Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department of Justice
(Letter Report, 01/01/99, GAO/OCG-99-10).

As part of its Performance and Accountability Series, GAO provided
information on the major management challenges and program risks facing
the Department of Justice.

GAO noted that: (1) the Immigration and Naturalization Service's (INS)
persistent management challenges have resulted in recommendations to
restructure the agency so that enforcement of immigration laws and
delivery of immigration services are clearly divided; (2) INS is
developing a restructuring plan to accomplish this division and other
objectives; (3) although the Attorney General has established a strategy
to strengthen immigration enforcement, GAO's review of three aspects of
the strategy has raised concerns about INS' efforts to achieve program
objectives: (a) INS has spent billions of dollars on border enforcement
but has not yet done a comprehensive evaluation to determine whether its
strategy to deter illegal entry has been effective; (b) INS has a
program designed to place criminal aliens in removal proceedings while
they serve their prison sentences, but it has failed to identify
thousands of such aliens before their release into U.S. communities; and
(c) INS is required to complete criminal history checks on all
applicants for naturalization before the application is approved;
however, its failure to do so in some cases has resulted in criminal
aliens being improperly naturalized; (4) auditors issued a disclaimer of
opinion on the Department's fiscal years 1996 and 1997 consolidated
financial statements because they were unable to obtain sufficient
evidence to determine whether the Department's account balances and
disclosures were fairly stated; (5) the Department's program for
managing and disposing of seized assets has been designated a high-risk
area; (6) managed by the U.S. Marshals Service, the program has
experienced major operational problems for several years; (7) GAO's
recent work has indicated that property management has improved, but
some challenges remain; (8) recognizing the need for better management,
INS has undertaken some steps to address some of its long-standing
problems; and (9) to help improve its performance and achieve its
intended results, the Department developed strategic and performance
plans in accordance with the requirements of the Government Performance
and Results Act.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  OCG-99-10
     TITLE:  Major Management Challenges and Program Risks: Department 
             of Justice
      DATE:  01/01/99
   SUBJECT:  Financial management
             Immigration information systems
             Federal agency reorganization
             Illegal aliens
             Law enforcement
             Risk management
             Accountability
             Internal controls
             Search and seizure
             Immigration and naturalization law
IDENTIFIER:  DOJ National Asset Seizure and Forfeiture Program
             INS Institutional Hearing Program
             INS Institutional Removal Program
             DOJ/Treasury Consolidated Asset Tracking System
             Performance and Accountability Series 1999
             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Performance and Accountability Series

January 1999

MAJOR MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES AND
PROGRAM RISKS - DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE

GAO/OCG-99-10

Department of Justice Challenges


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  AFP - Asset Forfeiture Program
  BOP - Bureau of Prisons
  CATS - Consolidated Asset Tracking System
  DEA - Drug Enforcement Administration
  FBI - Federal Bureau of Investigation
  FFMIA - Federal Financial Management Improvement Act
  FMFIA - Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act
  IHP - Institutional Hearing Program
  INS - Immigration and Naturalization Service
  SADF -

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER



January 1999

The President of the Senate
The Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report addresses the major performance and management challenges
that have limited the effectiveness of the Department of Justice in
carrying out its mission.  It also addresses corrective actions that
the Department has taken or initiated to address these challenges and
further actions that are needed.  For many years, we have reported
significant performance and management challenges at the Department. 
These challenges are the result of serious deficiencies in (1) the
organizational structure, communications, financial management, and
program implementation at the Immigration and Naturalization Service;
(2) the Department's financial statements and internal controls; (3)
embezzlements and financial management controls at the Drug
Enforcement Administration; and (4) the Department's accountability
over seized and forfeited property. 

The Department has made progress in addressing some of its
long-standing problems.  For example, since 1993, INS has
reorganized, developed a national strategy for controlling the U.S. 
border, and restructured the naturalization process.  In addition,
the Department has efforts under way to address financial management
weaknesses, including establishing working groups, both at the
Department level and at the Drug Enforcement Administration. 
Further, the Department has taken steps to improve its accountability
over seized and forfeited property, such as issuing reconciliation
instructions and implementing system enhancements.  However, while
progress has been made in some areas, the Department has not
addressed needed improvements in others.  We believe that the
Department's continued attention to its strategic goals and
performance measures will be instrumental in addressing the
challenges we identify in this report. 

This report is part of a special series entitled the Performance and
Accountability Series:  Major Management Challenges and Program
Risks.  The series contains separate reports on 20 agencies--one on
each of the cabinet departments and on most major independent
agencies as well as the U.  S.  Postal Service.  The series also
includes a governmentwide report that draws from the agency-specific
reports to identify the performance and management challenges
requiring attention across the federal government.  As a companion
volume to this series, GAO is issuing an update to those government
operations and programs that its work has identified as "high risk"
because of their greater vulnerabilities to waste, fraud, abuse, and
mismanagement.  High-risk government operations are also identified
and discussed in detail in the appropriate performance and
accountability series agency reports. 

The performance and accountability series was done at the request of
the Majority Leader of the House of Representatives, Dick Armey; the
Chairman of the House Government Reform Committee, Dan Burton; the
Chairman of the House Budget Committee, John Kasich; the Chairman of
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, Fred Thompson; the
Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, Pete Domenici; and Senator
Larry Craig.  The series was subsequently cosponsored by the Ranking
Minority Member of the House Government Reform Committee, Henry A. 
Waxman; the Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on Government
Management, Information and Technology, House Government Reform
Committee, Dennis J.  Kucinich; Senator Joseph I.  Lieberman; and
Senator Carl Levin. 

Copies of this report series are being sent to the President, the
congressional leadership, all other Members of the Congress, the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Attorney General
of the United States, and the heads of other major departments and
agencies. 

David M.  Walker
Comptroller General of
the United States


OVERVIEW
============================================================ Chapter 0

The Department of Justice, the nation's chief law enforcement
organization, is charged with providing leadership to ensure that
U.S.  citizens are protected from violence and criminal activity. 
The Attorney General heads the Department, represents the United
States in legal matters generally, and oversees the operations of its
various components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), Bureau of Prisons (BOP), U.S.  Marshals
Service, and the Offices of U.S.  Attorneys.  This report focuses on
major performance and management challenges at the Department level
and in two major components-INS and DEA. 


