Satellite Control Systems: Opportunity for DOD to Implement Space Policy
and Integrate Capabilities (Letter Report, 05/17/99, GAO/NSIAD-99-81).

Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO: (1) reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) progress in integrating and improving its satellite
control capabilities and in fostering integrated and interoperable
satellite control within the government, as directed by the 1996
national space policy; and (2) determined whether opportunities exist
for DOD to standardize its satellite control capabilities by using
commercial products and practices.

GAO noted that: (1) DOD has made minimal progress in integrating and
improving its satellite control capabilities in accordance with 1996
national space policy; (2) in 1992, DOD identified a need for an
integrated satellite control system to achieve standardization and
interoperability across military services and individual satellite
programs; (3) in 1995, the Air Force, which controls most of DOD's
satellites, characterized its satellite control capabilities as aging,
inefficient, and costly to operate; (4) the Air Force initiated an
effort to standardize these capabilities and achieve full implementation
in 2003--a first step toward an integrated and interoperable DOD
capability; (5) Air Force officials chose to proceed with a conceptual
design over operational alternatives; (6) however, in 1997, the Air
Force terminated this effort because of schedule delays resulting from
software development problems and the additional amount of software that
needed to be written; (7) Air Force Space Command representatives are
now recommending that the use of the Air Force's existing satellite
control capabilities be extended to 2005 to provide time to acquire an
improved capability; (8) until then, the Air Force will be unable to
reduce approximately $400 million it spends annually to operate,
maintain, sustain, and modernize satellite control capabilities; (9) the
Navy's satellite control capabilities are not as old, inefficient, or
costly to operate as the Air Force's capabilities; (10) although the
Navy upgraded its capabilities in the early 1990s, another upgrade is
planned because the company that provided the existing capabilities no
longer provides software support services; (11) DOD has taken limited
action to foster integrated and interoperable satellite control for all
government space activities since it was directed to do so by the 1996
national space policy; (12) although DOD established a senior steering
group in 1998 to address national security space management and
integration issues, government space agencies continue to plan for
satellite control capabilities on an independent basis rather than
coordinate and integrate their efforts on an interagency basis; and (13)
considering the long-standing need to replace the Air Force's aging and
costly satellite control capabilities and the Navy's more recent plan to
upgrade its capabilities, DOD has an opportunity to revitalize its
effort to achieve integrated satellite control by acquiring a
standardized capability.

--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------

 REPORTNUM:  NSIAD-99-81
     TITLE:  Satellite Control Systems: Opportunity for DOD to
	     Implement Space Policy and Integrate Capabilities
      DATE:  05/17/99
   SUBJECT:  Aerospace research
	     Military satellites
	     Defense cost control
	     Interagency relations
	     Private sector practices
	     Commercial products
	     Systems conversions
	     Systems compatibility
	     Defense procurement
IDENTIFIER:  Defense Satellite Communications System
	     Defense Meteorological Satellite Program
	     Differential Global Positioning System
	     Air Force Satellite Control Network
	     Naval Satellite Control Network
	     Air Force Standardized Satellite Control System
	     DOD Distributed Command and Control System
	     Air Force Commercial Off-the-Shelf Based Research
	     Architecture
	     Navy OS/Comet System
	     NASA Shuttle Mission Control System

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ns99081 GAO United States General Accounting Office

Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on
Appropriations, House of Representatives

May 1999 SATELLITE CONTROL SYSTEMS

Opportunity for DOD to Implement Space Policy and Integrate
Capabilities

GAO/NSIAD-99-81

  GAO/NSIAD-99-81

Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems United States
General Accounting Office

Washington, D. C. 20548 Let t er National Security and

International Affairs Division

B-280224 Letter May 17, 1999 The Honorable Jerry Lewis Chairman,
Subcommittee on Defense Committee on Appropriations House of
Representatives

Dear Mr. Chairman: As requested, we (1) reviewed the Department of
Defense's (DOD) progress in integrating and improving its
satellite control capabilities and in fostering integrated and
interoperable satellite control within the government, as directed
by the 1996 national space policy and (2) determined whether
opportunities exist for DOD to standardize its satellite control
capabilities by using commercial products and practices.

Results in Brief DOD has made minimal progress in integrating and
improving its satellite control capabilities in accordance with
1996 national space policy. In 1992,

DOD identified a need for an integrated satellite control system
to achieve standardization and interoperability across military
services and individual satellite programs. 1 In 1995, the Air
Force, which controls most of DOD's satellites, characterized its
satellite control capabilities as aging, inefficient, and costly
to operate. The Air Force initiated an effort to standardize these
capabilities and achieve full implementation in 2003 a

first step toward an integrated and interoperable DOD capability.
Air Force officials chose to proceed with a conceptual design over
operational alternatives. However, in 1997, the Air Force
terminated this effort because of schedule delays resulting from
software development problems and the

additional amount of software that needed to be written. Air Force
Space Command representatives are now recommending that the use of
the Air Force's existing satellite control capabilities be
extended to 2005 to provide time to acquire an improved
capability. Until then, the Air Force will be unable to reduce
approximately $400 million it spends annually to operate,

1 In this context, standardization means cooperation among
agencies for efficient use of resources and for the adoption of
common, compatible, or interchangeable components or equipment.
Interoperability means the ability of systems to provide services
to, and accept services from, other systems and to use the
services so exchanged to enable the systems to operate effectively
together.

