Defense Acquisitions: Evaluation of Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare
Assessment (Letter Report, 07/12/1999, GAO/NSIAD-99-85).
Congress directed the Defense Department (DOD) to conduct an
anti-submarine warfare (ASW) assessment because of concerns that ASW
funding was falling relative to other Navy programs, that the Navy
lacked a clear plan for identifying ASW requirements and funding
priorities, and that ASW requirements were not being adequately
considered in establishing the Navy's overall funding priorities.
Congress directed that an assessment be done of ASW shortfalls and
capabilities supported by rigorous analysis and the establishment of
priorities among ASW programs. The Navy agreed to perform such a
quantitative analysis. This report reviews (1) DOD's 1997 ASW assessment
and (2) the role and the funding influence of the Navy's new
Antisubmarine Warfare Requirements Division.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-85
TITLE: Defense Acquisitions: Evaluation of Navy's Anti-Submarine
Warfare Assessment
DATE: 07/12/1999
SUBJECT: Antisubmarine warfare
Naval warfare
Defense capabilities
Military budgets
Submarines
Weapons research and development
IDENTIFIER: DOD Future Years Defense Program
Navy Ship Antisubmarine Warfare Readiness/Effectiveness
Measuring Program
Navy Surface Antisubmarine Warfare Program
Navy Compact Low Frequency Active Development Program
Navy Antisubmarine Warfare Assessment
Navy Lightweight Hybrid Torpedo Development Program
Navy Advanced Deployable System Development Program
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United States General Accounting Office GAO Report
to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Subcommittee on
Military Research and Development, Committee on Armed Services,
House of Representatives July 1999 DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS
Evaluation of Navy's Anti-Submarine Warfare Assessment GAO/NSIAD-
99-85 United States General Accounting Office
National Security and Washington, D.C. 20548
International Affairs Division B-280335
Letter July 12, 1999 The Honorable Curt Weldon Chairman The
Honorable Owen B. Pickett Ranking Minority Member Subcommittee on
Military Research and Development Committee on Armed Services
House of Representatives This letter responds to your request that
we review (1) the Department of Defense's (DOD) 1997 antisubmarine
warfare (ASW) assessment and (2) the role and funding influence of
the Navy's recently established Antisubmarine Warfare Requirements
Division. The conferees on the Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense
Authorization Act directed the ASW assessment and supported the
establishment of the ASW Requirements Division in response to
concerns that ASW funding was declining relative to other Navy
programs, the Navy lacked a clear plan for identifying ASW
requirements and funding priorities, and ASW requirements were not
being adequately considered in establishing overall Navy funding
priorities. The conferees directed an assessment be made of ASW
shortfalls and capabilities supported by a rigorous analysis and
the establishment of priorities among ASW programs. To meet this
congressional directive, the Navy said it would perform a
quantitative analysis of ASW shortfalls and capabilities. As
agreed with your representative, we reviewed the assessment to
determine the extent it was responsive to these requirements and
provided a sound basis for making resource allocation decisions.
In reviewing the ASW Requirements Division, we identified
activities it had taken to influence ASW funding decisions and the
outcomes of those decisions. Results in Brief
The ASW assessment concluded that proficiency had declined and
that the programs and funding levels in the fiscal year 1999
budget, as proposed at the time of the assessment, provided for
adequate equipment to respond to the most likely threats.
However, in providing its conclusions, the assessment notes
concerns regarding the data available for its analysis. The
assessment noted that tools for quantitatively assessing ASW
Letter Page 1
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 performance--
particularly modeling and simulation tools--and available ASW
studies and fleet exercise data are deficient. Much of the
assessment's modeling data was based on open-ocean ASW rather than
the more complex littoral environment where the Navy now believes
the most likely threat exists. In our view, the assessment was
not fully responsive to the conferees' direction because (1) it
was not supported by a rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and
capabilities, (2) information to support the assessment's findings
was not always complete, and (3) priorities among ASW programs
were not established. The Navy has subsequently provided Congress
with an ASW Roadmap that places ASW programs in one of three
priority categories but does not identify program priorities
within each category. The absence of complete and reliable data--
particularly on ASW operations in the littoral--and the absence of
program priorities limit the assessment's value in making resource
allocation decisions. The ASW Requirements Division, which
prepared the 1997 assessment, has sought to influence Navy ASW
funding decisions in the fiscal year 1999 and 2000 budget
submissions through briefings and meetings with resource sponsors
and senior Navy officials, including the Chief of Naval
Operations. The Division believes it has had some success in
influencing decisions to fund early ASW-related research and
development projects within the Office of Naval Research and to
restore funding for a number of ASW programs whose funding had
been reduced, deferred, or eliminated by platform divisions under
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare
Requirements, and Assessment. Background The primary
goal of ASW is to deny the enemy the effective use of submarines.