   THE CHALLENGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:1

Over the years, we and others have identified performance and
management challenges within the Department.  For example, at INS,
these challenges have been related to organizational structure,
communications, financial management, and program implementation. 
Other challenges within the Department have been related to its
financial statements and internal controls, embezzlements and
financial management controls at DEA, and accountability over seized
and forfeited property.  We believe that the Government Performance
and Results Act of 1993 (the Results Act) could provide the
Department with a vehicle for addressing the management and
performance issues that we have identified. 


   INS MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
   PERSIST
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2

INS' persistent management challenges have resulted in
recommendations to restructure the agency so that enforcement of
immigration laws and delivery of immigration services are clearly
divided.  INS is in the process of developing a restructuring plan to
accomplish this division and other objectives.  Until the
restructuring plan is approved, INS does not plan to address such
management challenges as the absence of written guidance concerning
appropriate channels of communication within the organization.  Other
management challenges we and others have reported as needing
attention include (1) INS' outdated policies and procedures on how to
implement immigration laws, (2) INS' selection of a replacement
financial management system without first analyzing its business
processes and developing a risk management plan, and (3) the absence
of appropriate accounting records and internal controls to enable
INS' auditor to express an opinion on INS' financial statements. 


      CHALLENGES WITH
      IMPLEMENTATION OF INS'
      PROGRAMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.1

Although the Attorney General has established a strategy to
strengthen immigration enforcement, our review of three aspects of
the strategy has raised concerns about INS' efforts to achieve
program objectives.  First, INS has spent billions of dollars on
border enforcement but has not yet done a comprehensive evaluation to
determine whether its strategy to deter illegal entry has been
effective.  Second, INS has a program designed to place criminal
aliens in removal proceedings while they serve their prison
sentences, but it has failed to identify thousands of such aliens
before their release into U.S.  communities.  Of those whom INS did
identify, most were released from prison and placed in detention by
INS before it completed the removal proceedings, causing INS to incur
millions of dollars in avoidable detention costs.  Third, INS is
required to complete criminal history checks on all applicants for
naturalization before the application is approved.  However, its
failure to do so in some cases has resulted in criminal aliens being
improperly naturalized.  INS has issued instructions to implement
internal control procedures in the naturalization process, but
questions about the integrity of the process remain. 


      SIGNIFICANT DEPARTMENTAL
      FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
      WEAKNESSES
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.2

Auditors issued a disclaimer of opinion on the Department's fiscal
years 1996 and 1997 consolidated financial statements because they
were unable to obtain sufficient evidence to determine whether the
Department's account balances and disclosures were fairly stated.  In
addition, the auditors identified multiple deficiencies in internal
controls, including serious departmentwide computer-based control
weaknesses that jeopardized a number of sensitive operations. 


      EMBEZZLEMENTS AND FINANCIAL
      MANAGEMENT CONTROL
      WEAKNESSES AT DEA
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.3

We recently reported on two embezzlement cases at DEA and on some of
the financial management weaknesses identified and reported by DEA's
external auditor.  In this report, we stated that some of the
financial management weaknesses compromised DEA's overall control
environment and are the type of control problems that could allow
embezzlements, such as those reported, to occur without timely
detection.  For example, the external auditor reported in its fiscal
year 1997 financial statement audit report that, of 148 items
sampled, documentation to support the proper receipt and acceptance
of goods and services had not been received for 14 expense
transactions.  Payment of expenses without adequate documentation is
the type of control weakness that contributes to an environment where
embezzlements can take place.  For instance, in one of the cases of
reported embezzlements, DEA processed transactions even though it
lacked documents to establish that the amounts were owed. 


      CHALLENGES IN SEIZED ASSET
      MANAGEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.4

The Department's program for managing and disposing of seized assets
has been designated a high-risk area.  Managed by the U.S.  Marshals
Service, the program has experienced major operational problems for
several years.  Our recent work has indicated that property
management has improved, but some challenges with maintaining proper
accountability over seized property remain.  In addition, independent
auditors disclaimed on the fiscal year 1997 financial statements of
the Department's Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP) and found that the
program had several material weaknesses.  For example, the auditors
found that they could not determine the validity of accounts payable,
expenses, and undelivered orders and that controls were not operating
effectively with respect to monitoring and reporting changes in
seized/forfeited cash and property. 


      PROGRESS AND NEXT STEPS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 0:2.5

We believe that the Results Act can be a useful vehicle for
addressing the management and performance challenges that we have
identified at the Department.  For example, at INS, our work has
shown that a comprehensive, systematic evaluation of INS' strategy to
deter illegal entry along the Southwest Border would provide INS with
information on whether the money it spent on border enforcement has
produced the intended results.  INS could use this information to
help it make decisions about what changes, if any, are needed in its
strategy, resource levels, and management of the program. 

Recognizing the need for better management, INS has undertaken steps
to address some of its long-standing problems.  For example, since
1993, INS developed a strategic plan, reorganized, identified
organizational priorities, incorporated priorities and workload
information into resource allocation decisions, developed a national
border strategy consistent with the Attorney General's strategy, and
restructured the naturalization process.  INS also is in the process
of developing a restructuring plan that would create separate
enforcement and service functions.  In addition, INS has initiated
actions to address its financial management problems. 

To help improve its performance and achieve its intended results, the
Department developed strategic and performance plans in accordance
with the requirements of the Results Act.  The plans described the
Department's long-range goals, strategies, and performance indicators
for its major functional areas.  As part of its Results Act planning,
the Department established strategies for (1) ensuring sound and
effective financial management policies and practices; (2) providing
timely, useful, and reliable budget accounting and performance data
to support decisionmaking; and (3) effectively managing seized and
forfeited assets.  However, the plans did not specifically address
how the Department will correct significant financial management
weaknesses identified in its fiscal year 1996 and 1997 audits, nor
the steps involved in improving its AFP. 