Lett er

B-280224 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

maintain, sustain, and modernize satellite control capabilities.
The Navy's satellite control capabilities are not as old,
inefficient, or costly to operate as the Air Force's capabilities.
Although the Navy upgraded its capabilities in the early 1990s,
another upgrade is planned because the company that

provided the existing capabilities no longer provides software
support services. DOD has taken limited action to foster
integrated and interoperable satellite control for all government
space activities since it was directed to do so by the 1996
national space policy. Prior studies recommended that a

high- level interagency management group be established to oversee
implementation of integrated systems across agency lines. Although
DOD established a senior steering group in 1998 to address
national security space management and integration issues,
government space agencies

continue to plan for satellite control capabilities on an
independent basis rather than coordinate and integrate their
efforts on an interagency basis. Considering the long- standing
need to replace the Air Force's aging and costly satellite control
capabilities and the Navy's more recent plan to upgrade its
capabilities, DOD has an opportunity to revitalize its effort to
achieve integrated satellite control by acquiring a standardized
capability. A resumed search for such a capability is appropriate
because it would also provide an opportunity to review Air Force
satellite control decisions for future space- based infrared and
communication satellite programs that are currently in
development. Commercial off- the- shelf products that could
perform core functions for controlling satellites are available,
and several studies have advocated the use of such products. In
making a selection

among alternatives, DOD could reduce acquisition risk by employing
best commercial practices a key element of DOD's acquisition
reform initiatives. Commercial firms place a premium on
demonstrated performance before making critical decisions rather
than on predicted performance, as was the case with the Air
Force's 1995 selection. We are recommending that the Secretary of
Defense take actions to revitalize efforts to (1) integrate and
improve DOD's satellite control capabilities, using commercial
products and practices and (2) foster integration and
interoperability of satellite control among government

space activities. Background Satellite control systems are used to
ensure that satellites reach their planned orbits and perform
their intended missions while in orbit. There

B-280224 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

are two types of satellite control operations platform control and
payload control. Platform controls involves monitoring the health
and status and managing the operations of a satellite's physical
structure, sometimes called the bus. Payload controls involves
monitoring the health and status and managing the operations of a
satellite's mission equipment. Specific satellite control
functions consist of (1) locating satellites and receiving and
processing data from them, (2) following satellites' motion over
time,

and (3) transmitting signals to satellites. These three functions
are called telemetry, tracking, and commanding and are performed
by a network of ground command and control centers, ground
antennas, and

communication capabilities between the centers, antennas, and
satellites. 2 There are two types of satellite control networks
common and dedicated. 3 DOD operates two common networks that
provide primary or backup control for communications,
environmental monitoring, navigation, and intelligence satellites.
Examples include the Defense

Satellite Communications System, Defense Meteorological Satellite
Program, and Global Positioning System. DOD also operates several
dedicated networks that control missile warning, communications,
and

intelligence missions. Examples include the Defense Support
Program and Milstar Communications System.

The Air Force Satellite Control Network (AFSCN) is the larger of
the two common networks. It supports essentially all national
security (defense and intelligence) satellites during launch and
early orbit periods and is used

to analyze anomalies affecting orbiting satellites. For certain
satellite constellations, AFSCN provides essentially all the
routine control functions needed throughout the satellite systems'
lifetime. AFSCN capabilities consist of two command and control
centers located at Schriever Air Force Base, Colorado, and Onizuka
Air Force Base, California; antennas dispersed throughout the
world; and associated communications capabilities.

2 In this report, we focused on computer systems used at command
and control centers to perform satellite control functions. 3 A
common network generally performs platform control for multiple
satellite constellations, allowing its ground antennas and core
data processing capabilities to be shared among many satellites
and therefore reducing costs. Some unique data processing
capabilities, however, may be needed for a particular satellite
system. A dedicated network generally performs platform and
payload control for

one satellite constellation; thus no sharing of its capabilities
with other satellite constellations takes place. Some reasons for
dedicated networks are: (1) continuous contact must be maintained
with certain satellites and (2) special radio frequencies or high
data rates are sometimes used.

B-280224 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

The Naval Satellite Control Network (NSCN) the smaller of the two
common networks controls different satellite constellations. NSCN
is to undertake increasing responsibilities in 1999 because the
control functions

for a constellation of communication satellites are to be
transferred from AFSCN to NSCN. NSCN capabilities consist of a
primary command and control center at Point Mugu, California, with
backup capabilities in Colorado and Maine; antennas in Guam,
California, and Maine; and associated communication capabilities.
In a May 1996 report, we discussed opportunities for (1)
standardization and interoperability among government satellite
control networks and (2) cost savings and greater efficiencies
through network consolidation. The three government space sectors
defense, intelligence and civil were operating separate satellite
control networks to satisfy their individual satellite program
needs. These sectors were spending several hundred million dollars
a year to control their satellites or missions, were planning on
upgrading their satellite control systems during the next 5 years,
and did

not have the necessary impetus or direction for more efficient use
of the nation's satellite control resources. As a result, we
recommended that a national policy be developed to direct
integration, consolidation, and sharing, to the extent feasible,
of the nation's satellite control capabilities. 4 In September
1996, the administration established a new national space

policy that included directions for DOD to (1) pursue integrated
satellite control and continue to enhance the robustness of its
satellite control capability and (2) coordinate with other
departments and agencies, as appropriate, to foster the
integration and interoperability of satellite control for all
government space activities.