To accomplish this goal, the Navy uses ASW systems on surface
ships, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft, and helicopters and
fixed systems to detect, track, classify, localize, and destroy
threat submarines. Such systems include acoustic and nonacoustic
sensors and torpedoes. Most current ASW systems were designed
during the Cold War to pursue nuclear submarines operating in the
open-ocean environment. During this period, ASW was one of the
Navy's highest priority missions because of the global threat
posed to the United States by submarines of the former Soviet
Union. Since the end of the Cold War, DOD has shifted its focus
to regional threats and conflicts. As part of this shift, the
Navy is emphasizing pursuing smaller diesel-electric submarines
operating in the more acoustically complex littoral environment.
Letter Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-
99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 During the Cold War era, naval
forces were trained, organized, and equipped to counter the Soviet
influence throughout the world. With the end of the Cold War and
the subsequent decline in defense budgets, the Navy recognized the
need to reshape its forces for regional contingencies.
Consequently, the Navy began focusing its resources on joint
operations in the world's littoral areas. As a result, ASW when
compared to joint mission areas, such as strike warfare, antiair
warfare, missile defense, and amphibious warfare, often received a
lower funding priority. For example, the Navy's fiscal year 1999
budget projected a decline from about $884 million for ASW
research, development, test, and evaluation (RDT&E), or about 10.9
percent of the Navy's RDT&E budget for fiscal year 1999, to about
$566 million or about 6.8 percent for fiscal year 2003. The 1997
assessment, which was submitted in March 1998, was required
because the previous 1996 assessment did not meet congressional
needs. The 1996 assessment was to provide the defense committees a
long-range plan for improving ASW capabilities against potential
threats in both littoral and open ocean areas. That assessment,
however, did not include a rigorous analysis of ASW capabilities
or establish program priorities. The newly established ASW
Requirements Directorate prepared the 1997 assessment. The
Directorate was established in September 1996 under the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and
Assessment, to determine and assess Navy requirements in the ASW
mission area. The Deputy Chief serves as the Chief of Naval
Operations'(CNO) principal advisor in determining warfare
requirements and allocating resources among surface, submarine,
and air warfare divisions; the Expeditionary Warfare Division; and
the Special Programs Division. In September 1998, after a period
of evaluation, the Directorate was formally elevated to a
permanently staffed division headed by a Navy captain assigned to
a flag rank billet. The ASW Requirements Division monitors
platform division program proposals and identifies and provides
support for ASW programs. The Division has no direct control over
RDT&E or procurement funds but communicates ASW requirements and
capabilities to the platform divisions and the Deputy CNO. Page 3
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 Data Deficiencies
Limit In its ASW assessment, the Navy concluded that proficiency
had declined Responsiveness to and that the
programs and funding levels in the fiscal year 1999 budget, as
proposed at the time of the assessment, provided for adequate
equipment Congressional to respond to the most
likely threats. However, in providing its Directions
conclusions, the Navy noted concerns regarding the data available
for its analysis. Much of the assessment's modeling data was
based on open-ocean ASW rather than the more complex littoral
environment where the Navy now believes the most likely threat
exists. In our view, the assessment was not fully responsive to
the conferees' direction because (1) it was not supported by a
rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and capabilities, (2)
information to support the assessment's findings was not always
complete, and (3) priorities among ASW programs were not
established. The absence of complete and reliable data--
particularly on ASW operations in the littoral--and the absence of
program priorities limit the assessment's value in making resource
allocation decisions The 1997 ASW Assessment In its 1997
assessment, the Navy concluded that ASW proficiency had declined
and that effective organization, comprehensive training, and
modern equipment were needed to optimize proficiency. The
assessment noted that organizational improvements were needed to
provide an integrated approach to ASW and pointed to the
establishment of the ASW Requirements Division as a step in the
right direction. The assessment also noted that the opportunity
to practice ASW had declined because many units are now required
to perform multiple missions. For example, it cited the change in
mission of the S-3 aircraft. Designed as the primary ASW aircraft
flown from aircraft carriers, the S-3 has now become the air
refueling platform for the carrier air wing and is not being used
for the ASW mission. The assessment further noted the potential
to gain greater performance from ASW systems. The assessment
concluded that the program of record--programs and funding levels-
-in the proposed fiscal year 1999 budget provides for adequate
equipment to respond to likely threats to the end of the Future
Years Defense Plan. The 1997 assessment, which was prepared by the
ASW Requirements Division, was based on data collected from many
diverse sources, including fleet observations, at-sea exercises,
studies, and simulations. However, the Requirements Division
noted concerns regarding the data available for its analysis. The
Division noted that it initially expected to provide a
straightforward quantitative analysis and that the evidence would
be consistent and the metrics contained in the evidence would be
Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-85
Defense Acquisitions B-280335 unambiguous. Division officials
said that tools for quantitatively assessing ASW performance--
particularly modeling and simulation tools--and available ASW
studies and fleet exercise data are deficient. They stated that
studies to support ASW investment decisions are often too narrowly
focused and the whole system of identifying ASW shortfalls and
correcting them is fragmented. Assessment Not Fully
The conferees on the Fiscal Year 1997 National Defense
Authorization Act, Responsive to in
directing the Navy to assess ASW capabilities and shortfalls,
stated that Congressional Direction the assessment be
supported by a rigorous analysis of ASW shortfalls and
capabilities and establish priorities among ASW programs.