According to Department officials, various actions are planned or
under way to correct the reported financial management weaknesses. 
For example, the Department established a working group comprised of
senior-level accounting representatives from each of the reporting
entities, the Department's Inspector General, and representatives
from an independent public accounting firm to address these problems. 
DEA has taken or is planning to take a number of actions to address
its reported financial management weaknesses.  For example, DEA has
established an executive working group to oversee the development and
completion of its financial management action plan to address
weaknesses identified in financial statement audits in fiscal years
1996 and 1997.  The Department has improved its management of seized
property, but more remains to be done, particularly with respect to
accountability over seized and forfeited property, including seized
drugs.  According to Department officials, the asset forfeiture
management staff have taken various steps to address reported
problems.  For example, they have issued seized and forfeited
inventory reconciliation instructions and implemented system
enhancements. 

Despite several reorganizations, management problems at INS have
persisted and, we believe, have affected INS' ability to carry out
its mission and achieve its performance goals.  Solving its
long-standing problems will require sustained management attention to
INS' implementation of its strategic goals and good measurement of
the extent to which the goals are met.  INS will need to use the
performance information it generates to help it make decisions about
what changes, if any, are needed to its strategies, policy
directives, resource levels, and program management in order to
realize improvements in agency management and program effectiveness. 
We believe that strong leadership and direction from within the
agency, as well as from the Congress, would be instrumental in
achieving such improvements. 

The Department, similarly, will need to focus on implementation and
measurement of its strategic goals.  We believe it is too early to
tell how well the Department's results-oriented plans will be
implemented and what impact they will have on decisionmaking,
resource allocation, and program results.  The results of the audits
of the Department's fiscal year 1998 financial statements, including
those of DEA and INS, should provide an update on the status of the
Department's and its components' financial management weaknesses.  We
believe that in other areas, such as the asset forfeiture program,
the Department should build on progress it has already made and
continue to implement better procedures for maintaining
accountability over seized and forfeited property.  In addition, with
respect to financial management of seized and forfeited assets, the
results of the audit of the fiscal year 1998 asset forfeiture
program's financial statements should provide an indication of the
progress made in addressing the challenges facing the program. 


MAJOR PERFORMANCE AND MANAGEMENT
ISSUES
============================================================ Chapter 1

The Department of Justice is a multifaceted organization whose
responsibilities encompass a wide array of functions, including
assisting local and state law enforcement agencies in reducing
juvenile delinquency, detecting and investigating acts of terrorism,
securing the nation's borders, and interdicting illegal drugs. 

Over the past several years, we, the Department's Inspector General,
the National Performance Review, and others have studied performance
and management issues at the Department and its components and
identified a number of challenges that are of continuing concern.  At
INS, where we have focused much of our work in response to
congressional interest, concerns exist about management issues
relating to organizational structure, communications, and financial
management.  Within INS' program areas, INS' implementation of the
Attorney General's strategic priorities in such program areas as
border control, criminal alien removal, and naturalization need
further attention.  At the Departmental level, we have identified
significant financial management challenges, including weaknesses in
certain internal controls at DEA that have allowed embezzlements to
occur.  Weaknesses also exist in the Department's asset forfeiture
program.  We believe that the Department's implementation of the
Results Act could help to address the performance and management
issues that we identified at the Department. 


   INS MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
   PERSIST
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1

INS' functions are multilayered and complex.  In carrying out its
responsibilities, INS contends with issues of foreign policy (for
example, U.S.  readiness to provide asylum to political refugees);
domestic policy (for example, the tension between the need for cheap
labor that immigrants have historically met and the protection of
employment and working standards for U.S.  citizens); and
intergovernmental relations (for example, between the federal
government, which sets policy on immigration, and state and local
governments, which largely bear its costs and consequences). 
Effective performance of INS' functions requires skills in a wide
range of areas, including leadership, program development,
coordination and communication between headquarters and field
offices, service delivery, and enforcement.  To enable INS to better
implement and enforce immigration laws, the Congress significantly
increased its resources during the past several years.  For example,
between fiscal years 1993 and 1998, the number of on-board staff at
INS increased from about 19,000 to nearly 31,000.  During the same
period, INS' budget more than doubled from $1.5 billion in fiscal
year 1993 to about $3.8 billion in fiscal year 1998. 

In 1991, we reported that INS was experiencing severe management
problems in a variety of areas.  Two years later, INS began to take
steps to address some of those problems.  INS reorganized, prepared a
national strategy for controlling the U.S.  border, and developed a
management priority system in which it set measurable goals for such
program activities as the removal of criminal aliens.  In 1994, INS
implemented a new organizational structure intended to provide more
direct oversight of field units and took steps to use priorities and
workload information to better allocate resources.  However, less
progress had been made on other needed improvements, such as issuing
updated policies and procedures manuals and establishing clear
channels of communications within the new organizational structure. 
Additionally, INS lacked appropriate accounting records and internal
controls to enable its auditor to express an opinion on INS' fiscal
year 1997 financial statements.  Further, INS selected a new
financial management system without focusing first on analyzing its
business processes--an approach required by the Congress. 


      CONTINUING CONCERNS ABOUT
      INS' ORGANIZATIONAL
      STRUCTURE
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.1

INS' mission involves carrying out two primary functions.  One is an
enforcement function that involves preventing aliens from entering
the United States illegally and removing aliens who succeed in doing
so.  The other is a service function that involves providing services
or benefits to facilitate entry, residence, employment, and
naturalization of legal immigrants. 

Several critics have concluded that mission overload has impeded
INS from succeeding at either of its primary functions.  The
Commission on Immigration Reform, for example, stated that INS'
service and enforcement functions are incompatible and that tasking
one agency with carrying out both functions causes problems, such as
competition for resources, lack of coordination and cooperation, and
personnel practices that create confusion regarding mission and
responsibilities.  In March 1998, the administration acknowledged
that INS needed to implement fundamental reforms to address
organizational problems.  The administration concluded that these
problems impeded INS' ability to (1) effectively enforce immigration
laws at the borders and in the interior of the United States, and (2)
efficiently provide immigration and citizenship services. 

To remedy these problems, the Commission on Immigration Reform, the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, INS, and several Members
of Congress have recommended ways to restructure INS.  The proposals
have ranged from dismantling INS and replacing it with a new agency
that would handle immigration enforcement functions, while moving
immigration service functions to the Departments of State and Labor,
to restructuring INS internally by creating two separate chains of
command--one for enforcement and the other for services-and leaving
it as a single agency within the Department of Justice.  INS has
appointed an executive to oversee its reorganization in the two
functional areas.  Under this arrangement, INS would remain a single
agency within the Department. 

