Defense Acquisitions: Evaluation of Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare
Assessment (Letter Report, 07/12/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-85).

Congress directed the Defense Department (DOD) to conduct an
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assessment because of concerns that ASW
funding was falling relative to other Navy programs, that the Navy
lacked a clear plan for identifying ASW requirements and funding
priorities, and that ASW requirements were not being adequately
considered in establishing the Navy's overall funding priorities.
Congress directed that an assessment be done of ASW shortfalls and
capabilities supported by rigorous analysis and the establishment of
priorities among ASW programs. The Navy agreed to perform such a
quantitative analysis. This report reviews (1) DOD's 1997 ASW assessment
and (2) the role and the funding influence of the Navy's new
Antisubmarine Warfare Requirements Division.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-85
     TITLE:  Defense Acquisitions: Evaluation of Navy's Anti-Submarine
	     Warfare Assessment
      DATE:  07/12/1999
   SUBJECT:  Antisubmarine warfare
	     Naval warfare
	     Defense capabilities
	     Military budgets
	     Submarines
	     Weapons research and development
IDENTIFIER:  DOD Future Years Defense Program
	     Navy Ship Antisubmarine Warfare Readiness/Effectiveness
	     Measuring Program
	     Navy Surface Antisubmarine Warfare Program
	     Navy Compact Low Frequency Active Development Program
	     Navy Antisubmarine Warfare Assessment
	     Navy Lightweight Hybrid Torpedo Development Program
	     Navy Advanced Deployable System Development Program

******************************************************************
** This file contains an ASCII representation of the text of a  **
** GAO report.  This text was extracted from a PDF file.        **
** Delineations within the text indicating chapter titles,      **
** headings, and bullets have not been preserved, and in some   **
** cases heading text has been incorrectly merged into          **
** body text in the adjacent column.  Graphic images have       **
** not been reproduced, but figure captions are included.       **
** Tables are included, but column deliniations have not been   **
** preserved.                                                   **
**                                                              **
** Please see the PDF (Portable Document Format) file, when     **
** available, for a complete electronic file of the printed     **
** document's contents.                                         **
**                                                              **
** A printed copy of this report may be obtained from the GAO   **
** Document Distribution Center.  For further details, please   **
** send an e-mail message to:                                   **
**                                                              **
**                                            **
**                                                              **
** with the message 'info' in the body.                         **
******************************************************************

    United States General Accounting Office GAO                Report
    to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
    Military Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services,
    House of Representatives July 1999          DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
    Evaluation of Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare Assessment GAO/NSIAD-
    99-85 United States General Accounting Office
    National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
    International Affairs Division B-280335
    Letter July 12, 1999 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman The
    Honorable Owen B. Pickett Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
    Military Research and Development Committee on Armed Services
    House of Representatives This letter responds to your request that
    we review (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) 1997 antisubmarine
    warfare (ASW) assessment and (2) the role and funding influence of
    the Navy's recently established Antisubmarine Warfare Requirements
    Division.  The conferees on the Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense
    Authorization Act directed the ASW assessment and supported the
    establishment of the ASW Requirements Division in response to
    concerns that ASW funding was declining relative to other Navy
    programs, the Navy lacked a clear plan for identifying ASW
    requirements and funding priorities, and ASW requirements were not
    being adequately considered in establishing overall Navy funding
    priorities.  The conferees directed an assessment be made of ASW
    shortfalls and capabilities supported by a rigorous analysis and
    the establishment of priorities among ASW programs.  To meet this
    congressional directive, the Navy said it would perform a
    quantitative analysis of ASW shortfalls and capabilities. As
    agreed with your representative, we reviewed the assessment to
    determine the extent it was responsive to these requirements and
    provided a sound basis for making resource allocation decisions.
    In reviewing the ASW Requirements Division, we identified
    activities it had taken to influence ASW funding decisions and the
    outcomes of those decisions. Results in Brief
    The ASW assessment concluded that proficiency had declined and
    that the programs and funding levels in the fiscal year 1999
    budget, as proposed at the time of the assessment, provided for
    adequate equipment to respond to the most likely threats.
