Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost
More, Achieve Less Than Planned (Letter Report, 04/13/99,
GAO/NSIAD-99-76).
Pursuant to a congressional request, GAO reviewed the cost and
realization of national security objectives at Russia's Mayak nuclear
complex and Shchuch'ye chemical weapons storage depot, focusing on
whether the: (1) Mayak project will be completed on schedule and within
past Department of Defense (DOD) estimates of its total cost to the
United States; (2) United States has made progress in ensuring that the
completed Mayak facility would achieve U.S. national security objectives
by safely and securely storing retired materials taken only from
dismantled nuclear weapons; (3) Shchuch'ye project will be completed on
schedule and the status of DOD efforts to estimate its total cost to the
United States; and (4) completed Shchuch'ye facility will achieve U.S.
national security objectives by helping Russia destroy the Shchuch'ye
depot's stocks and accelerate elimination of all Russian chemical
weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
GAO noted that: (1) Russian funding shortfalls have substantially
increased the Mayak facility's estimated cost to the United States while
underscoring the need for substantial additional assistance if the
Shchuch'ye project's broader objectives are to be attained; (2) Russian
reluctance to share critical information with the United States may
limit Mayak's national security benefits and has contributed to delays
in the Shchuch'ye project; (3) Russia's failure to fund its share of the
costs of the Mayak facility has already increased estimated U.S. costs
for Mayak from $275 million to $413 million, deferred construction of
one of the facility's two planned storage buildings, and delayed the
facility's initial availability by about 3 years; (4) U.S. costs for
Mayak could ultimately increase to almost $1.3 billion if DOD eventually
opts to build the facility's originally planned second building and help
Russia prepare, package, and transport plutonium for storage at Mayak;
(5) notwithstanding its growing investment in the Mayak project, the
United States continues to lack clear assurance that Russia will
actually use the Mayak facility in a manner that will ensure the
achievement of all U.S. national security objectives for the project;
(6) U.S. and Russian negotiators have drafted--but have not yet
concluded--an agreement that could assure DOD that weapons-grade
plutonium at Mayak is securely stored and would not be used for weapons
in the future; (7) the Shchuch'ye project has fallen about 18 months
behind schedule since October 1997 and now is not scheduled to begin
operating until 2006; (8) several factors, including Russia's failure to
promptly provide needed information about the chemical weapons to be
destroyed, have slowed both completion of the facility's conceptual
design and DOD's efforts to refine its $750 million estimate of the
pilot facility's cost to the United States; (9) the United States lacks
assurance that the Shchuch'ye project will achieve its broader national
security objectives of accelerating the destruction of such weapons at
other depots and helping Russia comply with the Chemical Weapons
Convention; (10) Russia's economic difficulties strongly suggest that it
would be unwilling or unable to invest the billions of dollars needed to
construct and operate destruction facilities at the four depots that
store the rest of its 32,000 metric ton nerve agent stockpile; and (11)
DOD is counting on large-scale assistance from other nations to fund the
additional facilities needed to help Russia fully comply with the
Chemical Weapons Convention and so realize the Shchuch'ye project's
broader objectives.
--------------------------- Indexing Terms -----------------------------
REPORTNUM: NSIAD-99-76
TITLE: Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian
Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than Planned
DATE: 04/13/99
SUBJECT: Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear weapons
Nuclear fuel plants
Schedule slippages
Chemical warfare
International cooperation
Arms control agreements
Property disposal
Foreign technical aid
Federal aid to foreign countries
IDENTIFIER: Chemical Weapons Convention
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
Mayak (Russia)
Shchuch'ye (Russia)
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NS99076.book GAO United States General Accounting Office
Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on
Armed Services, House of Representatives
April 1999 WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
Effort to Reduce Russian Arsenals May Cost More, Achieve Less Than
Planned
GAO/NSIAD-99-76
GAO/NSIAD-99-76
United States General Accounting Office Washington, D. C. 20548
Lett er
Page 1 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
GAO
National Security and International Affairs Division
B-282010 Letter April 13, 1999 The Honorable Floyd Spence Chairman
The Honorable Ike Skelton Ranking Minority Member Committee on
Armed Services House of Representatives
Since the early 1990s, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
supported Russia's design and construction of two facilities
intended to promote U. S. national security by helping to reduce
Russian arsenals of nuclear and chemical weapons. The first, a
storage facility now under construction at Russia's Mayak nuclear
complex, is intended to facilitate Russia's elimination of nuclear
weapons by providing safe and secure storage for nuclear materials
(such as plutonium) removed from such weapons. The second, a pilot
chemical weapons destruction facility to be built near
Russia's Shchuch'ye chemical weapons storage depot, is intended to
destroy that depot's nerve agent weapons, accelerate destruction
of such weapons at other depots by providing a proven destruction
technology, and help Russia comply with the Chemical Weapons
Convention. 1 DOD has supported these facilities through its
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. 2
Your committee has expressed concerns about the cost of the Mayak
and Shchuch'ye facilities, the likelihood that they will become
operational on schedule, and the extent to which the United States
is likely to realize its national security objectives for them.
Accordingly, our specific objectives in response to your request
were to assess
1 The Chemical Weapons Convention prohibits the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use
of chemical weapons. The Convention, which entered into force on
April 29, 1997, requires signatory states to destroy any stocks
that they may have of such weapons over a 10- year period and
provides for the possible granting of a 5- year extension.
2 The CTR program was initiated in 1991 to help former Soviet
states reduce risks posed by weapons of mass destruction. The
Congress has provided DOD with more than $2. 7 billion through
fiscal year 1999 for the CTR program. For more information
regarding this program, see our reports entitled Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Status of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
(GAO/NSIAD-96-222, Sept.
27, 1996), Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From
the Former Soviet Union An Update (GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 9,
1995), and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat From
the Former Soviet Union (GAO/NSIAD-95-7, Oct. 6, 1994).