DOD Has Not Effectively Implemented Policy Guidelines for
Satellite Control

DOD has made minimal progress in integrating and improving its
satellite control capabilities in accordance with 1996 national
space policy. Although the Air Force and Navy have merged some of
their capabilities,

the Air Force was unsuccessful in acquiring a standardized
satellite control system. Also, DOD has taken limited action to
foster integrated and interoperable satellite control for all
government space activities, as the 1996 policy directed.

4 Satellite Control Capabilities: National Policy Could Help
Consolidation and Cost Savings (GAO/NSIAD-96-77, May 2, 1996).

B-280224 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Minimal Progress to Integrate and Improve DOD Capabilities

Before the 1996 national space policy was established, DOD
identified a need for an integrated satellite control system, and
the Air Force initiated an effort to replace its satellite control
capabilities with a standardized satellite control system (SSCS).
However, the Air Force's effort was unsuccessful because of system
development problems, and as a consequence the Air Force has
continued with the costly, aging, and

inefficient existing system for some satellite programs while
seeking individual solutions for others. Several government
satellite control studies have been performed that contain a
common approach: integrate and upgrade satellite control
capabilities to achieve efficiencies and economies. The Air Force
is currently reviewing approaches to revitalize its effort for a
satellite control solution.

DOD has made some progress as a result of older studies, which
recommended that the Air Force and the Navy merge their satellite
control networks. The two services established a communications
link between

the main Air Force satellite operations center and the Navy
satellite operations center, allowing the two services to gain
access to each other's satellite control antennas. Sharing
antennas has allowed the Navy to close one antenna site, and there
is the potential for closing another site, thus reducing costs.
However, the two networks are not interoperable because they
cannot control each other's satellites or back up each other's
capabilities. Therefore, relative to study recommendations, the
effort can

only be characterized as minimal. Control Systems Lack Necessary
Capabilities and Need Upgrading

In 1992, the U. S. Space Command the military command responsible
for DOD's space operations identified a need for an integrated
satellite control system because of several existing system
deficiencies. The Command described the existing satellite
infrastructure as fragmented, fragile, vulnerable, and lacking
standardization and interoperability. In 1994, the Air Force Space
Command the military command that operates AFSCN and provides
space support for the majority of DOD's satellites identified the
need for improved satellite control capabilities. The Command
cited aging equipment, manpower and funding reductions,

future satellite system requirements, and technological
opportunities as reasons for needed network upgrades, stating that
its network must become more responsive, standardized, and
interoperable; easily

expandable; and economical to operate and maintain. In 1995, the
Air Force established operational requirements for new satellite
control capabilities with the objective of maximizing the use of
industry standards and commercial or government off- the- shelf
hardware, software, and

B-280224 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

communications if they reduce acquisition timelines and operations
and maintenance costs. 5

The existing AFSCN's command and control capabilities were
designed in the early 1980s and include a centralized mainframe
computer system, in contrast to a modern distributed workstation
design. According to Air Force documentation, much of the software
was written in old, customized, and proprietary languages that
resulted in (1) lack of standardization and interoperability, (2)
increasing operations and maintenance costs, and (3) difficulties
in responding to system requirement changes or accommodating new
systems. The Air Force budgets over $400 million annually for
AFSCN operations, maintenance, sustainment, and modernization. It
programmed $2. 2 billion for these purposes for fiscal years 1999-
2003. Currently, the engineering sustainment contract is scheduled
to expire in October 2003, and it is unclear whether the network

can be sustained beyond that point. 6 The sustainment contractor
reported that there is moderate to high risk that several pieces
of system hardware may not be supportable beyond 2003 because (1)
critical parts can no longer be procured, (2) equivalent
replacement parts have not been identified, or (3) capability to
repair the parts no longer exists. Some Air Force representatives,
however, are more optimistic that sustainment could be continued
if necessary.

The existing NSCN is a distributed command and control system that
was designed in the early 1990s. The Navy budgets about $19
million annually to operate, maintain, sustain, and modernize the
NSCN. It programmed

$95 million for these purposes for fiscal years 1999- 2003. The
Navy is planning to upgrade NSCN because the company that provided
the existing computers is no longer providing associated software
support services. Navy representatives informed us that they plan
to begin evaluating system alternatives in fiscal year 2001 and
complete the replacement of NSCN's data processing capabilities in
fiscal year 2003.

Air Force Effort to Standardize Capabilities Was Unsuccessful

In 1995, the Air Force initiated an effort to replace the AFSCN's
command and control capabilities with SSCS and achieve full
implementation in fiscal 5 In this report, the terms commercial
off- the- shelf and government off- the- shelf mean products
developed and produced for general and government use,
respectively, that have applicability to, and use for, satellite
control systems without major modification or change.

6 Engineering sustainment involves design and planning for
replacement, or continued supply, of parts needed to prolong a
system's ability to perform its mission.

B-280224 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

year 2003. The purpose was to establish a standard and
interoperable satellite control system for multiple DOD satellite
programs that was more responsive, dependable, and cost- effective
than the existing system.