    However, in providing its conclusions, the assessment notes
    concerns regarding the data available for its analysis. The
    assessment noted that tools for quantitatively assessing ASW
    Letter           Page 1
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 performance--
    particularly modeling and simulation tools--and available ASW
    studies and fleet exercise data are deficient.  Much of the
    assessment's modeling data was based on open-ocean ASW rather than
    the more complex littoral environment where the Navy now believes
    the most likely threat exists.  In our view, the assessment was
    not fully responsive to the conferees' direction because (1) it
    was not supported by a rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and
    capabilities, (2) information to support the assessment's findings
    was not always complete, and (3) priorities among ASW programs
    were not established.  The Navy has subsequently provided Congress
    with an ASW Roadmap that places ASW programs in one of three
    priority categories but does not identify program priorities
    within each category.  The absence of complete and reliable data--
    particularly on ASW operations in the littoral--and the absence of
    program priorities limit the assessment's value in making resource
    allocation decisions. The ASW Requirements Division, which
    prepared the 1997 assessment, has sought to influence Navy ASW
    funding decisions in the fiscal year 1999 and 2000 budget
    submissions through briefings and meetings with resource sponsors
    and senior Navy officials, including the Chief of Naval
    Operations. The Division believes it has had some success in
    influencing decisions to fund early ASW-related research and
    development projects within the Office of Naval Research and to
    restore funding for a number of ASW programs whose funding had
    been reduced, deferred, or eliminated by platform divisions under
    the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare
    Requirements, and Assessment. Background              The primary
    goal of ASW is to deny the enemy the effective use of submarines.
    To accomplish this goal, the Navy uses ASW systems on surface
    ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters and
    fixed systems to detect, track, classify, localize, and destroy
    threat submarines.  Such systems include acoustic and nonacoustic
    sensors and torpedoes. Most current ASW systems were designed
    during the Cold War to pursue nuclear submarines operating in the
    open-ocean environment.  During this period, ASW was one of the
    Navy's highest priority missions because of the global threat
    posed to the United States by submarines of the former Soviet
    Union.  Since the end of the Cold War, DOD has shifted its focus
    to regional threats and conflicts.  As part of this shift, the
    Navy is  emphasizing pursuing smaller diesel-electric submarines
    operating in the more acoustically complex littoral environment.
    Letter    Page 2                                       GAO/NSIAD-
    99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 During the Cold War era, naval
    forces were trained, organized, and equipped to counter the Soviet
    influence throughout the world.  With the end of the Cold War and
    the subsequent decline in defense budgets, the Navy recognized the
    need to reshape its forces for regional contingencies.
    Consequently, the Navy began focusing its resources on joint
    operations in the world's littoral areas.  As a result, ASW when
    compared to joint mission areas, such as strike warfare, antiair
    warfare, missile defense, and amphibious warfare, often received a
    lower funding priority.  For example, the Navy's fiscal year 1999
    budget projected a decline from about $884 million for ASW
    research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), or about 10.9
    percent of the Navy's RDT&E budget for fiscal year 1999, to about
    $566 million or about 6.8 percent for fiscal year 2003. The 1997
    assessment, which was submitted in March 1998, was required
    because the previous 1996 assessment did not meet congressional
    needs. The 1996 assessment was to provide the defense committees a
    long-range plan for improving ASW capabilities against potential
    threats in both littoral and open ocean areas.  That assessment,
    however, did not include a rigorous analysis of ASW capabilities
    or establish program priorities. The newly established ASW
    Requirements Directorate prepared the 1997 assessment.  The
    Directorate was established in September 1996 under the Deputy
    Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and
    Assessment, to determine and assess Navy requirements in the ASW
    mission area.  The Deputy Chief serves as the Chief of Naval
    Operations'(CNO) principal advisor in determining warfare
    requirements and allocating resources among surface, submarine,
    and air warfare divisions; the Expeditionary Warfare Division; and
    the Special Programs Division.  In September 1998, after a period
    of evaluation, the Directorate was formally elevated to a
    permanently staffed division headed by a Navy captain assigned to
    a flag rank billet. The ASW Requirements Division monitors
    platform division program proposals and identifies and provides
    support for ASW programs.  The Division has no direct control over
    RDT&E or procurement funds but communicates ASW requirements and
    capabilities to the platform divisions and the Deputy CNO. Page 3
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 Data Deficiencies
    Limit  In its ASW assessment, the Navy concluded that proficiency
    had declined Responsiveness to                and that the
    programs and funding levels in the fiscal year 1999 budget, as
    proposed at the time of the assessment, provided for adequate
    equipment Congressional                    to respond to the most
    likely threats.  However, in providing its Directions
    conclusions, the Navy noted concerns regarding the data available
    for its analysis.  Much of the assessment's modeling data was
    based on open-ocean ASW rather than the more complex littoral
    environment where the Navy now believes the most likely threat
    exists.  In our view, the assessment was not fully responsive to
