Department of Defense: Military Assistance Provided at Branch Davidian
Incident (Letter Report, 08/26/1999, GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133).

Pursuant to a legislative requirement, GAO reviewed certain aspects of
the military assistance provided to law enforcement agencies during the
Branch Davidians incident, focusing on: (1) whether the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) requests for support from military
counterdrug programs met requirements for authorizing that support; (2)
the measures ATF took to deal with any drug activity it might find
during its warrant service, and whether those measures were appropriate
for such operations where a methamphetamine laboratory might be
encountered; and (3) the types, costs, and reimbursements of all
military support, including that from counterdrug programs, provided to
ATF and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

GAO noted that: (1) ATF's two requests for military counterdrug support
of its Davidian operations met requirements to authorize provision of
that support under the relevant statutes; (2) ATF cited possible
drug-related activity at the compound in both its written requests--the
first to the Texas National Guard and the second to Operation Alliance,
a coordinating center for counterdrug assistance; (3) the military's
decision in both cases to provide the counterdrug support was a
reasonable exercise of agency discretion and was authorized under the
relevant statutes; (4) ATF's planning for the warrant service addressed
the possibility of encountering hazardous drug materials; (5) ATF agents
were made aware of the suspected drug laboratory and the appropriate
precautions; (6) moreover, a team from the Drug Enforcement
Administration was at the command post the day of the operation to
handle and drug-related materials that might be found; (7) this planning
was consistent with ATF's own policies--and those of other federal law
enforcement agencies--governing operations to secure armed suspects and
facilities, including those where a drug laboratory is present; (8)
military assistance to ATF and FBI included: (a) surveillance,
reconnaissance, and transport; (b) equipment and supplies; (c) training
and instruction; and (d) maintenance and repairs; (9) the military
provided several items of major equipment, including helicopters and
unarmed tactical ground vehicles; (10) GAO estimated the total cost of
military assistance to be about $1 million, of which nearly 90 percent
was incurred by the Texas National Guard and active Army units and the
rest by the Alabama National Guard and active Air Force; (11) under the
Economy Act, ATF and FBI reimbursed the Texas National Guard, the Army,
and the Air Force for about three-quarters of the support; (12)
repayment of another 14 percent, which came from counterdrug programs,
was waived by the military, which has the authority to do so if the
supported agency suspects a drug connection; (13) these nonreimbursable
expenses represented less than $140,000; (14) the military also
mistakenly undercharged these two agencies by a comparatively small
amount, which should have been reimbursed; (15) the Army does not plan
to collect these undercharges, as it would realize no benefit--it would
have to apply any collection to prior-year obligations; and (16)
finally, under applicable statutes, the military gave ATF and FBI
without charge some excess military items, mostly office and camp
equipment, clothes, and tools.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD/OSI-99-133
     TITLE:  Department of Defense: Military Assistance Provided at
	     Branch Davidian Incident
      DATE:  08/26/1999
   SUBJECT:  Drugs
	     Military operations
	     Search and seizure
	     Civic action
	     Law enforcement
	     Interagency relations
	     Drug trafficking
	     Statutory law
	     Reimbursements to government
	     Controlled substances
IDENTIFIER:  Waco (TX)

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A Report to the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney
General, and the Secretary of the Treasury

GAO/NSIAD/OSI-99-133

August 1999 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Military Assistance Provided at Branch Davidian Incident

National Security and International Affairs Division

B-276428 Letter August 26, 1999 The Honorable William S. Cohen The
Secretary of Defense

The Honorable Janet F. Reno The Attorney General

The Honorable Lawrence H. Summers The Secretary of the Treasury

In 1993, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)
received assistance from the U. S. military, including counterdrug
program support, while investigating violations of federal
firearms laws by members of an obscure sect, the Branch Davidians,
and their leader, Vernon Howell (also known as David Koresh), in
Waco, Texas. On February 28, 1993, as the ATF

tried to serve warrants on the sect's compound, a gunfight
erupted, killing and wounding agents and Davidians. A standoff
ensued that soon involved the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI). The military provided support to the two federal law
enforcement agencies (LEA) throughout the 51- day standoff, which
ended April 19, 1993, when the compound was destroyed by fire.

In August 1996, the House Committees on Government Reform and
Oversight and on the Judiciary issued a report, Investigation into
the Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies Toward the
Branch Davidians (Report 104- 749). 1 The report recommended that
we review certain aspects of the military assistance provided to
the LEAs in this incident. We have reviewed the nature and extent
of the assistance, including that from counterdrug programs,
provided to these operations, as well as the counterdrug aspects
of ATF's plans to serve a search warrant at the Davidian compound.
We pursued three specific objectives:  Determine whether the ATF's
requests for support from military counterdrug programs met
requirements for authorizing that support. 1 This report was based
on a joint investigation by the Subcommittee on National Security,
International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight, and the Subcommittee on Crime of
the Committee of the Judiciary.

 Identify the measures ATF took to deal with any drug activity it
might find during its warrant service, and determine whether those
measures were appropriate for such operations where a
methamphetamine laboratory might be encountered.  Account for the
types, costs, and reimbursements of all military support,
including that from counterdrug programs, provided to the ATF and
the FBI.

Results in Brief ATF's two requests for military counterdrug
support of its Davidian operations met requirements to authorize
provision of that support under the relevant statutes. 2 The ATF
cited possible drug- related activity at the compound in both its
written requests the first to the Texas National Guard and the
second to Operation Alliance, a coordinating center for
counterdrug assistance. The military's decision in both cases to
provide the

counterdrug support was a reasonable exercise of agency discretion
and was authorized under the relevant statutes. ATF's planning for
the warrant service addressed the possibility of encountering
hazardous drug materials. ATF agents were made aware of the
suspected drug laboratory and the appropriate precautions.
Moreover, a team from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)
was at the

command post the day of the operation to handle any drug- related
materials that might be found. This planning was consistent with
ATF's own policies and those of other federal LEAs governing
operations to secure armed suspects and facilities, including
those where a drug laboratory is present.

