Military Safety: Army M939 5-Ton Truck Accident History and Planned
Modifications (Letter Report, 04/09/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-82).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the Army's M939 series
5-ton tactical cargo truck, focusing on the: (1) extent to which
accidents involving the truck have occurred; and (2) results of Army
studies on the truck's design and its plans to address any identified
deficiencies.
GAO noted that: (1) GAO's analyses and an Army analysis indicate a
higher rate of accidents involving the M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo
truck than other comparison vehicles; (2) GAO's analysis of January 1987
through June 1998 accident data showed that, while M939s made up an
average of about 9 percent of the Army motor vehicle fleet during that
time, about 34 percent of the fleet's accidents resulting in fatalities
of vehicle occupants involved these trucks; (3) 44 percent of accidents
that involved a rollover and resulted in fatalities of vehicle occupants
involved the M939; (4) GAO's comparison of Department of Transportation
accident statistics and M939 accident statistics showed that over a
10-year period, the fatality rate for occupants of the M939 averaged
about 30 times higher than the fatality rate for occupants of comparably
sized commercial trucks; (5) an Army Safety Center analysis found that
the chance of a fatality in a M939 was 3 to 21 times higher than in
other similar military trucks in the Army motor vehicle fleet--the
M34/M35 series 2 1/2 ton trucks; (6) the Army plans to spend an
estimated $234 million on various modifications to improve the M939's
safety and operational performance; (7) based on the results of studies
into the root causes of M939 accidents, the Army concluded that the
overall truck design was sound, but some modifications were necessary;
(8) the Army plans to use the $234 million to add anti-lock brake kits,
alter brake proportioning specifications, upgrade the truck's tires,
install cab rollover crush protection, and modify the accelerator
linkage; (9) most modifications will be completed by 2005; and (10) the
M939s will remain in service as these modifications are made.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-82
TITLE: Military Safety: Army M939 5-Ton Truck Accident History and
Planned Modifications
DATE: 04/09/99
SUBJECT: Motor vehicle safety
Military training
Military land vehicles
Traffic accidents
Transportation statistics
Armed forces reserve training
Transportation safety
Accident prevention
IDENTIFIER: M939 Truck
M34 Truck
M35 Truck
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Cover
================================================================ COVER
Report to Congressional Requesters
April 1999
MILITARY SAFETY - ARMY M939 5-TON
TRUCK ACCIDENT HISTORY AND PLANNED
MODIFICATIONS
GAO/NSIAD-99-82
Military Safety
(703276)
Abbreviations
=============================================================== ABBREV
AMV - Army Motor Vehicles
DOD - Department of Defense
SUMHT - single-unit medium and heavy trucks
TACOM - Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command
Letter
=============================================================== LETTER
B-282071
April 9, 1999
The Honorable Christopher J. Dodd
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman
United States Senate
The Honorable Rosa L. Delauro
House of Representatives
In April 1997, two U.S. Army Reserve soldiers were fatally injured
during a training exercise at a U.S. Army installation. Both were
passengers in a M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo truck that
overturned. In response to your request, this report identifies (1)
the extent to which accidents involving the M939 series 5-ton
tactical cargo truck have occurred and (2) the results of Army
studies on the truck's design and its plans to address any identified
deficiencies. You also asked us to evaluate the adequacy of the
Army's training program for the drivers of the M939 truck because
inadequate training could be a contributing factor in accidents.
This issue will be addressed in a later report.
BACKGROUND
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :1
The Army classifies its vehicles on the basis of such factors as
function and physical characteristics. For example, tracked vehicles
(Abrams Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles) are classified as Army
combat vehicles; wheeled vehicles (trucks, automobiles, cycles, and
buses) are classified as Army motor vehicles. Within the Army motor
vehicle grouping, vehicles are further separated into tactical and
non-tactical categories and within the tactical grouping, into light,
medium, and heavy classifications based primarily on vehicle weight.
The M939 series trucks are accounted for as part of the Army motor
vehicle's medium tactical fleet.
The Army reviews operational requirements for its vehicle fleet in an
effort to improve readiness. From January 1983 through October 1993,
the Army upgraded its 5-ton medium tactical fleet by purchasing about
34,900 M939s to replace aging and obsolete trucks. The new truck,
designed to operate on and off road, maintained the basic design of
its predecessors but came equipped with such first-time standard
equipment as air-brakes and automatic transmissions. At present, the
Army has three variations and nearly 40 different models of the M939
in its inventory. Depending on the model, the truck performs
multiple duties that include hauling cargo, collecting refuse,
transporting troops, and operating as a tractor or wrecker. The last
M939s were fielded in late 1993.