    the conferees' direction because (1) it was not supported by a
    rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and capabilities, (2)
    information to support the assessment's findings was not always
    complete, and (3) priorities among ASW programs were not
    established.  The absence of complete and reliable data--
    particularly on ASW operations in the littoral--and the absence of
    program priorities limit the assessment's value in making resource
    allocation decisions The 1997 ASW Assessment   In its 1997
    assessment, the Navy concluded that ASW proficiency had declined
    and that effective organization, comprehensive training, and
    modern equipment were needed to optimize proficiency.  The
    assessment noted that organizational improvements were needed to
    provide an integrated approach to ASW and pointed to the
    establishment of the ASW Requirements Division as a step in the
    right direction.  The assessment also noted that the opportunity
    to practice ASW had declined because many units are now required
    to perform multiple missions.  For example, it cited the change in
    mission of the S-3 aircraft.  Designed as the primary ASW aircraft
    flown from aircraft carriers, the S-3 has now become the air
    refueling platform for the carrier air wing and is not being used
    for the ASW mission.  The assessment further noted the potential
    to gain greater performance from ASW systems.  The assessment
    concluded that the program of record--programs and funding levels-
    -in the proposed fiscal year 1999 budget provides for adequate
    equipment to respond to likely threats to the end of the Future
    Years Defense Plan. The 1997 assessment, which was prepared by the
    ASW Requirements Division, was based on data collected from many
    diverse sources, including fleet observations, at-sea exercises,
    studies, and simulations.  However, the Requirements Division
    noted concerns regarding the data available for its analysis.  The
    Division noted that it initially expected to provide a
    straightforward quantitative analysis and that the evidence would
    be consistent and the metrics contained in the evidence would be
    Page 4                                       GAO/NSIAD-99-85
    Defense Acquisitions B-280335 unambiguous.  Division officials
    said that tools for quantitatively assessing ASW performance--
    particularly modeling and simulation tools--and available ASW
    studies and fleet exercise data are deficient.  They stated that
    studies to support ASW investment decisions are often too narrowly
    focused and the whole system of identifying ASW shortfalls and
    correcting them is fragmented. Assessment Not Fully
    The conferees on the Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense
    Authorization Act, Responsive to                        in
    directing  the Navy to assess ASW capabilities and shortfalls,
    stated that Congressional Direction              the assessment be
    supported by a rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and
    capabilities and establish  priorities among ASW programs.
    Assessment Lacks Complete and  The Navy could not rely on the use
    of modeling and simulation to Reliable Quantitative Analyses of
    quantitatively analyze ASW capabilities and shortfalls because
    most of the ASW Capabilities and Shortfalls    models are based on
    open-ocean conditions rather than shallow water littoral
    conditions that the Navy believes are the most likely future
    submarine threat environment.  Moreover, the models have not been
    updated to adequately depict acoustic and environmental conditions
    found in the littorals or the way the fleet operates during ASW
    at-sea exercises. For example, the Navy said the models * do not
    use multiple types of ocean bottoms, such as hilly or rocky
    bottoms; * do not reflect complex sound velocity profiles
    typically found in the littoral environment; * assume incorrectly
    that the loss of signal strength over distance is the same in both
    littoral and open-ocean environments; * do not adequately account
    for littoral environmental conditions such as changes in
    temperature and levels of salinity; and * make performance
    predictions based only on one-on-one platform engagements, rather
    than combined ASW force operations. The lack of quantitative
    modeling analyses of ASW capabilities and shortfalls in shallow
    water littoral conditions raises concerns regarding the basis and
    support for the assessment's conclusions and its usefulness for
    making resource allocation decisions.  A Navy modeling official
    stated that about $1.5 million would be required annually to
    upgrade and maintain the full spectrum of ASW simulations and
    models.  The official noted that the Undersea Warfare Center
    received $200,000 to analyze how the littoral environment
    adversely affected ASW system performance during one Page 5
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 specific at-sea
    training exercise and that this data will be used to improve its
    models. Information to Support Findings  The assessment contained
    significant ASW data and analyses, but in Was Not Always Complete
    several areas the information was not complete.  Examples included
    (1) information from ASW at-sea exercises; (2) plans for
    addressing threats from the most advanced submarines; (3)
    information on key ASW command, control, communication, and
    intelligence requirements, capabilities and shortfalls; and (4)
    the impacts of using multiple platforms to conduct ASW.   In
    addition, the assessment's conclusions assumed higher funding
    levels for ASW programs than were ultimately budgeted. At-sea
    Exercises                    To assess the performance of ASW
    systems, the Navy analyzed the results of at-sea exercises
    conducted under the Ship Antisubmarine Warfare
    Readiness/Effectiveness Measuring program in both open ocean and
    littoral environments.  The assessment concluded that ASW
    proficiency had declined.  However, the exercise data did not
    provide information on the causes for the reduced performance, and
    the assessment did not address the impact of environmental
    conditions on ASW performance.  In addition, exercise data on
    torpedo performance was based on a limited number of firings.