B-282010 Page 2 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
whether the Mayak project will be completed on schedule and
within past DOD estimates of its total cost to the United States,
whether the United States has made progress in ensuring that the
completed Mayak facility would achieve U. S. national security
objectives by safely and securely storing retired materials taken
only from dismantled nuclear weapons,
whether the Shchuch'ye project will be completed on schedule and
the status of DOD efforts to estimate its total cost to the United
States, and whether the completed Shchuch'ye facility will
achieve U. S. national security objectives by helping Russia
destroy the Shchuch'ye depot's
stocks and accelerate elimination of all Russian chemical weapons
under the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Results in Brief Russian funding shortfalls have substantially
increased the Mayak facility's estimated cost to the United States
while underscoring the need for substantial additional assistance
if the Shchuch'ye project's broader objectives are to be attained.
Russian reluctance to share critical information with the United
States may limit Mayak's national security benefits and has
contributed to delays in the Shchuch'ye project.
Russia's failure to fund its share of the costs of the Mayak
facility has already increased estimated U. S. costs for Mayak
from $275 million to $413 million, deferred construction of one of
the facility's two planned storage buildings, and delayed the
facility's initial availability by about 3 years. U. S. costs for
Mayak could ultimately increase to almost $1. 3 billion if DOD
eventually opts to build the facility's originally planned second
building and help Russia prepare, package, and transport plutonium
for storage at Mayak.
Notwithstanding its growing investment in the Mayak project, the
United States continues to lack clear assurance that Russia will
actually use the Mayak facility in a manner that will ensure the
achievement of all U. S. national security objectives for the
project. U. S. and Russian negotiators have drafted but have not
yet concluded an agreement that could assure DOD that weapons-
grade plutonium at Mayak is securely stored and would
not be used for weapons in the future. However, Russian
negotiators have not agreed to U. S. proposals aimed at confirming
that Mayak's plutonium would originate solely from dismantled
weapons and that Mayak would thus support Russia's dismantlement
of nuclear weapons.
B-282010 Page 3 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Shchuch'ye project has fallen about 18 months behind schedule
since October 1997 and now is not scheduled to begin operating
until 2006. Several factors, including Russia's failure to
promptly provide needed
information about the chemical weapons to be destroyed, have
slowed both completion of the facility's conceptual design and
DOD's efforts to refine its $750 million estimate of the pilot
facility's cost to the United States. The project also fell behind
schedule because DOD increased the time allotted for constructing,
testing, and starting up the pilot facility, due in part to
funding limits.
The United States lacks assurance that the Shchuch'ye project will
achieve its broader national security objectives of accelerating
the destruction of such weapons at other depots and helping Russia
comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention. As designed, the U.
S.- funded pilot facility
would destroy most of the depot's 5, 600 metric tons of chemical
weapons although not until well past Russia's Chemical Weapons
Convention deadline for destroying its entire chemical weapons
stockpile and provide Russia with a proven technology for use at
its four other nerve agent depots. However, Russia's economic
difficulties strongly suggest that it would be unwilling or unable
to invest the billions of dollars needed to
construct and operate destruction facilities at the four depots
that store the rest of its 32,000 metric ton nerve agent
stockpile. As a result, DOD is counting on large- scale assistance
from other nations to fund the additional
facilities needed to help Russia fully comply with the Chemical
Weapons Convention and so realize the Shchuch'ye project's broader
objectives.
This report suggests that if the Congress wishes to have greater
assurance that the Shchuch'ye project will achieve its stated
broad national security objectives, it may wish to require DOD to
identify specific funding sources for the construction of the four
additional chemical weapons destruction
facilities or provide further justification for continuing the
project. Background The Mayak facility is intended to promote U.
S. national security interests
by allowing Russia to safely and securely retire nuclear materials
removed from dismantled nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union, which
had about 30, 000 nuclear weapons at the time of its collapse, may
have produced as much as 200 metric tons of plutonium and 1,200
metric tons of highly enriched uranium sufficient for producing
over 70,000 nuclear weapons. Following the 1991 Soviet collapse,
Russian officials indicated that a shortage of secure storage
space for nuclear material might impede their ability to retire
and eliminate nuclear warheads.
B-282010 Page 4 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Although U. S. agencies were unable to confirm the existence of
such a shortage, DOD agreed in 1992 to provide $15 million to help
Russia design a facility to hold nuclear materials from dismantled
weapons. In 1993, DOD agreed to provide another $75 million to
help build such a facility at Mayak. DOD informed congressional
committees in 1996 that it would cap its growing investment in
Mayak at half of the facility's cost. Based on
then- current DOD cost estimates, such a cap would have limited
total U. S. expenses for Mayak at about $275 million. As of
February 1999, DOD had obligated about $165 million for Mayak and
expended about $83 million.
Mayak's two planned storage buildings were designed to accommodate
a total of 50,000 containers 3 filled with as much as 66 metric
tons of plutonium and 536 metric tons of highly enriched uranium.
4 By mid- 1998, the first of these storage buildings and several
support buildings had been partially constructed. Initial
operations were to start in 1999.
DOD has also been supporting design and construction of the
Shchuch'ye pilot chemical weapons destruction facility to promote
U. S. national security by (1) destroying all nerve agent- filled
munitions at a Russian chemical weapons storage depot, (2)
accelerating Russia's chemical weapons destruction efforts by
providing a proven nerve agent destruction
technology and a facility design that could be adapted for use at
other storage sites, and (3) helping Russia meet its Chemical
Weapons Convention deadlines. By ratifying the Chemical Weapons
Convention in 1997, Russia agreed to destroy its chemical weapons
by 2007, with a
possible extension to 2012. However, it does not have an
operational capability to destroy large quantities of chemical
weapons 5 and its seven declared chemical weapons storage depots
contain 40,000 metric tons of chemical weapons agent the world's
largest chemical weapons stockpile. Over 80 percent of this
stockpile consists of the lethal nerve agents sarin, soman, and
VX. According to executive branch officials, the destruction of
Russia's chemical weapons stockpile, especially its nerve agents,
would
3 In addition to the cost of the Mayak facility, DOD also has
spent $63 million to produce about 32, 700 nuclear material
containers for Russian use at a facility such as the one being
built at Mayak. 4 These amounts are sufficient to build more than
29,000 nuclear weapons. 5 The United States ratified the Chemical
Weapons Convention on April 25, 1997, and is obligated to destroy
its 31,500- ton stockpile by 2007. The Congress had already
directed the U. S. Army to destroy this stockpile. According to
the Army, 13 percent of the stockpile had been destroyed by mid-
January 1999. It plans to complete the destruction of the entire
U. S. stockpile by 2004.
B-282010 Page 5 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
significantly reduce the chemical weapons threat faced by the
United States.