Military assistance (both counterdrug and other) to the ATF and
the FBI included surveillance, reconnaissance, and transport;
equipment and supplies; training and instruction; and maintenance
and repairs. The military provided several items of major
equipment, including helicopters and unarmed tactical ground
vehicles. We estimated the total cost of military assistance to be
about $1 million, of which nearly 90 percent was

incurred by the Texas National Guard and active Army units and the
rest by the Alabama National Guard and active Air Force. Under the
Economy Act, 2 The military is authorized to provide support to
LEAs under a number of statutes. Generally, these agencies must
reimburse the military for the cost of its assistance. However,
the active military can support counterdrug activities on a
nonreimbursable basis under section 1004 of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1991, as amended (P. L. 101 510), and the
National Guard can do so under 32 U. S. C. 112.

the ATF and the FBI reimbursed the Texas National Guard, the Army,
and the Air Force for about three- quarters of the support.
Repayment of another 14 percent, which came from counterdrug
programs, was waived by the military, which has the authority to
do so if the supported agency suspects a drug connection. These
nonreimbursable expenses represented less than $140,000. The
military also mistakenly undercharged these two agencies by a
comparatively small amount (about 10 percent of the total), which
should have been reimbursed. The Army does not plan to collect
these undercharges, as it would realize no current benefit it
would have to apply any collection to prior- year obligations.
Finally, under applicable statutes, 3 the military gave the ATF
and the FBI without charge some excess military items, mostly
office and camp equipment, clothes, and tools.

Scope and The events we examined occurred several years before we
performed our Methodology

work. Moreover, the ATF's investigation of Vernon Howell during
1992 93 focused on firearm violations, not on illegal drugs;
neither the ATF nor any other agency, federal or state, performed
a comprehensive, in- depth drug investigation of Howell or any
other Davidian residing at the compound at the time.

For our first two objectives, we interviewed many current and
former employees of the military and of those federal, state, and
local LEAs that had dealings with the case. We also reviewed
pertinent case files and material provided to the Waco
Administrative Review. 4 We did not try to substantiate actual
drug activity by Howell or other compound residents. To obtain
information concerning the authority under which their components
assisted the LEAs, we contacted the Department of Defense (DOD),
the National Guard Bureau, Joint Task Force Six, and the Texas
National Guard.

For our third objective, we sought to determine the types and
costs of military assistance provided to the ATF and the FBI. To
this end, we reviewed available records maintained by DOD, the
Army, and the Texas National Guard (requests and authorizations
for assistance, hand receipts, 3 P. L. 101 189  1208 and P. L. 102
484  1044.

4 A group convened by the Department of the Treasury to review all
aspects of ATF's investigation of Howell and the Davidians,
including the ATF's effort to serve the arrest and search warrants
on Feb. 28, 1993.

flight logs, DOD reports, etc.). We also interviewed officials at
Operation Alliance, Joint Task Force Six, the Texas National Guard
counterdrug program, and the Army. In addition, we reviewed the
military's documentation concerning cost and reimbursement by the
LEAs, including the accounting and recovery records. This
information we compared with

our data on the support rendered by the military. For all
objectives, we visited or contacted various military and law
enforcement organizations, reviewed hundreds of pertinent
documents, and viewed other relevant media. Appendix I describes
our contacts and

sources in greater detail. We conducted our work between January
1997 and February 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.

Background Throughout the ATF's investigation and the standoff at
the compound, the military provided the ATF and the FBI a wide
variety of assistance. A detailed discussion of the statutes
authorizing the support is provided in appendix II. LEAs operating
in Texas may obtain military assistance for investigations having
a counterdrug component from the Texas National Guard counterdrug
program. This program can provide a range of investigative support
services, from aerial reconnaissance to logistics. 5 In accordance
with regulations, 6 requests for support from National Guard
counterdrug

programs must cite in writing a suspected drug connection. LEAs
can also seek military counterdrug assistance via Operation
Alliance, a clearinghouse representing the counterdrug interests
of many federal, state, and local LEAs. 7 The Alliance only
accepts requests that cite in writing a suspected drug connection.

5 Program personnel will not normally become involved in arrests
of suspects, chain- of- custody of evidence, searches,
interdiction, or the physical security of law enforcement
officers. 6 National Guard Regulation 500 2. 7 The Alliance
comprises state and local representatives from several states and
agents from the DEA, the Customs Service, the Border Patrol, Coast
Guard, the FBI and the ATF, the Internal Revenue Service, U. S.
Marshal's Service, the Secret Service, and U. S. Attorneys.
Representatives from DOD and the National Guard serve on the group
as advisors only.

Requests that the Alliance approves can be referred to military
organizations, which review the requests to ensure, among other
things, that a suspected drug connection is explicitly stated. 8
Each military organization can decline to provide the support
despite the referral. In addition to the National Guard program,
the Alliance may refer the request to Joint Task Force Six. This
task force, an active service organization, identifies military
units that can provide the assistance and coordinates

with the requester. 9 It also has a rapid support unit to respond
to any immediate need. Finally, LEAs can receive items without
charge from DOD's Regional Logistics Support Office; these items
come from its excess inventory. The agencies can request this
support directly, and their operations need not have a counterdrug
component.

According to the ATF, the drug connection in this operation was a
possible clandestine methamphetamine laboratory, perhaps active,
that it suspected was somewhere on the extensive Davidian
compound. Drug laboratories, active or not, are extremely volatile
and toxic, and specialized training and

equipment are necessary to safely deal with the chemical
materials. The DEA, having lead responsibility for counterdrug
activities, provides extensive, highly detailed procedures that
its agents are supposed to follow when dealing with clandestine
laboratories. These procedures, which cover

planning, entry, assessment, processing, exit, and follow- up,
include such requirements as  planning with a lab- certified
chemist the entry of the suspect premises,  assigning safety
officers for the entry,  having self- contained breathing
apparatus and lab- certified teams on hand,  giving specific
warnings to the entry team, and

 supplying the entry team with full heat- and chemical- resistant
clothing. However, other federal LEAs, including the ATF, which do
not have drugs as their primary focus and which lack DEA's
extensive training and equipment have less elaborate drug- lab
policies. In ATF's case, its instructions in this matter are quite
explicit agents are to call upon DEA

8 The statutes, however, do not require a full discussion of the
possible connection. 9 Joint Task Force Six neither plans nor
coordinates civilian operations, and active Army units can perform
only support roles, not law enforcement functions.

to handle any possible drug evidence they encounter during their
investigations. ATF entry teams must be made aware of the drug
laboratory and of standard precautions. There is, however, no
requirement that ATF teams making a dynamic entry 10 wear fully
protective counterdrug suits with self- contained breathing
apparatus. This is also true for DEA entry teams. According to
officials from both agencies, such equipment would restrict an
entry team's vision and mobility and place it at unacceptable
risk, as suspects are often armed.