Figure 1: M939A2 5-Ton
Tactical Cargo Truck
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: U.S. Army.
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Should vehicles or equipment prove dangerous or unsafe to operate,
the Army Safety Center, Transportation School and Center, and
Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) are responsible for
identifying problems and disseminating information. Among other
duties, the commands collect and evaluate information from accident
investigations and field reports. They also issue Army-wide safety
alerts, precautionary messages, and other information warning of
identified dangers with equipment and vehicles.
RESULTS IN BRIEF
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :2
Our analyses and an Army analysis indicate a higher rate of accidents
involving the M939 series 5-ton tactical cargo truck than other
comparison vehicles. Specifically, our analysis of January 1987
through June 1998 accident data showed that, while M939s made up an
average of about
9 percent of the Army motor vehicle fleet during that time, about
34 percent of the fleet's accidents resulting in fatalities of
vehicle occupants involved these trucks. Moreover, 44 percent of
accidents that involved a rollover and resulted in fatalities of
vehicle occupants involved the M939. Furthermore, our comparison of
U.S. Department of Transportation accident statistics and M939
accident statistics showed that over a 10-year period, the fatality
rate of occupants of the M939 averaged about 30 times higher than the
fatality rate for occupants of comparably sized commercial trucks.
Finally, an Army Safety Center analysis found that the chance of a
fatality in a M939 was 3 to 21 times higher than in other similar
military trucks in the Army motor vehicle fleet--the M34/M35 series
2-1/2 ton trucks.\1
The Army plans to spend an estimated $234 million on various
modifications to improve the M939's safety and operational
performance. Based on the results of studies into the root causes of
M939 accidents, the Army concluded that the overall truck design was
sound, but some modifications were necessary. The Army plans to use
the $234 million to add anti-lock brake kits, alter brake
proportioning specifications, upgrade the truck's tires, install cab
rollover crush protection, and modify accelerator linkage. Most
modifications will be complete by 2005. The M939s will remain in
service as these modifications are made.
--------------------
\1 The latter two analyses were based on accident rates per million
miles driven.
THREE DIFFERENT ANALYSES POINT
TO HIGH M-939 ACCIDENT RATES
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :3
Our two analyses and the analysis conducted by the Army Safety Center
all involved comparisons of different types of accident data
collected over different time frames. Nevertheless, all of the
analyses showed that the M939 had a higher accident rate than each
type of comparison vehicle.
COMPARISON OF M939 WITH ARMY
MOTOR VEHICLES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.1
In our first analysis, we reviewed data from January 1987 through
June 1998 and compared selected M939 accident statistics with those
of the rest of the Army motor vehicle fleet. We reviewed the
accident categories in terms of "fatal accidents," defined as any
accident event in which at least one occupant of an Army motor
vehicle died; "occupant deaths," defined as the total number of Army
motor vehicle occupants killed; "rollovers," defined as any vehicle
that did not remain upright as the result of an accident; and
"rollover deaths," defined as those occurring to occupants of Army
motor vehicles that rolled over as a result of an accident.
In analyzing this selected accident information compiled by the Army
Safety Center, we found the frequency of M939 accidents high in each
instance. For the 11-1/2 year period reviewed, the M939 series truck
inventory averaged 26,991, or about 9 percent of the average annual
Army motor vehicle inventory of about 314,000 vehicles, and accounted
for about 15 percent of the total Army motor vehicle accidents.\2
Appendix I shows the actual figures by year, 1987-1998.
Our comparison of M939 accident statistics with accident statistics
for the rest of the Army motor vehicle fleet showed that the M939
accounted for about 34 percent of all Army motor vehicle fatal
accident events, and 34 percent of all Army motor vehicle occupant
deaths. Comparative rollover statistics revealed much the same. The
M939 rollovers accounted for 17 percent of the total Army motor
vehicle rollovers, and 44 percent of the total Army motor vehicle
rollover fatalities. Figure 2 shows these accident statistics.
Figure 2: Comparison of
Selected M939 Accident
Statistics to Remaining Army
Motor Vehicle Fleet, 1987-1998
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of Army Safety Center accident data.
--------------------
\2 Army Regulation 385-40 establishes the criteria for Army motor
vehicle classification of a motor vehicle involved in an accident. A
vehicle's general purpose must be to transport cargo or personnel,
and be under full operational control of the Army. A vehicle can
include a passenger car, station wagon, truck, ambulance, bus,
motorcycle, fire truck, or refueling truck.