Assessment Lacks Complete and The Navy could not rely on the use
of modeling and simulation to Reliable Quantitative Analyses of
quantitatively analyze ASW capabilities and shortfalls because
most of the ASW Capabilities and Shortfalls models are based on
open-ocean conditions rather than shallow water littoral
conditions that the Navy believes are the most likely future
submarine threat environment. Moreover, the models have not been
updated to adequately depict acoustic and environmental conditions
found in the littorals or the way the fleet operates during ASW
at-sea exercises. For example, the Navy said the models * do not
use multiple types of ocean bottoms, such as hilly or rocky
bottoms; * do not reflect complex sound velocity profiles
typically found in the littoral environment; * assume incorrectly
that the loss of signal strength over distance is the same in both
littoral and open-ocean environments; * do not adequately account
for littoral environmental conditions such as changes in
temperature and levels of salinity; and * make performance
predictions based only on one-on-one platform engagements, rather
than combined ASW force operations. The lack of quantitative
modeling analyses of ASW capabilities and shortfalls in shallow
water littoral conditions raises concerns regarding the basis and
support for the assessment's conclusions and its usefulness for
making resource allocation decisions. A Navy modeling official
stated that about $1.5 million would be required annually to
upgrade and maintain the full spectrum of ASW simulations and
models. The official noted that the Undersea Warfare Center
received $200,000 to analyze how the littoral environment
adversely affected ASW system performance during one Page 5
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 specific at-sea
training exercise and that this data will be used to improve its
models. Information to Support Findings The assessment contained
significant ASW data and analyses, but in Was Not Always Complete
several areas the information was not complete. Examples included
(1) information from ASW at-sea exercises; (2) plans for
addressing threats from the most advanced submarines; (3)
information on key ASW command, control, communication, and
intelligence requirements, capabilities and shortfalls; and (4)
the impacts of using multiple platforms to conduct ASW. In
addition, the assessment's conclusions assumed higher funding
levels for ASW programs than were ultimately budgeted. At-sea
Exercises To assess the performance of ASW
systems, the Navy analyzed the results of at-sea exercises
conducted under the Ship Antisubmarine Warfare
Readiness/Effectiveness Measuring program in both open ocean and
littoral environments. The assessment concluded that ASW
proficiency had declined. However, the exercise data did not
provide information on the causes for the reduced performance, and
the assessment did not address the impact of environmental
conditions on ASW performance. In addition, exercise data on
torpedo performance was based on a limited number of firings.
Officials of the Surface Warfare Development Group told us that
the small number of torpedo firings in shallow water littoral
environments made it practically impossible to draw conclusions on
torpedo performance. Advanced Submarine Threat ASW
modeling results against a technologically advanced nuclear
submarine in the open ocean identified a number of shortfalls.