In 1994, DOD began taking initial steps toward providing Russia
the capability of destroying chemical weapons at the Shchuch'ye
depot, which stores about 2 million artillery projectiles and
rocket and missile warheads filled with nerve agents. The project
would result in a pilot facility capable of destroying 500 metric
tons of nerve agents annually. Russia could expand the pilot
facility into a full- scale facility capable of destroying 1,200
metric tons annually. DOD plans to fund the entire cost of the
pilot destruction facility. As of the end of 1998, DOD had
obligated about
$95 million for the project and expended about $56 million. Mayak
Will Cost DOD More and Be Available Later Than Planned
Because of Russian funding shortfalls, DOD now plans to bear about
90 percent of the cost of constructing a truncated version of the
Mayak facility that will be available almost 3 years later than
previously scheduled. DOD
estimates that the smaller facility will cost the United States
about 50 percent more than the amount that DOD had previously
planned to contribute toward the full- sized facility. U. S. costs
could increase to as
much as $1. 3 billion if DOD opts to expand Mayak to its
originally- planned size and to help Russia load Mayak with
plutonium. Russian Funding Shortfalls Lead to Higher U. S. Costs,
Smaller Facility, Delayed Opening
DOD's 1996 assumption that Russia would pay for half of Mayak's
costs has not been born out by subsequent events. According to a
DOD estimate, through 1999 Russia had programmed about $45 million
for Mayak less than 14 percent of all U. S.- Russian Mayak
funding. In April 1998, Russian officials informed DOD that Russia
would be unable to contribute significant funds for Mayak in the
future and asked DOD to fund Mayak's completion.
After concluding that it could not allocate the funds needed to
complete the entire facility by 1999 as planned, DOD chose to
extend the time allotted for constructing Mayak's first storage
building and to defer the second storage building. DOD estimated
that the smaller facility could be completed by mid- 2002 at a
cost of $413 million$ 138 million more than DOD's 1996 cap of $275
million for the full- sized facility. DOD's new
estimate included $20 million to cover the cost of extending the
project and $36 million for new infrastructure items needed to
operate Mayak. The
B-282010 Page 6 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
truncated, 25,000- container facility would be able to hold 50
metric tons of plutonium and 200 metric tons of highly enriched
uranium. 6 In January 1999, Russia agreed that DOD would
contribute no more than $413 million for a 25,000- container
facility. 7 However, DOD officials continue to budget and plan for
the possibility that DOD will opt in 2000 to proceed with the
deferred second storage building, which could be completed by mid-
2006 and designed to hold an additional
100 metric tons of plutonium. DOD officials told us that Russia
would need the second building if it chooses to retire more
plutonium as a result of the elimination of nuclear weapons. DOD
estimates that the second building would cost the United States
another $230 million raising total U. S. Mayak design and
construction costs to about $642 million.
DOD May Help Russia Prepare Plutonium for Storage at Mayak
DOD may also provide another $650 million to help Russia prepare,
package, and transport plutonium for storage at Mayak. In April
1998, Russian officials informed DOD that Russia lacked the
resources to fully utilize its capabilities for preparing and
packaging materials for storage at Mayak and that this lack of
resources could constrict Russian nuclear
weapons dismantlement. According to DOD officials, DOD
subsequently proposed that it would help Russia prepare, package,
and transport plutonium for storage at the facility. DOD officials
informed us that such aid would be contingent on Russia's
willingness to provide the United
States with access to the facilities that would prepare and
package the plutonium. The CTR program office estimates that
helping Russia prepare, package, and transport 50 metric tons of
plutonium for storage at Mayak's first building by 2006 could cost
DOD about $223 million. The cost of such an
6 Unlike highly enriched uranium, plutonium produces heat and can
change in ways that could raise safety concerns if stored at too
high a temperature for too long. While Mayak's first building was
designed to safely hold no more than 33 metric tons of plutonium,
the initial results of a
DOD- sponsored study indicate that it could safely hold the 50
metric tons of plutonium that Russia now plans to retire at Mayak.
Containers holding 50 metric tons of plutonium would fill about
half of the building's storage capacity. The remaining half could
be used to store up to 200 metric tons of highly enriched uranium.
Whether Russia will store any highly enriched uranium at Mayak is
unclear, given
that it has agreed to sell 500 metric tons of uranium from
dismantled weapons to the United States after converting the
uranium into low- enriched fuel for power reactors.
7 The Congress has barred the obligation or expenditure of any
fiscal year 1998 funds for Mayak until 15 days after DOD notifies
the Congress that DOD and Russia have entered into an agreement
that specifies the total cost to the United States for the
facility, as well as an agreement that incorporates the principle
of transparency with respect to the use of the facility (P. L.
105- 85, sec. 1407).
B-282010 Page 7 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
effort would increase sharply if DOD were also to help Russia fill
Mayak's second building if constructed with another 100 metric
tons of plutonium. The CTR program office estimates that
preparing, packaging, and transporting a total of 150 metric tons
of plutonium for storage at a two- building Mayak facility by 2010
would cost DOD roughly $650 million. Such an effort, coupled with
the cost of designing and constructing both
buildings, could raise total U. S. Mayak costs to almost $1.3
billion, as shown in table 1.
Table 1: Mayak Facility's Capacity, Schedule, and Cost Estimates
Note: Shaded areas represent potential future costs. Source: GAO
analysis of DOD information.
