NASA and
DOD officials did not regularly convene the other four working groups
in the absence of approved charters.  Since our March 1998, report,
according to a DOD official, a joint meeting attended by
representatives of all the NASA/DOD test working groups, except the
wind tunnel working group, was held in May 1998 at the Air Force's
Arnold Engineering Development Center.  The wind tunnel working group
held an organizing meeting on June 30, 1998, and its first full
meeting on August 5, 1998.  In addition to the joint meeting, a NASA
official said that the rocket propulsion test and the space
environmental simulation working groups met on a quarterly basis in
1998. 

Despite the formation of the rocket propulsion working group, NASA
and DOD have competed against each other to test engines for new
rocket programs.  A principal arena of competition is the next phase
of the Air Force's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle Program.  In
particular, the Air Force spent millions of dollars to upgrade a test
stand on the assumption that it, not NASA, would test the new launch
vehicle's engines. 

On November 19, 1998, a NASA official said that DOD and NASA has
still not prepared the legislatively mandated joint plan to
coordinate rocket propulsion test facilities.  However, he added that
the rocket propulsion test working group is performing joint planning
and preparing guidance to ensure the best use of each agency's test
facilities. 

In October 1997, NASA and Air Force officials took a step toward
creating a national perspective on test facilities in the aeronautics
area.  Specifically, they reached an understanding on the scope and
approach for joint strategic management of their aeronautical test
facilities, including a new management organization to be called the
National Aeronautical Test Alliance.  However, as of our March 1998
report, they had not resolved basic issues, such as the
organization's structure and authority.  On December 9, 1998, a NASA
official said that NASA and DOD expect to establish the new alliance
soon because NASA has signed the charter for the alliance and DOD
currently has it in final review.  He added that once the charter is
signed, the wind tunnel and aeropropulsion test working groups will
merge into the new alliance.  Ultimately, if the National
Aeronautical Test Alliance is successful, its adaption to other types
of test facilities could be considered. 


   RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NASA'S
   CORRECTIVE ACTIONS AND THE
   RESULTS ACT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

NASA's corrective actions on its management challenges should be
viewed in the context of its strategic and performance plans.  The
agency pursued strategic planning prior to its being required by the
Results Act.  However, our review of the draft strategic plan NASA
submitted to the Congress in response to the Results Act showed that
the plan did not fully address all key elements required by the Act. 
Also, the plan did not discuss major management challenges and
problems, such as a long-standing weakness in contract management and
the lack of a fully integrated accounting system, that could affect
NASA's ability to fulfill its mission.  Our review of NASA's 1999
performance plan found that it also did not recognize major
management challenges and associated corrective actions.  Further,
the performance plan should better link performance goals and
measures to the program activities in the agency's budget and show
that NASA coordinated the plan with agencies having complementary
activities.  In responding to our review, NASA stated that it will
continually improve the content of its annual performance plan. 


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 2


   CONTRACT MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

NASA Procurement:  Status of Efforts to Improve Oversight
(GAO/NSIAD-98-198R, July 13, 1998). 

NASA:  Major Management Challenges (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178, July 24,
1997). 

High-Risk Program:  Information on Selected High-Risk Areas
(GAO/HR-97-30, May 16, 1997). 

NASA Procurement:  Contract Management Oversight (GAO/NSIAD-97-114R,
Mar.  18, 1997). 

NASA:  Procurement Assessments (GAO/NSIAD-97-80R, Feb.  4, 1997). 

NASA:  Contract Management (GAO/NSIAD-96-95R, Feb.  16, 1996). 

NASA Budgets:  Gap Between Funding Requirements and Projected Budgets
(GAO/NSIAD-95-155BR, May 12, 1995). 


   INTERNATIONAL SPACE STATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Space Station:  U.S.  Life-Cycle Funding Requirements
(GAO/T-NSIAD-98-212, June 24, 1998). 

International Space Station:  U.S.  Life-Cycle Funding Requirements
(GAO/NSIAD-98-147, May 22, 1998). 

Space Station:  Cost Control Problems (GAO/T-NSIAD-98-54, Nov.  5,
1997). 

Space Station:  Deteriorating Cost and Schedule Performance Under the
Prime Contract (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-262, Sept.  18, 1997). 

Space Station:  Cost Control Problems Are Worsening
(GAO/NSIAD-97-213, Sept.  16, 1997). 

Space Station:  Cost Control Problems Continue to Worsen
(GAO/T-NSIAD-97-177, June 18, 1997). 

NASA:  Major Management Challenges (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178, July 24,
1997). 

Space Station:  Cost Control Difficulties Continue
(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-210, July 24, 1996). 

Space Station:  Cost Control Difficulties Continue (GAO/NSIAD-96-135,
July 17, 1996). 

Space Station:  Estimated Total U.S.  Funding Requirements
(GAO/NSIAD-95-163, June 12, 1995). 


   NASA AND DOD AEROSPACE TEST
   FACILITIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Aerospace Testing:  Promise of Closer NASA/DOD Cooperation Remains
Largely Unfulfilled (GAO/NSIAD-98-52, Mar.  11, 1998). 

Best Practices:  Elements Critical to Reducing Successfully Unneeded
RDT&E Infrastructure (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-98-23, Jan.  8, 1998). 

NASA:  Major Management Challenges (GAO/T-NSIAD-97-178, July 24,
1997). 

NASA Facilities:  Challenges to Achieving Reductions and Efficiencies
(GAO/T-NSIAD-96-238, Sept.  11, 1996). 

NASA Infrastructure:  Challenges to Achieving Reductions and
Efficiencies (GAO/NSIAD-96-187, Sept.  9, 1996). 


PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
SERIES
============================================================ Chapter 3

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  A Governmentwide
Perspective (GAO/OCG-99-1)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Agriculture (GAO/OCG-99-2)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Commerce (GAO/OCG-99-3)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Defense
(GAO/OCG-99-4)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Education (GAO/OCG-99-5)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Energy
(GAO/OCG-99-6)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Health
and Human Services (GAO/OCG-99-7)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Housing
and Urban Development (GAO/OCG-99-8)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of the
Interior (GAO/OCG-99-9)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Justice
(GAO/OCG-99-10)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Labor
(GAO/OCG-99-11)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of State
(GAO/OCG-99-12)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Transportation (GAO/OCG-99-13)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of the
Treasury (GAO/OCG-99-14)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Veterans Affairs (GAO/OCG-99-15)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Agency for
International Development (GAO/OCG-99-16)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Environmental
Protection Agency (GAO/OCG-99-17)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (GAO/OCG-99-18)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (GAO/OCG-99-19)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Social Security
Administration (GAO/OCG-99-20)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  U.S.  Postal Service
(GAO/OCG-99-21)

High-Risk Series:  An Update (GAO/HR-99-1)




The entire series of 21 performance and accountability reports and
the high-risk series update can be ordered by using the order number
GAO/OCG-99-22SET. 


*** End of document. ***