The assessment discussed the capabilities and shortfalls of ASW
systems against the more advanced threat but provided little
information on plans to address these shortfalls. According to
Navy officials, the assessment did not address the shortfalls
because it assumed the most likely threat would be a diesel
submarine operating in the littoral environment. The assessment
concluded that the program of record in the proposed President's
fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the likely submarine
threat to the end of 2003. Command, Control, The
assessment did not evaluate ASW command, control, communication,
Communications, and and intelligence (C3I)
capabilities and shortfalls. Because a small, Intelligence Issues
slow-moving, and quiet diesel submarine operating in the littoral
is difficult for ASW platforms to detect, there is a greater need
for ASW platforms to share submarine threat data. The assessment
recognized C3I systems as Page 6
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 important components
of ASW but did not include information on current requirements,
capabilities, or shortfalls. Using Combined Platforms The
assessment did not address the use of combinations of ASW assets
to detect, track, and destroy enemy submarines. Attrition rates
in the Navy campaign warfare models considered only one-on-one ASW
engagements to predict the number of enemy submarines detected and
destroyed over time. The predictions do not reflect the increased
effectiveness of combined air, surface, and subsurface assets that
the Navy plans to use in littoral ASW operations. Funding Changes
The assessment's conclusion that there would be adequate ASW
capabilities to respond to the most likely threats was based on
program and funding levels projected at the time of the assessment
in the fiscal year 1999 budget. However, ASW funding projected in
the fiscal year 2000 budget submission was lower than the fiscal
year 1999 budget projections. For example, the Navy reduced
funding for the Lightweight Hybrid MK-54 Torpedo program, which
will delay the torpedo's introduction into the fleet by 2 years.
Also, the MK-50 Lightweight Torpedo Phase II shallow water upgrade
was canceled because of funding constraints. Assessment Identifies
ASW The assessment concluded that the ASW program of record as
contained in Needs but Not Priorities the proposed
President's fiscal year 1999 budget was adequate to meet the
likely future threat and identified the following near-, mid-, and
long-term ASW mission requirements. * Near-term requirements *
Improve ASW crew proficiency by increasing training. * Buy
additional towed array sensors for submarines. * Develop an ASW
system for the new DD-21 destroyer. * Accelerate MK-48 torpedo
upgrades. * Mid-term requirements * Further improve the
proficiency of the entire ASW team. * Develop operational concepts
for network centric operations. * Long-term requirements * Develop
long endurance sensors and unmanned ASW vehicles. * Design sensors
that automatically adjust to a complex acoustic environment. The
assessment did not establish ASW program priorities. However, the
Navy subsequently developed an integrated ASW Roadmap that defines
and Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-85
Defense Acquisitions B-280335 prioritizes a set of broad ASW
requirements. This document (1) places each ASW-related
requirement into its primary functional area (i.e., surveillance,
detection, and localization) and (2) prioritizes each requirement
into three priority categories-essential, critical, and important.
This document was completed in late February 1999 and provided to
Congress. Although the Roadmap does provide priorities by
category, it does not prioritize programs within the three
priority categories. Thus, the Roadmap would be of little value
in making funding decisions among all the programs identified as
essential. Requirements Division In addition to preparing the
1997 assessment, ASW Requirements Division Seeks to Influence
officials told us they have sought to restore funding for a number
of ASW programs whose proposed funding had been reduced or
eliminated. For ASW Funding Priorities the most part, the ASW
Requirements Division sought to influence funding and Decisions
decisions by the primary resource sponsors-the Surface, Submarine,
and Air Warfare Divisions. They also sought to influence the
funding of early ASW-related research and development projects
within the Office of Naval Research (ONR). Efforts to Influence
Fiscal According to Division officials, they reviewed the
fiscal year 1999 platform Year 1999 Funding
division program proposals and identified ASW programs for which
funds had been deferred or deleted and sought to have funding
restored on those programs they considered to be most important.
Since the 1997 ASW assessment had not yet been completed, the
officials stated that they used their judgment in making
recommendations affecting fiscal year 1999 program proposals.
