Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting Explosives and
Narcotics (Letter Report, 09/04/96, GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO provided information on
available explosives and narcotics detection technologies focusing on:
(1) funding for those technologies; (2) characteristics and limitations
of available and planned technologies; and (3) deployment of these
technologies by the United States and foreign countries.

GAO found that: (1) since 1978, the federal government has spent about
$246 million for research and development on explosives detection
technologies and about $100 million on narcotics detection technologies;
(2) the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Customs
Service use a variety of equipment such as X-ray technology, hand-held
devices, and dog teams to search for explosives and narcotics; (3) a
number of advanced detection technologies are or will be available to
FAA and Customs, but certain factors such as cost, the impact on
commerce, and detection reliability must be considered; and (4) many
other countries, such as Great Britain, Belgium, and, Germany deploy
explosives detection technologies that do not have FAA approval in the
United States.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD/RCED-96-252
     TITLE:  Terrorism and Drug Trafficking: Technologies for Detecting 
             Explosives and Narcotics
      DATE:  09/04/96
   SUBJECT:  Transportation safety
             Drug trafficking
             Explosives
             Inspection
             Commercial aviation
             Terrorism
             Research and development
             Law enforcement
             Narcotics
             Search and seizure

             
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Cover
================================================================ COVER


Report to Congressional Requesters

September 1996

TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING -
TECHNOLOGIES FOR DETECTING
EXPLOSIVES AND NARCOTICS

GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-252

Terrorism and Drug Trafficking

(705130/341502)


Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV

  DOD - Department of Defense
  FAA - Federal Aviation Administration
  IMS - Ion Mobility Spectroscopy
  KeV - thousand electron volts
  MeV - million electron volts
  ONDCP - Office of National Drug Control Policy
  R&D - research and development
  TSWG - Technical Support Working Group

Letter
=============================================================== LETTER


B-272630

September 4, 1996

The Honorable Benjamin A.  Gilman
Chairman
The Honorable Lee H.  Hamilton
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

The Honorable Alfonse M.  D'Amato
United States Senate

The ability to detect explosives and narcotics is increasingly
important to U.S.  national security.  Explosives are the terrorist's
weapon of choice.  Their use against commercial aircraft have led to
loss of lives and weakened confidence in the security of air travel. 
Likewise, narcotics trafficking ruins lives, drains billions of
dollars from the economy, and spawns violence that threatens U.S. 
communities. 

As you requested, we have developed information on explosives and
narcotics detection technologies that are available or under
development.  More specifically, this report discusses (1) funding
for those technologies, (2) characteristics and limitations of
available and planned technologies, and (3) deployment of
technologies by the United States and foreign countries.  The
appendixes provide detailed information on the most significant types
of technologies available and under development, including brief
summaries of their characteristics, their current status in terms of
development or deployment, the estimated range of prices for the
technologies, and the amount of federal funds spent on the
technologies between fiscal years 1978 and 1996. 

This report is one of a series you requested on the role of
technology in explosives and narcotics detection.\1 In recent
testimony, \2 we concluded that an approach should be developed
immediately to address the actions needed to reduce vulnerabilities
in aviation security identified in our classified reports.  This
report provides a summary of technologies that should be considered
in addressing the actions needed.  A subsequent report will address
issues related to governmentwide coordination of technology
development and deployment. 


--------------------
\1 Terrorism and Drug Trafficking:  Threats and Roles of Explosives
and Narcotics Detection Technology (GAO/NSIAD/RCED-96-76BR, Mar.  27,
1996).  Other reports have been classified by executive branch
agencies. 

\2 Aviation Security:  Immediate Action Needed to Improve Security
(GAO/T-RCED/NSIAD-96-237, Aug.  1, 1996). 


   BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1

The increased threat of terrorism is an urgent national issue.  The
President directed the establishment of a commission on July 25,
1996, headed by Vice President Gore, whose charter included reviewing
aviation security.  The commission was charged with reporting to the
President within
45 days its initial findings on aviation security, including plans to
(1) deploy technology capable of detecting the most sophisticated
explosive devices and (2) pay for that technology.  In a classified
report, we made recommendations to the Vice President, in his
capacity as chairman of the commission, that would enhance the
effectiveness of the commission's work.  Detection technologies are
also important in the effort to stem the flow of drugs into the
United States. 