As of October 1998, the details of the new structure had not been
worked out, the timetable for its implementation had not been
established, and the ability of the structural reorganization to
resolve long-standing management and program implementation problems
remained unclear. 


      CHALLENGES WITH INTERNAL
      COMMUNICATIONS AND
      COORDINATION
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.2

Although INS' Commissioner stated that the 1994 INS reorganization
would build communication capabilities, communication continued to be
a challenge in INS.  We reported in 1997, as we did in 1991, that
INS' headquarters and field managers generally viewed headquarters as
not being in touch with events, problems, and concerns in the field. 
Part of the communications challenge involved uncertainty among INS
managers about the roles and responsibilities of headquarters
executives, which in turn caused uncertainty about proper channels of
communication for obtaining policy guidance or implementing program
initiatives.  Headquarters' efforts to resolve concerns about roles,
responsibilities, and communication processes were not successful. 
For example, instances occurred in which key stakeholders were
excluded from decision meetings affecting them, and various
inconsistent versions of guidance on naturalization procedures were
distributed to field offices.  INS does not intend to issue written
guidance on appropriate communication channels and coordination
methods between offices until it obtains a decision on how the agency
will be restructured. 

Lack of up-to-date policies and procedures also have contributed to
communications challenges.  For example, field manuals containing
policies and procedures on how to implement immigration laws were
out-of-date at the time of our 1991 report and had not been updated
by the time of our 1997 report.  As a result, INS employees were
burdened with having to search for information on immigration laws or
regulations in multiple sources; this sometimes resulted in their
obtaining conflicting information.  The lack of current manuals also
led some field officers to create policy locally, thus compounding
coordination difficulties.  However, during the past 2 years, INS has
published an administrative manual and established a timetable
through January 2001 for issuing five field manuals. 


      FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT
      WEAKNESSES AT INS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.3

The financial statement audit of INS' fiscal year 1997 Statement of
Financial Position and the related Statements of Operations and
Changes in Net Position resulted in a disclaimer of opinion.  The
auditor reported that INS had not maintained appropriate accounting
records and relevant documentation to support certain balances in the
financial statements.  In addition, INS' internal control structure
was not adequate to ensure that its assets were properly safeguarded
from loss, damage, or misappropriation, and that transactions were
accurately and completely recorded.  Accordingly, the auditor could
not perform sufficient audit procedures to determine whether the
financial statements were affected by these conditions.  The auditor
identified eight material weaknesses\1 with respect to (1) the fund
balance with the Treasury reconciliation process, (2)
intragovernmental receivables, (3) fixed assets, (4) accounts
payable, (5) deferred revenue, (6) contingent liabilities, (7)
recording of revenues and expenses, and (8) INS' financial management
systems. 

In connection with its financial management systems, the auditor
reported that the systems (1) are not integrated, resulting in
significant delays and burdensome reconciliation efforts; (2) have
significant internal control weaknesses--including computer control
problems--affecting the accuracy and reliability of financial
information; and (3) limit, rather than enhance, effective
decisionmaking.  We reported in July 1997 that financial management
systems problems made it difficult for INS to monitor the status of
its budget and to make sound budgetary decisions.  For example, in
March 1995, INS' budget office projected that the field would have
about $115 million in surplus funds through the rest of the year. 
Upon subsequent input from INS' field offices, it turned out that the
field offices would experience a $5 million shortfall for the
remainder of the year. 

In 1997, INS selected a new financial management system but did not
first analyze its financial management processes, as required by the
Clinger-Cohen Act of 1996,\2 to ensure that the new system did not
automate outmoded, inefficient business processes.  Instead of
developing and implementing a risk management plan, as we
recommended, INS tasked its contractor with helping to ensure that
risks associated with implementation of the new system would be
identified and necessary steps taken to mitigate them.  According to
INS, it had an urgent need to replace its financial management
system, which is over 19 years old and does not have the
functionality needed for INS to efficiently manage and account for
its resources, and believed this was a prudent way to proceed.  INS
did not take all the requisite steps to ensure that its new financial
management system would meet its requirements. 

INS has recently initiated actions to address its financial
management problems.  These include (1) engaging a contractor to
reconcile the fund balance differences with Treasury and (2)
undertaking a complete review of all open balances prior to
conversion to the new financial management system. 


--------------------
\1 A material weakness is a condition in which the design or
operation of one or more of the internal control components does not
reduce to a relatively low level the risk that errors or
irregularities in amounts that would be material to the financial
statements may occur and not be detected promptly by employees in the
normal course of performing their duties. 

\2 The Clinger-Cohen Act requires executive agencies to conduct
analyses of work processes before making significant investments in
information technology. 


      KEY CONTACT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:1.4

Norman J.  Rabkin, Director
Administration of Justice Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8777
[email protected]


   CHALLENGES WITH IMPLEMENTATION
   OF INS' PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2

In 1994, the Attorney General announced a strategy to strengthen
enforcement of the nation's immigration laws.  Three priorities
within the strategy involved strengthening the U.S.  border, removing
criminal aliens, and promoting citizenship for qualified immigrants. 
In accordance with these priorities, INS considerably increased its
allocation of resources and its law enforcement presence along the
Southwest Border.  At the same time, INS established the removal of
criminal aliens as a key enforcement priority and improvements in its
adjudicative processes, such as processing naturalization
applications, as a key service priority.  Reviews of these program
areas by us and others have resulted in concerns about the
effectiveness of INS' efforts in implementing these priorities. 


      EFFECTIVENESS OF SOUTHWEST
      BORDER STRATEGY UNKNOWN
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.1

Consistent with the Attorney General's strategy, in 1994, INS issued
a national Border Patrol strategy intended to deter illegal entry
between the ports of entry along the Southwest Border.  In the
strategy's initial phase, the focus was on two sectors--San Diego and
El Paso--that in 1993 accounted for the majority of apprehensions
nationwide.  In the second phase of the strategy, INS increased the
resources it allocated to sectors in Tucson, Arizona, and south
Texas.  We reported in 1997 that after investing billions of dollars
in the strategy, INS had made progress in implementing some, but not
all, of its strategy.  For example, INS had allocated Border Patrol
agents in general accordance with the strategy, focusing resources in
the areas of highest known illegal activity, but the proportion of
time the agents at the Southwest Border collectively spent on border
enforcement activities did not increase as planned between 1994 and
1997.  Further, the Border Patrol had not identified the most
appropriate mix of staffing and other resources needed for its
sectors, as called for in the strategy. 