Following an initial screening of several candidate systems that
were to serve as a basis for SSCS, four were selected for detailed
evaluation. They were (1) the Distributed Command and Control
System (DCCS) a

conceptual system being developed for the National Reconnaissance
Office; (2) Commercial Off- the- Shelf Based Research Architecture
(COBRA) a system being used by the Air Force to control research
and

development satellites; (3) OS/ Comet a system being used by the
Naval Research Laboratory; and (4) the Shuttle Mission Control
System a capability being used by the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA). None of the four systems satisfied
all requirements; therefore, modifications would have been
necessary for any system chosen. The Air Force selected DCCS as
the baseline system, concluding that this developmental design (1)
would provide the best architecture and functional capabilities,
(2) would provide a core software system standardized over a
broader group of satellite systems, and (3) would require less
modification than the other candidate systems. However, according
to Air Force officials involved in the evaluation process, less
was known about DCCS than the other candidates. For example, DCCS
had not passed its critical design review a key point in the
acquisition of a system

to assess design maturity whereas the other three candidates were
operational. The DCCS design subsequently encountered development
problems, requiring design changes and resulting in schedule
delays. The design changes (1) fundamentally altered the DCCS
architecture, restricting the hardware that could be used and (2)
substantially increased the lines of software code that Air Force
officials estimated would have to be

developed to derive SSCS. Because of these system development
problems, Air Force officials concluded that DCCS would not meet
Air Force needs or schedule. In October 1997, the Air Force
terminated its SSCS effort.

By choosing DCCS instead of an operational system about which it
had more knowledge, the Air Force took a significant risk and was
ultimately left without a standardized satellite control
capability. This choice appears inconsistent with the Air Force's
1995 requirements calling for maximum use of off- the- shelf
technology. It also runs counter to the practice of leading
commercial firms, which want proof that a technological concept

B-280224 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

will work and can be delivered on schedule. Thus, the Air Force's
choice to proceed with this developmental design would have likely
presented too high a risk for a commercial firm. 7

Consequences of No Standardized Capabilities

More than 1 year after the Air Force terminated its SSCS effort,
no renewed effort had been formally initiated. As a consequence,
AFSCN command and control operations, which the Air Force has
described as costly and manpower- intensive, may need to be
extended to support existing satellite programs. Also, managers
for the future Space- Based Infrared System

(SBIRS), who planned to use SSCS, had to continue implementing an
individualized satellite control solution.

Almost all national security satellites are dependent on AFSCN to
reach their intended orbit, and several existing satellite
programs such as the Defense Satellite Communications System are
dependent on AFSCN for routine satellite control functions.
Therefore, until the Air Force replaces the AFSCN's command and
control capabilities with a less costly, standardized capability,
it will be unable to reduce approximately $400 million it spends
annually to operate, maintain, sustain, and

modernize AFSCN. Replacing these capabilities is intended to
reduce operations, maintenance, and sustainment costs. Air Force
Space Command representatives informed us they were recommending
that a contract be awarded in fiscal year 2001 to replace the
command and

control capabilities in fiscal year 2005. This would be 2 years
later than the original plan to achieve full implementation of
SSCS. At the end of our review, formal approval and budgeting for
this recommendation had not yet occurred.

Air Force managers of SBIRS a satellite system being developed to
replace an older satellite system to provide strategic and theater
ballistic missile warning and defense capability had planned to
use SSCS, when it became available, as the system's core satellite
control capability. Because SSCS was not expected to be available
for the first phase of the program, Air Force managers made plans
to use a satellite control system called SCS- 21 that was being
developed by the SBIRS prime contractor. They planned to
transition to SSCS for the second phase. However, when the SSCS
effort was terminated, the managers chose a commercial off- the-
shelf version of SCS- 21 that was also being provided by the SBIRS
prime 7 See Best Practices: Successful Application to Weapon
Acquisitions Requires Changes in DOD's Environment (GAO/NSIAD-98-
56, Feb. 24, 1998).

B-280224 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

contractor. According to program representatives, the SCS- 21 core
software will provide many, but not all, the satellite control
functions needed by the SBIRS program. Capabilities to address the
extra functions are being added to the core software, but no
changes are being made that would affect the commercial off- the-
shelf properties of the core software.

Although this is an individualized satellite control solution,
maintaining these commercial properties should make subsequent
versions of the commercially available SCS- 21 core software easy
to install. Several Studies Have Been Performed, but a Solution Is
Not Yet Available

Prior to the 1996 national space policy, DOD led or participated
in several studies that discussed intra- agency and interagency
satellite control capabilities. These studies contained a common
approach: integrate and upgrade satellite control capabilities to
achieve efficiencies and economies. We discussed portions of four
different studies in our May 1996 report. Since the 1996 national
space policy was established, DOD components have performed
several other studies that address satellite

control. However, they were all long- range studies, and at the
end of our review in April 1999, no decisions or implementing
actions had been taken on them. We discuss three examples below.
In December 1997, the DOD Space Architect completed a satellite

operations study to develop architecture alternatives for the
2010- 2015 time frame in support of defense, intelligence, and
civil space sector needs. The draft report included alternative
assessments that both

emphasized and de- emphasized interoperability. It stated that the
lack of satellite operations standardization prevents resource
sharing and interoperability within and between federal agencies
and the commercial and international community. Although the draft
report stated that increased interoperability was beneficial, it
also stated that analytical attempts to quantify the value of
interoperability in terms of

cost and performance were inconclusive. In addition, the draft
report discussed various ways of using commercial products and
services for satellite operations, including advantages cost
savings, increased

performance, and government personnel reductions and disadvantages
market dependency and proprietary interest. At the end of our
review in April 1999, the Architect's final report had not been
released.  In March 1998, the U. S. Space Command published its
long- range plan, which represented a guide for achieving the
Command's vision of how

military space strategy would evolve in the 21 st century,
specifically to 2020. The Command stated that because the
operational techniques of many military satellites closely
parallel those of commercial systems,