Examples of their efforts to influence fiscal year 1999 funding
decisions are presented below. We could not determine that the
Division's efforts were the sole cause for the funding decisions,
but we did verify the Division's actions and the final outcome of
the funding decision-making process based on documents and records
of meetings and decisions. During development of its fiscal year
1999 program plan, the Surface Warfare Division proposed delaying
the initial operating capability for the Lightweight Hybrid
Torpedo Development Program from fiscal year 2001 to 2005. This
would have potentially made available for other uses about $82
million of the torpedo's planned funding over the fiscal year 1999
to 2003 period. Because ASW Requirements Division officials
believed that the program represented an important and needed
capability for surface combatants and air platforms, they
questioned the proposed reduction Page 8
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 during a July 1997
meeting attended by surface, submarine, and air division
directors. Though no specific funding restoration decision was
made at that meeting, about $58 million was eventually restored to
the program plan. According to an official from the Programming
Division, the restored funds permitted the program's initial
operating capability to be moved back up to fiscal year 2003. The
ASW Requirements Division also sought to influence ONR funding of
ASW research projects. For example, due to funding constraints,
ONR staff tentatively decided to not conduct sea trials of an
automated radar periscope detection and discrimination technology
they had successfully tested on land. Because this technology
held promise for detecting diesel-electric submarines in littoral
waters, the ASW Requirements Division Director, in an April 1,
1998, memorandum, requested the Chief of Naval Research to support
continued program testing in fiscal year 1998. On May 22, 1998,
the Chief of Naval Research committed to providing the necessary
funding to perform the sea trials during July 1998 and
demonstrating the system aboard a research maritime patrol
aircraft in fiscal year 1999. Efforts to Influence Fiscal The
1997 assessment indicated potential shortfalls in ASW programs
Year 2000 Funding related to (1) surveillance and
cueing; (2) tactical sensors and systems needed to improve
detection of submarines, including high search rate airborne
platforms; and (3) torpedo upgrades. Using these as a baseline
reference, ASW Requirements Division officials sought to influence
the resource sponsors during the fiscal year 2000 budget
development process as shown in the following examples. As noted
earlier, we could not determine that the ASW Requirements
Division's efforts were the sole cause for the funding decision,
but we did verify the Division's actions and the final outcome of
the decision process. The Submarine Warfare Division, during
development of its fiscal year 2000 program proposal, decided to
terminate the Compact Low Frequency Active development program,
resulting in the availability of $10.5 million in fiscal year 2000
and 2001 development funding to apply to other division program
needs. Because this program would enhance a very limited ASW
surveillance capability in littoral waters, the ASW Requirements
Division Director, during an April 30, 1998, meeting with the
Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare Requirements, and Assessments,
and later with the CNO, recommended that the entire $10.5 million
be restored to the program. In late May 1998, the Submarine
Warfare Division reinstated this Page 9
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 development program
and restored a total of $22 million of development funding through
fiscal year 2004. The Submarine Warfare Division proposed to delay
the Advanced Deployable System development program, resulting in
the availability of nearly $93 million in out-year development
funding to apply to other division program needs. This program
would develop cueing to enhance the ability of Navy submarines and
other ASW platforms to conduct ASW in littoral waters against
diesel-electric submarines. Because of this potential
enhancement, the ASW Requirements Division Director, during an
April 30, 1998, meeting with the Deputy CNO for Resources, Warfare
Requirements, and Assessments, and later with the CNO, recommended
that the entire $93 million reduction be restored. Based on the
ASW Requirements Division Director's recommendation, $92.3 million
was initially restored. Subsequent adjustments by the Navy
Comptroller and DOD resulted in an additional $50.2 million being
added to the program. Although it is not possible to directly or
fully attribute the Division's actions to specific budget
decisions, ASW Requirements Division officials noted that the
fiscal year 2000 budget requested about $759 million for ASW-
related RDT&E funding, or about 9.5 percent of the Navy's RDT&E
budget for fiscal year 2000, and projected about $643 million, or
about 7.8 percent of the Navy's RDT&E budget for fiscal year 2003.