    Officials of the Surface Warfare Development Group told us that
    the small number of torpedo firings in shallow water littoral
    environments made it practically impossible to draw conclusions on
    torpedo performance. Advanced Submarine Threat           ASW
    modeling results against a technologically advanced nuclear
    submarine in the open ocean identified a number of shortfalls.
    The assessment discussed the capabilities and shortfalls of ASW
    systems against the more advanced threat but provided little
    information on plans to address these shortfalls.  According to
    Navy officials, the assessment did not address the shortfalls
    because it assumed the most likely threat would be a diesel
    submarine operating in the littoral environment.  The assessment
    concluded that the program of record in the proposed President's
    fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the likely submarine
    threat to the end of 2003. Command, Control,                   The
    assessment did not evaluate ASW command, control, communication,
    Communications, and                 and intelligence (C3I)
    capabilities and shortfalls.  Because a small, Intelligence Issues
    slow-moving, and quiet diesel submarine operating in the littoral
    is difficult for ASW platforms to detect, there is a greater need
    for ASW platforms to share submarine threat data.  The assessment
    recognized C3I systems as Page 6
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 important components
    of ASW but did not include information on current requirements,
    capabilities, or shortfalls. Using Combined Platforms      The
    assessment did not address the use of combinations of ASW assets
    to detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines.  Attrition rates
    in the Navy campaign warfare models considered only one-on-one ASW
    engagements to predict the number of enemy submarines detected and
    destroyed over time.  The predictions do not reflect the increased
    effectiveness of combined air, surface, and subsurface assets that
    the Navy plans to use in littoral ASW operations. Funding Changes
    The assessment's conclusion that there would be adequate ASW
    capabilities to respond to the most likely threats was based on
    program and funding levels projected at the time of the assessment
    in the fiscal year 1999 budget.  However, ASW funding projected in
    the fiscal year 2000 budget submission was lower than the fiscal
    year 1999 budget projections. For example, the Navy reduced
    funding for the Lightweight Hybrid MK-54 Torpedo program, which
    will delay the torpedo's introduction into the fleet by 2 years.
    Also, the MK-50 Lightweight Torpedo Phase II shallow water upgrade
    was canceled because of funding constraints. Assessment Identifies
    ASW     The assessment concluded that the ASW program of record as
    contained in Needs but Not Priorities      the proposed
    President's fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the
    likely future threat and identified the following near-, mid-, and
    long-term ASW mission requirements. * Near-term requirements *
    Improve ASW crew proficiency by increasing training. * Buy
    additional towed array sensors for submarines. * Develop an ASW
    system for the new DD-21 destroyer. * Accelerate MK-48 torpedo
    upgrades. * Mid-term requirements * Further improve the
    proficiency of the entire ASW team. * Develop operational concepts
    for network centric operations. * Long-term requirements * Develop
    long endurance sensors and unmanned ASW vehicles. * Design sensors
    that automatically adjust to a complex acoustic environment. The
    assessment did not establish ASW program priorities. However, the
    Navy subsequently developed an integrated ASW Roadmap that defines
    and Page 7                                        GAO/NSIAD-99-85
    Defense Acquisitions B-280335 prioritizes a set of broad ASW
    requirements.  This document (1) places each ASW-related
    requirement into its primary functional area (i.e., surveillance,
    detection, and  localization) and (2) prioritizes each requirement
    into three priority categories-essential, critical, and important.