B-280224 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

private industry may be able to operate military systems for less
money and military personnel could be transferred from satellite
operations functions to core military functions. In commenting on
a draft of our report, DOD officials stated that although it may
be feasible for private industry to operate military satellites,
the effect on national security has not been addressed.  In
November 1998, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board issued a

report titled, A Space Roadmap for the 21 st Century Aerospace
Force, which included an assessment of satellite operations. One
of the report's findings was that commercial satellite ground
operations are far less people- intensive and far more efficient
overall than military systems, representing an important potential
source of savings. In elaborating, the report stated that existing
military satellite operations were costly, mostly proprietary,
user unfriendly, increasingly difficult to support, and

difficult to upgrade. The report recommended that (1)
opportunities be evaluated to make selective investments in
commercial off- the- shelf software packages for legacy satellite
systems and (2) best commercial practices be used to acquire
future satellite control systems.

Given the consequences of terminating SSCS, Air Force Space
Command representatives are reviewing alternative approaches to
acquire modern satellite control capabilities. Specifically, they
are (1) looking for an approach to replace existing capabilities
by 2005, (2) proposing to sustain

existing capabilities beyond the sustainment contract expiration
date of October 2003 until the replacement is available in fiscal
year 2005, and (3) attempting to identify viable options to
accelerate replacement of existing capabilities to fiscal year
2003. No decisions had been made on these matters at the end of
our review in April 1999, and the Air Force was no closer to
identifying and implementing a standardized and interoperable
satellite control system than it was in 1995.

Limited Action to Foster Integrated and Interoperable Government
Satellite Control

DOD has taken limited action to foster integrated and
interoperable satellite control for all government space
activities, as directed by the 1996 national space policy.
Representatives within the Office of the Secretary of Defense and
the Departments of the Air Force and the Navy informed us that no
formal coordination of such satellite control matters had taken

place. In July 1998, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
Central Intelligence established revised procedures for the
management of national security (defense and intelligence) space
programs and activities. In commenting on a draft of our report,
DOD acknowledged that greater effort should be applied toward
satellite control integration and

B-280224 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

interoperability and anticipated placing greater emphasis during
the years 2000 to 2005. However, DOD commented that similar
commitment must be made by other government agencies involved in
space activities to achieve success.

Prior studies recommended that a high- level interagency
management group be established to oversee implementation of
integrated systems across agency lines. We made a similar
recommendation in our May 1996 report. The revised national
security management procedures for space included establishing a
National Security Space Senior Steering Group to

address space management and integration issues. However,
government space agencies continue to plan for satellite control
capabilities on an independent basis rather than coordinate and
integrate their capabilities on an interagency basis. For example,
NASA recently contracted to consolidate its space operations,
including satellite control, at several research centers with the
long- term objective of increasing operational effectiveness and
efficiencies at reduced costs. According to NASA

officials, other agencies were not involved in the process of
assessing alternatives to achieving consolidated space operations
at NASA's centers, although other agencies, including DOD, have
expressed interest in NASA's activities.

Integrating satellite control capabilities on an interagency basis
is feasible. For example, under a separate national policy
established in 1994, the President directed convergence of DOD's
meteorological satellite system and the Department of Commerce's
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's (NOAA)
environmental satellite system. NOAA provides the primary
satellite operations capability at its control center in Suitland,

Maryland, for both satellite systems. DOD provides backup
satellite operations capability for its system at Schriever Air
Force Base, Colorado. In commenting on a draft of this report, DOD
officials emphasized that this satellite system convergence
constituted significant action to foster integrated and
interoperable satellite control and has achieved certain monetary
advantages. However, they claimed that integrating the

operations of these systems has resulted in unclear lines of
authority, less timely military decision- making, and increased
coordination requirements, thus complicating military space
planning. Such integrated operations may require government
agencies to revise their procedures and practices, but should
afford them an opportunity to achieve significant cost savings.

B-280224 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

DOD Has an Opportunity to Revitalize Integrated Satellite Control
Effort

DOD has an opportunity to integrate Air Force and Navy satellite
control networks by revitalizing the effort to acquire a
standardized satellite control capability. Such an effort would be
timely, considering the Air Force's need and the Navy's plans to
replace each of their satellite control capabilities by 2003.
Commercial off- the- shelf products that perform core satellite
control functions and that have a demonstrated record of
performance are available. Several satellite control studies have
advocated

the use of such products. Resumed Search for Standard Core
Capability Is Timely

The Air Force has an opportunity to resume its search for a
standard satellite control system. The unsuccessful attempt to
replace its existing capabilities with SSCS merely prolonged the
retention of an aging and costly system. The Air Force could
consider introducing a replacement capability in 2003, when the
existing engineering sustainment contract

expires. Also, now is an opportune time to review the SBIRS
satellite control decision made in 1997. Based on a fiscal year
2000 budget decision, DOD plans to delay the first launch of SBIRS
by 2 years from 2002 to 2004. Although the SCS- 21 system may
still be suitable for SBIRS, the planned program delay has reduced
the urgency of making a final satellite control choice. It has
also created an opportunity to consider other alternatives that
may have wider application for DOD satellites.