COMPARISON OF M939S WITH
COMMERCIAL, SINGLE-UNIT
MEDIUM AND HEAVY TRUCKS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.2
In our second analysis, we used Department of Transportation
published data for years 1987-1996 and compared the accident rate for
M939s with the rate for single-unit medium and heavy commercial
trucks (which are physically similar to M939s). According to an
agency official, the Department of Transportation defines "fatal
crashes" as any event in which someone is killed in a crash--vehicle
occupant or otherwise--and "truck occupant fatalities" as a fatality
of an occupant of a single-unit truck. These comparisons revealed
that the accident rates for the M939 were substantially higher than
those found for the commercial trucks. However, Army officials point
out that commercial trucks are driven almost exclusively on paved
roads; the M939 is driven on both paved and unpaved roads.
We found that over the 10-year period, 1987-1996, the frequency rates
of fatal crashes per million miles driven for M939s averaged about
seven times higher than those for commercial trucks. The M939
accident rate ranged from a high of 12 to a low of 3 times higher
than the commercial truck rate. In 1988, the M939's accident rate
was 0.23 and the commercial truck rate was 0.02--about 12 times
higher; and in 1992, the M939 accident rate was 0.056 and the
commercial truck rate was 0.018--about 3 times higher. Figure 3
shows these statistics.
Figure 3: Comparison of Rate
of Commercially Driven
Single-Unit Medium and Heavy
Trucks Fatal Crashes with
Related M939 Statistics,
1987-1996
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Highway Administration, Army Safety
Center, and Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command data.
We also found that, over this same 10-year period, the M939 occupant
fatality rate averaged about 30 times higher than those for
commercial trucks. The M939 occupant fatality rate ranged from a
high of 59 to a low of 13 times higher than the commercial truck
rate. In 1995, the M939 occupant fatality rate was 0.165 and the
commercial truck rate was 0.0028--about 59 times higher; and in 1989,
the M939 rate was 0.046 and the commercial truck rate was
0.0035--about 13 times higher. Figure 4 shows these statistics.
Figure 4: Comparison of Rate
of Commercially Driven
Single-Unit Medium and Heavy
Trucks Occupant Fatalities with
Related M939 Statistics,
1987-1996
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Highway Administration, Army Safety
Center, and Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command data.
COMPARISON OF M939S WITH
2-1/2 TON TACTICAL ARMY
TRUCKS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :3.3
The Army Safety Center's analysis reviewed accident data from October
1990 through June 1998. In this analysis, the accident rate of the
M939 was compared with accident rates for another series of
trucks--the M34/M35 series 2-1/2 ton truck. Army officials advised
us that this truck was most comparable with the M939. The analysis
reviewed accidents categorized as Class A mishaps. Army Regulation
385-40 defines a "Class A" mishap as an accident where total property
damage equals $1 million or more; an Army aircraft or missile is
destroyed, missing or abandoned; or an injury and/or occupational
illness resulting in a fatality or permanent total disability.
Because an M939 costs significantly less than $1 million, almost all
Class A mishaps involving an M939 are so classified because they
result in a death or permanent total disability.
The Army Safety Center's analysis found accident rates for M939s to
be higher than the comparison vehicles. The analysis showed M939
Class A mishap frequency rates per million miles driven to be 3 to 21
times higher than those of similar M34/M35 series 2-1/2 ton trucks.\3
For example, the 1995 Class A mishap rate for the M939 was 0.21 and
for the 2-1/2 ton M34/35s, it was 0.01 per million miles
driven--about a 21-fold difference. Figure 5 shows this comparison.
Figure 5: Comparison of Rate
of Class A M939 and M34/35
Truck Mishaps, 1991-98
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Note: For years 1992, 1994, 1997, and 1998, the M34/35 had no Class
A mishaps.
Source: 1998 Army Safety Center Analysis.
--------------------
\3 The M939, M34, and M35 series trucks are all classified as medium
tactical vehicles. Army records indicate that for the 1991-98 time
frame, these three truck series comprised around 70 percent of all
vehicles similarly categorized.
ARMY PLANS TO SPEND $234
MILLION TO IMPROVE M939 SAFETY
PERFORMANCE
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :4
The Army has initiated a program to improve the M939's safety
performance and, according to TACOM estimates, plans to spend around
$234 million for various modifications. Most of the modifications
are the direct result of corrective actions suggested in studies.