    This document was completed in late February 1999 and provided to
    Congress.  Although the Roadmap does provide priorities by
    category, it does not prioritize programs within the three
    priority categories.  Thus, the Roadmap would be of little value
    in making funding decisions among all the programs identified as
    essential. Requirements Division  In addition to preparing the
    1997 assessment, ASW Requirements Division Seeks to Influence
    officials told us they have sought to restore funding for a number
    of ASW programs whose proposed funding had been reduced or
    eliminated.  For ASW Funding Priorities  the most part, the ASW
    Requirements Division sought to influence funding and Decisions
    decisions by the primary resource sponsors-the Surface, Submarine,
    and Air Warfare Divisions.  They also sought to influence the
    funding of early ASW-related research and development projects
    within the Office of Naval Research (ONR). Efforts to Influence
    Fiscal      According to Division officials, they reviewed the
    fiscal year 1999 platform Year 1999 Funding
    division program proposals and identified ASW programs for which
    funds had been deferred or deleted and sought to have funding
    restored on those programs they considered to be most important.
    Since the 1997 ASW assessment had not yet been completed, the
    officials stated that they used their judgment in making
    recommendations affecting fiscal year 1999 program proposals.
    Examples of their efforts to influence fiscal year 1999 funding
    decisions are presented below.  We could not determine that the
    Division's efforts were the sole cause for the funding decisions,
    but we did verify the Division's  actions and the final outcome of
    the funding decision-making process based on documents and records
    of meetings and decisions. During development of its fiscal year
    1999 program plan, the Surface Warfare Division proposed delaying
    the initial operating capability for the Lightweight Hybrid
    Torpedo Development Program from fiscal year 2001 to 2005. This
    would have potentially made available for other uses about $82
    million of the torpedo's planned funding over the fiscal year 1999
    to 2003 period.  Because ASW Requirements Division officials
    believed that the program represented an important and needed
    capability for surface combatants and air platforms, they
    questioned the proposed reduction Page 8
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 during a July 1997
    meeting attended by surface, submarine, and air division
    directors.  Though no specific funding restoration decision was
    made at that meeting, about $58 million was eventually restored to
    the program plan.  According to an official from the Programming
    Division, the restored funds permitted the program's initial
    operating capability to be moved back up to fiscal year 2003. The
    ASW Requirements Division also sought to influence ONR funding of
    ASW research projects.  For example, due to funding constraints,
    ONR staff tentatively decided to not conduct sea trials of an
    automated radar periscope detection and discrimination technology
    they had successfully tested on land.  Because this technology
    held promise for detecting diesel-electric submarines in littoral
    waters, the ASW Requirements Division Director, in an April 1,
    1998, memorandum, requested the Chief of Naval Research to support
    continued program testing in fiscal year 1998. On May 22, 1998,
    the Chief of Naval Research committed to providing the necessary
    funding to perform the sea trials during July 1998 and
    demonstrating the system aboard a research maritime patrol
    aircraft in fiscal year 1999. Efforts to Influence Fiscal     The
    1997 assessment indicated potential shortfalls in ASW programs
    Year 2000 Funding               related to (1) surveillance and
    cueing; (2) tactical sensors and systems needed to improve
    detection of submarines, including high search rate airborne
    platforms; and (3) torpedo upgrades.  Using these as a baseline
    reference, ASW Requirements Division officials sought to influence
    the resource sponsors during the fiscal year 2000 budget
    development process as shown in the following examples. As noted
    earlier, we could not determine that the ASW Requirements
    Division's efforts were the sole cause for the funding decision,
    but we did verify the Division's actions and the final outcome of
    the decision process. The Submarine Warfare Division, during
    development of its fiscal year 2000 program proposal, decided to
    terminate the Compact Low Frequency Active development program,
    resulting in the availability of $10.5 million in fiscal year 2000
    and 2001 development funding to apply to other division program
    needs.  Because this program would enhance a very limited ASW
    surveillance capability in littoral waters, the ASW Requirements
    Division Director, during an April 30, 1998, meeting with the
    Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments,
    and later with the CNO, recommended that the entire $10.5 million
    be restored to the program.  In late May 1998, the Submarine