A decision needs to be made about what satellite control
capabilities to use for two future DOD communication satellite
systems the Gapfiller Super High Frequency and Advanced Extremely
High Frequency. DOD expects to

begin acquiring these satellite systems during the fiscal year
2001 time frame. If a standardized satellite control system is not
selected in time to accommodate these satellites, the Air Force
may be placed in a position of having to (1) modify its existing
capabilities or (2) acquire individual satellite control
solutions. Both choices would be undesirable.

Commercial Products Could Provide Core Capability

As discussed in the previous section, several studies over the
years have advocated the use of commercial products to provide
standard core capability for satellite control functions. Most of
these studies have recognized that the government does not perform
such unique satellite control functions that commercial products
could not satisfy requirements. The most recent of these studies,
by the Air Force Scientific Advisory

B-280224 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Board, claimed that selective use of commercial off- the- shelf
products could have big payoffs. The Air Force is currently
acquiring different commercial satellite control packages for the
Global Positioning System and SBIRS. Although these and other
alternatives are available, the Air Force is not currently
considering them to satisfy multiple satellite control
requirements. We discuss four examples below.  One alternative
system is COBRA, which was developed by an Air Force Space and
Missile Center research office as a low- cost means of controlling
research satellites. The COBRA system consists of multiple

commercial off- the- shelf products integrated to form a whole
satellite control capability. It was designed to control different
types of satellites a distinct advantage when searching for a
standardized system to support multiple types of national security
satellites. According to Center representatives, COBRA has been
used to control three different research satellites and is to be
used to control others. It also has demonstrated some capability
to control DOD operational

satellites such as the Milstar communication system and is
currently controlling nonoperational Defense Support Program and
Defense Satellite Communication System satellites. An earlier
version of COBRA was not chosen as SSCS because the Air Force
believed that more software modification would have been required
than with the DCCS candidate.  A second alternative is a system
called OS/ Comet, which is a

commercial off- the- shelf product that the Air Force is currently
acquiring to provide core satellite control capability for the
Global Positioning System. To accommodate the unique
characteristics of the

satellite system, capabilities are being added to work with OS/
Comet but no modifications are being made to the OS/ Comet
software. OS/ Comet was developed to control satellite systems at
the Naval Research Laboratory's Blossom Point Tracking Facility,
where it is still being used. It is now being made available by
the development contractor as a commercial off- the- shelf
product. Like the COBRA system, OS/ Comet was a candidate for SSCS
but was not chosen because the Air Force

believed that more software modification would have been required
than with the DCCS candidate. However, as an indicator of OS/
Comet's value, the Iridium company selected the system to control
its constellation of 66 commercial communication satellites.

 A third alternative is a system called SCS- 21, which the Air
Force is currently acquiring to control SBIRS satellites. Similar
to the COBRA system, SCS- 21 includes commercial off- the- shelf
products integrated into a package to provide core satellite
control capabilities. The SBIRS

B-280224 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

contractor is adding capabilities to accommodate the unique
characteristics of the satellite system, but no modifications are
being made to the SCS- 21 software. NASA representatives told us
that they plan to use SCS- 21 under a consolidated space
operations contract as

the core satellite control software at several research center,
including Goddard Space Flight Center, which controls numerous
scientific satellites.  Although we did not perform an exhaustive
search, nor do we endorse any specific commercial product, other
commercial satellite control systems are available. One such
standard system is Epoch 2000.

According to the developer, this off- the- shelf system was
developed through the experience in designing and implementing
special control systems for NASA's scientific satellites and
NOAA's environmental satellites. It is a modern, distributed
software system that can be used

with many commercial hardware architectures and is being used to
control a variety of commercial communications satellites and
government scientific and resource monitoring satellites. The
developer told us that the functions performed by satellite
control systems are not substantially different among different
satellite systems. Air Force Space Command representatives told us
that several private firms have offered to demonstrate their
commercial satellite control products.

Best Commercial Practices Could Reduce Acquisition Risk

As discussed above, in its effort to acquire SSCS, the Air Force
selected a conceptual system as a baseline, which had not passed
its critical design review and for which little was known, and
ultimately encountered development problems. Three other candidate
systems were operational but were not chosen. This approach is not
consistent with best commercial practices, in which a premium
would have been placed on demonstrated performance when selecting
a product to be acquired. Instead, the Air

Force selected a product according to the product's predicted
performance rather than its known performance.

In our February 1998 report, we noted that early in system
development, leading commercial firms gained more knowledge than
DOD about how well a prospective system would satisfy performance,
cost, and schedule requirements. This is because commercial firms
essentially complete the discovery process, accumulating knowledge
and eliminating unknowns about the system before major milestones
such as critical design review are

passed. The first step ensuring that technology is sufficiently
obtainable to warrant starting the program is critical. DOD often
accepts more

B-280224 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

unknowns in its programs than commercial firms and understates the
risks associated with these unknowns.