Detection technologies are typically developed for specific
applications--some for aviation security, some for drug interdiction,
and some for both.  The major applications for the aviation security
efforts of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) include the
screening of checked baggage, passengers, cargo, mail, and carry-on
items such as electronics, luggage, and bottles.  FAA's need for
detection technology comes from its security responsibilities
involving more than 470 domestic airports and 150 U.S.  airlines,
annually boarding over 500 million passengers with their checked
baggage and carry-on luggage, and transporting mail and cargo. 

Some advanced detection technologies are commercially available to
serve aviation security applications.  However, only one technology
is currently deployed in the United States.  That technology is being
operationally tested at two U.S.  airports. 

Major applications for the drug interdiction efforts of the U.S. 
Customs Service include screening of cargo and containers,
pedestrians, and vehicles and their occupants.  Customs' need for
detection technology emanates from its responsibilities to control
301 ports of entry.  Currently, over 400 million people, almost 120
million cars, and 10 million containers and trucks pass through these
points each year. 

Currently, Customs' screening is done manually by inspectors with
relatively little equipment beyond hand-held devices for detecting
false compartments in containers. 

The challenges in detecting explosives are significantly different
than the challenges in detecting narcotics, as are the consequences
in not detecting them.  Customs and other drug enforcement agencies
are concerned with much larger quantities than are aviation security
personnel.  Consequently, greater technical challenges are posed in
attempting to detect explosives that might be used to bring down a
commercial aircraft. 

Two general groups of technologies, with modifications, can be used
to detect both explosives and narcotics.  The first group uses
X-rays, nuclear techniques involving neutron or gamma ray
bombardment, or electromagnetic waves, such as radio frequency waves. 
These technologies show anomalies in a targeted object that might
indicate concealed explosives and narcotics or detect actual
explosives and narcotics.  The second group, referred to as trace
detection technologies, uses chemical analyses to identify particles
or vapors characteristic of narcotics or explosives and deposited on,
or surrounding, objects, such as carry-on electronics or surfaces of
vehicles.  In addition to technologies, dogs are considered a unique
type of trace detector because they can be trained to respond in
specific ways to smells of narcotics or explosives. 


   RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2

Aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex and
costly mix of intelligence, procedures, and technologies.  Since
1978, federal agencies have spent about $246 million for research and
development on explosives detection technologies and almost $100
million on narcotics detection technologies.  Most of this spending
has occurred since 1990, in response to congressional direction, and
has been for technologies to screen checked baggage, trucks, and
containers. 

Difficult trade-offs must be made when considering whether to use
detection technologies for a given application.  Chief among those
trade-offs are the extent to which intelligence-gathering and
procedures can substitute for technology or reduce the need for
expensive technology.  Decisionmakers also need to evaluate
technologies in terms of their characteristics and limitations.  Some
technologies are very effective and could be deployed now, but they
are expensive, slow the flow of commerce, and raise issues of worker
safety.  Other technologies could be more widely used, but they are
less reliable.  Still others may not be available for several years
at the current pace of development. 

Despite the limitations of the currently available technology, some
countries have already deployed advanced explosives and narcotics
detection equipment because of differences in their perception of the
threat and their approaches to counter the threat.  Should the United
States start deploying the currently available technologies, lessons
can be learned from these countries regarding their approaches, as
well as capabilities of technology in operating environments.  FAA
estimates that use of the best available procedures and technology
for enhancing aviation security could cost as much as $6 billion over
the next 10 years or alternatively about $1.30 per one-way ticket, if
the costs were paid through a surcharge. 


   SPENDING ON DETECTION
   TECHNOLOGIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3

Since 1978, the federal government has spent about $246 million for
research and development (R&D) on explosives detection technologies,
including over $7 million for ongoing demonstration testing at the
Atlanta, San Francisco, and Manila airports.  During the same period,
the government has spent about $100 million for R&D on narcotics
technologies and a little more than $20 million procuring a variety
of equipment to assist Customs inspectors, such as hand-held devices
for detecting false compartments.  The majority of the spending has
occurred since 1990. 