    Warfare Division reinstated this Page 9
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 development program
    and restored a total of $22 million of development funding through
    fiscal year 2004. The Submarine Warfare Division proposed to delay
    the Advanced Deployable System development program, resulting in
    the availability of nearly $93 million in out-year development
    funding to apply to other division program needs.  This program
    would develop cueing to enhance the ability of Navy submarines and
    other ASW platforms to conduct ASW in littoral waters against
    diesel-electric submarines.  Because of this potential
    enhancement, the ASW Requirements Division Director, during an
    April 30, 1998, meeting with the Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare
    Requirements, and Assessments, and later with the CNO, recommended
    that the entire $93 million reduction be restored.  Based on the
    ASW Requirements Division Director's recommendation, $92.3 million
    was initially restored. Subsequent adjustments by the Navy
    Comptroller and DOD resulted in an additional $50.2 million being
    added to the program. Although it is not possible to directly or
    fully attribute the Division's actions to specific budget
    decisions, ASW Requirements Division officials noted that the
    fiscal year 2000 budget requested about $759 million for ASW-
    related RDT&E funding, or about 9.5 percent of the Navy's RDT&E
    budget for fiscal year 2000, and projected about $643 million, or
    about 7.8 percent of the Navy's RDT&E budget for fiscal year 2003.
    This $643 million amount is about $77 million more than the amount
    projected for 2003 in the fiscal year 1999 budget. Conclusions
    The Navy's 1997 assessment noted a number of deficiencies in the
    data that was available for its analysis.  The assessment was not
    fully responsive to congressional direction because of data
    limitations and concerns associated with the Navy's shift in ASW
    emphasis from open ocean to littoral operations.  Until more data
    and analyses of ASW operations and capabilities in the littoral
    become available, uncertainties will surround the effectiveness of
    ASW plans, programs, and capabilities.  The ASW Requirements
    Division has been active in its efforts to influence ASW funding
    decisions. Agency Comments and  In written comments, DOD concurred
    with a draft of this report Our Evaluation                 (see
    app. I).  DOD said the Navy has reaffirmed that ASW is a priority
    mission as well as a core and enduring competency.  The CNO has
    Page 10                                       GAO/NSIAD-99-85
    Defense Acquisitions B-280335 requested a systematic plan to
    tackle the issues identified in the 1997 ASW assessment and
    integrated roadmap and the ASW Requirements Division is leading
    the development of this plan.  DOD also provided technical
    clarifications that we incorporated as appropriate. Scope and
    To determine the extent that the 1997 ASW assessment included a
    Methodology      quantitative analysis of ASW capabilities and
    shortfalls, we reviewed the data and sources of information used
    to support the assessment's findings and conclusions.  This
    included discussions with officials of the ASW Requirements
    Division; Office of Naval Research; Office of Naval Intelligence;
    Naval Sea Systems Command, including the Surface Ship Directorate
    and Submarine Directorate; Naval Air Systems Command (ASW
    Division); and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport
    Division. We also interviewed officials of the Center for Naval
    Analyses; the Naval Surface Warfare Center; Presearch, Inc., a
    contractor that helped prepare the 1997 ASW assessment; and the
    former Director of Antisubmarine Warfare programs, who was
    responsible for preparing the 1996 ASW assessment.  We also
    reviewed modeling documentation prepared by the Naval Undersea
    Warfare Center, Newport Division.  We also discussed with Center
    officials the benefits and shortfalls of the Center's models the
    Navy planned to use to perform the quantitative analysis.  We
    discussed the deep water modeling used in the assessment with
    officials of Johns Hopkins University.  We also discussed modeling
    and simulation with the Director and Technical Director of the ASW
    Requirements Division. To determine if the Navy performed a
    sufficient detailed analysis to support the assessment's findings
    and conclusions, we performed a detailed review and analysis of
    the assessment.  We reviewed and analyzed the assessment to
    determine if it established or contained priorities among ASW
    programs. We also reviewed torpedo plans and performance
    particularly in shallow, littoral water. We obtained the views of
    an ASW Requirements Division torpedo official on the effectiveness
    and capabilities of lightweight and heavyweight torpedoes.  We
    reviewed and analyzed the Commander, Surface Warfare Development
    Group's March 1997 "Cross-Sharem Analysis of Antisubmarine Warfare
    Effectiveness in Shallow Water/Littoral Undersea Warfare
    Exercises."  We interviewed torpedo officials from the Undersea