Military Counterdrug The ATF made two requests for military
counterdrug support to its Support to ATF's

Davidian operations. The first was made directly to the Texas
National Guard counterdrug program, and the second was later made
to Operation Davidian Operation Alliance, which approved and
forwarded the request to the Texas National Was Authorized Under
Guard counterdrug program and Joint Task Force Six for their

Statutes consideration. Some counterdrug support to the ATF during
its attempt to serve the warrant extended through the ensuing
standoff, constituting a continued response to the agency's second
request.

For both of its requests, ATF cited a possible drug connection to
its Howell investigation. Although ATF conducted a firearms
investigation of Howell and other Davidians, it also acquired
information on possible drug activity when it decided to seek
support from military counterdrug elements. Not all of this
information was shared with the military, but it formed the

backdrop to and reinforced the data that was shared. During our
review and in the following narrative, we focused on what the ATF
knew about a possible drug connection, when the ATF knew it, and
what information the ATF provided to the military counterdrug
programs. These points are central to determining whether the
military was authorized to provide counterdrug assistance under
the relevant statutes.

10 A very rapid, vigorous, sudden, unexpected entry. It is
intended to surprise suspects and prevent them from getting to
their guns or from destroying evidence and is used to prevent harm
to agents and civilians alike.

ATF's First Counterdrug In 1992, the local sheriff's office
discovered that , between March and June Request: Assistance From
of that year , Howell and other Davidians at the Waco compound had
the Texas National Guard received frequent shipments of weapons,
explosive components, and related materials. 11 By June 1992 those
shipments totaled more than Counterdrug Program

$40,000. Realizing that matters were now beyond its capabilities,
the local sheriff's office contacted the ATF and on June 4, 1992,
briefed it on (1) the situation at the compound, including armed
guards at the site and (2) the group's violent history, including
a 1987 gun battle between Howell and the Davidians' former leader.
On June 9, 1992, the ATF formally opened an

investigation of Howell and his associates. 12 The agency focused
on the conversion and manufacture of weapons and explosives,
gathering information on Davidian connections and gun related
deliveries that continued to arrive at the compound.

In late June, the sheriff's office notified ATF of a recent
delivery to the compound of chemicals, instruments, and glassware.
The sheriff's explosives technician did not regard these items as
consistent with the manufacture of explosives; an ATF agent
thought these items could be used to manufacture drugs, suggesting
a current operation. Later, in November 1992, while pursuing its
firearms investigation, the ATF acquired information about a
possible drug connection when the sheriff's office told the agency
about one of Howell's associates. A search of criminal databases
showed that this individual had a long history of drug involvement
and had been paroled to the Waco area in April 1992 after serving
time for his latest drug conviction. From the first months of the
investigation, ATF had kept in touch with the DEA office in Waco,
seeking information it might have about the suspects. The DEA
agents offered their help on the case, including undercover work,
and performed some minor investigative assistance. In the summer
or fall

of 1992, the ATF and DEA agents speculated on how the Davidians
were financing their heavy gun purchases and substantial building
projects while supporting 100 or so compound residents. Based on
their enforcement

11 Assault rifles and conversion kits, ammunition, inert grenades,
sensors, night- vision devices, chemicals, combat vests, etc.
According to the Treasury Department report, some of these items
could be used to illegally manufacture and possess machine guns
and destructive devices contrary to the National Firearms Act (26
U. S. C.  5845). 12 The sheriff's office gave ATF the names of
more than 30 current residents of the compound, which ATF checked
for criminal histories.

experience, it seemed possible to the agents that a resident might
be dealing in illegal drugs. Having decided that it needed
military assistance, on December 4, 1992, ATF discussed with a
liaison from DOD 13 how the military might help. The liaison
suggested that the military could provide aerial thermal
(infrared) photography of the site. He also informed ATF that it
would have to reimburse the military unless there was a drug
connection to its investigation. On December 11, 1992, ATF
contacted officers of the Texas National Guard counterdrug program
to learn what aid it could provide to the Howell investigation.
The Texas National Guard discussed the types of assistance

available, including surveillance overflights, but explained that,
to receive help from this program, the investigation must have a
drug connection. The Texas National Guard advised the ATF to
determine whether it might have a drug connection and, if so, to
send a formal written request citing that connection.

On December 14, 1992, ATF wrote the Texas National Guard
counterdrug program, requesting it to support the investigation
with aerial photography and surveillance but mentioning no drug
connection. The Texas National

Guard told ATF it must submit a revised request that contained a
possible drug connection. 14

The ATF decided to inquire of all its contacts in this case
whether they had knowledge of any drug activity in connection with
the suspects. The first to be asked was a former resident of the
compound; on December 16, 1992, this individual responded in
writing with the following statements.  Howell had told him that
drug trafficking was a desirable way to raise

money.  Howell had told him about finding a methamphetamine
laboratory when he took over the compound.

13 This position was filled by a military officer under the Office
for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support; he was stationed at ATF's
Special Operations Division, Washington, D. C. 14 According to
Texas National Guard counterdrug officers, it is not unusual for
LEAs to make requests without stating a drug connection. In those
cases the Texas National Guard returns the request with an
explanation of the need for a written statement of possible drug
activity.

 Howell had told him that he turned the laboratory over to the
sheriff's office, but another former resident maintained to this
individual that Howell had not surrendered any drug materials.
Another former resident was rumored to have trafficked in drugs
while living at the compound. ATF discussed this information with
the sheriff's office, which confirmed that a methamphetamine
laboratory was thought to have existed at the compound at one
time. The sheriff's office denied ever receiving drug evidence
from Howell or any other Davidian. 15 This raised the possibility
that the illegal equipment might still be at the compound. The
sheriff's office also confirmed for ATF that the alleged drug
trafficker named by the former resident had lived at the compound
along with another suspicious person. ATF searched the state's
criminal database and found that (1) the first individual had an
extensive history of narcotics and firearms violations and was in
prison and (2) the second had violated federal firearms laws and
was in prison for possessing a firearm during a

drug- trafficking crime. It may also be at this time that the ATF
learned of a third former resident who had produced
methamphetamine at the compound. ATF's computer checks also showed
that several current compound residents had prior drug
involvement, including possession of marijuana, cocaine, and
tablets of dangerous drugs.