Russian Officials Press for Additional U. S. Support
Russian officials continue to seek additional U. S. support for
various Mayak- related facilities. In 1998, DOD refused to pay
about $76 million for items including a garage, a car wash, a bus
station, and an overly large
heating plant that it considered non- essential. In November 1998,
Russian officials argued that Russia could not afford to pay for
several such items that they stated would be needed to ensure
Mayak's certification for
operation by Russian authorities. DOD officials, while rejecting
almost all of the items, agreed to pay for a fire station and to
consider heating plant options because they considered these items
to be integral to Mayak's safe
Mayak facility, as planned in 1996 Mayak facility, as currently
planned Mayak facility, if expanded to
originally- planned size
Capacity Two buildings holding a total of 50, 000 containers One
building holding a total of 25, 000 containers Two buildings
holding a total of 50, 000 containers Estimated start of
operations 1999 2002 2002 (first building)
2006 (second building) Estimated U. S. cost of design and
construction $275 million $413 million $642 million
Estimated U. S. cost of loading facility with plutonium
(preparation, packaging, and
transportation) $0 $223 million (50 metric tons) $650 million
(150 metric tons)
Total estimated U. S. cost of facility design, construction, and
loading
$275 million $636 million $1. 29 billion
B-282010 Page 8 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
operation. Russia's continued economic difficulties suggest that
it will continue to press DOD for additional support for such
items in the future. 8 Full Achievement of U. S. National Security
Objectives at Mayak Hinges on Russian Decisions
The United States cannot ensure it will achieve the full range of
its Mayak national security objectives unless and until Russia
agrees to measures needed to confirm that the completed facility
contains only materials from dismantled nuclear weapons. DOD
appears to have made greater progress toward being able to confirm
that weapons- grade materials at Mayak are not available for reuse
in weapons and are being stored securely and safely.
Ongoing Negotiations Continue Efforts to Define U. S. Access
In a January 1996 joint statement with the U. S. Secretary of
Defense, the Russian Minister for Atomic Energy stated that the
Mayak facility would have joint accountability and transparency
measures that would permit the United States to confirm Mayak's
use. However, in September 1996, we
reported that the United States and Russia had not made any
progress in finalizing transparency arrangements for Mayak, which
was then scheduled for completion less than 3 years later. 9 We
noted that without a detailed transparency arrangement the United
States would be unable to ensure that Russia was using Mayak to
store materials from dismantled weapons
and that those materials were not being reused for weapons. We
therefore suggested that the Congress consider linking DOD's
ability to obligate funds for constructing Mayak to the completion
of a transparency agreement. The Congress subsequently barred DOD
from obligating fiscal year 1998
funds for Mayak until 15 days after DOD had notified the Congress
that DOD and Russia had entered into an agreement incorporating
the principle of transparency with respect to the facility's use.
10 In October 1997, the United States and Russia began negotiating
an agreement to define the
8 Russia's economic situation raises concerns about its ability to
pay the cost of operating Mayak once the facility is completed.
Russian officials have stated that Mayak could cost as much as $80
million a year to operate. Although DOD officials have not
estimated Mayak's life- cycle costs, a U. S. contractor
estimate suggests that the facility could cost Russia about $12
million to $13 million a year for operations and maintenance.
9 See our report entitled Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
10 This restriction is found in P. L. 105- 85, sec. 1407.
B-282010 Page 9 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
transparency measures that the United States would be allowed to
employ at Mayak. By February 1999, the negotiators had partially
drafted a possible agreement. DOD officials that we spoke with
could not predict when the agreement would be completed.
Weapons Origin of Mayak's Future Contents in Doubt
DOD is attempting to secure sufficient access to the plutonium
entering Mayak to be confident that it was removed from dismantled
nuclear weapons. Knowing that the plutonium originated from
nuclear weapons
would provide evidence that Russia is dismantling such weapons. U.
S. officials have defined several criteria for assessing whether
plutonium originated from a nuclear weapon. DOD officials informed
us that Russian negotiators have offered to allow U. S.
measurements relevant to one of these criteria to be made as
plutonium enters Mayak for storage and to supplement these
measurements with written pledges that the stored
material originated from weapons. U. S. officials told us that
Russian negotiators have agreed to measurements that would provide
confidence that Mayak's plutonium is weapons grade.
However, according to U. S. officials, Russian negotiators have
not agreed to allow U. S. measurements regarding the shape of the
alleged plutonium components and other U. S. criteria. Russian
officials have stated that all plutonium components will be
reshaped before they are shipped to Mayak for U. S. measurement.
11 Such reshaping would reduce DOD's ability to confirm that the
weapons- grade plutonium entering Mayak had been
removed from weapons and that Mayak is directly supporting
Russia's elimination of nuclear weapons. Russian negotiators
rebuffed a U. S. request to allow measurements of Mayak- bound
plutonium at the reshaping facility prior to its reshaping because
of (1) the lack of any U. S.- funded activities at the reshaping
facility and (2) Russian sensitivities concerning
the information that the United States would obtain. DOD officials
informed us that they intend to make the taking of weapons- origin
measurements a condition of any CTR aid to Russia's preparation,
packaging, and transportation of plutonium for storage at Mayak.
11 According to DOD officials, Russian negotiators stated that the
reshaping was intended to deny International Atomic Energy Agency
inspectors access to sensitive information. The Agency's
membership includes more than 100 nations that do not have nuclear
weapons. See our report entitled Nuclear Nonproliferation and
Safety: Challenges Facing the International Atomic Energy Agency
(GAO/ NSIAD/ RCED- 93- 284, Sept. 22, 1993).
B-282010 Page 10 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Draft Access Agreement Provides Pledge That Materials Will Not Be
Removed and Allows DOD
Monitoring DOD is also seeking to increase its confidence that
nuclear materials stored
at Mayak would not be used to produce new Russian nuclear weapons
and would be stored securely. 12 The draft agreement contains
provisions addressing both of these objectives, although questions
remain concerning Russia's plans for providing physical security
for the facility.
The draft agreement includes a Russian pledge not to remove any
material from Mayak other than for emergency purposes 13 without
first negotiating sufficient provisions to assure the United
States that the materials would not be reused for weapons. To
bolster U. S. confidence that these materials would be securely
stored, the draft agreement would
provide the United States with considerable access at Mayak. U. S.
monitors would be allowed to inspect Mayak six times a year and
utilize data generated by Mayak's material control and accounting
system. U. S. monitors would be allowed to spend at least 5 days
to conduct the initial inspection. During each inspection, they
would be allowed to download
recorded data from sensors used by the Russians to identify, scan,
and track each container as it passes through Mayak's unloading
and incoming control rooms. Annually, U. S. monitors would be able
to select randomly up to 120 storage shafts and verify the
identifying tags on the containers in those shafts against Mayak's
records. 14 U. S. monitors would have the right to scan one
container from each of the selected shafts to determine its
contents. Russia also would be required to inventory a random
number of containers twice a year with U. S. participation.