These studies focused on identifying root causes of M939 accidents
based on information contained in accident investigation reports. On
the basis of the studies' findings, the Army concluded that the
overall truck design was sound but that some modifications were
necessary to improve the truck's safety performance. Planned
modifications include $120 million for upgrading the trucks tires,
altering brake proportioning specifications, and adding anti-lock
brake kits. Other modifications include $114 million to install cabs
equipped with rollover crush protection systems and improve
accelerator linkage. The modifications, for the most part, will be
completed by 2005 with the M939s remaining in service during the
process.
HIGHER ACCIDENT FREQUENCY
AND INJURY SEVERITY RATES
GIVE RISE TO M939 CAUSAL
STUDIES
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.1
To identify possible mechanical problems or performance limitations
contributing to M939 accidents, the Army conducted two studies and a
computer simulated modeling analysis. Although M939 trucks have been
in service since 1983, Army Safety Center personnel stated that no
aberrant accident statistics appeared before early 1992. However,
during 1990-91, with the increased operating tempo associated with
Desert Shield/Desert Storm, there was an increase in fatal accidents
and deaths attributable to M939s.\4 In August 1992, TACOM issued
Safety of Use Message 92-20 discussing M939 performance limitations.
This message warned of the truck's sensitive braking
system--specifically that, when the truck is lightly loaded and on
wet pavement, aggressive braking could cause rear wheel lockup,
engine stall-out, power steering inoperability, and uncontrolled
skidding.\5
The Army began taking a closer look at the M939's accident history
after circulating Safety of Use Message 92-20. Between 1993 and
1995, TACOM, the Army Safety Center, and the Army Transportation
School and Center initiated a review of M939 accident reports and
began putting together evidence that validated the need for the
studies. Also, in an effort to reduce the number and severity of
M939 accidents, the Army issued Ground Precautionary Message 96-04 in
December 1995, limiting M939s to maximum speeds of 40 miles per hour
on highway and secondary roads and 35 miles per hour over
cross-country roads.
Between September 1995 and June 1997, TACOM conducted two studies and
a computer simulation analysis. The studies among other things,
recreated and analyzed repetitive events cited in many accident
investigation reports and discussed in Safety of Use Message 92-20.
The two studies and modeling analysis focused on tire and air brake
performance under various conditions. On the basis of the project's
findings, TACOM concluded the overall truck design was sound and
nothing was significantly different between the M939 and its
commercial counterparts produced during the same time period.
However, the studies found that improvements to some vehicle
subsystems would enhance the truck's safety performance.
The tire study completed in October 1996, together with other
information relating to M939 usage, confirmed that the M939s were
being used on-road more than originally planned. The original intent
was for M939s to be driven on-road 20 percent and off-road 80 percent
of the time. In some Army units, especially reserve units, this no
longer held true. Some units were using the M939s on-road as much as
80 to 90 percent of the time. The truck's original tire, designed
for maximum efficiency during off-road usage, performed less
efficiently on-road, especially during inclement weather. The
increased on-road usage enhanced the probability of the M939's being
involved in an accident. On the basis of this scenario, TACOM tested
several different tire designs looking to improve on-road traction
under all environmental conditions, while retaining required off-road
capabilities. The study recommended that all M939s be equipped with
radial tires.
The brake study, completed in June 1997, concluded that the air brake
system may lock up more quickly than drivers expect, especially when
the vehicle is lightly loaded. In tests, the Army found that
aggressively applied pressure to the brake pedal caused the sequence
of events found in many accident reports: wheel lockup, engine
stall-out, loss of power steering, and uncontrolled skidding, often
culminating in rollover. The probability of spin-out and rollover
increased on wet or inclined surfaces. To lessen the likelihood of
wheel lockup and the resulting chain of events, the study suggested
(1) modification of all brake proportioning systems and (2)
installation of anti-lock braking kits.
The modeling analysis used computer technology to recreate the
truck's probable behavioral characteristics in a simulated
environment and also to validate conditions being tested in the
studies. According to TACOM officials, the modeling results
correlated with actual testing results compiled during the tire and
brake studies.
Besides the recommended improvements from the studies, the Army
identified others it considered necessary. The Army decided to
replace M939 cabs when they wore out with ones outfitted with a
rollover crush protection system and also to modify the accelerator
pedal resistance on the A2 variant of the M939. Both TACOM and Army
Safety Center personnel stated that installation of the reinforced
cab rollover crush protection system, while not an industry standard
or required by law, would better protect M939 occupants in the event
of a rollover.