We also reported that INS did not have data on several outcomes that
the strategy was expected to achieve.  For example, there were no
data to indicate whether illegal aliens were deterred from entering
the United States, whether there had been a decrease in attempted
reentries by those who had previously been apprehended, and whether
the strategy had reduced border violence.  We noted that, despite the
investment of billions of dollars in the strategy, INS had amassed
only a partial picture of the effects of increased border control and
did not know whether the investment was producing the intended
results.  Further, INS lacked a systematic, comprehensive evaluation
plan to assess the strategy's overall effectiveness.  We noted that
developing such a plan would be in keeping with the concepts embodied
in the Results Act.  Pursuant to our report, in September 1998, INS
contracted with independent research firms for an evaluation. 


      PROCESS FOR REMOVING
      CRIMINAL ALIENS NEEDS
      IMPROVEMENT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.2

In accordance with the Attorney General's strategy, one of INS'
priorities has been to remove deportable criminal aliens from this
country.  However, we and the Department's Inspector General have
issued several reports noting that INS has been challenged in
implementing this priority. 

INS' Institutional Hearing Program (IHP)\3 is the Department's main
vehicle for placing aliens who are incarcerated in state and federal
prisons into deportation proceedings so that they can be
expeditiously deported upon release from prison.  We reported in 1997
on the 1995 performance results of the IHP, and in 1998 we reported
on 1997 IHP results.  In each year, covering a 6-month period, we
found that INS failed to identify nearly 2,000 potentially deportable
aliens before they completed their prison sentences.  As a result,
the criminal aliens were released into communities in the United
States without INS determining whether they posed a risk to public
safety.  Hundreds of these criminal aliens were aggravated felons
who, by law, should have been placed in removal proceedings while in
prison and taken into INS custody upon release.  Some of these aliens
were subsequently rearrested for new crimes, including felonies. 

Even when INS determined that an alien was potentially deportable and
should be placed in removal proceedings, INS did not complete the IHP
for at least half of such cases in both 1995 and 1997.  As a result,
INS took many of the released criminal aliens into custody and
completed the removal process for them subsequent to prison release. 
As a result of its failure to complete the IHP before prison release,
INS incurred about $37 million in avoidable detention costs in 1995
and about $40 million in such costs in 1997. 

In response to our 1997 recommendations for improving the IHP, INS
made progress in some areas and no progress in others.  For example,
despite our recommendation that INS give priority to aliens serving
time for aggravated felonies, INS indicated that it did not intend to
do so.  INS' position was that it should be screening all
foreign-born inmates as they enter prison systems and that aggravated
felons as a unique group did not need to be singled out.  However,
since INS was not yet using a workload analysis model to help it
determine its resource needs for completing the IHP on all eligible
aliens, it remains unclear whether INS has sufficient resources to
screen everyone as they enter the prison system.  INS acknowledged
the need to address the backlog of cases not screened in previous
years because aggravated felons could be part of the backlog.  In
response to a 1995 recommendation by the Inspector General, INS was
planning to address the backlog by December 1998. 

A September 1998 report by the Inspector General noted that INS
failed to remove aliens who were arrested by the Border Patrol during
drug seizures.  In the majority of cases, INS did not take any steps
to ensure that aliens who were arrested by the Border Patrol and
subsequently incarcerated for criminal drug convictions were placed
in deportation proceedings or taken into INS custody after they were
released from prison. 


--------------------
\3 The IHP was subsumed under a broader program in June 1998 called
the Institutional Removal Program (IRP).  The objectives of the
programs are the same.  The IRP, however, counts certain removal
orders not included in the IHP--specifically, reinstatement of prior
removal orders and administrative removal orders--in measuring
program outcomes. 


      WEAKNESSES IN INS'
      PROCEDURES FOR GRANTING
      CITIZENSHIP
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.3

In support of the Attorney General's strategy, a priority in INS'
service delivery area has been to facilitate processing of aliens'
applications for citizenship.  In order to become a naturalized
citizen, aliens must meet certain requirements, such as that of being
of good moral character.  To determine whether an alien has been
convicted of a crime that would preclude citizenship, INS is to
submit the alien's fingerprints to the FBI, which researches whether
that alien has a criminal record. 

Over the past several years, the Department's Inspector General and
we have reported on INS' failure to conduct complete criminal history
checks before granting applications for citizenship.  For example, in
1994, we reported that INS did not obtain the results of all
requested fingerprint checks from the FBI, and the results were,
therefore, not always available to examiners before the aliens'
hearings.  As a result, INS improperly naturalized citizens with
felony convictions.  In 1997, we reported that INS still could not
ensure itself and the Congress that it was granting citizenship only
to deserving applicants.  In addition, a report to the Department by
a consulting firm indicated that INS had not ensured that its field
units were implementing internal control procedures issued by the INS
Commissioner.  INS has begun restructuring its naturalization process
to address these challenges. 


      KEY CONTACT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:2.4

Norman J.  Rabkin, Director
Administration of Justice Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8777
[email protected]


   SIGNIFICANT DEPARTMENTAL
   FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3

The audit of the Department's fiscal year 1997 Consolidated Statement
of Financial Position and Consolidated Statements of Operations and
Changes in Net Position resulted in a disclaimer of opinion because
the auditors were unable to obtain sufficient evidence about certain
balances and disclosures in the consolidated financial statements.\4
The Department had also received a disclaimer of opinion on the
Consolidated Statement of Financial Position for fiscal year 1996,
and the Department's Inspector General noted that, although
improvements were being made in certain areas, overall, the
Department had not substantially progressed toward an unqualified
opinion. 