This information suggested to ATF that there were reasonable
grounds to suspect a drug connection to its investigation.
Consequently, on December 17, 1992, 16 ATF notified DEA to that
effect, informing it of the suspected laboratory, and asked DEA to
handle all drug evidence when the warrants would be served. ATF
also informed the DOD liaison that a

methamphetamine laboratory might be at the compound. The next day
the ATF sent a revised request for aid to the Texas National Guard
counterdrug program, this time citing a drug connection
specifically, that Howell was suspected of unlawfully being in
possession of firearms and possibly narcotics.

Since its requirement for a drug connection was met in this new
letter, the Texas National Guard approved the request. In all, six
reconnaissance

15 In our discussions with the sheriff's office, it denied
receiving drug material from Howell. 16 Report of the Department
of the Treasury on the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms
Investigation of Vernon Wayne Howell, also known as David Koresh
(Sept. 1993).

overflights would be made, with thermal imaging used on at least
two flights to search for armed guards and drug- manufacturing
facilities. 17

ATF's Second Counterdrug By late January 1993, the ATF had taken
statements from other former Request: Assistance From Davidians
and their relatives that suggested a drug connection:

Joint Task Force Six and the  Information about affidavits and
testimony in a 1992 court case that a

Texas National Guard methamphetamine laboratory was still at the
compound after it had Counterdrug Program supposedly been turned
over to the sheriff's office.  Reports that Howell may have used
the laboratory.  Reports that Howell gave illegal drugs to some of
his followers.

At the same time, an ATF undercover agent reported that Howell had
told him, in conversation at the compound, that (1) the site would
be a good place for making methamphetamine and (2) the sheriff
suspected him of manufacturing drugs. Another Davidian resident,
according to two undercover ATF agents, told them that he himself
had been involved in drugs at one time. In addition, thermal
images made by National Guard overflights had shown a hot spot
inside the compound, possibly indicating a methamphetamine
laboratory.

Meanwhile, in preparation for serving warrants at the compound,
ATF sought operational and logistical help from other agencies,
including the military. It updated the DOD liaison on its case,
mentioning that counterdrug support would soon be requested, and
it gave information on the drug connection to the head of the
Texas National Guard counterdrug program. On January 22, 1993,
after some confusion over the appropriate

route to take, the ATF's written request for military support of
the upcoming warrant service arrived at Operation Alliance. It
asked for certain training, as well as a loan of Bradley infantry
fighting vehicles and other equipment, for a continuation of the
firearms and drug case. 18 When the ATF filled out the Alliance's
request form, it noted that the operation involved a possible meth
lab.

17 At that time, clandestine manufacture of methamphetamine was
thought to produce considerable heat, which infrared imaging could
pick up. LEAs, including the DEA, sometimes used aerial thermal
imaging to detect the heat produced in illegal narcotics
manufacture. 18 The letter noted that no weapon systems on the
Bradleys would be used; it requested floodlights, loudspeakers,
smoke generators, gas masks, night- vision goggles, and office and
camping gear.

On February 2, 1993, the Alliance and its military advisers met to
consider the request for support. The ATF discussed some of the
indications of a drug laboratory statements by former residents;
the suspicious delivery of materials possibly intended for use in
making drugs (sometimes referred to as precursor materials); 19
and the hot spot, which was identified on an aerial photograph of
the compound. Since its requirement for a possible drug connection
was met, the Alliance referred the request to Joint Task

Force Six and the Texas National Guard counterdrug program. In its
letter forwarding the request, the Alliance cited a dangerous
extremist organization believed to be producing methamphetamine.
On February 4, 1993, representatives of the Texas National Guard
counterdrug program and Joint Task Force Six met with the ATF to
discuss the request that Operation Alliance had passed on to them.
This meeting concentrated on parameters, limits, and training
objectives but did discuss the drug connection. The ATF presented
indications of a possible methamphetamine laboratory at the
Davidian compound: reports by former residents, deliveries of
possible precursor materials, and thermal

images from reconnaissance overflights that indicated the possible
location of the laboratory. The ATF also noted in its presentation
that some current residents had recent drug- related arrests.
According to one military attendee, the evidence of a possible
drug connection was not the strongest they had ever seen, nor was
it the weakest.

At this meeting the Texas National Guard agreed to provide the ATF
operation with vehicles, office and camp equipment. 20 Approval by
Joint Task Force Six took somewhat longer. After its parent
organization, the

Army Forces Command, had reviewed and modified the support
requested, Joint Task Force Six agreed on February 17, 1993, to
provide range practice and some limited training. During February
25 27, Joint Task Force Six's rapid- support unit trained ATF
agents at Fort Hood, Texas. 21

19 The glassware, instruments, and chemicals mentioned earlier (p.
7). 20 This request to the Texas National Guard was later modified
(February 24, 1993) because the ATF now needed support for a
dynamic entry rather than a siege, as earlier planned. 21 They did
not receive training on securing or removing drug material. Texas
National Guard helicopters and crews also traveled to Fort Hood
(February 27) to practice with the ATF their support of the
operation.

Continuation of Military On the day that the ATF attempted to
serve arrest and search warrants at Assistance During the

the compound, the Texas National Guard joined several local,
state, and Standoff federal LEAs to support the operation. ATF had
planned a dynamic entry to secure the Davidians before they could
get to their weapons. However, the Davidians were warned of the
ATF's approach and met the agents with

gunfire. A 51- day standoff resulted, from February 28 to April
19, 1993, during which the ATF and the FBI (which took control of
the operation) requested and received a range of support from the
active military and the Texas National Guard.