As shown in table 1, annual R&D spending on explosives detection
technologies fluctuated from $23 million to $28 million during the
first part of this decade, before increasing to $39 million for
fiscal year 1996.  The $14 million, or over 50 percent, increase from
fiscal year 1995 is due principally to FAA's funding of demonstration
testing of a technology for screening checked baggage and to the
funding of a counterterrorism application by the Technical Support
Working Group (TSWG).\3



                                Table 1
                
                 R&D Spending on Detection Technologies
                  for Fiscal Years 1978 through 1996\a

                   (Millions of current-year dollars)

                       FY78
                         to
Technology             FY90  FY91  FY92  FY93  FY94  FY95  FY96  Total
-------------------  ------  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  ----  -----
Explosives              $78   $23   $28   $28   $25   $25   $39   $246
Narcotics                 2    14    16    18    20    14    17    100
======================================================================
Total                   $80   $36   $45   $46   $45   $39   $55   $346
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Spending for explosives technologies is based on estimates
provided by FAA and TSWG, while narcotics spending is based on
estimates by Customs, DOD, and the Office of National Drug Control
Policy (ONDCP).  Customs was unable to provide estimates of spending
prior to fiscal year 1988.  Spending by DOD and ONDCP did not begin
until fiscal years 1991 and 1992, respectively. 

Note:  Totals may not add due to rounding. 

Annual spending on narcotics detection technology increased during
the first part of the decade from $14 million to a peak of $20
million in fiscal year 1994 and then dropped $3 million from that
peak, or 15 percent.  The reason for this decline is reduced spending
by the Department of Defense (DOD) as it shifted emphasis from one
type of narcotics detection technology to other, less costly types of
technologies to satisfy Customs' needs. 


--------------------
\3 The Technical Support Working Group is a National Security
Council-sponsored interagency forum for coordinating research and
development on counterterrorism. 


      CONGRESSIONAL DIRECTION
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1

The spending on detection technologies that has occurred since 1990
has been due in large part to congressional direction.  The Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990 (Public Law 101-604) directed FAA to
increase the pace of its R&D.  The act also set a goal of deploying
explosives detection technologies by November 1993.  However, it
prohibited FAA from mandating deployment of a particular technology
until that technology had first been certified as capable of
detecting various types and quantities of explosives using testing
protocols developed in conjunction with the scientific community. 

FAA initially concentrated its efforts on developing protocols and
technologies for screening checked baggage to address one of the
security vulnerabilities that contributed to the bombing of Pan Am
flight 103 in December 1988.  However, the goal of deploying such
technology has still not been met.  FAA has certified one system, and
it is being operationally tested at two domestic airports and one
airport overseas. 

Congress tasked DOD in 1990 to develop narcotics detection
technologies for Customs and other drug enforcement organizations. 
DOD has focused on developing "non-intrusive inspection" technologies
to screen containers without the need for opening them.  Customs is
deploying a DOD-developed technology for trucks and empty containers,
but it rejected another DOD-developed technology for fully loaded
containers (see p.  8).  Customs has identified containerized cargo
at commercial seaports as its greatest unsolved narcotics detection
requirement.  According to Customs, it may be necessary to explore
new methods of financing the systems that are technologically
feasible for seaports, but high in cost. 


   CHARACTERISTICS AND LIMITATIONS
   OF DETECTION TECHNOLOGIES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4

Both aviation security and drug interdiction depend on a complex mix
of intelligence, procedures, and technologies, which can partially
substitute for each other in terms of characteristics, strengths, and
limitations.  For example, FAA evaluates information from the
intelligence community in determining a level of threat and mandating
security procedures appropriate to a specific time and place.  These
security procedures include bag matching and passenger profiling.\4
FAA estimates that incorporating bag matching in everyday security
could cost up to $2 billion, while profiling could reduce to 20
percent the number of passengers requiring additional screening.  The
Customs' drug interdiction task has an analogous set of procedures
and technologies and trade-offs. 