This $643 million amount is about $77 million more than the amount
projected for 2003 in the fiscal year 1999 budget. Conclusions
The Navy's 1997 assessment noted a number of deficiencies in the
data that was available for its analysis. The assessment was not
fully responsive to congressional direction because of data
limitations and concerns associated with the Navy's shift in ASW
emphasis from open ocean to littoral operations. Until more data
and analyses of ASW operations and capabilities in the littoral
become available, uncertainties will surround the effectiveness of
ASW plans, programs, and capabilities. The ASW Requirements
Division has been active in its efforts to influence ASW funding
decisions. Agency Comments and In written comments, DOD concurred
with a draft of this report Our Evaluation (see
app. I). DOD said the Navy has reaffirmed that ASW is a priority
mission as well as a core and enduring competency. The CNO has
Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-85
Defense Acquisitions B-280335 requested a systematic plan to
tackle the issues identified in the 1997 ASW assessment and
integrated roadmap and the ASW Requirements Division is leading
the development of this plan. DOD also provided technical
clarifications that we incorporated as appropriate. Scope and
To determine the extent that the 1997 ASW assessment included a
Methodology quantitative analysis of ASW capabilities and
shortfalls, we reviewed the data and sources of information used
to support the assessment's findings and conclusions. This
included discussions with officials of the ASW Requirements
Division; Office of Naval Research; Office of Naval Intelligence;
Naval Sea Systems Command, including the Surface Ship Directorate
and Submarine Directorate; Naval Air Systems Command (ASW
Division); and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, Newport
Division. We also interviewed officials of the Center for Naval
Analyses; the Naval Surface Warfare Center; Presearch, Inc., a
contractor that helped prepare the 1997 ASW assessment; and the
former Director of Antisubmarine Warfare programs, who was
responsible for preparing the 1996 ASW assessment. We also
reviewed modeling documentation prepared by the Naval Undersea
Warfare Center, Newport Division. We also discussed with Center
officials the benefits and shortfalls of the Center's models the
Navy planned to use to perform the quantitative analysis. We
discussed the deep water modeling used in the assessment with
officials of Johns Hopkins University. We also discussed modeling
and simulation with the Director and Technical Director of the ASW
Requirements Division. To determine if the Navy performed a
sufficient detailed analysis to support the assessment's findings
and conclusions, we performed a detailed review and analysis of
the assessment. We reviewed and analyzed the assessment to
determine if it established or contained priorities among ASW
programs. We also reviewed torpedo plans and performance
particularly in shallow, littoral water. We obtained the views of
an ASW Requirements Division torpedo official on the effectiveness
and capabilities of lightweight and heavyweight torpedoes. We
reviewed and analyzed the Commander, Surface Warfare Development
Group's March 1997 "Cross-Sharem Analysis of Antisubmarine Warfare
Effectiveness in Shallow Water/Littoral Undersea Warfare
Exercises." We interviewed torpedo officials from the Undersea
Weapons Program Office and the Naval Undersea Warfare Center,
Newport Division. We discussed torpedo data contained in the
assessment with an official of the Surface Warfare Development
Group. We obtained and reviewed heavyweight and lightweight
torpedo firing data in shallow/littoral water since the assessment
was completed. We also Page 11
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 obtained data on
torpedo upgrades and the schedule status of the new MK-54
Lightweight development program. To identify the impact and
influence that the Division has had on Navy ASW funding decisions,
we asked ASW Requirements Division staff to provide examples of
where their influence affected funding decisions during
development of the Navy's fiscal year 1999 and 2000 budget
requests. For each example identified, we determined the basis
for the initiated action and collected supporting budget briefings
and other documentation from both the Division and the respective
Navy organization responsible for budgeting action. We also
reviewed Navy database documentation that supported the funding
restorations. To identify trends in ASW funding, we first
determined the ASW-related RDT&E programs included in the Navy's
1997 ASW assessment report. We then determined the Navy's funding
projections applicable to these programs over the fiscal year 1999
to 2003 period as contained in the fiscal year 1999 and 2000
President's budgets. In addition, we compared the ASW-related
RDT&E funding projections to the Navy's funding projections of
total RDT&E budget authority to arrive at the ASW-related
percentage. We limited our analyses to RDT&E funding because of
the difficulties associated with classifying the extent to which
other appropriations are ASW-related. Finally, we asked ASW
Requirements Division officials to comment on funding projections
of ASW-related RDT&E programs contained in the fiscal year 1999
and 2000 President's budgets. We performed our review between
August 1998 and April 1999 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. We are also sending copies of this
report to Senator John Warner, Chairman, and Senator Carl Levin,
Ranking Minority Member, Senate Committee on Armed Services;
Senator Ted Stevens, Chairman, and Senator Robert C. Byrd, Ranking
Minority Member, Senate Committee on Appropriations; and
Representative C.W. Bill Young, Chairman, and Representative David
R. Obey, Ranking Minority Member, House Committee on
Appropriations. We are also sending copies of this report to the
Honorable William Cohen, Secretary of Defense; the Honorable
Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy; the Honorable William J.
Lynn, Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Honorable
Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and Budget. Copies will
also be made available to others upon request. Page 12
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions B-280335 Please contact me on
(202) 512-4841 or Richard Price on (202) 512-3630 if you or your
staff have any questions concerning this report. Key contributors
to this assignment were John Heere, Richard Silveira, and Ralph
Tavares. Sincerely yours, James F. Wiggins Associate Director
Defense Acquisitions Issues Page 13
GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense Acquisitions Appendix I Comment from the
Secretary of Defense Appendix I
(707360) Letter Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-85 Defense
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