The bulk of support during the standoff qualified as military
assistance to civilian authorities, which requires no connection
to drugs in order to be provided but which generally must be
repaid. However,Texas National Guard counterdrug assistance
(mainly helicopters and personnel)

continued to be provided after the attempted warrant service
became a standoff because, upon the Davidians' eventual surrender,
this support would be needed to finish the counterdrug mission. 22

Approval of Military DOD provided support for counterdrug
activities of the Davidian operation Counterdrug Support Was under
section 1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act of 1991 (P.
L. Reasonable and Authorized

101 510). The Texas National Guard also provided counterdrug
support under 32 U. S. C.  112. These laws authorize certain types
of support of LEAs' counterdrug activities. 23 However, neither
law provides a formal standard for determining the level of
counterdrug activity that a particular operation must include for
authorization of such support. Because there is no formal
standard, the military officials involved have considerable
discretion in determining the degree of counterdrug activity
necessary to approve the support. Based on our review of the
relevant statutes, events leading up to the decision by military
officials to approve the support, and

interviews with key personnel, we found no basis to conclude that
the officials involved abused that discretion. We also found no
indication that ATF officials misrepresented the information
provided to the military in order to obtain the support.
Therefore, we conclude that the military's decision to approve the
counterdrug support was reasonable and authorized under the
relevant statutes.

22 According to the Texas National Guard, this counterdrug support
did not require a new request, as it was provided as a
continuation of the ATF's second request approved February 4,
1993. 23 See app. II for a more detailed discussion of these laws.

ATF Planning for ATF spent several months planning the operation
to serve warrants at the Warrant Service

Davidian compound. Although the possible drug laboratory was not a
major part of this effort, ATF did plan and take certain measures
to deal Included Measures for with it.

Drug Laboratory As recounted earlier, in December 1992 the ATF had
already asked the DEA to handle the illegal drug laboratory that
it thought might be hidden on the compound. 24 By the end of
January 1993, its plans reflected that agreement: A team of DEA
agents, including one certified to handle clandestine

laboratories, would be on hand the day of the warrant service
specifically to deal with drug evidence. If ATF agents should
encounter any drug materials while securing people or weapons/
explosives evidence, they

were to pull back from that particular location, cordon it off,
and call in the DEA team. The DEA agents would manage the drug
evidence and supervise cleanup. This solution was in keeping with
standard practice by ATF and other federal LEAs.

These plans were shared with the military organizations supporting
the operation. At the February 4 meeting between ATF and the
military, participants discussed the dangers of operating around
volatile substances (chemicals for making methamphetamine and
explosives are very volatile), especially with gunfire and
diversionary devices. 25 The ATF also assured the military
representatives that it would have a DEA team ready to take down
the lab. Indeed, some days before the warrant service occurred,
the ATF informed DEA of the date, time, and place of the operation
and confirmed that DEA would have a certified clandestine-
laboratory agent at ATF's command post to handle the drug
evidence.

ATF also took certain standard measures to guard against
explosives, weapons, and hazardous chemicals:  During final
training for the operation, according to ATF and military sources,
ATF leaders discussed with their agents the suspected laboratory
and urged caution in the use of weapons. Those few agents

24 Its location was not known. 25 These devices, sometimes
referred to as flashbangs, are useful in diverting criminal
suspects. Their explosions create a very brilliant flash and a
very loud noise to disorient or stun people in the immediate
vicinity.

carrying diversionary devices were reminded to look before
deploying them.  Before ATF attempted to serve the warrants, at
least one ATF leader

went over routine cautions with the agents do not taste, smell, or
touch anything, do not interfere with any chemical reaction, be
sure to undergo decontamination if you get drug material on
yourself or weapons, etc.  During the attempted warrant service,
ATF teams wore helmets, anti- ballistic vests, protective gloves,
sturdy boots, and eye protection. They also had first- aid kits
and fire extinguishers on hand. These measures also conform in
large part with DEA's drug- laboratory safety measures for
initial- entry teams. They differ only in that the entire clothing
of DEA teams (hoods, gloves, pants, and jackets) are made of
Nomex, 26 whereas only the gloves of ATF agents are made of this
material.

ATF planners acknowledged that their entry teams were not heavily
protected against hazardous drug materials. This did not concern
them, however, because the laboratory was not a tactical
consideration. They

believed they could eliminate some parts of the main residence (e.
g., bedrooms, dining room, and entrances) as likely sites for a
drug laboratory. Moreover, the need to secure the weapons and
armed suspects overrode the hazards of a possibly disassembled
laboratory. On the day of the warrant service, DEA agents with
special gear were at the command post specifically to handle any
drug laboratory ATF might encounter. According to the DEA, it had
arranged for a state chemist to be

on standby to assist it, and its hazardous- materials van was on
standby that day at its Waco office. Moreover, DEA agents,
including the laboratory- certified individual, remained part of
the law enforcement support during the standoff to handle any drug
evidence that might be uncovered once the residence had been
secured and vacated. 27 At DEA's request, the state chemist was
also at the command post at least 1 day during the siege.

26 Nomex is a highly fire- resistant commercial material used in
protective clothing. 27 At some point in the standoff, the DEA
asked to be part of the final clearing of the site after removal
of the Davidians, but that task was later assumed by another LEA
in the aftermath of the fire.

Types, Cost, and Military support of the Davidian operation came
from both active and

Reimbursement of National Guard units. The cost of all that
support amounted to almost $1 million, of which about 76 percent
was reimbursed to the military and Military Support to the

another 14 percent ($ 137,400) waived as counterdrug support. The
Davidian Operation

remaining 10 percent represent the military's billing
discrepancies. Types and Costs of Military

Military support for the Davidian operation ranged from aircraft
and Support

vehicles to equipment, supplies, and services (training,
maintenance, etc). We have estimated the cost of this support to
be at least $982, 400. 28 The Alabama and Texas National Guard,
the Army (including Special Forces units), the Air Force, and
other DOD activities the Uniformed Services University of the
Health Sciences, the Regional Logistics Support Office and its
Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices all provided some

form of military assistance. Table 1 summarizes the types and
costs of this support. The FBI incurred the largest single costs
about $230, 000 for damages to an Army UH- 1 helicopter and
$170,000 in operational costs for three Army UH- 1s. In these two
instances, assistance was provided during the standoff; the
helicopter damage was due to pilot error, not Davidian gunfire.

28 This total does not include a cost for medical support from the
Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences (which
provided 133 staff days of services to the FBI during the
standoff) because the military no longer has documents available.
The total also does not include the value of material provided by
the Regional Logistics Support Office and Defense Reutilization
and Marketing Offices, since those items, as excess inventory,
were provided free of charge.