--------------------
\4 We previously noted this increase in vehicle related fatal
accidents during the Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm time period
in our report, Military Safety: Analysis of DOD's On-duty
Non-aviation Accident Fatalities (GAO/ NSIAD-99-14, Oct. 16, 1998).
\5 The Army uses Ground Precautionary Messages and Safety of Use
Messages to disseminate servicewide safety information.
ONGOING OR SCHEDULED M939
MODIFICATIONS
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :4.2
According to TACOM officials, the scheduled M939 modifications will
cost around $234 million. The Army estimates that tire upgrades,
brake proportioning, and anti-lock brake system improvements will
cost about $120 million or about $3,800 per truck; adding cab
rollover protection and modifying the A2's accelerator linkage will
cost another $114 million or an additional $3,600 per truck. With
respect to the current schedule for completing M939 modifications,
brake proportioning and accelerator linkage equipment modifications
will be completed by the end of fiscal year 1999; all remaining
modifications, except for cab replacement, are scheduled for
completion around 2005. Because the truck cabs will be replaced as
they wear out, a precise schedule for completing this modification
cannot be estimated at this time.
Even though some of the M939s have been in service for 15 years, the
decision to spend $234 million on modifications and equipment
upgrades is based on the need to improve the vehicles' safety because
the Army expects these trucks to be in service for at least 30 years.
According to TACOM, the June 1998, M939 inventory was around 31,800
trucks. All M939s will be equipped with radial tires, brake
reproportioning, anti-lock brake kits installation, and reinforced
cab replacements. However, the accelerator linkage improvements are
needed only on the 16,800 A2 variant of the trucks. Table 1 shows
the schedule for the planned modifications.
Table 1
Scheduled M939 Modifications, Costs, and
Completion Dates
(Dollars in millions)
Completion
Estimated date (fiscal
Scheduled action cost year)
------------------------------------------ ------------ ------------
Upgrade tires $39.5 2003
Realign brake proportioning 3.5 1999
Install anti-lock brake kits 77.4 2005
Add rollover crush protection cabs 112.0 2005\a
Modify accelerator linkage 2.0 1999
======================================================================
Total $234.4
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Replacement of all M939 cabs may not be completed by the end of
fiscal year 2005 because they are being replaced when they wear out.
Source: Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command.
Although most scheduled modifications will not be completed until
fiscal year 2005 or later, TACOM and Army Safety Center personnel
noted that accident rates have declined significantly since the
reduced speed limits instituted by the December 1995 precautionary
message. Figure 6 shows the drop in the number of mishaps since
1995.
Figure 6: M939 Class A
Incident Rates Since 1995
(See figure in printed
edition.)
Source: GAO analysis of Army Safety Center accident data.
Army officials believe the modifications being made to the M939s will
improve their safety performance and reduce severe accidents,
rollovers, and fatalities.
AGENCY COMMENTS
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :5
In written comments on a draft of this report (see app. III), DOD
stated that it concurred with this report and noted that the report
accurately describes problems the Army found to be causing M939
accidents.
SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY
------------------------------------------------------------ Letter :6
To analyze the accident history of the M939 series 5-ton tactical
vehicle, we obtained specific information from the Army Safety
Center, Fort Rucker, Alabama; TACOM, Warren, Michigan; the Department
of Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, Washington, D.C.;
and the Department of the Army, Washington, D.C.
To identify any accident anomalies associated with the M939s, we
conducted two analyses and reviewed another conducted by the Army
Safety Center. Our first analysis compared selected M939 accident
statistics with similar information for the overall Army motor
vehicle fleet (of which M939s are a subset). Our second analysis
compared M939 accident statistics per million miles driven to
Department of Transportation accident statistics for comparable
commercial trucks. The Army Safety Center study we reviewed compared
various M939 accident frequency rates per million miles driven with
rates for comparable military tactical trucks.
The number of years used in each comparison varied on the basis of
the data available. Army motor vehicle fleet to M939 comparisons did
not include events prior to 1987 because some accident statistics
were not readily available. Our comparison of rates of M939 fatal
accident events and vehicle occupant fatalities with rates for
corresponding commercial sector trucks was limited to 1987-1996 due
to the unavailability of accident data for commercial sector vehicles
after 1996. Lastly, the Army Safety Center study comparing M939
Class A accident rates with rates for other similar Army tactical
vehicles only included events occurring between October 1990 and June
1998. The extent to which other factors, such as human error, driver
training, and off-road versus on-road usage, may have contributed to
disparate accident rates was beyond the scope of this review.