    Weapons Program Office and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center,
    Newport Division.  We discussed torpedo data contained in the
    assessment with an official of the Surface Warfare Development
    Group.  We obtained and reviewed heavyweight and lightweight
    torpedo firing data in shallow/littoral water since the assessment
    was completed.  We also Page 11
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 obtained data on
    torpedo upgrades and the schedule status of the new MK-54
    Lightweight development program. To identify the impact and
    influence that the Division has had on Navy ASW funding decisions,
    we asked ASW Requirements Division staff to provide examples of
    where their influence affected funding decisions during
    development of the Navy's fiscal year 1999 and 2000 budget
    requests.  For each example identified, we determined the basis
    for the initiated action and collected supporting budget briefings
    and other documentation from both the Division and the respective
    Navy organization responsible for budgeting action.  We also
    reviewed Navy database documentation that supported the funding
    restorations. To identify trends in ASW funding, we first
    determined the ASW-related RDT&E programs included in the Navy's
    1997 ASW assessment report.  We then determined the Navy's funding
    projections applicable to these programs over the fiscal year 1999
    to 2003 period as contained in the fiscal year 1999 and 2000
    President's budgets.  In addition, we compared the ASW-related
    RDT&E funding projections to the Navy's funding projections of
    total RDT&E budget authority to arrive at the ASW-related
    percentage. We limited our analyses to RDT&E funding because of
    the difficulties associated with classifying the extent to which
    other appropriations are ASW-related.  Finally, we asked ASW
    Requirements Division officials to comment on funding projections
    of ASW-related RDT&E programs contained in the fiscal year 1999
    and 2000 President's budgets. We performed our review between
    August 1998 and April 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
    government auditing standards. We are also sending copies of this
    report to Senator John Warner, Chairman, and Senator Carl Levin,
    Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services;
    Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Senator Robert C. Byrd, Ranking
    Minority Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations; and
    Representative C.W. Bill Young, Chairman, and Representative David
    R. Obey, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on
    Appropriations.  We are also sending copies of this report to the
    Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable
    Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable William J.
    Lynn, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Honorable
    Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget.  Copies will
    also be made available to others upon request. Page 12
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 Please contact me on
    (202) 512-4841 or Richard Price on (202) 512-3630 if you or your
    staff have any questions concerning this report.  Key contributors
    to this assignment were John Heere, Richard Silveira, and Ralph
    Tavares. Sincerely yours, James F. Wiggins Associate Director
    Defense Acquisitions Issues Page 13
    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Comment from the
    Secretary of Defense                                 Appendix I
    (707360)      Letter    Page 14    GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense
    Acquisitions Ordering Information The first copy of each GAO
    report and testimony is free. Additional copies are $2 each.
    Orders should be sent to the following address, accompanied by a
    check or money order made out to the Superintendent of Documents,
    when necessary, VISA and MasterCard credit cards are accepted,
    also. Orders for 100 or more copies to be mailed to a single
    address are discounted 25 percent. Orders by mail: U.S. General
    Accounting Office P.O. Box 37050 Washington, DC  20013 or visit:
    Room 1100 700 4th St. NW (corner of 4th and G Sts. NW) U.S.
    General Accounting Office Washington, DC Orders may also be placed
    by calling (202) 512-6000 or by using fax number (202) 512-6061,
    or TDD (202) 512-2537. Each day, GAO issues a list of newly
    available reports and testimony.  To receive facsimile copies of
    the daily list or any list from the past 30 days, please call
    (202) 512-6000 using a touchtone phone.  A recorded menu will
    provide information on how to obtain these lists. For information
    on how to access GAO reports on the INTERNET, send an e-mail
    message with "info" in the body to: [email protected] or visit
    GAO's World Wide Web Home Page at: http://www.gao.gov United
    States                       Bulk Rate General Accounting Office
    Postage & Fees Paid Washington, D.C. 20548-0001            GAO
    Permit No. GI00 Official Business Penalty for Private Use $300
    Address Correction Requested

*** End of document. ***