Table 1: Types and Costs of Military Assistance to the ATF and the
FBI in Their Branch Davidian Operations Types of support
Description Cost

Aircraft Reconnaissance and surveillance overflights, aerial
diversion, transportation, standby for medical evacuation, and
recovery of loaned items (helicopters and fixed- wing aircraft)
$548, 400

Vehicles Surface transportation, protection, and recovery (tanks
and other combat vehicles, utility vehicles, and various tracked
and wheeled transport and recovery vehicles) 196, 600

Equipment and supplies Flak vests, helmets, masks, night- vision
goggles, cameras, binoculars, electronic jammers, cellular
telephones, ammunition for grenade launcher, tents, generators,
lighting, clothing, fuel for vehicles and generators, and medical
dressings 68, 200

Personnel Coordination, liaison, logistics, maintenance, 24- hr.
medical and health clinic, operation of classified equipment,
driver training, grenade- launcher training, mine- detector
training, communications training, medical training, and firing-
range support 169, 200

Total $982, 400

Note: In figuring costs for active- duty military participants,
incremental costs alone per diem and travel, but not pay and
benefits were used. Source: DOD and the Texas National Guard.

Reimbursement of Support As required by the Economy Act, the ATF
and the FBI reimbursed the military for most of its assistance.
Reimbursements covered 76 percent (about $747,300) of the costs,
of which the FBI paid about 96 percent (about $718,300) and the
ATF the remainder (about $29,000). The FBI also paid directly for
the services of the Uniformed Services University of the Health
Sciences. Appendix III provides more detail on reimbursements.
Billing Discrepancies In five instances the active Army failed to
properly bill the FBI for services, equipment, and supplies,
resulting in undercharges totaling about $100,000. The largest
instance was an undercharge of $73,000 in operational

expenses for the UH- 1 and CH- 47 helicopters lent by Fort Hood.
According to a Fort Hood official, the Army does not plan to
collect these undercharges, since it would realize no current
benefit that is, it would have to apply any collection to prior-
year obligations. There were also two minor Texas National Guard
overcharges for vehicle parts and helmets. Appendix IV provides
more details on these billing discrepancies. Waivers of
Reimbursement The military waived reimbursement for the costs of
support from its

for Counterdrug Support counterdrug programs. This assistance
represented a small part of the

overall military support to the Davidian operation, accounting for
only

14 percent of costs (about $137,400) and consisting of aerial
overflights, helicopter logistical support, fuel, telephone
service, and training. Most of this nonreimbursable assistance was
provided by the Texas National Guard counterdrug program at a cost
of about $130,600 (about 37 percent of the Texas National Guard's
total support). The Alabama National Guard and Joint Task Force
Six waived the minor costs of the counterdrug support they
provided$ 1, 200 and $5, 600, respectively. Appendix V contains
more details on these waivers. Conclusions The ATF requests for
assistance from military counterdrug programs met the requirements
of the relevant statutes for authorizing such support. In these
written requests, ATF cited its suspicions of drug activity. In
both cases, the military reasonably exercised its discretion in
providing that support as authorized under the relevant statutes.
In planning how it would serve warrants at the compound, ATF
planned for the possibility of encountering a methamphetamine
laboratory or other

hazardous drug materials. As required by agency policy, ATF agents
in the operation were made aware of the suspected laboratory and
of the appropriate precautions. Moreover, DEA agents were at the
command post to handle any drug- related materials. Agency
Comments In oral comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of Defense

stated it accepted the report as presented and the Department of
Justice (including the Drug Enforcement Agency and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation) stated it concurred with the substance of
the report. In written comments on a draft of this report, the
Department of the Treasury

(including the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms) stated it
concurred with the report's conclusions. All three departments
provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional
committees. We are also sending copies to the Honorable Louis
Caldera, Secretary of the Army; the Honorable Russell C. Davis,
Chief of the National Guard Bureau; the Honorable John W. Magaw,
Director of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; the
Honorable Louis J. Freeh, Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation; and the Honorable

Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator of the Drug Enforcement
Administration. Copies will also be made available to others upon
request. Please contact me at (202) 512- 5140 if you have any
questions concerning this report.

Mark E. Gebicke Director, National Security and

Preparedness Issues

Letter

Letter 1 Appendix I

22 Organizations Visited and Documents Reviewed

Appendix II 24

Statutes Related to Military Support of Branch Davidian Operations
Appendix III

27 Reimbursements to the Military From the ATF and the FBI for
Assistance to Their Branch Davidian Operations

Appendix IV 28

Discrepancies in Billing the FBI for Military Support to Its
Branch Davidian Operations

Appendix V 29

Costs Waived by the Military in Support of the Branch Davidian
Operations

Appendix VI 30

Comments From the Department of the Treasury

Table Table 1: Types and Costs of Military Assistance to the ATF
and the FBI in Their Branch Davidian Operations 16

Abbreviations

ATF Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms DOD Department of
Defense DEA Drug Enforcement Administration FBI Federal Bureau of
Investigation LEA law enforcement agencies

Organizations Visited and Documents Appendi I x Reviewed To obtain
the information needed for our review, we visited or contacted the
following organizations:  Military organizations  The Office of
the Deputy General Counsel, the Department of Defense (DOD); the
Office of the Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support,
Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense; and the
National Guard Bureau, all in Washington, D. C.  Joint Task Force
Six, Fort Bliss, Texas.  Texas National Guard, Camp Mabry, Texas.
U. S. Army Aviation and Troop Command, St. Louis, Missouri.  U. S.
Army, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas.  Defense Finance and Accounting
Service, Fort Monmouth, New

Jersey.  Law enforcement organizations

 Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF), Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and
Customs in Washington, D. C.  Local offices of federal law
enforcement agencies (LEA) (ATF, DEA, and the U. S. Attorney's
Office) in Texas.  Operation Alliance, Fort Bliss, Texas.  State
and local LEAs the McLennan County Sheriff's Department and
District Attorney's Office, the Texas Department of Public Safety,
and the Texas Department of Protective and Regulatory Services.

We also reviewed hundreds of documents and other media, including
the following:  Investigation into the Activities of Federal Law
Enforcement Agencies toward the Branch Davidians, Committee on
Government Reform and Oversight in conjunction with the Committee
on the Judiciary, House of Representatives Report 104 749 (Aug. 2,
1996), Union Calendar No. 395.

 Activities of Federal Law Enforcement Agencies toward the Branch
Davidians, Joint hearings before the Subcommittee on Crime of the
Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on National
Security, International Affairs, and Criminal Justice of the
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, Committee on the
Judiciary Serial

No. 72 (July 19 21, 24 28, 31, and Aug. 1, 1995), in three parts.
Events Surrounding the Branch Davidian Cult Standoff in Waco,
Texas, House Judiciary Committee hearing (Apr. 28, 1993).