Conclusions DOD has not effectively implemented the guidelines for
satellite control as set forth in the 1996 national space policy.
DOD needs to integrate its satellite control capabilities to
reduce costs and inefficiencies. This could be done through
standardization and interoperability. Considering the Air Force's
need and the Navy's plan to upgrade their satellite control
capabilities, now is an opportune time for DOD to consolidate
these

individual efforts to achieve an integrated approach. A sound plan
toward this end would consider using commercially available
products and making a selection based on best commercial practices
employed by leading firms to reduce acquisition risk. DOD has
taken limited action to foster integrated and interoperable
satellite control for all government space activities. Under 1996
national space policy guidelines, DOD is obligated to coordinate
with other departments and agencies, as appropriate, regarding
integration and

interoperability of satellite control. DOD's recently established
National Security Space Senior Steering Group could be a useful
mechanism for guiding and overseeing such integration and
interoperability. However, the Senior Steering Group's
effectiveness at fostering interagency satellite control
integration and interoperability has yet to be demonstrated. It
would be timely for the Senior Steering Group to determine whether
DOD's

plans to replace its satellite control capabilities could be
integrated with NASA's efforts to consolidate its satellite
control operations. Recommendations We recommend that the
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretaries of the

Air Force and the Navy to (1) consolidate their plans to replace
existing Air Force and Navy satellite control capabilities and (2)
consider using commercial off- the- shelf satellite control
products and best commercial practices in making a selection among
alternative systems to satisfy core satellite control
requirements, thus limiting the need for unique capabilities. We
also recommend that the Secretary direct the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Technology; the Under Secretary of
Defense (Controller/ Chief Financial Officer); and the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and
Intelligence to only consider funding requests for such
replacement efforts that make

B-280224 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

maximum use of commercial products and practices to achieve
integrated satellite control capabilities within DOD.

We further recommend that, in consonance with the development of
DOD's plans to replace its satellite control capabilities, the
Secretary take the lead in ensuring that the National Security
Space Senior Steering Group serves as the forum for fostering and
overseeing the integration and interoperability of satellite
control for all government space activities in accordance with
1996 national space policy guidelines.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD agreed that
more integrated satellite activity should take place within DOD as
well as across defense, civil, and commercial space sectors. It
stated that integrated operations can lead to increased
standardization, resulting in lower satellite acquisition and
operation costs. However, DOD pointed out that such integration
pursued primarily for the benefit of monetary savings has

the potential of limiting the ability of military forces to
effectively carry out their assigned missions. DOD officials
emphasized the need to ensure military control over such satellite
integration. We agree that both cost savings and the necessary
military control are important and recognize that integrated
operations present new management challenges.

DOD commented that our draft report made several accurate
observations of recent and ongoing DOD satellite control planning
and operational activities but did not properly highlight some
significant strides or realistic obstacles. For example, DOD
mentioned (1) the termination of fractured and duplicative
operations of communications satellites by the Air Force and Navy
and (2) satellite control compliant efforts, specifically the
convergence of DOD's meteorological and the Department of
Commerce's environmental satellites that was initiated prior to
the establishment of the 1996 national space policy. These actions
are discussed in the report.

DOD emphasized that fiscal realities cannot be ignored, stating
that replacing legacy systems is expensive and requires proper
planning and budgeting. We discussed the Air Force's effort to
standardize its satellite control capabilities, which began in
1995, and stated that since terminating this effort in 1997, the
Air Force has not formally initiated renewed efforts. We believe
an opportunity now exists for DOD to renew its effort to

standardize these capabilities using commercially available
products and agree that effective planning and budgeting are
critical.

B-280224 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense direct the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy to
consolidate their satellite control replacement plans and consider
using commercial off- the- shelf products and best commercial
practices in making a selection. DOD commented that it would not
want to migrate toward a monolithic

satellite control capability, and we agree that such a capability
may not be the optimum solution. Instead, DOD stated that the
question is how to structure architectures so that national
security and civil interests are appropriately addressed and so
that interoperability and commonality are balanced against
security requirements to protect DOD systems from intrusion. DOD
also stated that any resulting architecture should be built
incrementally and that consolidating satellite control
capabilities is an

appropriate step in that direction. In doing so, DOD expects to
take advantage of increasing commercial space activity and to
pursue commercial off- the- shelf solutions for satellite control.
We agree that structuring architectures for controlling multiple
types of satellites could be difficult. Also, we believe that
DOD's intention to employ commercial capabilities to address such
diverse requirements is sound and that greater efficiencies should
be achievable by using a common core of satellite control software
capabilities.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of
Defense provide directions to only fund satellite control
replacement efforts that are designed to achieve integrated
capabilities. DOD suggested (1) adding the Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence to
implement those directions and (2) including a reference to making
maximum use of commercial products and practices. We agreed and
modified our recommendation. DOD agreed with our recommendation
that the Secretary of Defense take the lead in establishing an
interagency mechanism to provide a forum for fostering and
overseeing the integration and interoperability of satellite
control within the government. DOD commented that significant
actions in this regard have been taken, citing a memorandum of
understanding by the Secretary of Defense and Director of Central
Intelligence dated July 31, 1998, for national security space
management. The memorandum implements revised procedures for the
management of DOD and intelligence community space programs and
activities as directed by a Presidential Decision Directive. The
memorandum establishes a National Security Space Senior Steering
Group, directing that all interested national security and civil
agencies be invited as members in the Senior Steering Group's
deliberations, and a National Security Space Architect. We are

B-280224 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

aware of this revised management structure and believe it could
provide the proper interagency mechanism to fulfill the intent of
the 1996 national space policy. Accordingly, we modified our
recommendation to identify the Senior Steering Group as the
appropriate interagency forum. However, the revised management
structure had only been in effect for about 9 months when we
completed our review in April 1999, and its effectiveness at
fostering interagency satellite control integration and
interoperability was

yet to be demonstrated. Toward this end, it would be timely for
the Senior Steering Group to determine whether DOD's plans to
replace its satellite control capabilities and NASA's efforts to
consolidate its satellite control operations could be integrated.