The auditor of the 1997 Consolidated Financial Statements issued a
disclaimer of opinion on the basis of deficiencies, including the
following four departmentwide material weaknesses (1) inadequate
reconciliations of Fund Balance with Treasury account balances,
including a $350 million unreconciled difference between one
component's account balance and Treasury's books; (2) inadequately
supported intragovernmental accounts receivable balances at two
components; (3) weaknesses in accounting for and disclosure of seized
and forfeited cash, property, and evidence at three components; and
(4) weaknesses in the processing and recording of accounts payable
and undelivered orders at five components.  The auditor also reported
that one component did not maintain appropriate accounting records
and relevant documentation to support certain balances and
disclosures, and that there were also weaknesses with the component's
internal control structure.  In addition, the auditor identified a
reportable condition\5 related to weaknesses in accounting for and
control over property and equipment at three components. 

In addition to the control weaknesses that contributed to the
disclaimer of opinion in 1996 and 1997, the auditor reported as a
departmentwide material weakness that improvements were needed in
general controls at the Department's data centers and in certain
components' financial management systems.  Specifically, the auditor
reported that access controls were weak over files supporting various
operations at the FBI, DEA, INS, and Marshals Service.  User
passwords were not required to be changed, security software was not
configured to prevent access to inactive users, and system
programmers had been inappropriately provided the ability to make
numerous types of modifications to files that would allow them to
circumvent security controls or assist others in such actions. 
Program change control procedures for system and application software
were not formally documented or uniformly followed, increasing the
risk that unauthorized software changes or unintentional errors could
be made.  Further, the auditor reported that the Department did not
have a plan to recover primary systems, critical data processing
applications, or key business processes in the event of a disaster. 
An underlying concern was that written security policies and
procedures were outdated and did not define the roles and
responsibilities of managers and others with security
responsibilities.  The Department's management agreed with the
findings and stated that each departmental component will work with
the Department's Chief Information Officer to develop corrective
actions. 

With respect to compliance with laws and regulations, the auditor
noted certain inconsistencies between the Department's Federal
Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) report and the auditors'
evaluation of internal controls that were based on their audits of
the components' financial statements.  In addition, the auditor
identified instances where the Department's or the components'
systems did not substantially comply with one or more of the
requirements detailed in the Federal Financial Management Improvement
Act of 1996 (FFMIA).  The auditor noted that seven of the nine
components reported noncompliance with the financial management
system requirements of FFMIA.  The Department reported that
inadequate controls existed in the financial accounting, reporting,
and control of (1) undelivered orders and accounts payable, (2)
property and equipment, (3) seized/forfeited property, and (4)
certain revenue and expense account balances.  The auditors of six of
the nine components noted similar conditions.  Finally, auditors of
four components reported that certain financial transactions were not
processed in accordance with the requirements of the Standard General
Ledger at the transaction level. 

According to the Department, it has various actions planned or under
way to correct the weaknesses that the auditor identified as
contributing to the disclaimer of opinion on the departmentwide
statements.  Significant actions planned or under way include (1)
establishing a working group comprising senior-level accounting
representatives from each of the reporting entities, the Department's
Inspector General, and representatives from an independent public
accounting firm; (2) hiring contractors to research and resolve
differences between the Department's Fund Balance with Treasury
account records and Treasury's records; (3) issuing new or revised
policies and procedures to address various weaknesses; (4)
implementing new financial and property management systems; and (5)
establishing a departmentwide strategic action plan and corresponding
timetables for preparing the fiscal year 1998 departmentwide
financial statements. 


--------------------
\4 The Department prepared its fiscal year 1997 consolidated
financial statements from the financial statements of its nine
components. 

\5 Reportable conditions involve matters coming to an auditor's
attention relating to significant deficiencies in the design or
operation of internal controls that, in the auditor's judgment, could
adversely affect an agency's ability to (1) safeguard assets against
loss from unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition; (2) ensure
the execution of transactions in accordance with management's
authority and in accordance with laws and regulations; or (3)
properly record, process, and summarize transactions to permit the
preparation of the financial statements or to maintain accountability
for assets. 


      KEY CONTACT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:3.1

Gary T.  Engel, Associate Director
Governmentwide Accounting and
 Financial Management Issues
Accounting and Information Management
 Division
(202) 512-3406
[email protected]


   EMBEZZLEMENTS AND FINANCIAL
   MANAGEMENT CONTROL WEAKNESSES
   AT DEA
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4

In September 1998, we reported that several DEA employees had
recently been involved in two different cases of embezzling DEA
funds.  One embezzlement case involved a single employee who
allegedly embezzled more than $6 million during a 6-year period.  The
employee allegedly submitted hundreds of false payment vouchers,
seeking reimbursement for services never performed by a sham
corporation he established.  The second case involved collusion among
three DEA employees who used DEA funds to purchase various electronic
and other equipment--valued at approximately $2.7 million--that was
diverted for their own use. 

We also reported that (1) DEA's auditor had reported numerous
financial management weaknesses in connection with its annual
financial statement audits for fiscal years 1996 and 1997 and (2) DEA
reported weaknesses in its FMFIA report covering the period October
1, 1997, through March 31, 1998.  In our report, we stated that some
of these financial management weaknesses are the type of control
challenges that weaken DEA's overall control environment and could
allow embezzlements, such as those reported, to occur without timely
detection.  For example, the auditor's fiscal year 1997 financial
statement audit report stated that weaknesses existed in DEA's
reporting of nonpayroll expenses, including a lack of documentation
to support the proper receipt and acceptance of goods and services in
14 of the 148 expense transactions sampled.  Payment of expenses
without adequate documentation is the type of control weakness that
contributes to an environment where embezzlements can take place. 
For instance, in one of the cases of reported embezzlement, DEA
processed transactions even though it lacked documentation to
establish that amounts were owed. 

According to DEA officials, DEA has taken or is planning to take a
number of significant actions to address the reported control
weaknesses.  For instance, in February 1998 the DEA Administrator
established an executive working group to oversee the development and
completion of the agency's financial management action plan to
effectively address all of the audit findings.  In addition, at the
direction of the DEA Administrator, the Office of Inspections has
revised its on-site inspection/audit protocol specifically to review
and assess compliance with the agency's segregation of duties policy,
as well as other significant financial management areas.  DEA
officials stated that this was done to prevent potential weaknesses
that could facilitate similar circumstances found to have occurred in
the two embezzlement cases. 