Details regarding Mayak's physical security measures remain
unclear, however. DOD officials informed us that Russia has been
reluctant to provide information about Russia's plans to provide
physical security for the facility. The lack of such information
could impair DOD's ability to assess Russian requests for safety-
related equipment.
DOD has addressed Mayak's safety by reviewing its design. DOD
officials reviewed Russian design documents in October 1996 and
identified several 12 In November 1998, Russian officials informed
us that they had secured temporary storage space for
materials from nuclear weapons that would be sufficient until
Mayak begins operating in 2002. They stated that the temporary
storage space is unsuited for long- term storage, in part because
it depends heavily on guards for security. 13 The draft agreement
specifies the United States would have to be notified of any such
removal. 14 One hundred twenty shafts a year would constitute
about 4 percent of Mayak's shafts and could contain almost 2
metric tons of plutonium.
B-282010 Page 11 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
safety concerns. A 1997 U. S. follow- up review concluded that the
Russians had incorporated some changes in their design and had
provided sufficient additional data to resolve remaining issues.
DOD officials informed us that they are continuing to monitor the
design of key safety- related
components. Shchuch'ye Project Has Fallen Behind Schedule
The Shchuch'ye project has fallen behind schedule since October
1997, delaying the preparation of a more accurate cost estimate
and the pilot facility's planned start- up date. The project has
fallen behind schedule largely due to delays in completing the
facility's conceptual design and U. S. funding constraints.
Development of the Facility's Conceptual Design and Cost Estimate
Is Behind Schedule
In October 1997, U. S. and Russian officials agreed to a joint
schedule for the Shchuch'ye project. This new schedule estimated
that the facility's conceptual design 15 would be completed by
April 1998. DOD officials have recently verified that it was not
completed until February 1999. DOD
officials attributed this 10- month delay to three factors. The
conceptual design fell behind schedule partly because Russia did
not promptly provide detailed specifications for the types of
chemical weapons stored at the Shchuch'ye depot to U. S.
engineers, despite repeated U. S.
requests. Without these specifications, U. S. engineers could not
verify that the facility's weapons- handling equipment would
safely extract nerve agents from these weapons. According to a DOD
official, by the end of January 1999, Russia had provided enough
information about the weapons stored at the Shchuch'ye depot to
allow completion of the conceptual design. However, the delay led
DOD to defer fabrication of test
weapons- handling equipment from January 1999 to July 1999.
According to a DOD official, this delay could impact the overall
project schedule. The conceptual design also fell behind schedule
partly because of delays in verifying the safety and effectiveness
of Russia's chemical agent destruction process for Russian VX
nerve agent. 16 The process employs a chemical compound to
neutralize the nerve agents extracted from the
15 In U. S. engineering practice, a project's conceptual or
preliminary design is complete when 35 percent of its total design
is complete. 16 This process had already been demonstrated to be
effective destroying other Russian nerve agents.
B-282010 Page 12 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
chemical weapons and then transforms the neutralized agents into a
solid waste product, which will be stored in bunkers next to the
facility. During testing, U. S. engineers discovered that the
waste product's flash point 17 was about 20 degrees Fahrenheit
below the threshold that U. S. fire code
standards would classify as explosive. 18 In response to U. S.
concerns, Russian engineers modified the chemical compound used to
neutralize the nerve agents to produce a waste product with a
flash point that was acceptable, according to a DOD official. 19
However, several additional months were needed before U. S. and
Russian engineers were able to produce acceptable test quantities
of the modified chemical compound. 20
In addition, the facility's conceptual design fell behind schedule
partly because Russian officials did not obtain needed investment
and site permits until June 1998 1 year behind schedule. Russian
officials were reluctant to complete more than 10 percent of the
Shchuch'ye facility's design without these permits, which are
roughly equivalent to a U. S.
environmental impact assessment. According to DOD officials, the
October 1997 schedule underestimated the length of time the
Russian Ministry of Defense would need to obtain the permits under
new laws and regulations that strengthened the role of regional
commissions.
Due to the delay in completing the conceptual design, DOD
officials have deferred the completion of a more reliable estimate
of the pilot facility's cost from April 1998. Their preliminary
estimate of the pilot facility's cost is about $750 million. DOD
officials expect that the final cost estimate for the pilot
facility will be about the same or lower than the preliminary
estimate. DOD intends to fund the entire cost of the Shchuch'ye
pilot facility with CTR funds, including its start up and
demonstration with various agents and munitions. In accordance
with our 1996
recommendation, the Secretary of Defense has stated that DOD will
not obligate funds for the Shchuch'ye pilot facility's
construction until DOD has 17 A volatile combustible substance's
flash point is the lowest temperature at which vapors above it
will ignite when exposed to flame. 18 DOD officials acknowledged
that the waste product's low flash point should have been
identified during DOD's 1996 review of the Russian process. 19
Under U. S. fire code standards, the modified waste product would
be classified as flammable. 20 A DOD official informed us that the
project might encounter additional delays in verifying the Russian
process. For example, Russian scientists were not able to start
joint toxicology testing and waste evaluation in early February
1999 as planned. The resultant delay of this activity until early
summer 1999 could impact the overall project schedule, according
to this DOD official.
B-282010 Page 13 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
developed a sound cost estimate based on a completed conceptual
design. 21 Pilot Facility Construction and Start of Operations
Delayed by 18 Months
The October 1997 joint schedule would have also accelerated the
Shchuch'ye pilot facility's construction and start of operations
by about 2 years over prior U. S. schedules. Under this schedule,
the pilot facility would have started operating in December 2004.
According to DOD
officials, Russian officials sought to accelerate the schedule
because they had publicly committed to begin destroying chemical
weapons earlier than the prior schedule would have allowed.
According to DOD officials and documents, DOD officials were
concerned about the new schedule's practicality as they signed it,
and they told Russian officials that its implementation would be
subject to confirmation of U. S. funding and other
factors. In June 1998, DOD officials abandoned the October 1997
schedule and adopted a new schedule that shifted the start of the
pilot facility's operations to June 2006, a delay of 18 months.