DOD's comments on a draft of this report are reprinted in their
entirety in appendix I. DOD also provided technical comments on
the draft report, which we incorporated as appropriate.

Scope and Methodology To review DOD's efforts to integrate and
improve its satellite control capabilities, we evaluated Defense,
Air Force, and Navy plans, requirements, programs, budgets, and
studies associated with current and

future satellite control capabilities. To review DOD's efforts to
foster integrated and interoperable satellite control within the
government, we discussed the extent of interagency actions with
defense and civil agency representatives. To identify
opportunities for integrating satellite control, we discussed the
status and capabilities of government- owned and commercially
available products for satellite control with several government
agency and private organization representatives.

We performed our work primarily at the Air Force Space Command,
Colorado Springs, Colorado, and at several Air Force Space and
Missile Systems Center offices at El Segundo, California;
Albuquerque, New Mexico; and Colorado Springs, Colorado. To obtain
additional information and explanations, we met with
representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense;
Department of the Air Force; Department of the Navy; Office of the
DOD Space Architect; and NASA in Washington, D. C.

We also obtained information from the U. S. Space Command,
Colorado Springs, Colorado; Naval Space Command, Dahlgren,
Virginia; NASA's Goddard Space Flight Center, Greenbelt, Maryland;
NASA's Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas; NOAA's Satellite
Operations Center, Suitland, Maryland; Naval Satellite Operations
Center, Point Mugu, California; and

Naval Research Laboratory's Satellite Tracking Facility, Blossom
Point, Maryland.

B-280224 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

To obtain information on the availability and applicability of
commercial satellite control products, we held discussions with
officials representing Integral Systems, Incorporated, Lanham,
Maryland; Raytheon Systems Company, Aurora, Colorado; Lockheed
Martin Space Operations Company, Houston, Texas; and Software
Technology, Incorporated, Alexandria, Virginia, and Denver,
Colorado. These companies have developed satellite control systems
for the various government organizations included in our review as
well as for commercial satellite system operations.

We performed our review from May 1998 through April 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We are sending copies of this report to Senator Daniel K. Inouye,
Senator Carl Levin, Senator Ted Stevens, Senator John W. Warner,
Representative John P. Murtha, Representative Ike Skelton, and
Representative Floyd D. Spence in their capacities as Chairs or
Ranking Minority Members of Senate and House Committees and
Subcommittees. We are also sending copies of this report to the
Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of

Defense; the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Acting Secretary of the
Air Force; the Honorable Richard Danzig, Secretary of the Navy;
the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of Management and
Budget; and the Honorable George J. Tenet, Director of Central
Intelligence. Copies will also be made available to others upon
request. If you or your staff have any questions concerning this
report, please call me on (202) 512- 4841. Major contributors to
this report are listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours, Louis J. Rodrigues Director, Defense Acquisitions
Issues

Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Contents Letter 1 Appendix I Comments From the Department of
Defense

22 Appendix II Major Contributors to This Report

28

Abbreviations

AFSCN Air Force Satellite Control Network COBRA Commercial Off-
the- Shelf Based Research Architecture DCCS Distributed Command
and Control System DOD Department of Defense NASA National
Aeronautics and Space Administration NOAA National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration NSCN Naval Satellite Control Network
SBIRS Space- Based Infrared System SSCS Standardized Satellite
Control System

Contents Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear
at the end of this appendix.

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Now on p. 15. See comment 1.

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Now on pp. 15 and 16. See comment 2. Now on p. 16.

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense

Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

The following are GAO's comments on the Department of Defense's
(DOD) letter dated April 12, 1999. GAO Comments 1. DOD's comment
about its recently completed satellite operations architecture
study refers to a proposed recommendation contained in a draft of
the Architect's report that the satellite control functions for
individual satellite systems should be integrated with the
systems' mission

operations in the same radio frequency band. This comment concerns
communications between satellites and ground command and control
centers. Our review did not focus on this linkage. Instead, we
focused on

the computer systems located at the ground centers that process
the data necessary to perform satellite control functions. In
addition, we are aware of the proposed recommendation in the
Architect's draft report regarding the establishment of satellite
autonomy goals to reduce the amount of needed ground operations.
Although at the end of our review in April 1999 the Architect's
final report had not been released, DOD officials provided no
information that would alter our assessment.

2. DOD noted that the Space Architect performed a cost-
effectiveness analysis of dedicated versus common satellite
control solutions and was unable to substantiate any cost savings
for common solutions. We observed in a draft of the Architect's
report that, in an attempt to quantify differences between common
and dedicated infrastructures, both of which included satellite
mission and satellite control functions, the study team found that
there was no significant life- cycle cost or performance
differences between the two approaches. Although the consistency
of these two statements is unclear, our review did not focus on
the merits of dedicated versus

common infrastructures. We focused on satellite control ground
processing, irrespective of the type of infrastructure. In
consonance with our approach, DOD stated that since commercial
activity in space is increasing (1) there are a number of high-
quality commercial products in

the marketplace that are capable of controlling DOD satellites and
(2) commercialization will enhance standardization and ensure
lowest cost because of competition.

Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-81 Satellite Control Systems

Appendix II Major Contributors to This Report Appendi x I I

National Security and International Affairs Division, Washington,
D. C.

Homer H. Thomson James A. Elgas

Denver Field Office Frederick G. Day Robert W. Stewart

Los Angeles Field Office

Larry J. Bridges David G. Hubbell

(707353) Let t er

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