Relevant trade-offs in selecting detection technologies for a given
application involve their characteristics and costs, including issues
of their effectiveness in detecting explosives or narcotics, safety
risks to users of the technology, and impacts on the flow of
commerce.  For example, some highly effective technologies could be
deployed now, but they are expensive, raise safety concerns, or slow
the flow of commerce.  These trade-offs are required for each of the
major detection technology applications for FAA and Customs. 

While areas of overlap exist, FAA's aviation security applications
generally relate to checked baggage, passengers, and carry-on items,
and Customs' drug interdiction applications generally relate to
screening of cargo, containers, vehicles, and baggage.  In addition
to detection technologies, teams of dogs and their handlers are used
for both aviation security and drug interdiction applications. 


--------------------
\4 Bag matching is a procedure to ensure that a passenger who checks
a bag also boards the flight; if not, the bag is removed.  Profiling
is a method of identifying potentially threatening passengers, who
are then subjected to additional security measures.  Profiling
reduces the number of passengers requiring additional security
measures. 


      AVIATION SECURITY
      APPLICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1


         CHECKED BAGGAGE
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.1

A system is available today for screening checked baggage that has
been certified by FAA as capable of detecting various types and
quantities of explosives likely to be used to cause catastrophic
damage to a commercial aircraft, as is required by the Aviation
Security Improvement Act of 1990.  However, the certified system is
costly and has operational limitations, including a designed
throughput of about 500 bags an hour with actual throughput much less
than that number.  Other less costly and faster systems are
available, but they cannot detect all the amounts, configurations,
and types of explosive material likely to be used to cause
catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft. 

FAA's plans for developing detection technologies for checked baggage
include efforts to improve the certified system, develop new
technologies, and evaluate a mix of technologies.  FAA believes that
an appropriate mix of systems that individually do not meet
certification requirements might eventually work together to detect
the amounts, configurations, and types of explosive material that are
required by the act. 

Appendix I provides additional information about the various types of
technologies available and under development for screening checked
baggage, including the characteristics and limitations of those
technologies, their status, the estimated range of prices for the
technologies, and federal government funding for the technologies. 


         PASSENGERS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.2

The National Research Council recently reported that X-ray and
electromagnetic technologies produce images of sufficient quality to
make them effective for screening passengers for concealed
explosives.\5 Future development efforts by FAA and TSWG are
generally focusing on devices that detect explosives on boarding
documents passengers have handled and portals that passengers would
walk through.  One type of portal uses trace detection technologies
that collect and analyze traces from the passengers' clothing or
vapors surrounding them.  The other type uses electromagnetic waves
to screen passengers for items hidden under clothing. 

The National Research Council also recently observed that successful
deployment of these technologies is likely to depend on the public's
perception about the seriousness of the threat and the effectiveness
of devices in countering the threat, which might also be considered
intrusive or thought to be a health risk.  (See App.  II for more
information about the various types of technologies available and
under development for passenger screening.)


--------------------
\5 Airline Passenger Security Screening:  New Technologies and
Implementation Issues.  Washington, DC:  National Academy Press,
1996. 


         CARRY-ON ITEMS
-------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1.3

Technologies available today for screening carry-ons for hidden
explosives include conventional X-ray machines, an electromagnetic
system, and trace detection devices.\6

FAA has recently developed trace detection standards for inspecting
carry-on electronics for explosives.  In addition, FAA has "assessed
as effective," but not certified, three trace detection systems to be
used during periods of heightened security.  FAA expects to soon
"assess as effective" three more trace detection systems.  The more
expensive trace technologies used for carry-on baggage are capable of
detecting smaller amounts of explosives and narcotics.  FAA's future
efforts are expected to include developing an enhanced X-ray device
and screeners for bottles.  (See app.  III for more detailed
information about technologies for screening carry-on items.)


--------------------
\6 We previously reported on limitations in performance of
conventional X-ray machines and their operators. 


      DRUG INTERDICTION
      APPLICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2