To assess Army initiatives directed at identifying M939 performance,
mechanical, or systemic problems and limitations, as well as
recommended corrective actions, we obtained or reviewed relevant Army
studies. We also interviewed officials at the Army Safety Center and
TACOM about these studies but did not assess or validate the
findings, estimated costs, or recommendations resulting from these
studies.
Although we worked with personnel from the Army Safety Center, TACOM,
Department of Transportation, and the Department of the Army during
data gathering and reviewed those results for reasonableness,
accuracy, and completeness, we did not validate the accuracy of
accident statistics contained in various databases or other published
information. However, this data is used to support the management
information needs of both internal and external customers and is
periodically reviewed internally by each organization for accuracy,
completeness, and validity.
We conducted our review from July 1998 through February 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
---------------------------------------------------------- Letter :6.1
We are sending copies of this report to the Honorable William Cohen,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Louis Caldera, Secretary of the
Army, and interested congressional committees. Copies will also be
made available to other interested parties upon request.
Please contact me on (202) 512-5140 should you or your staff have any
questions concerning this report. Major contributors to this report
were Carol R. Schuster; Reginald L. Furr, Jr.; Kevin C. Handley;
and Gerald L. Winterlin.
Mark E. Gebicke
Director, Military Operations
and Capabilities Issues
M939 SELECTED ACCIDENT STATISTICS
COMPARED TO ALL OTHER ARMY MOTOR
VEHICLES, 1987-1998
=========================================================== Appendix I
Total Fatal Occupant Total Rollover
accidents accidents deaths rollovers deaths
-------------- -------------- -------------- -------------- --------------
Ye
ar M939 AMV M939 AMV M939 AMV M939 AMV M939 AMV
-- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
19 258 2264 3 22 3 23 25 344 2 12
87
19 191 1867 8 22 8 24 30 292 7 15
88
19 164 1239 3 18 3 18 29 250 2 12
89
19 149 1054 9 29 12 31 28 178 10 16
90
19 175 958 12 41 13 51 44 179 13 30
91
19 138 618 4 14 4 14 40 140 3 12
92
19 130 543 10 22 10 23 39 117 9 18
93
19 102 464 3 6 3 6 30 105 3 3
94
19 84 415 8 16 10 19 24 85 6 14
95
19 84 353 3 9 3 9 18 85 3 6
96
19 62 311 4 4 5 5 9 52 2 2
97
19 21 117 2 2 2 2 4 24 2 2
98
==================================================================================
To 1,558 10,203 69 205 76 225 320 1,851 62 142
t
a
l
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: "Fatal accidents" are defined as any accident event in which
at least one occupant of an Army motor vehicle (AMV) died. For all
other definitions, see page 3 of this report.
Source: GAO analysis of Army Safety Center accident data.
M939 FATAL CRASH AND OCCUPANT
FATALITY STATISTICS COMPARED TO
COMMERCIAL, SINGLE-UNIT MEDIUM AND
HEAVY TRUCKS, 1987-1996
========================================================== Appendix II
Occupant Million miles
Fatal crashes fatalities driven
-------------- -------------- --------------
SUMHT\ SUMHT\ SUMHT\
Year M939 a M939 a M939 a
---------------------- ------ ------ ------ ------ ------ ------
1987 8 1,118 3 177 56.8 49,537
.
1988 13 1,014 8 180 56.5 51,239
.
1989 6 1,056 3 187 65.8 52,969
.
1990 11 979 12 185 87.4 53,443
.
1991 17 1,072 13 168 109.2 53,787
.
1992 5 987 4 156 88.6 53,691
.
1993 12 1,054 10 159 70.3 56,781
.
1994 4 1,188 3 193 58.7 61,284
.
1995 12 1,133 10 176 60.7 62,705
.
1996 5 1,159 3 174 85.5 63,967
.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
\a Single-unit medium and heavy trucks.
Note: "Fatal crashes" are defined as any event in which someone is
killed in a crash--vehicle occupant or otherwise--and "truck occupant
fatalities" as a fatality of an occupant of a single-unit or M939
truck.
Source: GAO analysis of Federal Highway Administration, Army Safety
Center, and Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command data.
(See figure in printed edition.)Appendix III
COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
========================================================== Appendix II
*** End of document. ***