 Report of the Department of the Treasury on the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Investigation of Vernon Wayne
Howell, also known as David Koresh (Sept. 1993).  Guidelines for
the Cleanup of Clandestine Drug Laboratories, Joint

Federal Task Force of the Drug Enforcement Administration,
Environmental Protection Agency, and Coast Guard (March 1990).
ATF Policy Regarding Investigations Involving Clandestine

Laboratories, dated April 25, 1990 (subsequently incorporated into
ATF Order 3210.7B).  Excerpts from the DEA agent's manual.  All
Waco Administrative Review documents.  ATF investigative files.
Final report by Brigadier General Sagsveen on the Waco/ Mt. Carmel

incident (July 30, 1996).  Results of the focal group review of
Texas National Guard support to the

ATF, known informally as the Spence Report (Apr. 28, 1993).
After- action report of Texas National Guard counterdrug support
in Waco, Texas (Apr. 29, 1993).

 Other relevant DOD provisions, policies, and procedures as well
as information on the National Guard counterdrug program, other
Guard material, and the operational support planning guide for
Joint Task Force Six.  Operation Alliance procedures for reviewing
counterdrug requests.  Videotapes of overflights of the Davidian
compound and of selected operational briefings.

Statutes Related to Military Support of Branch Appe ndi I I x
Davidian Operations National Defense Section 1004 of the National
Defense Authorization Act of 1991 authorized Authorization Act of
the Secretary of Defense to provide the support of active military
units for

the counterdrug activities of any other department or agency of
the 1991

Federal Government or of any State, local, or foreign law
enforcement agency. 1 In 1993, when the Davidian operations
occurred, the act limited active military support for counterdrug
activities to the following nine categories: 2  Maintenance and
repair of equipment made available by DOD to a federal department
or agency or to a state or local government.  Maintenance, repair,
and upgrading of non- DOD equipment to ensure that it will be
compatible with equipment used by DOD.  Transportation of
personnel, equipment, or supplies.  Establishment and operation of
bases of operation or training facilities.  Training of law
enforcement personnel, including associated support expenses for
trainees and the provision of materials necessary to carry out
such training.

 Detection, monitoring, and communication of movement of air, sea,
and surface traffic.  Construction of roads and fences and
installation of lighting to block

drug- smuggling across international boundaries of the United
States.  Establishment of command, control, communication, and
computer

networks to improve integration of law enforcement, active
military, and National Guard activities.  Provision of linguist
and intelligence analysis services.

10 U. S. C.  371 382 Sections 371 382 of title 10 of the U. S.
Code authorize the Secretary of Defense to provide certain types
of support by active military units to federal, state, or local
law enforcement officials. LEAs are not required to reimburse DOD
for the support if it (1) is provided in the normal course of
military training or operations or (2) results in a benefit to DOD
that is substantially equivalent to that which would otherwise be
obtained from 1 P. L. 101 510, div. A, title X,  1004, as amended.
Congress was extended the authority through 2002. See P. L. 105-
261, div. A, title X,  1021 2 In 1993, Congress added a tenth
purpose for which the Secretary may provide support aerial and
ground reconnaissance. See P. L. 103 160, div. A., title XI,
1121( b).

military operations or training. 3 Otherwise, DOD must be
reimbursed as required by the Economy Act. 4 Title 10 authorizes
the following types of support:  Any information collected during
the normal course of training or

operations that may be relevant to a violation of any federal or
state law within the jurisdiction of the officials supported.
Equipment (including associated supplies or parts) and base or
research facilities.  Training in the operation and maintenance of
DOD equipment.  Relevant expert advice.  Maintenance of equipment.
The operation of military equipment for (1) monitoring air and sea

traffic; (2) monitoring surface traffic outside U. S. borders, as
well as 25 miles within U. S. borders if the initial detection
occurred outside the United States; (3) aerial surveillance; (4)
intercepting vessels or aircraft detected outside the land area of
the United States; (5) facilitating communications with federal
LEAs; and (6) transporting and staffing an operational base for
civilian law enforcement personnel. 5

32 U. S. C.  112 Under 32 U. S. C.  112, the Secretary of Defense
may provide funds appropriated for National Guard activities to
the governor of a state who submits a drug- interdiction and
counterdrug- activities plan that meets certain statutory
requirements. To obtain funding, a state's plan must (1) specify
how National Guard personnel and equipment will be used in such
activities, (2) certify that the use of the National Guard of the
state is consistent with state law, and (3) certify that the
activities included in the

plan serve a state law enforcement purpose. If a state's plan is
approved and DOD provides funding, the state may use the funds to
pay expenses related to the use of its National Guard personnel
(while not in federal 3 10 U. S. C.  377. 4 The Economy Act, 31 U.
S. C.  1535, generally mandates prompt repayment for goods and
services provided by one agency to another.

5 See 10 U. S. C.  374. Federal LEAs responsible for enforcing the
Controlled Substances Act (21 U. S. C.  801 et seq.), certain
Immigration and Naturalization Act provisions (8 U. S. C.  1324
1328), section 401 of the Tariff Act of 1940, and the Maritime Law
Enforcement Act may request such aid.

service) and equipment for drug interdiction and counterdrug
activities. 6 DOD considers support requests that are not
specifically included in the original plan on a case- by- case
basis if accompanied by a certification from the state's attorney
general that the operations requested are consistent with state
law. 7 LEAs are not required to reimburse the National Guard for
this support. 8

National Defense for Section 1208 of the National Defense
Authorization Act 9 allowed DOD to Authorization Act for give
federal and state agencies equipment free of charge that the

Secretary of Defense had declared excess to the military's needs.
Under Fiscal Year 1990

this statute, the Secretary of Defense was required to determine
that the equipment was suitable for use in counterdrug activities.

6 The act defines drug interdiction and counter drug activities as
the use of National Guard personnel in the drug interdiction and
counter- drug law enforcement activities authorized by the law of
the State and requested by the Governor of the State. 7 National
Guard (NGR) 500 2.

8 P. L. 101 189. 9 In 1996, Congress repealed  1208. P. L. 104-
201, div. A., title X, section 1033( a) contained similar language
now codified as 10 U. S. C. 2576a.