They did so because the
completion of the facility's conceptual design had been delayed,
annual CTR funds would not be sufficient to support the
accelerated construction schedule, 22 and DOD's experience with U.
S. chemical weapons destruction facilities demonstrated that more
time would be required to test and start up the pilot facility.
Pilot Facility Construction
Schedule Depends on Russian Funding DOD's plans to fund the entire
cost of building the Shchuch'ye pilot facility
hinge on Russia's ability to prepare the facility's site for
construction and operations. U. S. officials have conditioned U.
S. assistance for the pilot facility's construction on Russia's
completion of several social and industrial infrastructure
projects, such as gas and water lines, storm sewers, housing, and
a rail line from the storage depot to the destruction facility.
These projects are estimated to cost almost $240 million. Russia
must complete initial social and industrial infrastructure
projects by late August 1999 before DOD officials will authorize
the U. S. contractor to
21 See our report entitled Weapons of Mass Destruction: Status of
the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.
22 The funding shortage worsened when CTR officials cut about $85
million from the Shchuch'ye project budget in fiscal years 2000
and 2001 to provide additional funding for the Mayak project. This
funding was restored in fiscal years 2002 to 2004.
B-282010 Page 14 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
mobilize for construction in September 1999. Russia was scheduled
to start construction of the initial infrastructure projects in
May 1998 but has delayed doing so until June 1999 leaving only 3
months for their completion. Russia will have to complete
additional social and industrial projects for U. S. assistance to
continue.
Shchuch'ye Project May Not Fully Achieve All U. S. Objectives
The Shchuch'ye project cannot achieve its broader national
security objectives unless Russia receives a large infusion of
additional funding. Destroying Russia's large chemical weapons
stockpile, particularly its nerve agents, has been a long-
standing U. S. goal. The Shchuch'ye project
was intended to serve this goal by (1) destroying all nerve agent-
filled munitions at one Russian chemical weapons storage depot,
(2) accelerating Russia's chemical weapons destruction efforts by
providing a proven nerve agent destruction technology and a
facility design that could be adapted for use at four other nerve
agent- filled weapons storage sites, and (3) helping
Russia meet its Chemical Weapons Convention deadlines. Although
the U. S.- funded pilot facility would largely achieve the first
objective, Russia's faltering economy and limited international
assistance raise serious doubts about the sources of funding for
constructing the four additional facilities needed to fully
achieve the second and third objectives.
Pilot Facility Would Destroy Most Weapons at Shchuch'ye Depot
As designed, the Shchuch'ye pilot facility would destroy 95
percent of the nerve agents stored at the nearby depot. The depot
stores about 2 million weapons, mostly artillery rounds and rocket
warheads, filled with about 5,600 metric tons of chemical agents
(about 14 percent of Russia's total declared chemical weapons
stockpile) primarily nerve agents. 23 The
pilot facility will not be able to destroy 5 percent of the nerve
agents, which are contained in large- diameter rocket and missile
warheads that will not fit on its processing lines. 23 The
Shchuch'ye facility would not destroy a small amount of phosgene-
filled projectiles stored at the Shchuch'ye depot. Phosgene is a
widely used commercial chemical (carbonyl chloride) and the
weapons themselves present a minimal threat, according to DOD
officials.
B-282010 Page 15 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Extending Shchuch'ye Technology to Other Depots Could Cost Russia
Billions of Dollars
Although the Shchuch'ye project would provide a proven design for
a chemical weapons destruction facility that Russia could use at
four other nerve agent storage depots, DOD and State Department
officials informed us that Russia's dire economic outlook could
hinder its ability to provide the billions of dollars needed to
erect four additional destruction facilities. DOD officials told
us that Russia could adopt the Shchuch'ye design for use
at (1) the Kizner depot which stores artillery projectiles and
rocket warheads similar to those at Shchuch'ye and (2) three
depots that store air- deliverable nerve agent weapons, if the
weapons- handling equipment were redesigned. However, Russia could
require over $3 billion to construct these four additional
facilities and provide needed infrastructure as well as additional
billions of dollars for their operations.
According to DOD officials and documents, Russia is directing its
limited funds toward the design and construction of two facilities
to eliminate bulk blister agents, rather than nerve agents.
Executive branch officials are counting on substantial assistance
from other nations to fund the construction of the four additional
facilities needed to destroy Russia's entire nerve agent
stockpile. However, according to DOD and State Department
officials, foreign assistance for Russia's chemical weapons
destruction efforts is largely limited to U. S. support for the
Shchuch'ye project, although Germany has provided some aid to help
Russia eliminate blister agents. DOD officials expressed hope that
the U. S. investment in building the Shchuch'ye pilot facility
will encourage other nations to help
Russia eliminate its chemical weapons. 24 Russia Is Unlikely to
Meet Its Chemical Weapons Convention Targets
The Shchuch'ye pilot facility's limited capacity and delayed start
of operations will prevent Russia from destroying the Shchuch'ye
depot's nerve agent stocks before Russia's Chemical Weapons
Convention deadline of 2007. The U. S.- funded pilot facility is
scheduled to begin destroying nerve agents by 2006 at a rate of
about 500 metric tons annually. At this rate, it would finish
destroying the small- and medium- diameter weapons that contain 95
percent of the depot's 5,600 metric tons of agent in 2017 10 years
after the expiration of Russia's Convention deadline and 5 years
24 According to DOD, foreign international assistance for Russia's
chemical weapons destruction program currently totals about $18
million. Germany is providing about $9.6 million to help eliminate
bulk blister agents; Italy has pledged $8 million for a facility
at Kizner; and two other countries are funding public health
studies. Other interested countries are waiting for Russia to
demonstrate its commitment to the program before pledging
assistance, according to DOD.
B-282010 Page 16 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
after the expiration of an extension to that deadline. By
completing the full- scale facility with a capacity of 1,200
metric tons annually, Russia could destroy the Shchuch'ye depot's
entire nerve agent stockpile by its extended Convention deadline.
However, to do so, Russia would have to provide about $250 million
to expand the facility roughly the same amount that it failed to
provide for the Mayak project. DOD officials informed us that DOD
has no plans to help construct the full- scale facility.