      KEY CONTACT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:4.1

Gary T.  Engel, Associate Director
Governmentwide Accounting and
 Financial Management Issues
Accounting and Information Management
 Division
(202) 512-3406
[email protected]


   CHALLENGES IN SEIZED ASSET
   MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5

Since 1990, the Department's Asset Forfeiture Program (AFP) has been
designated a high-risk area.  In recent years, we have reported on
the existence of major operational challenges relating to the
management and disposition of seized and forfeited property.\6
Although some improvements were made, significant problems have
remained, and continued oversight is necessary to ensure that
policies and procedures are followed and that adequate safeguards are
in place. 

In 1996, we reported on inadequate management of seized real
property, including instances where property deteriorated because of
inadequate maintenance, and mortgages were paid late at one of the
largest Marshals Service districts,\7 the Central District of
California.  Because of inadequate property management, the
government incurred unnecessary losses.  We also reported that the
Marshals Service was in the process of taking action to enhance
oversight of seized assets and to improve time frames for property
disposition. 

In 1998, we reviewed Marshals Service operations in the Central
District of California to determine the extent of certain controls
over seized assets.  We visited 14 real properties, all of which
appeared to be in good condition and properly maintained. 
Additionally, property management case files for these real
properties contained evidence of recent physical inspections and
appraisals.  A district official attributed improved property
management to increased oversight of properties by district personnel
and preseizure planning on all real estate seizures.  We also
reviewed the district's physical security and internal controls over
seized automobiles, vessels, and financial instruments.  In addition,
we conducted similar audit work at the Southern District of Florida
and the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York.  Overall, we
found no material weaknesses or deficiencies in the controls we
reviewed at these districts. 

These improvements notwithstanding, challenges remain, including the
following examples. 

The Department reported as a material weakness in its FMFIA report
for fiscal year 1997 that its asset forfeiture information systems
had been inadequate for tracking the life cycle of an asset from its
seizure through its ultimate disposition.  In addition, the audit of
the Department's fiscal year 1997 AFP financial statements resulted
in a disclaimer of opinion on the Statement of Financial Position and
Statement of Operations and Changes in Net Position.  The auditor was
unable to express an opinion since it could not obtain sufficient
evidence as to (1) the reasonableness of seized/forfeited asset
balances and related revenues and activity; (2) the validity of
accounts payable, expenses, and undelivered orders; and (3) the
adequacy of the overall presentation and disclosure of the financial
statements.  The auditor also reported the following material
weaknesses:  (1) controls were not operating effectively, and timely
oversight was not performed with respect to monitoring and reporting
changes in seized/forfeited cash and property, and, as a result, the
September 30, 1997, seized and forfeited cash and property balances
may be materially misstated; (2) accrual-based accounting concepts
were not followed for all of the AFP's operations; and (3) improved
security is required for the AFP's Consolidated Asset Tracking System
(CATS), which is the integrated information system for the AFP, and
at the Department's data centers, where CATS resides. 

In September 1998, the Department's Inspector General reported that
at most of the INS Border Patrol stations they visited, they found
weaknesses in the management of seized drugs.  Specifically, the
Border Patrol (1) lacked written policies or procedures on how to
handle and store seized drugs, (2) failed to store seized drugs in a
secure manner, (3) lacked adherence to proper chain of custody
procedures, and (4) did not always have an individual specifically
designated as responsible for the evidence.  These types of
weaknesses increase the risk of loss of seized drugs and
contamination of evidence.  The Border Patrol reportedly stated that
it had taken action, such as establishing an Evidence Procedures
Team, which developed an evidence handling policy, to correct these
weaknesses.  According to officials, the policy was undergoing
internal review. 

The Departments of Justice and the Treasury continue to operate two
similar but separate seized asset management and disposal programs
without plans for consolidation, despite legislation requiring them
to develop and maintain a joint plan to consolidate postseizure
administration of certain properties.\8

In June 1991, we recommended consolidating the management and
disposition of all noncash seized property, designating the Marshals
Service as the custodian.  We estimated that program administration
costs could be reduced if the Department of Justice and the Customs
Service consolidated the postseizure management and disposition of
such items.  We also reported that consolidation would likely result
in lower contractor costs due to economies of scale.  We still
believe that consolidation of asset management and disposition
functions makes sense.  We encourage both departments to continue to
identify areas of duplication and pursue options for consolidation. 

In summary, the Department continues to make considerable
improvements to its AFP.  However, we believe that, as a result of
the foregoing challenges, the program remains high risk and warrants
future follow-up.  Enhancements of internal controls are still needed
to effectively reduce vulnerability to theft and misappropriation of
seized property.  In addition, both the Departments of Justice and
the Treasury should pursue options for efficiency gains through
program consolidation.  We will continue to monitor progress in
addressing these issues. 


--------------------
\6 Seized property includes illegal drugs that have no resale value
to the federal government.  These items are subject to forfeiture and
are typically held by the seizing agency until they are approved for
destruction. 

\7 The Marshals Service has responsibility for safeguarding, storing,
and maintaining property such as financial instruments, automobiles,
vessels, and real property seized by the Department's investigative
agencies. 

\8 The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Public Law No.  100-690, 21
U.S.C.  887. 


      KEY CONTACTS
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:5.1

Norman J.  Rabkin, Director
Administration of Justice Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8777
[email protected]

Gary T.  Engel, Associate Director
Governmentwide Accounting and
 Financial Management Issues
Accounting and Information Management
 Division
(202) 521-3406
[email protected]


   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESULTS
   ACT PROVIDES A VEHICLE FOR
   ADDRESSING MANAGEMENT AND
   PERFORMANCE ISSUES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:6

With passage of the Results Act, the Congress sought to improve its
policymaking, spending decisions, and oversight by imposing on
federal agencies a new framework for management and accountability. 
In crafting the Results Act, the Congress recognized that
congressional and executive branch decisionmakers had been
handicapped by inadequate information on program goals and
performance.  By creating requirements for agencies to generate such
information, the Results Act intended to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of federal programs. 

We believe that the Results Act can be a useful vehicle for
addressing the management and performance challenges that we have
identified at the Department.  For example, at INS, our work has
shown that a comprehensive, systematic evaluation of the agency's
strategy to deter illegal entry along the Southwest Border would
provide INS with information on whether the billions of dollars it
has spent on border enforcement have produced the intended results. 
The performance, planning, and measurement evaluation principles that
underpin the Results Act can be used to help generate information
that would help the agency and the Congress identify what changes, if
any, are needed in the strategy, in policy, in resource levels, or in
program management. 