Reimbursements to the Military From the ATF and the FBI for
Assistance to Their Branch Appendi I

I I x Davidian Operations Support Recipient Reimbursement Aircraft

Active Army 3 UH- 1 utility helicopters and 3 CH- 47 helicopters
FBI $375, 179 Active Air Force C- 141 transport of FBI's hostage
rescue team (and its equipment) to and from FBI 73, 112 Waco
Vehicles

Texas National Guard 2 M- 35A2 2- ton cargo trucks with transport
trailers, 5 M- 818 5- ton tractor ATF 6, 858 trucks with trailers,
12 M- 1009 high- mobility multi- purpose wheeled vehicles Texas
National Guard 10 M- 2 Bradleys (infantry fighting vehicles), 3 M-
332 tractor trailers, 5

FBI 174, 313 M- 728 combat engineer vehicles, 1 M- 88A1 tracked
recovery vehicle (tank retriever), miscellaneous vehicles

Active Army 8 M- 998 high- mobility multi- purpose wheeled
vehicles, an M35A2 2- ton cargo FBI 15, 466

truck, 2 5- ton trucks, 14 heavy equipment transports,
miscellaneous vehicles Equipment

Texas National Guard unrecovered photographic and observation
equipment, 100 canteens, 50 ATF 5, 022

first- aid dressings, 130 empty magazines for M- 16A1 rifles,
assorted field clothing Texas National Guard 16 helmets, 13 helmet
covers, 12 M- 16A1 rifle slings, 54 empty magazines FBI 5, 190 for
M- 16A1s, an M- 25A1 protective mask, 180 tent pins Active Army 2,
488 gallons of generator fuel, fencing, 200 sandbags, 6 boxes of
chemical lights, FBI 5, 523 cellular- phone charges Supplies

Texas National Guard 286 cases of field rations and 2,036 gallons
of diesel fuel ATF 17, 015 Texas National Guard 62 cases of field
rations, 10, 529 gallons of diesel fuel, and transportation

FBI 19, 133 costs of tracked vehicles Personnel (per diem,
transportation, and travel costs)

Active Air Force electronic jammers and travel costs FBI 34, 340
Active Army liaison to LEAs and HQs; maintenance of aircraft,
vehicles, and equipment; operation

FBI 16, 135 of equipment; and local transportation costs for DOD
personnel Uniformed Services University of the Health Sciences 24-
hr. medical control, 24- hr clinic, drafting FBI Reimbursed

of Waco medical plan 133 staff- days a

Total of known amounts reimbursed $747, 286

a A flat rate plus all travel was used under a Memorandum of
Understanding between the two parties. All travel vouchers were
sent directly to the FBI for payment; FBI paid for expendable
medical supplies.

Discrepancies in Billing the FBI for Military Appendi V I x
Support to Its Branch Davidian Operations Undercharges Amount

Active Army used the wrong flying- hour rates when determining
charges for: $73, 073

 flights by UH- 1 helicopters for transport, deployment, medical
evacuation support, and recovery  flight by CH- 47 helicopter on
medical standby

Active Army did not bill for the loss of two night- vision goggles
9, 168 Active Army did not bill for 40- mm grenade- launcher
ammunition (200 target- practice rounds, 50 illumination rounds,
5, 066 and 250 high- explosive rounds) Active Army did not bill
for 9 cases of field rations consumed by Army personnel while
supporting the siege 164

Active Army (Special Operations) did not bill for the following
services provided during the siege: 10, 793

 observers and technical liaisons to the FBI's hostage rescue team
operation of classified/ special equipment  training federal
agents in use of classified equipment

Total undercharges $98, 264 Overcharges

Texas National Guard overcharged for vehicular parts $41 Texas
National Guard overcharged for the loss of 8 Kevlar ground- troop
helmets 498

Total overcharges $539 Net undercharges $97, 725

Costs Waived by the Military in Support of the Appe ndi V x Branch
Davidian Operations Support Recipient Cost Authority for waiver
Alabama National Guard

2 overflights for reconnaissance photography of the ATF $1, 238 32
U. S. C.  112 (counterdrug) compound Subtotal $1,238

Active Army (Joint Task Force Six)

Counterdrug training ATF 5, 610 10 U. S. C.  377 (substantial
training benefit)

 Communications P. L. 101 510  1004 (b) 4 5

 Medical evacuation 10 U. S. C.  373

First aid  Firing- range support  Minor construction

Subtotal $5,610 Texas National Guard

UC- 26 aircraft ATF 8, 032 a 32 U. S. C.  112 (counterdrug)

 4 overflights of the compound for reconnaissance photography  1
flight in support of siege

Helicopter flights in support of warrant service ATF 15, 388 b 32
U. S. C.  112 (counterdrug) Helicopter flights in support of siege
ATF 2, 454 32 U. S. C.  112 (counterdrug) Personnel services in
siege

ATF and FBI 102,301 c 32 U. S. C.  112 (counterdrug)  Liaison,
command and control  Helicopter flight crews, drivers of various
vehicles  Vehicle and equipment maintenance

Fuel for non- tracked vehicles ATF and FBI 410 32 U. S. C.  112
(counterdrug) Landline and cellular telephone service ATF and FBI
1, 995 32 U. S. C.  112 (counterdrug)

Subtotal $130,580 Total amount of expenses waived by the military
$137,428

a Includes costs for flying hours, personnel, and special
maintenance contract. b Includes repair of gunshot damage
sustained in warrant service. c Total pay, per diem, and travel
(896 staff- days). All personnel were in title 32 (counterdrug
program) status.

Comments From the Department of the Appendi VI x Treasury

GAO United States General Accounting Office

GAO/ NSIAD/ OSI- 99- 133

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States General Accounting Office

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Contents

Contents Page 21 GAO/ NSIAD/ OSI- 99- 133 Department of Defense

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Appendix I

Appendix I Organizations Visited and Documents Reviewed

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Appendix II

Appendix II Statutes Related to Military Support of Branch
Davidian Operations

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Appendix II Statutes Related to Military Support of Branch
Davidian Operations

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Appendix III

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Appendix IV

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Appendix V

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Appendix VI

Appendix VI Comments From the Department of the Treasury

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Let t e r

Appendix VI Comments From the Department of the Treasury

Page 32 GAO/ NSIAD/ OSI- 99- 133 Department of Defense

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