Although Russia's 1995 chemical weapons elimination plan called
for the completion of five nerve agent facilities by 2001, even
the most advanced of these projects the Shchuch'ye pilot facility
will not become operational until 2006. The Shchuch'ye depot's
stocks constitute only about 17 percent of its nerve agent
stockpile. Given Shchuch'ye's role as a pilot facility for the
Russian nerve agent destruction program, Russia is unlikely to
destroy the nerve agents stored at the four other depots in time
to meet even its extended Convention deadline. 25
According to a State Department official and a nongovernmental
organization, ongoing efforts to eliminate Russian chemical
weapons however prolonged are important to ensuring the continued
viability of the Convention itself and securing a broader range of
security benefits flowing from the Convention. The State
Department official said that Russia's ability to meet its
Chemical Weapons Convention time frame is less important than its
willingness to persevere in its efforts to eventually eliminate
its entire chemical weapons stockpile.
Conclusions The recent history of the Mayak and Shchuch'ye
projects indicates that U. S. efforts to reduce the threat of
Russian nuclear and chemical weapons will cost more than
previously estimated and take longer than previously scheduled.
Unless Russia and other foreign nations take certain steps, these
facilities will not provide the United States with all the
national security benefits that it sought. Russia's funding
shortfalls and reluctance
to provide DOD with crucial information have hampered DOD's
efforts and limited prospects for achieving all of these projects'
intended benefits within expected time frames.
25 Russian defense officials, speaking before the collapse of the
Russian economy in mid- 1998, stated that Russia was unlikely to
meet its Chemical Weapons Convention targets. According to DOD
officials, Russian officials have expressed interest in obtaining
assistance in improving security at Russia's seven
chemical weapons storage sites as the weapons there await
destruction. Russia has yet to define the specific physical
security improvements needed at each of its storage sites.
B-282010 Page 17 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
The extent and nature of the partially built Mayak facility's
costs and benefits to the United States remain unsettled. Russia's
funding shortfalls will substantially increase U. S. costs beyond
the $165 million that DOD has obligated to date and the $275
million cap that DOD set in 1996. Although
current plans call for no more than $413 million in U. S. funding
for Mayak, the United States could ultimately spend up to $1.3
billion to design and build an enlarged facility and load it with
150 metric tons of plutonium. Mayak's national security benefits
would be constrained by a continued Russian refusal to allow U. S.
confirmation that the materials at Mayak were removed from
weapons. However, Mayak could still provide the United States with
some assurance that at least 50 metric tons of weapons- grade
plutonium enough to provide Russia with more than 6,200 nuclear
weapons were being securely stored and were not available for use
in weapons. If expanded to its originally- planned size, Mayak
could allow DOD to monitor Russia's storage of roughly 75 percent
of all the plutonium estimated to have been produced by the Soviet
Union an amount sufficient for more than 18,000 nuclear weapons.
The Shchuch'ye project's outlook is more problematic. If
constructed, the pilot facility would slowly eliminate about 17
percent of Russia's nerve agents over the next 2 decades. Given
that DOD already has obligated about $95 million for the
Shchuch'ye project, achieving this limited benefit
would cost the United States an additional $655 million assuming
Russia can fund needed infrastructure projects that may cost
almost $240 million. Nonetheless, the $750 million investment by
the United States would not be sufficient to ensure the
realization of the project's broader objectives accelerating
Russia's destruction of its entire 32, 000 metric ton nerve agent
stockpile and its fulfillment of its Chemical Weapons Convention
deadlines. Although the Shchuch'ye project could provide a proven
technology for these facilities, Russia's ongoing economic
difficulties as illustrated by Mayak's funding shortfalls strongly
suggest that it would be unwilling or unable to invest the
billions of dollars needed to construct the additional facilities
it will need. As a result, DOD is counting on substantial
assistance from other nations to fund the construction of these
additional facilities and ensure that the Shchuch'ye project
realizes its broader objectives.
Matter for Congressional Consideration
Since substantial international assistance is essential for
achieving the Shchuch'ye project's broader objectives, the
Congress may wish to direct the Secretary of Defense to report to
it regarding the specific sources of
funding for the four additional facilities needed to eliminate
Russia's nerve agent stockpile. If the Secretary of Defense cannot
identify these likely
B-282010 Page 18 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
sources with specificity, the Congress may wish to consider
seeking further justification for the project from the Department
of Defense. Agency Comments and Our Evaluation
Although DOD and the Department of State generally concurred with
the factual information presented in this report, both agencies
took exception to our suggested matter for congressional
consideration. DOD also disagreed with some aspects of our
analysis, particularly those concerning the projects' ability to
realize their national security objectives. DOD objected to
statements in our report that it stated suggest that the
United States would not realize its national security goals at
Mayak or Shchuch'ye. DOD stressed that these projects would
achieve their most pressing national security goals. For example,
DOD stated that Mayak would achieve its major security objective
of safely and securely storing fissile material that could
otherwise be used to assemble nuclear weapons. It also stated that
ensuring that such materials were derived from dismantled nuclear
weapons was not Mayak's primary or sole security objective.
Similarly, DOD expressed confidence that Shchuch'ye would
destroy a substantial and threatening portion of the Russian
chemical weapons stockpile and validate technology needed to
facilitate destruction of similar agents elsewhere. DOD
recommended that we alter the initial paragraph of our conclusion
to better reflect its perspectives.
We did not intend to suggest that the United States is unlikely to
achieve any of its national security goals at Mayak and
Shchuch'ye. Instead, as stated in our report, we concluded that
the United States cannot ensure it will achieve the full range of
its national security objectives for Mayak
unless and until Russia agrees to allow the United States to
undertake measures needed to confirm that Mayak contains only
materials from nuclear weapons. Our report also concluded that,
although the Shchuch'ye
facility could eliminate the bulk of the Shchuch'ye depot's
chemical weapon stocks, the project is very unlikely to achieve
its broader objectives unless Russia receives a large infusion of
additional funding. These objectives have long been key elements
of the rationale for supporting the Mayak and Shchuch'ye projects.
For example, Mayak's primary function as a repository of materials
derived from Russian nuclear
weapons elimination has been reflected since 1992 in the titles of
U. S.- Russian agreements governing U. S. aid for Mayak. In
congressional testimony in March 1996, DOD officials reaffirmed
Mayak's intended role in removing potential bottlenecks in
Russia's elimination of nuclear weapons.