On the other hand, the Department has recognized the need to address
certain management and performance challenges that we, the Department
itself, and others have identified, and it has incorporated
strategies, goals, and performance indicators into its Results Act
plans to address them.  For example, the Department's fiscal year
1999 performance plan established excellence in management practices
as an annual goal and identified several strategies for achieving
this goal, including (1) ensuring sound and effective financial
management policies and practices, and (2) providing timely, useful,
and reliable budget accounting and performance data to support
decisionmaking.  The Department's goal is to obtain unqualified
departmentwide audited financial statements by fiscal year 1999.  It
intends to accomplish this by, among other things, completing the
replacement of financial management systems in DEA, INS, the Marshals
Service, and BOP, and addressing the material weaknesses reported by
the Department's auditors. 

The Department's plan also stated that effective management of seized
and forfeited assets would be another strategy for achieving
excellence in management practices.  To improve accountability,
control, and oversight of the AFP, the Department established time
frames for disposing of seized assets and a threshold for selling
real property at a percentage of appraised value.  In addition, all
new major asset forfeiture property management contracts are to
include performance-based elements. 

Because of the breadth and complexity of the Department's
responsibilities, we do not expect that its transition to
results-oriented management will be easy or quick.  However, we
believe that the Department's early planning efforts have helped
focus its attention on significant challenges and how to resolve
them.  As the Department develops its annual performance plans over
the coming years, we expect to monitor its progress in implementing
the Results Act. 


      KEY CONTACT
-------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 1:6.1

Norman J.  Rabkin
Administration of Justice Issues
General Government Division
(202) 512-8777
[email protected]


RELATED GAO PRODUCTS
============================================================ Chapter 2


   INS MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:1

INS Management:  Follow-up on Selected Problems (GAO/GGD-97-132, July
22, 1997). 

Immigration Management:  Strong Leadership and Management Reforms
Needed to Address Serious Problems (GAO/GGD-91-28, Jan.  23, 1991). 


   CHALLENGES WITH IMPLEMENTATION
   OF INS PROGRAMS
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:2

Criminal Aliens:  INS' Efforts to Remove Imprisoned Aliens Continue
to Need Improvement (GAO/GGD-99-3, Oct.  16, 1998). 

Naturalized Aliens:  Efforts to Determine If INS Improperly
Naturalized Some Aliens (GAO/GGD-98-62, Mar.  23, 1998). 

Illegal Immigration:  Southwest Border Strategy Results Inconclusive;
More Evaluation Needed (GAO/GGD-98-21, Dec.  11, 1997). 

Criminal Aliens:  INS' Efforts to Identify and Remove Imprisoned
Aliens Need To Be Improved (GAO/T-GGD-97-154, July 15, 1997). 

Naturalization of Aliens:  Assessment of the Extent to Which Aliens
Were Improperly Naturalized (GAO/T-GGD-97-51, Mar.  5, 1997). 


   SIGNIFICANT DEPARTMENTAL
   FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT WEAKNESSES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:3

Information Security:  Serious Weaknesses Place Critical Federal
Operations and Assets at Risk (GAO/AIMD-98-92, Sept.  23, 1998). 


   EMBEZZLEMENTS AND FINANCIAL
   MANAGEMENT CONTROL WEAKNESSES
   AT THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
   ADMINISTRATION
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:4

Financial Management:  Control Weaknesses Reported at the Drug
Enforcement Administration (GAO/AIMD-98-271R, Sept.  11, 1998). 


   CHALLENGES IN SEIZED ASSET
   MANAGEMENT
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:5

High-Risk Program:  Information on Selected High-Risk Areas
(GAO/HR-97-30, May 16, 1997). 

High-Risk Series:  Quick Reference Guide (GAO/HR-97-2, Feb.  1997). 

Review of SADF Disbursements (GAO/AIMD-96-114R, June 26, 1996). 

Asset Forfeiture:  Historical Perspective on Asset Forfeiture Issues
(GAO/T-GGD-96-40, Mar.  19, 1996). 

High-Risk Series:  Asset Forfeiture Programs (GAO/HR-95-7, Feb. 
1995). 


   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESULTS
   ACT PROVIDES A VEHICLE FOR
   ADDRESSING MANAGEMENT AND
   PERFORMANCE ISSUES
---------------------------------------------------------- Chapter 2:6

Results Act:  Comments on Justice's August Draft Strategic Plan
(GAO/T-GGD-97-184, Sept.  30, 1997). 

Observations on the Department of Justice's Fiscal Year 1999
Performance Plan (GAO/GGD-98-134R, May 29, 1998). 


PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
SERIES
============================================================ Chapter 3

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  A Governmentwide
Perspective (GAO/OCG-99-1)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Agriculture (GAO/OCG-99-2)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Commerce (GAO/OCG-99-3)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Defense
(GAO/OCG-99-4)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Education (GAO/OCG-99-5)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Energy
(GAO/OCG-99-6)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Health
and Human Services (GAO/OCG-99-7)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Housing
and Urban Development (GAO/OCG-99-8)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of the
Interior (GAO/OCG-99-9)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Justice
(GAO/OCG-99-10)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of Labor
(GAO/OCG-99-11)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of State
(GAO/OCG-99-12)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Transportation (GAO/OCG-99-13)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of the
Treasury (GAO/OCG-99-14)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Department of
Veterans Affairs (GAO/OCG-99-15)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Agency for
International Development (GAO/OCG-99-16)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Environmental
Protection Agency (GAO/OCG-99-17)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  National Aeronautics
and Space Administration (GAO/OCG-99-18)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (GAO/OCG-99-19)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  Social Security
Administration (GAO/OCG-99-20)

Major Management Challenges and Program Risks:  U.S.  Postal Service
(GAO/OCG-99-21)

High-Risk Series:  An Update (GAO/HR-99-1)





The entire series of 21 performance and accountability reports and
the high-risk series update can be ordered by using the order number
GAO/OCG-99-22SET. 

*** End of document. ***