B-282010 Page 19 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
In 1997, the executive branch made weapons- origin transparency
one of three key U. S. transparency negotiation objectives. While
a U. S. failure to achieve such transparency would not degrade
Mayak's usefulness for storing materials that could be used for
weapons, it would eliminate Mayak's role in providing assurance
that CTR aid is facilitating the dismantlement of Russian nuclear
weapons and would therefore signal a diminution of Mayak's
intended national security benefits.
Similarly, the executive branch's rationale for constructing the
pilot Shchuch'ye destruction facility has long included the goal
of jump- starting Russian chemical weapons elimination. Without
the realization of this goal, the $750 million Shchuch'ye project
would result only in the gradual elimination of about 17 percent
of Russia's nerve agents and the validation of its technology. It
would not help eliminate the remaining 83 percent of Russia's
nerve agents, including the air- deliverable nerve agents that the
United States originally placed a higher priority on
destroying than the munitions at Shchuch'ye. DOD acknowledged that
Russia needs a large- scale infusion of funds from other nations
to fully implement its Chemical Weapons Convention obligations.
However, DOD stated that the report we suggest it provide to
Congress concerning such funding would penalize the project for
its current problems and could ultimately hurt efforts to obtain
foreign funds. It stated that tying the Secretary of Defense's
ability to obligate funds to
such a report would be ill- advised. DOD also suggested that
Russia's plans to enlarge the pilot facility could allow it to
eliminate Shchuch'ye's stocks within its Chemical Weapons
Convention deadline if the deadline is extended by 5 years and
that Russia's economy could recover sufficiently to allow Russia
to fund its chemical weapons elimination efforts. The Department
of State stated that the report that we had suggested would
needlessly slow the project without adding significantly to
available information.
We disagree with these critiques. According to DOD, it plans no
further fundling of chemical weapons distruction facilities beyond
the pilot plant at Schehuch'ye. Thus our suggestion is motivated
not by the pilot project's
current problems but by the fact that its benefits will be limited
to a relatively modest reduction of Russian nerve agent stocks
unless foreign governments begin committing funds on a scale that
they have yet to do. While a Russian economic recovery could allow
Russia to expand the pilot facility and build new facilities,
Russia's current and projected economic condition suggests that
such speculation is not a sound basis for near- term
B-282010 Page 20 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
U. S. decision- making. Because prospects for achieving
Shchuch'ye's broader objective of jump- starting Russia's
destruction of its entire stockpile appears to rest on the
possibility of support from countries other than the United States
or Russia, we believe that the Congress may wish to weigh the
likelihood of such support in considering this costly project. The
presentation of current and complete executive branch information
concerning this topic could therefore assist the Congress in this
decision.
We have modified the wording of the matter for congressional
consideration to clarify our intent.
DOD's and State's comments are reprinted in appendixes I and II.
The agencies also provided technical suggestions that were
incorporated where appropriate.
Scope and Methodology Our Mayak and Shchuch'ye assessments are
case studies utilizing extant
data and information. To assess the status and projected cost of
the Mayak facility, we interviewed officials of DOD's Threat
Reduction Policy Office, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency's
Cooperative Threat Reduction Office, the Army Corps of Engineers,
the Bechtel Corporation, and the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
We reviewed and analyzed current and past status and conference
reports, design documents, safety and thermal
analyses, and cost estimates concerning Mayak. We also interviewed
officials from Russia's Ministry of Atomic Energy and monitored a
2- day senior level conference near Washington, D. C., on Mayak's
prospects that was jointly sponsored by the Defense Threat
Reduction Agency and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy. The
conference included presentations by Russia's VNPIET design bureau
and South Urals Construction Company.
To assess the efforts being made to ensure that Mayak will store
materials from dismantled nuclear weapons safely and securely, we
interviewed DOD and other U. S. officials concerning the ongoing
transparency negotiations. We also reviewed the currently agreed-
upon language in the draft agreement.
To assess the Shchuch'ye project's current status, prospects for
completion, and potential cost to the United States, we
interviewed officials of DOD's Threat Reduction Policy Office, the
Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Cooperative Threat Reduction
Office, and the Army
Corps of Engineers. We reviewed and analyzed current and past
status and
Page 21 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
conference reports, design documents, and other analyses
concerning the project. To assess the Shchuch'ye facility's
potential impact on Russia's prospects for meeting its
international chemical weapons commitments, we reviewed the
provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention and identified the
specific milestones applicable to Russia, and reviewed CTR program
documents to determine the facility's planned date of initial
operations and its capacity. We also met with DOD and State
officials regarding other nations' assistance to Russia's chemical
weapons elimination effort.
We conducted our review from October 1998 through March 1999 in
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.
As agreed, we plan no further distribution of this report until 14
days from the date of the report, unless you publicly announce its
contents earlier. At that time, we will send copies of this report
to other congressional committees; the Honorable William Cohen,
Secretary of Defense; the Honorable Madeleine Albright, Secretary
of State; and the Honorable Jacob Lew, Director, Office of
Management and Budget. Copies will also be available to others
upon request.
This report was prepared under the direction of Harold J. Johnson,
Associate Director, International Relations and Trade Issues. If
you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, he
can be reached at
(202) 512- 4128. Major contributors to this report were Boris
Kachura, Pierre Toureille, and Michael Rohrback.
Henry L. Hinton, Jr. Assistant Comptroller General National
Security and International Affairs
Page 22 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Page 23 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense Appendi x I
See p. 18 See p. 18
Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 24 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
See p. 19 See p. 19 See p. 3
Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 25 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
See p. 19
Appendix I Comments From the Department of Defense
Page 26 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
See p. 3 See p. 16 See p. 8
Page 27 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
Appendix II Comments From the Department of State Appendi x I I
See p. 19 See comment 1.
Appendix II Comments From the Department of State
Page 28 GAO/NSIAD-99-76 Weapons of Mass Destruction
The following are GAO's comments on the Department of State's
letter dated March 16, 1999.
Comment 1. We have not reprinted the Department of State's
technical comments. We have incorporated these comments as
appropriate.
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